G.R. No.

L-64250 September 30, 1983

SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and ERLITO LORCA, petitioners, vs.
HON. LUIS L. VICTOR, Judge Presiding over Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, TIMOTEA T. MORALDE, CAYETANO T. MORALDE, JR., ALEXANDER T.
MORALDE, EMMANUEL T. MORALDE, and JOCELYN MORALDE ABELLANA,
respondents.

Facts:
Two cases were filed arising from the death of Cayetano P. Moralde, Sr. (Moralde) due to
the collision of two buses owned by petitioner Superlines Transportation Co., Inc. (STCI) and
Pantranco South Express, Inc. (PSEI). Case 1, the first case, is by STCI against PSEI, while Case
2, the second and on a later date, is by herein private respondents, heirs of Moralde against STCI.
The cases are filed before the RTCs of Quezon, Gumaca Branch and of Cavite City respectively.

STCI moved for the dismissal of Case 2 on the ground of pendency of Case 1, however,
Finding that the two cases (Civil Cases No. 1671-G and No. N-4338) involved different parties as
well as different causes of action, respondent Judge Luis Victor denied the motion to dismiss. The
Court of Appeals denied the case on appeal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Case 2 should be dismissed due to the pendency of Case 1.

Ruling:

Yes, since the right of private respondents to claim damages is founded on the same facts
involved in the Gumaca action, any judgment rendered therein will amount to res judicata in the
Cavite case, for whatever adjudication is made in the former case between Pantranco and
Superlines as regards either of the parties' culpability would set said issue at rest, however, a more
pragmatic solution is to consolidate the Gumaca case with the Cavite case because the respondents
will still be intervening in Case 1.

The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives
opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the
limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect
opportunity for the powers of the count to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice
between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action.

The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and
delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing
itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted
to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of
the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on
that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself
open to grave criticism