Robert D. Eldridge, Paul Midford (Eds.) - The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force - Search For Legitimacy-Palgrave Macmillan US (2017) PDF

The Japanese Ground
Self-Defense Force
Search for Legitimacy
Edited by Robert D. Eldridge
and Paul Midford
The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force
Robert D. Eldridge • Paul Midford
Editors
The Japanese Ground

Self-Defense Force
Search for Legitimacy
Editors
Robert D. Eldridge Paul Midford
Institute for International Policy Norwegian University for Science
Studies and Technology
Tokyo, Japan Trondheim, Norway
ISBN 978-1-137-56531-0 ISBN 978-1-137-55194-8 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8
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Preface
This project began more than a decade ago. Eldridge initially intended to
do a single-authored study surveying the history of the Japan Ground Self-
Defense Force (GSDF or Rikujō Jieitai or Rikuji for short), and brought
boxes upon boxes of the necessary documents and materials with him on
a one-year working sabbatical to Hawaii’s Camp Smith, where he served
as the first-ever Scholar-in-Residence at the headquarters of US Marine
Corps Forces, Pacific. The sabbatical began in the summer of 2004, which
corresponded to the fiftieth anniversary of the official establishment of
the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). While there, one of the key aspects of
his work was interfacing with the GSDF. A couple of months into the
sabbatical, however, he became more and more involved in policy work
and was not able to do all the research and writing on the GSDF that he
hoped to do when he set out for Honolulu. Upon returning to Japan and
Osaka University’s School of International Public Policy, where he was a
tenured associate professor at the time, he decided to organize a group
project to look at the history of the GSDF and expand it to include dis-
cussions of how the SDF/GSDF has come to interact with domestic soci-
ety (citizens, public opinion, and politics) and with international society
through an examination of the issues of civilian control, public opinion,
and operations, such as those in response to domestic natural disasters
and/or peace-keeping operations.
During this time, Eldridge was in the process of completing a co-edited
book with Midford on Japanese public opinion toward the war on ter-
rorism, and he asked him to join the new project about the GSDF as
a chapter contributor and co-editor of the eventual book. Eldridge also
v
vi Preface
invited Ayako Kusunoki, an expert on Japan’s early postwar defense pol-

icy, Tomoaki Murakami, a specialist on the SDF’s involvement in peace-
keeping operations, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance, Katsuhiro
Musashi, an expert on the legislation relating to the practice of civilian
control, and Giuseppe A. Stavale, a career US military officer and a Foreign
Area Officer specializing in Japanese defense issues. With this team of six
academic and professional experts in place, Eldridge decided to apply for
a Suntory Foundation grant, and upon successfully receiving it, officially
began the project in the fall of 2008, and following a successful first year,
applied for a second year of the grant in 2009.
The name of the project was nearly the same as this book title: “A
History of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force and its Search for
Legitimacy.” It employs both a political science and a historical approach,
and includes much public opinion data specifically about security issues
and the GSDF. Beyond these data, much of the research is based on inter-
views and access that some of the contributors had not only to members
of the GSDF, but also to officials from the other services as well of the
civilian governments of both Japan and the United States.
The reason Eldridge began this study and proposed the project had
to do with the fact that despite its being the numerically largest of the
three services, most heavily tasked, and operating primarily on Japanese
soil throughout much of the archipelago (being thus more visible to the
Japanese public than its sister services, which might be at sea or in the air),
the GSDF was probably the least discussed of the three services. This has,
of course, changed since the March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
and Tsunami, but fundamentally the GSDF remains little known domesti-
cally as well as internationally. This lack of knowledge, in fact, applies to
the SDF as a whole. One Japanese writer even went so far as to lament
“there are about 240,000 personnel making up the SDF, which is about
the same number of employees at Japan’s top companies like Toyota
Motors, or Panasonic Electric. It is also the largest group in Japan’s civil
service. Yet, we would venture to say the public does not really know who
makes up the SDF. At least, we do not know the men and women of the
SDF as well as we know those who work for Toyota or Panasonic.”1
A personal experience of one of the editors, Eldridge, found this to
be very much the case. Waiting at the arrival gate at Osaka International
Airport in Itami City in the early 2000s for a friend from the US Marine
Corps to land, he happened to be with an acquaintance from the GSDF
who worked in one of the many provincial liaison cooperation offices
Preface vii
around the country.2 While we were talking, a lady in her fifties walked up
and interrupted our conversation to ask him where such-and-such a gate
was within the airport building. Somewhat confused, he looked at her
without responding. She repeated her question again, and then, finally,
said in exasperation, “Well, you do work here, don’t you? You have a uni-
form on, after all.”
Some have believed that the public’s view has been even harsher.
Writing a few decades ago about perceptions in Japan, the late veteran
Japan scholar and journalist Frank Gibney wrote, “The Self-Defense
Forces in Japan are barely past the status of public embarrassment. Most
Japanese continue to think that a strong economy and a unified society are
worth more than numerous divisions. The need for armed forces may be
understood by some, but not by many.”3
While this book is not necessarily intended to help readers get to know
the individuals making up the SDF, or the GSDF in particular, it is the
first published book-length study of the GSDF with chapters written in
an interdisciplinary manner by individuals with intimate knowledge of the
GSDF and issues of public opinion and policy. This book also offers an
international perspective, with three of the authors being non-Japanese.
One of the reasons for this lack of understanding has to do with the
lack of scholarly books about the GSDF, particularly in English. This issue,
along with a review of the existing literature and an overview of the com-
position of this book, is discussed more in the Introduction.
Domestically, other reasons include the generally low defense conscious-
ness of the Japanese public due in part to decades of peace and prosperity,
and the lack of contiguous land borders with other countries that one
typically associates land forces. Moreover, with the SDF being the post-
war successors of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN), which wreaked havoc in much of Asia and the Pacific during
World War II, including within Japan in the process, citizens wanted to
limit the role, public or otherwise, the military would ever have in politics
and national decision-making. (The debate on the constitutionality of the
SDF and issues like civilian control is taken up in several chapters of the
book.)
The reasons for the lack of domestic attention toward the SDF may
be the same reasons, when inversed, as to why international attention
has not focused as much on the GSDF as it has on, for example, the
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF).4 Namely, Japan’s GSDF has been
little involved in international security issues, at least before the 1990s.
viii Preface
Moreover, due to the legacies of World War II, the role of the SDF in
postwar defense policy-making has been limited politically, institutionally,
and structurally, and thus has been of little interest to outside observers.
Although this is changing, uniformed officials often do not have a seat at
the table when important issues are discussed, and in some cases, senior
SDF officers are not known by their political leaders. The late Dr. Inoki
Masamichi, a professor emeritus of Kyō to University, former President of
the National Defense Academy (Bōei Daigakkō), and the founding presi-
dent of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (Heiwa Anzen Hoshō
Kenkyūsho), sadly noted in his memoirs that it was he who had to intro-
duce the prime minister to his own military deputy.5 The SDF continues
to be less-than-fully embraced both by the Ministry of Defense (MOD or
Bōeishō) and bureaucrats.
The change in government brought about by voters for the first time
in 2009 also posed challenges for the SDF and GSDF. As in many other
policy areas, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), by virtue of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP)’s almost unbroken fifty-year-plus monopoly on
power, came to power with few leaders experienced in governing and a
lack of deep contacts with the bureaucracy. Defense and the SDF were
no exception. The DPJ’s promise to the public to reduce the role of
bureaucrats in governing further exacerbated this situation,6 as did the
presence of the Social Democratic Party in the ruling coalition and among
the Cabinet members. DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio’s handling
of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma issue, namely his calling for
the air station’s relocation outside of Okinawa Prefecture against previous
government-to-government bilateral agreements, also invited serious con-
cern among alliance managers, including those within the SDF. On the
other hand, even as a left-of-center party, the DPJ was very different from
the old Japan Socialist Party of the Cold War era. It accepted the existence
of the SDF and its role in national defense and disaster relief. In con-
trast to the 1995 Kobe earthquake, in the wake of the 3/11 earthquake
and tsunami, DPJ-affiliated governors quickly requested SDF mobili-
zation, and Prime Minister Kan Naoto and Defense Minister Kitazawa
Toshimi quickly ordered the mobilization of the SDF, a mobilization
that grew into the largest in GSDF and SDF history. It was symbolic of
the GSDF’s and SDF’s integration into, and acceptance by, larger society
that the DPJ’s third Prime Minister, Noda Yoshihiko, was the son of a
GSDF member. Another indicator was that Noda’s final Defense Minister,
Morimoto Satoshi, was only the second former SDF member to have
Preface ix
served as defense minister.7 Expectations for an SDF-friendly government

were raised in late December 2012 when another change in government
brought the LDP back to power. However, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s
reinterpretation of the constitution and subsequent security legislation
that allows the SDF to engage in combat overseas in support of allies
under some circumstances was greeted with mixed reactions in the GSDF
and SDF, just as it was in society overall. Some SDF members were even
quoted as stating they did not join the SDF to do combat missions outside
of Japan, while a retired officer wore his uniform at a public demonstra-
tion and expressed his opposition to the legislation.
What comes of these moves remains to be seen, but the Abe adminis-
tration, which this book covers to some extent, is certainly promoting a
more robust defense posture and proactive security stance. We are happy
to be able to publish this book at this juncture of great security debate in
Japan.
Before we turn to the Introduction, the editors would like to
acknowledge the above-mentioned generous grant (“Jinbun Kagaku,
Shakai Kagaku ni Kansuru Gakusaiteki Guruupu Kenkyū Josei” or
Interdisciplinary Group Research in Humanities and Social Sciences
Grant) provided by the Suntory Foundation, one of Japan’s leading sup-
porters of research. Second, we all would like to express our appreciation
to our respective institutions and staff for their support of our project
and understanding. Third, we would like to thank the numerous men
and women within the GSDF who have participated in interviews and
provided documentation for our research. Where we could acknowledge
individuals, we have done so in the respective chapters. We would also
like to thank retired US Army Colonel Robert Loy, Dr. James Auer, Dr.
Iokibe Makoto, the late GSDF Lieutenant General (retired) Yamaguchi
Noboru, GSDF Lieutenant General (retired) Banshō Kōichirō, GSDF
Colonel (retired) Miki Hideo, GSDF Colonel Yamaguchi Kazunori, and
the public affairs staff at the Central Readiness Regiment, and many oth-
ers. Eldridge and Midford would like to thank Alisa Pulver and Palgrave
Macmillan for their generous support during the preparation of this
book. Finally, we would like to thank our families for their support.
Eldridge would like to thank his wife Emiko, daughter Ami, and son
Kennan, for all their love and support especially in our various moves
and position changes. Midford would like to thank Robert Eldridge,
Natsuyo Ishibashi, Marie Söderberg, Joe Stavale, and the Trondheim
Writers’ Circle members Jennifer Bailey, Torbjørn Knutsen, and Sabrina
x Preface
Ramet for their valuable comments on earlier versions of Chap. 7, and

Knutsen for his comments on the introductory chapter. Midford thanks
his family, especially his mother, Carol E. Midford, and late father, Dr.
Thomas Arthur Midford, for their unwavering support of his decision
to pursue an academic career. Midford would also like to use the occa-
sion of this book to thank and pay respect to students he has taught
who have gone on to serve in the GSDF, most notably Sakita Takayoshi.
Kusunoki thanks her parents. Stavale is appreciative of his wife and chil-
dren, and the men and women of the GSDF whom he served alongside
during Operation Tomodachi, “who inspired me in countless ways to
chronicle the history of the GSDF in a transparent manner. They served
their communities with zeal, dignity, and compassion. These sons and
daughters of Japan brought courage and hope to places surrounded in
despair. They, along with their countrymen, awed me in their resilience
and strength.” Musashi thanks his wife Atsuko and Mssrs Masuda Kazuo
and Aoyanagi Hajime, both of the MOD. Murakami expresses appre-
ciation to his deceased father (Murakami Yūzō), and two friends whom
he lost in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, Mori Wataru and Katō
Takamitsu.
Robert D. Eldridge
Paul Midford
Osaka and Trondheim
Note on Transliteration of Japanese
Words and Names
Long vowels are denoted with macrons: “ou” is rendered as “ō ,” “uu” as
“ū,” and so on. However, words commonly used in English (mostly place
names), follow conventional English spellings: Tokyo and Kyoto rather
than Tō kyō and Kyō to. Following Japanese convention, Japanese names
are rendered family name first, then given name: Kan Naoto, not Naoto
Kan. In the case of English-language publications, authors with Japanese
names follow the spelling in those publications, and are listed given name
first, family name last. The Japanese authors in this book are rendered
given name, then family name.
xi
About the Editors
Robert D. Eldridge is currently a visiting fellow with the Institute for

International Policy Studies in Tokyo, Japan. Formerly, he was the former
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, AC/S G-7 (Government and External
Affairs), Marine Corps Installations Pacific from 2009–2015. He was a
tenured Associate Professor at the School of International Public Policy,
Osaka University, from 2001–2009, during which time the book project
began, and a former Scholar-in-Residence at the headquarters of US
Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, at Camp Smith, Hawaii. He received his
PhD in Political Science from the Graduate School of Law, Kobe University.
He has published extensively on the dynamics of the US–Japan alliance
and the Okinawa issue including The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa
Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945–1952 (2001),
Post-Reversion Okinawa and U.S.-Japan Relations (2004), and The Origins
of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute (2013), and translated
the memoirs of Miyazawa Kiichi called Secret Talks between Tokyo and
Washington (2007), Iokibe Makoto’s edited volume, The Diplomatic
History of Postwar Japan (2010), Horie Yoshitaka’s memoirs Fighting
Spirit (2011), the memoirs of Colonel Frank Kowalski, An Inoffensive
Rearmament (2013), Watanabe Tsuneo’s book about factions called
Japan Backroom Politics (2014), Takashima Tetsuo’s Megaquake (2015),
which includes new material on the Great East Japan Earthquake and
Tsunami, and Watanabe Akio’s The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan
(2016). He also co-edited (with Paul Midford) the book Japanese Public
Opinion and the War on Terrorism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
xiii
xiv About the Editors
Paul Midford is Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian

University for Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim, and
Director of the NTNU Japan Program. He previously taught full-time at
Kwansei Gakuin University, Lafayette College, and Kanazawa University.
Midford received his PhD in Political Science from Columbia University
in 2001. He specializes in Japanese foreign and defense policies, and the
impact of public opinion on policy. Midford is co-editor with Robert
D. Eldridge of Japanese Public and the War on Terrorism (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008). He has published in International Organization,
Security Studies, Pacific Review, Asian Survey, Japan Forum, and
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. Midford has published
Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Realism to
Pacifism? (2011). His latest co-edited books are as follows: John
Campbell, Unni Edvardsen, Paul Midford, and Yayoi Saito, eds.,
Eldercare Policies in Japan and Norway: Aging Societies East and West
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); and Espen Moe and Paul Midford, eds.,
The Political Economy of Renewable Energy and Energy Security: Challenges
and National Responses in Japan, China and Europe (Palgrave Macmillan,
2014).
About the Contributors

Ayako Kusunoki is an associate professor at International Research
Center for Japanese Studies, and previously an associate professor, School
of International Studies at Kwansei Gakuin University, in Nishinomiya,
Japan. She earned her second of two MAs at the University of Southern
California and an MA and PhD at Kobe University. She is a specialist on
Japan’s postwar diplomatic and security policy, and her first book (in
Japanese), Yoshida Shigeru and the Making of Japan’s Postwar Security
Policy: The Interaction of Ideas for Peace and Stability between the United
States and Japan, 1943–1952, was published by Minerva Shobō in 2009.
Her most recent book, also in Japanese, is Senryōkara Dokuritsu e (From
Occupation to Independence), published by Yoshikawa Kō bunkan in
2013.
Tomoaki Murakami is an Associate Professor at the College of Liberal
Arts and Sciences, Mie University, in Tsu City, Japan, and formerly a post-
doctoral fellow at the Graduate School of International Relations,
About the Editors xv
Ritsumeikan University, in Kyō to. He was a researcher at the International

Peace Cooperation Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan, and at the Hyō go Earthquake Memorial 21st Century
Research Institute, in Kō be. He received his PhD in Political Science from
the Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kō be
University. He has written on diplomatic history about Japan’s foreign
policy toward United Nations Peace-keeping Operations, including
“Japan’s Participation in UN Peace-Keeping: 1950s–1990s,” Asahiko
Hanzawa (ed.), Japan and the UN in International Politics: Historical
Perspectives (2007) and “Japan and the Cambodian PKO: A Prototype for
Japanese Participation in International Peacekeeping,”Gunji Shigaku, Vol.
42, No. 3 (March 2007), both in Japanese.
Katsuhiro Musashi is Professor of Law and Policy at the School of Policy
and Management, Doshisha University, in Kyoto, Japan. After graduating
from the Faculty of Law, Kobe University, in Kobe, he served in the
Secretariat at the House of Councilors at the National Parliament in
Tokyo. He received his LLD from Kō be University in 1996, and PhD
from Osaka University in 2007. After teaching at Meijō University in
Nagoya from 1996 to 2004, he moved to the Doshisha University. He has
written on Japanese politics and the Constitution, including (in Japanese)
A Study of Contemporary Japanese Legislative Process (1995) and A Study
of Diet Member Bills (2003). In recent years, he has focused on the ques-
tion of civilian control and publishedThe Evolution of Civilian Control in
Japan after the Cold War, in Japanese in 2009 with Seibundō , and served
on the MOD’s Experts Advisory Panel on Ministry Reform in 2010.
Giuseppe A. Stavale is a career US Marine who has served at numerous
overseas locations including duty with the US Department of State at
embassies in Athens, Beijing, and Rome. He has served with foreign mili-
taries and participated in operations in Africa and in Iraq. He received his
master’s degree in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, and completed training as a Foreign Area
Officer specializing in Japan. He has published articles in the Yomiuri
Shimbun, Marine Corps Gazette, and Small Wars Journal. He has served in
several assignments throughout Japan and participated in Operation
Tomodachi. The views represented here in are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Navy, Marine
Corps, or the Department of Defense.
Contents
Preface V
Part I Overview of the GSDF 1
1 Introduction 3
Paul Midford and Robert D. Eldridge
2 Organization and Structure of the Contemporary

Ground Self-Defense Force 19
Robert D. Eldridge
Part II The History of the GSDF 57
3 The Early Years of the Ground Self-Defense Forces,

1945–1960 59
Ayako Kusunoki
4 The GSDF During the Cold War Years, 1960–1989 133

Robert D. Eldridge
xvii
xviii Contents
5 The GSDF During the Post-Cold War Years, 1989–2015 183

Giuseppe A. Stavale
Part III Civilian Control and the Search for Acceptance 231
6 The Ground Self-Defense Force and Civilian Control 233

Katsuhiro Musashi
7 The GSDF and Disaster Relief Dispatches 265

Tomoaki Murakami
8 The GSDF’s Quest for Public Acceptance and the

“Allergy” Myth 297
Paul Midford
9 Conclusion 347
Robert D. Eldridge and Paul Midford
Appendix 1361
Appendix 2363
Appendix 3367
Appendix 4371
Appendix 5373
Bibliography 375
Index 403
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Table comparing T/O sizes for brigades and divisions 33
Fig. 2.2 Table on reserve system 34
Fig. 5.1 1990 composition and disposition of the Japan GSDF’s five
regional armies and fourteen districts 185
Fig. 5.2 1990 GSDF’s core units 186
Fig. 5.3 Comparison of division to brigade restructuring in accordance
with the 1995 NDPO 198
Fig. 5.4 Progression of GSDF restructuring goals based on 1995 NDPO 200
Fig. 5.5 2011 composition and disposition of the GSDF’s five regional
armies and fifteen areas of responsibility 213
Fig. 5.6 Organization of the JTF-PDR operation SANGKAY 218
Fig. 5.7 Picture of JTF-PDR. Narrative: Joint Japan GSDF Philippines
military disaster relief team following Typhoon Sangkay 220
Fig. 5.8 Comparison of the GSDF organizational strength before and
requirements of the 2014 NDPG 221
Fig. 7.1 Disaster dispatches by GSDF from 1951 to 2012. This graph
was made by the author based on the annual Defense of Japan
and other materials in the National Archives of Japan. It does
not include figures for the response to the Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami 276
Fig. 7.2 How often do you see the SDF in your neighborhood? 277
Fig. 7.3 What things attract your attention about the SDF? (multiple
answers possible) 277
Fig. 7.4 In what connection have you seen reports about the SDF in
the media? (multiple answers possible) 278
Fig. 7.5 Why do you have a positive view of the SDF? (multiple answers
possible)278
xix
xx List of Figures
Fig. 7.6 Good image of the SDF vs HaDR as the SDF’s main
contribution up to now 279
Fig. 7.7 SDF international emergency missions based on the international
emergency assistance law 283
Fig. 8.1 Overall image of the SDF 298
Fig. 8.2 Asahi Shimbun poll: Does Japan need military forces? 301
Fig. 8.3 Mobilization of the SDF to counter riots and chaos? 304
Fig. 8.4 The SDF’s main role up to now? 306
Fig. 8.5 Primary role/duty of the SDF? 307
Fig. 8.6 Should the SDF train seriously for national defense? 308
Fig. 8.7 Views of GSDF strength 310
Fig. 8.8 Support for strengthening the three SDF services and fear of
entrapment in war 311
Fig. 8.9 SDF’s main duties after the Cold War 315
Fig. 8.10 How do you think Japan should cooperate with UNTAC? 321
Fig. 8.11 Support for overseas deployments of the SDF 323
Fig. 8.12 Yomiuri Shimbun: trusted institutions 333
List of Tables
Table 6.1 Numbers of the Ministries that all the past Administrative
Vice-Ministers of Defense originally belonged to,
1954–2015249
xxi
PART I
Overview of the GSDF

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Paul Midford and Robert D. Eldridge
The Challenges of Reputation and Relevance

in the Quest for Legitimacy
Japan’s land army is the largest of the three services comprising the post-
war Japanese military. The postwar military is known as the Japan Self-
Defense Force (JSDF, hereafter cited as the SDF), or Jieitai, and was
officially established on July 1, 1954.8 The Ground Self-Defense Force
(GSDF, in Japanese: Rikujō Jieitai, or Rikuji for short) grew to a peak of
180,000 authorized personnel, and as of March 2016 numbers, 150,863
men and women, or a little more than 61% of the overall SDF strength of
247,154. Despite its size, this land army by another name receives only
about one-third of the budget provided to the services, but it is often the
busiest of the three. As this book will show, the number, scale, and com-
plexity of its missions are only growing, yet the resources—both fiscal and
personnel—devoted to it are constantly being questioned.
Ever since its formal establishment, if not earlier when it was the land
component of the so-called National Safety Forces (Hoantai in Japanese),
the GSDF has strived to build its legitimacy as an accepted part of post-
war Japan. In so doing, it has faced the twin challenges of reputation and
relevance. The GSDF has faced a reputational challenge because of the
perception that it is a continuation of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA;
Dainippon Teikoku Rikugun), a military organization that through much
P. Midford R.D. Eldridge (*)
© The Author(s) 2017 3

R.D. Eldridge, P. Midford (eds.), The Japanese Ground Self-Defense
Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8_1
4 P. MIDFORD AND R.D. ELDRIDGE
of its behavior was largely discredited in Japan as much as it was in the rest
of Asia and beyond.9 Moreover, as the land army of an island nation that
possesses powerful naval and air power, and has been closely allied with
the global naval and air-power hegemon, the United States, the relevance
of the GSDF for national defense has thereby been obscured, and often
questioned.
More than the MSDF(Kaijō Jieitai), the ostensible descendent of the
IJN (Dainippon Teikoku Kaigun), the GSDF, as the ostensible descen-
dent of the IJA, has had to deal with the reputational after-effects of the
latter’s central role in subverting and ultimately overthrowing Taishō
Democracy,10 and then leading Japan into irrational overexpansion and
a self-destructive and self-defeating war.11 The ASDF(Kōkū Jieitai in
Japanese), on the other hand, has no pre-war predecessor, and is freer
of pre-war reputational baggage than even the MSDF. The GSDF thus
became the primary repository of public and elite fears about a renewed
breakdown of civilian control and democracy, and even renewed war.12
In response, the GSDF, and to a lesser extent the rest of the SDF,
has pursued two goals since their establishment: to convince ordinary
Japanese that they do not pose a threat to democracy or the wellbeing of
citizens, and second, that they could instead assume roles beneficial for
society. The former goal could not be taken for granted, for as Richard
Samuels has observed, “Clearly the balance of public opinion valued pro-
tection from overprotection by their military.”13 The latter could also not
be taken for granted, since in the early postwar years, GSDF members who
appeared in public wearing their uniforms risked being derided as “tax
thieves (zeikindorobo).”14
The GSDF’s attempt to overcome the reputational legacy of the pre-war
ground army and achieve domestic legitimacy has deeply influenced the
missions, the structure, and indeed the very name of this military organiza-
tion. A large share of the GSDF’s postwar operations can be classified as
confidence-building measures designed to convince the public that it poses
no threat, and can actually benefit them. The GSDF’s lead role in disaster
relief, and to a lesser extent civil engineering projects, Olympic Games sup-
port, and even riceplanting, can be seen as a long-term reassurance strategy
toward the Japanese public (see Chaps. 6 and, especially, 7 for more on
this). These chapters show that this strategy has succeeded, over time, in
replacing negative images of the pre-war IJA with positive, benign, and even
beneficial images of postwar Japan’s land army. This process has, in turn,
built legitimacy and acceptance of the GSDF among the Japanese public.
INTRODUCTION 5
At the same time, the GSDF has faced the challenge of relevance.
Being the land army of an island nation is never an enviable position to
be in from the perspective of budgetary and policy priorities, especially
given Japan’s formidable naval and air power. These facts, combined with
Japan’s close alignment with the US, the global maritime and air power
hegemon since the end of World War II, have long raised real questions
about the relevance of the GSDF for the defense of Japan. Questions of
relevance had a noticeable impact on GSDF morale during its first several
decades of existence. For example, when GSDF personnel were asked in a
1975 poll whether they believed their work was meaningful, just over 48%
answered “no”.15
The question of relevance has been reflected in inter-service rivalry. In
the early 1990s, a retired MSDF admiral told Midford that the GSDF was
not needed. When the then relatively recent forward deployment of the
GSDF to Wakannai on the northwestern tip of northern Hokkaido (on
the Japanese shore of the Soya or La Perouse Strait, opposite Sakhalin),
was mentioned to this officer,16 he responded that a Soviet (or Russian)
attempt to land an invasion force would be so decimated by the MSDF
and the ASDF that any surviving troops who made it ashore would be so
bedraggled that the Japanese police could simply arrest them. While this
boast in large measure reflected inter-service rivalry and MSDF bravado,
it also reflects the enduring military reality that the GSDF has generally
preferred not to acknowledge: the central GSDF mission of defending
against an amphibious invasion of the main Japanese islands only comes
into play if the MSDF and ASDF fail in their mission to destroy an inva-
sion force at sea or in the air. Even in the event of such a failure, it would
nonetheless be extremely difficult to put forces ashore in sufficient num-
ber to launch a serious invasion. No military power, with the exception
of the US, has possessed the amphibious assault capabilities and related
logistics to be able to attempt such an invasion. Nonetheless, large-scale
counter amphibious assault exercises focused on the main islands have
continued to be a major focus of GSDF exercises and weaponry (e.g. its
sizable force of main battle tanks), and the GSDF has strongly, and for the
most part successfully, resisted pressure to restructure into a force more
relevant to the potential threat.
Indeed, the GSDF has been the largest of the three services and has had
the largest share of the defense budget, despite the arguments of critics. In
2016, the GSDF received 35% of the defense budget, whereas the MSDF
received 25% and the ASDF received 23%, with the remainder of the bud-
get (17%) going to the MOD’s 16,000 civilian bureaucrats, maintenance

of defense facilities, and other items.17 The GSDF is also by far the largest
of the three services. As of March 2016, the GSDF had an average actual
strength of 139,858 personnel, versus 43,262 for the ASDF and 42,019
for the MSDF.18
On the other hand, amphibious assault capabilities to retake outlying
islands had not been a primary focus of the GSDF until recent tensions
with China, especially involving the disputed Senkaku islands (Mainland
China refers to these as the Diaoyu islands), prompted a decision to create
an elite dedicated-amphibious-assault unit within the GSDF patterned on
the US Marine Corps (see Eldridge Chap. 1 for more on this force). This
decision also reflects the declining dominance of the MSDF and ASDF
over regional rivals, most notably China, which means that the threat of
invasion to the Senkakus, and perhaps other outlying islands, might no
longer be subject to defeat before reaching land, or subsequently through
Japan’s total dominance of surrounding water and airspace.
A related challenge to the relevance of the GSDF is Japan’s close align-
ment with the US. With the US greatly reinforcing Japan’s air and sea
dominance over regional rivals, at least until recently, doubts about the
GSDF’s relevance as a force for defending Japan’s main islands has thereby
been exacerbated. Moreover, at least until 2010, Japan was implicitly rely-
ing on the US Marine Corps as a back-up to help it retake any remote
islands seized by hostile powers in case the MSDF and ASDF failed to stop
an invasion at sea.
The GSDF has responded to the challenge of relevance, in part, by
defying geopolitical facts and stubbornly asserting that even as the land
army of an island nation exceptionally well protected by sea and air forces,
the Japanese home island nonetheless faces a real risk of a large-scale
amphibious invasion, thereby justifying its existence with its present scale
and heavy weaponry (including hundreds of main battle tanks). More cru-
cial to the GSDF’s efforts to both demonstrate relevance and overcome
the reputational baggage of the IJA has been its “good works” in the form
of domestic disaster relief deployments and “civilian cooperation,” most
notably its role in dangerous and large civil engineering projects and its
suppport for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. Since the end of the Cold War the
GSDF’s prominent role in overseas disaster relief and disaster-relief-like
operations (the latter often being formally categorized as peace-keeping
operations) has offered the GSDF new theaters in which to demonstrate
its relevance and value. These good works have helped the GSDF build a
INTRODUCTION 7
good reputation domestically and internationally, helping to distinguish

it from the IJA. At the same time, these missions have demonstrated the
relevance and utility of the GSDF not only to Japanese citizens in particu-
lar, but also to overseas audiences.
Structure of the Book
This book seeks to answer three questions. How was the GSDF able to
emerge as the postwar successor of the IJA despite Japan’s war-renouncing
and anti-militarist constitution? How was the GSDF, despite the public’s
great initial skepticism and even hostility that greeted its creation, able
to build both domestic and international legitimacy? Finally, how has the
GSDF’s mission and organization evolved over the decades in response
to changes in the international and domestic environments in ways that
demonstrate its relevance and value? This book addresses these questions
by focusing on four different factors that have shaped the GSDF’s devel-
opment: changes in Japan’s geopolitical environment, civilian control,
disaster response, and public opinion.
This book is divided into three parts and nine chapters, including this
introduction chapter and the concluding chapter. Part One, which con-
sists of this chapter and the next chapter, provides an overview of the
GSDF. The next three chapters, comprising Part Two, detail the history
of the GSDF amid the development of Japan’s postwar defense policy
and security relationship with the US. It examines how the GSDF, dur-
ing its early years, was able to walk a fine line between questions about its
constitutional legitimacy and maintaining the ability to serve as a reliable
deterrent against internal instability and outside aggression. Part Three,
which also consists of three chapters, examines the application of civilian
control to the GSDF, domestic and international public opinion, and the
efforts of the GSDF to gain the support of domestic and international
society through domestic disaster relief, and peace-keeping and humani-
tarian operations abroad. A concluding chapter ends the volume.
Following this Introduction, Chap. 1, written by Eldridge, and entitled
“Organization and Structure of the Contemporary GSDF,” provides a
detailed empirical overview of the GSDF today, its leadership, organiza-
tion and structure, including units, ranks, missions, and budget. It also
examines the relationship of the GSDF with its sister organizations, the
ASDF and MSDF.
Chapter 2, written by Kusunoki and entitled, “The Early Years of the

Ground Self-Defense Forces, 1945–1960,” looks at the process by which
the GSDF was established, both legally and organizationally, and the
degree to which it came to be accepted politically and socially in its first
decade. The path from demilitarization as a result of its defeat in World
War II through the start of “remilitarization” through the creation of
the National Police Reserve following the start of Korean War and the
departure of many US forces from Japan to the Korean peninsula is intro-
duced in detail, as are the external factors and actors, such as Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur and his
staff, and internal actors, such as Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, his advi-
sors, and the Diet. Furthermore, Kusunoki examines the tensions that
arose between US demands for quicker rearmament during the 1950s,
and similar calls by former Japanese military professionals, versus domestic
doubts over the constitutionality of the SDF’s very existence. By not using
the nascent GSDF to put down disturbances at the time of the 1960 revi-
sion of the US–Japan security treaty, Kusunoki argues the GSDF, which
began focusing more on natural disasters and less on international security
(handled by the US), was able to keep its reputation clean and build the
foundation for greater public support.
Chapter 3, “The GSDF during the Cold War, 1960–1989,” written by
Eldridge, traces changes in the GSDF following the revision of the Japan–
US security treaty, its reorganization into five regional armies, and the
developments that took place through the second to fifth defense build-up
plans, including the deployment of GSDF units to Okinawa Prefecture as
a result of the reversion of administrative rights over the islands to Japan
in 1972, the era of détente in the 1970s and the start and end of the new
Cold War in the 1980s, as well as the creation of the first-ever National
Defense Program Outline (Bōei Keikaku no Taikō) in 1976. Moreover,
it looks at several challenges that emerged during this time, including a
war-gaming scenario that became public knowledge called the “Three
Arrows Study (Mitsuya Kenkyū),” the call to arms and subsequent sui-
cide of writer Mishima Yukio in the headquarters building of the Eastern
Army, a MiG25 incursion into Hokkaido and the subsequent resignation
in protest of the GSDF Chief of Staff over the government’s handling of
the incident, a shift in budgetary priorities to the other services, and the
dismissal of the Chief of the Joint Staff, who was of GSDF origins, for
comments about legal limitations on domestic operations that were con-
sidered inappropriate.
INTRODUCTION 9
In Chap. 4, entitled “The GSDF in the Post-Cold War Years,

1989–2014,” Stavale chronicles the reforms undertaken by the Government
of Japan and the GSDF from 1989–2014 in the transformed international
environment following the end of the Cold War. As a professional mili-
tary officer in the US Marine Corps—one of the GSDF’s two American
counterpart organizations—Stavale has lived some of these changes and
shares his insights into this process of reform. He observes that changes in
the GSDF have been the result of Japan’s reactions to events, rather than
being the product of proactive policy. A number of events, some frighten-
ing and tragic, acted as a forcing function on society to demand certain
capabilities and protections, and this motivated politicians, who were oth-
erwise disinclined to prioritize defense issues, by providing the political
cover needed to justify highly scripted reforms. His chapter describes sev-
eral trigger points, both international and domestic shocks that sustained
a steady evolution during the post-1989 period. Stavale shows that 1989
itself was a turning point by tracing the link between causes (domestic and
international events) and effects (reforms) on the GSDF. By comparison,
actors self-motivated to seek reform had relatively little impact on out-
comes. Stavale explains the cumulative significance of each reactive reform
and describes a maturing and increasingly capable GSDF.
Chapter 5 is entitled “The Ground Self-Defense Force and Civilian
Control,” and is written by Musashi, who served in the Secretariat of the
House of Councilors before becoming an academic. His chapter describes
changes in the exercise of civilian control over the GSDF as a result of
the end of the Cold War, and analyzes the underlying reasons for these
changes. After considering the influence of changes in the international
environment, and the relationship among respective defense ministers, the
civilian bureaucrat-run Internal Bureau of the MOD, and the uniformed
personnel of the SDF, as possible causes for change, Musashi looks at
how civilian control was impacted by the replacement of the long-standing
LDP coalition rule with the coalition rule of the DPJ, which succeeded in
removing the LDP from power almost (except for nine months) for the
first time since 1955. He looks at how this change in government, and the
DPJ’s tenure of three years and three months affected civilian control poli-
cies, especially in light of indications pointing to the SDF’s growing influ-
ence. Finally, Musashi examines how the second change in government,
this time from the DPJ back to the LDP at the end of 2012, affected the
debate on the best form of civilian control, culminating in the enactment
of major reform in 2015. This chapter uses previous research, oral his-
tories, and data on personnel working in the Internal Bureau to analyze

changes in the exercise of civilian control over time. Regarding DPJ rule,
this chapter uses press reports and the contents of internal discussions led
by Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi, for whom Musashi served as a
consultant, regarding the future direction of civilian control following the
DPJ’s assumption of power in 2009.
Responding to large-scale disasters has been a major role of the GSDF
almost since its creation, yet this role was only formally added as a core
mission of the GSDF following the end of the Cold War. This was a mis-
sion that the DPJ-led Kan Naoto cabinet especially had to rely upon in
the wake of the 3/11 Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami and nuclear
accident, as no other postwar government had.19As Murakami explains
in Chap. 6, “The GSDF and Disaster Relief Dispatches,” since its for-
mation, the GSDF has had no combat experience, but it has accumu-
lated a wealth of experience providing domestic disaster relief. Although
the SDF received much international attention following the March 11,
2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, when it mobilized
over 100,000 troops for disaster relief operations, this was by no means
the first time the GSDF has been mobilized for disaster relief. The GSDF
has been deployed many times for disaster relief since its inception in
1954, when then Prime Minister Yoshida sought to ground the GSDF’s
legitimacy in domestic disaster relief operations. Although the GSDF
thus became a global pioneer in making disaster relief a primary mission,
there has nonetheless been very little research on the GSDF’s role in
domestic disaster relief, a gap this chapter fills by examining its histori-
cal evolution in this role from the 1950s through the March 11 triple
disaster.
Chapter 7, “The GSDF’s Quest for Public Acceptance and the ‘Allergy’
Myth,” draws on Midford’s long research on Japanese public opinion and
extensive polling data to examine how the GSDF, and more broadly the
SDF, have fared in their attempt to achieve legitimacy and public accep-
tance for their existence. Starting with the large-scale mobilization of
the GSDF for disaster relief following the Ise Bay typhoon of September
1959, the GSDF was able to build legitimacy and public acceptance by
focusing on domestic disaster relief operations and “civilian cooperation”
operations such as supporting the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, road construc-
tion, and even rice farming. So successful were these efforts that a large
and stable majority of the Japanese public had a positive image of the
SDF already by the second half of the 1960s. To a significant extent, the
INTRODUCTION 11
GSDF in particular gained an image among the Japanese public as being

the leading disaster relief force. Nonetheless, the public continued to rec-
ognize territorial defense as the primary reason for the SDF’s existence.
The popularity built through domestic disaster relief in turn paved the way
for the GSDF, with the support of the MSDF and ASDF, to win public
acceptance for overseas deployments, ostensibly for peace-keeping opera-
tions. In reality, however, these peace-keeping operations were limited to
humanitarian relief operations, such as water purification and medical ser-
vices, and to reconstruction and development projects, operations that
closely resemble the GSDF’s domestic disaster relief operations. These
missions in turn achieved great popularity so long as they remained clearly
separated from combat or from supporting the conduct of combat opera-
tions by other militaries. Midford concludes that recurring discourses
about the public’s “allergy” toward the SDF are little more than a myth.
The public continues to oppose overseas combat operations, especially
for the GSDF, not because of a lack of trust or support for the SDF, but
because the public believes overseas and offensive military operations have
little utility for Japan.
The concluding chapter is co-authored by Midford and Eldridge and
draws some tentative conclusions about the GSDF, just after the 60th
anniversary of its official establishment in 2014. It highlights some of
the known plans of the GSDF’s immediate future and some of the chal-
lenges it will face doctrinally and in personal, budget, equipment, and
public support. It will also relate the ongoing discussion about revision
versus reinterpretation of the constitution regarding the right to collective
self-defense.
This is a path-breaking study, the first book-length study of the GSDF
in English.20 Even in Japanese, there are surprisingly few comprehensive
analyses of the GSDF, and fewer histories. A title search of rikujō jieitai
on WorldCat turned up several dozen books. A few dozen were pictorial
books and public relations books,21 and several dozen books were on the
GSDF’s main weapons systems, especially tanks.22 Two were significant
books focusing on GSDF deployments for domestic disaster relief and
civilian cooperation, most notably support for Olympic Games held in
Japan.23 There were three notable works offering partial histories of the
GSDF,24 including one that compares it with the Imperial Japanese Army
(IJA). There are two notable works focusing on the GSDF’s military capa-
bilities, the most recent being from 1997.25 There are three significant
books offering a comprehensive analysis of the GSDF as a land army.26
This book on the ground army of the world’s third largest economic
power is especially timely for three reasons. First, the resurgence of tensions
in Northeast Asia, particularly over territorial disputes between Japan and
all of its neighbors, and the greater emphasis recent Japanese governments
have placed on using the GSDF for defending Japan’s control of disputed
and outlying islands are driving media coverage and academic and special-
ist interest in Japan’s ground forces. Second, the March 11, 2011, Great
East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami has focused global attention on the
GSDF as Japan’s lead disaster relief organization. As we show in this book,
the GSDF has been a global pioneer as one of the first military organiza-
tions to emphasize disaster relief as a central and large-scale mission. More
and more militaries throughout the world are following suit by increasing
the centrality of Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HaDR) as a mission.
The GSDF can offer these other militaries important lessons on how this
is done.
Third, as has been widely reported in the global media, Japan’s conser-
vative Prime Minister Abe Shinzō reinterpreted the constitution in 2014
to allow Japan, under some conditions, to exercise the right of “collective
self-defense,” (shūdanteki jieiken) meaning that it could defend allied (or
semi-allied) nations that come under attack. In 2015, he introduced legis-
lation that would create a legal framework for the SDF to engage in over-
seas combat under some circumstances, and would also make it easier for
the SDF to provide logistical support to multilateral coalitions. Given that
even these relatively modest measures face a Japanese public that is over-
whelmingly opposed to the use of military force overseas, it remains to be
seen to what extent the SDF’s overseas operations will actually expand.
The prospect of the GSDF conducting combat on foreign soil is especially
unpopular. This volume helps to elucidate the factors that influence the
likelihood and scope of expanded GSDF and SDF operations overseas.
Notes
1. Ogawa Kazuhisa, ed., RikujōJieitai no Sugao (Tokyo: Shō gakukan,
2009), p. 18.
2. The Provincial Liaison Office (PLO or Jieitai Chihō Renrakubu) is
now called the Provincial Cooperation Office (Jieitai Chihō
Kyōr yoku Honbu). There are fifty offices around the country—one
for each prefecture located in each capital city, and four for the
much geographically larger Hokkaido, to include one in Sapporo.
INTRODUCTION 13
3. Frank Gibney, “The View from Japan,”Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50,

No. 10 (October 1971), p. 108.
4. As discussed in the Introduction, several historical books have been
written specifically about the MSDF. None have yet to appear on
the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) in English.
5. Inoki Masamichi, Watashi no 20 Seiki: Inoki Masamichi Kaikoroku
(Tokyo: Sekai Shisōsha, 2000), p. 362.
6. This was a popular conservative idea during this period. The neo-
liberal Your Party (Minna no tō) and neo-liberal LDP members
close to former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō were even stron-
ger critics of the influence of unelected bureaucrats on policy than
was the DPJ.
7. The first was Nakatani Gen, a former GSDF member who became
Defense Minister in April 2001, and again in December 2014.
8. The SDF, which also includes the MSDF and ASDF, was officially
established on July 1, 1954, and succeeded the National Safety
Force (NSF) (established on October 15, 1952). The NSF, or
Hoantai, in turn, succeeded the National Police Reserves (NPR;
or Kokka Keisatsu Yobitai), established by General Douglas
A. MacArthur, on July 8, 1950, upon the outbreak of the Korean
War. Some in the SDF and Japanese government therefore trace
the founding anniversary of the SDF to 1950, not 1954.
9. In terms of military organizational lineage, one could argue that
the GSDF, and indeed the SDF overall, is more accurately consid-
ered an organizational offspring from the US military, or to iden-
tify the pre-war IJA and the US military as sharing parenthood of
the SDF. Regarding the tensions that its lineage to the IJA and the
US military create for the GSDF’s organizational identity, see
Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular
Culture in the Japanese Army (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2007).
10. The overthrow occurred gradually during the first decade or so of
the Shō wa era. On Taishō democracy, see the chapter by Shuichi
Kato, “Taisho Democracy as the Pre-Stage for Japanese Militarism,”
in Ann Waswo, et. al., eds., Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taisho
Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), and
this edited volume more generally.
11. See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International
Ambition (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991) for
an explanation of the causes of Japan’s over-expansion and its

degree of expansion compared with other over-expanders. For an
account of how over-expansion undermined Japan’s military–
industrial base, see Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total
War: The Search for Economic Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1987).
12. Regarding these fears, see Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Explaining

Japanese Anti-militarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on
Japan’s Security Policy,” International Security 35, no. 2 (Fall
2010), pp. 123–160; Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public
Opinion: From Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2011), Chap. 2; and Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to
Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Antimilitarism,” International
Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119–150; and Berger,
Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and
Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1998). The latter argues
that the military was scapegoated by other elites who had earlier
supported Japan’s imperial expansion.
13. Richard Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and The
Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007),
p. 49.
14. Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors, p. 29, who finds that some GSDF
members still felt that the public regarded them this way as
recently as 2001. Also see Aaron Skabelund, “Public Service/
Public Relations: The Mobilization of the Self-Defense Forces for
the Tokyo Olympics,” in William M. Tsutsui, and Michael
Baskett, eds., The East Asian Olympiads, 1934–2008: Building
Bodies and Nations in Japan, Korea, and China (Boston: Brill,
2011), p. 64.
15. See Defense of Japan, 1976, Japan Defence Agency, Tokyo, pp. 59,
118.
16. For the argument that the Soviets were planning to invade and
occupy at least the Wakannai peninsula in Northwestern Hokkaido
during a super-power conflict to ensure control of the Soya Straits,
made by the GSDF officer who recommended forward deploy-
ment of the GSDF to Wakannai, see Shigeki Nishimura, “The
Change of Military Situations in the Far East and Its Implications
for Japan,” a discussion paper prepared for a Joint Meeting of the
INTRODUCTION 15
United Nations Association of the USA and the Asia Pacific

Association of Japan, May 28–29, 1986, New York City.
17. Defense of Japan 2015, Fig.III-1-3-3.A decade earlier, in 2005, the
GSDF had received a slightly larger slice of the budget pie, or
37.8%.
18. See Bōeihakusho 2016, shiryō 16, Jieikan no teininoyobigenin
(March 31, 2016). The GSDF thus filled 91.9% of its authorized
strength of 150,863, nearly the same rate as the ASDF at 91.7%,
but a bit below the MSDF at 92.7%. Overall, the three services,
including those in the Joint Staff Office, had an actual total of
226,742, versus an authorized total of 247,160, meaning that
91.7% of authorized strength for the three services overall was
filled.
19. For an account of the DPJ’s handling of the disaster, see Richard
J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2012). Also see Yuki Tatsumi. Great Eastern
Japan Earthquake: “Lessons Learned” for Japanese Defense Policy,
(Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2012).
20. Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors, largely focuses on the GSDF, but is
ultimately about gender in the Japanese military and broader soci-
ety, rather than a look at the GSDF itself. On this point, see Alessio
Palatano, “Book Review: Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and
Popular Culture in the Japanese Army,” International Relations of
the Asia Pacific 10 (2010), pp. 543–551.
By comparison, there are three book-length studies about the
MSDF in English: James E. Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of
Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–1971 (New York: Praeger, 1971);
Peter J. Woolley, Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971–2000
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reiner, 2000); and Alessio Patalano,
Post-war Japan as a Sea Power: Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience
and the Making of a Navy (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). There
are, to our knowledge, no book-length studies about the ASDF in
English.
21. Representative examples include Asagumo Shimbun sha,

Henshūkyoku, ed., Haran no Hanseiki: rikujō jieitai no 50 nen
(Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 2000); Yasuhiro Shimada,
Tatakau! Reikujō jieitai (Tokyo: Takarajimasha, 2004), which is
a mook; Kikuo Yamazaki, Rikujō jieitai Shashin Chūtai yomoyama
monogatari (Tokyo: Kōjinsha, 2007); and Rikujō jieitai seisaku

kyōr yoku, Kanzen micchaku kore ga hontō no rikujō jieitai
(Tokyo: Mediasofuto, 2015), which is part pictorial part public
relations.
22. This class significantly overlaps with the pictorial and public relations
genre. Representative examples include Rikujō jieitai supa baiburu-
kore ga tatakau jieitais haryō da (Tokyo: Kō dansha, 2001), a Mook
focusing on vehicles; Hiroshi Saitō, Rikujō jieitai sharyō
sōbishi-1950–1981 (Tokyo, SenshaMagazin, 1991), a picture book
focusing on GSDF vehicles; Rikujō jieitai saishin heiki: kindai meka
to sono senryoku no subete (Tokyo: Futabasha, 1981); Shin Hirata,
Hiroshi Tsubota, eds., Rikujō jieitais haryō kaki no jissha kunren
(Arugonoto 2014), which focuses on live fire exercises; and Hiroaki
Kimoto, Sensha taichō: rikujō jieitai no kikō butai o shiki suru (Tokyo:
Kō jinsha, 2012); which focuses on GSDF tanks; and Hiroaki
Kinoshita, Rikujō jieitai paffekutto gaido 2008–2009 (Tokyo:
Gakken, 2008), an annual guide pictorial with some information
about the GSDF’s organization, weapons, and so on.
23. Morioka Taimususha, ed., Arigatō Jieitai: yūshitachi: Rikujō jieitai
Iwate chūtonchi, Higashi Nihon daishinsai“saigai haken”kirokushū
(Morioka: Morioka Taimususha, 2011), a book about GSDF
troops dispatched from a base in Iwate to provide disaster relief
after the March 11 quake and tsunami; and Hokushin Rokaru
Shuppan Senta, Nagano toki iorinpikku pararinpikku o sasaeta
rikujo jieitai dai12 shidan taiintachi no kiroku (Hokushin Rokaru
Shuppan Senta, no date), which focuses on the support a GSDF
division provided to the Nagano Olympics.
24. Asagumo Shinbunsha Henshūkyoku, Rikujōjieitai ni jūnen nenpyō
(Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1971); a chronology covering the
first 20 years of the GSDF; Reiichi Horie, Nobutaka Yamamura,
Kayoko Kikuchi, Dokyumento Jieitai: Rikujō jieitai hen (Tōkyō:
Bungei Shunjū, 1996); an anthology of major documents related
to the GSDF’s history; and Kyūdai Mineo, Kōbun Yuruki, Nihon
no guntai manyuaru-Teikoku rikugun to rikujyō
jieitai “Sentōr yoku” no hikaku kenshō (Tokyo: Kōjinsha (2002),
which compares the GSDF with the IJA.
25. Yomiuri Shimbunsha, Rikujō jieitai: chij ō senryoku no zenyō
(Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1987); Morino Gunjiken kyūjo,
INTRODUCTION 17
ed., Jisedai no rikujyō Jieitai-shōraisen o kaku tatakau (Tokyo: Kaya

shobō , 1996).
6. Yoshifusa Amano, Kaisō no rikujō jieitai (Tokyo: Gunji Kenkyūsha,
2
1970); Kazuhisa Ogawa, Rikujōjieitai no sugao (Tokyo: Shōgakkan,
2009); Kōtarō Kamei, Rikujō jieitai futsūka rentai: Mononofu
gunzō (Tokyo: Kaya Shobō, 2013).
CHAPTER 2
Organization and Structure
of the Contemporary Ground
Self-Defense Force
Robert D. Eldridge
Position of the GSDF in National Defense Policy

The Defense Agency Establishment Law (Bōeichō Secchihō) and the com-
panion Self-Defense Forces Law (Jieitaihō) of June 9, 1954, established
the framework for the modern defense establishment which Japan, with
some revisions along the way, still uses today.1 The mission of the Defense
Agency (Bōeichō), which became the Ministry of Defense (MOD; Bōeishō)
on January 9, 2007, was (and is) “to preserve the peace and indepen-
dence and to maintain the security of our nation. For this purpose, it shall
control and operate the Ground Self-Defense Forces, the Maritime Self-
Defense Forces, and the Air Self-Defense Forces … and to perform func-
tions related thereto.”2 Administratively, the Minister of Defense (Bōei
Daijin), formerly the Director General of the Defense Agency (Bōeichō
Chōkan), is responsible for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) on a daily basis,
but operationally the Prime Minister has the authority to be commander
in chief (saikō shikikanken) as per Article 7 of the SDF Law.3 His orders are
given through the Defense Minister.
R.D. Eldridge (*)

Institute for International Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8_2
20 R.D. ELDRIDGE
The 1954 SDF Law saw the creation of three services—the Ground
Self-Defense Forces (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF), and
Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF)—each headed by a service chief. The total
number of SDF personnel authorized at the time in 1954 was 152,115.4
The highest number of authorized personnel reached 274,652 for SDF
personnel between 1990 and 1993.5 Today (as of March 31, 2015), the
authorized strength is 247,160.6
With no conscription in postwar Japan (as per Article 18 of the
Constitution, which went into effect in May 1947) and employing an
all-volunteer force, the SDF has had to continuously compete with the
private sector and other organizations in the public sector when recruiting
its personnel. As a result, its actual strength has never reached full capacity,
with the highest being 247,191, or about 27,000 short of the authorized
strength of 273,801, in 1988.
The GSDF, being a ground army, is the largest of the services with an
actual strength today of 138,610 men and women, followed by the ASDF,
with 43,027, and then the MSDF, with 42,052.7 The GSDF’s authorized
strength is 150,863, and thus the GSDF is at 91.9 percent of its staffing
goal, which is slightly under the cross-service average of 92.1 percent as
of March 2016. Actual strength for the GSDF reached 156,216 in 1990.
During the 1990s and 2000s, the actual strength fluctuated in the low
150,000s and mid-140,000s, and first dipped below 140,000 in 2007.
Regarding the SDF as a whole, officers comprise 42,478, with war-
rant officer equivalents numbering 4491, sergeant equivalents at 137,898,
and enlisted at 42,472. However, when compared to the authorized
strength, the actual strength of the enlisted, which is 75.0 percent of
their quota, suggests they are having trouble filling the SDF with good
men and women, a historical challenge.8 (The numbers of females in the
SDF is a mere fraction. Of the above number of officers to enlisted, the
female numbers portions are respectively: 2118; 39; 7613; and 3706).9
The SDF as a whole, and the GSDF, in particular, tends to be top-heavy,
having a large number of officers relative to enlisted personnel.10 Although
not published, as of March 2015, the GSDF has approximately 120 gen-
eral officers, 1000 colonels, 2300 lieutenant colonels, 5000 majors, and
15,000 captains to second lieutenants.11 The same is likely true for 2016.
The Ground Staff Office (GSO), or Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbu (abbrevi-
ated in Japanese as Rikubaku), is responsible for supporting the defense
minister in areas of defense relating to the mission of the GSDF, work-
ing closely (but sometimes at odds) with the Internal Bureau (Naikyoku),
ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE CONTEMPORARY GSDF 21
which directly supports the civilian minister of defense. Currently, there

are approximately 900 men and women working in the GSO, 250 of
whom are civil servants.12 The GSO occupies approximately six floors of
the new MOD building in Ichigaya (otherwise known as Camp Ichigaya),
which moved from the Roppongi area (Camp Hinokichō ) of Tokyo in the
spring of 2000.13
The GSO is headed by the Chief of Staff (COS), GSDF, or Rikujō
Bakuryōchō (abbreviated in Japanese as Rikubakuchō), who is a full general
(four stars), and a Vice COS (Rikujō Bakuryō Fukuchō), who is a lieutenant
general (three stars). Fourteen of the thirty-five GSO COSs have gone on to
become the COS, Joint Staff (JS; Tōgō Bakuryōchō), of which there have been
thirty-one.14 Most recent was Oriki Ryōichi, who served from March 2009
to January 2012 in the joint capacity, and from March 2007 to March 2009
as COS, GSO. Probably the most well-known COS, JS, who originated
from the GSO was Kurisu Hiromi, whose comments to the media in the
late 1970s about the extra-legal roles of the SDF in a national crisis became a
political issue causing him to be relieved. He subsequently became a prolific
writer on defense issues. (Kurisu’s comments are discussed more in Chaps. 3
and 5.) The previous COS of the GSO, General Iwata Kiyofumi, is the first
one to have served as the Vice COS, Joint Staff Office (JSO; Tōgō Bakuryō
Fukuchō), a position created in March 2006, suggesting the importance the
Japanese government is placing on joint experience. Along these lines, two
leading candidates to replace Iwata were Lieutenant General Isobe Kōichi, a
1995 graduate of the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College (CSC),
who once served as the Vice COS, JSO, and his rival, Lieutenant General
Banshō Kōichirō, who studied in 1999 at the US Army War College, has
only had experience within the GSDF but has worked hard to promote
jointness in the amphibious arena and bilateral cooperation (with the United
States) and international cooperation in his unit’s work in rebuilding efforts
in Iraq. Eventually the assignment went to the current COS, Okabe Toshiya,
who was is the second one to serve as Vice COS of the JSO.
The GSO COSs since General Shima Atsushi, who served as the 22nd
GSO COS from March 16, 1990, to March 16, 1992, have all been graduates
of the National Defense Academy (NDA; Bōei Daigakkō) in Yokosuka City,
Kanagawa Prefecture.15 As seen in the figure below, prior to this, with the
exception of three GSO Chiefs, all were graduates of the Imperial Japanese
Army Academy (Rikugun Shikan Gakkō) or Tokyo Imperial University
(Tōkyō Teikoku Daigaku).16 Former NDA President Inoki Masamichi was
highly critical of the over-dependence on one school to train the future lead-
22 R.D. ELDRIDGE
ers of the SDF. He wrote, “the complete monopolizing of the leadership of

the JSO, GSO, Maritime Staff Office, and Air Staff Office by graduates of
the National Defense Academy” is far too narrow of a set of experiences and
education, much like the prewar when the Imperial Army (Dainippon Teikoku
Rikugun) and Navy (Dainippon Teikoku Kaigun) each had its respective
institutions from which the leadership exclusively came.17 A similar tendency
can be seen at the GSDF Officer Candidate School (Kanbu Kōhosei Gakkō),
first established in 1954 and located in Kurume City, Fukuoka Prefecture, in
which NDA graduates seem to have the edge due to the camaraderie built
up as a result of the NDA alumni system and the fact that until 2007, gradu-
ates from civilian universities were segregated in a separate program.18
Several of the Chiefs of the GSO have studied abroad at one point,
usually in the United States at the Army Command and General Staff
College or the Army War College. The late General Kimizuka Eiji, for
example, who headed the relief efforts after the March 11, 2011, Great
East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, graduated from the above US Army
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in June 1991, attend-
ing school with General Vincent K. Brooks (commanding general, US
Army Pacific) and Major General James C. Boozer, Sr. (commanding
general, US Army Japan and I Corps [Fwd]), who served in those posi-
tions at the same time that Kimizuka was COS, as well as the former
president of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, whose country was
also racked by a major earthquake and tsunami just nine weeks after the
latter took office.19 The chance to study abroad is a prized one, as it is only
the elites of the SDF who are able to live abroad or even really pursue any
further studies at all, in contrast, for example, with the US military which
tries to provide higher education chances to all of its members.20
In order to ensure civilian control, in light of the fears of a resurgence
of the Imperial Japanese Army leaders, four of the first eight GSO Chiefs
were provided by the Home Ministry (Naimushō). The other four had
military backgrounds in the Imperial Army. The last of those with an
Imperial Army background, General Nakamura Morio, who had just fin-
ished his military schooling when World War II ended, was appointed
COS in July 1984 and served until March 1986.
The COS is formally chosen by the defense minister, through the
issuance of a personnel order (Jinji Hatsurei). When choosing a COS,
the Personnel Department (Jinjibu) of the GSO provides its nomina-
tions, which is said to often reflect the thinking of the incumbent COS,
to the Internal Bureau of the Defense Ministry. While it will consider
the recommendations of the GSO, the powerful Internal Bureau may

have its own ideas on whom to nominate. If there is no discrepancy
between the two entities—military and civilian—the current COS’
nomination may very well carry the day, and the Defense Minister may
act on that recommendation. However, sometimes the Minister may
make his or her own decision, as in the case of Lieutenant General
Kimizuka, who was named by then Defense Minister Kitazawa to serve
as COS of the GSO in August 2011 and promoted to full General, fol-
lowing his efforts as the postwar Joint Task Force (Tōgō Ninmu Butai)
commander in the wake of the March 11 disaster, and continued until
July 2013.
The GSO COS is supported by a Vice COS, or Rikujō Bakuryō
Fukuchō. There have been 51 Vice Chiefs to date since July 1, 1954.
Twenty of them went on to become COS. Six were promoted immedi-
ately, and the remainder after serving in at least one other position, such
as Commanding General of Eastern Army (EA). Twenty-five of the Vice
Chiefs were graduates of the NDA, but this number is misleading in that
it was only from the mid-1980s that those graduates were eligible for the
position, from a practical point of view (age, seniority, and experience). If
the focus were narrowed to the period from the mid-1980s when the last
Imperial Army Academy graduate, Hisayama Tatsuji, served as Vice COS,
then twenty-two of the thirty men have been NDA graduates, despite the
warnings by former NDA President Inoki, who passed away in November
2012 at the age of ninety-eight, about not having enough diversity within
the military leadership. Incidentally, sixteen of the first twenty-one Vice
Chiefs were graduates of the Imperial Army Academy.
There are ten departments within the GSO, each headed by a major
general. These are the Personnel Department, mentioned above,
the Comptroller Department (Kanribu), Operations Support and
Intelligence Department (Unyō Shien-Jōhōbu), Policy and Programs
Department (Bōeibu), Logistics Department (Sōbibu), Education and
Training Department (Kyōiku Kunrenbu), Medical Department (Eiseibu),
Inspector General (Kansatsukan), Judge Advocate General (Hōmukan),
Inspector (Kansatsukan), and Military Police General (Keimu Kanrikan).
With the exception of the last four departments, each department has
two to seven divisions or sections with it. The Comptroller Department
includes the Administration Division (Sōmuka) and the Finance Division
(Kaikeika). The Personnel Department consists of the Personnel Planning
Division (Jinji Keikakuka), Assignment Division (Honinka), Recruiting
24 R.D. ELDRIDGE
and Career Transition Division (Boshū Engoka), and Welfare Division

(Kōseika). The Operations Support and Intelligence Department has
three divisions: Operations Support Division (Unyō Shienka), Intelligence
Division (Jōhōka), and Foreign Liaison Section (Bukan Gyōmuhan). The
Policy and Programs Department includes the Policy and Programs
Division (Bōeika) and the Research and C4 Systems Division (Jōhō Tsūshin
Kenkyūka). Within the Logistics Department are found the Logistics
Management Division (Sōbi Keikakuka), Ordnance and Chemical
Division (Buki Kagakuka), Communications and Electronics Division
(Tsushin Denshika), Aircraft Division (Kōkūkika), Quartermaster Division
(Juhinka), Engineer Division (Shisetsuka), and Material Research and
Development Division (Kaihatsuka). Finally, the Education and Training
Department includes the Education and Training Programs Division
(Kyōiku Kunren Keikakuka) as well as the Education and Training
Division (Kyōiku Kunrenka). Each of the above divisions, including the
Foreign Liaison Section, is headed by a colonel.
Nationally, there are five army headquarters—Northern Army (NA;
Hokubu Hōmentai, with its headquarters located in Sapporo, Hokkaido
Prefecture, at Camp Sapporo), Northeastern Army (NEA; Tōhoku
Hōmentai, which is located in Sendai, Miyagi Prefecture, at Camp
Sendai), Eastern Army (EA; Tōbu Hōmentai, located in Nerima Ward,
Tokyo, at Camp Asaka on the border of Saitama Prefecture), Middle Army
(MA; Chūbu Hōmentai, located in Itami, Hyō go Prefecture, at Camp
Itami), and Western Army (WA; Seibu Hōmentai, located in Kumamoto
City, Kumamoto Prefecture, at Camp Kengun). Their respective areas of
defense responsibilities appear in the map below.
Each of the regional army headquarters is led by a lieutenant general,
who serves as Commanding General (Sōkan). Under him21 are a COS
(Bakuryōchō), who is a major general, and two Deputy COSs (Bakuryō
Fukuchō), responsible for administration (gyōsei) and operations (bōei)
respectively, who are also major generals. Each of the divisions—kansat-
sukan, sōmubu, chōsabu, bōeibu, sōbibu, which are like US military “G”
sections—a G-1, G-2, G-3, and so on—are headed by colonels. These
sections, which include many civilians such as a political advisor, can be
described as a “mini-GSO” for their respective regional armies.22 Some
GSDF personnel in divisions and brigades below these staffs have said
cynically that the “mini-GSO” appellation also means that there is a ten-
dency for these regional army headquarters to become bureaucratic, just
like the main GSO in Ichigaya, for which they are worried about the ability
to proactively deal with potential crises ahead of time.23
The commanding general of each regional army headquarters is respon-
sible for operations. Under each of these headquarters are at least one
division (shidan) and one brigade (ryodan). Some, like in Hokkaido with
NA and in Western Japan with MA, have had several divisions under their
command at one point. All are responsible for defense and disaster relief
operations on land in their respective areas, a topic discussed in detail in
Chap. 6. While these are generally small geographic regions (compared to,
e.g., the United States III Marine Expeditionary Force’s area of responsi-
bility being 52 percent of the earth’s surface) considering the size of Japan
to begin with, the area of responsibility goes from coast to coast (i.e., the
Pacific Coast to the Sea of Japan side) and challenges on one side will
bring opposite challenges on the other, to include handling refugees from
the opposite coast affected by an invasion or natural disaster or physically
going to respond and lend assistance.
NA, which is primarily responsible for the defense of Hokkaido and
disaster relief operations there, was established in October 1952. Its insig-
nia, or butaishō, is an outline of the island of Hokkaido with a green back-
ground, representing the outdoors and nature of the island. In light of
the Soviet threat, it traditionally had been the largest of the five armies. At
the height of the Cold War, it had four divisions (2nd Division, or Daini
Shidan, at Camp Asahikawa located in Asahikawa City, 5th Division, or
Daigo Shidan at Camp Obihiro in Obihiro City, 7th Division, or Dainana
Shidan, at Camp Higashi Chitose in Chitose City, and 11th Division, or
Daijūichi Shidan, at Camp Makomanai in Makomanai City) and approxi-
mately 33,000 authorized personnel. Today, NA comprises about 17,000
(out of an authorized 22,000) men and women in two divisions (2nd and
7th) and two brigades (5th Brigade, or Daigo Ryodan, and 11th Brigade, or
Daijūichi Ryodan), as well as artillery and other units, spread across thirty-
eight camps and installations, and four Provincial Liaison Offices (Jieitai
Chihō Renrakubu), now called Provincial Cooperation Offices (Jieitai
Chihō Kyōr yoku Honbu). NA’s area of responsibility partially overlaps with
the Ō minato District (Ōminato Chihōtai) of the MSDF, which begins in
the northern part of the main island of Honshū, and the Northern Air
Defense Force (Hokubu Kōkū Hōmentai) of the ASDF, which begins a
little further south and extends northward over Hokkaido. Traditionally,
NA has been an important headquarters as eight of the thirty-five COSs
26 R.D. ELDRIDGE
of the GSO have come directly from it, including the current one, General
Okabe, and his predecessor Iwata.
The following map delineates the respective defense regions for the
entire country for each of the services. Because of the different nature of
the missions, equipment used, and scope of the battle space involved, the
defense areas are not aligned along rigid lines identical to one another,
but instead overlap with those of the other services. Because this requires
close coordination and information-sharing, among other responsibilities,
liaison officers from each service can be found in one another’s regional
headquarters, a system that began in 2006 with the introduction of the
joint operations structure, although the provision of liaison officers across
all commands has yet to be complete. The liaison officer is usually a colo-
nel or lieutenant colonel equivalent.
NEA is the next army headquarters to the south, and borders NA. It,
too, shares defense areas with the MSDF’s Ō minato District and the ASDF’s
Northern Air Defense Force. It also shares defense areas with the MSDF’s
Maizuru District (Maizuru Chihōtai) and Yokosuka District (Yokosuka
Chihōtai), and the ASDF’s Central Air Defense Force (Chūbu Kōkū Hōmentai).
NEA’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) covers six prefectures (Aomori, Akita,
Iwata, Yamagata, Miyagi, and Fukushima), within which 9.1 million Japanese
citizens (or 7.2 percent of the population) live.24 Due to the Ō u Mountain
Chain running down the middle of the Tōhoku region, the two coasts (that
of the Sea of Japan and of the Pacific Ocean) experience differing weather pat-
terns, which NEA must be ready to respond to. Seven nuclear facilities reside
in the AOR, including Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant. In addition
to being responsible for the defense and disaster relief operations of north-
eastern Japan, which has experienced many, it also tasked with working forces
from the Fuji School (Fuji Gakkō), otherwise known as the Fuji Combined
Training Brigade (Fuji Kyōdōdan), in responding to large-scale natural disas-
ter in Kantō. Most recently, personnel from NEA assisted in disaster relief
operations in Izuōshima Island (Tokyo Metropolitan) after the heavy rains of
Typhoon No. 26 in October 2013, in the Philippines after Typhoon Yolanda
in November–December 2013 and during the late summer 2016 in Iwate
Prefecture and elsewhere following destructive rains.
NEA was officially established on January 14, 1960, and comprises two
divisions, the 6th Division (Dairoku Shidan, located in Higashine City,
Yamagata Prefecture) and the 9th Division (Daikyū Shidan, located in
Aomori City, Aomori Prefecture), and the 2nd Engineer Brigade (Daini
Shisetsudan, located in Shibata-chō , Miyagi Prefecture), as well as a variety
of other units, for a total of approximately 20,000 personnel (including

about 200 in the headquarters itself). In addition to these commands,
NEA has thirteen camps, and six provincial cooperation offices in its area
of responsibility. Its unit insignia is higashi, or East, written as a large kanji
character representing “northeast” and wings on each side, symbolizing
“youth” and “leaping.” The insignia has been used since the headquar-
ters’ formation.
Curiously, none of the commanders had gone on to senior leadership
positions in the GSDF until Lieutenant General Kimizuka proved himself
during the response to the March 11 disaster in his area-of-responsibility
as Commanding General, NEA, and subsequently from March 14, as the
Commander, Joint Task Force—Tō hoku, as alluded to above. He became
the 33rd COS on August 5, 2011.25
Eastern Army, or EA, was established in Ichigaya on January 14, 1960
(and subsequently moved to Camp Asaka in 1994 to make room for the
relocation of the MOD buildings). It is the second smallest area, after
WA, but the region it covers, which includes Kantō , has the largest civil-
ian population and the most critically important functions—government,
bureaucracy, and economy/business—of the country. Concentration has
its benefits, but it also has its costs, especially in light of the potential of a
major earthquake and tsunami to wreak havoc on the capital and the gov-
ernment’s ability to respond in a timely manner. EA, whose insignia has a
big “East” kanji character in the middle of cherry blossom, or sakura (a
regularly used symbol of the GSDF), shares defense responsibilities with
the Maizuru and Yokosuka Districts of the MSDF and the Central Air
Defense Force of the ASDF.
In order to perform the defense and disaster relief operations in the cap-
ital area (as well as in Shizuoka, Nagano, and Niigata Prefectures, among
others), EA has the 1st Division (Daiichi Shidan, located in Nerima Ward,
Tokyo), the 12th Brigade (Daijūni Ryodan, located in Shintō Village,
Gunma Prefecture at Camp Sō magahara), and the 1st Engineer Brigade
(Daiichi Shisetsudan, located in Koga City, Ibaraki Prefecture). In addi-
tion to these commands, EA has thirty-seven camps, and eleven provin-
cial cooperation offices in its area of responsibility. Nine of the thirty-five
COSs of the GSO have directly come from this command, which repre-
sents the highest number from any one regional army. Proximity to the
flagpole, familiarity, and the attention one receives there may be some
explanations for this trend, as is the importance of the mission in protect-
ing Japan’s overly centralized capital region.
28 R.D. ELDRIDGE
Middle Army, or MA, also established on January 14, 1960, is respon-

sible for 30 percent of Japanese territory, which is the largest amount of
Japanese territory (land) covered by any regional army. MA’s operations
cover twenty-one of Japan’s forty-seven prefectures throughout the cen-
tral-western part of Japan, from Aichi Prefecture to Yamaguchi Prefecture,
including the island of Shikoku. Its defense responsibilities are shared with
Central Air Defense Force and the Western Air Defense Force (Seibu Kōkū
Hōmentai) of the ASDF, and the Yokosuka District, Maizuru District,
Kure District (Kure Chihōtai), and Sasebo District (Sasebo Chihōtai) of
the MSDF. Under its headquarters are the 3rd Division (Daisan Shidan,
located in Itami City, Hyō go Prefecture, at Camp Senzō ), the 10th
Division (Daijū Shidan, located in Nagoya City, Aichi Prefecture, at
Camp Moriyama), the 13th Brigade (Daijūsan Ryodan, located in Kaita
Town, Hiroshima Prefecture, at Camp Kaitaichi), and the 14th Brigade
(Daijūyon Ryodan, located in Zentsūji City, Kagawa Prefecture, at Camp
Zentsūji). In addition to these commands, MA has thirty-four camps and
twenty-one provincial cooperation offices in its area of responsibility. Six
of the thirty-five COSs of the GSO have directly come from this com-
mand, which represents the third highest number from any one regional
army.
Finally, WA, established December 1, 1955, is responsible for the
defense and disaster relief operations in Kyūshū and Okinawa. Its head-
quarters is located in Kumamoto City, Kumamoto Prefecture, at Camp
Kengun, and it includes two divisions, the 4th Division (Daiyon Shidan,
located in Kasuga City, Fukuoka Prefecture, at Camp Fukuoka), 8th
Division (Daihachi Shidan, located in Kumamoto City at Camp Kita-
Kumamoto), and the 15th Brigade26 (Daijūgo Ryodan, located in Naha
City, Okinawa Prefecture, at Camp Naha). Within WA is also found
the 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Daini Kōsha Tokkadan), the 5th
Engineer Brigade (Daigo Shisetsudan), and the 3rd Training Brigade
(Daisan Kyōikudan). In addition to these commands, WA has thirty-three
camps and eight provincial cooperation offices in its area of responsibility.
Defense responsibility is shared with the Western Air Defense Force and
the Southwestern Composite Air Division (Nansei Kōkū Konseidan) of
the ASDF and the Sasebo District and Kure District of the MSDF. Only
one (General Mori Tsutomu) of the thirty-four COSs of the GSO has
directly come from this command, which along with NEA, represents the
lowest number from any one regional army. However, the importance
of the southwestern areas is growing and more attention is being paid
to this command, with 2522 islands (190 of which are inhabited) within
its AOR.27 Indeed, plans are in the works to build up the defense of the
Nansei Islands in what is being called the “Great Southwestern Wall,”
with the GSDF taking the lead in the conceptualizing of it.28 The appoint-
ment of Lieutenant General Banshō, a popular general both inside and
outside of the GSDF who has been the leading proponent of this concept
and someone who actively pursued it from his time as COS at WA, as the
35th Commanding General of the same command suggests the Japanese
government is placing greater emphasis on this area.29 As discussed earlier,
Banshō, the son of a GSDF master sergeant, is the other senior GSDF
officer being considered as the next COS, which would make him only the
second one to come from this command.30
In these plans, amphibious operations and defending or retaking islands
will be critical, and the US Marine Corps, at the request of the GSDF,
has been working closely with the WA’s Infantry Regiment (Seibu Hōmen
Futsūka Rentai), nicknamed the Salamanders, to develop the capabili-
ties of the 650 members of the light, but elite, force. Located at Camp
Ainoura in Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture, and commanded by a colo-
nel directly under the WA headquarters, the WAiR, in fact, is develop-
ing US Marine-like capabilities (whose 5th Marine Division occupied the
same camp from 1945 to 1955). Some may be skeptical with this, as the
WAiR has a long way to go and in any case its roles, mission, and size
will be limited, but their formation on March 27, 2002, symbolizes the
recognition of the new geo-strategic reality. Indeed, it is the only regi-
ment directly under the control of a regional army. The establishment of
a second WAiR was in the works but will not likely be officially created
until March 2019, a year after the planned stand-up of the Amphibious
Rapid Deployment Brigade (Suiriku Kidōdan) Headquarters in March
2018. (At this time, WAiR will transition to become the 1st Amphibious
Rapid Deployment Regiment [Suiriku Kidō Rentai]). The Government
of Japan announced on February 2, 2014, its plans for the creation in
2018 of the 3000-member Amphibious Brigade and is intending to locate
seventeen V-22s to Saga Airport in the area. These units would fall under
the Ground Defense Command (Rijō Sōtai), also to be established by
then, which would coordinate the operations of the regional armies but
not have overall command.
In addition to the above regional army headquarters, the GSDF also
has the Central Readiness Force (CRF; Chūo ̄ Sokuō Shūdan), located at
Camp Asaka. The CRF was established on March 28, 2007, in order to
30 R.D. ELDRIDGE
fulfill the roles in international peace cooperation activities and domestic

contingencies assigned to it by the National Defense Program Guidelines
of December 2004. The CRF merged the 1st Airborne Brigade (Daiichi
Kūteidan), 1st Helicopter Brigade (Daiichi Herikoputaadan), Special
Operations Group (Tokushu Sakusengun), and the 101st Central Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical Defense Unit (Chūo ̄ Tokushu Buki Bōgotai) into a
single command of approximately 4200 men and women today. All of the
subordinate units of the CRF, to include the Central Readiness Regiment
(Chūo ̄ Sokuō Rentai) at Camp Utsunomiya,31 are stationed within the
Kantō Plain of Japan and within five prefectures. (The CRF relocated
to Camp Zama, where the headquarters of US Army Japan is located,
in March 2013, in order to improve interoperability with US Forces.)
Importantly, as a reflection of the importance of jointness, the CRF has
in its insignia a purple shadow spelling out the letters “CRF” to signify its
cooperation with and among its Maritime, Air, and GSDF counterparts.
The main part of the insignia has the Japanese archipelago and a red circle
(as the Rising Sun, or Hinomaru, flag) to signify domestic missions. The
red circle also means the globe, representing overseas missions. A laurel
surrounding it is meant to pray for the successful accomplishment of its
missions.
Like the Regional Armies, the CRF is headed by a three-star general
(lieutenant general). However, he is referred to in Japanese as “Shireikan,”
or Commander, which has more of combat or mission sense to it, rather
than “Sō kan” (Commanding General) or “Chō ” (Head), which have more
of an administrative connotation. There are also two deputy commanders,
one for domestic operations and the other for international operations,
who are major generals. The CRF’s mission is broken down into two main
categories—domestic operations and international operations.
For domestic operations, the CRF was created to respond to attacks by
guerillas or Special Forces and will support regional armies as required.
This means that the CRF’s role may be as the supporting unit. In inter-
national operations, the CRF is Japan’s “first responder” to participating
in international operations; the CRF will participate in international peace
support operations, disaster relief operations, humanitarian and recon-
struction assistance activities, and non-combative evacuation operations
(NEO). Additionally, within the GSDF, the CRF has the mission to train
and sustain any Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) deployment. The CRF
is the supported unit in this role as required by the regional armies and
other components of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF).
When established, the original target end-strength of the CRF reached

3000 personnel without growing the GSDF end-strength. This was meant
as a flexible number as the CRF is task-organized and tailored to the situ-
ation and mission at hand. The CRF draws forces from the other regional
armies and forms the right size and most capable force for the assigned
mission. The CRF is on an equal status with the other five regional armies
and responds directly to the GSO. However, for actual domestic and
international operations, the CRF falls under the control of the JS. The
current organization is depicted in Appendix 4. The CRF maintains opera-
tional control of forces after the order to dispatch to international mis-
sions and reports directly to the JS. Logistics and Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) are provided by other units under the direction of the GSO. Airlift
is coordinated by the JS with MSDF, ASDF, and other means (such as
civilian-contracted transport), but there tends to be a reliance on the latter
in large part due to the failure of the SDF to achieve seamless and friction-
less jointness among the services.32
Underneath the CRF is the Central Readiness Regiment, located at
Camp Utsunomiya City in Tochigi Prefecture and commanded by a
Colonel. It consists of approximately 700 personnel and 100 vehicles,
divided among a headquarters and headquarters service company (HQ
and HSCo) and three infantry companies, the former providing headquar-
ters and management, deployment, combat support, fire combat in both
international and domestic missions, and the latter providing camp secu-
rity, escort guard, and close combat in military operations on urban ter-
rain (MOUT) war and counter-guerilla operations. It has participated in a
number of international missions to date including in Haiti and Djibouti,
and domestically dealing with the Fukushima nuclear reactor incident after
the March 11 disaster.33 Plans are afoot, however, to disband the CRF, to
include the CRR, and merge its personnel and resources into the Ground
Defense Command, to be established in 2018.
The GSDF has an intelligence organization referred to as the Military
Intelligence Command (MIC; Chūo ̄ Jōhōtai), which is tasked to sup-
port the GSO, regional armies, CRF, and other intelligence activities
with skills in intelligence, topography, and expertise in foreign lan-
guages. The MIC is organized with a headquarters element, Intelligence
Analysis Unit (IAU; Jōhō Shoritai), Geospatial Intelligence Unit, (GIU;
Chiri Jōhōtai), Basic Intelligence Unit (BIU; Kiso Jōhōtai), and a Local
Intelligence Unit (LIU; Genchi Jōhōtai), LIU, all with separate roles
32 R.D. ELDRIDGE
that complement each other toward providing service and support to

GSDF units. The MIC and its subordinate units are all located in the
Kantō Plain and coordinate with the Defense Intelligence Headquarters
(Jōhō Honbu), or DIH, during joint operations. In early 2007, the GSDF
established an Intelligence School (Jōhō Kyōikubu) at Camp Kodaira in
western Tokyo for entry-level intelligence training to include instruction
in foreign languages.
The GSDF maintains two observation units in Hokkaido which are
unique to the GSDF, the 301st Coastal Observation Unit in Wakkanai
and 302nd Coastal Observation Unit in Shibetsu. Both units are under
the command of the Commanding General, NA. The missions of these
two units are to collect information on marine vessels and aircraft and
observe and report on weather and hydrographic conditions. These units
are in key areas to observe the four disputed northern islands of Habomai,
Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu, which have been under the control of
Russia since the end of World War II and the main obstacle keeping the
two countries from signing a peace treaty, as it is Japan’s view that these
islands are its territory.
As mentioned earlier, the GSDF currently has eight infantry divi-
sions, one armored division, four infantry brigades, two brigades, and the
CRF. As indicated in Fig. 2.1, the GSDF average brigade T/O (table
of organization) strength is 3000–4000 personnel, comparable to the
levels of the US Army or North Atlantic Treaty Organization members.
However, the average GSDF division T/O strength is 6000–9000 per-
sonnel, whereas an average US Army division is about 15,000–20,000
personnel.
Due to the worsening fiscal situation in the wake of the bursting of the
bubble economy in the early 1990s, the Japanese defense budget declined
for more ten years straight beginning in the early 2000s, leading to a
reduction in personnel numbers across the board. In order to make up for
the decline, the MOD has used reserve personnel to augment the regu-
lar GSDF personnel structure, according to the 1995 National Defense
Program Outline (NDPO; Bōei Taikō) following the end of the Cold
War. Going into the 1990s, the GSDF had an authorized end-strength
of 180,000 personnel, but the 1995 NDPO, following the end of the
Cold War and in the wake of calls for a “peace dividend,” incrementally
phased out approximately 35,000 active-duty personnel for an active-duty
end-strength of 145,000 members supplemented by reservists. The subse-
GSDF Brigade Division
3,000 5,000 10,000 20,000
U.S. Army Brigade Division
3,000 5,000 10,000 20,000+
NATO Brigade Division
Fig. 2.1 Table comparing T/O sizes for brigades and divisions
quent Mid-Term Defense Program of 2000 scheduled completion of the

force reduction by 2010. As mentioned earlier, these reductions were seen
in the GSDF, as well among as the other services.
Japan has three systems of reservists to augment the SDF promptly
and systematically in a crisis. The first system, the regular SDF Reserve
System (Yobi Jieikan Seido), was created in 1954 for the GSDF. Personnel,
initially, made up of those who have served at least one year in the regu-
lar SDF, must train five days a year, and are responsible for helping out
in disaster relief, protection of citizens, and other areas upon the orders
being given. One appointment is for three years, and during that time,
they receive a monthly stipend of 4000 yen (40 dollars), and 8100 yen
(81 dollars) for each day they train. Currently (in 2016), there are about
32,000 Reserve Personnel, of which 6.4 percent (or 2000) are female, out
of an authorized strength of 47,900.
The second system, the Ready Reserve Personnel System (Sokuō Yobi
Jieikan Seido), was formally adopted in late March 1998 specifically for the
GSDF. There are currently (as of March 2016) 5000 (out of an autho-
rized 8057), of which 5.1 percent (approximately 250) are female. They
are required to train thirty days a year, and like their Reserve Personnel
counterparts, are responsible to assist in defense, civil protection, and
disasters. Those who have served in the SDF previously for at least one
year are eligible, but their registration must be done within one year of
34 R.D. ELDRIDGE
SELF-
DEFENSE
GSDF, MSDF, ASDF GSDF
FORCE
1954 GSDF
YEAR 1970 MSDF 1997 Established
ADOPTED 1986 ASDF 1998 In force
Assigned to Specific Units and Billets

ROLE Assigned to Provide General Support Alongside Active-Duty Members and
Used to Fill the Unit to Effective Strength
Defense Operations Defense Operations

Civil Protection Operations Civil Protection Operations
RECALL
Disaster Relief Law & Order Operations
PURPOSE
Training Disaster Relief
Training
TRAINING 5 Days per Year

OBLIGATION (No more than 20 Days per Year) 30 Days per Year
SERVICE
OBLIGATION 3 Year Enlistment Term 3 Year Enlistment Term
4,000 yen Monthly Stipend 16,000 yen Monthly Stipend

8,100 yen Daily Training Stipend 10,400 –14,200 yen Daily Training Stipend
PAY &
(Rank Dependent)
ALLOWANCES
120,000 yen One-time Three Year Bonus
42,500 yen Monthly Incentive to
Companies for Each Member
PERSONNEL Volunteers from Former and Retired Volunteers from Former and Retired
SOURCE SDF Members GSDF Members
ACTUAL TOTAL: 47,900

TOTAL
PERSONNEL 46,000 GSDF 8,075 GSDF
STRENGTH 1,100 MSDF
800 ASDF
Fig. 2.2 Table on reserve system. Note: Compiled from various Japan Ministry
of Defense sources, as of March 2016
their having left the force (in order to have maintained their fitness and
training levels).
The GSDF Ready Reserve System debuted at the WA’s 4th Division
Headquarters at Camp Fukuoka. Ready Reserve Personnel receive
a monthly stipend of 16,000 yen (160 dollars), training per diem of
between 10,400 and 14,200 yen (104–142 dollars), and a 120,000 yen
(1200 dollars) bonus for continuing in the system. In addition, their
place of employment receives 42,700 yen (427 dollars) per month in
compensation. The higher incentives are meant to encourage the per-
sonnel to maintain a higher degree of readiness in order to carry out
their missions together with active-duty personnel. As such, the GSDF
Ready Reserve personnel are depended on much more to be able to
execute complex tasks when recalled for duty and to be more profi-
cient at their assigned duties compared to regular SDF Reserve System
personnel.
The SDF established a third reserve system in 2001 and which began
in 2002, and is both dedicated to training candidates for eventual entry
into the SDF Reserve System and geared toward providing the GSDF a
pool of skilled personnel to fill gaps in language, medical, technological,
and other areas. Specifically, the Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel
System (Yobi Jieikanhō Seido) is responsible for training civilian person-
nel who possess very little to no experience as a member of the SDF
but bring with them technical expertise, such as medicine or foreign
languages. Depending on their skill classification, candidates have up to
two years to successfully complete ten days of training in technical fields
(various field of medicine, dentistry, linguistics, information technology
[IT], communications, electrical engineering, and construction) or up
to three years for fifty days of training in general areas such as guard and
logistics support tasks.
While the actual numbers have varied from between 1000 to 3920,
currently (as of March 2016) there are 2900 (of which 19.3 percent
are women, or 560 members), out of 4621 authorized, SDF Reserve
Personnel Candidates.34 Unique to this system is that personnel in this
system are not subject to recall for real-world deployments or duty beyond
training.35 Generalists serve for three years, and technical specialists for
two. They receive a per diem of 7900 yen (79 dollars) when training. They
are assigned to units upon the completion of the necessary education and
training as SDF personnel. By-and-large, all three reserve systems of the
36 R.D. ELDRIDGE
SDF are largely meant to augment and support the GSDF and thereby
primarily controlled by the GSDF.
As Japan continues to face demographic problems, such as the declining
birth rate which is compounded by the rising number of elderly people,
the issue of qualified personnel, ostensibly young males, to serve in the
SDF, especially, the GSDF, as the largest of the three services in terms of
personnel, will worsen.36 As such, the trend of appealing to and recruiting
more females—whose presence is still few (5.6 percent of total force as of
2015, when medical personnel, such as nurses, are included)—and making
larger use of the reserves to fill the gap in full-time active-duty personnel
will be a key counter-measure. SDF officials involved in recruiting for this
category, for example, proudly showed a video documentary, produced
by a local television network, of one young mother in the Osaka area who
joined the system in an effort to recruit females at an informal recruitment
session at a national university in the Kansai region in 2007. (Interestingly,
only young males, including some foreign students who sat in perhaps out
of curiosity, attended the event.) Despite these efforts, the percentage of
females in the GSDF remains small.
The recruitment of females in any category will also be important in
international missions due to local cultural norms where males and females
do not interact alone unless married or relatives. Similarly, the GSDF dis-
covered in domestic missions as well, such as during the March 11 disas-
ter, that it was difficult for female victims to ask GSDF personnel, who
were almost exclusively male, for feminine hygiene and other items.37 One
GSDF public affairs official, a young woman from Kyūshū, was moved
to join the GSDF because of its role in natural disasters in aiding her
family and neighbors when she was a child and experienced flooding in
her hometown in Kagoshima Prefecture. There are certainly many more
stories like hers, and probably many more as a result of the March 11
disaster.38
One countervailing possible trend is the decreased interest in joining
or remaining in GSDF if it were sent into harm’s way, particularly on
behalf of vague ideas such as “international contributions” or “collective
defense.” Recent stories in Japan have focused on young people refusing
to join the SDF if the mission were not related directly to Japan’s defense
and on some current and former members of the GSDF suggesting the
need to refuse such missions as it was “not what they signed up for.” Fears
have even been stoked that Japan will institute a draft as a result of the
pending security legislation up for approval in FY 2015.39
Regarding personnel and training, the GSDF has fifteen branch special-
ties with official schools to train and advance proficiency and competence.
Branch is the term used to refer to a family of occupational specialties.
The infantry branch is the largest in numbers. (See Appendix 2 for a list
of occupational specialties with branch insignia; sub-specialties are not
included.) Most of the GSDF formal schools are found in the Kantō
area and some are shared with the other SDF services. Some of the most
notable GSDF schools are concentrated in Camp Kodaira in Kodaira
City, western Tokyo, where intelligence and foreign language, military
police, personnel, finance, electronic systems, and military tactics are
taught. The GSDF Officer Candidate School, known by its abbreviated
form, Kankōkō, is located in Fukuoka Prefecture, as introduced earlier.
Various infantry, mobile infantry, artillery, and armor-related schools are
located at Fuji School in Camp Fuji in Shizuoka Prefecture. The GSDF
Air School (Rikujō Jieitai Kōkū Gakkō) specializes in training helicopter
pilots, with its core functions located in Camp Akeno in Ise City, Mie
Prefecture, and with additional camps in Utsunomiya City, introduced
earlier, and Kasumigaura City, Ibaraki Prefecture. The GSDF operates its
own Ordnance School (Rikujō Jieitai Buki Gakkō) in Camp Tsuchiura
also in Ami Town, Ibaraki Prefecture. In 2010, the GSDF Youth Technical
School (Rikujō Jieitai Seinen Kōka Gakkō) changed its name to the
Advanced Technical School (Rikujō Jieitai Kōtō Kōka Gakkō) for adminis-
trative purposes. It is a three-year school aimed at careerists and is located
in Yokosuka City.
The GSDF shares the SDF Physical Fitness Training School (Jieitai
Taiiku Gakkō) located in Nerima Ward, Tokyo. This school’s goal is to
train service members into athletes and Olympic contenders with a focus
on jūdō, track, running, and swimming. The GSDF, both at the school
and in general, encourages its members to participate in martial arts, espe-
cially jūdō, karate, kendō, and naginata, to develop mental strength and
discipline, and sponsors competitions to encourage espirit de corps and
unit morale.
The GSDF shares the NDA in Yokosuka City with the other two SDF
services. Although the graduation requirements are the same for each
student regardless of service affiliation, each service does require certain
training to be completed. The GSDF-specific training at NDA includes
leadership, ground operations, field fortification, communications, basic
combat training, operations, and study tours of GSDF units and bases
among other topics.40 Foreign cadets and graduate students do attend
38 R.D. ELDRIDGE
NDA, mainly from other Asian countries, with strong representation from
Thailand. Cadets from the United States, Japan’s only ally, attend as well
from sister academies, such as the US Air Force Academy at Colorado
Springs, Colorado, US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, and the
US Military Academy at West Point, New York. Education at the NDA is
free and cadets are paid a stipend to study. When they graduate, they are
not obligated to join the SDF or even to pay for their education.
Camp Meguro, a shared facility, in Meguro Ward, Tokyo, is home to
the GSDF Staff College (Rikujō Jieitai Kanbu Gakkō), commonly referred
to as the CSC, among other schools such as the Joint Staff College (JSC;
Tōgō Bakuryō Gakkō), which moved there on October 1, 1994, and con-
ducts education and research in joint operations, and the National Institute
for Defense Studies (NIDS; Bōei Kenkyūsho), which falls under the direct
control of the Minister of Defense.41 There are additional schools for
the other SDF services on Camp Meguro. Foreign military students also
attend the GSDF Staff College and NIDS, although some lectures are off-
limits to foreign students. Classes are primarily lecture style, and said to be
quite boring and unimaginative.
While not a formal school for the instruction of skills, the GSDF
established the Ground Research and Development Command (GRDC;
Rikujō Jieitai Kenkyū Honbu) in March 2001. The GRDC is located
within Camp Asaka for the purpose of developing further capabilities by
leveraging technology in the equipment used by the GSDF.42 Unique to
most GSDF schools is the shared presence of a very active research and
development mission. Liaison officers from the US Army (since 1972) and
US Marine Corps (since 2011), have offices there as well, although the lat-
ter is technically assigned to the GSO.43 The first US Marine Corps Liaison
Officer especially worked hard at developing the SDF’s understanding of
the importance of jointness and amphibious operations, and helped with
the procurement of the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV).
Established on August 24, 1954, the Fuji School has the unique mis-
sion to educate and train assigned GSDF personnel in infantry, field artil-
lery, armor, and the combined use of these weapon systems. It is located
about 100 kilometers from Tokyo at the base of Mount Fuji and adja-
cent to the US Marine Corps’ Combined Arms Training Center at Camp
Fuji. Training for GSDF officers in these three branches is the focus. Of
the roughly 23,000 officers in the GSDF today, 23 percent are infantry,
12 percent field artillery, and 6 percent are armor, leaving the remaining
thirteen branches making up 59 percent of the total GSDF officer corps.
At any one time, there are about 1400 personnel training at Fuji School
normally ranging in rank from Second Lieutenant to Major. Officers in
the above the branches attend the basic course as a Second Lieutenant,
advanced course as a First Lieutenant or Captain, and functional officer
course as a Captain or Major.
An in-depth analysis of the GSDF formal training is not addressed
in this chapter. However, a few notable observations are made regard-
ing their significance or purpose and effectiveness to prepare officers for
future assignments and greater responsibility. Noting the experiences of
American military officers who have attended the GSDF Staff College and
NIDS as full-time students, and comparing the course with instruction at
comparable American institutions, a clear and perhaps critical vulnerability
is discovered in that GSDF officers were “not trained to make complex
tactical decisions,” due in part to cultural and organizational bureaucratic
reasons.44 According to some foreign officers who have graduated from
the GSDF Staff College and NIDS, most JSDF officers did not really think
they would be called upon to perform in a crisis, contingency, or conflict.
Although some of these GSDF officers are extremely capable and hun-
gry for greater challenges and willing to try new solutions to complex
problems, GSDF officers who attend these formal schools, such as the
Staff College and NIDS, as students found themselves in a group-think
environment where the “yellow-sheet” answer was the only conceivable
and acceptable response by the GSDF as an institution.45 Added to this
is the cultural shame of failing and the low tolerance for risk in Japanese
society, and the “mind-numbing, one-way lectures lacking any form of
dialogue or interaction,” much like that which exists in Japanese universi-
ties. According to one of these interviewees, most GSDF officers default
to the lowest common denominator. “They are smart folks and could be
brilliant at the tactical and operational arts but the system does not teach
nor permit them to reach their full individual potential. Those that bother
to broaden their perspectives on their own are “punished” by the system if
they try to act on their knowledge.” He added that GSDF “students were
not introduced to thought-provoking concepts of warfare. They do not
debate competing concepts like [American officers] do. The goal [in the
SDF classroom] is to produce the textbook solution. [The definition of]
‘correctness’ is getting your answer to match the school’s answer as close
as possible. Most [students] do not buy-into this approach but they can
do nothing about it.” In this inflexible system, the GSDF will continue to
produce officers that might attempt to solve problems in the same predict-
40 R.D. ELDRIDGE
able manner, but will be highly challenged as staff officers and unit com-
manders when faced with fluid, ever-changing situations. The Japanese
military response to the March 11 disaster, while good, reflected this linear
thinking as did its attempts at developing after action reports and lessons
learned. Fortunately, there are changes occurring and a new generation of
officers emerging who recognize they will be called on to defend Japan.
Even some of the critical American officers notice this change in mindset.
The GSDF has long experienced a trend concerning personnel recruit-
ment that can also be found in other countries, such as in the United
States where a large number of personnel come from Texas and other
military-friendly states. At least one-fourth of the total active-duty person-
nel strength of the GSDF hails from the Kyūshū region, which has only
about ten percent of the national population. The cause for this trend is
both economic and cultural. The island of Kyūshū comprises seven prefec-
tures which all have relatively low per capita incomes in Japan. Six of the
seven prefectures rank in the bottom twelve, and collectively, Kyūshū is the
lowest of the regional groupings.46 Agriculture, electronics, and machine
manufacturing are the dominant industries. Since the end of the “bub-
ble economy” in the early 1990s and the start of the recession, the SDF
has been an attractive alternative, with many choosing the GSDF. This
trend was especially true in the early 1950s when employment was dif-
ficult to find amid a large number of returned military personnel and a
still-small industrial base. At the same time, Kyūshū has always had a spe-
cial and unique place in Japanese military history wedded to the making
of modern Japan. From the Warring States (1467–1603), through the
Edo (1603–1867) and Meiji (1868–1912) Periods,47 the Great Clans/
Domains or Daimyō of Kyūshū have supplied military forces and have
played a decisive role in major military campaigns that have shaped Japan
and given deep meaning to the Samurai code of bushidō. The Japanese
people have also noticed this reputation for hardiness, service, and sacri-
fice and have over the years affectionately called Japanese men who display
this ideal representation of Japanese chivalry—Kyūshū danji. In this con-
text, the tradition of serving one’s community and nation has endured in
Japan, most especially through the hearty people of Kyūshū who continue
to show their patriotism through service in the forces which are dedicated
to national defense, with a tendency to serve in the land force—the GSDF.
Of the 42,472 enlisted personnel, and 137,898 non-commissioned
officers in the SDF as of March 2016, 65 percent and 62 percent respec-
tively were in the GSDF. Most of the former group are in the twenties
(average age 22.4 years), while there is a greater age-group spread among
the non-commissioned officers to include some 70 percent being in their
thirties and forties (average age 37.4 years). Eighty-five percent of those in
the enlisted ranks have a high school education, and of the three services,
the GSDF has the fewest number (fifteen) of job specialties within the
enlisted personnel ranks.48
The ranks and the rank of nomenclature of the GSDF are established
under the Self-Defense Law (1954, No. 165), Chap. 5, Article 32.
Ministry of Defense Order No. 35 of September 30, 2010, is the latest
instruction on the proper rank design and wear. The GSDF has a rank
structure similar to other militaries and has two categories: officer and
enlisted. Officers are divided into three levels: Company Grade, Field
Grade, and General Officer. Company Grade officers consist of, from low-
est to highest, sani or Second Lieutenant, nii or First Lieutenant, and ichii
or Captain. Field Grade officers consist of, from lowest to highest, sansa or
Major, nisa or Lieutenant Colonel, and issa or Colonel. General Officers
consist of rikushōho or Major General, rikushō or Lieutenant General, and
rikubakuchō or COS, who is a full General. The GSDF does not use the
rank of Brigadier General and does not consider Warrant Officers as regu-
lar officers since they are categorized as enlisted. This is a carryover of
traditions from Japan’s past, as the Imperial Japanese Army rank struc-
ture was modeled after European militaries and also did not use the rank
of Brigadier General. However, the GSDF maintains a seniority system
among its Colonels and has three unofficial terms associated with the vari-
eties of trees for each level. Due to the Army-level staff positions normally
held by most senior Colonels, the GSDF informally considers these senior
Colonels as brigadier generals and permits certain identifiers to highlight
this status such as a one-star placard in their official staff vehicle. This is
normally witnessed by Colonels serving in the billet of division or brigade
COS, without which, there would be no official honors or privileges con-
ferred to this senior Colonel.
Enlisted personnel are divided into two categories: enlisted personnel
and non-commissioned officers. Enlisted personnel consist, from low-
est to highest, of sanshi or Recruit, nishi or Private Class, isshi or Private
First Class, and shichō or Leading Private (comparable to a Corporal in
the US Army). Non-commissioned officers consist of, from lowest to
highest, sansho or Sergeant, nisho or Sergeant First Class, issho or Master
Sergeant, sōchō or Sergeant Major, and juni or Warrant Officer. There is
only one level of Warrant Officer and no further, such as Chief Warrant
42 R.D. ELDRIDGE
Officer 2, Chief Warrant 3, and so on. Following the lead established

by the MSDF in April 2003, the GSDF announced in Japan Fiscal Year
(JFY) 2006 the establishment of a Command Master Sergeant Major
(Rikujō Jieitai Saisennin Jōkyū Sōchō) system which was systematically
introduced. Modeled on the US Armed Forces, the goal of the GSDF
was to cultivate and promote leadership and initiative among its non-
commissioned officers and warrant officers. In light of the changing
operating environment, the GSDF sought to better utilize the experi-
ences and abilities of its enlisted members through professionalizing
their careers and providing the incentive to advance through promot-
ing a climate where non-commissioned officers felt a sense of owner-
ship and responsibility in the competency of their service. The highest
enlisted rank in the GSDF is Command Master Sergeant Major of the
GSDF.49
The topic of awards is another abbreviated military trait of the GDSF
and the rest of the SDF. The GSDF does not have its own unique awards.
The MOD has one award system used by all three services. Since the estab-
lishment of the SDF in 1954, medals have not been conferred upon SDF
personnel. Instead, ribbons only with a certificate are awarded with some
ribbons having a cash stipend. As of 2016, there are forty-one authorized
ribbons and two authorized devices. Ribbons are worn on GSDF service
shirts and service coats (not on camouflage uniforms) by male and female
members and are worn in order of precedence per Japan Ministry Defense
Ministry Order No. 51 dated August 17, 1962. (See Appendix 3 for a list
of the authorized ribbons and the order of precedence.) GSDF members
are permitted to receive and wear the awards presented to them by the
United States Armed Forces and are usually ranked as an individual’s high-
est award.
The GSDF has two types of service uniforms: winter uniform and sum-
mer uniform. They are identical but differ in material weight. The summer
uniform has three categories: Natsufuku Daiishu, or Summer Uniform
Number One, which consists of a jacket and tie; Natsufuku Dainishu, or
Summer Uniform Number Two, which consists of a long-sleeve shirt with
tie or no tie; and Natsufuku Daisanshu, or Summer Uniform Number
Three, that consists of a half-sleeve shirt with or without a tie.
The culture of using unit and branch insignia on uniforms, equipment,
and other objects to identify affiliation, accountability, and unit pride is
common within the GSDF and is similar to other militaries. (See Appendix
4 for a listing of major GSDF unit insignias and an explanation of its com-
position.) This unit pride in the GSDF is displayed in various forms such
as unit songs, bottle labels on local sake, and the prolific use of their unit
logo on many accessories, trinkets, and souvenirs.
Most units from the Company level and above have unit songs. In addi-
tion, each of the regional armies as well as the 15th Brigade in Okinawa
have their own bands that are active in their communities and often
perform with their counterparts in the US military stationed in Japan.
Furthermore, although the GSDF does not celebrate its founding with
birthday balls, a rather Western tradition, individual GSDF units, usu-
ally from regimental level and above, do commemorate the establishment
of their unit in a formal manner. These ceremonies, open to the public
and very important persons (VIPs), are scripted, very formal and includes
speeches by SDF and MOD officials, local leaders, and Diet represen-
tatives, musical performances, and a demonstration of capabilities, some
equipment displays, and ends with a reception for the VIPs and family
members.
Although not unique to the GSDF, Article 39, Chap. 3, Sect. 3, of the
Ordinance for the Enforcement of Rules for the SDF requires all SDF
personnel, as described in the Self-Defense Force Law (1954, No. 165)
Article 39.5.1, to recite an oath upon entering the SDF. It has also become
customary to reaffirm the pledge by reciting the oath when reporting into
a new duty station. This oath was adopted by the MOD and became a
part of SDF culture in 2007, so it is still relatively new. The oath, cited
below, has been serving the same function as the Oath of Office or Oath
of Enlistment does for US Forces:
I will be cognizant of the Self-Defense Forces’ mission to protect peace and

the independence of Japan, and shall aim to maintain unity, to strictly and
impartially observe rules, to constantly cultivate virtue, to respect people, to
refresh mind and body, to polish skills, to execute duties with a deep sense of
responsibility and dedication, to face events without regard for risk, to strive
to the utmost of my abilities to complete the assigned tasks, and to respond
to the will of the people.
Retirement in the GSDF is regulated by rank and is connected to a manda-

tory retirement age which is uniform throughout the SDF. The manda-
tory retirement age for general officers is 60 years of age (the mandatory
retirement age for each service COS is sixty-two years of age), Colonels—
fifty-six, Lieutenant Colonels and Majors—fifty-five, from Captain to
44 R.D. ELDRIDGE
Master Sergeant—fifty-four, and Sergeant First class and Sergeant—fifty-

three.50 A mandatory retirement age for GSDF personnel holding the rank
of Leading Privates and below is not established as the promotion system
is established so that a career GSDF member will at least attain the rank
of Sergeant before mandatory retirement at age fifty-three. Each of the
Provincial Cooperation Offices has a division or office (engoka) specifically
charged with assisting in retirements and finding re-employment. One
common form of re-employment for senior personnel is as an advisor to
companies or local governments on crisis management or disaster pre-
paredness. Concerns about the propriety of amakudari, or “descent from
heaven”—the practice of public officials finding employment with compa-
nies or other entities from which favors are owed—do exist and the SDF
has been criticized about it, but at the same time for some situations, there
is no denying that a special skillset is being matched with a clear need. The
degree of public scrutiny, as well as the fact that many GSDF personnel
are hired locally and come from less-developed regions, combine to make
it difficult for the above offices to find reemployment for some of their
charges. Senior ranking members, of course, have less difficulty.
The terms used for the ranks of GSDF personnel and the ranks of the
other the SDF services are different than the Japanese terms used for the
ranks of personnel in other countries’ military services. For example, an
officer holding the rank of Major in the army of most militaries, such as
the United States or Great Britain, is shōsa when rendered in Japanese.
However, the Japanese term used when referring to a JSDF member of
the equivalent rank is sansa, which is broken down into the numeral three
for san and the term for field grade sa. The tendency to use a numeral
and the term for the particular level of rank is used throughout the rank
structure, and serves to distance the SDF from being publicly perceived
as a military organization able to wage offensive operations and war. As
a result, the terms used by the GSDF and the rest of the SDF to describe
SDF equipment, occupational specialties, operations, and so on, is not the
same language (gunji yōgo or military terms) when referring to the same
thing of another country’s military. For example, the GSDF occupational
specialty of “infantry” is called futsūka in Japanese, which directly trans-
lates into “regular specialty.” However, the term “infantry,” when applied
to the US military, for example, is hohei, and inspires near-awe of the war-
rior spirit, bravery, and resiliency.
The issue of confidentiality and protection of information is a linger-
ing problem for the SDF and one to which the GSDF is not immune,
too. The GSDF and MOD have been taking steps, as institutions, to be
competent and viewed as credible with information handling, whether it
be intelligence or technological information. In 2007, Japan concluded
a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), with
the United States. This is an indication of American confidence in the
ability for MOD and its SDF to safeguard sensitive information related
to defense but there are also indicators that the US government would
like its alliance partner to do more. The United States has urged the
MOD to establish security programs similar to those used by the US
government such as conducting background investigations on person-
nel handling classified information, establishing a clearance system, estab-
lishing effective laws and enforcing them, and establishing procedures
and regulations. Doing this would pave the way to better command and
control and information-sharing, especially during contingencies. There
have been many stories in recent years of various breaches of security
by JSDF personnel. In February 2007, during Exercise Yamasakura at
MA Headquarters in Itami City, Hyō go Prefecture, a GSDF officer lost
a Universal Serial Bus (USB) memory device. The USB memory device
was not thought to contain classified or sensitive information but the
nature of the incident, misplacing information related to the defense of
Japan, and the subsequent lack of reporting about it, gave the impression
of a cover-up and GSDF officials attempting to hide the incident from
civilian bureaucrats in the Internal Bureau.51 Then, on August 1, 2009,
the GSDF authorities arrested and charged a GSDF Captain with provid-
ing personal information of about 140,000 GSDF personnel members
to a real-estate agent.52 Although classified defense-related information
was not compromised, this incident demonstrates a lack of training and
screening, but also reveals the ability for officials to take action that serves
as a deterrent for future breaches in the handling of personal identifiable
information.
Transparency and Public Relations

To a certain degree, the GSDF along with the rest of the SDF services
battle with their daily image and how they are perceived not by people
outside Japan but by their fellow countryman. The Japanese media and
the Internal Bureau are obsessed with any remark or action taken by uni-
form officials who could be perceived or invested into a challenge or threat
against civilian control (a topic discussed in detail in Chap. 5). Due to the
46 R.D. ELDRIDGE
fears of the legacy of militarism prior to and during World War II, there
is little to no tolerance of uniformed officers expressing their thoughts
on political issues, particularly those that appear critical of the civilian
leadership. A recent case in point was March 2010 when Colonel Nakazawa
Tsuyoshi, the commanding officer of the 44th Infantry Regiment (Dai 44
Futsūka Rentai), made a remark, seen as critical of then-Prime Minister
Hatoyama Yukio, while addressing a bilateral gathering of US military and
GSDF personnel during an annual exercise. A media firestorm emerged
with accusations of the officer threatening the principle of civilian control
for his perceived criticism of the prime minister and resulted in him being
cautioned in writing by the defense minister. The colonel, whom a senior
member of the US military described as “one of the best officers in the
GSDF (or U.S.) … someone likely to have become a general and possibly
chief of staff,” was subsequently reassigned to the GRDC later that month
and later to NIDS.
The GSDF has many stellar initiatives aimed at being able to con-
nect with residents in close proximity to the GSDF facilities and camps,
or chūtonchi, but also to connect with and educate and gain the under-
standing from the whole Japanese public they serve. Nearly each major
camp maintains a museum, room, or research hall used to preserve their
past and tell their history, the best one perhaps being the Hokuchin
Museum (Hokuchin Kinenkan) located on the southwest corner of Camp
Asahikawa in Hokkaido, which is accessible from the street for the general
public.
In light of (or despite) their turbulent past and current status under
the “peace constitution,” the GSDF does an extremely good job of this,
weaving themselves into the fabric of their local communities and telling
their story. An example of their efforts and priority with connecting to the
public they serve can be observed at Camp Asaka where there is a very
large GSDF Public Relations Center (Rikujō Jieitai Kōhō Sentaa), which is
adjacent to the main gate and accessible to anyone who wants information
or wishes to tour the facility.
The GSDF has in-depth and redundant liaison efforts. In addition to a
Public Affairs Office in each regional army, they have separate local com-
munity liaison officers, and a group of “opinion leaders” to the armies’
commanders who serve as informal political or community relations “advi-
sors.” The SDF also helps to publish a commercial monthly magazine
titled MAMOR, which is a term derived from the Japanese word mamoru
and means “to protect.” The magazine writes about personnel from vari-
ous branches and tells their personal experiences of life in the SDF, a great
recruitment tool which also humanizes the SDF and allows the public to
empathize with them. The GSDF is featured regularly. As a recruitment
tool, it is not shy to appeal to men as each monthly features a young,
attractive female modeling in one of the uniforms of the SDF on its cover
and more suggestive poses on military equipment in the first few pages of
the magazine.53 In addition to this monthly, the GSDF publishes a twenty-
page quarterly magazine in Japanese (with an English title) called ARMY
(Active, Reliance, Morale, Yearning), while the MOD publishes an 8-page
quarterly newsletter in English called Japan Defense Focus, which includes
stories about Japanese defense policy as a whole and individual stories
about each of the services, including the GSDF. The Regional Army head-
quarters and many individual camps also publish their own newspapers or
newsletters, such the Chinzei Shimbun (Chinzei Newspaper) six times a
year by WA, Asuka by MA, Azuma by EA, Michinoku by NEA, Akashiya
by NA. Smaller units as well have newspapers. The Okinawa Provincial
Cooperation Office, for example, publishes Uchinaa, an eight-page quar-
terly newsletter quarterly.
The GSDF also cooperates with the Asagumo, a MOD-affiliated
biweekly newspaper, and the monthly Jieitai Jōhōshi (Self-Defense Force
Information Magazine). Moreover, the Defense Ministry annual publishes
its white paper called the Bōei Hakusho (Defense of Japan), which includes
sections on the GSDF, consecutively since 1976 (after one issue was pub-
lished in 1970). The GSDF also contributes photos to the MOD annual
calendar, distributed in December the year before, as well as publishing its
own GSDF-specific calendar. Recently, the Naha-based SDF teamed up
with Tokyo Broadcasting Station for its Nainai no Omiai Daisakusen, a
popular television show in which men and women in relatively rural areas
are introduced to one another like a big dating game. Some 1324 women,
of whom 88 were selected, applied to go on the show, which aired April
8, 2014. It was the largest pool of applicants ever, suggesting that SDF
personnel are becoming increasingly attractive as marriage partners among
Japanese women, both for the job security and their commitment to the
nation and their sense of personal responsibility and sincerity. Other shows
were planned as well, and a new word, J-kon, for “marriage to a mem-
ber of the Jieitai,” has actually entered the Japanese lexicon. This greater
respect for members of the SDF has, in part, risen as a result of their
efforts following the March 11 disaster.
48 R.D. ELDRIDGE
Nevertheless, as discussed in the Introduction, it still can be said that

many people still feel unconnected to the SDF. Indeed, only a very minute
percentage of the population (0.002 percent) ever serves in the SDF at
any one time. Moreover, few people have family or close friends who have
served in the SDF.
With this said, and perhaps as a way to raise awareness for its roles and mis-
sions, the SDF has a number of support groups, such as the various chapters
of the Defense Association (Bōei Kyōkai) throughout Japan in every prefec-
ture and the SDF Cooperative Association (Jieitai Kyōr yokukai), as well as
the SDF Friendship Association (Jieitai Taiyūkai), a veterans’ organization,
and SDF Parents Association (Jieitai Fukeikai), which concerns itself with
the welfare of SDF personnel. Thanks to these organizations, the GSDF,
for example, is able to engage with a number of civilians, some of whom
may not previously have had any connection to the SDF before. One of
these groups in Tochigi Prefecture held a matchmaking event. More than
seventy women signed up for it from all over Japan, although it was limited
to just forty for the twenty-five members of the SDF. Fortunately for both
parties there is a website devoted to such events around the country.
Through these organizations, as well as due to the location of the vari-
ous units, the GSDF regularly participates in and sponsors local festivals
and friendship events such as cherry blossom viewing, open-base festivals,
marathons, and others sports competitions, performances in local festi-
vals, parades, and perhaps most notably, key participation in the annual
Sapporo Snow Festival (Sapporo Yukimatsuri). These venues provide a
variety of opportunities—such as community relations, recruitment, and
other ways—for the GSDF to connect with the public, be a part of the
region they serve, and raise unit morale.
The GSDF’s biggest event of the year is undoubtedly the Fuji Firepower
Demonstration (Fuji Sōgō Karyoku Enshū), a huge display of the various
weaponry and capabilities in the possession of the GSDF, which takes
place over the course of a summer weekend at the Fuji training area at Mt.
Fuji. The annual event is attended by tens of thousands of spectators, who
apply during June and July, or are invited as representatives of the various
support groups described above. The Minister of Defense and the COS of
the GSDF are also in attendance, and often the leaders of the other ser-
vices as well. Foreign military officers also come out to attend, especially
representatives from the US military.
Another important event for the GSDF is the Troop Review for the
Anniversary of the Establishment of the SDF (Jieitai Kinenbi Kanetsushiki),
whose venue rotates annually between the three services. The 2013 cere-
mony, where Prime Minister Abe, as the commander in chief, spoke before
the thousands of guests and to the thousands of SDF personnel gathered,
was conducted at Camp Asaka in western Tokyo, and was the ceremony
site again in 2016 as well.54
The above efforts at public affairs and community relations, as well as
other actions directly helping the local communities, such as disaster relief,
have helped secure high support for the SDF over the past several decades, as
covered in Chaps. 6 and 7. On a final note, as the reader would have under-
stood, the GSDF’s primary function is as a land army, while the ASDF con-
ducts air defense and transport missions, and the Navy maritime operations,
to include submarines, surface ships, and air reconnaissance. Each of these
services work closely with their US counterparts, with the GSDF having
official counterpart relations with both the US Army and US Marine Corps.
Increasingly, the SDF is operating jointly, although there are many
institutional, doctrinal, and personality-related challenges to this happen-
ing smoothly. In the area of joint operations as well, the relationship with
the US military has had a twofold effect. First, it allows the SDF to study
what the US side has done to date, learning more cheaply some of the les-
sons the Americans have had to learn the hard way. Second, the US mili-
tary acts to put pressure on its respective counterparts to work together
with their SDF brethren.
Another added benefit of the relationship with the US military in
recent decades has been to allow the SDF to “piggy back” into some of
the regional multilateral exercises and international operations. US good
offices have gotten access for the Japanese side in ways the Japanese gov-
ernment or SDF would not have been able to on their own. This allows for
Japan not only to demonstrate an international presence or contribution,
but also to give the SDF practical experience, most recently SDF partici-
pation along with New Zealand representation (both for the first time) in
the summer of 2015 in the Australia–US exercise Talisman Saber.55
As with this exercise, the mil-to-mil relationship with the United States
continues to grow and deepen. On April 27, 2015, the two governments
announced the latest version of “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense
Cooperation,” which while not spelling specific tasks for specific com-
ponents, did have a robust agenda for the SDF, which includes many
missions for the GSDF.56 A new related Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreement is to be passed in Fiscal Year 2016.
It is to the history of the GSDF we turn next.
50 R.D. ELDRIDGE
Notes
1. Both laws have been revised on numerous occasions over the past
five decades. Neither law has been officially translated into English,
although portions of the SDF law appear in the annual white
paper on defense, Defense of Japan. Portions can also be found in
Osamu Nishi, The Constitution and the National Defense Law
System in Japan (Tokyo: Seibundō Publishing, Co., 1987). A
translation of part of the Defense Agency Establishment Law can
be found in Harrison M. Holland, Managing Defense: Japan’s
Dilemma (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988),
Appendix b.
2. See “Paragraph 1, Article 4—Mission of the Defense Agency,”
Defense Agency Establishment Law. For the administrative and
politically significant elevation of the Defense Agency into the
MOD, see Tamura Shigenobu, ed., Bōeishō Tanjō: Sono Igi to
Rekishi (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 2007), and Yuki Tatsumi and
Andrew L. Oros, eds., Japan’s New Defense Establishment:
Institutions, Capabilities, and Implications (Washington, D.C.:
The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007).
3. There is no official English-language translation of the SDF Law.
Article 7, as translated by the editors, simply reads: “The Prime
Minister, representing the Cabinet, possesses the right to be the
commander in chief of the Self-Defense Forces.”
4. “Bō eichō Ima, Mukashi Monogatari, No. 1: Bō eichō -Jieitai no
Hossoku,” Securitarian, April 2004, No. 545, pp. 44–45.
5. Asagumo Shimbunsha, Bōei Handobukku, various editions refer-
enced, including Heisei 4 Nen (1992 Edition) and Heisei 21 Nen
(2009 Edition).
6. “Reference 16, Jieikan no Teiin oyobi Genin (Authorized and
Actual Strength of Self-Defense Personnel), as of March 31,
2016,” in Ministry of Defense, ed., Bōei Hakusho 2016.
7. These figures are as of March 31, 2016. The actual strength is not
the same number as the authorized strength. The latter strengths
are: 150,863 for the GSDF, 46,940 for the ASDF, and 45,364 for
the MSDF. There are an additional 3650 personnel working in the
Joint Staff (Tōgō Bakuryō), with a total strength of 3987 autho-
rized. See Reference 16, “Authorized and Actual Strength of Self-
Defense Personnel (As of March 31, 2016),” in Ministry of

Defense, ed., Bōei Hakusho 2016.
8. Thomas M. Brendle, “Recruitment and Training in the SDF,” in
James H. Buck, ed., The Modern Japanese Military System (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1975), p. 84.
9. “Reference 46, Bōei Hakusho 2015.
10. The US Marine Corps, which has approximately 50,000 more per-
sonnel than the GSDF, has only 75 percent on average of the num-
ber of officers the GSDF does at each rank. If the additional 50,000
were included, the percentage would be about fifty.
11. Information provided by a personnel officer of the GSO by e-mail,
March 31, 2016.
12. Information provided by senior official of GSO by telephone,

January 7, 2010.
13. For more on the relocation, see Bō ei Shisetsuchō , ed., Bōei

Shisetsuchōshi: Kichi Mondai to Tomoni (Tokyo: Bō eishō , 2007),
pp. 237–241.
14. The position was, prior to March 2006, known as the Chairman of
the Joint Staff Council (Tōgō Bakuryō Kaigi Gichō). The Council is
now known as the Joint Staff Office (Tōgō Bakuryō Kanbu). In
addition to this position, one COS (Ō mori Hiroshi) went on to
become president of the National Defense Academy from January
1965 to July 1970, while another (Magari Toshirō ) became a sum-
mary court judge.
15. The NDA was originally founded in 1952 as the Hoan Daigakkō
(National Safety Academy) and renamed the NDA in 1954. It
moved to its present location in Obaradai, Yokosuka, in 1955. For
more on the NDA, see Maki Tomo, Bōei no Tsutome: Jieitai no
Seishinteki Kyoten (Tokyo: Chūō Kō ron Shinsha, 2009), Nakamori
Shizuo, Bōei Daigakkō no Shinjitsu: Mujun to Kattō no 50 Nenshi
(Tokyo: Keizaikai, 2004), Nishihara Masashi, “Beigun Komonsha
to Bō ei Daigakkō no Secchi,” Obaradai, No. 83 (March 2003),
pp. 4–17, and Bō ei Daigakkō , ed., The National Defense Academy
of Japan (Yokosuka: Bō ei Daigakkō , undated (circa 1996)).
16. Of the remaining three, one (Terashima Taizō ) was a graduate of
Tō hoku University, one (Ishii Masao) of Rikkyō University, and a
third (Nakamura Morio), a graduate of the Imperial Japanese
Army Air Force Academy (Rikugun Kōkū Shikan Gakkō).
52 R.D. ELDRIDGE
17. Inoki, Masamichi, Watashi no 20 Seiki: Inoki Masamichi Kaikoroku

(Tokyo: Sekai Shisō sha, 2000), p. 363.
18. Integration of 340 candidates (170 from NDA and 170 from civil-
ian universities) began on a trial basis in 2007. Eldridge interview
with commandant, vice commandant, and senior officials from
Officer Candidate School (OCS), February 3, 2011.
19. According to Kimizuka, while in Leavenworth, Kansas, he and his
Indonesian counterpart lived close by one another and their fami-
lies spent much time together. As president, Bambang Yudhoyono
and the First Lady Hj. Ani Yudhoyono visited Kesennuma City,
which fell within then Lieutenant General Kimizuka’s area of
responsibility, after the March 11 Earthquake and Tsunami in June
2011. Later, after becoming COS, General Kimizuka made an offi-
cial visit to Indonesia and was hosted at the presidential residence.
His friendship with his American classmates continues today as
well. Upon retiring, he moved to a house near Zama, where the
headquarters of US Army Japan (USARJ) is located, and regularly
dined with the Boozers. “E-mail from General (ret.) Kimizuka Eiji
to Dr. Robert D. Eldridge, November 27, 2013.”
20. This is in great contrast to the US military, which encourages all of
its personnel to go on for higher education, offering tuition assis-
tance and partnering with branch campuses, distance education,
and on-line educational sites. While more and more Japanese per-
sonnel have a chance to go abroad, it is still relatively limited.
Ironically, the lack of awareness of international thinking/norms
and foreign affairs is was one of the biggest faults of the prewar
military, an issue desperately but ultimately unsuccessfully pointed
out by Lieutenant General Kuribayashi Tadamichi, defender of
Iwō Tō , who argued strongly against war with the United States,
having lived there many years as an attaché and intimately familiar
with its vast resources and resourcefulness.
21. The reference to “him” is intentional; there have been no female
generals to date in the GSDF.
22. Yomiuri Shimbun, ed., Nihon no Bōei Senryoku, 1: Rikujō Jeiaitai
(Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1987), pp. 13–14.
23. Conversations with Eldridge by these personnel.
24. Based on information received by Eldridge during a briefing and
visit to Camp Sendai on March 11, 2014.
25. Many in the GSDF were surprised at Kimizuka’s nomination as

COS by Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi, as another lieutenant
general, Sekiguchi Taiichi, who had been Vice COS and com-
manding general of EA was the favored candidate. Sekiguchi and
Kimizuka were classmates at NDA (20th graduating class, or Dai
20 Ki), having graduated in 1976.
26. The 15th Brigade succeeded the 1st Combined Brigade, or Daiichi
Konseidan, on March 26, 2010. The change was based on the
Mid-Term Defense Program for fiscal year (FY) 2005–2009 (Chūki
Bōeiryoku Seibi Keikaku, Heisei 17 Nendo kara Heisei 21 Nendo),
which increased the number of forces from 1800 to 2100 to help
them deal with new threats and challenges in the southwestern
areas.
27. Based on information received by Eldridge during a briefing and
visit to Camp Ainoura on June 11, 2014.
28. Eldridge-led interviews with GSDF officials from GSO and WA
during the spring and summer of 2010.
29. Banshō was named by experts and readers of a conservative maga-
zine as one of the most popular general officers in Japan of all time,
and the only postwar general to make the cut. See “Nihon Shijō
Saikyō no Sensō Shikikan ha Dare Desuka: Oda Nobunaga Kara
Yamamoto Isoroku Made,” Sapio, Vol. 22, No. 1 (January 4,
2010), pp. 7, 22.
30. Banshō mentioned during a small dinner party one night following
the completion of the First Amphibious Seminar conducted at his
headquarters in Kengun that he graduated the NDA (as a master
sergeant), the same day (March 23, 1980) his father retired from
the GSDF. Observations recorded by Eldridge during dinner, June
11, 2014.
31. Symbolic of the need to be fast and flexible, the second commander
of the Central Readiness Regiment was Colonel Yamaguchi
Kazunori, the GSO Liaison Officer to the US Marine Corps
Combat Development Command, who was able to leverage his
close connections to Marines in that position. (Eldridge interviews
with Colonel Yamaguchi between 2005 and 2014.)
32. This view was gained during senior US–Japan bilateral military
conferences and unofficial briefings by GSDF officials attended by
Eldridge from 2010 to 2012.
54 R.D. ELDRIDGE
33. Briefings for and discussions with Eldridge (and Colonel Grant
F. Newsham, USMC), by CRR officials, June 23, 2011, Camp
Utsunomiya.
34. In Operation Tomodachi, Eldridge briefly worked with a female
linguist of the GSDF, who was a reservist in this system.
35. Only the two JSDF reserve systems that provide deployable forces
are recognized in Tables 3–5.
36. For more on this trend, see Tomoko Tsunoda and Brad Glosserman,
“The Guillotine: Japan’s Demographic Transformation and its
Security Implications,” Pacific Forum CSIS Issues and Insights, Vol.
9, No. 10 (June 2009).
37. “Rikuji no Josei Taiin, Koritsu Chiku no Josei o Shien,” Yomiuri
Shimbun, March 20, 2011.
38. Eldridge interview with Sezutsu Kei at Camp Itami, Itami City,
Hyō go Prefecture, October 10, 2007.
39. “Draft System May Follow War Legislation,” Japan Press Weekly,
June 17, 2015 (http://www.japan-press.co.jp/modules/news/
index.php?id=8311, accessed August 2015).
40. National Defense Academy study, December 2001.
41. The goal of NIDS is to act as the MOD’s “core policy research
arm, conducting research and studies with a policy orientation pri-
marily on security and military history, while also serving as a stra-
tegic college-level educational institution for the training of
high-level officers of the Self-Defense Forces”(http://www.nids.
go.jp/english/about_us/index.html, accessed June 14, 2010).
42. Compiled from http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/link/index.html;
accessed June 10, 2010.
43. In addition to the GRDC, the US Army has LNOs historically
assigned to each of the GSDF regional army headquarters. The
USMC, in addition to the assignment of an LNO to GRDC, it
began having an LNO assigned to WA in July 2012 (http://www.
dvidshub.net/news/92536/western-army-welcomes-marine-liai-
son#.U3ekw_mSxXM, accessed May 2014). The GSDF has LNOs
assigned to III Marine Expeditionary Forces since 1997 (as well as
to the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade since April 2014) in
Okinawa, Marine Forces Pacific at Camp Smith in Hawaii, and the
Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico,
Virginia, on the Marine Corps side, and to the U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command in Fort M onroe, the U.S. Army Combined
Arms Command in Fort Leavenworth, I Corps in Washington
State, and the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command at
Fort Schafter in Honolulu, Hawaii.
44. Stavale e-mail interview with US Marine Corps Colonel, February
1, 2010.
45. Ibid.
46. Only Fukuoka Prefecture stands out—it is ranked 18th in 2012.
See “Kenmin Shotoku, Heikin 279 Manen Okinawa ga Saikai
Dasshutsu: 09 Nendo, Chiikikan Kakusa ha Saisho,” Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, February 29, 2012 (http://www.nikkei.com/article/
DGXNASFS29028_Z20C12A2EE1000/, accessed June 2014).
47. Martin Collcutt, Marius Jansen, Isao Kumakura, Cultural Atlas of
Japan (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1991), p. 9.
48. “Column: Deeta de Miru Soshi (Column: Enlisted as Seen through
Data),” MAMOR, No. 44 (October 2010), p. 19.
49. Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2006, p. 366.
50. Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2010, p. 495.
51. “‘Memorii Funshutsu’ Shokuba ni Hō chigo, Betsu no Rikuji Taiin
ga Nusumi Suteru,” Mainichi Shimbun, July 1, 2008.
52. “Rikuji 14 Mannin Jō hō Baikyaku no Utagai, Kagoshima no Ichii
Taiho,” Yomiuri Shimbun, September 1, 2009.
53. MAMOR is published by Fusō sha, a conservative publisher which
also publishes SPA!, a weekly soft-porn tabloid.
54. For his remarks, see “Address by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe at the
2013 Troop Review for the Anniversary of the Establishment of
the Self-Defense Forces, Sunday, October 27, 2013,” http://
japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201310/27kunji_e.html
(accessed June 2014).
55. “Japan, New Zealand Joining Talisman Saber for 1st Time,” Stars
and Stripes, May 28, 2015.
56. “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation April 27,
2015,” available at the Foreign Ministry of Japan’s website, http://
www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf (accessed August 2015).
PART II
The History of the GSDF

CHAPTER 3
The Early Years of the Ground Self-Defense

Forces, 1945–1960
Ayako Kusunoki
Introduction
For Japan, who took its first steps as a sovereign state during the era of
imperialism, a strong military was essential to guarantee national survival
in an Asia dominated by Western powers. Establishment of the military
became synonymous with the founding of the state and the military became
a symbol of modernization. It could perhaps be said that the victories in
the Sino-Japanese (1894–1895) and Russo-Japanese (1904–1905) wars
were proof that the frenzied push toward modernization that had been
ongoing since the Meiji Restoration (1867–1868) had been successful.
In terms of military spending, the military commanded more than 30
percent of the national budget beginning in the twentieth century with
a brief exception in the 1920s. From the 1937 outbreak of the Second
Sino-Japanese War onward, that portion surpassed 70 percent. Through a
military conscription system established in 1873, citizens were obligated
to serve in the military and dispatched to the battlefield. In 1941, at the
beginning of the Pacific War, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) reached
A. Kusunoki (*)
Research Department, International Research Center for Japanese Studies,
Kyoto, Japan

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8_3
60 A. KUSUNOKI
2.1 million men in service, filling fifty-one divisions.1 The military was
an active presence on the domestic front as well, participating in wide-
spread activities ranging from public security operations to disaster relief.
In terms of both their external authority to eliminate foreign enemies
and their internal authority to maintain order, the powers of the IJA and
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) were nearly unlimited.
It was the Occupation reforms that completely rejected that form of
political society. Following the defeat in World War II, the IJA and IJN
were gradually disbanded within Japan and the territories it had colonized
or otherwise occupied. By the fall of 1945, much of the wartime military
was disarmed and awaiting repatriation. Parallel to these developments,
the introduction of democratic reforms and the demilitarization of poli-
tics, the economy, and society proceeded under the strong guidance of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP; often referred to as
General Headquarters [GHQ]). GHQ policy was to thoroughly eliminate
systems, customs, and organizations with a feudal character, as they were
believed to have been the roots of and support for militarism. One of the
most significant steps taken as part of this policy was the constitutional
revision in 1946. In the new constitution, Japan renounced “war as a sov-
ereign right of the nation.”2
This did not merely serve as an outward promise that Japan would
never again challenge the peace and stability of international society.
Indeed, it can be said that as time passed, it was its significance as an
internal promise that came to have a strong normative function. For the
many citizens who had lost family, friends, and neighbors in “that war,”
the constitution’s pacifism was not merely a lofty ideal but an actual policy
goal to be pursued. This is why SCAP General Douglas MacArthur was
able to gain the Japanese people’s empathy when he laid out his pet idea
of placing the national security of a disarmed Japan in the hands of the
United Nations (UN)—“a Pacific Switzerland.” With the exception of a
brief period immediately following the outbreak of the Korean War, there
was a strongly negative reaction at the popular level to maintaining mili-
tary strength beyond that necessary for self-defense.3
The establishment of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), Japan’s postwar
“military force,” thus began in politico-social circumstances which did not
necessarily welcome the existence of a military. Additionally, the Yoshida
Shigeru government avoided addressing the relationship between the con-
stitution and rearmament. Instead, it built up its defense strength gradu-
ally, creating the National Police Reserve (NPR) in August 1950, then
THE EARLY YEARS OF THE GROUND SELF-DEFENSE FORCES, 1945–1960 61
the National Safety Agency (NSA) and National Safety Forces (NSF), and
finally, the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) and the SDF in July 1954.4
Opinions are divided as to how Yoshida’s policy should be judged given
the context of the international environment and domestic circumstances
that Japan found itself in. However, there is no question that as a result
of Yoshida’s rearmament policies the SDF were placed in an extremely
uncertain constitutional position.
Thus, the popular support and institutional foundation for the
SDF were both weak. Its low domestic legitimacy became a significant
restraining factor on the ability of the SDF to perform its military func-
tions. Throughout the 1950s, the upgrading and enlargement of the
SDF had to take into consideration both financial constraints and popu-
lar opinion supporting the constitution’s pacifism. The basing of Japan’s
defense on the US–Japan Security Treaty was also considered in terms
of the constitution. During this process, security viewpoints were not
necessarily debated.
This chapter will make clear what sort of “military force” the Japanese
government formed from the SDF, specifically the Ground Self-Defense
Force (GSDF), within the domestic constraints seen in the 1950s. The
largest of the three branches in terms of scale, the GSDF has numer-
ous bases and camps within Japan, giving it many points of contact with
the public. Naturally, these also increased the opportunities for it to be
exposed to the severe supervision by the public. Thus, it was for the GSDF
that the question of how to make the SDF something acceptable to the
public within the climate of postwar democracy most became a pressing
concern. On the other hand, the GSDF has to have the ability to respond
to both direct and indirect aggression. During the Cold War, this meant
the ability to respond to a military invasion by the Soviet Union and to
riots and sabotage incited by communists domestically. There was also a
need for organized disaster relief given Japan’s frequent natural disasters.
In other words, the capabilities required of the GSDF had changed little
from those of the prewar military.
The process of rearmament leading up to the establishment of the
SDF in 1954 has been the early SDF topic of most interest to researchers,
with interest being in the development of postwar Japan’s rearmament in
the form of a “Defense Agency” and “Self-Defense Forces.” There have
been numerous empirical studies showing how rearmament proceeded
gradually due to a combination of the post-peace treaty Japanese political
environment, which was marked by fierce confrontations both between
62 A. KUSUNOKI
conservatives and reformists and among the conservatives themselves,

and disagreements between the United States and Japan over increas-
ing Japan’s defense capabilities.5 As documents from Japan as well as
the United States have been made public and oral histories from those
involved with the SDF have become increasingly available, recent research
seems to have shifted to issues following the SDF’s founding. One of these
is the question of how the concept of civilian control introduced by the
US military was applied to the JDA and SDF. The formation and opera-
tion of the unique Japanese system of civilian control known as “bureau
control” is the principal focus here.6 Another topic of interest is analysis
of the multiple defense plans drawn up since the establishment of the JDA
and SDF to clarify what defense policy courses were present within the
JDA and government.7
Past research, whether focusing on the period predating the establish-
ment of the SDF or not, has focused on the institutional frameworks of
the JDA and SDF. In comparison, analysis of how the SDF—in the case of
this chapter and book, the GSDF—developed its abilities as an actual force
is not necessarily as well developed. For example, how was the placement
of facilities such as bases and camps decided? What types of organizations
were formed in the process of equipping the force? How was education
and training undertaken?8
General defense policy, the various institutions involved in the opera-
tion of the JDA and SDF, and defense plans were all part of a framework
demarcating what the SDF was to be as a whole. Their importance goes
without saying, but if we do not also analyze how that framework was
filled in, we cannot grasp the true picture of the GSDF as a military force.
Following the process by which the institution of the GSDF was estab-
lished in the 1950s, this chapter explores how its basing plan and organi-
zation, equipment, and education/training programs were prepared and
what kind of activities the GSDF performed (or did not perform, as the
case may be). It also makes clear what outwardly and inwardly focused
functions the GSDF developed.
The Creation of the NPR: “Military” or “Police”?

The establishment of the NPR began with a letter from General MacArthur
to Prime Minister Yoshida on July 8, 1950, two weeks after the outbreak
of the Korean War. American and Korean forces had repeatedly fallen back
in the face of the Soviet-supported North Korean army’s offensives; less
than two months from the beginning of the war they faced a perilous
situation, having been driven to Pusan at the southern edge of the Korean
peninsula. At the time, there were four divisions of the US Army stationed
in the Japanese mainland carrying out occupation duties: the 7th Infantry
Division (in Hokkaido), the 1st Cavalry Division (in Kantō ), the 25th
Infantry Division (in Kansai), and the 24th Infantry Division (in Kyūshū).
By mid-July, three of these divisions had been transferred to the Korean
peninsula, however, and it had already been decided to dispatch the fourth
as well. MacArthur decided that a Japanese-organized force should fill the
vacuum created by the departure of this American occupying force.9 He
gave the Japanese government “permission” to establish a 75,000-man
NPR to “strengthen the police.” GHQ did not permit the creation of
this force to be debated in the Diet; the NPR Law (Keisatsu Yobitairei)
was approved by the cabinet a month later on August 9 (the law was
announced and went into force the following day).10
The law established the NPR as an organization to “supplement the
police power of the National Rural Police (NRP; Kokka Chihō Keisatsu)
and local police to the extent necessary to maintain our nation’s peace
and order and guarantee the public welfare.”11 GHQ envisioned two roles
for this reserve. The first was defending important military installations
within Japan. The other was to “supplement the Japanese police in prepa-
ration for serious civil strife or conflict and to fill the vacuum caused by
the deployment of the American military away from Japan” in the place
of the four American divisions sent to the Korean peninsula. It was to
aim to “be located in four main military areas approximately coinciding
with those of the four divisions of the U.S. Army” and form “1500-man
infantry divisions with the usual service and technical support” as quickly
as possible.12 In other words, GHQ not only created the NPR as an orga-
nization supplementing already existing police forces but also planned to
develop and expand it into a military organization capable of responding
to indirect and small-scale direct aggression before long.
However, given that Japan had renounced war in its constitution, the
establishment of a “military” was politically unacceptable. MacArthur’s
GHQ had been the very organization responsible for the thorough demil-
itarization and democratization of Japan. For this reason, efforts were
taken to conceal the “military” flavor of the NPR as much as possible.
The coining of new terms such as sōtai (“general forces”) for “armies,”
kankutai (“regional forces”) for divisions, and tokusha (“special vehicles”)
for tanks is a notable example of these efforts.13
64 A. KUSUNOKI
The Japanese government was informed to some extent of the American

military’s ultimate intention of turning the NPR into a military organiza-
tion. When Chief Cabinet Secretary Okazaki Katsuo visited Major General
Courtney Whitney, head of GHQ’s Government Section, on July 8 to
confirm the meaning of MacArthur’s letter, Whitney explained that the
NPR was not a normal police force and was intended to respond to inter-
nal disturbances and attacks by foreign enemies. They would be armed
with carbines and equipped with things such as artillery and tanks in the
future.14 Despite this, many Japanese actors, most significantly Prime
Minister Yoshida, seem to have understood the NPR as solely intended
for the purpose of supplementing “police resources.”
This was because the Japanese government was greatly concerned
about the domestic stability of Japan. It had noticed the rapid growth
of communist strength in the country since MacArthur’s restrictions on
the right of public workers to strike in the summer of 1948.15 The imple-
mentation of the Dodge Line in early 1949 caused severe deflation and
concerns about social unrest became more and more serious. It was in the
summer of this year that the mysterious cases known as the Shimoyama,
Mitaka, and Matsukawa Incidents occurred one after another. These inci-
dents occurred during the Japanese National Railways’ third set of layoffs
and communist involvement was suspected. As the size of the Japanese
police had been weakened as part of the Occupation’s democratic reforms
to 125,000 men—30,000 in NRP headquarters and the rest in local police
forces—it was clear that there were significant limits on the ability of the
police to respond.16 The Japanese government had repeatedly requested
that MacArthur authorize an increase in the police, but the Supreme
Commander never agreed.17 These were the circumstances in which the
letter of July 8 arrived. Yoshida, who possessed a strong sense of order,
welcomed the letter with open arms and did not hold back in his support
for the creation of the NPR. He tapped Masuhara Keikichi, a man with a
Home Affairs background and the then-governor of Kagawa Prefecture,
to be the NPR’s first Director General.18
Most of the men under Masuhara and his deputy Eguchi Mitoru
(transferred in from the Ministry of Labor) who worked together with
the Civil Affairs Section Annex (CASA), the section of GHQ charged
with the creation of the NPR, in setting up the new organization had
police backgrounds. Of these men, Katō Yō zō (head of NPR’s Personnel
Bureau), Ishii Eizō (head of NPR’s Police Affairs Bureau), and Kubotani
Naomitsu (head of NPR’s Equipment Bureau) played the most significant
roles. They were supported by men such as Gotō da Masaharu (head of the
Police Affairs Bureau’s Investigation Division), Utsumi Hitoshi (head of
the Police Affairs Bureau’s Education and Training Division), and Makari
Nobuyoshi (head of the Personnel Bureau’s Personnel Division). Katō ,
the head of the NRP’s General Affairs Section, and Ishii, the head of the
Tokyo Police’s precinct headquarters, were transferred to the NPR at the
strong urging of Ō hashi Takeo, head of the Attorney General’s Office,
and Saitō Noboru, the head of the NRP. Gotō da had been chief of crimi-
nal investigations under Ishii and was transferred with him, as was Utsumi.
The rest of NPR headquarters was assembled by gathering up personnel
from the NRP prefectural security and police affair section heads. The
organization of the headquarters actually began when the “Regulations
for the Organization of National Police Reserve Headquarters” were
decided upon on August 26.19
The recruitment of troops began on August 13, parallel to the orga-
nization of NPR headquarters. Everything, from the formation and
implementation of a recruitment plan to background checks on volun-
teers and the dispersal of uniforms and equipment, was overseen by the
NRP. Because of heightened concerns about the forces of communism
due to the outbreak of the Korean War and the comparably attractive
employment conditions (a monthly salary of 5000 yen and a severance
payment of 60,000 yen), there were reportedly 382,000 volunteers,
five times the number needed. Some 74,000 recruits were assembled at
police academies in various police districts and then sent to American
military camps in eleven groups over the period from August 23 to
October 12.20
The extremely ambiguous nature of the NPR—was it intended as a
supplement to the police, or as the beginning of a military force?—caused
no shortage of confusion for its leadership. For example, Gotō da, who was
in charge of organizing the force, suspected that GHQ’s ultimate purpose
was the establishment of a military. He had enlisted in the IJA shortly after
joining the Ministry of Home Affairs and spent the Pacific War serving in
the headquarters of the Taiwan Army. Upon being shown an organizational
chart for the NPR by an American military officer, he immediately realized
it was the same as that of an American infantry division.21 However, the
explanation given to the public was that the NPR was only an organiza-
tion to supplement “the strength of the police.” The leadership went to
work establishing what was actually a “mini-military” as a “police force,”
all the while debating how best to actually implement GHQ’s intentions
66 A. KUSUNOKI
and Yoshida’s desires. For young officials feeling the humiliation of the
Occupation and burning with the need to rebuild Japan, their duties made
them feel it all the more. They spent their days suppressing their depres-
sion and asking themselves “why have we ended up under an Occupation
like this, forced to create something so ambiguous?”22
There were others who understood MacArthur’s orders as permission
for the re-establishment of a “military” and worked to make the NPR
its first step. These were Major General Charles A. Willoughby, head of
General Staff-2 (G2) of the US Army Forces in the Far East, and former
IJA officers. The fiercely anti-communist Willoughby was critical of the
democratic reforms introduced by Government Section and others, fear-
ing that they had weakened Japan. He had placed many former Japanese
officers under his protection under the pretext that they were needed for
information collection and the compilation of a history of the war. Former
IJA Colonel Hattori Takushirō was the officer charged with the history’s
compilation. He and many former officers around him worked on a plan
for the establishment of a Japanese military and a list of former military
personnel who should be its core, anticipating that the day for Japan’s rear-
mament had finally come.23 As the establishment of the NPR got under-
way, Willoughby planned to make Hattori the Senior Superintendent, or
Sōtai Sōkan, the commander of NPR forces, and place 400 former officers
from Hattori’s list in leadership positions.
Masuhara was surprised when Hattori was suddenly brought in by
Major General Winfield Shepherd, head of GHQ’s Civil Affairs section.
Even more surprised and opposed to the move were the Yoshida govern-
ment and the Government Section. Yoshida, who disliked former mil-
itary personnel in general, took special exception to Hattori and those
around him. Hattori had played an important role in planning operations
for the Army General Staff beginning in the late 1930s and had been
Tō jō Hideki’s private secretary. In addition to former generals Shimomura
Sadamu and Tatsumi Eiichi, who enjoyed Yoshida’s trust, strong oppo-
sition to Hattori’s involvement in NPR leadership selection also came
from former generals Iimura Jō , Kozuki Yoshio, Miyazaki Shūichi, and
Yamamoto Moichirō . The Government Section, which was often in oppo-
sition to Yoshida, backed him in this case. As the result of heated argu-
ments between Government Section and G2, MacArthur ordered a freeze
on the recruitment of former military officers.24
Hayashi Keizō , a vice minister at the Imperial Household Agency
(Kunaichō ) with a Home Affairs background, was chosen as Senior
Superintendent. Not only did Hayashi have no experience with military

command, he had virtually none with the police, either. However, he had
been involved in the failed formation of the Ugaki Kazushige cabinet,
was the son of former general Hayashi Yasakichi, had had a career with
Home Affairs, and had an irreproachable character. Given the need to find
someone without a military background for the position, there was no
one else felt to be more qualified. Hayashi firmly turned down the posi-
tion but was ultimately convinced by Masuhara, Okazaki, and others to
take it. Hayashi’s appointment was not finalized until October 9 as G2,
having lost the argument over the employment of former officers, such as
Hattori, refused to agree with the selection.
Judging from the results, the selection of Hayashi as the force’s
chief executive can be said to have been the correct choice for the early
GSDF. His integrity gained him the trust of both civilian and uniformed
NPR personnel, and he became a spiritual pillar of strength for the early
GSDF. He presided as the top uniformed member until his retirement in
1964, serving, in turn, as the NSA’s Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff,
Joint Staff Council for the Defense Agency.25
The prohibition on former military officers meant that filling other
staff officer positions also took time. When training first got underway
at the camps, leadership positions were decided by the American military
observers or by votes among the trainees themselves. The situation was
generally haphazard, with a tendency for those with some non-commis-
sioned officer (NCO) experience or English fluency to be chosen. Before
long, it was decided to fill 200 high-level leadership positions through spe-
cial appointment and 800 mid-level leadership positions through recruit-
ment from the general public. The process of selection and appointment
began in mid-September and took until the following year to complete.
The approximately 160 men selected through special appointment were
drawn from various government positions, mainly those related to the
police, although GHQ vetoed the recruitment of those with a Special
Higher Police (Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu) background. Rounding out the
top leadership positions with Hayashi were Iseki Yūjirō (former executive
director of the Petition Committee) as Vice Senior Superintendent and
Takeuchi Shōhei (former Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) Natural Resources Agency’s Electrical Power Bureau head) as
Administrative Supply Superintendent. The four kankutai superinten-
dent positions were filled by Yoshida Chūichi (vice governor of Saitama;
Region 1), Nakano Toshio (NRP Sapporo Police Chief; Region 2), Ōmori
68 A. KUSUNOKI
Kan (Chiba Prefectural Police Chief; Region 3), and Tsutsui Takeo (for-
mer governor of the Korean province Kōkaidō; Region 4).26
The limits of this method of recruitment quickly became apparent,
however. The lack of skilled commanders caused considerable difficulties
in preparing the NPR to act as a capable force. By the fall of 1951, a year
from its founding, the NPR was still an “undisciplined mob.”27 In order
for it to function, professional soldiers would be needed in unit leadership
positions after all. After being advised by Tatsumi, Yoshida took the plunge
and agreed with the use of former officers. General Matthew B. Ridgway,
commander of the US Army’s Far East Command (and MacArthur’s suc-
cessor when the latter was relieved by President Harry S. Truman in April
1951), was also positive toward the idea of exempting former officers from
the purge.28
In March 1951, letters were sent to approximately 3000 offi-
cers from the 58th graduating class of the IJA Academy and the 74th
class of the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy asking them to join the
NPR. Eventually 245 were hired (and appointed as officer candidates on
June 1). In August, candidates were selected from field grade officers with
leadership and operational experience and, after a selection process led
by Tatsumi and Shimomura, 405 of approximately 900 applicants were
hired (appointed on October 1). Some 414 company grade officers were
then hired in September, meaning that 1064 former officers entered the
NPR in 1951 alone.29 Some of the more “non-harsh” former officers were
appointed to serve as deputies and secretaries for the kankutai superin-
tendents, all of whom had Home Affairs bureaucratic backgrounds and
did not understand military matters.30 The recruitment of former officers
and police bureaucrats for mid-level leadership positions took place nine
times over the following five years until it became possible to fill positions
through internal promotion and with graduates of the National Defense
Academy (NDA; Bōei Daigakkō) in mid-1954.31 Even those officers with
military experience were required to first enter the NPR Officer School
established in Kurihama and learn from scratch, using American military
manuals. Even the former colonels hired to be Superintendents First Class
had to “shut up and listen from the back of the room” in bewilderment.
They had to bear it, once again facing the reality that they had lost the war
and thinking to themselves that “I guess this is how you rebuild a defeated
country’s military from scratch?”32 Unlike the Maritime Self- Defense
Force (MSDF), which was recreated almost entirely based upon the IJN,
a break from the past military was considered important for the GSDF.
GHQ intended to develop the NPR into a “military” in the future.

And, at the time in which the Korean War had just begun, the Japanese
people were favorable to the possession of military arms for the purpose
of self-defense.33 Had the Japanese government proceeded by announc-
ing that it was going to rearm itself, it might have succeeded. However,
the Yoshida government devoted itself to establishing the NPR purely
as a “supplement to police power” and not as a “military.” Because the
demilitarization and disarmament of Japan was the will of the Allies,
there were several institutional restraints on remilitarization, such as
decisions by the Far Eastern Commission. Constitutional restrictions
also existed, of course. But I think that Yoshida’s intentions were more
important than those issues in detaching the creation of the NPR from
“rearmament.”
Although Yoshida was not fundamentally opposed to the possession
of a military, he had no intention of beginning rearmament prior to the
conclusion of a peace treaty. Rearming could potentially damage rela-
tions with neighboring countries who feared a Japanese military revival
and there would predictably be domestic opposition as well. He was
most concerned that rearmament would place a heavy burden on the
weakened Japanese economy: Economic instability would likely bring
about social instability. Yoshida, who perceived the communist threat as
political rather than military, feared more than anything else that polit-
ical, social, and economic uncertainty would make Japan a breeding
ground for communism. For this reason, he emphasized the importance
of maintaining public order and desired that the police be strengthened
for that purpose, but he did not believe the establishment of a military
was necessary. It was his hunch that maintaining a political, social, and
economic health could also be part of national defense during the Cold
War, and that military force alone would not be enough to protect a
country.34
There was another important reason that Yoshida opposed remilitariza-
tion prior to the signing of a peace treaty. He believed that the more
remilitarization was rushed, the greater the likelihood of involvement by
former military officers. Yoshida’s vision for Japan’s remilitarization was
the establishment of an Anglo-American-style democratic military possess-
ing only the minimum capabilities necessary for self-defense. This military
was to be established in the future as conditions allowed after the constitu-
tion was revised with popular agreement. New individuals were necessary
to make that happen, but the training of personnel took time. If rearma-
70 A. KUSUNOKI
ment was rushed, then there would be no choice but to rely upon former
military officers; the new military would therefore become a copy of the
old IJA and IJN. Yoshida, who allowed only a few former officers such
as Shimomura and Tatsumi to get close to him, wanted to remove the
influence of former military officers from the new military as much as pos-
sible. Numerous rearmament plans by former officers such as Hattori and
Nomura Kichisaburō were brought to him, but Yoshida distanced himself
from them.35
The former Home Affairs bureaucrats who controlled the NPR’s lead-
ership positions, also wanted to eliminate former military officers from the
NPR as much as possible. The IJA had come to be seen as the embodi-
ment of evil following the defeat, a perception aided by the disrepute of
the Hattori group, and the new leaders tried to place as much distance
between themselves and the former officers as possible.36 For this reason,
they opposed the introduction of former officers into NPR leadership
positions until the very end. Gotō da and Utsumi, who had been drafted
into the military during the war, were especially passionate about rooting
out the vices of the old military. When Utsumi spoke before new recruits
in 1951, saying, “We are building a strong Reserve. Its training must be
filled with humanity. We’re creating people who incorporate humanity.
We’re creating something powerful as a unit as well,” we can understand
his statement as a reflection of that conviction.37 As will be discussed later,
they were also extremely inhibitive about the NPR using its power.
The former military officers had to give up and accept the situation:
“Everyone knew that ‘we’d lost, the Home Affairs bureaucrats were
mostly in charge now, and nothing was going to go well unless they did
things correctly.’”38 In this way, the NPR, which was regulated as a “police
force,” created a new effective organization while also incorporating for-
mer military personnel.
The Formation of the NPR as an Effective Force

The NPR’s central organization and central unit headquarters was estab-
lished at Etchujima in Tokyo on September 7, 1950, about a month after
the NPR’s founding. Before long a headquarters company was placed in
Tokyo, units were gradually placed in locations such as Tokyo, Osaka,
Sendai, and Fukuoka, and training got underway. However, this was all
provisional; unit organization was not formally decided upon until the
end of December.
According to “Regulations for the National Police Reserve’s Unit

Organization” distributed on December 29, the Japanese mainland was
divided into four regions (kanku). The first region consisted of Tō hoku
and Kantō , the second region, Hokkaido, the third region, Kinki and
Chūgoku (except for Yamaguchi Prefecture), and the fourth region,
Yamaguchi Prefecture and Kyūshū. Each regional force, or kankutai,
contained a regional headquarters, infantry regiments, artillery regi-
ments, engineer battalions, and medical battalions. The regional head-
quarters were located in Etchujima for the first region, Makomanai for
the second region, Uji for the third region (this was moved to Itami in
April 1951), and Fukuoka for the fourth region. The NPR consisted of
these four regional forces, a service and supply unit, and units under the
direct control of the Senior Superintendent. Camps were readied in each
region, and affiliated facilities such as schools, supply depots, and hospi-
tals were built.39
Recruits needed to be equipped and trained. However, because of
Occupation restrictions on the possession of weapons and production
of military supplies, Japan was not able to procure arms, ammunition,
and vehicles on its own in 1950. For this reason, all of the NPR’s pri-
mary equipment was supplied by the American military. The weapons
initially supplied when the NPR was founded were carbine rifles. Later,
0.50-caliber machine guns, 0.45-caliber submachine guns, 2.36-inch
rocket launchers, and 60-mm mortars were also loaned to the Japanese.
As Japan was under Allied occupation and had been demilitarized and
disarmed in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, early American
policy toward Japan, and resolutions of the Far Eastern Commission, it
was not permitted to possess any arms beyond “small arms”; this set the
limit as to what could be provided. The NRP and other advisory bodies
secured necessary supplies beyond arms and ammunition through emer-
gency procurement.40
With the entry of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army into the
Korean War in November 1950, UN forces faced difficult conditions
on the Korean peninsula and pressure within the US military for heavier
armaments for the NPR became significant. In early 1951, MacArthur
contacted Washington requesting heavy weapons for the NPR such as
medium tanks and 155-mm howitzers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
endorsed MacArthur’s opinion in early February and proposed to the
State Department that the NPR become a heavily armed force of ten
divisions. The State Department, however, was anxious about opposition
72 A. KUSUNOKI
from the countries on the Far Eastern Commission and opposed the NPR
becoming a heavily armed force prior to the signing of a peace treaty as it
would clearly violate the policy of Japan disarmament. Both sides agreed
to the establishment of a Special Far East Command Reserve stockpiling
enough heavy armaments for the NPR’s four divisions. These would be
released to the Japanese pending the agreement of the State Department
and, depending on the situation, the decision of the American govern-
ment. This was decided upon in late April 1951.41
The US military was unsatisfied with this decision, and over the follow-
ing fifteen months it sought and received approval from President Truman
to have the Department of the Army draw up the necessary budget for a
plan to fully arm ten NPR divisions.42 The State Department was wary of
heavily arming the NPR even after the peace conference, however, fear-
ing that it could hinder ratification of the peace treaty. General Ridgway
also opposed giving heavy weapons to the NPR as the rearmament issue
had become politicized. For this reason, the military gave up on provid-
ing heavy weaponry and settled for only training the NPR on American
military bases for the time being. When the State Department sought the
understanding of the members of the Far Eastern Commission for this,
there was no particular opposition. But it was requested that no ostenta-
tious steps be taken prior to ratification of the peace treaty.43
In this way, the American military’s requests that the NPR by provided
with equipment beyond that of a “police force” and its defense strength be
increased were suppressed within the US government through 1951 due
to political and diplomatic considerations. The equipment lent to the NPR
from March to October 1951 included M7A1 and M8 grenade launchers,
60-mm and 81-mm mortars, and M16 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns in
addition to rifles, pistols, automatic weapons, and sniper rifles. However,
with the elimination of institutional restraints on Japan’s rearmament once
the peace treaty went into effect in April 1952, the equipment supplied
began to go beyond small arms. In 1952, the NPR was provided with
32,500 Type 99 rifles, carbine and rifle bayonets, 3.5-inch rocket launch-
ers, 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers, M15A1 self-propelled anti-aircraft
guns, and M24 light tanks. The NPR also became self-sufficient for sec-
ondary equipment with the establishment of the NPR’s supply chain in
April 1951.44
Training with the above equipment was held on camps. Although unit
organization had been set at the end of 1951 and camps established in
various locations, basic training went no further than the regimental level
until the end of 1954. This was because the equipment supplied by the
American military was initially only small arms, nothing more powerful
than automatic weapons, and supply conditions were not good. Because
replacement parts for the equipment had not been provided, it was also
impossible to completely repair equipment. Another reason was that per-
sonnel changes were frequent in the first two years of the NPR.45
Regimental training was divided into six periods and lasted until
September 1952. The teaching methods were those of the American
military, based on translated manuals.46 The first training period (until
January 14, 1951) covered very basic topics such as the operation of car-
bines, improving hygiene, regulations, and other knowledge and skills
necessary for soldiers. The second period (until May 19) was aimed at
small-unit training and covered squad, platoon, and company training.
The purpose of the third period (until October 6) was to finish and
integrate the activities of units at the battalion level and below. During
this period, curriculums for “company operations” and “battalion opera-
tions” were created and distributed. Training was also undertaken to
bring units into compliance with American standards through research
exhibition exercises by the National Police Reserve Academy (Sōtai
Gakkō). The fourth period (until January 19, 1952) continued the unit
training of the third, but with an emphasis on training related to unit
specializations such as administration or combat. Company and battalion
training was completed in July as a result of the unit training undertaken
in the fifth (until June 13) and sixth (unit September 30) training peri-
ods. At the final stage, the units had obtained the tactics and techniques
necessary for rapidly responding to the various situations included in
regimental operations, and supply and administrative roles were able to
be performed in the field.47 Artillery and tank training was undertaken at
the American military base in Somagahara.48
As this training was going on, the educational facilities established
within the NPR began cultivating unit leaders and providing various skills.
At about the same time the NPR was founded, a school was established
in Etajima with programs in leadership, firearms, signal training, facilities,
ordnance, and vehicles, and another in Etchujima for personnel affairs,
management, supply, and prosecution. These schools were attended by
those selected from new recruits. In September, the Tokyo Command
School (Tōkyō Shiki Gakkō) was established to educate commanders and
staff officers. Advisory bodies temporarily took charge of the education
provided by these facilities until April 1951.
74 A. KUSUNOKI
More systematic and permanent educational facilities were prepared

from April 1951 on with the intention of establishing the NPR’s edu-
cational organization. First, in April 1951, the National Police Reserve
Academy was formed in Kurihama. The Academy was initially established
with four branches: low-level leadership training, mid-level and staff offi-
cer training, signal, and medical education. From November to the fol-
lowing January, other schools were established as recruits’ specializations
and classifications were determined: the NPR Artillery School (Sōtai Tokka
Gakko) in Narashino, the NPR Infantry School (Sōtai Futsuka Gakkō) in
Kurume, the NPR Engineer School (Sōtai Shisetu Gakkō) in Katsuta, and
the NPR Ordnance School (Sōtai Buki Gakkō) in Tachikawa. The NPR
Special Training Unit (Sōtai Tokubetsu Kyōikutai) was also established to
provide armor training. The academy’s branches were reorganized as sepa-
rate staff, signal, medical, and service schools in October 1952 with the
goal of improving the level of their training. An aviation school was also
established at this time.49 Through the training provided by these schools,
the NPR had achieved a stable supply of officers and specialists by about
mid-1954.
The Conditions of the NPR as a “Police Force:”

Public Security Operations
The NPR was an organization intended to “supplement the National
Rural Police and local police to the extent necessary to maintain our
nation’s peace and order and guarantee the public welfare.” Primary
responsibility for maintaining public order belonged to the police but it
was expected that NPR would “supplement” their efforts. In the pre-
war period, the military had also been mobilized to maintain order such
as during the 1918 Rice Riots and the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake.50
During the Occupation, occupying forces had been mobilized in cases
such as the spring 1948 Hanshin Education Incident (protests by Korean-
Japanese against orders by the governors of Ō saka and Hyō go to close
Korean schools; these included the occupation of government offices).
Article 3, Sect. 1 of the National Police Reserve Law stated that “the
National Police Reserve can be ordered by the Prime Minister to act to
maintain public order when there is special need.”
As communist activities became extreme during the period of the peace
treaty and the re-establishment of Japanese independence, the likelihood
of public security operations being needed was not at all remote. Gotō da
recalls being “very glad that no communist revolution broke out.”51 In the
“Japanese Communist Party’s Immediate Demands,” otherwise known as
the “1951 Program,” adopted in October 1951, the party chose the path
of armed revolution, calling for liberation from enslavement to American
imperialism and the establishment of a democratic government of national
liberation. On the May Day immediately following the peace treaty going
into effect (May 1, 1952), a group of demonstrators marched from Meiji
Jingū Gaien toward the Imperial Palace, where they surged into the off-
limits plaza in front of the palace and fought police. Two demonstrators
were killed and 2300 police and demonstrators were injured. Central
Tokyo was temporarily in disorder; an American’s car parked nearby was
overturned and set on fire, and an American soldier was thrown into the
palace moat. Concerned by the situation, Yoshida ordered the NPR mobi-
lized for the “Commemoration of the Effectuation of the Peace Treaty
and 5th Anniversary of the Enforcement of the Constitution” ceremony
scheduled for May 3.
Surprisingly, it is unclear who at the NPR handled this order, and how.
There is no evidence remaining of it having gone through formal proce-
dures. In the end, 500 men from the first region’s 1st Infantry Regiment
stationed in Nerima “attended” the ceremony, and another unit waited
near Meiji Jingū in case there was an emergency. The attending soldiers
were armed with carbines and rifles, but no ammunition; the waiting
troops were ready with live ammunition and light machine guns.52
Riots were common throughout the country afterward as well. The
Yoshida cabinet held a ministerial meeting on public order in mid-July
and decided on a policy of strengthening the crackdowns on disturbances
caused by the Communist Party and extremist Koreans. The Suita Incident
had occurred a month before (in this incident, 1000 students, workers,
and Koreans held a rally at Ō saka University’s Toyonaka campus oppos-
ing military bases and rearmament, and calling for an immediate ceasefire
in Korea. The demonstration became violent as stones were thrown at
nearby police stations and protestors clashed with the police). Relevant
cabinet ministers and Director General Masuhara attended this meeting,
where it was decided that the NPR would be actively used: “Unlike in the
past, the National Police Reserve will be mobilized without hesitation.” It
was agreed, however, that the NPR would be limited to small arms such
as carbines and rifles.53
76 A. KUSUNOKI
There are no examples of the NPR (or its successors) being mobilized
for public security operations, not during the two years of its existence nor
up to the current day. They have never been ordered to be on standby for
such operations, either. There was a strong psychological resistance within
the government to using the NPR for the purpose of maintaining order.
Yoshida’s policy of “calling up” the NPR for the May 3 ceremony was
changed by Cabinet Research Office Chief Murai Jun to “attendance.” He
would place the NPR at the ceremony grounds, but only as a “show,” as
he intended for the police to be in charge of the ceremony’s security. This
is because he felt that the NPR should not be involved with actual security:
That should be left to the police. The standby unit was arranged to be
used only if something went wrong.54 Ō hashi Takeo, the cabinet minister
in charge of the NPR, gave the following testimony in a May 6 plenary
session of the House of Representatives: “of course the government has
absolutely no intention of refusing to field the National Police Reserve if
there is a security need. However, given its nature, unnecessarily mobiliz-
ing it in situations judged able to be settled using standard police forces is
something that we know we want to avoid as much as possible.”55
The NPR of the time was also hesitant about engaging in public
security operations. In an interview with the Yomiuri Shimbun, Senior
Superintendent Hayashi said that he “didn’t think the National Police
Reserve should be used in public security operations, but if the govern-
ment was resolved and gave the order, it would have to be set out without
delay, in a way that would not be a disgrace.”56 The units that would be
at the front were more serious still. The commander of the 1st Infantry
Regiment, which was ordered to “attend” (and provide a standby force
for) the May 3 ceremony, ordered on his own authority for the waiting sol-
diers to be issued light machine guns and live ammunition. This is because
he understood that, given the NPR’s strength, simple numbers would
not be of any use if something happened unless they were armed with live
ammunition. Even so, they were primarily armed with tracer ammunition
with the goal of intimidation. “This is because it would be terrible to
shoot our fellow countrymen, even if it was necessary. The best scenario
would be to be able to suppress the situation through intimidation.”57
For the government, which feared indirect aggression by communists,
the NPR was a last resort to be used only if a civil disturbance broke out
that the police could not handle. The mere existence of that last resort
may itself have been a type of reassurance. Having the option of using the
NPR to maintain domestic order actually created an extreme dilemma,
however. Even if used to suppress a riot, there would be no way to escape

criticism over having the NPR aiming guns at the public. And if the
NPR failed to suppress the riot, the very reason for the NPR’s existence
would be called into question. It was thought that the NPR could not
be ordered to engage in public security operations unless the cabinet was
prepared to fall.
Disaster Relief
In Japan, which suffers natural disasters such as earthquakes, typhoons,
blizzards, and volcanic eruptions almost regularly, nature is the greatest
peacetime threat. Rebuilding destroyed infrastructure, aiding and rescu-
ing affected people, and restoring local society in the wake of disasters
has been an important job for policymakers throughout history. A well-
organized military can play a large role in such times. The military was
dispatched in the cases of large-scale prewar disasters such as the eruption
of Sakurajima (1914) and the Great Kantō Earthquake (1923), entrench-
ing disaster relief as a peacetime activity of the military.58
Although disaster relief was not a designated mission of the NPR, it
naturally succeeded to this tradition. The first deployment of NPR regi-
ments for disaster relief was in response to flooding in Fukuchiyama,
Kyoto, in July 1951. The mayor of Fukuchiyama requested aid from the
NPR’s Camp Fukuchiyama, and the regimental commander there dis-
patched his unit for flood prevention activities on his own authority. He
was later punished by NPR Headquarters (Sōtai Sōkanbu) for exceeding
his authority. Gotō da, who recommended the punishment, explained his
rationale in the following way: “We cannot accept the unauthorized use of
military power. We must first report to the Prime Minister, as it should be
done under his orders. Then we must investigate whether the action is in
accordance with the procedures prescribed by law.” The locals had been
pleased by the dispatch of the NPR in Fukuchiyama. However, Gotō da
argued that even if the results were positive, the autonomous use of a unit
was not something that could be accepted from the viewpoint of civilian
control over the military.59
Even so, there was great demand for disaster relief activities. Although
Gotō da called for tightening dispatch procedures, he was not objecting
to the use of the NPR in disaster relief activities itself. Indeed, he thought
positively of them as a way of gaining the understanding of the pub-
lic for the NPR.60 When Yamaguchi Prefecture and other surrounding
78 A. KUSUNOKI
areas suffered damage from heavy rains in October 1951 due to Typhoon
Ruth (resulting in 903 dead and missing in the Kyūshū and Chūgoku
areas), two companies were dispatched to the area from Camp Ozuki for
road clearing, the transport of relief supplies, and reconstruction efforts.
This was the first example of the NPR being dispatched on orders of the
prime minister. This first deployment was communicated to the entire
force as “a significant act that set a new precedent for the National Police
Reserve.”61
Later, on March 3, 1952, standards for the “deployment” of the NPR
were given and a framework for its disaster relief activities was established
to an extent. In the two years before it was reorganized as the NSF under
the NSA, the NPR was sent out six times including in response to an
earthquake in Tokachi, Hokkaido, and a massive fire in Tottori City,
Tottori Prefecture.62
The creation of the NPR was thus something that was literally done in
real time. Three factors can be said to have decided its shape as a “new
organization.” First, the Japanese government and the former Home
Affairs bureaucrats involved did not want to simply “recreate” the old
military; they had a strong desire to build the NPR as an organization
appropriate for Japan under its new constitution. Second, the arming,
organization, and training of the NPR were all done in the style of the
American military. Third, both the Japanese government and the leader-
ship of the NPR were generally wary of having the NPR actually use its
power, especially in the case of using it for the purpose of maintaining
public order. While a consciousness of operating under strict civilian con-
trol was thoroughly entrenched in the NPR, the actual use of the NPR in
public security operations was avoided because of its political impact, even
though such operations were one of the reasons it was created.
It is not hard to imagine that operating and maintaining the NPR’s
organization was made difficult by the failure to resolve the ambiguity as
to whether the NPR was a “military” or “police” force. Put another way,
the issue was what was to be sought as the basic spirit of the NPR? What
was to become the new core replacing the prewar military’s self-identifica-
tion as “the Emperor’s military?”
In a cautionary tale given by Senior Superintendent Hayashi Keizō after
his appointment in October 1950, he said that he wanted the “fundamen-
tal principle” of the NPR to be “cultivating a love of one’s country and
one’s people.” He said that meant “a spirit of love for our fellow country-
men, wishing as fellow citizens for our parents, brothers, sisters, wives,
and children to live in peace and grow.” He tried to instill a consciousness

that the NPR existed to protect the peaceful lives of the people and pro-
tect social order for them: “We must never forget that the National Police
Reserve belongs to the people […] we should advance earnestly remem-
bering that the National Police Reserve is a public institution charged to
us by the state and people.”63
He tried hard afterward to spread this basic spirit whenever the oppor-
tunity presented itself. When former military officers were admitted to the
NPR in 1951, for example, he told them that its basic spirit was “love of
our country and love of its people; the desire for safe peace for our par-
ents and siblings … ‘Proper domestic order and peaceful lives.’” He also
appealed to new recruits, telling them that
We can’t stand idly by and just watch real-life problems. History shows us
that there is no safety for the individual where there is no solidarity. We have
to strive for the NPR to be the seed of that solidarity. Maintaining order
is the most crucial thing for the Japanese people. A sense of volunteerism
surpassing life and death [is necessary]. I believe the spirit is something that
emerges naturally when we’re passionate together and improve together.64
Hayashi’s thoughts apparently had a strong appeal to the men and

helped pull them together.65
Militaries in democratic societies must be organizations rooted in broad
popular support that serve the safety and prosperity of the people. Hayashi
communicated this to his men in plain language; his words surely had the
effect of giving meaning to the trial and error process through which the
NPR formed itself as an organization. The NPR’s institutional makeup
progressed with the goal of becoming a military organization functioning
within a democratic society.
From The NPR To The NSA and NSF

The issue of rearmament was first taken up by the American and Japanese
governments when Advisor to the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,
met with Prime Minister Yoshida in Japan to negotiate a peace treaty in
January and February 1951. In these meetings, Dulles pursued rearma-
ment as a concrete “contribution” Japan could make to the Free World.
The discussion proceeded with difficulty as Yoshida took an unrecep-
tive position throughout the negotiations. Ultimately, the Japanese
80 A. KUSUNOKI
government confirmed that it intended to begin rearming and signed

a security treaty with the United States that included the provision of
military bases, and the Americans presented Japan with a generous
peace treaty. In negotiations stretching through the San Francisco Peace
Conference in September and ending in late February 1952, a security
framework between the two countries consisting of the peace treaty, the
US–Japan Security Treaty, and the US–Japan Administrative Agreement
was completed. Rearmament was put off as something to be handled after
the peace treaty was enacted.66
At the time of the Yoshida–Dulles talks, the Japanese government
made clear its intention to establish a Ministry of National Security
(Kokka Chianshō) under the control of the prime minister as well as a
department in charge of the US–Japan agreements. This ministry would
bring together the various government bodies related to public order:
the police, NPR, Japan Coast Guard (Kaijō Hoanchō), National Fire and
Disaster Management Agency (Kokka Shōbōchō), and the Immigration
Bureau (Shutsunyūkoku Kanrichō). The Japanese government also submit-
ted its “Initial Steps for Rearmament Program” and promised to establish
a “land and sea National Safety Forces of 50,000 men” separate from the
NPR.67 The Japanese plans did not nearly satisfy Dulles and his staff on the
question of how Japan was going to take responsibility for its security.68
However, they could not force a security policy on an independent Japan
and made the conclusion of a peace treaty as their top priority. As a result,
the talks concluded with only a Japanese confirmation of an intention to
rearm.69
The US military immediately began working on placing the Japanese
government on a course of rearmament after the peace conference ended
with a Western success. Within the American government, General
Ridgway decided to hold unofficial talks with the Japanese government.
Ridgway pressed for an enlargement of the NPR in late December and
early January meetings with Yoshida and in meetings between Lieutenant
General Doyle O. Hickey (Ridgway’s Chief of Staff) and Tatsumi.
At this same time, the JCS were preparing a plan for a 300,000-man,
ten-division Japanese ground force.70 Ridgway, who was concerned
about communist activity, also felt the need for a rapid strengthening
of Japan’s defenses within “the scale politically possible.” In his view,
enlargement of Japan’s ground forces was urgently needed and it was
necessary and possible for the Japanese government to expand its forces
to 150,000 in 1952 and 300,000 in 1953.71 In January 1952, Ridgway’s
Far East Command drafted a plan for the creation of a balanced ten-
division ground force that could take the occupying American force’s
place in bearing responsibility for the defense of Japan. In this plan,
the NPR would be expanded to 150,000–180,000 men in 1952 and
300,000–325,000 men in 1953.72
In comparison, the post-peace treaty Yoshida government’s near-term
aim was to slowly build “military force” by continuing to strengthen
policing. He felt that maintaining a force of 300,000 men was clearly
beyond the means of the Japanese economy as well as impossible to
cover up under a pretext of “maintaining public order.” An expansion to
100,000 men was the maximum possible for Yoshida. This number was
based on the rationale that 30 percent of the NPR’s 75,000 men would
leave after it reached its time limit in October 1952. Fifty thousand new
recruits would be added to the remaining 50,000 men. Hickey advocated
that 50,000 men be added to the existing 75,000 to create a force of
125,000. For this reason, the number was increased to a middle-ground
of 110,000.73 The Yoshida government announced in a January 1952
House of Representatives Budget Committee meeting that it planned to
expand the NPR to 110,000 men and, when it reached its time limit, reor-
ganize it as a defense force (bōeitai).74
Ridgway regarded the 110,000-man plan as an improvement over the
initial Japanese plan.75 He had not given up on the goal of an expansion to
150,000–180,000 men in 1952, however. It is thought that he met directly
with Yoshida to push the plan and made indirect contact through Colonel
Kowalski in GHQ’s Civil Affairs to Senior Superintendent Masuhara and
Minister Ō hashi until late February. But Yoshida held firm on 110,000
men despite these efforts.76
Regarding the creation of a Ministry of National Security to unify pub-
lic order and security agencies as put forth at the Yoshida–Dulles talks, it
seems that the Japanese government decided at the end of 1951 to reject
this and instead reorganize the NPR. Ministerial reorganization was inher-
ently difficult and GHQ’s Government Section had also expressed oppo-
sition.77 Despite this change, Yoshida was able to overcome US demands
and continue with his policy of no fundamental change in the NPR’s
nature as a supplementary police force and achieving de facto rearmament
without constitutional revision through gradually increasing its scale and
capabilities.
Following the peace treaty, Yoshida would occasionally reveal in discus-
sions with his brain trust his intentions for the creation of a “splendid”
82 A. KUSUNOKI
(rippana) military.78 He thought that Japan would not be able to depend

on the American military for its defense forever.79 While he was cautious
about a quantitative expansion of the NPR, he was, as mentioned before,
generally enthusiastic about enhancing its equipment and replenishing its
personnel; once he became aware that a lack of staff officer-quality person-
nel was hindering the improvement of the NPR’s abilities, he had decided
to allow the employment of former military officers. He had also been
supportive of the creation of the Coastal Safety Force (Kaijō Keibitai).80
Yoshida’s ultimate goal was the creation of a balanced military consisting
of an army, navy, and air force.81
Yoshida was convinced that military needed to be built into the demo-
cratic system, however.82 In other words, it was necessary to establish
civilian control. Yoshida also felt that it was no less important that the
new military by built only after its institutional basis had been established
through constitutional revision. On March 26, 1952, one month after
the peace treaty went into effect, Yoshida told Ridgway that it was desir-
able for the Japanese people to understand the communist threat and for
calls for constitutional revision and rearmament to come from them.83 He
told Robert D. Murphy, the first postwar American ambassador, in a May
conversation that rearmament was premature and that the people were
not yet prepared to accept constitutional revision.84 These comments
hint at the fact that Yoshida felt it important that the postwar Japanese
military be placed within the constitutional system and have institutional
legitimacy.
It should also be noted that Yoshida believed that constitutional revision
must be undertaken at the suggestion of the people. In order to obtain
the agreement of a people who had experienced a tragic war and longed
for peace, it was necessary to make them realize the necessity of rearma-
ment. Accordingly, the government had to first educate the people to
regain the “psychological basis needed as the context for rearmament.”85
Yoshida emphasized as the target for this effort “neither the extreme Right
nor the extreme Left,” but the farm population “with its honesty and
stability.”86 Although considered an elitist, aristocratic politician, when it
came to rearmament, Yoshida approached the issue seriously as something
needing democratic procedures.
Thus, at least at the time of the peace treaty, Yoshida seems to have
decided that time was still needed for the work of creating a military
possessing institutional legitimacy, under civilian control, and capable of
defending Japan. He likely thought that it was acceptable for such work
to take time. In early 1951, as the UN forces on the Korean peninsula
were forced to fall back, he did not believe that the United States and
Soviet Union would enter into a full-scale war. There was therefore no
possibility of a Soviet invasion of Japan as such an act would mean war
with the United States.87 Yoshida’s basic view of the Cold War was that
military clashes like the Korean War were exceptions and a “psychological
war” between the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) would continue in the long-term. In other words, Yoshida did
not see the international situation as a crisis making the rearmament of
Japan urgent.
Major barriers to rearmament also remained. The first was economic
difficulties. Even though the outbreak of the Korean War had breathed
new life into the Japanese economy, at the time of the treaty, it was depen-
dent upon special procurements and aid. The introduction of credit was
seen as essential. According to Yoshida’s own words, Japan’s finances were
in “a situation where even building a single destroyer would cause bank-
ruptcy.” Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato also objected to the numbers put
forth by Far East Command.88
Second, there was no national consensus for constitutional revision or
rearmament. While some such as former Prime Minister Ashida Hitoshi
argued for rearmament in the wake of the Korean War, anti-war and anti-
military pacifist thought captured the hearts of many, especially women
and the young. In a February 1953 Asahi Shimbun poll, 38 percent
supported a policy of gradually increasing defense strength, greatly out-
numbering the 20 percent who opposed it. However, only 31 percent
supported changing the constitution and rearming, compared to 42 per-
cent who were opposed.89 In the two general elections held between 1952
and 1953, the votes for the breakaway Hatoyama Ichirō faction of the
Liberal Party who supported rearming held static while the anti-rearma-
ment Leftist Socialist Party greatly increased its share of the votes.90 There
was a large rupture within the population over constitutional revision and
rearmament.
The third barrier was the influence of former military officers. Yoshida
felt that a new military needed new ways of thinking and new people, but
it took time for new systems and concepts to take hold and the develop-
ment of new personnel had to be seen as an even more long-term issue.
The more rearmament was rushed, the greater the reliance upon former
84 A. KUSUNOKI
IJA and IJN personnel, thereby further endangering the creation of the
new Anglo-American style military that Yoshida was thinking of.91
For these reasons, he chose as an alternative strengthening “police
power” and thereby gaining the substantial effects of rearmament. In his
view, the American requests for the expansion and enlargement of the
NPR, for arriving at rearmament all at once and bypassing the politico-
social environmental considerations, must have been troublesome and
something he could not accept.
Yoshida’s plans bore fruit with the passing of the NSA Law (Hoanchōhō)
on July 31, 1952, and the establishment of the NSA on the next day.
The NPR was reformed as the NSF in October (at its time limit) and
were placed under the NSA along with the Coastal Safety Force (renamed
the Safety Security Forces, or Keibitai). The mission of the NSA was “to
manage and administer the forces that act when necessary in special cir-
cumstances to maintain our nation’s peace and order and protect lives
and property; to do the administrative work in accordance with this and
to provide administrative support for guarding and rescues at sea.”92 As
such, there was no major change from the mission of the NPR. However,
as the phrase “supplement the National Rural Police and local police” had
been removed, the role of the NSF and Safety Security Forces as forces
acting in response to situations unable to be handled by the general police
was made clear. Administratively, whereas the NPR had been an organ
of the Cabinet’s General Administrative Agency (GAA; Sōrifu), the NSA
was established as an external agency of the GAA with a state minister as
its head.93
Prime Minister Yoshida was the first head of the NSA. On the day of
his first appearance at the agency, he explained the meaning and signifi-
cance of the NSA in the following way: “if we’re going to have a new
armed force, it must be built with a modern, new spirit. One reason the
National Police Reserve has become the National Safety Agency is that
creating soldiers and educating leaders take time we do not have. This
National Safety Agency is the cornerstone of our new armed force, the
basis for the creation of a new national military.”94 In a mid-September
meeting with Ambassador Murphy, Yoshida expressed confidence that
public opinion was becoming positive toward rearmament and under-
standing was developing for the establishment of defense mechanisms.95
Yoshida was thinking of embarking upon true rearmament, with the NSA
as a foothold.
Creating the Basis for a “Military”

Based on the experience gained over two years with the NPR, the National
Safety Agency Law set three categories for the deployment of the NSF:
“Ordered Deployments” (Article 61), “Requested Deployments” (Article
64), and “Disaster Dispatch” (Article 66). The regulations for Ordered
Deployments were defined as “The Prime Minister can, in times of emer-
gency, order the deployment of all or part of the National Safety Forces or
Safety Security Force for the purpose of maintaining order upon judging
there to be a particular need.” When the Director General of the NSA
predicted such a deployment order would be issue and judged it necessary,
he could “issue orders to all or part of the National Safety Forces or Safety
Security Force to await deployment” (Article 63).
Requested Deployments were the ability of a prefectural governor to
“upon judging there to be an unavoidable necessity due to a serious public
order situation and conferring with the prefectural public safety commis-
sion, request that the Prime Minister deploy units of the National Safety
Forces or Safety Security Force”; it was at the discretion of the gover-
nor. This is thought to have been added due to the frequent disturbances
believed to be instigated by communists that were occurring not just in
Tokyo but throughout the country (such as the Suita Incident). Upon
receiving the request, the prime minister “could order the deployment of
units if judging it to be unavoidable.” Disaster Dispatch gave prefectural
governors and others designated by law the power to request that the
“[NSA] Director General or other designated individuals dispatch units
in times of natural or other disasters, when judged necessary to safeguard
lives and property.” In this situation, the Director General could order the
dispatch of units.96
The only regulation for the deployment of the NPR had been a clause
stating that it could “be ordered by the Prime Minister to act to main-
tain public order when there is special need.” In comparison, the legal
basis for the deployment of the NSF was made clear in the National
Safety Agency Law by defining the prime minister’s powers in the form
of Ordered Deployments and adding Disaster Dispatch and Requested
Deployments. It had become easier for the government to make actual use
of the NSF. The law also included articles covering the authority of the
NSF when deployed (Articles 69, 71–75), the circumstances in which the
use of weapons was permitted (Articles 70, 76), communicating with civil-
ian bodies (Article 67), and a code of conduct. In other words, it laid out
86 A. KUSUNOKI
the bounds in which the major military force of the NSF (from a domestic
standpoint) could be used. The “Instructions Regarding the Deployment
of the National Safety Forces” and “Instructions Regarding the Dispatch
of the National Safety Forces for Disaster Relief” (dated October 25,
1952) which set out the specific steps to be taken during deployment can
be seen as a continuation of this.97 The legal basis for “units” independent
of the police—to use Yoshida’s words, a “new national military”—to act
had been established.
The creation of the Safety Academy (Hoan Daigakkō) can also be
understood as setting the groundwork for the “new national military.”
Yoshida thought that educating young personnel with the democratic
spirit was essential for the creation of a new military organization, and he
was unusually enthusiastic in his involvement with establishing the institu-
tions for officer training.98 In order to develop “sensible citizens” within
the military, individuals rooted in the spirit of democracy and liberalism
and not merely close-minded military specialists, he tapped Maki Tomo,
a member of Keiō University’s board of trustees, to be the first president
of the Safety Academy (later, it became NDA) on the recommendation
of Koizumi Shinzō .99 Although the appointment of an individual without
any experience as an officer, indeed, without any military experience at all,
caused surprise and uneasiness within the NSA and the American military,
Yoshida ignored this.100 The school was also unique for its curriculum
emphasizing general knowledge over specialized military subjects and for
having ground and naval cadets learning together in the same program.
The original plan is said to have been the work of Utsumi Hitoshi, head of
the NSA’s Education Division.101
The students entering the college were varied; some were relatives of
former soldiers, some were returnees for Manchuria, and others were
drawn by the free tuition. As such their feelings toward the mission of the
NSF were also diverse. Of those from Manchuria, there were many “who
entered with the conviction, drawn from their harsh experiences that they
had to protect the country.”102 Some instructors felt that Maki’s philoso-
phy of “be a gentleman first, then a soldier” was a bit too easy going given
that they were “training people to risk their lives fighting.”103 Although
enveloped in Maki’s philosophy, on the ground, these instructors made
sure their students knew “this is going to be a military.”104
Assessments of Yoshida’s rearmament policy began to be made by
American officials, especially those within the embassy. These showed
understanding while remaining unsatisfied. In an early August 1952 dis-
cussion with budgetary officers, Kenneth T. Young, head of the State
Department’s Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, described the creation of
the NSA, an agency in charge of security and defense issues, as a step for-
ward for the rearmament problem.105 Later that month, the embassy ana-
lyzed the policy split over rearmament policy as follows: The rearmament
plans put forward by right conservatives such as Hatoyama Ichirō and
Shigemitsu Mamoru, although admirable for their aggressiveness, would
place a heavy burden on the economy; furthermore, there was the danger
of not knowing where they would go because of their anti-American and
independent tendencies. On the other hand, Yoshida’s reluctant rearma-
ment policy not only maintained economic stability, but also it meant that
for the near future Japan would be militarily dependent upon the United
States; this was convenient for the United States as Japan would continue
as an obedient American partner.106 At around the same time, General
Clark made clear his resignation that a strong force such as the United
States wanted would probably be politically difficult for the Japanese.107 At
the end of the year, Ambassador Murphy appraised Yoshida’s rearmament
policy as “while not impressive, it made steady progress.” “While lament-
ing the speed of increase as insufficient, he recommended not putting
pressure on Yoshida over rearmament and instead trusting him and allow-
ing him to do as he wished.108
In order for Yoshida’s rearmament policy to be carried through, how-
ever, it was necessary for the public to come to view rearmament as neces-
sary and for Yoshida himself to maintain his politically unifying power. It
became clear in 1952 and 1953 that there would be difficulties on both
of these points.
Establishment of the NSF as a Capable Organization

Changes were also made to the NPR’s unit structure as it was reorganized
as the NSF. In order to increase mobility, new hōmentai (“area groups,”
or “regional armies”) equivalent to armies were added to the existing
regional force (kankutai) beginning with the Northern Army in charge
of the Hokkaido area in October 1952. Ground forces were concentrated
in Hokkaido in order to oppose the Soviet military threat. Each regional
force was organized to include a headquarters, units under the headquar-
ters’ direct control, three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, an
engineer battalion, and a medical battalion. In addition to the regional
force, the area groups contained a headquarters, units under the head-
88 A. KUSUNOKI
quarters’ direct control, an engineer group (shisetsu-gun), and an artillery

brigade primarily armed with 105 and 150-mm howitzers and anti-aircraft
guns. In addition to this, regional army and the three other regional forces,
service and supply units, schools, central communications command, the
central construction section, and supply depots were placed under the
First Staff Office (bakuryō kanbu) (as of October 1952). The NSF had
fifty-five camps, which was increased to seventy-one by June 1954.109
At the time of the NSA’s creation in August 1952, the NPR’s size
was increased by 36,000 to 111,752 men. Since almost 30,000 men had
discharged with the end of the NPR’s term in October, approximately
67,000 men were recruited that year. Its size did not change substantially
in 1953 (111,880 men in August 1953), with the 7000 new recruits all
replacements. With the setting of a ground force of 180,000 men as a
goal, the size gradually increased after 1953. Forty-eight thousand joined
in 1954, increasing the size of the NSF to 130,000.110 In the ten years
from 1952 to 1959, the recruitment rate for enlisted personnel increased
from 3.1 to 6.5 applicants for each available position, and the applicant
rate for officer school increased from 2.4 to 5.0. Employment conditions
were controlled by the amount of competition. With the exception of
1952, the personnel fulfillment rate was roughly 95 percent every year.111
The NSF’s equipment needs, especially those for heavy arms, were ful-
filled as the US military provided equipment. The first distribution of forty
105/150-mm howitzers and forty 20-ton tanks were loaned by Far East
Command’s Safety Advisory Section Japan from spring to August 1952.
In 1953, 4.2-inch mortars, anti-aircraft guns, 8-inch howitzers, 155-mm
field guns, and recoilless rifles were provided. With the Mutual Defense
Assistance Agreement (discussed later) coming into effect in March 1954,
the Mutual Defense Assistance Plan (MDAP) served as a framework for
the provision of weapons by the US military and three 90-mm anti-aircraft
guns were provided by the end of the year. Other small arms, machine
guns, mortars, and equipment, such as observation gear, weapon racks,
and so on, were provided by local US military bases.
The provision of aircraft also proceeded apace. After the NSF’s aviation
school was created in October 1952, twenty L-16 and fifteen L-15 liaison
aircraft were loaned, and twenty L-21s the following year. Afterward 132
L-5, L-21, and L-19 aircraft were provided. The Japanese government
also purchased twelve H-13 twin-seat and H-19 multi-seat helicopters.112
As American loans of 105/155-mm howitzers, M24 tanks, and so on
furnished the NSF with heavy arms, it was finally able to begin occupation-
specific infantry, artillery, and armored training in the fall of 1952. The
regional forces became almost completely operational by the end of this
year. In June 1953, group exercises centered on the 1st Infantry Regiment
were held at the base of Mt. Fuji and regiments and the regional forces
held local exercises in the fall. In 1954, retraining and joint training was
undertaken at the battalion level and below. The Northern Army also
trained in constructing roads and the 1st Regional Force conducted
mountain training.
School preparation continued as this training was ongoing and was
largely complete in 1954. At the time of the NSF’s creation, the NPR
Academy’s branches (low-level leadership training, mid-level and staff
officer training, signal, and medical education, personnel, accounting,
quartermaster education, and security education) were divided into new
staff, signal, medical, and service schools. An aviation school was created
in 1952 and quartermaster, transportation, air defense artillery, and offi-
cer candidate schools were established in 1954. The Fuji School was also
created combining infantry, artillery, and armor education. The chemical
education unit (later the chemical school) was also formed in 1954. The
implementation of specialized schools aided in increasing the speed of
training and the technical level covered.113
What sort of awareness did members of the NSF have now that it
was finally able to operate on the kankutai (divisional) level? Sakuma
Makoto, a former Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Council, and a member
of the Safety Academy’s first class, clearly remembered an interviewer
(a captain) at his entrance exam saying that “if there’s a war, I’m run-
ning away.”114 The feelings of NSF members were likely diverse. Motives
for joining included those who chose the NSF for mental discipline,
those stirred up from witnessing the Suita Incident, those recoiling from
criticism of the NPR, and those with their eyes on the retirement pay.
Regarding the role of the NSF, while some were positive about rearma-
ment (“it’s necessary for us to be able to defend the country with our
own hands, but given the state of the world our current equipment and
training is insufficient”) or expressed dissatisfaction with the never-end-
ing debates in the Diet over rearmament (“they should think of some
way to make rearmament economical”), others were reserved (“I want
to be given a larger defense mission than just public security like it is
now”) or even skeptical (“Although we fervently hope to protect the
country and people, we feel great doubts when thinking of whether they
trust us or not”).115
90 A. KUSUNOKI
With popular opinion on rearmament divided, and the very existence of

the NSF a subject of debate and its future unclear, it is, of course, natural
that there would be differences in how members thought about “national
defense” and how they defined themselves. At the same time, the NSF was
slowly beginning to show results from its efforts to build social capital.
One of these was its role in disaster relief as defined in Article 66 of the
National Safety Agency Law. For example, when northern Kyūshū and
Yamaguchi prefectures suffered record torrential rain in June 1953 (caus-
ing 1001 dead and missing), the governors of Fukuoka, Saga, Kumamoto,
and Yamaguchi requested the NSF be dispatched. Units from the NSF’s
4th Regional Force were sent to each area for emergency relief and recon-
struction activities.116 The NPR’s customary disaster relief activities had
been clearly established in the National Safety Agency Law, allowing it to
be used.
Infrastructure construction and transportation operations also helped.
When requested by the heads of local governments or government agen-
cies, the NSA entrusted the NSF with civil and communications engi-
neering, trade, and transportation work in part or entirely, provided the
work was appropriate for training purposes and did not negatively impact
private companies. This work was largely road and bridge construction
or civil engineering actions such as land-clearing, and was given to engi-
neering battalions. Representative examples of such work would be the
construction of telephone lines on routes up Mt. Fuji and rock removal
during the construction of the Tosho 2 highway in Muroran, Hokkaido.
NSF engineering was welcomed because it was cheaper and more scru-
pulous than that by private operators; requests increased each year. The
NSF also engaged in unexploded ordnance removal, rice harvesting, and
appearances by the NSF band in local events. It handled sixty-one requests
in 1953, and these activities continued after the NSF was reorganized into
the GSDF, rising to 300 by 1959.117
The Political Process for Rearmament:

Formation of the JDA and SDF
Yoshida’s ability to somehow control the rearmament process likely only
lasted through the end of 1952. From 1953 on, two factors determined
the direction of rearming. The first was American pressure on increasing
defense strength.
The Eisenhower administration, fighting a bruising Cold War with the

Soviet Union, made cultivating and strengthening Japan as a member of
the Free World camp the top priority for its Japan policy. For this reason,
the United States basically patiently supported Japan’s conservative gov-
ernments, to discourage Japan from drifting toward neutrality. However,
from the American perspective, at least until the latter half of the 1950s,
they had expressed little interest in taking an anti-communist stand and
fighting the Cold War together with the United States, and this occasion-
ally frustrated the U.S. government. What should the United States do to
build Japan into a healthy part of the Free World?
The issue of rearmament exposed the differences in the American and
Japanese views of the Cold War. American requests for rearming, which
came in waves during the period of the peace treaty and the return of
Japanese independence, reached peak pressure in 1953 and 1954. The
Eisenhower administration’s national security strategy, known as “mas-
sive retaliation,” relied on maintaining a massive force which could be
used to immediately retaliate at the place and with the means of one’s
choosing. Accordingly, the US government planned a large-scale expan-
sion of its nuclear arsenal and reduction of conventional arms to save on
defense with the goal of striking a balance between military strength and
the economic strength on which that strength depended. This naturally
meant that the United States would seek to have allied nations carry the
conventional force burden. Japanese rearmament was an issue that tied
into America’s national security strategy. During his November 1953 visit
to Japan, Vice President Richard M. Nixon concluded that the disarma-
ment of Japan , as mandated in the 1946 constitution had been a mistake,
saying: I’m going to admit right here that the United States did make a
mistake in 1946. We made a mistake because we misjudged the intention
of the Soviet leaders.”118
At the time, the Eisenhower administration was solidifying its plans
to use military assistance based on the Mutual Security Act (MSA) as aid
for Japan beginning in the 1954 fiscal year. After Secretary of State Dulles
made this intention clear at a joint meeting of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Japanese
interest in MSA support rapidly increased. As arguments were made
both for and against accepting such aid, financial circles strongly sup-
ported it. Korean War procurements had breathed life back into a
Japanese economy in the middle of deflation, not only causing produc-
tion levels to rapidly improve but also allowing the accrual of foreign
92 A. KUSUNOKI
currency holdings. However, even with annual special procurements of

$800 million, Japan was only just able to maintain its balance of pay-
ments. The planned introduction of special procurements through MSA
aid as a transitional measure until a self-sustaining economy based on
normal trade could be achieved could establish a production base and
was seen as necessary for cultivating international competitiveness.119 As
a powerful support base for the conservatives, the wishes of the financial
world could not help but influence governmental policy.
The Yoshida government decided in late June to enter negotiations
with the intention of accepting aid; these began in mid-July. But there
was a large difference in each country’s understanding of MSA aid. While
the Japanese government understood MSA aid to be solely economic, the
American government’s planned aid was military and it maintained its
position that the amount of aid received would depend on the extent of
Japanese defense efforts. The negotiations proceeded with difficulty, their
focus ultimately arriving on the content of Japan’s defense policies and
plans or, more specifically, the scale and speed at which it was increasing its
defense. Talks between Ikeda Hayato, Secretary General of the Liberal Party,
and Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson, for about a month
from early October (the Ikeda–Robertson Talks), failed to find a substain-
tial agreement on Japan’s force goals. Their joint statement included no
specific numbers for increasing force levels and the time within which
these goals were to be reached. Although the Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement was signed the following year in Tokyo, dissatisfaction over
Japanese defense efforts remained within the American government.120
The Eisenhower administration did not place additional pressure on
the Japanese over further rearmament in the end, since it decided to shift
the emphasis of its Japan policy from strengthening defense to achieving
political and economic stability around 1955.121 As a result, Yoshida’s con-
tinued passive resistance to increasing defense managed to postpone the
time of the rearmament issue’s resolution until American policy toward
Japan changed.122 However, American pressure to expand Japan’s armed
forces inevitably influenced the domestic political process for rearmament,
the second factor that determined the shape taken by defense policy.
Yoshida’s choice of joining the Western camp in the East-West standoff
and relying on the United States for security while only very gradually
creating a military for self-defense—something that Yoshida obstinately
denied was “rearmament”—faced criticism from both the left and right.
The left attacked joining with the United States, one of the principal
actors in the Cold War, and providing it with military bases, as being
against the principles of pacifism enshrined in the constitution. It went
without saying that they considered rearming entirely unconstitutional as
well. Meanwhile, anti-Yoshida right-wing conservatives such as Hatoyama
Ichirō , Shigemitsu Mamoru, and Kishi Nobusuke, while taking a clear
anti-communist stance, felt that Yoshida was over relying on the United
States. They felt Japan should rearm itself and carry out its duties as a
sovereign state. And they insisted that the constitution imposed by the
United States be immediately revised. The opposition between conserva-
tives and reformers, and between Yoshida and anti-Yoshida conservatives
was directly connected to the issue of what Japan’s relationship with the
United States should be, that is, what the nation’s place in the world
should be. Yoshida’s rapid loss of unifying power after the San Francisco
Peace Conference made the disagreements even fiercer.
More fundamentally, it is thought that Yoshida’s image as a part of
the Occupation era made his government unpopular. In the early 1950s,
with the nearly seven-year-long Occupation finally over and Japan hav-
ing just regained its independence, many Japanese sought a clear break
with the asymmetrical US–Japan relationship of occupier and occupied.
However, there was no change to the truth that American military forces
were still stationed in Japan and Japan was still economically and militarily
reliant upon the United States, even if the situation was nominally based
on agreements between sovereign states. Irritation at a reality which did
not work the way they wanted it to caused gloom among the people;
Yoshida’s cooperative relationship with the United States came to seen
as a subservient one in their eyes. The need for autonomy and an equal
relationship with the United States asserted by the progressives and anti-
Yoshida conservatives was, regardless of details or accuracy, based on the
honest feelings of the people.125
Yoshida’s supporters lost seats in the 1952 and 1953 general elections,
and the fifth Yoshida government that began in May 1953 was forced to
be a minority, single-party government. However, anti-Yoshida conserva-
tives, the Hatoyama group and the Reform Party (Kaishintō) headed by
Shigemitsu (formed in February 1952) was not overly successful either.
It was the Socialists, especially Left-wing Socialists, who gained the most
seats. With memories of the war still fresh, popular opinion tended to
gravitate toward anti-war, anti-military sentiments. “Young men, do not
take up arms,” the slogan of Suzuki Mosaburō , chairman of the Left-wing
Socialists, appealed to many.
94 A. KUSUNOKI
In the face of such social circumstances, proponents of rearmament

gradually toned down their proposals, coming closer to Yoshida’s policies.
For his part, Yoshida needed the support of all conservatives to strengthen
his position in the MSA negotiations with the United States. A meeting
was held between Yoshida and Shigemitsu in late September 1953, just
before Ikeda visited Washington, D.C. The two agreed to the following:
“In consideration of the current international situation and the indepen-
dent spirit rising among the people, we make clear our policy of increasing
our defense strength, reducing stationed troops accordingly, and establish
a long-term defense plan appropriate to our national strength. In conjunc-
tion with this we will revise the current National Safety Law, reforming the
National Safety Forces as the Self-Defense Forces, and add defending the
nation from direct aggression to its missions.” The Liberal and Reform
parties reached basic agreement on building up defense strength without
reforming the constitution.
From December 1953, the three conservative parties began coordi-
nating their policies to revise the National Safety Agency Law and set up
the SDF. Spearheading the debate were Reform Party members who had
earnestly studied the issue of rearmament. Although clashes sometimes
occurred between the Reform Party, who wanted the SDF’s nature as a
military organization to be clear, and the Liberal Party, who wanted it
to be a security organization, an extension of the NSF, with its military
nature as ambiguous as possible, the coordination proceeded by making
both defense from direct aggression and public security operations roles of
the SDF. The three parties’ agreement was settled on March 6, 1954, and
a March 9 cabinet meeting agreed on the “Defense Agency Establishment
Bill (Bōeichō Secchihō),” and “Self-Defense Forces Bill (Jieitaihō).” Both
bills were approved by the House of Representatives on June 2, and
announced on June 9 (taking effect on July 1).126 Defense strength was
thus established with the mission of responding to both direct and indirect
aggression through a process coupling US–Japan disagreements over the
scale and speed of rearmament and domestic politics over the nature of
rearmament.
Tasks and Capabilities of the SDF

The mission of the SDF was defined in the new law as follows: “[each
branch] shall respectively act, the Ground Self-Defense Force mainly on
land, the Maritime Self-Defense Force mainly at sea, and the Air Self-
Defense Force mainly in the air, taking as their principal mission pro-
tecting our nation’s peace and independence, preserving our country’s
safety, and defending our nation from direct and indirect aggression, and
also maintaining public order when necessary” (SDF Law, Article 3).
The prime minister had the “highest authority of command and super-
vision” (Article 7). The Director General of the Japan Defense Agency
“presides over the service of the Self-Defense Forces, receiving guidance
and supervision from the Prime Minister” (Article 8). The chief of staff
of each branch of the SDF received “guidance and supervision from the
Director General.” They also “supported the Director General as his
highest specialized advisors” and “implemented the Director General’s
orders for the service of each unit” (Article 9). The direct command
authority of the prime minister over units had not been defined in the
NSA Law, but the SDF Law made this clear, establishing the form that
civilian control took: a pyramid-shaped chain of command with civilians
at the top.127
The activities of the SDF (including the GSDF) were defined as
“defensive mobilization,” “public security operations,” “disaster relief,”
and “steps in response to airspace violations.” Defensive mobilization
was a response to direct aggression: “the Prime Minister may, with the
authorization of the Diet, order the mobilization of all or part of the
SDF in the case of an external armed attack (including cases where such
an attack is likely), if he judges it necessary to protect our nation.”
However, “in the case of special urgent needs, he can order such mobili-
zation without the authorization of the Diet” (Article 78). Public secu-
rity operations were divided into two types: “Ordered public security
operations” (Article 78) and “Requested public security operations”
(Article 81). In the case of the former, the prime minister could “order
the mobilization of all or part of the Self-Defense Forces in the case
of indirect aggression or other emergency situations if he judges that
standard police forces will be unable to maintain order.” For the lat-
ter, prefectural governors could “request the deployment of units upon
judging there to be an unavoidable necessity due to a serious public
order situation and conferring with the prefectural public safety com-
mission.” The stipulated public security operations were fundamentally
unchanged from those in the NSA Law.
The stipulations for disaster relief (Article 83) were also maintained
from the NSA Law. That is, “Prefectural governors and others desig-
nated by law can request that the Director General or other designated
96 A. KUSUNOKI
individuals dispatch units in times of natural or other disasters, when

judged necessary to safeguard lives and property.” The Director General
(or other designated individual) could dispatch units “when he judged
the situation to be unavoidable.” However, the new law differed from
the NSA Law in terms of the simplification of request procedures. The
second section of the article allows the Director General to dispatch
units without waiting for a governor’s request when “during a natural
or other disaster, the situation is especially urgent and he judges there is
not time to wait for a request as described in the prior section.”128 Thus,
the possibility of a cataclysmic disaster in which a governor cannot even
request help was stipulated in the law. (This provision was emphasized
following the January 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake; in the
prior forty years, it had largely been forgotten about by those who imple-
mented the law.)
The powers of the SDF (the right to retain and use weapons, their cri-
teria for use, their authority when mobilized, etc.) were largely retained
in the same form as under the NSA Law (Articles 87–96). However,
there were also new sections covering the use and collection of sup-
plies and the exemption of the SDF from various laws during defensive
mobilizations (Articles 103–117). These are provisions which envision
a need to manage the SDF’s use of hospitals, communication facilities,
land, and buildings, and its stockpiling and shipping of supplies so as to
contribute to the carrying out of its duties in situations involving armed
actions. Although they place restrictions on the SDF’s use of force, they
also agree to a degree of restrictions on civil liberties so that the SDF can
use its strength effectively. A prefectural governor was able to order the
expropriation of land or supplies and then place it under SDF supervi-
sion because the Disaster Relief Act was invoked.129 This was the result of
the need to maintain a balance between preserving the pretense that the
SDF was not “war potential” as forbidden in Article 9 of the Japanese
constitution and meeting the request that the SDF be provided with as
many abilities and authority as possible to allow it to effectively respond
to direct and indirect aggression.
At the time of its creation, the GSDF consisted of one regional army,
four regional forces, and various smaller units under direct command in
addition to facilities including eight supply depots, twelve schools, and
two regional hospitals. It had 139,627 personnel. By August 10, six
regional forces and thirteen schools were added. Seventeen regional liai-
son departments handling the recruitment for all the SDF’s branches were
created and began operating under the supervision of the regional force
commanders. A 15,000-man reserve system was also adopted at the time
of the SDF’s creation, which 2484 joined in 1954. By 1959, this had
increased to 13,067.130
The NPR thus reorganized and expanded from 1952 to 1954, devel-
oping into the SDF and JDA. Through the process of twice rebranding,
its role was modified from “supplementing the police” to “act[ing] when
necessary in special circumstances to maintain our nation’s peace and order
and protect lives and property” and finally to “defending our nation from
direct and indirect aggression.” At the same time, the legal framework for
the use of its strength and mechanisms envisioning armed activities and
making the restriction of civil liberties and social mobilization possible to
a certain extent were prepared. A powerful force different from the police
both in nature and role had been institutionalized. The GSDF’s scale was
also expanded in the period up to 1954. It had been equipped with a focus
on heavy weaponry, and had established an educational and training sys-
tem. Its priority was placed on the defense of Hokkaido. The GSDF had
gradually developed a posture in response to the severe international Cold
War surrounding Japan.
That this de facto “military” got rolling without having been given
constitutional legitimacy may have been involuntary on Yoshida’s part.
With the progressives surging, conservative rivalries intensifying, and the
Americans and business community pushing the acceptance of MSA aid,
the conservatives agreed to create the JDA and SDF. Yoshida’s image
of rearmament had been a military under civilian control with only the
minimum amount of strength necessary for defending the country,
implemented after constitutional revision carried out by popular con-
sent. However, with the weakening of his power base following the peace
treaty, he no longer had the power to exclusively control the rearmament
process.131
Once something is formalized as an institution and has begun operat-
ing, it is difficult to change. Following the collapse of the Yoshida gov-
ernment at the end of 1954, Hatoyama, his successor as prime minister,
aimed to fulfill his desire of revising the constitution. The conservatives
had not gained a two-thirds majority in the general election, however,
and Hatoyama, who was ill, having suffered a stroke a few years earlier,
used his limited time and energy on restoring Japan–Soviet relations.
Constitutional revision was thus a dim possibility. Instead, it was under
the Hatoyama administration that the government’s interpretation of the
98 A. KUSUNOKI
SDF as not in violation of the constitution began to become fixed. This

interpretation noted that Article 9 recognized Japan’s right to self-defense
as an independent state; as such, the creation of a force like the SDF whose
mission was self-defense and only possessed strength commensurate to
that mission was not in any way in violation of the constitution. There
were many objections to this constitutional interpretation (which is based
on the Ashida amendment), however, and philosophical arguments about
it continued throughout the Cold War, occupying much of the debate
over security.132
Yoshida expressed regret in a November 1964 letter to Tatsumi Eiichi,
writing “I feel a deep sense of responsibility for the current defense prob-
lem, and I mentioned this the other day to Prime Minister Satō [Eisaku]
and the others.”133 Yoshida began making controversial statements in the
early 1960s supporting the possession of nuclear weapons and expressed
dissatisfaction with the Ikeda government, which pushed an income-
doubling plan and tried to keep a low profile in domestic politics. This
was perhaps an expression of his belief that as the economy recovered
and entered on the course of high-speed growth, Japan should maintain a
larger military, actively take responsibility for its own defense, and support
the security of the West with the United States.
The Withdrawal of US Land Forces and the GSDF
From the end of the Yoshida administration, the US government

avoided demanding an increase in Japanese defensive capabilities. But
there was no change in America’s desire to see Japan’s military strength
grow, especially in terms of its ground forces. Instead of applying direct
pressure, the American government sought to promote an increase
in Japan’s defensive capabilities by gradually withdrawing American
ground troops still stationed in Japan, in an attempt to create a situa-
tion when Japan would have no choice but to bear responsibility for its
own defense. Since this was in harmony with the Eisenhower adminis-
tration’s policy of reducing conventional forces, and thereby reducing
defense spending and helping to balance the budget, the withdrawal of
American ground forces from Japan became more or less policy from the
mid-1950s onward.
The awareness that the stationing of US troops in post-independence
Japan had always been only a temporary measure, and that Japan would
have to take responsibility for its own security before long, was widely
shared by conservative politicians in Japan. The proposal for revising the

Yoshida-era Japan–US Security Treaty prepared by Shigemitsu Mamoru,
the Hatoyama government’s foreign minister, prior to his visit to the
United States in August 1955, would have changed it into a mutual
defense treaty. The core of the proposal read, “The signatories declare
that any armed attack on the territory of either signatory or areas under
their administration in the Western Pacific shall be recognized as threat-
ening the peace and security of their own country and that they will take
steps to meet the common danger, in accordance with their own country’s
constitutional procedures.” It also included the withdrawal of US forces
from Japan in the text: All American ground forces “will withdraw from
Japan within 90 days of the end of the completion year of Japan’s long-
term defense plan.” Not only that, but “the time for the withdrawal of air
and naval units from Japan shall be determined in discussions between the
signatories […] (however, the deadline for the previous shall, regardless of
the situation, must be within six years of the completion of the withdrawal
of ground units).”134
The idea of the complete withdrawal of American forces (including
air and naval forces) from Japan was intended “to strike a balance by
making Japan bear a new responsibility for mutual defense on one side
and making the United States agree to withdrawal on the other; and to
give the latter a reason to justify the former.” There is no doubt that
a feeling that “a country which defends itself through the presence of
foreign troops is not truly independent” ached in the hearts of the dip-
lomats who drafted it.135 Although this proposal was never actually for-
mally submitted to the United States, it was understood in the Foreign
Ministry by at least the mid-1950s that the withdrawal of American
forces from Japan was linked to strengthening Japanese defensive capa-
bilities. For this reason, the American government’s approach was likely
correct.
From the perspective of the Eisenhower administration, the prob-
lem was the degree of Japanese defensive strengthening and the range
of American forces subject to withdrawal. With regard to the latter, the
US government had at that time no scenario envisioning giving up the
air and naval bases it had in Japan that supported the core of American
military strategy for the Far East. In the case of the former, they felt a
lack of effort on the part of the Japanese government. For this reason,
when Shigemitsu met with Secretary Dulles, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, and others in the United States, they were
100 A. KUSUNOKI
extremely dismissive of his proposal for changing the US–Japan Security

Treaty into a mutual defense treaty. On the topic of the withdrawal of
American forces from Japan, the Americans would only repeatedly state
that it would happen in accordance with the increase of Japanese ground
forces. Radford bluntly rejected the defensive plan that Shigemitsu had
brought as being insufficient for allowing Japan to respond to a military
threat. He pointed out that the Japanese government should keep in mind
when requesting their withdrawal that roughly half of the American forces
in Japan were performing logistic functions.136
Incidentally, the plan that Shigemitsu had brought was the “6-Year
Defense Plan” created by the JDA in March 1955. This plan was based
on an internal study of the research committee that was created in
October 1952 along with the NSA. This study was put together with the
goal of being a “realistically possible, practical plan,” taking into consid-
eration the military threats facing Japan and domestic constraints such
as financial limitations. The “6-Year Defense Plan” was the tenth draft
written by this committee. The plan’s target for the GSDF was “to reach
a strength of 180,000 men by the end of 1958 built around two regional
armies, six regional forces, and four armored units (mechanized com-
bined brigades), with 15,000 civilian employees and 20,000 reservists in
addition to this.”137 At the time of the creation of the JDA and SDF, the
GSDF had a strength of 140,000 men. Since this had been increased to
161,658 by August 1, 1955, the plan proposed an additional increase of
roughly 20,000 men.138
According to Nakamura Ryūhei (a former Chief of Staff, Joint Staff),
who joined the committee from the First Staff Office, the size proposed
for the GSDF was the result of an examination of various proposals. One
hundred eighty thousand was the lowest number among them, and there
were many in the First Staff Office who had pushed for 240,000 men, the
size of the old peacetime army.139 Taking into account financial limitations
and popular opposition to rearmament, 180,000 men was judged a “real-
istically possible” target. For the Americans, it was not a satisfactory plan.
Nonetheless, judging that the likely gains from placing obvious pressure
on the Japanese were limited, they had no choice but to be patient and
watch.140
Even so, US–Japan relations over the security treaty began to change
with the formation of Kishi Nobusuke’s government. There had been
various problems that led to conflict between the American military and
local populations near bases since the peace treaty went into effect in April
1952. These included complaints of noise pollution, training accidents,

and the expropriation of land. Of these, the January 1957 Girard Case
made a major impression and enraged Japanese popular opinion, less
because of the details of the incident itself, than because of the inequal-
ity of the procedures the United States and Japan used in handling it.
Concerned about the incident’s seriousness, the US government looked
into accelerating the reduction of American ground forces in Japan. In
the bilateral summit held in mid-June, the Americans announced their
policy of completely withdrawing all ground forces from Japan (this
had been approved by Eisenhower earlier that month).141 The number
of American soldiers stationed in Japan was reduced from 17,000 in
1957 to 10,000 the following year, and then to 6000 in 1959.142 While
the American military expected the withdrawal of US ground forces to
speed up the expansion of the SDF, they no longer had any intention
of getting involved in Japanese defense plans.143 The trade-off between
American withdrawal and Japanese defensive increases was thus ended
in 1957.
It is thought that the withdrawal of American ground forces was
greeted as politically favorable.144 And looking only at personnel num-
bers, the American ground units withdrawn were more than made up
for by GSDF increases. On August 1, 1955, the GSDF was just short of
161,000 men; by April of the following year, this had been increased by
10,000 men to about 172,000. This was its approximate size during the
June 1957 Kishi–Eisenhower meetings. It had exceeded 180,000 men by
May 1958 (182,000) and was just under 183,000 in May 1959.145 In the
five years following the creation of the SDF, even though recruitment was
dependent on the employment situation, there were anywhere from 2.4
to 5.0 times the number of applicants to the number of positions for the
rank of Private, and the GSDF was consistently at roughly 95 percent of
its designated size.146
This increase in size was primarily taken up by the formation of com-
bined brigades. These were small-scale versions of the regional forces,
built around an infantry regiment supplemented by an artillery regi-
ment and other units such as engineer, recon, signal, and supply units.
In December 1955, the 7th (Makomanai) and 8th (Fukuoka) Combined
Brigades were created, followed by the 9th (Aomori) in December 1956,
and the 10th (Moriyama) in June 1958. In June 1958, there were 106
GSDF camps and forty-nine provincial liaison offices. Schools, regional
hospitals, and regional supply depots were also arranged and created.
102 A. KUSUNOKI
In 1955, the Western Army was created with authority over the Kyūshū
area, following the earlier Northern Army. Northeastern Army, Eastern
Army, and Middle Army followed, and in January 1960, the regional
army–regional force system in which six regional forces, four combined
brigades, and various other units and facilities were organized under five
regional armies was established.147 With the formation and reorgani-
zation of units, shortages occurred in the MSA-based system through
which major equipment was provided or lent by the United States. In
addition to this issue, much of the equipment lent by the United States
was of World War II vintage, whose parts could not be smoothly replen-
ished for, and MSA provisions became gradually restricted from 1957
onward. The need for equipment to become domestically produced thus
became apparent.
Meanwhile, the US–Japan Technology Agreement was signed in
March 1956, making the exchange of technical knowledge and the use of
patents based on the MSA possible. This treaty jump-started the refine-
ment, prototyping, research, and development of domestically produced
parts. First, prototypes for 105-mm recoilless rifles, 90-mm tank guns,
and 105/155-mm howitzers were created; in March 1958, official stan-
dards for 105/155-mm howitzers were instituted, setting the path to
domestic production. In 1959, domestic production of 4.2-inch and
81-mm self-propelled guns, 105-mm recoilless rifles, and armored cars
was achieved. As for aircraft, twenty-four LM-1s were supplied through
American offshore procurement and distributed to various air units. The
following year (1957), three LM-1s and seven H-13s were supplied,
twelve H-19s were purchased, and two domestically produced L-19s
were put into service. Domestically produced L-19Es were adopted
beginning in 1958.148
A system of training was established in which each year was divided into
four quarters and training progressed from small-unit to large-unit exer-
cises. Although this experienced obstacles due to changes in organization,
division-level command post exercises and joint exercises with the MSDF
and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) were held beginning in the late 1950s.
War games were held between the 3rd and 4th Regional Force outside
Kurume in late February 1955, and parachute drop training was publicly
held for the first time by the Narashino Provisional Airborne Training Unit
in April of that year. War games between the 2nd and 5th Regional Forces
were held in Hokkaido in mid-October. The 1st and 6th Regional Forces
held war games at Nasunohara in November of the following year. Joint
land-sea exercises with the MSDF and land-air exercises with the ASDF
were held for the first time in 1956. New training standards were intro-
duced in 1957, and in October 1958, the Northern Army’s fall maneuvers
were held, covering all of Hokkaido.149
Although not training, participation in disaster relief operations also
served training purposes. In the late 1950s, the GSDF was repeatedly dis-
patched to areas damaged by storms, floods, and earthquakes such as to
northern Kyūshū (July 1957), Izu (1958), Yamanashi (August 1959), and
to areas damaged by the tsunami caused by the Great Chilean Earthquake
(1960). A major disaster at this time was the September 1959 Ise Bay
Typhoon which caused more than 5000 dead and missing in Aichi and
Mie prefectures. Initially, the GSDF 10th Combined Brigade from Camp
Moriyama was dispatched, but since the damage exceeded initial predic-
tions, on October 1, the “SDF Chūbu Area Disaster Countermeasures
HQ” was created with the GSDF Vice Chief of Staff as its head and draw-
ing on units from all SDF branches throughout the country. Ultimately,
74,000 SDF personnel engaged in rescue operations for two and a half
months. The GSDF engaged in activities such as lifesaving, levee restora-
tion, road construction and repair, anti-erosion operations, clearing fallen
trees and mud, bridge construction, restoring communications, evacuating
school children, and disease control.150 It was an unprecedented mobili-
zation of not just personnel, but also vehicles and aircraft. It goes with-
out saying that the operation was a valuable opportunity for the GSDF
to appeal to the public through its activities. The relief operation was also
used as training, as there were few opportunities to gather units from across
the country. (For more on the SDF’s disaster relief operations see Chap. 6
by Murakami)
Together with the move to the regional army–regional force system,
the depots for the engineer, quartermaster, ordnance, medic, and signal
branches of the GSDF were unified into a single system and centralized
depots were established. At the same time, regional depots were placed
under the command of the regional army and given the authority to han-
dle logistic functions uniformly, thereby creating a supply chain reaching
down to individual units. The response capacity of field logistics improved
from 1960 as the result of lessons learned and practice gained from the
disaster relief operations.151
In this way, the late 1950s laid much of the groundwork that would
support the GSDF’s activities throughout the Cold War in terms of scale,
organization, equipment self-sufficiency, and logistics. The withdrawal of
104 A. KUSUNOKI
American ground forces from Japan and the limitations on their provision
of equipment helped push this. The GSDF had not only to make up for
the capabilities lost due to the American withdrawal, but also had to find a
more autonomous procurement system for equipment, because they were
no long able to rely upon the American military to provide it.
The words autonomy, self-reliance, and independence have likely never
flown around a political vacuum with such magnetism as in the period
from the last years of the Yoshida government through those of the anti-
Yoshida governments of Hatoyama, Ishibashi, and Kishi. The post-treaty
1950s were a time in which various political forces were led by these con-
cepts to think seriously about the state of postwar Japan’s diplomatic poli-
cies, economy, and society. The question of what the image of the state
was to be was, for the conservatives in particular, an issue tied to the ques-
tion of how the possession of a “military” was to be handled. There were
many paths championed from within the government and within the JDA,
from those who sought to create a military that was self-contained—pos-
sessing the ability to defend the country by itself—and struck a unique
balance between the army, navy, and air force, to others who pushed for
a military that would operate in cooperation with the American military
for the foreseeable future.152 What Japan ultimately chose in the 1950s
was to equip and expand the SDF to the degree politically and economi-
cally permissible, enabling it to oppose the Soviet Union’s great military
strength to a degree, while also having it fulfill non-military activities such
as disaster relief.
“A beloved Self-Defense Forces” is an expression first used by the
Director General of the JDA around the time of the creation of the
SDF. It is true that there were those who felt that “if it were ‘a more
elite, steadfast Self-Defense Forces’ it would be different, but what does ‘a
beloved Self-Defense Forces’ even mean? […] How can we make people
swear to ‘work hard when it’s time to work even if it means sacrificing
your life’ on the one hand, and have ‘a beloved Self-Defense Forces’ on
the other? It’s a contradiction.”153 However, it was an expression of the
desire to build a capable organization that could gain the understanding
of the people. And from the latter 1950s, the results of that effort started
to slowly show themselves. The number of people who toured the GSDF
camps continued to increase, from about 218,000 in 1955, to 340,000 in
1956, 714,000 in 1957, 970,000 in 1958, and greatly surpassing a million
with 1,273,000 people in 1959.154
US–Japan Security Cooperation: Collective Action

It would not be an overstatement to say that most of the energies of the
Kishi government that took office in February 1957 were poured into
revising the security treaty. The goal of Kishi, who had managed to reach
the office of prime minister only four years after entering postwar politics,
was to sweep away the remaining dregs of the Occupation, creating a
domestic political system suitable to an independent state. On the diplo-
matic front, he wanted to raise Japan’s international position. Practically
speaking, he wanted to reform the asymmetric and unequal US–Japan
Security Treaty, changing the US–Japan relationship to one between
equals; he would then use that new relationship to gain the popular sup-
port necessary to push through constitutional revision.155
The American government, which had felt uneasy since the enactment
of the peace treaty about the Japanese political situation with its conserva-
tive infighting and clashes between progressives and conservatives, wel-
comed the birth of a strong, pro-American conservative government. In
an October 1957 report to the State Department, Ambassador Douglas
MacArthur II stated that while “Kishi has his defects, he is at present by
far [the] best leader in sight in terms of U.S. objectives,” and advised that
the American government support him.156 It was fortunate for the Kishi
government that the Eisenhower administration began to show willing-
ness to re-examine the US–Japan security treaty in 1957. Shortly after the
June meeting between Kishi and Eisenhower, the American and Japanese
governments engaged in an “Exchange of Letters regarding the relation-
ship between the Security Treaty and UN Charter” at Kishi’s request,
confirming the principle that the measures of the security treaty were in
accordance with the UN Charter. It was also agreed to create a “Japan-US
Committee on Security” to examine problems arising from the security
treaty.157
In 1958, the American government shifted course toward a serious
revision of the security treaty. In October of the previous year, the Soviet
Union had succeeded in launching its Sputnik satellite and the communists
were becoming more confident in their confrontation with the West. The
United States feared the psychological impact this would have on Japanese
society and an increase in anti-American sentiment. They also decided it
was desirable to solidify Japan’s cooperation with the Free World by revis-
ing the US–Japan Security Treaty while a strong conservative like Kishi
was in power to make it a more equal and mutual treaty.
106 A. KUSUNOKI
Even so, removing the asymmetrical nature of the security treaty the
way the Japanese government ached for, revising it into a mutual defense
treaty, was difficult. The security treaty signed at the same time as the
San Francisco Peace Treaty stated that American forces stationed in Japan
“may be utilized to contribute […] to the security of Japan against armed
attack from without” (Article 1). In other words, the United States could
either defend Japan or not as it chose. Since the American government was
restricted by the Vandenberg resolution adopted by Congress and could
not sign a mutual defense agreement with the militarily weak Japan, the
security treaty had no choice but be asymmetrical. The Japanese foreign
ministry had deeply desired since the time of the peace treaty was signed
for the American obligation to protect Japan to be made explicit in the
form of a mutual security treaty based on Article 51 of the UN Charter
(collective self-defense). Although it is true that Kishi was obsessed with
revising the treaty, the Foreign Ministry also had a strong motivation as
well.158
However, Japanese defense strength improved only gradually, and with-
out constitutional revision, the dispatch of the SDF abroad did not seem
realistic. Japan was unable to bear responsibility for America’s security.
On that point, Ambassador MacArthur proposed a mutual defense treaty
that did not violate the Japanese constitution: An irregular mutual defense
treaty where Japan’s primary obligation to the United States would be lim-
ited to the provision of bases. This policy was accepted in Washington, and
ultimately turned into a complete revision of the security treaty at Kishi’s
decision. The “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the
United States and Japan” (the new security treaty) and US–Japan Status of
Forces Agreement (a revision of the US–Japan Administrative Agreement)
were signed in January 1960, the result of negotiations beginning in the
summer of 1958 and lasting more than a year.159
Since most of the negotiations over the security treaty revisions were
taken up by the exceedingly legal, technical work of confirming the
language of each clause, they were held between the foreign ministry
and the American embassy in Tokyo. This is not to say that the JDA
and SDF had nothing to do with them, however. It was inevitable that
Japan’s intentions and capabilities concerning the security of itself and
the region in order would be questioned as part of the process of guar-
anteeing the security treaty’s mutuality. The issue of “capabilities” was
one for the SDF.
The SDF and JDA felt a sense of crisis from the hastened withdrawal
of American ground forces from Japan. In June 1958, immediately before
the treaty revision negotiations began, a document from the Security
Division of the Foreign Ministry’s North American Bureau believed to
reflect the JDA’s point of view had the following to say on “items to be
taken up by the cabinet relating to the security issue”:
As things stand now, the growth of the SDF is under various constraints
in contrast with the considerably rapid course of the American military’s
reduction; in view of trends up to now, there is a significant danger that a
gap in our country’s defenses will result. Accordingly, it is absolutely neces-
sary for the government as a whole to revise its perception of the security
issue, eliminate the fallacy that working on defense is done to cooperate
with the U.S., and handle relations with the American military in Japan
properly with a view to the big-picture of joint U.S.-Japan security.160
There were anxieties that defense increases were not keeping up with
the speed of the American ground force withdrawal and that a gap in
Japan’s defenses would result. This sense of danger was exacerbated by
the fact that the American military obligation to defend Japan was not
specified in the security treaty. The diplomat’s instinctual dislike of flaws
in treaties likely complicated the anxiety felt that American would possibly
not protect Japan.
The JDA and SDF also pointed out security problems with the Foreign
Ministry’s goal of introducing a prior consultation system on issues such
as changes to the deployment and equipment of American forces, and the
use of American bases in Japan for missions outside of the Japan region.
The Foreign Ministry thought such a prior consultation system was essen-
tial as a framework for reflecting the Japanese will on the operation of
American bases, which had a tendency to enflame the public’s sense of
sovereignty and draw anti-American sentiment. Japan expected the frame-
work to soften the impression that it might be unwillingly drawn into an
American war, or that nuclear weapons would be introduced to the coun-
try.161 However, in an October 1958 meeting with the foreign ministry,
JDA leaders such as Vice Director Imai Hisashi, Assistant Vice Director
Asō Shigeru, and SDF Chief of Staff Hayashi said that “We cannot overes-
timate Japan’s defense strength. For the time being, the defense of Japan
requires the joint U.S.-Japan security arrangement. Although the more
the American military presence in Japan is reduced the more necessary
108 A. KUSUNOKI
it is to have strong treaty relations, having troops stationed is the most

effective way.” They also said, “We should not just request the withdrawal
of the American military. Also, approaches that constrain the American
military in Japan will harm our defenses” and “We must naturally provide
bases and support for the sake of the security of the Far East. If times were
better, Japan would also have to be armed with offensive capabilities, but
for now America shoulders that burden for us.”162 The JDA and SDF
reminded the Foreign Ministry that the need to tie the United States to
Japan through the provision of military bases was not gone, and that they
should not invite a reduction of that deterrent. For those from the JDA
and SDF who understood the reality of Japan’s defensive capabilities, the
“fear of abandonment” was very strong.
That they thought the cooperative relationship between the SDF
and American forces in Japan should be strengthened and given a legal
framework regardless of the success or failure of the treaty revisions is also
apparent from the context. The issue of how the two countries would act
together in an emergency was not specifically laid out in the security treaty
or the Administrative Agreement then in effect. There was only Article 24
of the Administrative Agreement that stated “In the event of hostilities,
or imminently threatened hostilities, in the Japan area, the Governments
of the United States and Japan shall immediately consult together with a
view to taking necessary joint measures for the defense of that area and
to carrying out the purposes of Article 1 of the Security Treaty.” This is
because the Yoshida government avoided making a specific decision on
the establishment of a unified US–Japan command, or the placement of
an American as commander explicit in the agreement.163
The American government later sought an implicit understanding
from the Japanese government. In July 1952, shortly after the peace
treaty went into effect, an agreement over setting up a joint command in
an emergency was reached between Yoshida, Ambassador Murphy, and
General Clark.164 This was a “secret agreement” of sorts, as it was never
made public. As having the United States and their ally’s militaries acting
together under a joint command—led by an American—in an emergency
constituted a military necessity for the American military, the American
government wanted to receive the Japanese government’s agreement in
advance, even if it was unofficial. Although no further steps were taken
with regard to this agreement, peacetime cooperation between American
forces and the SDF in fields such as air defense gradually progressed.165
It seems that sharing joint action plans was also tried in the field to an
extent. In the 1950s, when the direct military threat to Japan was from the
Soviet Union, Hokkaido would have been the likely target once a Soviet
invasion began. It was for this reason that the SDF concentrated units
there. In the case of the GSDF, about 50,000 of its 180,000 men were
placed in Hokkaido, and the ASDF placed Misawa Air Base in Aomori for
its defense. According to the recollection of Nakamura, who served in the
Defense Affairs group (bōeihan) from Ground Staff Office’s G-3 Division,
the defense affairs team visited Hokkaido with representatives of United
States Army, Japan HQ from Camp Zama, and studied topics such as the
defense of the Ishikari plain.
The American military’s general plan was to leave the defense of
Hokkaido to the GSDF and to place the American military in charge of
the area from Sendai south. In other words, it was a plan where the defense
of Hokkaido would be the GSDF’s mission and, although it was unclear
as to at what stage the American military would be reinforced, it would
in any case not abandon Sendai. For this reason, the American military’s
attitude toward the Japan plan for the defense of Hokkaido was one where
they were “willing to listen but would not comment.” This position was
thoroughly maintained during a joint map exercise held with 100 officers
from each side. Although the Japanese expected that they might be able
to find out how the American military would use tactical nuclear weapons
in the defense of Japan through the exercise, the Americans held to their
position of not leaking their nuclear plans. The two sides were not poised
to share all their operation plans.166
Based on this, it was thought that
regardless of whether the security treaty is revised or not, with the American
military’s withdrawal reaching an advance understanding between the
United States and Japan on the concrete details of emergency operations
based on Article 24 of the Administrative Agreement—even if they are not
immediately made rights and obligations in the treaty—is not only a key
request for national defense but also a timely step for the creation of defense
preparation plans.167
Until about the fall of 1958, the Foreign Ministry raised the formation
of a joint defense system as a policy for treaty revision, with the JDA and
SDF leadership acknowledging its importance.168
110 A. KUSUNOKI
As treaty negotiations progressed and agreement was reached in arrang-

ing a mutual defense treaty—albeit an irregular one where the United
States was obligated to defend Japan and Japan bore the responsibility to
defend American bases in Japan—the movement to lay out specifics for a
joint defense mechanism lost steam, however. The focus of negotiations
shifted to the ways the American military was allowed to use their bases.
Ultimately, joint defense was only mentioned in the treaty text in a general
form: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in
the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common
danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes”
(Article 5). While the purpose of an alliance as an “alliance” should lie
in the certainty of joint defense between the partners, the treaty revision
was not used to codify joint actions of the American forces in Japan and
the SDF. The question of how the two would operate together in the case
of an emergency only began to take concrete shape following the enact-
ment of the 1978 “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation” (the
Guidelines). The core of the US–Japan Security Treaty, particularly in the
1950s, was on the operation of American bases in Japan.
The Security Treaty Riots and the GSDF

The revised Japan–US Security Treaty, signed in Washington, D.C., in
January 1960, resolved a lot of the problems of the earlier treaty from
the Japanese perspective. First of all, it introduced a prior consultation
system for the deployment of American forces in Japan, stipulating that
the two countries would consult “from time to time regarding the imple-
mentation of this Treaty” and “whenever the security of Japan or inter-
national peace and security in the Far East is threatened” (Article 4). The
elimination of the “internal riots and disturbances” clause and the ability
of either party to terminate the treaty after an initial term of ten years
by giving one year’s notice (Article 10) can also be given as improve-
ments. Symmetry and equality between the United States and Japan was
secured, at least formally.169
The new security treaty was submitted to the House of Representatives
on February 5 and deliberations began with the goal of approval dur-
ing the 34th regular session of the Diet. Discussion of the treaty became
greatly prolonged as the opposition parties repeatedly objected over
issues such as the specific meaning of “the Far East,” the Diet’s right to
amend treaties, and prior consultation, however. Kishi and Eisenhower

had agreed at the time of the treaty signing in January that Eisenhower
would visit Japan for two days from June 19. Diet approval thus needed to
be completed by that date. Thirty days would be needed, even assuming
automatic approval by the House of Councilors due to Article 61 of the
Japanese constitution. Running out of time, on May 19, Kishi resorted
to extending of the Diet session and forcing the new treaty through with
only the support of the Liberal Democratic Party. In an extremely secret
decision known by only a few close to Kishi, 500 policemen were placed
inside the chamber of the House of Representatives to physically remove
Socialist Party members at the time of the vote. This tactic drew down
thunderous criticism from the public. Although the treaty was sent on to
the House of Councilors, enraged opposition Diet members boycotted
the session, paralyzing the Diet.
Opposition and criticism of Kishi’s strong-arm tactics took the form
of mass actions that spread throughout the country. Demonstrations
on May 26 are said to have reached 540,000 participants nationwide.
Demonstrators calling for the abolition of the security treaty and the
defense of democracy surrounded the National Diet Building for days.
Meanwhile, Kishi determinedly waited for a month to pass. It was his
intention to welcome Eisenhower to Japan and call attention to the new
stage of US–Japan cooperation no matter what. He might have had his
eyes on eventual constitutional revision. Kishi was convinced that the new
symmetric, equal security treaty would stabilize US–Japan relations and
gain the support of the public.
It was necessary, however, to ensure that President Eisenhower’s per-
sonal safety was guaranteed and that his visit was not marred at all. As a
result, people within the government and the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) began to call for the SDF to be used for the security of the capital
during his visit.
Regarding the use of the SDF in dealing with internal disturbances, the
Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission (Kokka Kōan
Iinkai) signed an agreement in September 1954 on preserving the public
peace, which stated that while the SDF and police would not be able to
order one another’s organization or personnel around, they would “coop-
erate closely,” and under this policy, the two agreed to “discuss concretely
between the SDF and police the division of security-related protection and
direct riot suppression duties […] in accordance with the situation and the
degree to which police force is insufficient.”170 Moreover, in December
112 A. KUSUNOKI
1957, a more detailed agreement was signed between the two organi-
zations on preserving peace, and in October 1958, the SDF and police
signed a communications agreement.171 Although the Japan Communist
Party finally renounced its violent revolutionary approach in July 1955,
violent labor disputes continued throughout the 1950s culminating in the
Mitsui Miike Strife from 1959 to 1960. In other words, it was anticipated
that the SDF would, institutionally at least, cooperate with the police to
preserve domestic peace and tranquility.
Within the LDP, arguments flew around such as “Why should only the
SDF get to keep its hands clean and avoid getting covered with mud? Why
does the SDF alone get to watch on from above when we’re facing our
first great postwar crisis and police officers are being exhausted fighting
Zengakuren? We have no obligation to keep spending massive amounts to
support a useless white elephant” and “If the SDF is going to be unreli-
able, why not request that US troops in Japan or the Seventh Fleet act?
Since the new security treaty still hasn’t gone into effect, we should con-
sider applying the current treaty’s internal disturbance clause.”172
The situation became increasingly tense following the June 10 Hagerty
Incident (in which White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty’s car
was surrounded and attacked by demonstrators at Haneda Airport and
Hagerty had to be rescued with a helicopter). It was likely around this time,
as Kishi rushed toward ratification of the new treaty and Eisenhower’s visit
that his strong resolve began to weaken. Five days later, Tokyo University
student Kanba Michiko was crushed to death as demonstrators forcing
their way onto the Diet grounds clashed with police.173
The police were exhausted by the constant guarding. There were
roughly 110,000 police officers in the country. It is clear that there was
serious uneasiness about the security measures for Eisenhower’s visit and
arguments within the government and LDP became increasingly hawkish.
Yoshida Shigeru pressured Kishi to use the SDF to quell the d emonstration
and safely welcome President Eisenhower, with Yoshida’s followers, Ikeda
and Satō , the latter Kishi’s younger brother, holding the same opinion.
LDP Secretary General Kawashima Shō jirō also called for the dispatch of
the SDF.174
However, the Police, from the Director General of the National Police
Agency on down, were opposed to the mobilization of the SDF.175 Within
the Defense Agency, there were those who were in favor of the dispatch.
Sugita Ichiji, who had just become the GSDF Chief of Staff in March, was
likely in the vanguard.176 As the commandant of the Fuji School, he appar-
ently said, according to one note-taker, that the “‘enemy’ of the SDF was
Sōhyō, Nikkyōsō, the Communist Party, part of the Socialist Party, as well
as part of the mass media.”177 Sugita believed that a war between states
in the traditional sense was unlikely to occur internationally in the Cold
War, and thus the SDF’s role would fundamentally be to deal with indirect
aggression within Japan and preserve peace. Immediately after becoming
Chief of Staff, Sugita ordered on April 1, 1960, that a study on policing
(“Keibi Kenkyū”) be started, and for two days, from April 20, he had all
units from around the country participate in table-top exercises under the
command of Vice Chief of Staff Hosoda Hiroshi. In addition, Sugita sped
up efforts to be able to protect the capital by sending sandbags and barbed
wire from Hokkaido to Tokyo, and had the unit designated to respond
first continuously practice its movements among making other prepara-
tions for full operations. When things came to a head over the ratification
of the revised security treaty on June 14, the “(Draft) Outline for Dealing
with President Eisenhower’s Visit to Japan,” was prepared with the order
to respond to keep the peace readied.178
However, most officials in the Defense Agency were cautious about
employing the SDF. In part, this was likely because they thought the SDF
was not as capable as the police in dealing with indirect aggression within
the country.179 Even more important was the view held among officials in
the Defense Agency that “it was not politically good to leave the SDF, in
its development phase, with the legacy of having fought against its own
countrymen,” and thus they were “cautious about suppressing ‘internal
enemies.’”180 Defense Agency Director General Akagi Munenori, who
had been friends with Prime Minister Kishi since their days together in
the Gokoku Dōshikai (Association of Like-Minded Brethren to Protect the
Nation), established in 1945, initially thought the use of the SDF was
unavoidable, but increasingly came to share the views of the senior staff of
the agency.181 In his memoirs published in Japanese more than a decade
later, Akagi shows himself more strongly opposed to the dispatch of the
SDF, and gives his reasons as follows:
I was always opposed to the dispatch of the SDF. The reason is that there
was no point in trying to quell the demonstration if it could not been
done at one time. To do that, machine guns and other weapons would be
required …. To the SDF, the demonstrators would certainly do much more
to provoke them. If the troops fired on the rioters, and blood was shed,
it would … pour oil on to the fire. This result would play right into the
114 A. KUSUNOKI
hands of the Communist forces. On the other hand, if the SDF went out
without any weapons, they would be in an even weaker position than the
riot police. In that event, the SDF would be criticized as being unnecessary.
In either case, I was strongly opposed to the SDF’s dispatch. … [However,]
the strong demands of Secretary General Kawashima, Ministers Ikeda and
Satō , and the hardliners in the Diet could not be ignored. As a result, I had
the SDF support the efforts of the police by providing food, trucks, lodging,
and other items to police units that came from nearby prefectures … I was
invited to Prime Minister Kishi’s private residence … where I was subjected
to his strong requests to dispatch the SDF … I told the prime minister I
did not think the SDF should be used … It was a moving moment, watch-
ing this tragic figure. With his arms folded across his chest, Prime Minister
listened without a word, and finally agreed in the end.182
At this point, Kishi gave up on having the president visit Japan, and decided
to resign. The revised security treaty was passed at midnight on June 19
as Kishi and his younger brother sat alone in the Prime Minister’s official
residence waiting for that hour to come.183 That evening, infantry and
artillery units were readied at Camps Ichigaya, Nerima, and Utsunomiya,
and the airborne brigade at Camp Narashino in Chiba Prefecture. A heli-
copter unit armed with tear gas was on standby at Camp Asaka. Amid
this tumultuous situation, the revised treaty was approved by the Diet,
ratification documents were exchanged on June 23rd, and the treaty went
into effect the following day. Kishi was successful in seeing the security
treaty revised, an effort he had worked long and hard at. However, in the
process, he lost his political standing and future. What was left behind
was a continued divide over security policy among the public and a some-
what forlorn political and security debate that would take almost another
decade to overcome.
Gotōda later wrote, “It is very good that we have been able to preserve
our role and protect the country. I think the reason that we also have
the gratitude of the public is that the SDF was not made to stand against
the people [during the struggle against the security treaty], even if that
has to be said through clenched teeth. We were able to make it through
without going against the principle that, no matter what, we cannot take
a military force which has the mission of becoming the core of a people,
of rising up and taking arms against foreign aggression and make it turn
against that people.”184 The anger of the crowds surrounding the Diet
building was directed less at the Japan–US Security Treaty and more at
Prime Minister Kishi’s handling of the Diet deliberations and ratification
process. The demonstrations were, in part, an effort to protect the demo-

cratic advances postwar Japan had made over the previous fifteen years.
If the SDF had been thrown into that commotion and clashed with the
demonstrators, its image and reputation would likely have been fatally
affected, as the SDF would no longer have been seen as a protector of
the people.
Conclusion
In postwar Japan, the Constitution “renounce[s] war as a sovereign right
of the nation,” and this meant the SDF did not possess any legitimate
basis. As a result, throughout the 1950s, the Japanese government sought
to find an appropriate place for a military, compatible with its postwar
democracy.
Among the three services, the GSDF is the largest, and the one whose
camps most closely exist side-by-side with the people, and thus are very
much in the public’s eyes. The GSDF is also the one with the most oppor-
tunity to interact with the people. Beginning in the 1960s, the SDF began
to secure its place as the “People’s Self-Defense Forces” (note: not as the
“military”). As a result of the Ikeda Hayato Cabinet passing two defense
laws in 1961, the organizational structure of the GSDF changed in 1962
from kankutai to divisions, and “special vehicles (tokusha)” became “tanks
(sensha).” The camouflage used to hide the military flavor in vocabulary
was, in part, removed. In these ways, 1960 was a turning point for the
SDF.
During the process of establishing itself as “a SDF for the people”
within domestic politics and society, the SDF came to fulfill social con-
struction functions domestically by way of non-military activities such
as disaster relief operations and infrastructure construction. Its public
security capabilities were also readied. Based on experiences during the
protests against the security treaty, when the capital seemed to be on
the cusp of revolution, the Ground Staff Office put together “Public
Security Operations (Draft)” in November 1960, “with the goal of
providing general standards for the GSDF’s public security operations
and related training to staff officers and commanders at the regimental
level and below.” “Riot suppression training” was held from the fol-
lowing January, covering breaking up and dispersing demonstrations,
and arresting their leaders.185 The SDF was never mobilized for public
security operations in the 1950s, however, and the 1960s were no differ-
116 A. KUSUNOKI
ent. In retrospect, the security treaty demonstrations were the last public
security crisis where one wrong step could have plunged the country
into civil strife. As high-speed economic growth took hold, Japanese
society became prosperous and calm, and much of the population sepa-
rated themselves from radical, disruptive activities. The social basis for
the kind of turmoil that would make the involvement of the SDF neces-
sary had been lost.
The primary mission of the SDF is responding to direct aggression
from abroad. In Cold War Asia, it was the SDF that was on the frontline,
confronting the massive Soviet military. The GSDF’s organization was
arranged in preparation for the Soviet military threat, with more than a
quarter of its soldiers stationed in Hokkaido. The United States continued
to be dissatisfied by the speed and scale of the SDF’s enlargement. There
were also those within the government, LDP, Defense Agency, and the
SDF who called for building larger scale, fully autonomous defensive capa-
bilities. The conservative governments from Yoshida on chose to build up
the SDF within the framework of the peace constitution, however. It was
a ground force of 180,000 men, a scale that was financially acceptable and
just barely constitutional.
Of course, it was in no way a force that could resist the Soviet Union.
But it was, paradoxically, as the military for a state wagering its survival
within the international situation of the Cold War that it had meaning.
With humanity having gained nuclear weapons, the use of war as an alter-
native expression of politics and diplomacy was no longer a path easily
chosen. Militaries inevitably transformed from “militaries to be used”
to “militaries created to not be used” or “militaries which exist to make
themselves useless.”186 It could be said that the SDF were in alignment
with the international circumstances of the Cold War, and the way that the
postwar Japanese people chose to live.
Notes
1. Takahashi Noriyuki, Yamada Kuniaki, Hoya Tō ru, Ichinose
Toshiya, Nihon Gunjishi (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kō bunkan, 2006),
pp. 310–370.
2. For more on the Occupation reforms, see Robert E. Ward and
Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., Democratizing Japan: the Allied
Occupation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987);
Takemae Eiji, Senryō Sengoshi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992);
Iokibe Makoto, Senryōki: Shushotachi no Shin Nihon (Tokyo:

Kō dansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 2007). On constitutional revision,
see volumes 1 to 4 of Satō Tatsuo, ed., Nihon Koku Kenpō
Seiritsushi (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1994).
3. According to public opinion polls on rearmament, approval of
rearmament reached 76 percent in September 1951, but approval
gradually declined afterward, with about 30 percent approving
and 40 percent opposing rearmament after 1956. NHK Hō sō
Yoron Chō sasho (NHK Public Opinion Bureau), Zusetsu Sengo
Yoronshi (Tokyo: NHK Books, 1975), pp. 142–143.
4. On the course of rearmament leading up to the SDF’s creation,
see Martin E. Weinstein, Japan’s Postwar Defense Policy,
1947–1968 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Hata
Ikuhiko, Shiroku Nihon Saigunbi (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1976);
Uemura Hideki, Saigunbi to 55 Nen Taisei (Tokyo: Bokutakusha,
1995); Tanaka Akihiko, Anzen Hoshō: Sengo 50 Nen no Mōsaku
(Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1997); Masuda Hiroshi, Jieitai no
Tanjō: Nihon no Saigunbi to Amerika (Tokyo: Chūko Shinsho,
2004); for the most recent research, see Shibayama Futoshi,
Nihon Saigunbi e no Michi, 1945–1954 Nen (Kyoto: Minerva
Shobō , 2010).
5. Weinstein, Japan’s Postwar Defense Policy; Hata, Shiroku Nihon
Saigunbi; Ō take Hideo, Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu: Sengo
Nihon no Bōeikan (Tokyo: Kō dansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 2005);
Uemura, Saigunbi to 55 Nen Taisei; Masuda, Jieitai no Tanjō.
6. Nakajima Shingo, Sengo Nihon no Bōei Seisaku: “Yoshida Rosen” o
Meguru Seiji-Gaikō-Gunji (Tokyo: Keiō Gijuku Daigaku
Shuppankai, 2006); Sadō Akihiro, Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji,
(Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kō bunkan, 2003).
7. Uemura, Saigunbi to 55 Nen Taisei; Nakajima, Sengo Nihon no
Bōei Seisaku; Sadō , Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji.
8. For an insightful study in English on GSDF training, education,
and manning, see Thomas M. Brendle, “Japan’s Ground Self-
Defense Force, 1950–1970: Problems Encountered in Developing
and Managing an All-Volunteer Army.” Unpublished
Ph.D. Dissertation, Tufts University, 1971.
118 A. KUSUNOKI
9. Kusunoki Ayako, Yoshida Shigeru to Anzen Hoshō Seisaku no

Keisei: Nichibei no Kōsō to Sono Sōgo Sayō, 1943–1952 Nen (Kyoto:
Minerva Shobō , 2009), 125.
10. “The MacArthur Letter: Establishment of the National Police
Reserve (July 8, 1950),” Ō take Hideo, ed., Sengo Nihon Bōei
Mondai Shiryōshū, Vol. 1 (hereafter, Bōei Shiryōshū), (Tokyo:
Sanichi Shobō , 1991), pp. 426–427; Yomiuri Shimbun
Sengoshihan, ed., ‘Saigunbi’ no Kiseki (Tokyo: Yomiuri
Shimbunsha, 1981), pp. 54–56.
11. “Keisatsu Yobitai Rei: Seirei 260-go (The National Police Reserve
Order: Cabinet Order No. 260) (August 10, 1950),” Ō take, ed.,
Bōei Shiryōshū, Vol. 1, pp. 446–447.
12. “Keisatsu Yobitai no Sosetsu oyobi Kakucho Keikakusho” (July
12, 1950),” Ō take, ed., Bōei Shiryōshū, Vol. 1, pp. 430–439.
13. Frank Kowalski and Robert D. Eldridge, An Inoffensive
Rearmament: The Making of the Postwar Japanese Army
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013), pp. 81–82.
14. Dō ba Hajime, Sonoda Gō min, and Tamura Yūzō , Bōeichō (Tokyo:
Hō bunsha, 1956), pp. 75–76.
15. Kusunoki, Ayako, Senryō kara dokuritsu he, 1945–1952 (Tokyo:
Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2013), pp. 195–202.
16. Kosugi Heiichi Bunsho, Tokyo Daigaku Daigakuin Hō gaku Seiji
Gaku Kenkyūkai Fuzoku Kindai Nihon Hō sei Shiryō Sentaa;
Katō Yō zō , Shiroku Jieitaishi: Keisatsu Yobitai Kara Konnichi
Made (Tokyo: Gekkan Seisaku Geppō sha, 1979), p. 18.
17. “Letter from Yoshida to MacArthur (August 9, 1949),” from
Sodei Rinjirō , ed., Yoshida Shigeru-Makkaasaa Ō fuku Shokanshū
(Tokyo: Hō sei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 2000), pp. 268–274;
Yoshida Shigeru, Kaisō Jūnen, Vol. 2, (Tokyo: Shinchō sha, 1957),
pp. 128–136; Watanabe Takeshi, Senryōka no Nihon Zaisei
Oboegaki (Tokyo: Chūkō Bunko, 1999), p. 351.
18. Masuhara Keiichi, “Keisatsu Yobitai Kara Jieitai Made (Intabyū
Kiroku),” in Andō Yoshio, ed., Shōwa Zaiseishi e no Shōgen, Vol. 2,
(Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1966), p. 395; “Ō hashi Takeo
Intabyū Kiroku,” in Ō take, ed., Bōei Shiryōshū, Vol. 1, p. 451;
“Tatsumi Eiichi Intabyū Kiroku,” ibid., 511, 514–515; Inoki
Masamichi, Hyōden Yoshida Shigeru, Vol. 4, (Tokyo: Yomiuri
Shimbunsha, 1981), pp. 262–263.
19. Kano Nobuyuki, “Bei Senryō gun ni yoru Nihon Koku Keisatsu
Yobitai no Sō setsu (2): Yobitai Honbu to Heitaiin nomi no
Nyūtai,” Gunji Kenkyū, Vol. 34, No. 10 (1999), pp. 235–236.
NPR headquarter was initially placed within the NRP building,
but it was moved to the site of the former Tokyo Maritime
Training School (Tokyo Kō tō Shō sen Gakkō ) on September 7.
20. Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., Jieitai Jūnenshi (Tokyo:
Ō kurashō Insatsukyoku, 1961), pp. 29–30.
21. Gotō da Masaharu, Jō to Ri:Gotōda Masaharu Kaikoroku Vol. 1,
(Tokyo: Kō dansha, 1998), pp. 109–110.
22. Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjo Senshibu, ed., Utusmi Hitoshi Ō raru
Hisutorii (Keisatsu Yobitai-Hoanchō Jidai) (Tokyo: Bō eishō Bō ei
Kenkyūjo, 2008), pp. 46, 101.
23. “Tatsumi Eiichi Intabyū Kiroku,” 510; Hata, Shiroku Nihon
Saigunbi, pp. 165–166; Shibayama, Nihon Saigunbi e no Michi,
pp. 299–300.
24. “Tatsumi Eiichi Intabyū Kiroku,” p. 510; Dō ba, Bōeichō, pp. 80,
212.
25. Dō ba, Bōeichō, pp. 80, 213–215.
26. Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., Jieitai Jūnenshi, pp. 30–31;
Dō ba, Bōeichō, pp. 82–84.
27. “Tatsumi Eiichi Intabyū Kiroku,” p. 511.
28. Kusunoki, Yoshida Shigeru to Anzen Hoshō Seisaku no Keisei,
pp. 250–251.
29. Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., Jieitai Jūnenshi, p 32; Bō eichō
Jinjikyoku Jinji Dainika, ed., Boshū Jūnenshi, Vol. 1, (Tokyo:
Bō eichō , 1961), p. 54.
30. Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjo Senshibu, ed., Nakamura Ryūhei Ō raru
Hisutorii (Tokyo: Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjo, 2008), p. 146.
31. Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., Jieitai Jūnenshi, p. 32.
32. “Yamada Takashi Ō raru Hisutorii,” in Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjo
Senshibu, ed., Nakamura Ryūhei Ō raru Hisutorii, pp. 364–368.
33. According to a November 1950 public opinion poll by the Asahi
Shimbun, which asked, “Some say that our country should create
a military; do you support or oppose that opinion?” 53.8 percent
answered “Support,” 27.6 percent answered “Oppose,” and 18.6
percent answered “I don’t know.” See “Asahi Shimbun Yoron
120 A. KUSUNOKI
Chō sa ‘Kō wa to Nihon Saibusō ,’” in Ō take, ed., Bōei Shiryōshū,

Vol. 1, pp. 585–586.
pp. 180–182.
35. Ibid. See others such as Shibayama, Nihon Saigunbi,
pp. 494–508.
36. Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjō Senshibu, ed., Sakuma Makoto Ō raru
Hisutorii, Vol. 1, (Tokyo: Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjo, 2007), p. 32.
37. Kosugi Papers. See also Utsumi Oral History, pp. 20, 61–62.
Hisutorii, p. 146.
39. Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., Jieitai Jūnenshi, pp. 27,
145–146.
40. Ibid., p. 223.
41. Collins to JCS, “JCS 1380/97: National Police Reserve-Japan
(NPRJ),” January 30, 1951; JCS, “Decision on JCS 1380/97,”
February 5, 1951; JCS to Marshall, “National Police Reserve-
Japan (NPRJ),” February 9, 1951, all in CCS 383.21 Japan
(3-13-45), Sec. 24, Geographic File 1951–1953, RG 218:
Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland;
Marshall to Acheson, February 15, 1951, U.S. Department of
State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter abbreviated
as FRUS) 1951, Vol. 6, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 884–885; Marshall
to Acheson, April 20, 1951, ibid., pp. 1001–1002; Shibayama
Futoshi, “Chō sen Sensō no Bunmyaku ni okeru Beiei ni totte no
Nihon Saigunbi no Imi Henka, 6/1950–8/1952,” Dōshisha
Amerika Kenkyū, No. 37 (2001), pp. 56–58; Kusunoki, Yoshida
Shigeru to Anzen Hoshō Seisaku no Keisei, pp. 247–250.
42. Marshall to the JCS, May 10, 1951, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-
45), Sec. 25, Geographic File 1951–1953, RG 218; Shibayama,
“Chō sen Sensō no Bunmyaku ni okeru Beiei ni totte no Nihon
Saigunbi no Imi Henka,” pp. 69–70.
43. Rusk to Acheson, “Heavy Armament for the Japanese National
Police Reserve,” September 25, 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. 6, Part
1, pp. 1358–1360; CINCFE to DA, C 51649, September 26,
1951; CINCFE to DA, C 51750, September 28, 1951, CCS
383.21; Japan (3-13-45), Sec. 26, Geographic File 1951–1953,

RG 218; Collins to the JCS, “JCS 1380/21: Training Japanese
National Reserve with Heavy Armament at United States Bases in
Japan,” October 18, 1951, ibid.; Bradley to Lovett, “Training
Japanese National Police Reserve with Heavy Armament at
United States Bases in Japan,” October 29, 1951, ibid.; Webb to
the Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster), November 29, 1951,
FRUS 1951, Vol. 6, Part 1, pp. 1418–1419.
45. Ibid., pp. 200, 223. See also Watanabe Masaya and Uemura
Hideki, “Keisatsu Yobitai no Henbō : Konsutabyurari kara Bō ei
Butai e,” Gunjishigaku, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2007), pp. 36–50.
46. Sakamoto Riki, “Jietai Zero-sai Kokkeitan,” Ō take, ed., Bōei
Shiryōshū, Vol. 1, pp. 498–499.
48. This was stated by Masuhara on July 4, 1951. See Asahi Shimbun,
July 5, 1951.
49. Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., Jieitai Jūnenshi, pp. 32–35,
173.
50. The prewar military was involved in five public security opera-
tions in total. Operations carried out by the military included
responding to labor unrest at the Ashio Copper Mine Strike and
Kobe, and to the March 1 Movement. Dō ba Hajime, “Jieitai no
Chian Shutsudō Mondai,” Kokubō, Vol. 8, No. 12 (August
1960), pp. 9–10.
51. Gotō da, Jō to Ri, Vol. 1, pp. 124–125.
52. Yomiuri Shimbun Sengoshihan, ed., “‘Saigunbi’ no Kiseki,”
pp. 8–32.
53. Yomiuri Shimbun, July 16, 1952.
pp. 11–14.
55. “Records of the 13th House of Representatives,” No. 38 (May 6,
1952) (http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/013/051
2/01305060512038a.html, accessed April 2014).
p. 29.
57. Ibid., pp. 15–21.
122 A. KUSUNOKI
58. Yoshida Ritsuto, “Guntai no ‘Saigai Shutsudō ’ Seido no Kakuritsu:

Daikibo Saigai e no Taiō to Eiju no Henka kara,” Shigaku Zasshi,
Vol. 117, No. 10 (October 2008), pp. 73–97.
59. Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjo Senshibu, ed., Utsumi Hitoshi Ō raru
Hisutorii, p. 83.
61. Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., Jieitai Junenshi, p. 358.
62. Ibid., p. 355.
63. Hayashi Keizō , “Sō kan Shunin ni Saishite no Kunwa,” in Ō take,
ed., Bōei Shiryōshū, Vol. 1, pp. 489–490.
64. Kosugi Heiichi Papers.
65. Dō ba, Bōeichō, pp. 80, 213–215.
Chap. 6.
67. “1951/2/2 no Kaidan de Senpō ni Kō fu shita ‘Anzen Hoshō ni
tsuite no Nichibei Kyō r yoku no tame no Chūō Kikan no Secchi
ni tsuite’ tsuki, Wabun,” Gaimushō Jō yakukyoku Hō kika, ed.,
“Heiwa Jō yaku no Teiketsu ni Kansuru Chō sho IV 1951/1-2 no
Daiichiji Kō shō (10/1967),” included in Gaimushō , ed., Nihon
Gaikō Bunsho: Heiwa Jōyaku no Teiketsu Chōsho, Vol. 2 (Tokyo:
Gaimusho, 2002) (hereafter, Chōsho), pp. 162–164; “1951/2/2
no Kaidan Memo,” ibid., pp. 161–162; “1951/2/3 Yugata
Senpō ni Kō fu shita ‘Initial Steps for Rearmament Program’
(‘Initial Steps for Rearmament Program, given to the other party
on the evening of February 3, 1951),” ibid., p. 182.
68. Fearey, “Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting,” February 5,
1951, FRUS 1951, 6-1, pp. 857–858.
69. For the US–Japan negotiations over the security treaty and rear-
mament, see also Chap. 6 of Kusunoki, Yoshida Shigeru to Anzen
Hoshō Seisaku no Keisei.
70. JCS to Lovett, December 12, 1951, FRUS 1951, 6-1, p. 1434.
71. SCAP to DEPTAR, C 57490, November 18, 1951, CCS 092
Japan (12-12-50), Sec. 8, RG 218; CINCFE to DEPTAR, C
59752, December 20, 1951 and SCAP to DEPTAR, C 61509,
January 15, 1952, both in Adjutant General’ s Section—
Operations Division, Top Secret General Correspondence (here-
after abbreviated as AG-TS), 1951, RG 554: Records of General
Headquarter, Far East Command, SCAP and UN Command,
NARA; Memorandum by Wright, January 23, 1952, C/S,

1945–52, RG 554; FRUS 1951, 6-1, p. 1434; “Tatsumi Eiichi
Interview,” in Ō take, ed., Bōei Shiryōshū, Vol. 1, p. 512.
72. Yoshitsugu Kō suke, “Hoantai no Sō setu to ‘Bō eiryoku Zenzō ’
Rosen: ‘Keisatsu Yobitai Kakuchō Keikaku’ ni miru Amerika no
Nihon ‘Saigunbi’ Seisaku,” Rekishigaku Kenkyū 696 (1997),
pp. 21–22.
73. “Dainanakai Hikoshi Kaidan Yoroku (1952/2/11) (7th
Unofficial Discussion Record), Chōsho VII, 304. Letter from
Yoshida to Tatsumi Eiichi (1950/11/29),” Zaidan Hō jin Yoshida
Shigeru Kinen Jigyō Zaidan, ed., Yoshida Shigeru Shokan (Tokyo:
Chūō Kō ronsha, 1994), pp. 384–385.
74. “Records of the 13th House of Representatives Budget
Committee” No. 5 (January 31, 1952) (http://kokkai.ndl.go.
jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/013/0514/01301310514005a.html).
75. SCAP to DEPTAR, C 61509, January 15, 1952, AG-TS 1951,
RG 554.
76. Memorandum by Kowalski, February 19, 1952; Kowalski, “NPRJ
Expansion,” February 20, 1952; Kowalski, “Conference between
Acting Chief, CAS, and Japanese State Minister for NPRJ Affairs,”
February 22, 1952; Col. Woodyard, “Conference by SCAP with
Prime Minister Yoshida,” February 23, 1952, all in GHQ/SCAP
Records, TS 00298 (National Diet Library Modern Political and
Constitutional History Collection). Yoshitsugu, “Hoantai no
Sō setsu to ‘Bō eiryoku Zenzō ’ Rosen,” pp. 23–28.
77. SCAP to DEPTAR, C 61509, January 15, 1952, AG-TS 1951,
RG 554.
78. For example, “1950/10/24 Meguro Kantei ni okeru Tokubetsu
Shukai Giji Yoroku” (Records of the Proceedings of the Special
Meeting at the Meguro Kantei on October 24, 1950), Chōsho III,
p. 137.
79. CINCFE to DEPTAR, C 69596, August 25, 1951, CCS 092
Japan (12-12-50), Sec. 6, RG 218, NARA.
80. James E. Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime
Forces, 1945–1971. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.
81. Murphy to Acheson, no. 1810, December 8, 1952, Tokyo
Embassy, 1952, RG 84: Foreign Service Posts of the Department
of State; Japan, NARA; CINCFE to DEPTAR, August 25, 1951,
Sec. 6, Geographic File 1951–1953, RG 218.
124 A. KUSUNOKI
82. “1951/2/7 no Sō ri Daresu Kaidan Memo (Memorandum of

Discussion between the Prime Minister and Dulles on February
7, 1951),” Chōsho III, pp. 224–225.
83. “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Commander in Chief,
Far East (Ridgway),” March 26, 1952, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol.
14, China and Japan, part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1985), p. 1218.
84. Murphy to Acheson, May 12, 1952, Tokyo Embassy, 1952, RG
84, NARA.
85. Yoshida, Kaisō Jūnen, Vol. 2, p. 161.
86. “Memorandum of Conversation by Ridgway,” March 26, 1952,
supra.
87. Chōsho III, p. 78.
88. Watanabe Takeshi, Senryōka no Nihon Zaisei Oboegaki (Tokyo:
Chūō Kō ron Shinsha, 1999), 395; Memorandum by Fine (ESS),
January 19, 1952, C/S, Subject File 1945–52, RG 554.
89. Asahi Shimbun, February 14, 1953.
90. Ō take, Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu, Chap. 3.
91. CINCFE to DEPTAR, C 67162, April 19, 1952, AG Sec, TS
1952, RG 554; Murphy to Acheson, no. 1810, December 8,
1952, Tokyo Embassy, 1952, RG 84.
92. “Hoanchō hō (July 31, 1952) (National Safety Agency Law),” in
Ō take, ed., Bōei Shiryōshū, Vol. 2, p. 391.
93. Katō Yō zō , Shiroku Jieitaishi: Keisatsu Yobitai Kara Konnichi
Made (Tokyo: Gekkan Seisaku Geppō sha, 1979), pp. 60–61.
94. Asahi Shimbun, August 5, 1952, Ibid., p. 449.
95. Murphy to Allison, September 15, 1952, Tokyo Embassy, 1952,
RG 84.
96. “Hoanchō hō ,” in Ō take, ed., Bōei Shiryōshū, Vol. 2, 399–400.
See also, Katō , Shiroku Jieitaishi, p. 86.
97. Asahi Shimbun, October 15, 1952, in Ō take, ed., Bōei Shiryōshū,
Vol. 2, pp. 442–444.
98. CINCFE to DEPTAR, C 69596, August 25, 1951, CCS 092
Japan (12-12-50), Sec.6, RG 218, NARA.
99. Interview with Dō ba Hajime, “Kono Hito to Ichimon Itto:
Boei Daigakkō chō Maki Tomō,” Kokubō (January 1961),
pp, 28–29.
100. Bō ei Daigakkō Dō sō kai Maki Kinen Shuppan Iinkai, ed., Maki no
Makoto: Maki Tomō Sensei Tsuisoshu (Tokyo: Bō ei Daigakkō
Dō sō kai Maki Kinen Shuppan Iinkai, 1972), pp. 27–55, 119–120,
777–781.
101. Utsumi Ō raru Historii. Interview of Utsumi Hitoshi by the
author, January 27, 2009.
102. Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkujo Senshibu, ed., Sakuma Makoto Ō raru
Hisutorii, pp. 27–29.
Hisutorii, p. 149.
105. Memorandum of Conversation by Frelinghuysen, August 5,

1952, C/S, Subject File, 1945–52, RG 554.
106. Tokyo to Washington, no. 406, August 26, 1952, Tokyo Embassy,
1952, RG 84.
107. Watkins to Bendtsen, August 28, 1952, C/S, Subject File,

1945–52, RG 554.
108. Murphy to Allison, September 15, 1952; Murphy to Acheson,
December 3, 1952, Tokyo Embassy, 1952, RG 84.
109. Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., Jieitai Jūnenshi, pp. 146–147.
110. Ibid., p. 60; Bō eichō Jinjikyoku Jinji Dainika, ed., Boshū Jūnenshi,
Vol. 1, p. 71.
111. Bō eichō Jinjikyoku Jinji Dainika, ed., Boshū Jūnenshi, Vol. 1,
pp. 34–38, 71. The figures for 1951 and 1952 are only for Privates.
The officer school applicant rates use statistics from 1952 onward.
112. Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., Jieitai Jūnenshi, pp. 57, 227.
113. Ibid., pp. 61, 173, 179–181, 200.
Hisutorii, p. 25.
115. Mainichi Shimbun, July 1, 1953, Yomiuri Shimbun, July 18,
1953, in Ō take, ed., Bōei Shiryōshū, Vol. 2, pp. 494–499.
117. Ibid., p. 361.
118. Richard M. Nixon, “American Policy in the Far East,” America-
Japan Society Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 5 (November–December
1953), pp. 41–46.
126 A. KUSUNOKI
119. Keizai Dantai Rengō kai, ed., Keizai Dantai Rengōkai Jūnenshi,
Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Chūō Kō ronsha, 1963), pp. 588–606; Uemura,
Saigunbi to 55 Nen Taisei, pp. 147–152.
120. Robert D. Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands: The
Reversion Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 116–117; 151.
121. “NSC 5516/1: U.S. Policy toward Japan, April 9, 1955,” FRUS
1955–1957, Vol. 23, Part 1, Japan (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 52–62; Uemura,
Saigunbi to 55 Nen Taisei, pp. 168–187; Nakajima, Sengo Nihon
no Bōei Seisaku, pp. 125–127; Iokibe Makoto, ed., Sengo Nihon
Gaikōshi (3rd Ed.) (Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan),
(Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2010), Chap. 2; Sasaki Takuya, Aizenhawaa
Seiken no Fūjikome Seisaku: Soren no Kyōi, Misairu Gyapu Ronsō,
to Tōzai Kōr yū, (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2008), Chaps. 1 and 2.
122. Uemura, Saigunbi to 55 nen Taisei, Chaps. 3–4. Ikeda Shintarō ,
Nichibei Dōmei no Seijishi: Arison Chūnichi Taishi to “1955 Nen
Taisei” no Seiritsu (Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2004), Chaps. 2 and 3;
Tanaka, Anzen Hoshō, Chaps. 4–7.
123. Masumi Junosuke, Sengo Seiji: 1945–55-nen, Vol. 2, (Tokyo:
Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1983), 399–434; Kitaoka Shinichi,
Jimintō: Seikentō no 38 nen (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1995),
pp. 50–62; Kō saka Masataka, “Saishō Yoshida Shigeru Ron,”
Kōsaka Masataka Chosakushū, Vol. 4, (Tokyo, Toshi Shuppan,
2000), pp. 78–92.
124. Katō , Shiroku Jieitaishi, 97–100; Miyamoto, Shin Hoshutōshi,
(Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1962), pp. 249–257; Uemura, Saigunbi
to 55 Nen Taisei, pp. 191–205; Sadō Akihiro, Sengo Seiji to Jieitai
(Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kō bunkan, 2006), pp. 38–42.
125. “Jieitaihō ,” in Ō take, ed., Bōei Shiryōshū, Vol. 3, p. 589; Katō ,
Shiroku Jieitaishi, pp. 101–102.
126. “Jieitaihō ,” in Ō take, ed., Bōei Shiryōshū, Vol. 3, pp. 599–600.
127. Ibid., 601–607; Katō , Shiroku Jieitaishi, pp. 108–111.
128. Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., Jieitai Jūnenshi, pp. 78,
83–84.
129. Kusunoki Ayako, “Senryō Kō waki no Anzen Hoshō : Yoshida

Shigeru no Saigunbi Seisaku, 1945–1954,” in Sugita Yoneyuki,
et al, eds., Ajia Taiheiyō Sensō no Igi: Nichibei Kankei no Kiban ha

Ika ni shite Naritatta ka (Tokyo: Sanwa Shoseki, 2005),
pp. 129–170.
130. Nakamura Akira, Sengo Seiji ni Yureta Kenpō Kyūjō (Tokyo: Chūō
Keizaisha, 1996), pp. 141–151.
131. “Letter from Yoshida Shigeru to Tatsumi Eiichi (November 19,
1964),” Yoshida Shigeru Shokan, p. 394.
132. “Nihon Koku to America Gasshūkoku to no Aida no Sō go Bō ei
Jō yaku (Shian) (Mutual Defense Treaty between Japan and the
United States of America (Draft) July 27, 1955), Gaimushō
Gaikō Kiroku 0611-2010-0791-08 (held in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Archives).
133. Statement by Shimoda Takezō , Treaties Bureau Chief, “Shimoda-
Pasonzu Kaidan: Daiikkai (August 6, 1955) (Shimoda-Parsons
Talks: First Meeting),” ibid.
134. “Memo of Conversation [Second meeting between Shigemitsu
and Dulles],” August 30, 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 23, Part
1, Japan (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1990), pp. 99–100. On Shigemitsu’s visit to the United States,
see Sakamoto Kazuya, Dōmei no Kizuna: Anpo Jōyaku to Sōgosei
no Mōsaku (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2000), and Ikeda, Nichibei Dōmei
no Seijishi, pp. 156–165.
135. Uemura, Saigunbi to “55 nen Taisei,” pp. 77–78, 254–255.
147–148.
138. “Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Office of

Northeast Asian Affairs (Ockey) to the Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson),” January 19, 1957,
FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 23, No. 1, Japan, pp. 249–250.
139. “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson),”
June 7, 1957, ibid., pp. 343–344; “Memorandum of a Conference
with the President, White House, Washington, June 18, 1957,”
ibid., pp. 357–360; “Memorandum of a Conversation, White
House, Washington, June 19, 1957,” ibid., pp. 369–374;
“Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State
128 A. KUSUNOKI
Dulles and Prime Minister Kishi, Department of State,

Washington, June 20, 1957,” ibid., pp. 377–380.
140. Sadō , Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji, pp. 105–106.
141. “Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White

House, Washington, June 18, 1957,” ibid., pp. 357–360;
“Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington,
June 19, 1957,” ibid., pp. 369–374; “Memorandum of
Conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and Prime
Minister Kishi, Department of State, Washington, June 20,
1957,” ibid., pp. 377–380.
142. Prime Minister Kishi, in a conversation with Ambassador

MacArthur prior to his visit, reportedly said he would “attempt a
review of American military installations, taking into consider-
ation the political and psychological circumstances and the
growth of the Self-Defense Forces, as the U.S. seriously reduced
the size of the American military including the complete with-
drawal of all ground forces.” Beihochō , “Daijin yori Beitaishi no
Kodan subeki Tō men no Anzen Hoshō Mondai ni tsuite,”
Iwayuru “Mitsuyaku” Mondai ni Kan suru Chōsa: Sonota Kanren
Bunsho (1.1960/1 no Anpo Jōyaku Kaiteiji no Kaku Mochikomi ni
Kan suru “Mitsuyaku” Mondai Kanren) (hereafter referred to as
Mitsuyaku Kanren Bunsho), Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Diplomatic Papers. (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mit-
suyaku/pdfs/k_1960kaku1.pdf).
147–148.
144. Bō eichō Jinjikyoku Jinji Dainika, ed., Boshū Jūnenshi, Vol. 1,
pp. 34–48, 70–71.
146. Ibid., pp. 85–86, 223–227.
147. Ibid., pp. 88–90.
148. Ibid., pp. 358–359.
149. Ibid., p. 93.
150. Sadō , Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji.
153. Hara Yoshihisa, ed., Kishi Nobusuke Shōgenroku (Tokyo: Mainichi
Shimbunsha, 2003), pp. 116–136; Kitaoka Shinichi, “Kishi
Nobusuke: Yashin to Zasetsu,” in Watanabe Akio, ed., Sengo

Nihon no Saishōtachi, (Tokyo: Chūō Kō ronsha, 1995),
pp. 129–134.
154. MacArthur to Department of State, October 18, 1957, FRUS
1955–1957, Vol. 23, No. 1, Japan, pp. 517–521.
155. “Nichibei Anpo Iinkai Secchi ni Kansuru Nichibei Kyō dō

Happyō ,” Kashima Heiwa Kenkyūjo, ed., Nihon Gaikō Shuyō
Bunsho-Nenpyō, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō , 1983), pp. 816–817.
Tō gō Fumihiko, Nichibei Gaikō Sanjūnen: Anpo-Okinawa to
Sono Go, (Tokyo: Chūkō Bunko, 1989), pp. 48–50.
156. Kusunoki, Yoshida Shigeru to Anzen Hosho Seisaku no Keisei,
Chap. 6. Kusunoki, “Nichibei Domei no Seiritsu Kara Okinawa
Henkan Made,” in Takeuchi Toshitaka, ed., Nichibei Dōmeiron:
Rekishi-Kinō-Shuhen Shokoku no Shiten (Kyoto: Minerva Shobō ,
2011), pp. 71–99.
157. Hara Yoshihisa, Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji: Anpo Kaitei no
Seijiryokugaku (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1988); Sakamoto,
Nichibei Dōmei no Kizuna. The length of the negotiations was
less due to a bilateral problem and more because of the domestic,
and, in particular, intra-ruling party dynamics of the LDP. For
more, see Robert D. Eldridge, “The Revision of the Security
Treaty and Okinawa: Factional and Domestic Political Constraints
on Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s,” in Makoto Iokibe, Caroline
Rose, Junko Tomaru, and John Weste, eds., Japanese Diplomacy
in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration (London: Routledge,
2008), pp. 164–180.
158. Beiho, “Anzen Hosho Mondai ni Kan shi Kakugi ni oite

Toriagerarerubeki Jiko,” 1958/10/4 yori 11/26 ni itaru Keii,
Gaimushō Gaikō Bunsho 0611-2010-0791-01.
159. Kusunoki, Nichibei Dōmei no Seiritsu kara Okinawa Henkan
made, pp. 82–85.
160. Beiho, “Boeicho to no Uchiai ni Kan suru Ken (October 21,
1958),” Gaimusho Gaiko Bunsho 0611-2010-0791-01.
161. See Kusunoki, Yoshida Shigeru to Anzen Hoshō Seisaku no Keisei,
Chap. 6.
162. McClurkin to Allison, “Political Aspects of Japanese Rearmament,”
March 4, 1953, Lot File 55D388, box 5, RG 59, NARA.
163. Beihochō , “Daijin yori Beitaishi no Kodan subeki Tomen no
Anzen Hosho Mondai ni tsuite”, and Beiho, “Anzen Hosho
130 A. KUSUNOKI
Mondai ni Kan shi Daijin yori Sori ni Kyogi Negaebeki Jiko (June
17, 1958),” Mitsuyaku Kanren Bunsho.
Hisutorii, pp. 120, 174–177.
165. “Anpo Jō yaku no Kaisei o Fukumu Nichibei Bō ei Kankei no
Kentō ni tsuite,” Gaimushō Gaikō Bunsho
0611-2010-0791-01.
166. For example, Beihochō , “Nichibei Anzen Hoshō ni Kansuru

Shinjō yaku ni tsuite no Kihonteki Kangaekata,” Mitsuyaku Kanren
Bunsho, and Beiho, “Boeichō to no Uchiai ni Kan suru Ken.”
167. Hara, Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji. Sakamoto, Nichibei Dōmei no
Kizuna.
168. Sadō , Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji, p. 109.
169. Sadō , Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji, p. 109. The names of the
agreements, respectively, in Japanese were “Chian Shutsudō no
Sai ni Okeru Chian no Iji ni Kansuru Saibu Kyō tei,” and “Jieitai
to Keisatsu to no Tsūshin Kyō r yoku Kyō tei.”
170. Dō ba, Jieitai no Chian Shutsudō Mondai, Chap. 7. Zengakuren
is the abbreviated Japanese name for the “All-Japan Federation
of Students’ Self-Governing Associations,” a communist and
anarchist student group active in the anti-treaty revision
movement.
171. Hara, Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji, Chaps. 11 and 13; Hara, ed.,
Kishi Nobusuke Shōgenroku, Chap. 6.
172. Dō ba, “Jieitai no Chian Shutsudō Mondai,” pp. 6–7.
174. See his books: Wasurerareteiru Anzen Hoshō (Tokyo: Jiji

Tsūshinsha, 1967); Suisu no Kokubō to Nihon (Tokyo: Jiji
Tsūshinsha, 1967, written with Fujiwara Iwaichi); Kindai Nihon
no Seisenryaku: Bakumatsu Kara Daiichiji Taisen Made (Tokyo:
Hara Shobō , 1978); Nihon no Seisenryaku to Kyōkun: Washinton
Kaigi Kara Shūsen Made (Tokyo: Hara Shobō , 1983); Jōhō Naki
Sensō Shidō: Daihonei Jōhō Sanbō no Kaisō (Tokyo: Hara Shobō ,
1987); Sekai Senryaku Shiriizu Vol. 8, No. 1 Sugita Ichiji Ikōshū
(Tokyo: Nihon Sekai Senryaku Fooramu, 1993); Kokka Shidōsha
no Riidaashippu: Seijika to Gensuitachi (Tokyo: Hara Shobō ,
1993).
175. Hoshino Yasusaburō and Hayashi Shigeo, Jieitai: Sono Futatsu no
Kao (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobō , 1963), 76. Sōhyō, the Japanese
abbreviation for the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan,

was a left-leaning labor federation founded in 1950. Nikkyōsō, the
abbreviation for Japan Teachers’ Union, and was founded in
1947.
176. Maeda Tetsuo, Jieitai ha Nani o Shite Kita no Ka? Waga Kokugun
no 40 Nen (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō , 1990), pp. 141–142; Sadō ,
Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji, pp. 113–114. Originally, Sugita,
Wasurerareta Anzen Hoshō.
177. Beiho, “Boeichō to no Uchiai ni Kan suru Ken.”
178. Akagi Munenori and Suzuki Takanobu, eds., Kishaseki Kara

Mita Kokkai Jūnen no Sokumenshi: Anpo Kara Anpo Made
(Tokyo: Sankei Shimbun Shuppankyoku, 1969), p. 127.
179. Mainichi Shimbunsha, ed., Anpo to Jieitai: Nihon no Heiwa to
Anzen (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1969), p. 82.
180. Akagi Munenori, Ima Dakara Iu (Tokyo: Bunka Sō gō Shuppan,
1973), pp. 102–105.
181. Hara Yoshihisa, Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji, Chaps. 11 and 13;
Kishi Nobusuke Shōgenroku, Chap. 6.
183. Hoshino and Hayashi, Jieitai, pp. 27, 72–74.
184. The comment by Kō saka Masataka can be found in “Jieitai no
Mokutekikan o Megutte (Tō ron),” Kokubō, Vol. 12, No. 4 (April
1963), p. 25.
CHAPTER 4
The GSDF During the Cold War Years,

1960–1989
Robert D. Eldridge
Introduction
This chapter explores the evolution of the Ground Self-Defense Force
(GSDF) following the revision of the Japan–US Security Treaty in 1960
through the last days of the Cold War in 1989. While the American role in
the development of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) was not as prominent
in the period covered in this chapter as it was in the decade and a half after
World War II, it was still significant and reflected the fact that develop-
ment of Japan’s own security arrangements was very much intertwined
with the United States. In particular, the evolution of Japan’s defense pol-
icy and the growth of its military were inherently connected to the level
of commitment the United States, as Japan’s only formal ally, showed. It
was, however, a Catch-22 relationship: The more the United States com-
mitted to Japan, the less support there was in Japan for increasing defense.
This dichotomy, in turn, created frictions and resentment on both sides,
particularly among Americans who expected Japan to increase its capabili-
ties and contributions as its economy grew, especially in the 1980s. In any
case, over time, the two countries came to agree on the need for the SDF
to pursue qualitative improvements rather than quantitative growth. It
R.D. Eldridge (*)


Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8_4
134 R.D. ELDRIDGE
was the period covered in this chapter, 1960–1989, when the shift from
quantity to quality was most seen, and where large geopolitical and bilat-
eral changes were taking place driving some of these changes.
This chapter is divided into three phases. The first phase discusses the
continued foundation-building that began in the 1950s, and was covered
in the previous chapter. The second phase looks at the role of the SDF and
GSDF, in particular in 1970s—a period of uncertainty known as Détente
for the lessening of tensions with the Soviet Union and the normalization
of relations with China but nevertheless filled with crises—and the third
phase examines the role of the GSDF in the strengthening of the Japan–
US security relationship in the 1980s, a period filled with the “New Cold
War” internationally on the one hand and bilateral trade frictions between
the two allies on the other. All three phases include a look at some of the
issues in the GSDF with civilian control and political and policy matters
during this time.
Continued Foundation-Building in the 1960s
As discussed in Chap. 2, despite the planning and preparations made, the

GSDF was not, in the end, given orders to put down domestic distur-
bances enveloping the capital city at the time of parliamentary delibera-
tions on the revised security treaty. In this sense, the public reputation of
the GSDF as an apolitical organization was maintained, but some suspi-
cions among the public remained, particularly as the debate within the
ruling party had been evenly divided between those urging the use of the
GSDF and those arguing against it.
Thus, the early 1960s was a particularly delicate time for the SDF. It
was not helped when the seventeen-year-old son of a GSDF officer stabbed
the leader of the Socialist Party, Asanuma Inejirō , during a nationally tele-
vised debate on October 12, 1960.1 Inejirō subsequently died from a loss
of blood and a period of national mourning set in. A year later, another
incident in December 1961 in which thirteen ultranationalists plotted to
assassinate Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, in office since July 1960, was
uncovered. Five of the conspirators were former Imperial Army officers.2
Japan would witness other issues interpreted as challenges to civilian con-
trol that decade and into the 1970s—and even an emotional rejection of
the postwar path it was taking by the famous writer Mishima Yukio—but
before we look at those events, it is necessary to see how the structure of
the GSDF evolved.
THE GSDF DURING THE COLD WAR YEARS, 1960–1989 135
Reorganization of the GSDF (5 H o m

̄ entai,
13 Divisions, 180,000 men)
On January 13, 1961, the National Defense Council (Kokubō Kaigi), a
consultative body to the prime minister established in 1956, with him
as chairman, approved the reorganization of the GSDF into thirteen
divisions (shidan).3 Until then, as explained in the previous chapter, the
GSDF had been organized into six divisions and four combined brigades,
or konseidan.4
The plan was presented to the Ikeda Cabinet and approved on January
20. Ikeda, a former Finance Minister, had been a strong advocate of Prime
Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s view that the defense budget should be kept
as low as possible to allow Japan to focus on economic growth.5 There
was an added political necessity now as well—following the security treaty
riots, Ikeda, as Kishi Nobusuke’s successor, sought a consensus-focused
national policy and wished to avoid a public debate on the contentious
issues of foreign affairs and defense matters.
The chief of staff of the GSDF at this critical time in the GSDF’s restruc-
turing was Sugita Ichiji, a former Imperial Army colonel and graduate of the
Nakano School of intelligence and espionage who had joined the GSDF’s
predecessor, the National Safety Force, in July 1952 and without delay
became the commanding officer of the Northern Army Headquarters in
August.6 Immediately prior to his being named chief of staff, he was serving
as the director of the preparatory staff involved in standing up the Eastern
Army, located then at Camp Ichigaya in Tokyo. He was the fourth chief of
staff of the GSDF and the appointment of him and his deputy, Major General
Hosoda Hiroshi, who as a younger officer had served with Sugita in the plan-
ning section of Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) during World War
II, as vice chief of staff, broke the tradition up to then of naming both a civil-
ian and a former Imperial Army officer to the two top positions in the GSDF
in order to balance it out and ensure that the military was not dominated by
former Imperial Army officers in the senior postwar leadership positions.7
When Sugita took over, he knew he would be retiring in a couple of
years, and thus felt that he only had two years to help prepare the GSDF
for the challenges facing Japan at the time, especially domestic instability as
seen by the demonstrations at the time of Prime Minister Kishi’s departure
for Washington, DC, to sign the revised Treaty of Mutual Security and
Cooperation with the United States at the White House. “I was impa-
tient,” Sugita wrote a few years after retiring, “as I knew I had to hurry …
136 R.D. ELDRIDGE
I knew it would not be easy. I could not simply rely on the work done by
my predecessor, Sugiyama Shigeru, to see us through. I had to expand it.
Going beyond it was the responsibility given to me.”8
Sugita was particularly concerned with the Leftist radicalism of
Japanese politics against the SDF, which often prevented proper training
and impacted recruitment (as it does to some extent today). Indeed, he
felt that these challenges with public opinion made things significantly
more difficult for the GSDF than with the Maritime Self-Defense Force
(MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), which conducted much of
their training and exercises at sea or in the air, out of sight of the general
public or often without directly impacting them.9 It was almost as if the
GSDF was fighting two battles at once, an international one with its exter-
nal Cold War enemies and a domestic one with the extreme left.
Sugita, in fact, was faced with another challenge when he became chief
of staff. At the time, the US “New Look” strategy proposed by then
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, still
held sway and even impacted thinking in Japan. As a result, Sugita writes,
“ground operations using conventional weapons were looked down
upon. There were calls for a reduction in ground troops, as the feeling
was that the GSDF had been fully built up to its proper size. The Air and
Maritime components were being emphasized. Indeed, it would not be
an exaggeration to say this was the age of an ‘air strategy-first.’”10 This
shift was symbolized, according to Sugita, by the contentious decision of
the National Defense Council in November 1959 to approve the selec-
tion of the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter (to be domestically produced by
Mitsubishi) as the ASDF’s next primary fighter following a Diet resolution
the same month. Until 1956, the GSDF had been given the priority in the
budget, but after that, it shifted to the MSDF and ASDF (from 1957 to
1959), and then to the ASDF in 1960. “It was a lonely time for the GSDF
[when I took over],” Sugita noted.11
Sugita was also increasingly concerned about the political and security
situation on the Korean peninsula. Six weeks after Sugita became chief of
staff, Syngman Rhee resigned as president of South Korea on April 26.
Sugita became worried about the leftward drift of Korean politics, the calls
for national reunification (with the Communist North Korea), and the
threat that a reunified Korea (or an unstable Korea which invited foreign
intervention, as in the previous century) presented for Japan. Sugita was
worried the Ikeda government did not appreciate the seriousness of the
situation. Following a coup by Pak Chung Hee, a general who would rule
South Korea for the next eighteen years until his assassination, Sugita met
secretly with the South Korean Defense Minister (Song Hyo Chan) in
Tokyo during the latter’s layover after a visit to the United States, where
the two discussed the situation in Korea. He later reported his meeting to
Ikeda in the form of a memo (requested by former PM Yoshida) in which
he stated that General Song had asked for Japanese economic assistance
and intelligence-sharing.12 A few months later, Song invited Japanese SDF
representatives to attend armed forces day celebrations in Seoul, but the
Government of Japan, perhaps out of fear of perceptions or simply due to
the fact that the two countries had yet to establish diplomatic relations,
did not allow anyone to go despite Sugita’s pleas to Director General of
the Defense Agency Fujieda Sensuke and the Joint Staff Council.13
The year, 1960, may have been a lonely year for Sugita, but it was
also a time of promise and expanding roles for the GSDF. The first role
concerned potentially dealing with the domestic demonstrations over the
revision of the security treaty, and the second one would explore, however
cautiously, ways for Japan to become a true alliance partner of the United
States as a result of the revision of the security treaty. If the near decade
following the original security treaty represented a time when Japan was
being protected by the United States, Sugita felt, then the time following
the revision of the treaty under a new one represented a time when Japan
formed an alliance with the United States as a partner and sought to have
an equal relationship.14
The US government also had greater expectations for Japan, particu-
larly in light of the reluctance of the American public and Congress to
“continue assistance unless convinced that countries benefiting from our
defense effort in the region are also contributing to the full extent of
their own capabilities.”15 Indeed, the US government believed that Japan
should begin to look at the “expansion of its military establishment,” give
“attention to long-range planning,” and broaden “gradually … its funda-
mental concept of ‘self-defense’ to correspond more closely to strategic
realities.”16
Second Defense Build-Up Plan (July 18, 1961) and Increased

Recognition
The prime minister during this time was Ikeda Hayato, a disciple of Yoshida
Shigeru who had previously called for reliance on the United States, a focus
on the economy, and limited expenditures on defense (known later as the
138 R.D. ELDRIDGE
“Yoshida Doctrine”). Ikeda, in addition, wished to maintain a low profile

in international security and avoid contentious political issues domestically
to focus on high growth. At the same time, the former Ministry of Finance
bureaucrat (and then minister himself) was a believer in “gradualism,”
carefully measuring fiscal expenditures against public support and political
realities.17
The US Embassy in Tokyo found that in the early 1960s, the “pre-
dominant public attitude toward the JSDF was one of realization that
the JSDF was here to stay and of acceptance of that fact with no active
enthusiasm but also no antagonism.”18 If anything, the Embassy saw the
trend as toward greater acceptance of the SDF. A subsequent confidential
report noted that the SDF is well accepted due in large part to the “careful
attention the SDF authorities have given to public opinion … [they] labor
hard to improve their image and [have] done a good job. It is doubtful
now people are disturbed by the sight of soldiers and officers, who stay
humble and carry their brief cases like ordinary salaried men.”19 The Ikeda
Cabinet likely felt the same, and thus approved a significant increase in its
defense expenditures from 453 billion yen to 1180 billion yen during the
Second Defense Build-Up Plan (Dainiji Bōeiryoku Seibi Keikaku), which
covered the years 1962–1966. Of course, expected and actual rapid eco-
nomic growth during this period made such increases relatively easier to
enact, and indeed, defense spending as a share of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) actually fell below 1 percent for the first time around 1965.
The emphasis of the Second Defense Build-Up Plan was primarily on
the “modernization of equipment,”20 which can be distinguished from
a massive, indiscriminate rearmament for the sake of simply increasing
the size of one’s military. Specifically, the Second Defense Build-Up
Plan, according to a later defense White Paper, “aimed at strengthening
that defense potential to the point of capability in meeting conventional
aggression on a scale no greater than localized conflict. The plan clari-
fied that Japan should maintain a defense posture capable of effectively
coping with such aggression, and called for qualitative improvement of
the basic framework of defense capability that had been attained by the
end of Japan Fiscal Year 1961, and establishing the basis for formation
of efficient units capable of conducting defense operations based on the
latest technology. To attain this goal, the plan outlined the principle aim
of building a comprehensive defense capability within the three services
on the basis of achievements made during the first plan. The programmed
replacement of obsolete equipment, introduction of surface-to-air missiles
and research on the operation of sophisticated modern equipment were

the major goals. Specific aims included supplementing the 180,000-man
GSDF with a reserve force of about 30,000.”21
For the GSDF, one of the main focuses became on transitioning from
its previous structure laydown, as described above, to creating five 9000-
men divisions and eight 7000-men divisions, for a total of thirteen. By
January 1962, eight divisions had been activated, with the remaining four
completed by August that year.22 US officials felt that the SDF “could not
stop a determined Soviet invasion, but they are a deterrent … [and] would
undoubtedly fight well.”23
Recruitment was the biggest problem facing the SDF, and especially
the GSDF at the time. In addition to the lowly position the SDF had
in Japanese society in general, which could be described as not much
more than tolerated, the SDF had to compete with other employers
in the period of high economic growth. Despite aggressive recruitment
efforts, the number of applicants for the GSDF fell to 89,000 in 1963
and 69,000 in 1964, from 150,000 in 1962.24 The competition was so
tough that the Northern Army purportedly had an agreement with lead-
ing companies in the area, whereby the latter would “not raid the SDF
for people … [but] get preference for the hire of SDF personnel once
they leave the service.”25 This competition was certainly true in other
regions as well.
Although the desirability of the SDF as a place of employment fell dur-
ing these years, the positive image of the GSDF continued growing in
the early 1960s and especially into the 1970s and 1980s. On the 10th
Anniversary26 of the establishment of the SDF, Ikeda attended an event
at Camp Ichigaya in Tokyo (which houses the headquarters of Eastern
Army, and today also has the main headquarters buildings of the Ministry
of Defense), honoring the 526 members of the SDF who had died by that
time in the line of duty.27 The GSDF made up the majority of the causali-
ties, many of whom died in training-related accidents. Some 1000 people
turned out for the unveiling of the memorial known as the Monument for
SDF Members Killed in the Line of Duty, or Jieitai Junshokusha Ireihi.28
(A later Director General of the Defense Agency would describe going
to the funerals of fallen SDF personnel as “the most unpleasant thing”
of all his responsibilities.29) Ikeda, whose cenotaph is on the front of the
memorial, would continue to show his support for the GSDF by visiting
the 13th Division,30 headquartered in his native Hiroshima Prefecture,
in August 1964, a few months before he chose to step down from the
140 R.D. ELDRIDGE
premiership and ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidency due to

the discovery of throat cancer.31
At the time of the 1964 Olympics held in Tokyo, the GSDF was
ordered to provide logistical and security assistance. In August the pre-
vious year, a Tokyo Olympic Support Force Preparatory Headquarters
(Tōkyō Orimpikku Shien Shūdan Junbi Honbu) had been established within
Eastern Army Headquarters, and the actual support force came into
being that December. A total of 7600 GSDF personnel were mobilized
for the event, which included band performances, color guards, canon
salutes, communications, and other support.32 Riding the tide of the
Tokyo Olympic mood, twenty-one members of the SDF, including many
from the GSDF, participated in the 1964 Olympics, with one (Second
Lieutenant Miyake Yoshinobu) winning a gold medal in weightlifting and
other participants placing in wrestling and other sports.33 Director General
of the Defense Agency, Koizumi Junya, whose nickname was Anpo Otoko
or “Mr. Security Treaty,” in recognition of his support for the Japan–
US defense relationship, and who was the father of future Prime Minister
Koizumi Junichi, welcomed the three GSDF medal winners to his office
on October 24, the last day of the two-week Olympics.
Positive attention on the GSDF continued to flow following the
1964 Olympics. On April 22, 1965, Kasai Masae, the captain of the
Japanese women’s volleyball team which won the gold medal at the
Olympics, attended a press conference to announce her engagement to
First Lieutenant Nakamura Kazuo of the 1st Infantry Regiment (Daiichi
Futsuka Rentai), located in the northern part of Tokyo at Camp Nerima.
Prime Minister Satō Eisaku served as the formal go-between, or nakōdo,
and presided at their wedding at the Ichigaya Kaikan (Hall) at the end of
May.34
Satō would show his support of the SDF in other ways, too. Earlier that
year in January, he had visited Camp Nerima, a base first established in
1930 and currently housing the headquarters of the 1st Division (Daiichi
Shidan). In September 1966, Satō inspected Camp Takigahara, first estab-
lished in 1909 which now hosts the important Fuji School, a combined
training facility for the GSDF.35 Satō would continue to visit and inspect
GSDF camps throughout the remainder of his time as prime minister,
which continued until July 1972.
In the latter half of the 1960s, particularly following the successful
January 1967 Lower House elections, Satō ’s focus increasingly became
the return of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan and the defense
responsibilities for those islands and managing expectations of the United

States in regional security scenarios (Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait)
as a result of that reversion. The timing and size of the SDF contingent to
be deployed to Okinawa Prefecture would be one issue that would need
to be carefully coordinated with the United States and internally within
Japan.
Before the decade finished, the GSDF was asked once again to help
with a national event in the fall of 1967, namely for the state funeral of for-
mer Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. Yoshida, whose involvement in the
postwar creation of the SDF is described in Chap. 2, died on October 20,
with the state funeral being conducted on October 31. A special honor
guard from the 302nd Military Police Company (Dai 302 Hoan Chūtai)
of the GSDF’s Eastern Army participated in the ceremony conducted at
the Budō kan, and SDF personnel provided additional security in the area,
including lining the streets along the parade route.36 It was a busy time
then for the GSDF—just two days before, the large SDF Central Parade
was held in front of the National Stadium at Jingū Gaien, with four differ-
ent parade courses followed for the parade. The SDF would be mobilized
again for the state funeral of one of Yoshida’s “prize students,” former
Prime Minister Satō , who had led the push for the reversion of Okinawa
and was the first Japanese and Asian to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
due to his enactment of Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles, on June 6,
1975, where more than 1400 personnel of Eastern Army were on hand.
During the period covered in this chapter, the GSDF would also sup-
port the Lower House and Cabinet-sponsored funeral of former Prime
Minister Miki Takeo in early December 1988, and the funeral of Emperor
Hirohito (Shō wa Emperor) in February 1989, including airlifting digni-
taries by CH-47 Chinook helicopters.37
Mitsuya Kenkyu ̄
Some ten years before the SDF’s deployment to Okinawa, in 1963, the
SDF began studying some possible contingencies in the Korean Peninsula
in what was called the Mitsuya Kenkyū, or “Three Arrows Study.” The
official name of the study was “Showa 38 Nendo Sō gō Bō ei Zujō Kenkyū
(1963 Comprehensive Defense Tabletop Research),” and was conducted
between February 1 and June 30, 1963, by sixteen members of the Joint
Staff Council and thirty-six representatives of the three services, under
the direction of General Tanaka Yoshio, a former Imperial Japanese Army
142 R.D. ELDRIDGE
officer who was then the chairman (executive director) of the Joint Staff
Office.
There are three explanations for the origins of the name, “Mitsuya,”
which means three arrows. One is that the three services working together
are stronger than individually—one arrow could be snapped in half but
three together are much stronger. Perhaps, this was an effort to emphasize
the importance of jointness within the SDF (an issue that Japan has failed
to fully addressed over the years). A second explanation had to do with
the sounds, “mitsu” and “ya” which are readings respectively of “3” and
“8,” and is said to represent the 38th parallel on the Korean peninsula.
The scenario studied was a second Korean War and its effect on domestic
peace in Japan. The third explanation is that the study was conducted in
the 38th year of Shō wa.38
In fact, there were seven stages to the scenario. The first envisioned
stage began when a small coup erupted within the Republic of Korea
forces in the spring of an undetermined year in the 1960s, represented
as April 196(?). US forces in Korea were called in to help quell the coup.
The instability on the peninsula, in turn, affected the domestic situation
within Japan. North Korea lent its support to the coup, in the second
stage, and Communist forces, led by the North Korean army, invaded the
south and started the second Korea War in the third stage. It appeared
Japan would be attacked as well. With the worsening situation, the SDF
began combined operations with the US military in the fourth stage in
light of the threat that Japan would be attacked from outside. In the fifth
stage, western Japan was attacked, and in northern Japan, concern arose
that Soviet forces would attempt an invasion. Meanwhile, tactical nuclear
weapons were employed on the Korean Peninsula. According to the sce-
nario, Soviet forces began their invasion of Hokkaido, and the SDF and
US forces began full combined operations against the invaders in the sixth
stage. In the next and final stage, Soviet forces launched naval and air
strikes against all of Japan, including the use of nuclear weapons. Japan
suffered great destruction. The United States retaliated with nuclear
weapons and attacks on Sakhalin, North Korea, and the People’s Republic
of China (including Manchuria), eventually winning.
As discussed in further detail in Chap. 5, the SDF was dealt a significant
blow due to the debate within the Diet when this study became public
knowledge in February 1965. On February 10, 1965, Okada Haruo, a
Socialist Party representative in the Diet, raised it in the Lower House’s
Budget Committee (Yosan Iinkai). Long an opponent of the security
treaty and one of the “Anpo 7 Ninshu (7 Lower House Members against
the Security Treaty)” who led the attacks on the LDP government, Okada
charged that the “Japanese military were planning a coup d’etat and re-
establishment of an authoritarian type of government.”39 Prime Minister
Satō , who had recently taken over from his rival Ikeda, “visibly paled”
when questioned, according to the Asahi Shimbun, a left-of-center news-
paper that was historically critical of the SDF and the US–Japan Security
Treaty, saying it was “impermissible … [and] regrettable that this kind of
planning has been undertaken without the government’s knowledge.”40
He added he would get to the bottom of it and punish those responsible.
Satō was, in part, worried about the effect this revelation would have on
the deliberations over the budget. In his diary that night, Satō wrote that
he was now uncertain that the budget would be approved, and called for
a meeting of the most senior leaders of the party.41 By chance, at noon the
following day, Satō gave a speech at the Japan–America Society before 700
people, including the Society’s president, former Prime Minister Yoshida.
It is highly likely the topic came up in much of the table talk at lunch, not
to mention continued discussions in the parliament.
Indeed, that same day, the Diet decided to establish a subcommit-
tee, and on February 12th, Matsuno Raizō (later, Director General of
the Defense Agency) was asked to head the Bōei Zujō Kenkyū Mondai ni
Kansuru Yosan Shōiinkai (Finance Subcommittee regarding the Problem
of the Defense Tabletop Study) to look into the study. The focus of the
incident, according to one writer, “changed into an investigation of the
breach in security” with Tanaka’s deputy, Miwa Yoshio, and several oth-
ers under him punished for a lack of attention to security.42 This theme
was echoed by Satō , after he had a chance to learn a little more about
the affair: “It is absolutely natural for a defense authority to conduct the
type of exercise being performed. I am more concerned that top secret
documents have been leaked.”43 However, Satō was also concerned about
the impact it would have on the SDF and on the importance of civilian
control. Meeting with party elder Kō no Ichirō on the evening of February
12th, the prime minister agreed wholeheartedly with the former’s views
that “[we] cannot support the thinking of the former military members.
We must have a unified opinion that the prime minister is the commander-
in-chief.”44 Several weeks later, Satō still remained worried about the last-
ing effects of the incident on both the public and the SDF.
With this said, it was never made clear whether that the Ikeda gov-
ernment knew about this study (Ikeda, who was ill with throat cancer,
144 R.D. ELDRIDGE
had resigned in November 1964 and died in August 1965), or to what

degree or at what level it was known or approved of within the Defense
Agency. The Defense Agency did acknowledge on March 10, 1965,
that several members of its Internal Bureau had attended as observers,
and that it was informed ahead of time. According to a later Defense of
Japan white paper, it reported to the subcommittee of the Diet that the
study was “not intended … [as] any intervention in political affairs”
and emphasized that “civilian control was being secured.”45 Because the
government eventually came to view the Mitsuya exercise as a study,
rather than an actual contingency plan, no one was publicly punished
for the apparent lapse in civilian control.46 One could even argue that
the study had the positive effect of raising defense awareness and laid the
groundwork for similar tabletop studies in later years. In any case, the
appearance that this planning was being done without the government’s
blessing caused much consternation in political circles and among the
public, and led to calls for strengthening civilian control. Under pressure
to resign, Defense Agency Director General Koizumi took responsibility
for the incident and its handling in early June that year, with Matsuno
succeeding him (as part of a larger cabinet reshuffle).47
Public interest was particularly high due in part to the fact that the
Basic Treaty between Japan and the Republic of Korea, normalizing rela-
tions between the two countries, was being discussed at this very moment
and would be ratified by the end of the year. One question on the mind of
interested observers was if Japan would be obligated to help defend South
Korea. Satō denied it, and reiterated the Cabinet Legislative Bureau’s
interpretation that cooperation with the US military outside of Japan was
impossible. Nor could Japan, according to this interpretation, form with
South Korea, or Taiwan and the Philippines for that matter, a multilateral
security organization in East Asia.48 At a minimum, the US government
desired Japan to contribute more to the effort in Vietnam. In particu-
lar, President Lyndon B. Johnson stated so strongly, even going so far
as to say in internal White House discussions that he wanted “bodies.”49
However, the war was as unpopular, if not more so, in Japan than it was
in the United States.50
Nevertheless, Japan in fact did quietly begin considering participation
in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Part of the reasons for this was it
had not been able, politically or otherwise, the SDF to Lebanon dur-
ing the UN-led PKO efforts, despite being a non-permanent member of
the Security Council at that time. When Japan became a non-permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) again in 1965,

it began studying the possibility of dispatching the SDF.51 In the mean-
time, that same year, following the conclusion of the treaty between it
and South Korea, Japan sent a military attaché to Seoul. Over the years,
it increased its military attaché presence and as of March 2015 has fifty-
eight officers assigned to forty Japanese embassies and two government
representative offices abroad, although in some areas, such as the Nordic
countries, representation has declined.
Third Defense Build-Up Plan (March 1967)

The Third Five-Year Defense Build-Up Plan (Daisanji Bōeiryoku Seibi
Keikaku) began being discussed around this time in 1965 and was offi-
cially approved by the National Defense Council and Cabinet Decision on
November 29, 1966. It would cover the years from 1967 to 1971.
The Third Five-Year Plan envisioned the GSDF increasing to a strength
of 180,000, which was the same goal identified in the Second Five-Year
Build-Up Plan, but which had not been actively pursued. It emphasized
new equipment, such as replacing obsolete American tanks for more mod-
ern and powerful ones to be manufactured domestically.52 To enhance air
defense capabilities, a role of the GSDF, four additional HAWK (Homing
All the Way Killer) battalions were to be activated. In addition, more heli-
copters were to be added as part of efforts to increase air mobility.53
One thing the Third Five-Year Plan was unable to anticipate was that
the decision to return Okinawa and the reversion treaty itself would all be
conducted between 1969 and 1971. The actual reversion arrangements,
which included the deployment of the SDF (of which the GSDF would
make up the largest contingent), would be worked out between 1971
and 1972. During that time, the Fourth Plan, discussed below, would be
decided upon.
The Crisis-Filled 1970s

The reversion of Okinawa, formally agreed to in November 1969, was
both an opportunity as well as the beginning of great unease among
Japanese leaders. There were new responsibilities to be undertaken, such
as for the defense of Okinawa Prefecture, comprising more than 150
islands (of which forty-nine are inhabited) and their surrounding waters.
In the meantime, the US–Japan Security Treaty, whose ten-year initial term
146 R.D. ELDRIDGE
ended in June 1970, was automatically extended, despite a lot of anxiety

by both governments, with no objections from either side problems and
could be terminated now by either party with one year’s notice.54 There
were some new diplomatic concerns too, such as those surrounding
Taiwan’s and China’s interest in the Senkaku Islands (known as Diaoyu
in China and Tiaoyutai in Taiwan), who both announced claims to the
islands as a result of reports suggesting potential oil reserves in the area
and following the US decision to return the islands to Japan as part of
the reversion of Okinawa.55 The Oil Crisis of 1973 brought increased
attention to Japan’s dependency on foreign resources.56 Relations with
the United States in the meantime continued to deteriorate, and had
begun with the concerns that America was militarily withdrawing from
the region, first enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, announced by the
president in 1969 in Guam, a fear that was accelerated as a result of
the US withdrawal from Vietnam, and the stated intention of President
James E. Carter to withdraw ground combat forces from South Korea,
acting on his 1976 election campaign pledge. The combination of crises
and détente in the 1970s was also a time for Japan to explore greater dip-
lomatic autonomy, symbolized by its pursuit of resource diplomacy with
the Arab nations, a restoration of diplomatic relations with China lead-
ing to a peace treaty in 1978, and closer trading relations with Southeast
Asia and Europe. (In its rivalry with the Soviet Union, China even came
to strongly support the Japan–US alliance.) East-West Détente did not
last long, however, with many regional skirmishes, including the Soviet
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
Nakasone Yasuhiro, the First Defense White Paper,

and Autonomous Defense
With the LDP having done very well in the December 1969 election fol-
lowing his meetings in Washington with Nixon where the reversion of
Okinawa by 1972 was decided, Satō launched his third cabinet on January
14, 1970, making the conservative politician and former Imperial Navy
Lieutenant Nakasone Yasuhiro, who volunteered for the unpopular job,
Director General of the Defense Agency.57 One of the first things Nakasone
did was to form an advisory body on defense matters called the “Group to
Diagnose the Defense Agency and SDF,” or Bōeichō Jieitai o Shindan Suru
Kai, to write “prescriptions with a business diagnosis in mind.”58 One of
the recommendations the group made was for the SDF to increase its pub-
lic relations which it felt were inadequate (despite efforts to date, such as
the creation of the Defense Association and SDF Cooperative Association,
mentioned in Chap. 1, in 1955). Nakasone adopted the recommenda-
tions, and presented what is called the first defense white paper, or Bōei
Hakusho, to the Cabinet on October 20, 1970.59 It subsequently was not
published again until 1976, but after that, has been published annually.
In addition to the release of the white paper, another significant proj-
ect for Nakasone was the pursuit of a new approach to Japan’s security
called “autonomous defense,” which tried to end the “unacceptable level”
of “dependence on the United States and the United Nations” found
in the Basic National Defense Policy of Japan (adopted by the National
Defense Council on May 20, 1957).60 Specifically, Nakasone was both-
ered by its fourth clause, which stated “Dealing with external aggression
based on the security arrangements with the U.S. until the United Nations
will be able to fulfill its function in stopping such aggression effectively
in the future.” In response, Nakasone believed it should be changed to
“Concerning invasion, first, we shall fight to repulse it ourselves with all
the strength we possess nationally. Where necessary, we shall deal with this
with the co-operation of the United States.”61
In the general interpolation of the Lower House’s Budget Committee
meeting on March 23, 1971, Nakasone explained his personal views on
the five principles of an independent defense: (1) the protection of the
constitution and the defense of the country; (2) the unification of diplo-
macy and defense, and the maintenance of harmony between those and
other national policies; (3) the importance of civilian control; (4) support
for the three non-nuclear principles; and (5) US–Japan Security Treaty
system used as a supplement.62 The following day, the National Defense
Council studied Nakasone’s proposed revisions, but by the time it was
ready to consider a draft on August 19, Nakasone had been moved to
another position, this time within the ruling party as the chairman of the
LDP’s Executive Council (Sōmu), due to concerns about his nationalistic
stance on defense policy.
During the course of his one and half years as Director General,
Nakasone, who had served in the wartime military, spent time with the
SDF personnel learning of their personal situation and unit challenges, to
include their not having money to buy toilet paper for restroom stalls.63 He
brought representatives of various units to a karaoke festival at the GSDF
Fuji School, which was later copied by the MSDF and ASDF. Nakasone so
valued the network he built up from his office with the units that he even
148 R.D. ELDRIDGE
referred to it in his memoirs. In addition, Nakasone compiled the defense

budget at the end of 1970 with several of his agendas in mind: “respect for
the person, strengthening the intelligence function, and developing pros-
pects for the future,” with specific measures including advocating raises
for SDF personnel, changes in the warrant officer system, increases in the
number of resident overseas military officers, and expanded intelligence
capabilities.64 Nakasone, when serving as prime minister ten years later,
would continue to take a strong interest in the SDF, and his Tokyo-based
think tank, the International Institute for Policy Studies (Sekai Heiwa
Kenkyūsho), established after he stepped down as prime minister, is at the
time of this writing conducting studies on the SDF with a focus on the
GSDF.65
The Mishima Yukio Suicide

One incident during Nakasone’s time in office, almost like a scene out of
a novel, dramatically ensnared the GSDF, but had the effect of further
emphasizing the direction of the SDF as an apolitical organization. Less
than a month after the release of the defense white paper, the critically
acclaimed novelist Mishima Yukio committed suicide in the office of the
Commanding General of the Eastern Army, whose headquarters build-
ing was then located at Camp Ichigaya in downtown Tokyo. Mishima
had been increasingly despondent with the direction postwar Japan was
heading, and had formed a patriotic paramilitary group called the Shield
Society (Tatenokai). Mishima was not only well known but had also found
support for his activities within the GSDF, and his Society was occasionally
able to train with the SDF.66
On the morning of November 25, 1970, which was also the same day
the 64th Extraordinary Session of the Diet opened, Mishima and four
of his followers entered the Eastern Army headquarters building with
the intention of launching a coup d’état to restore the prewar Emperor
system. They bound Lieutenant General Mashita Kanetoshi to his chair,
barricaded his office, and threatened to kill him if he did not order his
800 personnel to gather in the courtyard to hear Mishima’s manifesto.67
Several of Mashita’s subordinates were wounded by the sword-wielding
intruders. After Mashita was subdued, Mishima went outside on the bal-
cony to announce his demands. Instead of joining the revolution, the per-
sonnel watched Mishima, who was also a model, stage actor, and director,
curiously. Some outright jeered him. After seven minutes of the frustrating
tirade, he went back inside the office and committed suicide by seppuku
(literally, cutting of the stomach, following which he was beheaded by a
couple of followers).
Conservatives despaired over the “Mishima Incident.” Ishihara Shintarō ,
a fellow ultraconservative writer and at the time a member of the Upper
House, commented in an interview about the great loss Japan suffered
with Mishima’s passing and stated his respect for Mishima’s dying for his
beliefs. Director General Nakasone, who had also interacted with Mishima
several times, wrote later that “on a personal level … could understand
[his] feelings.”68 Yet, Nakasone was somewhat in a state of “disbelief” after
the incident, particularly because earlier in the year, he had dined with
Mishima and discussed national and international affairs, but had found
nothing that suggested that he would do anything like that.69
Shortly after Nakasone got word of the attack, he asked to confirm that
it was in fact led by Mishima, and issued an order to have them arrested
by the police. “Arrest all of them immediately,” Nakasone told Major
General Miyoshi Hideo, the chief of staff of the Eastern Army, adding,
“The Self-Defense Forces will encircle the area and, if necessary, will deal
with it themselves but, insofar as possible, violence should be avoided
and the police should be to the fore.”70 Nakasone later explained that he
felt the “social impact [of the Mishima Incident] would be enormous.
Consequently, I wanted to deal with it quietly and, insofar as possible, to
put the police in the front line and leave use of the Defense Forces until the
last.”71 By the time Nakasone arrived at JDA headquarters, the incident
was over. Soon afterward, Mashita called to apologize and to explain that
there was “no disturbance in the unit.”72 Nakasone, remembering the mis-
handling of the 2.26 Incident in 1936 in which a coup d’état by Imperial
Japanese Army officers was almost successful, called together officers from
the staff, and after denouncing the breakdown of law and order, issued a
clear directive that was to be passed down throughout the SDF:
Members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, who bear the burden for national
peace and independence, must not be distracted by these events. Attempts
to destroy law and order through violence are a direct denial of democracy
and will not be recognized in any form. Members of the JSDF, make sure
you are as a body mentally prepared, be persistent in the execution of your
own duties, and worthy of the people’s trust.73
Nakasone also instructed Inoki Masamichi, the Kyō to University pro-

fessor of political thought who had become the new president of the
150 R.D. ELDRIDGE
National Defense Academy a few months earlier, to issue the following

statement denouncing Mishima’s manifesto: “For someone arbitrarily to
use the Self-Defense Forces for a specific political purpose would be to
turn them into a private army. However pure the motives, and no mat-
ter that the actions put the perpetrator’s own fate on the line, such a
destructive philosophy must be firmly rejected.”74 It was Inoki who actu-
ally drafted the statement himself, which was shared with the cadets on
December 18. The statement was also reproduced in the SDF newspaper
Asagumo, and ended up being adopted by the Defense Agency as its offi-
cial stance on the incident.
Inoki was bothered by Mishima’s actions and devoted several pages of
his memoirs to the incident and the statement. He had the year before
participated in a discussion with Mishima that was published in the con-
servative monthly journal, Shokun!, and while he had heard Mishima held
rightist views, found him to be a polite man.75 Inoki had also met Mashita
before, and was saddened that Mishima’s group had used violence against
the General and his staff and had called for a coup.76
In the meantime, Mashita, who had served as the vice chief of staff
of the GSDF prior to becoming the Commanding General of Eastern
Army in June 1969, survived the attack but subsequently resigned in
late December 1970 to take responsibility for the incident. At the time,
Mashita stated, “It will probably sound as if I am making excuses but
both the staff officers and the members of the JSDF have truly acquit-
ted themselves well. They dealt with the problem prudently and with-
out causing any injury. I had met with Mishima on three occasions but
had not thought him to be brooding to such an extent. I think that if
I could have talked to him quietly, on a one-to-one basis, things might
have worked out very differently,” adding, “When public opinion will
allow it, in the future, I intend to meet with the bereaved families
and ask them to let me visit the spirits of the dead.”77 The Mishima
Incident ended Mashita’s career prematurely; as the top of his gradu-
ating class, he had been one of the leading candidates to become the
next chief of staff. He died shortly thereafter at the age of fifty-nine.78
His son, Kanehiro, who was a junior officer in the GSDF at the time,
later became the Commanding General of the Eastern Army in July
1997, the only father and son pair to have done so in the postwar.
Perhaps that appointment was a way to restore some of the honor to
the father’s memory.
The 1971 Curtis–Kubo Agreement and SDF Dispatch to Okinawa

One week before Nakasone left his job as Director General to assume a
senior position in the ruling party, an important bilateral agreement was
worked out on the division of defense responsibilities for Okinawa. Kubo
Takuya, Director of Defense Policy for the JDA, and Vice Admiral Walter
L. Curtis, Jr., Chief Military Representative at the US Embassy, completed
their negotiations on these arrangements immediately following the June
17, 1971, reversion agreement, and on June 29, the Security Consultative
Committee (SCC) approved the Curtis–Kubo Agreement.
The consultations had actually been going on for some time before
that. On October 7, 1970, for example, Director General Nakasone
announced during a visit to Okinawa (the first time ever by a Defense
Agency Director General) the first dispatch of SDF to Okinawa to take
effect after the actual reversion. According to the final arrangements in
implementing the Curtis–Kubo Agreement, 3200 SDF personnel were
to be stationed in Okinawa so that the SDF could assume defense obliga-
tions regarding air defense, ground defense, maritime patrols, search and
rescue, and so on.79 Due in part to opposition in Okinawa to the deploy-
ment plans by anti-military activists, the local media, and leftist leaders,
including Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands Yara
Chō byō and the mayor of Naha, Okinawa’s largest city, the government
decided in April 1972 to revise the plans and lower the number to 2900
as well as delay the arrival of some of the units. The soon-to-be prefecture
even negotiated an agreement with the central government that the 3000-
meter runway on Shimoji Shima, near Miyako Island, would not be used
for military purposes, despite its strategic location.
Earlier that year, on January 3, 1972, the GSDF formed the Interim
1st Combined Brigade (Rinji Daiichi Konseidan) with approximately 670
members. It officially came into being in March. Major General Kuwae
Ryō hō , originally from Okinawa, was chosen as the Commanding General
of the 1st Combined Brigade and subsequently, with collateral duties, as
the first commander of Camp Naha after its establishment. The Brigade,
which was temporarily stationed in Kumamoto, was initially scheduled
to deploy to Okinawa in June, but in fact it was not actually able to until
October and took until December to complete.80 During that time, it
faced harassment and protests nearly every weekend from anti-base activ-
ists decrying the deployment to Okinawa. Kuwae felt bad for the men in
152 R.D. ELDRIDGE
his brigade, who looked forward to the weekends: “I had to keep them
inside the fence, and did not let them go off base.”81
In the meantime, Parliamentary Vice Minister Noro Kyō ichi paid one
of several visits to Okinawa to speak with local leaders and landowners on
the deployment and to request their understanding and support.82 Despite
careful and deliberate efforts to gain the trust of Okinawan residents,
including the above naming of an Okinawan as the first commander, the
SDF, and in particular the GSDF, would continue to experience a lack of
cooperation from local authorities and personal cases of discrimination
against them, to include not being able to register their children in local
schools, prevented from living in city housing, refusal of trash collec-
tion service, not allowing SDF members from Okinawa to participate in
national sporting events representing Okinawa, and subjecting them to
verbal abuse. In addition, many communities were unwilling to permit
SDF recruiting activities.83 The media at this time also highlighted testi-
monies of soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army who allegedly partici-
pated in the killings of residents on Kume Island, in part because some
were considered spies, further hardening attitudes against the deployment
of the postwar SDF to Okinawa.84
It was not only in Okinawa that SDF personnel faced abuse but also
in the mainland. The city of Tachikawa refused to accept the residen-
tial registration of SDF personnel on January 6, 1973, following the
relocation of the Eastern Army Headquarters to Camp Tachikawa the
previous month on December 27 (eventually, the city relented after sixty-
three days). Moreover, the SDF was subject to insurgent attacks in the
mainland, too. The attacks increased following the student radical-led
upheavals of the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, on August 21,
1971, radicals calling themselves the Sekieigun (Red Gate Army) tried
to enter Camp Asaka and murdered a leading private who was on guard.
(This attack was reportedly known in advance and facilitated by an Asahi
Jaanaru writer, leading to his arrest.) Two months later, five insurgents
drove a truck onto Camp Nerima, only to get arrested. Further, on May
11, 1972, a few days before the reversion of Okinawa, Molotov cocktails
were thrown at the Defense Agency Headquarters building in Roppongi
and at the Shinjuku Branch of the Tokyo Provincial Liaison Office. No
one was injured in these latter attacks.
Within Okinawa, there were several policies introduced to ensure
coexistence with the SDF, particularly the GSDF. The key SDF facilities
are away from the central part of Okinawa, near the airport. This limits
on-island training to a minimum. The SDF, in addition, goes out of its

way to recruit locally, and to hire Okinawans.85 Moreover, as it has done
in the mainland, since December 1972, when a patient on the island of
Aguni to the west of Okinawa proper needed emergency medical care,
the GSDF has assisted in the transport of patients from the outer islands
on the average of two every three days.86 In February 1990, three GSDF
pilots and crew, and one doctor, were killed in the line of duty on their
way to perform a medevac.87 In March 2007, two pilots and two crew
members were killed when their helicopter crashed into a mountain on
their way to conduct a medevac.88 Furthermore, the GSDF undertakes
the recovery and safe demolition of unexploded ordinance from the Battle
of Okinawa that is found in fields or construction sites (as they do on the
mainland). Indeed, on June 5, 1974, the Special Unexploded Ordinance
Unit (Tokubetsu Fuhatsudan Shoritai) was established within the 1st
Combined Brigade to handle the demolition of these bombs. On average,
the GSDF disposes of more than two pieces of unexploded ordinance per
day since the reversion of Okinawa.89 As expected, this, too, is dangerous
work, but no Japanese personnel have been killed or injured during this
demolition work in order to protect the lives of Okinawa’s residents. Over
the years, through these and other efforts, such as proportionately higher
recruitment within Okinawa among a population that is relatively poorer
and has fewer career options compared to the rest of Japan,90 and promo-
tion of a Defense Association, support within the prefecture has grown
over the years.
The Fourth Defense Build-Up Plan (1972)

On October 21, 1970, the Defense Agency published the outline for the
Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, which would run from 1972 to 1976.
The budget requested for the five-year plan was ¥5.8 trillion, or $16.1
billion. This sum was more than twice the total amount spent on the
1967–1971 Third Build-up Plan.91 The MSDF would eventually receive
the largest amount of funds for that round’s build-up efforts, while the
GSDF saw a modernization of the equipment it was using, including the
introduction of additional tanks, helicopters, armored cars, and various
types of guns.92
It was not until October 9, 1972, before Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei
was able to push the build-up program through the National Defense
Council and Cabinet. It was unusual for a long-term plan to be started
154 R.D. ELDRIDGE
partway through its first fiscal year, but this situation reflected the confu-
sion caused by Nakasone’s autonomous defense plan,93 as well, it should
be noted, as the change in government in July when Satō stepped down
after almost eight years in office. “The subsequent failure [of Nakasone’s
plan],” one writer observed, “meant that [his] successors needed time to
craft a new plan that was tailored to détente and clean of any suspicion
of revived Japanese militarism.”94 With Nakasone’s plan pushed aside,
the eventual defense budget approved was ¥4.63 trillion, down ¥1.17
trillion. This 20 percent decrease did not satisfy some in the Diet, who
looked toward détente and the promise of recently established diplomatic
relations with the People’s Republic of China. They demanded Tanaka
clarify the limits of defense strength in peacetime. Prime Minister Tanaka
promised to have the Defense Agency study the question, and present
to the Diet the limits on the SDF personnel and equipment. The plan
that emerged, in February 1973, was the “Peacetime Defense Capability
(Heiwaji no Bōeiryoku)” concept, which would further change over the
next few years.95
On the eve of this debate, a serious problem emerged when Director
General Masuhara Keikichi, who had originally succeeded Nakasone in
July 1971 but resigned due to a scandal and was re-appointed in July
1972,96 mentioned to a reporter the discussions he had had Emperor
Hirohito on defense issues on May 26 (1973), which were subsequently
reported in the newspaper on the 28th. The Emperor reportedly stressed
the importance of national defense, noting that the SDF when compared
to neighboring countries was not large, and emphasized the need for SDF
personnel to have the proper morale (in light of some scandals and other
problems that had emerged) and not imitate the bad aspects of the prewar
military. Masuhara not only caused a tremendous protocol issue by relay-
ing the Emperor’s comments but also raised a serious political issue when
he said that “the Emperor’s comments encouraged me as we go into the
Diet deliberations,” which in effect politicized the role of the Emperor.
Masuhara resigned the next day.97
A few months after this on September 7, 1973, the Sapporo District
Court sided with local residents from Naganuma, Hokkaido, declaring the
SDF unconstitutional in the case relating to a Nike base. While the case
was directed at the ASDF, and not the GSDF specifically, it was another
example of efforts by various domestic groups to limit or eliminate the
SDF. The decision was eventually overturned by the Sapporo High Court
on August 5, 1976, but not before the case received international aca-
demic and media attention.98
Tanaka would eventually resign from office a couple of years later due
to the Lockheed Scandal, in which he was later found guilty of having
accepted bribes to facilitate the purchasing of aircraft from that American
company. During this time, Tanaka’s relations with the United States had
also deteriorated as a result of the “Nixon Shocks” of 1971, as well as a
US-imposed embargo of soy beans, and differences over relations with
Arab countries in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and Oil Crisis.
His successor, Miki Takeo, was viewed as somewhat of a pacifist, but ironi-
cally ended up helping to stabilize the US–Japan security relationship and
Japan’s defense policy as a whole.
In part, Miki’s success was due to the proactive leadership of Sakata
Michita as Director General of the Defense Agency. Although (or because)
Sakata was a self-proclaimed “novice” in security matters, he approached
defense issues with fresh eyes, viewing the SDF much like the average
citizen would, and possessed a robust agenda that included making the
SDF more transparent.99 Himself elected for the first time in the postwar
amid the progressive democratic reforms of the Occupation, he felt pub-
lic support was vital especially in a democracy. “No matter how strong
the SDF was,” he wrote in his memoirs published in the last decade of
the twentieth century after he retired from politics in 1990 (after forty-
three years), “it meant nothing without the support and cooperation of
the people.”100
Sakata, who ended up serving through the entire term of the Miki
Cabinet (which was unusual in the sense that defense ministers usually
serve only a matter of months rather than years), recognized that the pub-
lic, like himself, did not fully understand defense matters, and was critical
that the Defense Agency was reticent to share information with the public.
He sought to change this by re-launching the publication of the white
paper, which he believed the most important and pressing of the govern-
ment white paper series. He felt this was particularly important to help
create a “national consensus” on the SDF.101 As education minister, he
had been particularly bothered that the SDF was not even introduced in
school textbooks. He also went out of his way to meet with SDF personnel,
getting to know not only their duties but also them as people. Sakata met
with them in the field during their training, at the camps, at festivals, and
in their offices, asking where they were from, what their most memorable
experiences were, and giving them insights into his thinking. One whole
156 R.D. ELDRIDGE
chapter of his earlier memoirs, Chiisakutemo Ō kina Yakuwari (A Big Role,

Even if Small), written immediately after he stepped down as Director
General and whose title refers to the SDF, is devoted to his interactions
with the uniformed personnel. A recent biography of Sakata described this
loving touch as that of an “educator-like defense minister.”102
One of the first actions Sakata took was creating the Defense Study
Group (literally, “Thinking about Defense,” or Bōei o Kangaeru Kai)
in late March 1975, with the members, who included Professor Kōsaka
Masataka of Kyōto University and former Ambassador to the United
States Ushiba Nobuhiko, conducting their first meeting in early April
and finishing in June for a total of six times.103 The group was considered
Japan’s security in light of the period of détente, public and political
opinion, fiscal constraints, and so on. As a result of the discussions, the
members recommended that Japan reject possessing nuclear weapons,
that its defense spending be limited to 1 percent of its Gross National
Product (GNP; which had become the de facto consensus of the pub-
lic),104 and that defense policy be reconsidered to reflect the détente
period. Moreover, the group recommended that a defense committee be
established in the Diet, the SDF emphasize its roles in natural disasters,
the Japanese government strengthen its public outreach on Japan–US
cooperation and defense policy in contingencies, Japan strengthen its
rear-area equipment, and Japan develop its military technologies, among
other things. During the summer, which marked the thirtieth anniversary
of the end of World War II, the secretariat prepared the 182-page final
report which was published at the end of September, and included chap-
ters on the US–Japan alliance, the international environment, domestic
conditions, and appropriate defense strength. It also included individual
submissions by each of the group members, and a final commentary by
National Defense Academy President Inoki and some others based on
their reading of the draft report.105
National Defense Program Outline (1976) and Immediate-Term

Defense Build-Up Program
Almost parallel to this effort, Sakata had directed that his staff begin pre-
paring a plan to follow the Fourth Defense Build-up plan. Criticism had
emerged over the previous build-ups and the overall objectives of the
build-up remained unclear for both the public and, in some cases, govern-
ment officials themselves. Questions had developed about just how many
“build-ups” were necessary when the SDF (including its predecessor orga-
nizations) was nearly twenty-five years old. In addition, others challenged
Nakasone’s vision of autonomous defense, fearing that it would lead to
an unnecessary arms race and the potential nuclearization of Japan, which
would hurt Japan both economically and diplomatically.
In light of these concerns, Defense Agency Vice Minister Kubo Takuya
had introduced the perspective of there being “limitations on Japan’s
defense capabilities in peacetime” in a personal paper drafted in June 1974
to which Kō saka and Ushiba, among others in the Defense Study Group,
added their intellectual and theoretical support the following year, calling
for a defensive ability that could counter an enemy’s attack or deny an
enemy’s ability from easily invading Japan.106 The results became known
as the Standard Defense Force Concept (Kibanteki Bōeiryoku Kōsō). Kubo
and the Internal Bureau of the Defense Agency followed this approach but
faced resistance from the uniformed personnel, who were still adhering
to Nakasone’s concept of “necessary defense capability (shoyō bōeiryoku).”
Indeed, according to one senior member of the JDA at the time, “most
military people were of the opinion that this thesis was pure nonsense.”107
In order to close the gap, Sakata had members of the SDF meet with the
Internal Bureau during the summer and fall of 1975.
Subsequently, on October 29, Sakata directed his staff to re-exam-
ine the SDF’s personnel numbers, structure, and equipment along
the lines of the Standard Defense Force Concept with the February
1973 “Peacetime Defense Capability” as the upper limit. Two weeks
later, Sakata met with members of the National Defense Council
Parliamentarians Group (Kokubō Kaigi Giin Konwakai), which had
been established in 1957, where the Standard Defense Force Concept
was blessed. Sakata was a strong believer in the need for civilian, spe-
cifically political, control over defense policy, and thus sought as many
opportunities as possible to have his efforts understood and supported.
“The decision-making process,” he wrote, “must be totally transparent
as if we were doing it behind a glass window. In this way, it is easy for
the public to participate, and for no questions to arise among the coun-
tries of Asia.”108 He often brought matters before the National Defense
Council, and did so with the above work on the Standard Defense
Force, receiving its official decision of approval the following year. In
fact, the Council met a total of six times during Sakata’s two years in
office, compared to a total of twenty-four times in the nineteen years
before he began as Director General.109
158 R.D. ELDRIDGE
In the middle of these discussions, Sakata launched an interesting pub-

lic relations initiative with regard to the SDF. On November 1, the SDF’s
official anniversary day, the Defense Agency published advertisements in
several daily newspapers, with the message personally drafted by Sakata
which said, “If you see a member of the SDF around your town, please
feel free to say hello.”110 It was not only in the image of the SDF and
their closeness with the public that Sakata was trying to improve. Earlier
in 1975, he had learned of a number of problems with the pay and living
conditions of SDF personnel and took measures to improve their situation
as well. In addition, on January 4, 1975, he personally wrote out new
year’s greetings to the SDF, rather than relying on a bureaucrat’s prepared
text, and recorded it for broadcast and agreed to its publication in the
newspaper Asagumo.
In other areas, Sakata was not immediately successful. The gap he had
tried to close between the Internal Bureau and the uniforms still remained
going into 1976, and the uniform leadership began their counterattack
on the Standard Defense Force Concept in February of the New Year.
The GSDF, for example, resisted the reorganization of the divisions based
on the actual strength of 155,000 members (rather than the authorized
strength of 180,000). If anything, the GSDF wanted to see the establish-
ment of a combined brigade on Shikoku, one of the four main islands
of Japan, which at the time did not have a ground presence. The GSDF
believed the Internal Bureau’s focus on the defense of Hokkaido, com-
bined with some units dedicated to education and training as well as disas-
ter dispatches, would not be enough to defend Japan were the true need
to arise. Sakata eventually sided with the GSDF on this matter and asked
that the appropriate changes be made.
In the meantime, the heated exchanges between the SDF and Internal
Bureau continued until July when the Ministry of Finance chimed in to
explain the fiscal situation required a refocus from maintaining personnel
numbers to improving the quality of the equipment it already processed.
In particular, amid the inflation hitting Japan at the time in the wake of
the Oil Crisis, 80 percent of the GSDF’s budget was eaten up by personnel
costs. This would have to change.
In addition to the worsening fiscal situation, four issues had emerged
in Japan’s security policy: (1) the need for defense policy planners to
develop a national consensus on Japan’s defense; (2) the need for a better
understanding of the current defense capabilities of the SDF, particularly
operational and logistical support; (3) the need for an accurate under-
standing of the domestic conditions, namely economic, social, and facili-

ties acquisition limitations; and (4) the need for an proper assessment of
the present international situation.111 Meeting a half-dozen times to con-
sider the security planning done on these issues, the National Defense
Council saw to it that the following four principles were adopted when
working on the National Defense Program Outline:
(1) On the premise that those domestic and international situations out-
lined above will not undergo any major changes for some time to come;
(2) Japan’s defense structure should primarily possess the assorted func-
tions required for national defense, while retaining balanced organization
and deployment, including logistical support; (3) such defense preparedness
should enable Japan to maintain a full surveillance posture during peace-
time, and cope effectively with conflict to the extent of limited and small-
scale aggression; and (4) this defense posture should be capable of adapting
smoothly to meet any serious changes in the situation around Japan which
might require such adaptation.112
Importantly, with the adoption of the NDPO in October 1976, as the

1977 Defense of Japan notes, the “actual goals of Japan’s defense magni-
tude were clarified in specific terms for the first time.”113 Furthermore, six
specific features of the standard defense force were identified: (1) main-
taining adequate surveillance posture; (2) coping with indirect aggression,
such as intense domestic insurgency, insurgency with external support,
organized personnel infiltration and arms smuggling, and the covert use of
force in Japan’s nearby sea and airspace; (3) coping with direct aggression
in accordance with the scope of the aggression (with the support of the
Japan–US security treaty) and rebuffing limited and small-scale aggres-
sion, in principle without external assistance; (4) effectively functioning
in command communications and logistical support, such as transporta-
tion, rescue, supply, and maintenance; (5) being able to carry out intensive
education and training of its personnel at all times; and (6) being capable
of carrying out rescue-relief operations in any area of the country when
required.
In the context of the GSDF, as with the other branches, a number of
shortfalls were identified which would require reorganization and bud-
getary measures. First, according to the NDPO, the GSDF, “in order
to be capable of swift and effective systematic defense operations from
the outset of aggression in any part of Japan, must deploy its divisions
160 R.D. ELDRIDGE
and other units with a balance conforming to Japan’s natural features,

etc.” In order to conduct “unflawed” deployment of units throughout
the country, the Defense Agency interpreted the above direction to deploy
divisions or combined brigades on a “balanced level, conforming with the
nation’s topography.”114 As Japan was divided into fourteen districts in
peacetime, the new approach called for fourteen units to be established.
As mentioned earlier, because there was no GSDF presence on Shikoku,
the GSDF established a combine brigade to cover the island within the
existing personnel quota, thus making the total of twelve divisions and
two combined brigades (the other one being in Okinawa).
Second, the GSDF was required to “possess at least one tactical unit of
each of the various types of forces used mainly for mobile operations” in
order to fulfill the mission.115 Because the GSDF lacked an armored divi-
sion, which feature tank units as their main component and have “enor-
mous mobile strike power” as compare to infantry units, it, in keeping
with the existing personnel quota, decided to abolish an existing tank bri-
gade and integrate the tanks into the 7th Division already deployed in
Hokkaido, thus transforming it into an armored division.116
Third, the GSDF was required to possess ground-to-air missile units
in order to handle the low-altitude air defense of vital areas (with Hawk
missiles, while the ASDF would handle high-altitude air defense with
Nike missiles). Eight vital areas were identified, including the political
and economic centers of Kantō and Kansai, strategic transportation points
of Seikan and Kanmon areas, and the vital defense zones of Kyūshū and
Okinawa. As such, eight anti-aircraft artillery groups were to be desig-
nated as low-altitude ground-to-air missile units.
Finally, the personnel structure of the GSDF, for which 180,000 troops
were found to be necessary, was re-examined to find a reasonable standard
to fulfill initial emergency requirements and avoid any shortfall in educa-
tion, training, and other fields of administration during peacetime. The
ratio of eighty-six was expected to continue for at least Japan Fiscal Year
(JFY) 1977.
Lockheed and the MiG Incident

Complicating the discussions at the time were a couple of incidents, one
political and the other security-related, that caused some concern. In late
July 1976, former Prime Minister Tanaka was arrested by in relation to
the Lockheed Scandal for violating Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Laws. Although he immediately resigned his status as a member

of the ruling party, this did not diminish his political influence and his
supporters spent the remainder of the year trying to remove the prime
minister for having allowed prosecutors to go after Tanaka. In addition to
the political world of Nagata-chō , the bureaucratic world of Kasumigaseki
was divided, complicating discussions on a number of fronts.
Shortly after this, in early September, a Soviet pilot defected, flying his
MiG-25 Foxbat unchallenged into Hakodate Airport in Hokkaido and
correctly creating a sense of urgency into Japan’s defense posture.117 The
incident not only caused relations to flare with the Soviet Union (and some
friction with the United States over how to handle the plane’s impor-
tant intelligence assets), but also created an internal debate on Japan’s
defenses. An entire chapter of the 1977 white paper was devoted to the
incident, and a review of the problems associated with early warning capa-
bilities and measures against low-altitude intrusion were studied.118 While
many of these matters concerned the ASDF, the other services could not
but help feel it was a collective failure.
From the GSDF perspective, in the moments after the incident,
Lieutenant General Tanaka Shō ji began to think about the likelihood
of the Soviet Union taking military action, either to retrieve the aircraft
(and pilot) or otherwise punish Japan.119 Such a move considered highly
possible. The Soviet Union had been increasing its submarine activities
for some time in the area, and Tanaka’s G-2 (intelligence section) had
closely followed the Soviet Union and so briefed the staff.120 Nevertheless,
Tanaka, who had 40,000 troops among four Japanese divisions under his
command, was still worried if they would be able to hold out for the three
weeks following a Soviet invasion before help arrived, as per the defense
plan. This is because the Soviet Union, at the time, was estimated to have
approximately 200,000 man forces spread across seventeen divisions, sup-
ported by 1600 aircraft, in the Far East.121
Tanaka and every one of his eleven predecessors were considered the
elites of the elite, having graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army
Academy. The Soviet Union’s nearby presence had long been a concern.
To improve the skills of the men under his command, Tanaka annually
had the two divisions conduct a command post exercise with one divi-
sion fighting the other. The 11th Division Commanding General, Kondō
Yasushi, in whose district Hakodate Airport lies, was in fact in a command
post drill at Camp Makomanai in southern Sapporo himself when the MiG
incident occurred.122 He decided to stay there and complete the drill, but
162 R.D. ELDRIDGE
ordered all personnel at the 28th Infantry Regiment, closest to the airport
at Camp Hakodate, to be on alert.
Several days later, US sources reported the possibility of a Soviet guerilla
unit attacking the airport. GSDF Chief of Staff Miyoshi Hideo ordered
a Japanese unit centered on the 28th Infantry Regiment to be ready to
respond. According to a retired GSDF officer who served in the Northern
Army, Prime Minister Miki and Defense Agency Director General Sakata
had both been hesitant to issue orders to respond, but Miyoshi, Tanaka, and
Kondo, who had all graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy,
were of like mind that the 28th Infantry Regiment would have to be sent in
if the Russians came, using tanks and other artillery if necessary. Eventually,
the unit did not have to be used, but they were prepared in the absence of
any contingency legislation, and even sought legal advice from within and
outside of the command. It was, in the words of the above officer, “a deli-
cate time for civilian control.”123 This experience would make the prepara-
tion of the next stage of the alliance all the more important.
The New Cold War

While the MiG defection incident happened during the détente years, the
diplomatic drama and military posturing was very much a Cold War inci-
dent. Over the coming years, the East–West frictions would continue to
grow.
The 1978 Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation

A year and a half prior to this MiG incident, and ten years after the Mitsuya
study became public knowledge, Sakata started another important task:
the initiation of bilateral talks with the United States on guidelines for
defense cooperation in a contingency. Sakata had been asked by Ueda
Tetsu, a member of the anti-SDF, anti-security treaty Socialist Party, dur-
ing deliberations in the Budget Committee of the Upper House in early
March 1975, whether the two countries possessed secret war plans. The
new Defense Agency Director General promised to look into it. He sub-
sequently reported to the committee on April 1 that while no such secret
agreement existed, action officers of the two countries regularly met to
share ideas and information. Sakata then turned the tables on Ueda and
said it was necessary for the two countries to formally reach agreement on
mutual support in a Japan-related contingency and that he would invite
the US secretary of defense to Japan to begin discussions.124 This initiative

was supported by Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi who relayed the invi-
tation during his visit to Washington in mid-April, and eventually blessed
by Prime Minister Miki Takeo and President Gerald R. Ford in their meet-
ing in early August.
The two defense leaders met in late August when James R. Schlesinger
visited Japan as part of a trip to Asia to calm the nerves of allies and oth-
ers who feared America’s withdrawal from the region following the fall
of Saigon in late April. Conducting the talks at the old Japanese Defense
Agency building, they agreed to hold discussions on what eventually
would become the Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation.125 In
addition, they agreed to conduct the talks on the guidelines within the
bilateral SCC as per the August 6 joint statement by Miki and Ford, and
that the defense leaders themselves should meet at least once a year.126
Subsequently, in July 1976, during the 16th Japan–US SCC, the
Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) was established, as per
the above guidance. The SDC, however, was not limited to discussions
about the immediate guidelines but is “devoted to studies and consulta-
tion on means of Japanese-American cooperation—based on the mutual
security treaty—including guidelines on measures to secure coordinated
joint counteraction by the U.S. armed forces and the Self-Defense Forces
in emergencies, so that the purpose of the security treaty and related
arrangements will be effectively attained.”127 The SDC conducted four
initial meetings, during which agreement was reached on establishing
three smaller working groups—operations, intelligence, and logistical sup-
port—in order to provide expert opinions to the SDC. The meetings also
produced shared recognition on three areas for studies and consultation:
(1) problems that might occur were Japan to come under direct attack
or when a threat existed; (2) geopolitical problems that could exert an
important influence on Japan’s national security; and (3) other issues, such
as bilateral exercises and drills. The deliberations and report writing con-
tinued until October 1978 when the “Draft Guidelines” were drawn up at
the eighth session of the subcommittee.128
The results of the bilateral discussions were accepted a month later at
the 17th SCC held on November 27, 1978, and approved by the National
Defense Council and Cabinet the following day. Shortly after this, in
December, Director General Yamashita Ganri directed the chairman of
the Joint Staff Council and chiefs of the ASDF, GSDF, and MSDF to
conduct studies on joint defense planning and associated activities. The
164 R.D. ELDRIDGE
chairman was to coordinate the work of the chiefs, and maintain “close
contact” with the director of the Defense Policy Bureau and the Director
General of the JDA.129 The Guidelines and related bilateral discussions, in
particular, highlighted the fact that the GSDF and its American ground
counterparts had little interaction and provided the framework for it to
develop.
Bilateral Training and Exercises

While the other services, particularly the MSDF, were well versed in work-
ing together with their counterparts and already training together, the
same was not true for the GSDF. It would not be until October 1981
before bilateral training took place. This was a communications exercise
conducted over the course of three days at the massive East Fuji Maneuver
Area (Higashi Fuji Enshūjō), originally established in the prewar period
by the Imperial Japanese Army, for which the GSDF was given control
over in 1968.130 The US Army was the primary lead for advance planning
and bilateral coordination on the American side, although it was actu-
ally conducted by US Marines from the 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa.
According to one study, whose author presciently viewed the Marines as
having a significant role to play in the future development of the GSDF,
lamented, “apart from officer exchanges, this would be the only formal
USMC-JGSDF training to occur for more than three years.”131
Several months later in February 1982, the first iteration of the bilateral
command post exercise, Yamasakura, was conducted over the course of five
days between the GSDF and US Army at the GSDF’s Camp Takigahara,
located in the foothills of Mt. Fuji across from the Marine Corps’ Camp
Fuji in Gotemba City, Shizuoka Prefecture, with approximately 1500
participants (1000 from the GSDF). Later that year in November, the
GSDF’s Eastern Army and the US Army’s IX Corps conducted a com-
bined exercise called “Yamato 82” to promote the “concerted movement
of Japanese and U.S. troops.”132 The Defense Agency described it at the
time as “the first … of its kind” but acknowledged “[it] accordingly, was
of the primary stage; for instance, there was no firing with live bullets,”
and went on to note that the “GSDF learned about the coordination and
adjustment between commanding and staff officers of Japanese and US
troops as well as the way to maintain close relations between both troops.
GSDF has also deepened its understanding about the operations and tac-
tics of the U.S. Army, thereby establishing a firm foundation for further

field training exercises to be staged.”133
Importantly, as work went into making this combined training a reality,
the previous bilateral training in communications and command post exer-
cises became routine, occurring annually in different locations. In May 1983,
the GSDF went to the United States for the first time to train, participating
in a bilateral command post exercise in at Fort Ord in Monterey, California.
Notably, this training took place during a year that was particularly challeng-
ing for the GSDF with multiple natural disasters (wild fires in six prefectures
in the Tōhoku and Hokuriku areas in late April, an earthquake that killed
more than 100 people in northern Japan in late May, heavy rains in Shimane
and western Japan that caused 112 deaths in July, and a volcanic eruption in
early October on Miyake Island). Three years later, an even more horrible
tragedy, this time, man-made, occurred when a jumbo jet crashed in the
mountains of Gunma Prefecture, killing more than 500 people.
The GSDF had been the furthest behind of the three services as far as
bilateral training went, but by the mid-1980s, established a gradual but
deliberate and respectable record and training cycle, participating in seven
bilateral exercises annually by 1985, equaling the MSDF, which had been
doing them for several decades already.134 As a result of these respective
exercises, the first bilateral combined command post exercise at the joint
level was held by Joint Staff Council in late February 1986, and the first
bilateral joint field exercise was done at the end of October. Six thousand
personnel from the SDF joined the drill, as did approximately 7000 from
the US side. Noting these advancements, one former US Navy officer
who was the head of the Japan division in the Pentagon for several years
observed that the Guidelines were “very important for helping the GSDF
move toward [the] same type of close relationship [that the MSDF had
with the U.S. Navy].”135
In the meantime, coordination on contingency planning continued as
per the 1978 Guidelines, with the result being the completion in 1984
of Operation Plan “5051,” whose scenario was a Soviet invasion of
Hokkaido, and following the 1990–1991 Gulf War and Crisis and the
1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, of “5053” in 1995, which imagined
Japan’s security being affected as a result of a crisis in the Middle East.136
In fact, the above planning was not the first time the two militaries had
worked on joint plans. In 1952, following the restoration of sovereignty
to Japan after the Allied peace treaty went into effect, the US military and
the National Police Reserve, the predecessor to the GSDF, began studying
166 R.D. ELDRIDGE
joint responses, and in 1955, the year after the SDF officially came into
being, the first bilateral plan was drafted. The result was the Coordinated
Joint Outline Emergency Plan (CJOEP).137 In addition, as a result of the
Mitsuya studies done during 1963, introduced earlier, the two militaries
reportedly came up with a joint plan known as “Flying Dragon” which
focused on the defense and response from Okinawa, while “Bull Run”
focused on the defense of mainland Japan, following the outbreak of con-
flict on the Korean Peninsula and/or Taiwan Strait.138
One of the issues that would historically hamper closer relations—that
of protecting secrets—arose during this time. On January 18, 1980, one
of the most serious known incidents symbolic of the Cold War happened
amid the growing tensions of the “New Cold War,” following the collapse
of détente and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. It involved
GSDF Major General Miyanaga Yukihisa, a Russian specialist originally
with the Imperial Japanese Army who had been an internee in Siberia fol-
lowing the war, and monitored the Soviet Union upon joining the SDF’s
predecessor, the National Safety Force, in 1952. Retiring in the early
1970s, he used his reputation and connections among his former sub-
ordinates in the GSDF’s Central Counterintellegence Command (Chūo ̄
Shiryōtai) to provide him with sensitive documents, which he passed to
Soviet military attachés. He was arrested by police, and sentenced to one
year in prison for theft but could not be tried for spying since no such law
existed. Although no American documents were said to be shared, experts
suggested otherwise.139 Attempts to prepare an anti-spying legislation
later in the 1980s were unsuccessful due to the opposition of some politi-
cal parties and the media, and limited the true deepening of the bilateral
defense cooperation.140 The incident would also have the latent effect of
emboldening those in the United States who distrusted Japan and viewed
it as an economic competitor, willing to sell out the United States through
industrial spying and other mercantilist practices. These trade frictions
grew during the 1980s and early 1990s between the number one and
two economic powers, as they cooperated against the Soviet Union, their
combined military enemy. In addition, the US government had greatly
lost faith in the GOJ when one Prime Minister, Suzuki Zenkō , following
a trip to Washington in May 1981, denied in response to questions from
the media that the bilateral relationship was a military alliance.141
To ensure the relationship remained close, and to repair the damage his
predecessor caused, Nakasone, who served as prime minister for much of the
1980s and who had previously “volunteered” to become Director General of
the Defense Agency in the early 1970s, reportedly described the importance
of Japan and its location in the US–Japan relationship as “an unsinkable
aircraft carrier” during a January 1983 interview with the Washington Post’s
Katharine Graham. While the phrasing was the interpreter’s, Nakasone did
not correct it. His intent was clear: “With this one shot, all of Washington’s
pent up feelings of mistrust at Japan’s negative attitude toward defense were
blown away. It was an enormously effective shock treatment that changed
the gloomy atmosphere between Japan and America completely.”142
The seriousness of the New Cold War had already been noted by this
point. In fact, it was symbolized by the fact that 1980—the same year as the
above spying incident came to light—was called “the Year of Defense.”143
A National Defense Academy professor specializing in psychological war-
fare described it at a conference in the United Kingdom that year on con-
temporary Japan as a “totally unprecedented state of affairs,” with articles
“on some aspect of Japan’s defense or security” appearing “almost daily”
in Japan’s newspapers, and weekly magazines and monthly periodicals fea-
turing stories, which were “often [cast] in sensational tones under banner
headlines.”144 He added, “what we see is the commercialization of the
defense debate in the mass media with little thought given to the likeli-
hood, or even the possibility, of the scenarios unfolding as described.”145
Tensions flared, however, in September 1983 when the Soviet Union
shot down Korean Airlines flight 007 over the Sea of Japan, west of Sakhalin
Island. All 269 passengers and the crew members on the flight traveling
from New York to Seoul were killed, including twenty-eight Japanese and
a US member of Congress. The Soviet Union denied responsibility, but
the GSDF’s intelligence section had been tracking the flight and messages
of the Soviet Su-15 interceptor through its signals intelligence listening
post in Wakkanai, Hokkaido. Japan made the information available to its
ally, and the United States and Japan jointly released it to an emergency
session of the UNSC a week after the downing. The Soviet Union, which
interfered with the search and rescue operations, never apologized or took
responsibility, worsening relations between it and its neighbors.
In light of the concern of the renewed threat posed by the Soviet
Union, GSDF operational planning increasingly focused on the defense
of Hokkaido and northern Honshū, involving the transfer of tanks
from other parts of Japan to “beef up” the four divisions (2nd, 5th, 7th
[armored], and 11th) already in the northernmost prefecture at the time,
even “at the expense” of other areas, according to observers.146 This new
priority was being given to Hokkaido due in part to the belief that Soviet
168 R.D. ELDRIDGE
strategy was to secure the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk were con-
flict to come, and thus the land areas, particularly near straits, would be
important and vulnerable to seaborne and aerial assaults.147 However, the
GSDF also felt it needed to update its concept of engaging an invading
force. Traditionally, according to a Rand study, it would “tactically [with-
draw] to an interior defensive line and then [counterattack] enemy forces
once they were ashore,” but the new operational concept called Sea Shore
Strike (S3) saw the GSDF “countering and defeating the invading force
at the shoreline.”148 This new concept, as well as new procurements and
reorganization, were all “seen as necessary for the GSDF to credibly carry
out its missions and roles,” the Rand study noted.149
The new procurements during the latter part of the 1980s came about
as a result of the Cabinet’s approval on September 18, 1985, of the JFY
1986–1990 Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP), or Chūki Bōeiryoku
Seibi Keikaku. Specifically for the GSDF, this MTDP was designed to
provide an evolving and maturing capability to deter and counter a land
invasion through armored mobility, anti-tank weapons and surface-to-ship
guided missiles. However, the adoption of the S3 concept required sys-
tems with greater long-range striking power, and prepared a detailed list
of priority equipment for procurement in the late 1980s for inclusion in
the 1991–1995 MTDP. One of those pieces of equipment included the
SSM-1, a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 150 kilometers, which
was first ordered in 1988.150
The next chapter discusses how the end of the Cold War affected pro-
curement and overall strategic thinking, and the relative slowness on the
Japanese side to adjust to international changes.
Notes
1. George R. Packard, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of
1960 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1966), p. 321.
2. Packard, Protest in Tokyo, pp. 322–323.
3. The Council was provided for in the Defense Agency Establishment
Law (Bōeichō Secchihō), which went into effect on July 1, 1954,
but the Council itself was not created until July 2, 1956.
4. The divisions were called kankutai, which meant region or
regional force in the postwar lexicon. Kankutai had also been the
prewar Imperial Japanese Army name for divisions. See Araki
Hajime, ed., Gakkō de Oshienai Jieitai: Sono Rekishi, Sōbi,
Tatakaikata (Tokyo: Namiki Shobō , 2002), pp. 46–47. A com-

bined brigade is a unit smaller in scale than a division but possess-
ing similar ground combat capabilities.
5. Miyazawa Kiichi (translated by Robert D. Eldridge), Secret Talks
between Tokyo and Washington: The Memoirs of Miyazawa Kiichi,
1949–1954 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007).
6. Sugita Ichiji, Wasurerarete Iru Anzen Hoshō (Tokyo: Jiji
Tsūshinsha, 1967), pp. 34–44. For more on the Nakano School
of the prewar, see Stephen C. Mercado, The Shadow Warriors of
Nakano: A History of the Imperial Japanese Army Elite’s
Intelligence School, (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2002). According to
Sugita, the GSDF Chief of Staff at this time in the early 1960s
had some twenty units under his jurisdiction, including five Army
headquarters and fifteen schools. See Sugita, Wasurerarete Iru,
p. 53.
7. Sugita, Wasurerareta Iru, p. 53.
8. Sugita, Wasurerareta Iru, p. 58.
9. Sugita, Wasurerareta Iru, p. 61. Sugita wrote that there was an
inherent inequality in Article 3 (“Mission of the Self-Defense
Forces”) of the 1954 SDF Law in that it was only the GSDF that
could really deal with “indirect aggression,” such as guerillas,
anarchists, and others who would disrupt domestic peace. See
Sugita, Wasurerareta Iru, pp. 61–62. Article 3 reads: “The pri-
mary mission of the Self-Defense Forces shall be to defend the
nation against direct and indirect aggression for the purpose of
preserving peace and the independence of the nation, and main-
taining the national security and, if necessary, shall take charge of
maintaining public order. 2. It shall be the mission of the Ground
Self-Defense Force to conduct operations chiefly on the ground,
and of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to conduct operations
chiefly at sea, and of the Air Self-Defense Forces to conduct oper-
ations chiefly in the air.”
10. Sugita, Wasurerarete Iru, p. 62.
12. Sugita, Wasurerarete Iru, pp. 276–279.
15. “Defense Buildup and Popular Attitudes toward Defense,”
Talking Points Prepared for Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy’s
170 R.D. ELDRIDGE
Visit to Japan, September 27, 1964–October 1, 1964,” State

Department Files.
16. “Defense Buildup and Popular Attitudes toward Defense.”
17. “Airgram 138, from American Embassy Tokyo to Department of
State on Public Attitudes Towards the Self Defense Forces and
Japan’s Defense Problems, July 31, 1964,” State Department
Files. Interestingly, in a sort of political memoir, Nakasone
Yasuhiro, who was a member of the Kishi Cabinet, noted that
Ikeda, who was Minister of International Trade and Industry, was
strongly in favor of employing the SDF to “crack down hard on
the rioters [at the time of the anti-Security Treaty demonstra-
tions],” even saying, “It’s an international communist plot so we
should use the SDF.” See Nakasone Yasuhiro, Meditations: On
the Nature of Leadership (Tokyo: PHP Institute, 2006), p. 45.
18. “Airgram 138.”
19. “Airgram 1, from American Consulate Sapporo to Department of
State on the Self-Defense Forces in Hokkaido, July 2, 1965,”
Department of State Files. In a revealing exchange with a Japanese
researcher shortly before this, one senior State Department offi-
cial conversely argued that the military should never be fully
socially appreciated in their countries: “[We] hope that the day
will never come when our greatest heroes are military leaders.”
See “Memorandum of Conversation on Japanese Attitudes
toward Viet-Nam, Communist China and Security Problems,
May 12, 1965,” State Department Files.
20. James H. Buck, “The Japanese Self-Defense Forces,” Asian
Survey, Vol. 7, No. 9 (September 1967), p. 608. According to
one scholar writing at the end of the same decade, “Japan …
increase[d] her defense spending faster than any other country in
the world with the possible exception of the U.S.” See Herbert
P. Bix, “The Security Treaty System and the Japanese Military-
Industrial Complex,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol.
2, No. 2 (January 1970), p. 33.
21. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1978 (Tokyo: Japan
Defense Agency, 1978), pp. 63–64.
22. Japan Defense Agency, Defense Strength of Japan (Tokyo: Japan
Defense Agency, 1962), p. 14.
23. “Airgram 1.”
24. “Japan Defense Policy, August 20, 1965,” attachment to

Memorandum from William P. Bundy to Ambassador Thompson,
August 23, 1965, State Department Files.
25. “Airgram 1.”
26. As mentioned in the Introduction, the GSDF tends to use various
dates for its anniversary. See Asagumo Shimbunsha Henshūkyoku,
ed., Haran no Hanseiki, p. 76.
27. As of October 2016, there are 1909 deceased members honored
in the memorial, none of whom died in actual combat.
28. “Memorial Zone Guidance,” pamphlet provided by Ministry of
Defense Public Affairs officials during tour and explanation on
July 8, 2014.
29. C.O.E. Ooraru Seisaku Kenkyū Purojekuto, ed., Ō raru Hisutorii:
Matsuno Raizō (Tokyo: Seisaku Kenkyū Daigakuin Daigaku,
undated), Vol. 2, p. 61.
30. The 13th Division was established on January 18, 1962, and
drew from the Third Region (Daisan Kankutai). Falling under
the jurisdiction of Middle Army Headquarters in Itami, Hyō go
Prefecture, it covered five prefectures in the Chūgoku region, and
the four prefectures of Shikoku. It was disbanded on March 28,
1999, and replaced by the 13th Brigade (Daijūsan Ryodan) the
same day.
31. Not everyone felt Ikeda had been supportive enough, however,
and did not approve of his “low posture.” (See Airgram 34, from
American Consul General Sapporo to Department of State on
“Views of Ground Self Defense Force Generals on National
Politics, March 27, 1964,” State Department Files.) One General
felt that Ikeda was “a man of limited intelligence and interests,
economics being his only subject,” and another was critical of
Ikeda’s “constantly bobbing his head to the Socialist Party”
despite its holding “less than 1/3 of the Diet seats.” The seven
generals interviewed in Hokkaido also believed the Defense
Agency should be raised to ministry level “because this would
give it prestige and influence in the Government,” a debate that
was prevalent at the time but would not be realized until 2007.
32. Eight years later, Japan hosted the winter Olympics in Sapporo,
Hokkaido, in January 1972. At that time as well, the GSDF pro-
vided a variety of support, as it did in 1970 for the Osaka World
Expo, when 3500 GSDF personnel, primarily from the Middle
172 R.D. ELDRIDGE
Army Headquarters assisted. In the winter Olympics, four mem-

bers of the GSDF participated in the biathlon events. Not every-
one was happy with the GSDF participating in events, however. As
a result of the protests of some 200 leftist organizations, the
Okinawa Amateur Sports Association (Okinawa Taiiku Kyōkai)
was forced to rescind the right of a GSDF member from participat-
ing as a member of the delegation from Okinawa to the National
(Kokumin Taiiku Taikai), held in Ibaraki Prefecture in the early
fall of 1974. See Matsukawa Kuni, Hi no Maru ha Miezu, Akahata
Nomi (Naha: Okinawa Keizai Shimbunsha, 1976), pp. 211–215.
33. For one member of the Olympic team from the GSDF, who lost
in the final 100 meters of a marathon, placing third was too much
of a dishonor. Four years later, on January 9, 1968, with health
issues plaguing his attempt to finally win a gold medal at the
Mexico Summer Olympics, First Lieutenant Tsubara Kō kichi
committed suicide in his officers’ barracks at Camp Asaka in
Saitama Prefecture. He had just been promoted to previous day.
See Asagumo Shimbunsha Henshūkyoku, ed., Haran no
Hanseiki: Rikujō Jieitai no 50 Nen (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha,
2000), p. 79.
34. Asagumo Shimbunsha Henshūkyoku, ed., Haran no Hanseiki,
p. 81. The Ichigaya Kaikan is now known as the Hotel Grand
Hill Ichigaya.
35. Interview by author during visit to Fuji School, June 25, 2012.
36. The first special honor guard for a state visit was provided for
India’s Prime Minister Nehru during his visit to Japan in October
1957. The honor guard is usually made up of 100 men from the
302nd, and about fifty members of the Central Music Band (Chūo ̄
Ongakutai), according to the 1988 Defense of Japan, p. 203.
37. The GSDF also assisted the following year by supporting the
enthronement ceremony of Emperor Akihiko, to include its band
performing and its CH-47 flying the massive “Takamikura” chair.
Previously, in June 1987, the GSDF had flown the Emperor to
Izu Oshima, which had experienced a volcanic eruption in
November 1986, causing the residents to have to evacuate.
Speaking of helicopter assets, the Eastern Army was called on to
provide support of search and rescue operations following the
crash of Japan Airlines flight 123 in the mountains of Gunma
Prefecture, 120 kilometer northwest of Tokyo, which killed all
fifteen crew members and 505 of the 509 passengers. In addition

to search and rescue from the air, GSDF personnel had the grim
job of searching through the wreckage to retrieve bodies. For
details, see Christopher P. Hood, Dealing with Disaster in Japan:
Responses to the Flight JL123 Crash (London: Routledge, 2013).
The current COS, General Oyabe, was in charge of the search by
the GSDF at the time as a young officer.
38. Mineo Kyūdai and Yuriki Kō bun, Nihon no Guntai Manuaru:
Teikoku Rikugun to Rikujō Jieitai “Sentōr yoku” no Hikaku Kenshō
(Tokyo: Kō jinsha, 2002), pp. 191–192.
39. Bix, “The Security Treaty System and the Japanese Military-
Industrial Complex,” p. 33. For a detailed study, see Tsukasa
Matsueda and George E. Moore, “Japan’s Shifting Attitudes
toward the Military: Mitsuya Kenkyū and the Self-Defense
Force,” Asian Survey, Vol.7, No. 9 (September 1967),
pp. 614–625. A copy of the study was published in the February–
March 1966 issue of Zenei, a journal of the Japan Communist
Party (Nihon Kyōsantō) which began publication in February
1946. It also appeared in the following edited volume: Hayashi
Shigeo, ed., Zenbun Mitsuya Sakusen Kenkyū: Yūji Taisei Shiriizu,
II (Tokyo: Bankeisha, 1979). For the experiences of one of the
participants in the Mitsuya study, see Bō eishō Bō eikenkyūsho
Senshibu, ed., Ichiki Toshio Ooraru Hisutorii (Tokyo: Bō eishō
Bō ei Kenkyūsho, 2009), pp. 62–64.
40. Welfield, An Empire, p. 205.
41. Satō Eisaku, Satō Eisaku Nikki, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha,
1998), p. 237.
42. Maeda, The Hidden Army, p. 129. Tanaka had already retired by
this point (in December 1964).
43. Maeda, The Hidden Army, p. 129.
44. Satō , Satō Eisaku Nikki, Vol. 2, p. 237.
46. A book published in 1979, purportedly using Mitsuya-related
documents, suggests in contrast that indeed joint plans did
emerge from the study. See footnote 39.
47. According to an interview conducted with Matsuno later, while
he expected to get the defense post due to his work with the com-
mittee, his membership in the defense group (or bōeizoku) of the
LDP, and knowledge of defense matters (having served in the
174 R.D. ELDRIDGE
Imperial Japanese Navy), he had to argue with Satō about the

appointment as the prime minister was going to pass him up
because the position had been previously promised to someone
else. Matsuno told him, if that were the case, to never to contact
him again, and Satō , according to him, relented. See
C.O.E. Ooraru Seisaku Kenkyū Purojekuto, ed., Ō raru Hisutorii:
Matsuno Raizō, Vol. 1, 177–179, and Vol. 2, pp. 99–100.
48. Welfield, An Empire, p. 209.
49. “Memorandum to the President on Luncheon Meeting with
Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Walt Rostow, CIA Director
Richard Helms, George Christian, and Jim Jones, Saturday,
November 4, 1967,” Folder: Meeting with Foreign Policy
Advisors, 4 November 1967, 2:20 p.m., Meeting Notes File, Box
2, LBJ Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin,
TX. For more, see Robert D. Eldridge, Iwo Jima and the Bonin
Islands in U.S.-Japan Relations (Quantico: Marine Corps
University Press, 2014), pp. 394–395.
50. For more on the unpopularity of it, see Thomas H. R. Havens,
Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1987).
51. For more on this issue, see Murakami Tomoaki, “Yoshida Rosen
to PKO Sanka Mondai,” Kokusai Seiji, No. 151 (2008),
pp. 121–139, and Murakami Tomoaki, “Kokuren Anzen Hoshō
Rijikai to Nihon, 1945–1972,” in Hosoya Yūichi, ed., Guroobaru
Gabanansu to Nihon (Tokyo: Chūō Kō ron Shinsha, 2013),
pp. 186–222.
52. For more on Japan’s domestic defense industry, see Michael
J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics,
and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998).
53. Buck, “The Japanese Self-Defense Forces,” p. 609.
54. Article 10 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
between Japan and the United States of America states, “This
Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments
of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come
into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily
provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in
the Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten
years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its inten-
tion to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall termi-
nate one year after such notice has been given.”
55. Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China
Sea Islands Dispute: Okinawa’s Reversion and the Senkaku Islands
(London: Routledge, 2014).
56. Iokibe Makoto, The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan
(London: Routledge, 2010).
57. Nakasone Yasuhiro, The Making of the New Japan: Reclaiming the
Political Mainstream (Richmond, United Kingdom: Curzon,
1999), p. 158.
58. Nakasone, The Making of the New Japan, p. 159. The members
included: Hosokawa Ryūgen (political critic); Aijima Toshio (sci-
entific critic); Shima Hideo (Chairman, Space Development
Organization); Hirasawa Kazushige (diplomatic affairs critic);
Inoki Masamichi (professor, Law Faculty, Kyō to University);
Morita Akio (Vice President, Sony Co., Ltd.); Endō Shūsaku (lit-
erary critic); and Satō Aiko (literary critic). See Brendle, “Japan’s
Ground Self-Defense Force, 1950–1970,” p. 43. For more on
the group and its recommendations, see Satake Tomohiko,
“‘Nakasone Kō sō ’ no Saikentō : Bō eichō kan Jidai ni Okeru
Nakasone Yasuhiro no Bō ei Kō sō ni Tsuite,” Hōgaku Seiji
Gakuronkyū, No. 68 (March 2006), pp. 33–64.
59. Shorter reports were published beginning in the late 1950s and
early 1960s.
60. Nakasone, The Making of the New Japan, p. 160.
65. Interview with IIPS President Satō Ken, former administrative
vice minister of defense, April 22, 2014, Tokyo.
66. For more on this relationship, see Sugihara Yūsuke and Sugihara
Gō suke, Mishima Yukio to Jieitai: Himerareta Yūjō to Shinrai
(Tokyo: Namiki Shobō , 1997).
67. Jeffrey Meyers, “Mishima’s Suicide,” Michigan Quarterly Review,
Vol. 49, No. 4 (Fall 2010). The office and the building in which
it was located were relocated on the property of the current
Defense Ministry complex, and is preserved as Ichigaya Memorial
Hall (Ichigaya Kinen Kaikan). It is open to the public during
176 R.D. ELDRIDGE
tours (reservation system), along with the room that served as the
location of the Tokyo war crimes trials.
69. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Nakasone Yasuhiro ga Kataru Sengo Nihon
Gaikō (Tokyo: Shinchō sha, 2012), pp. 216–217.
75. Inoki Masamichi, Watashi no Nijū Seiki: Inoki Masamichi
Kaikoroku (Tokyo: Sekai Shisō sha, 2000), p. 337.
76. There were fears that rightists might also attack Inoki. In addition
to police protection, SDF personnel stayed in Inoki’s official resi-
dence with him and his wife. His wife, Kurako, was especially
worried, and had a premonition that he would be stricken down
by the rightwing as he was writing his statement. “She never
expressed her criticism about anything before. It was very rare for
her to warn me [about something like this].” Inoki, Watashi no
20 Seiki, p. 341. Fortunately, in the end, nothing happened to
Inoki—“the cadets and the SDF as a whole supported my think-
ing,” Inoki wrote later. Inoki, Watashi no Nijū Seiki, p. 341.
Nakasone, on the other hand, was on the receiving end of many
complaints from rightist groups and individuals who supported
Mishima. See Nakasone, The Making of the New Japan, p. 166.
78. Inoki believed the incident weighed heavily on Mashita, causing
his early death. See Inoki, Watashi no Nijū Seiki, pp. 341–342. As
early as 1964, US officials viewed Mashita as someone who would
rise to the top of the GSDF, as a biographic report sent from the
US Consulate in Sapporo that year noted, while he was still Chief
of Staff of the Northern Army. “This is considered to be one of the
most difficult positions in the Defense Agency and he is said to
have done a good job at it. Because of his polite manner and ‘low
posture,’” the report stated, “he is effective in dealing with civil-
ians, and it is believed this trait will assist him in rising to the top in
the SDF.” See “Biographic Report, Japan, Mashita, Kanetoshi,
April 20, 1964,” A-4 Sapporo, U.S. State Department Files.
79. Yamaguchi Akikazu, “Briefing Memorandum: Local Defense

Obligations after the Reversion of Okinawa,” National Institute
for Defense Studies News, No. 151 (February 2011), pp. 1–6.
80. Kuwae Ryō hō , Ikusanga: Okinawa Jieitai (Tokyo: Hara Shobō ,
1982), p. 6. It should be noted that it was not only in Okinawa
where cases of the civil rights of SDF members being violated.
For example, in March 1969, three SDF members were not
allowed to take the entrance exam for Tokyo Metropolitan
University (Tōkyō Toritsu Daigaku) due to pressure on school
officials by the Students’ Union. See Brendle, “Japan’s Ground
Self-
Defense Force, 1950–1970,” 70. Many other individual
members of the SDF have their own personal stories of violations
of their civil rights.
81. Kuwae, Ikusanga, p. 6.
82. Noro Kyō ichi, Akasaka Kyūchome Nanbanchi: Bōei Seimu Jikan
no Memo (Tokyo: Nagata Shobō , 1972), pp. 61–87.
83. Matsukawa Kunio, Jieitai ni Hantai Suru Okinawa (Naha:
Shuppan Daiei, 1980), pp. 148–151.
84. Yamaguchi, “Briefing Memorandum,” p. 4. For more, see
Matthew Allen, “Wolves at the Door: Remembering the
Kumejima Massacres,” in Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds.,
Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and
American Power (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).
A Molotov cocktail, one of two attacks, was even thrown at the
Crown Prince and Princess when they came to visit Okinawa for
the July 1975 Ocean Expo. Although the activist (from
Kumamoto Prefecture), a member of the Okinawa Liberation
League, was arrested and spent time in jail, he later was elected to
the Nago City Assembly, working against the relocation of the
functions of a US air facility to Camp Schwab.
85. In 2014, the Ministry of Defense hired 246 young men and
women from Okinawa, higher than the national average.
86. Kuwae, Ikusanga, pp. 63–75. As of the time of this writing in
mid-October 2016, the SDF had airlifted 9000 patients.
87. The accident happened on February 17, 1990, when a GSDF
aircraft crashed on the way to Miyako Island. A memorial for the
lost personnel, which is located at Camp Naha, was built some
years later in October 2002 by the Okinawa Prefecture Outer
Islands Promotion Council (Okinawaken Ritō Shinkō Kyōgikai).
178 R.D. ELDRIDGE
88. Interview with Kaneko Masashi, former public affairs official,

15th Brigade, by e-mail, October 9, 2014. The pilot, sadly and
ironically, was from the community where the crash occurred.
Due to inclement weather, they could not land at the designated
site, and knowing of another location nearby, he tried there only
to get disoriented in the fog.
89. Kuwae, Ikusanga, pp. 85–95. As of the time of this writing in
mid-May 2015, the GSDF has handled more than 35,120 unex-
ploded bombs or pieces of ordinance.
90. In FY 2013, for example, the SDF recruited 246 personnel from
within Okinawa, substantially higher than the national average.
Ministry of Defense personnel in Okinawa admitted to the author
that there was much “affirmative action” involved. See “Heisei
25 Nendo Jieitai Okinawaken Saiyō Yoteisha Gekireikai: Okinawa
Kara Kokubō o Ninau Wakaki Seiei 246 Mei,” Okinawa Gurafu,
No. 626 (May 2015), pp. 42–43.
91. John K. Emmerson, The Japanese Dilemma: Arms, Yen, and
Power (New York: The Dunellen Publishing Company, 1971),
p. 45.
92. Emmerson, The Japanese Dilemma, p. 146, and Maeda, The
Hidden Army, p. 143.
95. Bōei Hakusho 1976, Chap. 2.
96. After leaving his career in the Home Ministry (including serving
as the Vice Minister of the Defense Agency) and running success-
fully for the Upper House in the June 1957, Masuhara was
appointed Director General in July 1971, and again in July 1972.
97. For more on this incident see, Kenneth J. Ruoff, The People’s
Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945–1995
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001),
pp. 113–117, and Iwami Takao, Heika no Goshitsumon: Shōwa
Tennō to Sengo Seiji (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 2005), pp. 86–88.
98. William R. Slomanson, “Judicial Review of War Renunciation in
the Naganuma Nike Case: Juggling the Constitutional Crisis in
Japan,” Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 9, Issue 1
(December 1975), pp. 24–49.
99. For more on this theme, see Sase Masamori, Mushiro Shirōto no
Hō ga Yoi: Bōeichō Chōkan Sakata Michita ga Nashitogeta Seisaku
no Daitenkan (Tokyo: Shinchō Sensho, 2014).
100. Sakata Michita with Nagachi Masanao, Bunkyō no Hata o Agete:

Sakata Michita Bunsho (Fukuoka: Nishinihon Shimbun, 1992),
p. 188.
101. Sakata, Chiisakutemo Ō kina Yakuwari, p. 39.
102. Sase, Mushiro Shirōto, pp. 21–24.
104. This approach was eventually adopted by the National Defense
Council on November 5, 1976. Sase, Mushiro Shirōto, pp. 40–46.
105. Bō ei o Kangaeru Kai Jimukyoku, ed., Waga Kuni no Bōei o
Kangaeru (Tokyo Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1975).
106. Sakata Michita with Nagachi Masanao, Bunkyō no Hata o Agete,
p. 194. Kubo’s paper, nicknamed the “K.B. Thesis,” is found in
Kubo Takuya, Kubo Takuya Ikō Tsuitōshū (Tokyo: Kubo Takuya
Ikō Tsuitō shū Kankō kai, 1981), pp. 58–86.
107. “Natsume Haruo Oral History Transcript No. 5,” The U.S-Japan
Program Oral History Series, The National Security Archive,
George Washington University, 1999, p. 9. Natsume’s colleague
added that it was “unpopular” as it “focused too much on
détente.” See “Maruyama Ko Oral History Transcript No. 2,”
The U.S-Japan Program Oral History Series, The National Security
Archive, George Washington University, 1999, p. 21.
108. Sakata Michita with Nagachi Masanao, Bunkyō no Hata o Agete,
pp. 195–196.
109. Sase, Mushiro Shirōto, p. 138.
110. Sase, Mushiro Shirōto, p. 100.
111. Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 1977, p. 50.
117. John Barron, MiG Pilot: The Final Escape of Lieutenant Belenko
(New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1980), pp. 108, 111–112.
118. Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 1977, pp. 125–140.
119. Ō koda Yahiro, Kita no Daichi o Mamorite 50 Nen: Sengo Nihon
no Hoppō Jūshi Senryaku (Tokyo: Kaya Shobō , 2005), p. 290.
120. Ō koda, Kita no Daichi, pp. 288–290.
121. Ō koda, Kita no Daichi, p. 292.
122. The 11th Division was downsized to a brigade in March 2008.
180 R.D. ELDRIDGE
123. Ō koda, Kita no Daichi, p. 293.

125. A recently declassified US memo prepared on the eve of the sec-
retary of defense’s visit to Japan showed that the US side was also
interested in finding out Sakata’s thinking. See “Memorandum
for General Scowcroft from Jay Taylor on Schlesinger’s Visit to
Tokyo, August 28, 1975,” NSA Presidential Country Files for
East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Folder: Japan (2), Gerald R. Ford
Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA.
126. The SCC, known today as the “two-plus-two,” was established as
a result of the 1960 bilateral security treaty.
128. A senior JDA official lamented that “at the start of the SDC meet-
ings, we were interested in providing a venue for the discussion of
the U.S-Japan military affairs, but after the ‘Guidelines’ were com-
pleted, the SDC fell into relative disuse. It was like it went out of
business just after it opened up. I was very dissatisfied about that.”
See “Maruyama Ko Oral History Transcript No. 2,” p. 36. It was
likely the fear of this, and the lack of clear legislation, that led Chief
of Staff of the Joint Staff Council, Kurisu Hiroomi, a GSDF four-
star General, to comment to a reporter for a weekly tabloid (Shūkan
Posuto) that the SDF would have to take certain extra-legal actions
in the event of an emergency. His comments caused a sensation and
were seen as a challenge to civilian control. He was immediately
relieved by Defense Agency Director General Kanemaru Shin. See
Kanemaru Shin, Waga Taikenteki Bōeiron: Omoiyari no Nichibei
Anpo Shinjidai (Tokyo: Eeru Shuppansha, 1979), Chap. 6.
130. Previously, the GSDF was given access to the 88.09 km2 facility
by the US military in 1959.
131. Ernest G. Beinhart, III, “The United States Marine Corps and
the Japan Self-Defense Force: An Outline Study in Bilateral
Military Relations,” Unpublished paper for the Command Staff
College, 1985.
132. Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1983, 219. Following the rever-
sion of Okinawa in 1972, IX Corps had transferred from Okinawa
and collocated with Headquarters, US Army, Japan to form
Headquarters, US Army, Japan/IX Corps, at Camp Zama.
134. Bō ei Nenkan Kankō Kyō kai, ed., Bōei Nenkan (Tokyo: Bō ei
Nenkan Kankō Kyō kai, 1989), p. 49. In contrast, the ASDF,
which did not conduct any official bilateral drills with the US Air
Force until 1978, when it did three, was conducting thirteen
bilateral exercises in 1985.
135. Cited by interviewer in “Maruyama Ko Oral History Transcript
No. 2,” p. 27.
136. Asahi Shimbun Jieitai 50 Nen Shuzaihan, ed., Jieitai Shirarezaru
Henyō (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2005), p. 288.
137. Asahi Shimbun Jieitai 50 Nen Shuzaihan, ed., Jieitai Shirarezaru
Henyō, pp. 283–288.
138. Hayashi Shigeo, ed., Zenbun Mitsuya Sakusen Kenkyū: Yūji Taisei
Shiriizu, 2 (Tokyo: Banseisha, 1979), pp. 12–14.
139. Noguchi Hiroyuki, “Miyanaga Supai Jiken no Shinsō ,” Waarudo
Interijensu (Tokyo: Japan Military Review, 2006). Also see
Maeda, The Hidden Army, pp. 239–240.
140. In order to strengthen Japan’s ability to protect secrets, the Abe
Shinzō Cabinet approved the Act on the Protection of Specially
Designated Secrets (Tokutei Himitsu no Hogo ni kansuru Hōritsu)
in October 2013. The Special Secrecy Law, as it is otherwise
known, went into effect in December 2014. A provisional transla-
tion is available at: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tokuteihimitsu/
gaiyou_en.pdf (accessed April 2015). The Defense Ministry des-
ignated 247 secrets, the most among Japanese government bod-
ies. See “382 State Secrets Designated by Gov[ernmen]t Bodies,”
Japan News, January 9, 2015.
141. Iokibe, The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan, pp. 147–148.
143. Iwashima Hisao, “Recent Defense Debates in Japan,” in Rei

Shiratori, Japan in the 1980s (Tokyo: Kō dansha, 1982), p. 100.
144. Iwashima, “Recent Defense,” p. 100.
145. Iwashima, “Recent Defense,” p. 101.
146. Norman D. Levin, Mark Lorell, and Arthur Alexander, The Wary
Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese Security Policies (Santa
Monica: Rand, 1993), p. 43.
147. Levin, et al., The Wary Warriors, p. 43.
150. Levin, et al., The Wary Warriors, pp. 45–46.
CHAPTER 5
The GSDF During the Post-Cold War Years,

1989–2015
Giuseppe A. Stavale1
Introduction
This chapter introduces a period of steady transformation for the Ground
Self-Defense Force (GSDF) and increasing transparency by the Japanese
government toward modernizing its defense capabilities to meet new chal-
lenges amid a rapidly changing domestic political and foreign affairs con-
text. The twenty-five years from 1989 to 2014 have been marked by major
developments and changes in international relations, and, in particular, to
the security environment in Northeast Asia. While the Cold War is said
to have ended in 1989 in Europe, its remnants in East Asia are still very
apparent. Moreover, traditional threats in the international arena, repre-
sented early on by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990, re-
emerged once again, as did civil wars and other state-to-state conflicts, and
non-traditional threats and new asymmetric challenges, such as terrorism,
have further complicated international society.
Japan entered this period with its GSDF focused on preventing a
Soviet land invasion of Hokkaido. After the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991, Japan’s attention was redirected toward the emerging menace
G.A. Stavale (*)

United States Marine Corps,
Arlington County, VA, USA

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8_5
184 G.A. STAVALE
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s Taepodong

missiles and nuclear weapons program, as well as the challenges from
a rising China whose intentions are unclear and a defense budget that
lacks transparency.2 Moreover, Japan’s territorial disputes with all of its
neighbors remain far from resolved and a constant source of political,
diplomatic, and increasingly frequent military concern. These disputes,
in turn, evoke bitter and deep-rooted memories and emotional responses
from its neighbors, particularly the peoples (often led by the govern-
ments) of Republic of Korea (ROK) and the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), due to the “history problem,” or Japan’s alleged failure to come
to terms with its aggression in World War II. Compounding the secu-
rity challenges for Japan is global terrorism. Immediately following the
events of September 11, 2001, the Japanese nation was sufficiently con-
vinced under the leadership of the charismatic Prime Minister Koizumi
Junichirō , the son of a former Director General of the Defense Agency,
to take proactive, preventative action at home and participate in both
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, initially,
but eventually withdrew from both these efforts in 2007 and 2006
respectively. And in the realm of international terrorism, the Japanese
nation was rocked by the killing of ten Japanese in a terrorist-related
hostage incident in January 2013 in Algeria, followed by another being
taken hostage in Syria in August 2014.
However complex, the regional security environment alone was not,
and still is not, the only contributing factor toward shaping Japan’s
defense policy and the GSDF. Other events and issues that have shaped
the GSDF include the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s
and the ten-year straight declining defense budget from 2002 to 2012,
peacekeeping operations (PKO) and humanitarian assistance, domestic
and international pressure for greater participation by Japan in inter-
national security, domestic politics, and close cooperation with the US
military, especially the growing relationship with the US Marine Corps
and its assistance with developing joint operations and amphibious
capabilities.
This chapter examines this path and is divided into two major parts.
The first section examines the development of the GSDF in the 1990s.
The second section examines the impact of 9/11 and other developments
from 2001 until 2015.
THE GSDF DURING THE POST-COLD WAR YEARS, 1989–2015 185
The GSDF in the 1990s

Until the end of the Cold War, Japan was concerned about a Soviet attack
from the north into Hokkaido. Accordingly, the GSDF was trained,
equipped, and organized to meet that threat, along with the support of
US forces. In 1990, the GSDF had 156,100 personnel of its authorized
end-strength of 180,000 or 86.7% staffing rate3 and was still organized
into five regional armies much as it had been since 1960 (as described in
the previous chapter; Figs. 4.1 and 4.2).
Since the Northern Army was the GSDF’s main effort and key to
blocking a Soviet invasion into Hokkaido in the north, its only armored
division, the 7th Division, was under the command of the Commanding
General of the Northern Army along with three other infantry divisions.
Until then, the 7th Division and the Northern Army monopolized the
Ground Staff Office’s attention and modernization efforts.
Fig. 5.1 1990 composition and disposition of the Japan GSDF’s five regional
armies and fourteen districts. Source: Figure created by Giuseppe A. Stavale
186 G.A. STAVALE
Basic Units 12 Infantry Divisions

2 Combined Brigades
Mobile units available in general 1 Armored Division
support 1 Artillery Brigade
1 Airborne Brigade
1 Training Brigade
1 Helicopter Brigade
Low-altitude ground-to-air missile 8 Antiaircraft Artillery
Units Groups
Fig. 5.2 1990 GSDF’s core units. Note: Figure created by Giuseppe A. Stavale
from defense of Japan 1990
The Type-61 Tank and highly agile and maneuverable Type-74 Tank
were the two types of tanks in the Northern Army’s inventory.4 Beginning
in Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 1990, the new Type-90 Tank, the counter to
the Soviet T-80 Tank,5 debuted for duty. Meanwhile, the Type-74 Tank
continued to replace all Type-61 Tanks. As of 2014, most of the Northern
Army’s units have been modernized with the newer Type-90 tank.6
By 1990, the GSDF had obtained other significant equipment items
(as part of the modernization efforts from 1986 to 1990) including the
203 mm self-propelled howitzer and the 155 mm FH70 towed howitzer.
Also, the fielding of AH-1S anti-tank (AT) helicopters continued in 1990.7
For the GSDF by 1990, the JFY 1986–1990 MTDP and the January
24, 1987, Security Council of Japan decision regarding defense expen-
ditures in support of the JFY 1976 National Defense Program Outline
(NDPO) and MTDP translated into the following numerical capabilities
for the GSDF.
Triggers and Conditions for Change

The GSDF was unable, however, to maintain the structure, composition,
and funding that had sustained them during the Cold War. To understand
how and why the GSDF evolved during this period of great change, it is
important to briefly examine the following key events leading up to this
era that set the conditions for change.
nd of the Cold War
E
Perhaps the first major sign of the changing times that would affect
defense policy and impact the GSDF was the end of the Cold War. With
this, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, there were strong
calls within the United States, which also was struggling economically,
to realize a “peace dividend” and make plans for a fairly rapid reduction
in US forces in Japan and the region. However, serious discussion about
the future of the Self-Defense Force (SDF)—its roles and composition—
was absent.
ursting of the Bubble Economy

B
The post-World War II period of high economic growth, which later
became the “bubble economy” in the latter 1980s, began to lose air
quickly starting in 1989, due in part to its inflated real estate market and
troubled banking system whose unaddressed origins were apparent earlier
in the decade if not before. While the government-led economy served
Japan well in the postwar years, it failed to adapt and modernize with an
ever complex and changing global economy. Many economists agree that
the Japanese “bubble economy” ended in 1990, but it took a few more
years for the government to acknowledge it which occurred on January
29, 1993, by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi.8
ersian Gulf Crisis and War

P
In 1990–1991, the Government of Japan (GOJ) was busy finding solu-
tions to domestic issues regarding its banking system and rapidly slowing
economy. In the meantime, a swiftly changing international environment
with the end of the Cold War followed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
in August 1990 threatened the global economy. As a modern, developed
nation with the second largest economy in the world at that time and a
member of the G-7, Japan—highly dependent on the Middle East for its
oil and other natural resources—was expected to act as a global leader,
but did not recognize the historic moment and its international obliga-
tions. With the world unfamiliar with Japan’s unique defense and security
policies, rooted in the restrictions of Article 9 of its postwar Constitution,
the international community criticized Japan’s contributions (essentially
limited to the financial realm) to the coalition effort to liberate Kuwait
and stabilize the Middle East.
imits of the Japanese Constitution

L
Instead of receiving appreciation from the international community for
its massive $13 billion contribution toward liberating Kuwait, Japan was
criticized for practicing “checkbook diplomacy” and was accused of not
sharing the burden of the rest of the international community by put-
188 G.A. STAVALE
ting its own personnel at risk and into harm’s way.9 As a result, a shocked
Japanese public and its leadership began to increasingly pay closer atten-
tion to defense and security issues and a new wave of discussions on its
constitutional limits was born.10 The debate mainly focused on how Japan
could participate more in handling and participating in resolving interna-
tional crises commensurate to its economic power. For the first time in
many years the phrases, “restrictions of the American-authored Japanese
Constitution” and “amend Article 9,”11 resonated not only with a greater
portion of the Japanese populace but also in many corners of the world.
eace Dividend and US Force Reductions

P
The peace dividend refers to military budget cuts made by the US gov-
ernment as a result of the lessening of tensions with the end of the Cold
War. The cuts made had little impact on the overall capabilities of US
forces based in Japan. Although there were some reductions in US assets
that were considered redundant or antiquated, the result was by-and-large
transparent. The Japanese public quickly realized that the new world order
introduced new threats and illuminated risks to Japan’s security which was
not publicly well known during the Cold War. Richard F. Kaufman dis-
cusses that Japan had already enjoyed a peace dividend after World War
II which continued after it adopted the policy of spending no more than
1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for defense in 1976, a principle
which continues today.12 Although the bursting of the bubble economy
has caused Japan to steadily cut defense spending, its large economy has
enabled Japan to make reforms for the GSDF. Whether or not Japan has
and is still experiencing a post-Cold War peace dividend may be an issue
that is subject to perspective, but the fact is that Japan remains able to
maintain low defense spending vis-à-vis its GDP due to the US–Japan
Security Treaty and the presence of American forces.
Participation in Resolving International Problems

Pressured to answer calls from the international community to do more
in resolving international challenges, Japan rather quickly committed itself
to participate in United Nations-sanctioned PKO which were welcomed
by the world. In late 1991, under the sponsorship of Ozawa Ichirō , the
then-Secretary-General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a
bill titled “Concerning Cooperation for the United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations and Other Operations”13 received the support of the majority
of the Diet, including the LDP, the New Komeitō (Clean Government)
Party, and the Democratic Socialist Party, and became law on June 15,
1992 (going into force in August of that year).14 Ozawa used the Japanese
Constitution as the premise for authorizing Japanese resources such as
the SDF to be used in UNPKO, citing the preamble, “we shall secure
for ourselves and our prosperity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with
all nations.” After becoming law, it was referred to as the “International
Peace Cooperation Law (Kokusai Heiwa Kyōr yokuhō),” but would become
better known as the “PKO Law” for PKO.15 The PKO Law gave the “legal
authority for the SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping operations.”16
The law authorized the government to deploy elements of the SDF to par-
ticipate in only logistical endeavors during PKO. Any action above logisti-
cal support requires special measures legislation from the Diet.
According to the GOJ, the law requires all of the following five condi-
tions to be met before authorization of a contingent of SDF personnel can
be made by the Diet:
. A ceasefire must be in place.

1
2. The parties to the conflict must have given their consent to the
operation.
3. The activities must be conducted in a strictly impartial manner.
4. Participation may be suspended or terminated if any of the “above
conditions ceases to be satisfied.
5. Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to pro-
tect life or person of the personnel.17
The Cabinet obtained Diet approval to exercise this new author-

ity and made its first contribution with a deployment of three civilian
electoral observers to Angola in support of the United Nations Angola
Verification Mission (UNAVEM) II, which was a short one-month
deployment from September to October 1992. These observers moni-
tored polling stations and watched for any violations during the electoral
process.18 Simultaneously, Japan’s next contribution was with the first use
of SDF personnel in Cambodia in support of United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The GSDF along with other SDF and
government personnel were committed to a one-year deployment. The
GSDF’s main contribution was engineers who conducted road repairs,
various infrastructure developments, and other logistical support. Sixteen
190 G.A. STAVALE
SDF personnel participated in ceasefire-monitoring operations. A total of

1216 Japanese personnel participated in UNTAC from September 1992
to September 1993, with the overwhelming majority being GSDF per-
sonnel. Since 1992, Japan has participated in a total of thirteen actual
UNPKO with civilian police, business leaders, SDF personnel, and other
government officials. Including UNTAC, the GSDF has participated in
most of these operations and other international humanitarian assistance
efforts.19
The PKO Law has also enabled the Japanese government to participate
in international disaster relief operations to which the GSDF has partici-
pated in about half of the fourteen international disaster relief operations
Japan has participated in since 1998. The first for Japan and the GSDF was
in 1994 in Rwanda assisting refuges with logistical support such as medi-
cal and water supplies.20 The most recent SDF deployment in support of
disaster relief operations has been to the Philippines in response to dam-
age created by Super Typhoon Haiyan, which devastated parts of Samar,
Leyte, Cebu, Negros, Panay, and Masbate Islands as it ripped across the
Philippines on November 8, 2013, leaving thousands dead.
Tensions and Threats to Regional Stability

In 1994, another international event occurred which would have long-
lasting consequences for the security of Japan and the shaping of the
GSDF—the discovery of nuclear weapons development in the DPRK. It
was discovered that the DPRK was using a former Soviet-provided power
reactor at Yongbyon to enrich uranium for making plutonium for nuclear
weapons. In May 1994, the reactor was shut down and about 8000 fuel
rods were removed, due to some unaccounted material and the time
involved, there was unconfirmed suspicion in the international commu-
nity at that time that the DPRK possibly made one or two nuclear bombs.
The mounting tensions were eased with a breakthrough in the 1994
US–North Korea Agreed Framework brokered on October 21 through
diplomatic efforts led by the United States and the ROK. The Agreed
Framework provided nuclear control provisions, energy, and economic
and diplomatic concessions for the struggling communist state. Mainly,
the construction of two light water nuclear reactors which would be
coordinated by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
(KEDO) which was established by the Clinton Administration and the
governments of South Korea, Japan, and other countries in March 1995.
Additionally, the United States agreed to provide the DPRK 500,000

metric tons of heavy oil annually until the first of the two light water reac-
tors becomes operational. Furthermore, full diplomatic recognition would
be established between the United States and the DPRK and barriers to
trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications ser-
vices and financial transactions would be significantly reduced according
to the Agreed Framework.21
Japan’s initial and correct estimation of this situation was with respect
to the ability of the DPRK to develop its missile technology and therefore
have a way to deliver a weapon of mass destruction. With its close prox-
imity to the Korean peninsula, Japan was concerned about the develop-
ment of the Nodong 1 (otherwise known as Rodong 1) missile, which was
based on Scud technology and has a range of about 1000 kilometers and
estimate to be able to carry up to a 1000 kilogram warhead. The DPRK
had a single successful test in 1993 in the Sea of Japan (launched toward
Japan) and has sold this technology to Pakistan who has improved on this
technology with their Hatf 5 (Ghauri 1 and 2)22 missiles with ranges of
1300 and 2000 kilometers.23 With the test-launch of the Taepodong bal-
listic missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean in August 1998, Japan
starting to pay more attention to a potentially nuclear-armed DPRK which
still harbored deep-seated distrust and resentment toward Japan for its
colonial period.
In mid-1995, another incident raised tensions in Northeast Asia,
this time between China and Taiwan which has become known as the
1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis. Preceding the 1995–1996 missile
crisis, the USS Kitty Hawk was deployed to the Far East as a result of the
1994 crisis involving the DPRK as part of stabilization efforts in Northeast
Asia when on October 27, 1994, a Chinese Han-class nuclear attack sub-
marine was observed by an American anti-submarine aircraft in the Yellow
Sea in international waters, about 100 nautical miles west of Kyūshū. The
incident escalated when Chinese fighter aircraft were launched to i ntercept
the American aircraft. Although the Chinese submarine broke contact
after three days of high tensions and uncertainty, the animosity lingered.
Then, in June 1995, the US government granted Taiwan’s President
Lee Teng-hui a visa to enter the United States for the purpose of visit-
ing Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. This irritated Beijing, which
viewed this as Washington’s way of encouraging Taiwan to distance itself
from China and to challenge the “One China” arrangement. China
responded with numerous live fire exercises, redeployment of aircraft and
192 G.A. STAVALE
troops close to the Chinese coast, and most concerning were the three
missile “tests,” the last round being between March 8–15, 1996, and
within 20–25 nautical miles of Keelung and one of the world’s busiest
ports—Kaohsuing. In the midst of China’s aggressive demonstration of
force, the United States answered in an attempt to check China’s increas-
ing posturing by first deploying the USS Nimitz Battle Group and then
the Japan-based USS Independence Battle Group from the US Seventh
Fleet home-ported in Yokosuka Naval Base. China’s actions did little to
dissuade Taiwan which in March 1996 held direct elections for president;
Lee won by a majority vote.24
The Japan Defense Agency sought to not agitate the situation. However,
Japan had been monitoring nuclear-armed China’s incremental military
modernization efforts for the few years leading up to this crisis and was
suspicious of China’s lack of transparency and motives.25 Furthermore,
Japan grew increasingly concerned of China’s territorial claims to the
Senkaku Islands, historically administered by Japan, and other islands such
as the Spratly and Parcel islands claimed by other countries such as the
Philippines, Vietnam, and others. This crisis motivated Japan to check
China’s ability to assert its claims on the Senkaku Islands through the
1995 NDPO and to join the United States on calling on China to become
more open and forthcoming with its defense policy and spending.
Japan’s dispute with China regarding the Senkaku Islands, which began
in the early 1970s, and the Exclusive Economic Zone attached with its
ownership was thought to be partially resolved in 2008 with the agree-
ment of establishing a joint-development zone.26 However, this would
not be the case as maritime incidents and China’s establishment of a new
Air Defense Identification Zone on November 23, 2013, has heightened
tensions over control of the Senkakus between Japan and China. Aside
from this issue, Japan is involved in other notable territorial disputes with
key neighbors such as Russia (Northern Territories) and South Korea
(Takeshima Islands).
The problem of the Northern Territories involves the southern islands
of the Kurile Island Chain and nuclear-armed Russia. The disputed islands
are Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu. It is for this reason that
since the end of World War II, Japan and Russia do not have a peace treaty.
These islands are surrounded by rich fishing areas, and for perspective,
Etorofu would be the fifth largest island for Japan, after the four main
islands of Japan. Furthermore, Kunashiri is larger than Okinawa. The cur-
rent total population of the four disputed islands is 16,800, with 7000 on
Etorofu, 6600 on Kunashiri, 3200 on Shikotan, and zero on Habomai.

Total land area is 5036 kilometers. Etorofu is mountainous and Kunashiri
has a few prominent mountains.27
In the 1956, Japan–Soviet Union Joint Declaration, the Soviet Union
had agreed to “hand over” the two islands of Habomai and Shikotan.
Japan refused this and to entering into a peace treaty because it would
not resolve the matter since Japan wanted the return of all four islands.
Since nothing was resolved at that time, the Soviet Union had refused to
acknowledge this declaration starting around 1960. The 1991 “special
visa-waiver program” between Japan and Russia is perhaps the most sub-
stantive action taken to date. Other significant communiqués and declara-
tions that have occurred between the two nations, specifically about the
territorial dispute, were in 1991, 1993, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2003,
2005, 2006, and 2007.
The 1993 Tokyo Declaration is perhaps the single key moment in the
annuals of this long-standing dispute due to both nations agreeing to
enter into a peace treaty by resolving this issue, and marked the first time
the two nations publicly declared to deal with this issue since 1956.28 In
President Boris Yeltsin’s October 1993 Tokyo visit, he stated that half the
troops stationed on the disputed islands had already been redeployed out
with plans to remove the remaining half except for border guards.29 The
1993 Tokyo Declaration is often referenced by the Japanese government.
Japan’s current policy is that the four aforementioned islands were histori-
cally part of Japan and demand there immediate return. Japan has no cur-
rent claims on southern Sakhalin or other northern islands of the Kurile
Island Chain.30 As of 2009, one division, or about 3500 Russian ground
forces, are stationed in the disputed islands.31 This is a considerable change
from the estimated one division of comprised troops and forty MiG-23s
stationed there in 1990.32
omestic Challenges Shaping the GSDF

D
These regional concerns in no small measure influenced policy makers
within the Defense Agency and the Cabinet to transform and modernize
the GSDF in order to mitigate threats and pressure from regional nuclear
powers.33 There were also other sources of influence that shaped the 1995
NDPO and the GSDF which cannot be overlooked. On September 4,
1995, three US service members abducted and raped a twelve-year-old girl
as she exited a book store in Kin Village, host to Camp Hansen in northern
Okinawa. This criminal incident, which shook the US–Japan relationship,
194 G.A. STAVALE
was met by a wave of Okinawan outrage not seen in decades and led to the
establishment of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), to
find ways to lessen the US military “footprint” and its impact on the small
island and Japan’s 47th prefecture. The committee produced a report
which has come to be known as the “SACO Final Report” on December
2, 1996, which called for a variety of training-related mitigation measures
and the return/relocation of bases and functions.34 Although most of the
initiatives were completed without impact to the GSDF, SACO and the
2002–2006 Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) would adjust the US
force laydown in Japan based on the capabilities and restrictions of the
GSDF and entire SDF.
Also in 1995, natural and man-made disasters challenged the GSDF and
highlighted the absolute need in reforms in order to provide humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief and responding to acts of terror at home. At
5:46 a.m. on January 17, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake occurred
devastating the city of Kō be. The tremor lasted 11 seconds and registered
6.9 on the Richter scale. Over 6000 people were killed and many more
were injured and left homeless. All roads were damaged, almost half of all
bridges were damaged, and 85% of all 345 schools were damaged. Old
wooden structures suffered the most damage, main gas and telephone
lines were cut which caused many fires and prohibited the concentration
of first responders to places where they could have had some effect. Main
water lines were cut, rail and subway lines were all damaged, and it was
the largest damage Japan Railways (JR) suffered in its history. JR’s whole
rail system in the area was severely damaged including pillars that broke in
nine points on the bullet train’s (Shinkansen) infrastructure. Six hundred
meters of the Hanshin Expressway collapsed as eighteen pillars broke.
Rokkō and Port Islands, both man-made, experienced liquefaction and
Rokkō Island actually flooded. During this earthquake, fifty-nine fires ini-
tially broke out which eventually climbed to 109 fires.35
All elements of national power were used to provide immediate relief to
the earthquake victims and to search for survivors and rescue victims. The
GSDF participated with thousands of personnel from the Middle Army’s
3rd, 10th, and 13th Divisions, and the 2nd Combined Brigade and
contributed the bulk of the total SDF mobilization of 26,000 personnel.36
The initial tasks were to execute aerial reconnaissance, search and rescue
operations, recovery of the dead, transport of wounded persons, medical
support, transport essential relief goods, installation and maintenance of
tents and bathing facilities, and other sanitary support.37 As the operations
progressed, GSDF personnel participated in various degrees of engineer-
ing complexity-related restoration activities. The operation ended on April
27, 1995.38
Over the past few years, the SDF in coordination with local officials
had been coordinating, exercising, and planning for disaster response
with a focus on an earthquake occurring in the densely populated Tokai
region and the South Kantō Plain focusing on Tokyo, Saitama, Chiba, and
Kanagawa Prefectures. The Eastern Army takes this issue extremely seri-
ously as Tokyo and other major economic centers and densely populated
cities are within its area of responsibility. The Eastern Army’s efforts are
serious and intense concerning disaster relief preparedness for emergen-
cies in Japan. As such, the Eastern Army regularly participates in official
information exchange and coordination meetings annually with other
government agencies and, civil organizations along with local and prefec-
tural governments. Some of the other disaster relief stakeholders include
the Japan Meteorological Agency, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport, and Tourism, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology, and Tokyo Metropolitan Government among
others. Additionally, the Eastern Army officially participates in at least two
annual drills with these agencies demonstrating a keen commitment to
planning and preparation.
In the early morning rush hour of March 20, 1995, five members of
the Aum Shinrikyō , a religious cult group, released sarin gas which it
had produced into multiple trains of four subway lines in Tokyo, expos-
ing nearly 5000 people to the deadly gas. The GSDF was requested by
the National Police Agency and by the governors of Tokyo Metropolis
and Chiba Prefecture for assistance and dispatched liaison officers special-
ized in chemical warfare from the Ground Staff Office to the National
Police Agency and another forty to various hospitals and medical facili-
ties. Furthermore, the Eastern Army’s 1st and 12th Divisions and 101st
Chemical Protection Unit based in Ō miya City, Saitama Prefecture,
deployed chemical protection platoons. Their mission was to detect and
decontaminate the subway stations affected. Including GSDF personnel, a
total of 200 SDF personnel participated in this response.39
Twelve people died and over 5000 were injured in the sarin attack.40
Since this experience, Japan has recognized the need to maintain the capa-
bility to react to and deal with a chemical, biological, and radiological
threat for use at home whether it is for a domestic criminal/terrorist or
196 G.A. STAVALE
foreign threat. Other events such as the anthrax threat of 2001 in the
United States underscored the need for this critical capability which lies
within the GSDF.
he Start of Significant Reforms

T
Although the Cold War ended and the amount of former Soviet forces
stationed in Northeast Asia began to wane along with tensions, Japan’s
defense capability and the GSDF had been steadily maturing under the
1976 NDPO and the 1978 Defense Guidelines, which in concert with the
security arrangements established with the United States, were designed
to meet the threats in a Cold War context. However, as the international
and domestic environment transformed, Japan slowly recognized that the
direction established by these Cold War era defense arrangements was not
addressing the threats, needs, and expectations of the present and fore-
seeable future. In this context, and considering advances in science and
technology and emerging domestic social issues such as lower birth rates
and the expanding aging population, the 1995 (JFY 1996) NDPO was
adopted by the Japanese Cabinet on November 28, 1995.
By maintaining a credible security arrangement with the United States,
the 1995 NDPO sought to upgrade and maintain a variety of functions
required for the defense of Japan while reaffirming to itself and regional
neighbors a balanced posture that maintained the minimum defense capa-
bility required to mitigate a military threat to Japan but in doing so, not
becoming a threat to other nations. The Japanese Security Council used
the following guiding principles in creating the 1995 NDPO:
1. Exclusively defense-oriented
2. Not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other
countries
3. Upholding civilian control
4. Adhering to the three non-nuclear principles
5. Maintaining firmly the Japan–US security arrangements41
At the core of the 1995 NDPO, Japan aimed to strengthen its defense
by preventing a direct attack or aggression against the Japanese homeland.
Furthermore, it recognized for the first time the need to establish capa-
bilities and mechanisms with the United States and the United Nations to
address threats to its security and interests in areas surrounding Japan or
“situations in areas surrounding Japan, (SIASJ)”. Additionally, the 1995
NDPO endeavored to institutionalize Japanese participation and coop-

eration with the United Nations and other international organizations
toward solving problems and providing aid in times of natural disaster and
other crises.
Specifically, for the GSDF, the 1995 NDPO required restructuring
from the Cold War posture of twelve infantry divisions and two combined
brigades to eight infantry divisions and six brigades. This was executed
by keeping the five regional army construct and their geographic areas of
responsibilities unchanged. Certain metrics were used to maintain divi-
sion or brigade strength and capabilities in the five regional armies and
various fourteen districts which defined each unit’s area of responsibility.
The 1995 NDPO maintained divisions adjacent to key water ways, such
as the Sō ya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima Straits. The highly populated politi-
cal and economic nerve centers of the Kantō and Kansai Regions received
priority, as did the districts that would immediately support these two
regions, such as Tō hoku, Tō kai, and Hokuriku districts, as well Kyūshū
considering the growing regional tensions and the desire to maintain a
credible deterrent force against threats to its outlying territorial areas. In
an effort to make the GSDF more efficient, lightweight, and mobile, more
brigades were created in eastern and central Hokkaido, Kō shinetsu, and
the Chūgoku regions, as well as maintaining the brigades in Shikoku and
Okinawa.42 See Fig. 4.3 for a comparison of division to brigade restructur-
ing in accordance with the 1995 NDPO.
The 1995 NDPO also reaffirmed the need to possess the capability for
maneuver units to support the GSDF and firmly seal any potential defense
gaps within the GSDF. These maneuver units include one armored divi-
sion, one helicopter brigade, and one airborne brigade. Furthermore, the
1995 NDPO reaffirmed the need to maintain its eight anti-aircraft artil-
lery groups in support of the GSDF air defense operations to include pro-
tection for Japan’s major political and economic cities.
Along with undertaking the restructuring of the GSDF by reshaping
four divisions into brigades, a little “fat” was trimmed in its force struc-
ture to the sum of 20,000 personnel. The 1995 NDPO directed GSDF
staffing levels from 180,000 personnel to 160,000 personnel of which
15,000 would be Ready Reserve Personnel (see Introduction). The Tables
of Organization (T/O) levels of GSDF brigades are comparable to US
Army or North Atlantic Treaty Organization member levels. The GSDF
average brigade T/O strength is 3000–4000 personnel. However, the
REGIONAL BEFORE 1995 NDPO THE 1995 NDPO DISTRICT
ARMY REQUIREMENTS
5th Infantry DIVISION 5th Infantry BRIGADE Obihro
Asahikawa
2nd Infantry Division 2nd Infantry Division (Central Hokkaido)
Makomanai
NORTHERN ARMY 11th Infantry DIVISION 11th Infantry BRIGADE (Eastern Hokkaido)
7th Armored Division 7th Armored Division Higashi-Chitose
9th Infantry Division 9th Infantry Division Aomori (Tohoku)
NORTH EASTERN
ARMY 6th Infantry Division 6th Infantry Division Jinmachi
12th Infantry DIVISION 12th Infantry BRIGADE Somagahara
EASTERN ARMY 1st Infantry Division 1st Infantry Division Nerima (Kanto)
Moriyama
10th Infantry Division 10th Infantry Division (Hokuriku & Tokai)
3rd Infantry Division 3rd Infantry Division Senzo (Kanto)
MIDDLE ARMY
13th Infantry DIVISION 13th Infantry BRIGADE Kaitaichi
2nd COMBINED Brigade 2nd COMBINED Brigade Zentsuji (Shikoku)
4th Infantry Division 4th Infantry Division Fukuoka
8th Infantry Division 8th Infantry Division Kita-Kumamoto
WESTERN ARMY
1st COMBINED Brigade 1st COMBINED Brigade Naha (Okinawa)
Narashino
Kisarazu
CENTRAL
Narashino
READINESS FORCE
Utsunomiga
Omiya
Asaka
Komakado
8 Infantry Divisions
12 Infantry Divisions 1 Armored Division
1 Armored Division 4 Infantry Brigades
TOTALS
2 Combined Brigades 2 Combined Brigades
4 Other Mobile Brigades 1 Airborne Brigade
Fig. 5.3 Comparison of division to brigade restructuring in accordance with the 1995
NDPO. Note: Compiled by Giuseppe A. Stavale from 1995 NDPO. Note that this
comparison of division to brigade restructuring is in accordance with the 1995 NDPO
average GSDF division T/O strength is 6000–9000 personnel, whereas

an average US Army division is about 15,000–20,000 personnel.
In regards to GSDF equipment, the 1995 NDPO put an emphasis on
leveraging technology and modernizing equipment. The record dem-
onstrates that the GSDF had much of its heavy equipment modernized
prior to the 1995 NDPO; however, an emphasis was put on capabilities
to meet the new and emerging challenges requiring new items ranging
from night vision goggles to better land mobility with the Light Armored
Vehicle and OH-1 observation helicopter among other items that were
obtained or improved. Air defense capability continued to be a focus of
effort considering the modernization of equipment and general procure-
ment. Additionally, the 1995 NDPO also reduced the number of tanks
and artillery pieces to a target of 900 each. This cut of 300 tanks and 100
artillery pieces was gradually achieved and synchronized with the transfor-
mation of divisions to brigades.
With the same law that put the GSDF Ready Reserve system into force
on March 26, 1998, the main logistics hubs of the GSDF were consoli-
dated and established the Ground Material Control Center (GMCC;
Rikujō Jieitai Hokyū Tōsei Honbu). This focus on equipment and logistics
cannot be overlooked as it is fundamental to enabling the GSDF to func-
tion efficiently and effectively. As the GSDF began to gradually expand
and mature its capability in the area of humanitarian assistance and disas-
ter relief so did its need to deploy and have self-sustaining logistics and
“reach-back” for resupply. A better logistical system was also needed from
their evolving experiences in UNPKO missions aboard, as Japan’s logisti-
cal capabilities were historically not designed for deployments overseas,
especially prolonged deployments. Prior to the consolidation, there were
ten logistical depots throughout Japan servicing the GSDF. After the ini-
tiative was complete, there was one control center, the GMCC in Camp
Jūjō managing five depots, one dedicated for each of the five regional
armies.
Other 1995 NDPO initiatives which impacted the GSDF was the
requirement to “possess a sophisticated command and communication
capability and be able to quickly and effectively conduct integrated defense
operations from a joint perspective.”43 As a result, on January 20, 1997, the
Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH; Bōeishō Jōhō Honbu) was estab-
lished through consolidation of the existing intelligence capabilities already
present within the Japan Defense Agency and all three services of the
SDF. The DIH was commanded by the then Joint Staff Council (JDC).44
200 G.A. STAVALE
The 1995 NDPO was the start of major reforms in the post-Cold
War era defense strategy of Japan and began to reshape and transform
the GSDF, a trend that continues into the new millennium. (See Fig.
5.4 for a ten-year progression of the implementation of GSDF force pos-
ture changes mandated by the 1995 NDPO.) The adoption of the 1995
NDPO was followed by the US–Japan Joint Declaration on Security in
April 1996 which resulted in both governments agreeing to review the
1978 Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation which has guided
the implementation of the security arrangements between both countries.
This effort concluded on September 23, 1997, with the 1997 Guidelines
for US–Japan Defense Cooperation, a document which was created with
the goal of providing an effective framework for building and maintain-
ing a credible relationship and to guide the policy for roles and missions
between the two nations. The 1997 Guidelines were created not only
for the implementation of forces for the conduct of operations during an
armed-attack against Japan, but, unlike the 1978 predecessor, the 1997
version also provided a framework for the relationship to strengthen dur-
ing normal, peacetime conditions, and also, and perhaps most significantly,
it addressed other contingencies such as humanitarian assistance and the
emerging threat of low intensity conflicts threatening Japan.
PROGRESSION OF GSDF RESTRUCTING GOALS BASED ON 1995 NDPO
31 March 31 March 31 March 31 March 31 March 31 March 31 March 31 March 31 March 31 March 31 March
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
TOTAL
DIVISIONS 13 13 13 13 13 11 11 11 11 10 10
(REGIONAL)
TOTAL
TARGET
BRIGADES 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 5 5
(REGIONAL)
ACTIVE-
DUTY 180,000 180,000 179,430 178,007 172,866 171,262 167,383 163,784 163,330 159,921 157,828
AUTHORIZED (151,155) (152,515) (152,371) (151,836) (145,928) (148,557) (148,676) (148,197) (148,226) (146,960) (147,737)
PERSONNEL
(ACTUAL)
READY
RESERVES 0 0 0 1,373 3,379 3,400 4,300 5,723 5,726 6,000 6,000
Fig. 5.4 Progression of GSDF restructuring goals based on 1995 NDPO. Note:

Compiled from various Japan ministry of defense sources
The 1997 Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation served as a

basis for the relationships between the GSDF, and the US Army, and the
US Marine Corps to significantly mature. Areas such as research in mis-
sile defense among other fields and exchanges with liaison officers have
gradually increased in frequency and substance under these guidelines.
Specifically, bilateral exercises increased in frequency as well as participa-
tion levels thereby improving interoperability and deterrence. To illustrate
how the relationship between the GSDF and its US military counter-
parts—Army and Marine Corps—matured under the 1997 Guidelines, in
JFY 1992, there were five GSDF-centric bilateral exercises with US Army
and Marine forces in which a total of 2910 GSDF forces participated and
2050 US forces participated (1150 Army, 900 Marines). In JFY 1997,
there were also five such exercises but with more participants—3940
GSDF personnel and 2700 US forces personnel—970 Marines and 1730
Army personnel. In JFY 2007, even with the US Army and Marine Corps
fully engaged in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan among other
worldwide obligations, there were eight GSDF-centric bilateral exercises
in which 5297 GSDF personnel participated and 2620 US forces person-
nel (2220 Army, 400 Marines). By JFY 2012, eight GSDF-centric bilateral
training events with the US Army and US Marine Corps in Japan and the
United States were sustained but with increasing numbers of participants
with approximately 6690 GSDF personnel and 5950 US Forces personnel
(2650 Army, 3300 Marines).45
The growing and deepening relationship between the GSDF and
its American counterparts continued into the twenty-first century. In
December 2001, the first Senior Level Seminar (SLS) was held in Tokyo
between senior GSDF general officers and senior US Marine Corps and
Army general officers and staff from US Forces Japan and Headquarters
US Pacific Command.46 This was the first of what has become a twice-
yearly event where senior officers from both nations exchange views and
shape the relationship between the GSDF and the US Marine Corps and
Army. Many initiatives are attributable to this forum and have advanced
the capabilities of the GSDF and produced positive results for the alli-
ance. For example, the first bilateral amphibious training event, Exercise
Iron Fist, in Coronado, California, in January 2006, involved the newly
created Western Army Infantry Regiment (WAiR), and elements of the
I MEF (based at Camp Pendleton, California) and the US Navy’s USS
Comstock.47 The purpose of the SLS is to promote mutual understanding
between the GSDF, US Army, and US Marine Corps and improve the
202 G.A. STAVALE
effectiveness of the US–Japan Alliance by providing a forum for senior-

level dialogue and relationship building. The Australian Army was added
as an observer at Japan’s request in the summer of 2011, attending the
meetings held in Honolulu (but not those in Japan).48
The steady maturation of the relationship between the GSDF and US
Forces yields on average about six annual bilateral exercises and training
events which are executed in Japan and the United States annually. Exercise
Yamasakura (YS) is the largest engagement between the GSDF and US
Army in Japan. Since the publishing of the 1997 Guidelines, these bilat-
eral engagements have increasingly allowed important relationships, under-
standing, and trust to deepen, especially between the GSDF and US Marine
Forces Japan and US Army Forces in Japan. All stakeholders have created
effective mechanisms and forums to exchange ideas and opinions and better
cooperate for the defense of Japan and the stability of Northeast Asia.
Two other significant shaping events or triggers of the decade impact-
ing the GSDF were the December 17, 1996, siege and hostage taking of
over 500 people at the Japanese ambassador’s residence in Lima, Peru,
and the August 1998 Taepodong ballistic missile launch over Japan and
into the Pacific Ocean by the DPRK demonstrating its rapid advancement
in missile technology.
The 1996 siege on the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima by
the terrorist group Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement was even-
tually suppressed by Peruvian soldiers four months later in April 1997.
One key outcome from this event is that it demonstrated to the GOJ
that it was near helpless to render aid to its citizens overseas. As such, the
Japanese government sought to increase capabilities within the SDF, such
as studying the merits of being able to conduct non-combatant evacuation
operations.
The 1998 launch of a Taepodong-I ballistic missile over Japan, equipped
with a solid-fuel third stage rocket and is believed to have had a range of
3100 miles, signaled the potential for the development of better Nodong
missile technology, and rattled Japan.49 The concern over this advance-
ment in technology reenergized Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense debate
and propelled Japan’s efforts past studies and discussions with the United
States and forward with tangible research, development, and procurement
with its ally and involved all elements of the SDF. Until then, Japan had
been ambivalent regarding its participation in Theater Missile Defense
research and development with the United States. The 1998 event so
incensed the Japanese public that it provided the legitimacy for the gov-
ernment to act on what was previously viewed as a theory and unsubstanti-

ated threat.50
The GSDF entered the 1990’s in a Cold War era posture and exited
the decade with a new outlook of the world. Moreover, the GSDF now
faced new expectations, not only from its countrymen, but perhaps
more so from the international community, such as through participa-
tion in PKO missions. The 1995 NDPO and the 1997 Guidelines began
to shape the GSDF and lay a foundation for more reforms to come in
the new millennium. By 2000, the GSDF had executed the 1996–2000
Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP), a five-year-long mechanism by
which resources are procured and programmed per the NDPO, and
began to shift its geographic threat priorities from the north to the
south and south-west.
9/11 and After: Toward a More Flexible, Joint,

and Responsive Force
The new millennium began rather quietly for the SDF, with the exception
of the move by the JDA and the respective headquarters of the Ground
Staff Office and its fellow service counterparts, back to Ichigaya from
Hinoki-chō , Roppongi, into new buildings and facilities in May 2000.
The events of September 11, 2001, however greatly impacted Japan and
the SDF as it energized the Japanese government to act with unusual
determination and speed, and pass legislation to provide for the protec-
tion of US military installations in Japan. This was accomplished by task-
ing the GSDF and its various armies that host United States Force, Japan
installations in their area of responsibility through Self-Defense Force
Law 81-2 (Guarding Operations) which was enacted by the Japanese
Diet and came into force on November 2, 2001.51
Although planned under the 1995 NDPO, the establishment of the
WAiR on May 27, 2002, had special meaning in a post-9/11 environment.
The WAiR is under the direct command and control of the Commanding
General, Western Army, in Camp Ainora. The WAiR was established for
the purpose of responding to island contingencies and has been in the
forefront within the GSDF to develop close relations with the US Marine
Corps and learn Marine-like capabilities. The WAiR has participated in
amphibious training and exercises with the US Marine Corps and Navy in
Coronado, California since 2006 in Exercise Iron Fist, and has also trained
204 G.A. STAVALE
in Guam and Southern California, the latter as a part of Exercise Dawn

Blitz, with their MSDF counterparts. 52
The US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 following
the 9/11 attacks also impacted Japan. The Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism
Special Measures Law (Tero Taisaku Tokubetsu Sochihō) which permitted
cooperation and support with other nations to prevent terrorist attacks
in late October 2001.53 Initially, support was delivered by the ASDF to
US forces, followed by the MSDF with refueling operations in the Indian
Ocean. Beginning in December 2003, the GOJ dispatched ground troops
overseas in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This was accomplished
through the passage of the Law concerning the Special Measures on
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Iraku Fukkō Shien
Tokubetsu Sochihō) by the Japanese Diet in July 2003.54 Although the
deployed SDF troops did not participate in combat operations and were
limited to Official Development Assistance (ODA) missions, it was the
first time any Japanese armed force had deployed overseas that was not a
UNPKO since World War II.
The environment was permissible in Japan for the government to take
these bold actions as there had been a wave of pride and patriotism which
was still in its infancy but took root prior to these events. For example,
in August 1999, the Diet had officially adopted the Hinomaru as the
national flag and the Kimigayo as the national anthem. Furthermore,
some traction was observed with the debate to amend or reinterpret
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution in the early to mid-2000s. The
incumbent Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō was popular and enjoyed
unprecedented support from the electorate. His bold leadership style,
flair for dramatics, determination to bring reform, and unabashed attitude
for being Japanese, as evidenced by his annual visits to the controversial
Yasukuni Shrine, he endeared himself to many countrymen who yearned
to be proud of being Japanese. Also, there was much to be said about the
close personal relationship Koizumi had with President George W. Bush
and their intersecting conservative views on regional threats, terrorism,
and the US–Japan alliance. Japan had learned from the 1990–1991 Gulf
War that the international community expected more than just funding
when dealing with an international crisis. An expectation had been formed
that called for more to be done by countries with the military and diplo-
matic strength, and economic resources. As such, the post 9/11 mood in
Japan enabled GOJ to “show the flag” and demonstrate its support and
willingness to shoulder the burden for international security and stability.
In January 2004, the first GSDF advance team departed for Iraq which
was followed with its first contingent of about 600 personnel of the 2nd
Division, Northern Army, from Asahikawa, Hokkaido, and led by Colonel
Banshō Kō ichirō .55 Liaison officers were assigned to Baghdad and Basra.
The Japanese government coordinated with the fledgling Iraqi govern-
ment and coalition forces to conduct ODA activities in the southeast
province of Muthanna and operated out of the capital of Samawah. The
main activities of the GSDF were medical care, water provision, and the
reconstruction of facilities and infrastructure. By carrying out these activi-
ties, the GSDF was able to create jobs and spur economic activity, and the
GSDF’s work was generally highly praised.56
By 2006, however, the charismatic Koizumi was out of office and the
situation was deteriorating in Iraq with a full-blown insurgency and sec-
tarian violence. Against this backdrop, Japan’s public support for contin-
ued presence in Iraq was low, even though the GSDF had experienced
local support and success in Samawah. In September 2006, the GSDF
terminated its activities in Iraq and returned to Japan. About 6000 GSDF
members participated in ODA activities in Iraq between 2004 and 2006.57
Interestingly, even though the GSDF was armed for their own self-defense,
other coalition troops provided force protection for them thereby mitigat-
ing the need to engage in combat.
While the above events were unfolding, the international commu-
nity discovered in October 2002 that the DPRK had defied the 1994
Agreed Framework by continuing their uranium-enrichment program.
The late Kim Jong-Il’s regime admitted to the breach and subsequently
withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and expelled
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, rendering
IAEA’s monitoring devices ineffective and reopened the nuclear plant to
make plutonium. Also that month, the issue of DPRK agents abducting
Japanese nationals for many years came to light, shocking many who were
unaware of the numerous incidents. Five abducted Japanese citizens who
were permitted a brief visit to Japan from North Korea did not return
to the DPRK and that their eight family members who were left behind
in North Korea were not permitted by Pyongyang to reunite with their
family in Japan. Further exacerbating an already tense and increasingly
volatile atmosphere in Northeast Asia was the DPRK’s proven short-range
Rodong missiles which were test-fired into the Sea of Japan on February
24 and then again March 10, 2003.
206 G.A. STAVALE
It was in this post-Cold War and post-9/11 context that the 2004
National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG; Bōei Keikaku Taikō) as the
old NDPO became known was developed, further reshaping the GSDF
for uncertainty, although it did not bring more funding. The trend to trim
the defense budget due to other national fiscal restraints continued.
2004 NDPG and Mid-Term Defense Program (JFY 2005–2009)

The 2004 NDPG promoted two policy objectives in consideration of the
new international security situation. The new NDPG promoted two pol-
icy objectives. First, “to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in
the event that it does, to minimize the damage”; and second, “to improve
the international security environment in order to prevent any threat from
reaching Japan.”58 With these policy objectives wedded to the US–Japan
security arrangements, the new NDPG continued to reshape the GSDF
by maintaining, “force structure to respond effectively to attacks car-
ried out by guerillas and special operations forces…” Furthermore, the
GSDF received the government’s main efforts toward reaching its new
NDPG goals of responding to the invasion of Japan’s offshore islands
and responding to large-scale weapons of mass destruction and natural
disasters.59 The new NDPG also placed emphasis on developing the SDF’s
joint capabilities, specifically command and control during operations and
intelligence management and the efficient use of intelligence.
The implications of the 2004 NDPG are summarized into the follow-
ing twelve objectives:
1. Move from heavy to light equipment

2. Focus defense on the South and West
3. Staff units to combat strength
4. Improve intelligence
5. Improve mobility
6. Establish a quick response force
7. Improve the capabilities of infantry units
8. Improve the ability to respond to international situations
9. Develop military technology
10. Improve joint operations
11. Transform with the changing environment
12. Improve ability to respond to armed attacks60
Breaking from the 1995 NDPO, the 2004 NDPG increased the autho-
rized number of regular GSDF personnel from 145,000 to 148,000 but
decreased the Ready Reserve personnel from 15,000 to 7000. While the
1995 NDPO authorized a combined total of 160,000 personnel, the 2004
NDPG authorized only 155,000 personnel. The 2004 NDPG also slashed
authorized tanks and artillery pieces by 300 each to a total of approximately
600 each.61 The number of authorized divisions and brigades remained the
same.
While the above cuts were being directed, the establishment of a quick
reaction force, which became known as the Central Readiness Force
(CRF), was mandated in order to “effectively respond to new threats and
diverse operations.” The JDA sought to obtain a special forces capabil-
ity in light of the rising threat of international terrorism and on March
29, 2004, announced the creation of a new 300-man, Special Operations
Group (SOG) within the GSDF based in Camp Narashino in Chiba
Prefecture. The SOG was under the direct control of the Defense Minister
with the responsibility of dealing with terrorist and guerilla attacks but was
then put under the command of the Commanding General, CRF, which
was formally created and activated in late March 2007.62
The CRF’s mission is broken down into two main categories—domes-
tic operations and international operations. For domestic operations, the
CRF has been created to respond to attacks by guerillas or Special Forces
and will support regional armies as required. This means that the CRF’s
role may be the supporting unit. The CRF was intended to be Japan’s
“first responder” to participating in international operations; the CRF
would participate in international peace support operations, disaster relief
operations, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities, and non-
combative evacuation operations. Additionally, within the GSDF, the CRF
was tasked with the mission to train and sustain any special operations
forces’ for deployment. The CRF would be the supported unit in this role
as required by the regional armies and other components of the SDF.
When established, the original target end-strength of the CRF was
to reach 3000 personnel without growing the GSDF end-strength. This
is a flexible number as the CRF would be task-organized and tailored
to the situation and mission at hand. Therefore, the CRF would draw
forces from the other regional armies and create the right size and capable
force for the assigned mission. The CRF was commanded by a three-star
General and responded directly to the GSO. However, for actual domestic
and international operations, the CRF falls under the operational control
208 G.A. STAVALE
of the Japan Joint Staff. Logistics and C4ISR63 are provided by other units
under the direction of the GSO. Airlift will be coordinated by the Japan
Joint Staff with MSDF, ASDF, and other means (i.e., civilian-contracted
transport). The first CRF Commanding General was Lieutenant General
Yamaguchi Jō shū.
The CRF is still a rather new organization but was increasingly tested,
both internationally and domestically. Important deployments of the CRF
were to Haiti in support of United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
on February 6, 2010, and to Fukushima to respond to the nuclear disaster
following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami.64
On March 26, 2013, in accordance with the May 1, 2006, US–Japan
Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, the CRF Headquarters trans-
ferred from Camp Asaka, where it had been activated, to Camp Zama.
This transfer was conducted with the goal to “reinforce the cooperation
between the GSDF and the U.S. Army in Japan, contribute to Japan--
U.S. defense cooperation and strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance,
and thereby contribute to the security of Japan as well as the peace and
stability of [the] Asia-Pacific region.65
As explained in Chap. 6, Japan was increasingly experienced in respond-
ing to disasters. In the evening of October 23, 2004, a Magnitude 6.8
earthquake struck thirteen kilometers below the earth’s surface in Niigata
Prefecture and claimed fifty-one lives, hurt another 4795, and damaged
over 120,000 structures. The GSDF supplied the primary responders pro-
viding living supplies, meals, water, medical supplies and treatment, baths,
shelter, home repair, transport, road clearance, and other clean-up duties
to include search and rescue.66 Then, when the earthquake and subse-
quent tidal wave struck Indonesia and Thailand on December 24, 2004,
the GSDF along with other SDF personnel responded with the interna-
tional community to render aid. These two events reinforced the GSDF’s
commitment to disaster relief and demonstrated to the Japanese public
and government for maintaining the crucial capability and capacity of pro-
viding disaster response and relief in multiple areas effectively. It would
take another two years, however, before the Diet would pass legislation
making disaster relief a primary mission.
In March 2006, command and control of operations changed and the
JDA’s Joint Staff Council (JSC), was replaced by establishing the post of
Chief of the Joint Staff who commands the Japan Joint Staff and reports
to the Defense Minister.67 In this construct, all operations are expected to
be coordinated and controlled by the Chief of the Joint Staff. The Chief is
expected to provide unified advice and execute the orders of the Defense
Minister. This reorganization was a departure from the past and a forcing
function for all of the services to leverage from each other’s strengths and
become joint and more efficient, and thereby offer the Defense Minister
better command and control of the SDF through the Chief of the Joint
Staff. Furthermore, development of contingency plans involving multiple
services and the development of equipment could be better facilitated
under this construct. Prior to this reorganization, operations were exe-
cuted by each service component with the Chief of Staff of each service
reporting directly to the Defense Minister, now the Chief of Staff of each
service is the force provider.68
On January 9, 2007, the JDA was formally elevated to ministry sta-
tus, and became known as the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and amend-
ments in the Defense Agency Establishment Law providing new missions
for the SDF went into force. Chief among them is the new primary mis-
sion, besides the defense of Japan, to participate in International Peace
Cooperation activities with the focus on disaster relief, written as Article
100-6 of the SDF Law.69
The defense budget has been a concern for both civilian and uniformed
members of MOD. The JFY 2010 total defense budget was ¥92,299.2
billion, a significant increase and sizable difference when compared to
the defense budget of ten years earlier; in JFY 2000, defense budget was
¥84,987.1 billion. However, the actual amount used for national defense
has been in steady decline for the past nine years. In JFY 2000, Japan spent
¥4935.8 billion or 6% on national defense compared to ¥4790.3 billion or
5% in JFY 2010.70 Nevertheless, the GSDF was budgeted for a new tank,
the Type-10 Tank (Type-2010), which is among other high-end replace-
ment equipment earmarked in the JFY 2010 budget. It is relatively similar
in performance to the Type-90 Tank; however, much lighter, forty-four
tons compared to fifty tons, which improves its mobility and transport and
has other technological advancements over the Type-90.
By the end of JFY 2003, in March 2004, the Northern Army’s 5th
Division was reorganized and redesignated as a brigade, and in March
2008, the 11th Infantry Division was reorganized and redesignated as
a brigade. This transformation was in keeping with the MTDP of JFY
2005–2009 and consistent with the refocus of priorities from north to
south and south-west. Of particular interest to the 11th Brigade is its mis-
sion of disaster relief. Since Japan does not have a separate National Guard
force such as in the United States, the SDF, primarily the GSDF, provides
210 G.A. STAVALE
domestic disaster relief services. In the 11th Brigade’s area of responsibil-

ity, Mt. Komagatake near Hakodate in southern Hokkaido is a concern.
This volcano has had small eruptions of two cycles, three times a year since
1996, and it is feared that a large eruption, such as one which occurred in
1929 where two were killed and 365 structures damaged, will occur again.
It was designated as a volcano to be placed under observation since 1965,
and the Sapporo District Meteorological Observatory has been monitor-
ing it around the clock since March 2002.
In March 1999, the reorganization and redesignation of Middle
Army’s 13th Division to a brigade was complete.71 In accordance with
the 2004 NDPG and MTDP of JFY 2005–2009, the reorganization of
the 2nd Combined Brigade was finished, and as such, in March 2006,
was redesignated as the 14th Brigade. The Western Army’s 1st Combined
Brigade on Okinawa was redesignated as the 15th Brigade on March 26,
2010. The reorganization increased the brigade’s end-strength by 300 to
2100 personnel in order to properly staff the unit and add new capabilities
such as coastal patrol and chemical defense units.72 This ongoing GSDF
transformation (restructure) will not close bases, however. As authorized
end-strength numbers are achieved, branch specialty changes, equipment
updates, better intelligence gathering and sharing, improvement in com-
mand and control, and key measures to reduce cost and improve compe-
tence, efficiency, and deployability in times of need are being developed
and implemented.
Prior to the redesignation of the Western Army’s 1st Combined
Brigade to the 15th Brigade, the Japanese government decided on July
4, 2009, to place a GSDF presence on Yonaguni Island, the southern-
most island in Okinawa Prefecture. Yonaguni has a population of about
1700 people and is twenty-eight square kilometers inland mass. Its main
industries are tourism, sugar cane, and fishing. Yonaguni is only 110
kilometers from Taiwan and is considered the extreme southwest end
of the national border of Japan. The decision to station a radar unit was
linked to the redesignation of the 1st Combined Brigade, which com-
menced after the increase of manpower was realized. However, the issue
of more GSDF troops being stationed in Yonaguni Island permanently
underwent further review due to political sensitivities regarding basing.
Although not without some local resistance and friction, after coordi-
nating the initiative with local and prefectural officials, MOD held a
groundbreaking ceremony on April 19, 2014, for the construction of
the GSDF base with plans to base a coastal guard unit their by the end
of JFY 2015.73 In keeping with the 2011 NDPG, this initiative not only
serves as a deterrent and commitment to protect Japan’s land and sea

borders with the disputed Senkaku Islands being nearby but also pro-
vides inhabitants on the remote island with resources and assistance in
coping with frequent typhoons and seismic activity.74
Since 1995, the time of the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subways, the
GSDF has been investing in its ability to mitigate and handle Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE)
threats. In September 1999, the GSDF found itself short in equipment
and not able to readily deal with a radiation leak in Tō kaimura, Ibaraki
Prefecture, as it did not possess vehicles that could completely protect
its occupants from radiation. In August 2002, the Yomiuri Shimbun
reported that the JDA decided to procure two biological agent detection
vehicles for the GSDF. In March 2004, members of the Middle Army
were called upon to help prevent the outbreak of Bird Flu in Kyō to. In
the 2004 NDPG, the SDF is charged to “deal effectively with large-scale
and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological)
disasters….” As such, the GSDF has taken the lead and has maintained
its fifteen chemical units to provide decontamination capabilities. When
the 2009 worldwide outbreak of the H1N1 virus became known, the
GSDF was charged with screening, detecting, and handling poten-
tially infected people entering Japan at various major ports of entry.
Then, in May 2010, when foot-and-mouth disease infected livestock in
Miyazaki Prefecture resulting in the slaughter of over 100,000 heads
of cattle and pigs, Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio granted Governor
Higashikokubaru Hideo’s request for help and dispatched over 2500
SDF personnel, many of whom were members of the GSDF, to assist
in disease control efforts.75 Personnel from the Western Army’s 8th
Division, 43rd Infantry Regiment, supported by engineers operating
heavy equipment, were some of the first on the scene to execute duties
associated with disposing carcasses and operating decontamination
points for vehicles exiting the contaminated areas. These recent efforts
demonstrate the maturation in the capability of the GSDF to respond to
a CBRNE threat.
2011 NDPG and Mid-Term Defense Program (JFY 2011–2015)

While under the control of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the
Security Council and Cabinet of the GOJ approved the NDPG for JFY
2011 and beyond on December 17, 2010, along with the MTDP for
212 G.A. STAVALE
JFY 11–15. The JFY 2011 NDPG called for MOD to build a “Dynamic
Defense Force (Dōteki Bōeiryoku)” that represented “Japan’s will and abil-
ity to prevent direct threats to Japan from reaching the country and to
eliminate any threat that reaches it.” Toward that goal, the 2011 NDPG
reinforced the requirement for the GSDF to develop capabilities to deploy
to crisis locations, with particular emphasis “placed on the defense of
off-shore islands” and surveillance capabilities such as the basing of the
coastal guard unit at Yonaguni Island that was further pursued under
these Guidelines. Also, highlighted was the requirement for the GSDF
to develop and maintain the ability to deploy specialized capabilities and
to “effectively provide air defense to protect operational units and key
areas.”76
Compared to the 2004 NDPG, the 2011 Guidelines would actually
decrease the authorized number of regular GSDF personnel by 1000
from 148,000 to 147,000 when fully implemented. The Ready Reserve
number of personnel remained the same and the new authorized end-
strength was set at 154,000 GSDF members. Adjusting to the modern
threat environment, the 2011 NDPG also reduced tanks, howitzers, and
rockets similar in scope to the 2004 NDPG. Tanks and howitzers were
reduced by 200 pieces each resulting in a total authorized allowance of
approximately 400 tanks and 400 pieces of artillery (howitzers). The
number of authorized divisions and brigades remained the same; how-
ever, the authorized number of surface-to-air guided missile units would
be reduced by one from eight to seven anti-aircraft artillery groups/
regiments (Fig. 5.5).77
The GSDF Responds to Recent Threats and Challenges
March 11, 2011 (3/11)

At 2:46 p.m. on March 11, 2011, Japan’s strength would be challenged
with the Great East Japan Earthquake. The 9.0 magnitude earthquake
off the Tō hoku coast in the Pacific Ocean triggered a deadly tsunami and
one of the worst recorded nuclear power station disasters, which shocked
and initially inundated the ability to respond effectively in a timely manner
to all affected areas. Preparing for such a triple disaster had eluded first
responders, even in Japan where the reality of living with cyclically natural
calamities is met with a high sense of preparation with mitigation measures
in place that are among the world highest state of readiness. Many of
Fig. 5.5 2011 composition and disposition of the GSDF’s five regional armies
and fifteen areas of responsibility. Note: Figure created by Giuseppe A. Stavale
those who had responded to the triple disaster noted that in preparation
for large-scale natural disasters such as a calamity like the one that visited
Japan on March 11 was never seriously envisioned as possible, underscor-
ing the shock spread through the otherwise highly prepared nation.
The Defense Minister began issuing mobilization orders that same day,
and on March 14, established Joint Task Force-Tō hoku (JTF-Tō hoku)
placing it under the command of the late Lieutenant General Kimizuka
Eiji, Commanding General of the Northeastern Army, GSDF.78 Kimizuka
would later be promoted to General and appointed as the 32nd Chief of
Staff of the GSDF from August 5, 2011 to August 26, 2013. By-and-large
the disaster area, including earthquake damage, tsunami-stricken coast-
line, and the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) nuclear power
station, were all within the Northeastern Army area of responsibility. The
disaster stricken area was so widespread and the impacted so much of the
214 G.A. STAVALE
population that JTF-Tō hoku would eventually reach over 100,000 mobi-
lized SDF personnel on Lieutenant General Kimizuka’s command, which
included the first real-world mobilization of the GSDF Ready Reserve and
SDF Reserve System personnel for a real-world operation on March 16.79
In comparison, the SDF mobilized 26,000 SDF personnel in response to
the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, or one-fourth of the response
to the Great East Japan Earthquake, underscoring the widespread devasta-
tion and massive effort which is the SDF’s largest single undertaking since
its creation in 1954.
Lieutenant General Kimizuka and his augmented staff directed JTF-
Tōhoku operations, which included “full-scale efforts in order to ensure
the safety of disaster victims and stability for the lives of those in the
region,” from his earthquake-damaged Northeastern Army headquarters
in Camp Sendai, in Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture.80 Although clearly
battered, the augmented Northeastern Army personnel fed from the out-
pour of support that came from every corner of Japan and the globe.
Serving alongside alliance partners through the US contribution known
as Operation Tomodachi, the indomitable spirit of Tō hoku tackled each
day’s efforts in a methodical can-do approach. Unlike other natural disas-
ters, where it was instinctively known that clean-up and recovery would
precipitate rebuilding, the ability to rebuild in some areas initially showed
sporadic whiffs of doubt from a beaten community who had lost much
more than just material possession. However, with a helping hand through
Operation Tomodachi, the first spark of a major bounce-back in the midst
of bad news came with the clearing of Sendai Airport, the largest major
air hub in the region which was soon put back into service and provided
the ability to rapidly move supplies. This turn of events provided much
hope to survivors to stay strong and live for those who had perished. But
it was the people of Tō hoku, who demonstrated strength and resilience
and who, in turn, most inspired the men and women under Lieutenant
General Kimizuka’s command as well as the many Americans who served
in Operation Tomodachi. So moved from the effects of the triple disas-
ter that a slogan—Gambare Tōhoku (“Keep Strong Northeast”)—was
inspired, with patches being worn on uniforms and stickers on helmets by
nearly all GSDF personnel serving in disaster relief operations.
JTF-Tō hoku initially performed search and rescue operations which
resulted in approximately 19,000 people rescued. The JTF also cleaned
and cleared public facilities to include roads, established bridges, per-
formed salvage operations in ports, performed mortuary affairs ser-

vices, provided transport assistance, provided clean water, food, fuel,
and bathing facilities, and other important services such as providing
medical assistance. Although the GSDF were not the only personnel
who participated in JTF-Tō hoku, it is notable that the JTF was led
by a GSDF Lieutenant General and that by-and-large the largest and
most visible aspect of the effort was the GSDF, to include initial SDF
efforts to cope with the deteriorating situation at the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant.
The tsunami had severely damaged TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant which is located along the Pacific Ocean coast in the
town of Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture. All back-up generators required
to pump water to cool the reactor cores had been flooded, damaged, or
otherwise inoperable causing several of the reactor cores to overheat to
dangerous levels. In response to Prime Minister Kan Naoto’s proclama-
tion of a “nuclear emergency” at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant in the evening of March 11, Defense Minister Kitazawa
issued Order No.5 on March 12, 2011, establishing a Headquarters for
Nuclear Disaster Response at the Office of the Prime Minister of Japan
and ordered the dispatch of additional SDF personnel to deal with the
evolving nuclear crises. All elements of the GSDF were ordered to ren-
der “necessary assistance.”81 The assistance was first visible on March
17 with the employment of two GSDF CH-47J Chinook helicopters
assigned to the 1st Helicopter Brigade, which were used to drop seawa-
ter on reactor number 3.82 This came when radiation levels were increas-
ing and spreading throughout the region. The cheers from Ichigaya
could be heard throughout Japan as the televised operations raised the
hopes of all dealing with the fluid and unprecedented crises. This first
major countermeasure would later prove ineffective in causing a major
and steady drop in the reactor’s core temperature but it did provide a
resolve to do something and inspired other health and life risking efforts
to pump water to cool the reactors and eventually get the Level 7 cri-
ses under control.83 Other notable GSDF efforts to the nuclear disaster
included decontamination, monitoring, and a wide variety of assistance
to those evacuated within a thirty-kilometer radius of the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
A year later, on March 27, 2012, the Japanese Defense Minister issued
ordered the SDF to make “preparations of measures to destroy ballis-
tic missiles or other objects.” And then, on March 30, issued the exe-
216 G.A. STAVALE
cution order “to destroy ballistic missiles and other objects” based on
Article 82-3, paragraph 3 of the SDF Law.84 This was done in response to
Japan being informed on March 19, 2012, by the international Maritime
Organization that the DPRK had issued a notice to mariners that a mari-
time zone had been established for debris that was expected to fall as a
result of an “observation satellite” launch into space sometime between
April 12 and 16, 2012. By-and-large, this was a joint operation with sig-
nificant and visible GSDF participation.
GSDF’s Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 units were mobilized
to Japan’s most south western islands in the Ryūkyū Island chain, as well
as heavily populated areas. PAC-3 missile units were widely seen on the
grounds of MOD in Ichigaya, Shinjuku in central Tokyo. In the morning
of April 13, a launch did occur from the west coast of the DPRK which
resulted in the rocket breaking apart within minutes of its launch and
falling into the Yellow Sea without damage to Japan. A similar launch
occurred again that December with a similar preparatory and alert posture
taken by Japan. On December 12, Japan detected a launch that resulted in
no damage to Japanese territory or personnel.85 These two events demon-
strated to the international community that Japan’s defense capabilities,
including those of the GSDF, were better informed, equipped, prepared,
and coordinated to respond to potential missile threats compared to years
prior when Japan was caught off-guard and feeling vulnerable. This ability
to respond to external threats gave Japanese society a sense of confidence
and self-reliance that has further contributed to the SDF’s increased pub-
lic support.
Operation Sangkay
On November 8, 2013, a Category 5 typhoon slammed into the western
Philippine archipelago and caused widespread devastation to remote areas
severing what little means of communication and infrastructure there was
to travel on. Known as Super Typhoon Haiyan to the international com-
munity, “Yolanda” as it was called in the Philippines, claimed well over
6000 lives as of January 2014.86 Following a request for help from the
Government of the Philippines to Japan on November 12, GOJ responded
with over 1000 SDF personnel, the largest contingent of SDF ever to
deploy overseas with the GSDF playing a major role. Taking lessons from
the US contribution to Japan following 3/11, in Operation Tomodachi,
the GOJ dubbed their contribution to the Philippines Operation Sangkay

which means “friend” in the Tagalog regional dialect used in Leyte.
On November 15, the Japanese government released the International
Emergency Response SDF Deployment Order, creating a Joint Task
Force-Philippine Disaster Relief (JTF-PDR) with about 1145 personnel
and a Local Philippine Coordination Cell with additional personnel. The
JTF was placed under the command of Rear Admiral Satō Hisanori of the
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and his deputy commander
was Colonel Asami Takehisa of the GSDF.87 The JTF was comprised of
a GSDF medical and aviation unit totaling about 270 personnel and six
helicopters.88 The remainder of the JTF consisted of about 550 JMSDF
personnel who made-up the maritime deployed unit utilizing three ships,
the escort (Helicopter Destroyer [DDH]) ship Ise, the transport (Tank
Landing Ship [LST]) ship Osumi, and the supply support (Auxiliary, Oiler,
Explosives [AOE]) ship Towada. Additionally, the ASDF participated with
an aviation transportation unit with about 270 ASDF personnel and eight
aircraft. The mission of the JTF was to provide medical assistance, to con-
trol the spread of communicable disease in the affected areas, and provide
support in the transport of relief supplies.89 The JTF arrived in the vicin-
ity of Leyte on November 22 and began humanitarian assistance opera-
tions on November 24 in Leyte, Cebu, Maya, Roxas, Bolongan, Guiuan,
Tacloban, and Homonhon Island (Fig. 5.6).
The bulk of the GSDF members came from the GSO headquarters in
Ichigaya and the Northeastern Army in Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture.
These medical- and aviation-centric personnel provided medical and vac-
cination-related services to local residents, including those who had been
evacuated, and transported medical personnel to remote areas by air. The
Japanese government reported that the JTF’s medical efforts led by the
GSDF treated 2646 personnel and vaccinated another 11,924 personnel
during the operation. Additionally, activities to prevent communicable
diseases were conducted over an area of approximately 95,600 m2.90 On
December 13, Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori issued the redeploy-
ment order to the JTF Commander and Operation Sangkay concluded on
the same day with the JTF returning to Japan before the year’s end.
A year and a half (and two Defense Ministers) later, in the wake of
the 7.8 magnitude earthquake that devastated Nepal and killed thou-
sands there in that landlocked mountainous country on April 25, 2015,
Japan joined the international community yet again in providing assis-
tance to the Nepalese people. In addition to the dispatch of a Disaster
218 G.A. STAVALE
Organization of the Joint Task Force-Philippine Disaster Relief

Operation SANGKAY
Minister of Defense
Chief of Staff, JSO
Commander, Self-Defense Fleet
Local Coordination Center

(Manila)
CJTF-PDR
Manila Tacloban Cebu

LO LO LO
Medic Aviation Relief Unit Maritime Unit Airlift Unit
HQ Aviation Unit
DDH Ise
Medical Unit
Supporting
７
Aircraft Unit
Aviation Unit LST Osumi
３ Maintenanc
e Unit
AOE Towada ２
３ Support Unit
２２１
Fig. 5.6 Organization of the JTF-PDR operation SANGKAY. Source: English

translation of figure carried in the press section of Japan’s ministry of defense:
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2013/11/15d.pdf. English translation
by Giuseppe A. Stavale
Relief Team, and providing emergency relief goods and financial assis-
tance, on April 28, 2015, the Japanese government dispatched a 110-
man GSDF medical assistance team to provide medical aid. Beginning
on April 30, 2015, and under the leadership of Colonel Nakagawa
Hirohide, this medical assistance team treated 2900 Nepalese and
provided instruction to another forty local personnel on post-disaster
mental health. The deployment of this team concluded on May 19,
2015.91
An important development that took place around this time was the
establishment of the Japanese National Security Council (Kokka Anzen
Hoshōkyoku) (NSC) on December 4, 2013. Although there were prede-
cessor organizations to include the National Defense Council (Kokubō
Kaigi) (NDC), from 1955 to 1986, and the Security Council of Japan
(Anzen Hoshō Kaigi), from 1986 to 2013, there had been a desire among
leaders of the ruling LDP to establish an National Security Council along

the lines of the American NSC, which had been created in 1947, particu-
larly since the early 2000s, following the terrorist attacks in the United
States.92 In the fall of 2013, the LDP, upon its return to power the year
before, submitted a new NSC bill to the Diet which passed on November
27.93 The NSC serves as a “control tower” for security policy and is meant
as a forum for the main four ministers (sometimes expanded to nine)—
the Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Minister of Defense—to regularly hold substantive discussions.94 The
first substantive decision of the NSC was the formulation of the National
Security Strategy (for the first time ever), the 2014 NDPG, and the Mid-
Term Defense Program (Chūki Bōeiryoku Seibi Keikaku, or MTDP), for
FY 2014 through FY 2018.
2014 NDPG and Mid-Term Defense Program

(JFY 2014–2018)
As tensions between the PRC and Japan soared to new heights due to
China’s unilateral declaration on November 23, 2013, of an Air Defense
Identification Zone in the East China Sea including air space considered
Japan’s and over the Senkaku Islands (referred to as the Diaoyu islands by
China), the Japanese government released the NDPG for FY 2014 and
beyond on December 17, 2013. In the 2014 NDPG, the GOJ noted its
concerns with the PRC’s aggressive military activities and without men-
tioning the political discussions regarding a revision or reinterpretation of
the Japanese Constitution allowing for collective self-defense, the docu-
ment provides a candid view of the international security situation and
the reality that Japan must be more active in dealing with the “so-called
‘gray-zone’ situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies
over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests.”95 Japan and
the United States subsequently worked on new guidelines to cover these
gray-zone situations and announced them in April 2015 during Prime
Minister Abe’s state visit to Washington.96
Based on the security challenges Japan faces today and those foresee-
able, the 2014 NDPG aims to “ensuring security of the sea and airspace
surrounding Japan, respond to an attack on remote islands, respond to bal-
listic missile attacks, respond in outer space and cyberspace, and respond
to major disasters”.97 For the GSDF, it will be required to “respond swiftly
220 G.A. STAVALE
Fig. 5.7 Picture of JTF-PDR. Narrative: Joint Japan GSDF Philippines military

disaster relief team following Typhoon Sangkay. Source: Courtesy of the Japan
ministry of defense’s public photograph gallery: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/data/
philippines/index.html
and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on offshore islands and vari-
ous other situations.” Therefore, the GSDF will be required to undergo
a major organizational change and establish and maintain units at var-
ies sizes and capabilities that can rapidly deploy. An emphasis is made
on maintaining “mobile operating units sustaining specialized functions
in order to effectively perform such operations as airborne operations,
amphibious operations, special operations, air transportation, defense
against NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons, and interna-
tional peace cooperation activities.”98
Specifically, the GSDF will establish the GSDF Central Command
(Rikujō Sōtai) (GCC) and disband the young CRF. The CRF’s subor-
dinate units will transfer to the GCC and two divisions and two brigades
will transform into two rapid “deployment divisions” and two “rapid
deployment brigades.” Furthermore, an Amphibious Rapid Deployment
Brigade (Suiriku Kidōdan) will be established along with other smaller
units responsible for security and surveillance.99
Highlighting mobility, the 2014 Guidelines directs the GSDF to

“implement programs towards successive formation of units equipped with
newly-introduced combat vehicles and [the] removal of tanks deployed in
basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and
Kyūshū.” Tanks located in Kyūshū will be further organized under the
authority of the Western Army’s Commanding General.100 How the GSDF
will reorganize from five regional armies and defined areas of responsibili-
ties has not been announced as of mid-2015. Figure 5.8 depicts a com-
parison of the GSDF before and after the 2014 NDPG.
Basing of the specialized deployable units was earmarked for Hokkaido
due to more training facilities and better opportunities, which brings the
added benefit of minimizing friction with local communities in otherwise
more congested communities. Furthermore, the 2014 NDPG calls for the
2014 AND BEYOND NDPG

31 March 2013 (The following are target numbers of the 2014
NDPG yet to be realized as of August 2014)
TOTAL
INFANTRY 8 5
DIVISIONS
(REGIONAL)
3 Rapid Deployment Divisions

2 4 Rapid Deployment Brigades
TOTAL
1 Armored Division 1 Airborne Brigade
MOBILE UNITS
(CRF & 1 Armored Division) 1 Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade
TOTAL
TARGET
BRIGADES
6 2
(REGIONAL)
ACTIVE-DUTY
AUTHORIZED 147,000 151,000
PERSONNEL (136,573) (N/A)
(ACTUAL)
READY 7,000 8,000

RESERVES
Fig. 5.8 Comparison of the GSDF organizational strength before and require-
ments of the 2014 NDPG. Source: Created and compiled by the author base on a
comparison of the GSDF organizational strength before and after the 2014 NDPG
222 G.A. STAVALE
GSDF to “maintain surface-to-ship guided missile (SSM) units in order to

prevent invasion of Japan’s remote islands while still at sea, as far as possi-
ble.” These guided missiles will be Type 12 SSMs and will replace the Type-
88. As discussed above, the coastal observation unit at Yonaguni Island
would be funded under the 2014 NDPG and MTDP for 2014–2018. The
purchase of Type-10 tanks will continue to change out aging tanks for a
total of forty-four under the 2014–2018 MTDP. Additionally, the GSDF
was charged to “review the organization and equipment of the basic oper-
ational units (divisions and brigades)” and cut its tanks and howitzers.101
Specifically, tanks and howitzers will each be cut by 100 pieces, from 400
to 300, in each category. However, the 2014 NDPG will increase the
GSDF end-strength from 154,000 (147,000 active-duty and 7000 Ready
Reserve) personnel to 159,000 (151,000 active-duty and 8000 Ready
Reserve) personnel, an overall increase of 5000 personnel by the end of
Japanese FY 2018.102
Of particular significance are the creation of an Amphibious Rapid
Deployment Brigade and the purchase of tilt-rotor aircraft and amphibi-
ous assault vehicles (AAV). The brigade is planned to be fully established
by JFY 2018 and will include the expansion of the WAiR which will
become the 1st Regiment, one of the three regiments in the brigade.103
Per the MTDP 2014–2018, this brigade, which will be under the com-
mand of the GCC will test six AAVs in the next two years with a target to
eventually purchase fifty-two vehicles. Additionally, the 2014 NDPG, pro-
vides for the purchase of seventeen tilt-rotor aircraft and other major items
to sustain and build a mobile force.104 In October 2014, Prime Minister
Abe was introduced to the Osprey and toured the aircraft at the Hyakuri
Air Review, and a month later on November 21, 2014 MOD made the
announcement that the 17 tilt-rotor aircraft it would purchase per the
NDPG would be American V-22s.
Summary
Japanese history provides plenty of examples of the Japanese cultural
tradition of reacting to events rather than anticipating them and tak-
ing action before harm occurs. The Japanese today are no different
from their ancestors and today’s political leaders are careful to not push
defense reform too aggressively. Therefore, to understand how and
why the GSDF evolved during this twenty-five-year period, it is criti-
cal to examine the key events that occurred in this period which set the
c onditions for change, all of which has shaped the world and deeply influ-
enced Japan. This period in GSDF history is described in many ways
such as, “the years of change,” or “transformation,” or “reform.” All
are correct, but perhaps the best summation of this period is captured
by former Defense Attaché to the Japanese Embassy, Washington, DC,
GSDF Colonel Yamaoka Takeo who used the story of The Tortoise and
the Hare to describe the Post-Cold War years for not only the GSDF
but also Japan. He said, “Up until the early 90s, Japan was extremely
slow in [the] evolution of its defense policy … Japan’s defense policy
was in fact a sleeping tortoise while its economy was a hare diligently
running.”105 In the 1990s, this situation suddenly flipped with shocking
speed as defense-related issues began to change but were always limited
or restrained by the Japanese Constitution.
Based on Japanese culture and the realities of Japanese politics, triggers
or “forcing functions” for future GSDF policy reform and implementation
will be based on the security environment and events that continue to illu-
minate risk to the Japanese public and its territories. Japanese history and
the past two decades have demonstrated this relationship.
The GSDF entered the new millennium rather uneventfully but with a
distinctly closer relationship forming with both the US Marine Corps and
US Army compared to ten years prior. Nevertheless, the domestic and
international events and subsequent effects on the GSDF that occurred
during this period would significantly challenge but not necessarily over-
turn, at least not yet, the advice given by former Japanese Prime Minister
Yoshida Shigeru during his speech to the first graduating class of the new
National Defense Academy in February 1957. Then, Prime Minister
Yoshida stated, “It is possible that many of you may finish your career at
the Self-Defense Force without ever being thanked or welcomed by the
people … because it is only when our nation is facing crisis and confusion,
when we are attacked by foreign forces or when necessity arises for you
to embark on disaster relief missions, that the people will appreciate and
praise the Self-Defense Forces. I want you all to bear with the life in the
shadows.”106
Notes
1. The views represented here in are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Navy, Marine
Corps, or the Department of Defense.
224 G.A. STAVALE
2. Joint Statement of the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee,

February 19, 2005, and Joint Statement of the US–Japan Security
Consultative Committee, May 1, 2007.
3. Defense of Japan 1990, p. 278.
4. Type-61 and Type-74 refer to the year the tanks were introduced,
in 1961 and 1974, respectively.
5. Tetsuo Maeda, The Hidden Army, (Carol Stream, IL: edition q,
inc., 1995), p. 280.
6. According to the then-Defense Agency, the Type-90 Tank was
inspired by the German Leopard 2 Tank and its development
began in 1982. See Defense of Japan 1990, pp. 113–114. Its hull is
manufactured by the Mitsubishi Steel Works and the turret is made
by The Japan Steel Works, Ltd. It is equipped with a 120 mm
smooth bore gun, a 12.7 mm machine gun, and a coaxial 7.62 mm
machine gun. It is also outfitted with a modern Fire Control
System, thermal and infrared night vision technology, and an auto-
matic ammunition loading system. This tank has a maximum speed
of 70 kilometers per hour and a total payload of fifty tons. The tank
is manned by a crew of three personnel. Many of the Northern
Army’s Type-90 Tank began overhaul maintenance for the first
time by Mitsubishi Steel Works in 2007.
8. Christopher D. Wood, The Bubble Economy: Japan’s Extraordinary
Speculative Boom of the ’80s and the Dramatic Bust of the ’90s (New
York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1992).
9. “War in the Gulf; Japan Is Wary of Kuwait Role,” New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/28/world/war-in-the-gulf-
japan-is-wary-of-kuwait-role.html, accessed December 24, 2009.
10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Current Issues Surrounding UN

Peace-keeping Operations and Japanese Perspective,” MOFA
Online, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/issues.html,
accessed July 23, 2004.
11. Article 9 states: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based
in justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means
of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of
the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency
of the state will not be recognized.”
12. Richard F. Kaufman, The Peace Dividend Revisited-Again, ESPUA

Online, http://www.epsusa.org/events/eea/kaufman07.pdf,
accessed December 9, 2011.
13. These operations are classified as: (1) UNPKO, (2) international
humanitarian relief activities, and (3) international electoral obser-
vation activities.
14. Iokibe Makoto, The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan (London:
Routledge, 2011), p. 179.
15. Giuseppe A. Stavale, “The Evolution of Japan’s Constitution and
Implications for U.S. Forces on Okinawa” (Unpublished master’s
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), p. 8.
16. Katsumi Ishizuka, “The Evolution of Japan’s Policy towards UN
Peace Operation,” presented at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting for
the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS),
at Cascais, Portugal, June 21–23, 2002, p. 14.
17.
MOFA, “Current Issues Surrounding UN Peace-keeping
Operations and Japanese Perspective,” MOFA Online, http://
www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/issues.html, accessed December
24, 2009.
18. See www8.cao.go.jp/english/e1-13-1-1.html, accessed December
24, 2009.
19. See www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/operations/pko.html, accessed January
24, 2014.
20. See www.pko.go.jp, accessed December 26, 2009.
21. Larry A. Niksch, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004), p. 12.
22. The missiles were originally called Hatf but later changed to their
present names of Ghauri.
23. Compiled from Jane’s Sentinel Security-South Asia; Jane’s All the
World’s Aircraft; Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, and various
media reports.
24. Richard Marshall, China-Taiwan Dispute Primer, Virtual
Information Center, February 29, 2000, p. 9.
25. Defense of Japan 1996.
26. “Japan, China Reach Ambiguous Agreement on Gas Field

Development, Shelving Border Issue,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
June 19, 2008.
27. The 1875 Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile

Islands between Japan and Russia left the whole Sakhalin Island to
226 G.A. STAVALE
Russia and the Kurile Islands (from Urup to Shimushu) to Japan.

After the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth, which officially ended the
Japan–Russia war, the southern half of Sakhalin Island was ceded
by Russia to victorious Japan. This was the border between Russia
(Soviet Union) and Japan until August 1945, when the Soviet Union
entered the war against Japan on 9 August 1945. Soviet forces
entered southern Sakhalin Island and all of the Kuriles on August 18,
1945. Soviet (Russian) forces have never departed these islands.
28. See http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/decla-
ration.html, accessed October 12, 2009.
30. See http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/
overview.html, accessed November 08, 2011.
33. Although not nuclear-armed, Japan has also had a long-standing
dispute with the ROK, which maintains cooperative relations, but
sometimes strained due to historical grievances. In 2005, the
Prefectural Government of Shimane Prefecture in Japan instituted
an ordinance asserting claims to Takeshima Island referred to Dok
To by Koreans and designating a Takeshima Island Day. While
Japan asserts its claims dating back to 1905, the ROK has pro-
duced documents dating to 512 as proof of its historical relation-
ship. The volcanic islets lie between the two countries in the Sea of
Japan and are surrounded by rich fishing grounds with what is
believed to also contain mineral deposits. The ROK has stationed
a small detachment of Marines on the otherwise uninhabited islets,
thereby maintaining physical control.
34. The SACO Final Report contained four major topics with a total
of twenty-eight initiatives aimed at reducing the US military impact
on the lives of Okinawans.
35. Research conducted at the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake

Memorial and Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation
Institute, January 5, 2007.
40. See http://www.nhk.or.jp/gendai/kiroku2005/0503-3.html,

accessed October 11, 2009.
41. National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996.
43. National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996.
46. See http://www.marforpac.marines.mil/News/News-Article-
Display/Article/530073/us-japan-militaries-conclude-senior-
level-seminars, accessed November 28, 2007.
47. See http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no37/leaders.html#rticle03,
accessed February 27, 2013.
48. See http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/english/greeting/Index.html,
accessed December 20, 2008.
49. Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger, and Takahashi Kawakami,
Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense, Rand Online (http://www.rand.
org/publications/MR/MR1374/MR1374.ch1.pdf, 13, accessed
August 21, 2004).
50. Ibid., p. 23.
52. Photographers Mate 2nd Class Erich Ryland, Japanese Army

Trains with US Marines; available from http://www.navy.mil/
submit/display.asp?story_id=22000; Internet; accessed July 28,
2008.
53. See http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/antiterrorism
/1029terohougaiyou_e.html, accessed November 19, 2013.
55. David Fouse, “Japan’s Dispatch of the Ground Self Defense Force
to Iraq: Lessons Learned,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,
July 2007, p. 2.
58. National Defense Program Outline for FY 2005 and After, p. 3.
59. Ibid., p. 9.
60. 2004 NDPG.
62. The original target date was April 1, 2007, but was moved up a few
days. The formal activation ceremony was presided over by Defense
Minister Kyūma Fumio on March 31, 2007, at Camp Asaka.
228 G.A. STAVALE
63.
C4ISR refers to Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance.
64. “Jieitai no Katsudō no Habu o Hirogetai,” Yomiuri Shimbun,

February 6, 2010.
66. See http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/english/dro/, accessed August
17, 2008.
67. On March 27, 2006, the partially amended Defense Agency

Establishment Law was enacted which provides the establishment
of the Joint Staff Office and established joint operations within the
SDF.
68. Noboru Yamaguchi, “Thoughts about the Japan-US Alliance after
the Transformation With a Focus on International Peace
Cooperation Activities,” The National Institute For Defense
Studies, January 2006, p. 5.
69. Ibid., p. 141.
70. Compiled from various Ministry of Defense and Ministry of

Finance sources.
71. See http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/mae/MAsyoukai/enkaku.html,
accessed September 28, 2011.
72. “Okinawa Rikuji, Ryodan ni Shōkaku ‘Nansei Jūshi’ de Butai

Kaihen,” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 27, 2010 (http://www.47news.
jp/CN/201003/CN2010032601000079.html, accessed April 2,
2010).
73. “Yonaguni Jima Rikuji Haibi e no Shidō, Kanshi Butai no

Chūtonchi Kikō,” Tokyo Shimbun, April 20, 2014, http://www.
yomiuri.co.jp/kyushu/featur e/TO000344/20140421-
OYS1T50057.html, accessed April 20, 2014.
74. See http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hi?a=20090705-00000061-san-
pol, accessed July 5, 2009.
75. Hatoyama Cabinet E-mail Magazine No. 31, May 21, 2010.
76. NDPG for FY 2011 and beyond, p. 15.
77. Ibid., attached table.
79. See http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressrele/2011/110316.html,
81. See http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/disaster/order05.html,

83. The IAEA has established the international nuclear and radiologi-
cal event scale (INES) which is a worldwide tool for communicat-
ing to the public in a consistent way the safety significance of
nuclear and radiological events, with Level 7 being the highest or
a “major accident.” A “major accident” is defined as a “Major
release of radioactive Material with widespread health and environ-
mental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended
countermeasures.”
85. Ibid., p. 190.
86. See http://www.philstar.com/nation/2014/01/09/1276835/
ndrrmc-yolanda-death-toll-rises-6190, accessed May 10, 2014.
87. See http://www.philstar.com/region/2013/12/12/1237116/
japanese-troops-conduct-relief-ops, accessed January 15, 2014.
88. See http://www.japan-defense.blogspot.jp/2013/11/japan-
sending-largest-jsdf-hadr.html, accessed December 19, 2013.
89. See http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai_heiwa/philip-
pines/index.html, accessed November 20, 2013.
90. Ibid., accessed February 20, 2013.
91. “Nepaaru ni Okeru Kokusai Kinkyū Enjo Katsudō ni Tsuite,” April
29,” http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/news/pko/2015/20150429.
html, accessed on June 2, 2015.
92. Criticisms of the National Defense Council included its infrequent
meetings (e.g., meeting only thirty-three times between 1956 and
1977), and the failure to respond to sudden crises, such as the
shooting down of Korean Airline flight 007 in 1983.
93. A bill had been submitted in 2007, but the government eventually
had to give up on the plan and the DPJ (Minshutō) did not support
the idea during its three years in power.
94. A National Security Secretariat (Naikaku Kanbō Kokka Anzen

Hoshōkyoku), headed by former Administrative Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Yachi Shōtarō, was established on January 7, 2014,
with a staff of sixty-seven. See National Institute for Defense
Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2014 (Tokyo: Japan Times,
2014), pp. 41–48.
95. NDPG for FY 2014 and Beyond.
230 G.A. STAVALE
96. Jeffrey W. Hornung, “U.S.-Japan: A Pacific Alliance Transformed,”

The Diplomat, May 4, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/
u-s-japan-a-pacific-alliance-transformed/, accessed June 2015.
97. NDPG for FY 2014 and Beyond, p. 14.
98. Ibid., p. 21.
99. Summary of Mid-Term Defense Program, p. 2.
100. Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014–FY2018), p. 5.
101. NDPG for FY 2014 and Beyond, p. 22.
102. Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014–FY2018), p. 5.
103. “‘Senkaku Yūji’ e Sonae Suiriku Kidōdan, 2 Sen-3 Zen Kibo de
Sasebo ni Shireibu,” Sankei Shimbun, February 3, 2014, http://
sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/140203/plc14020308020004-
n1.htm, accessed same day.
104. Aaron Mehta, “Japan Officially Selects Osprey, Global Hawk,
E-2D,” Defense News, November 22, 2014.
105. Yamaoka, Takeo, “Interview on Japan Ground Self-Defense Force
Operations in Iraq,” Washington, DC, May 12, 2004.
106. Alex Martin, “Military Flexes Relief Might, Gains Newfound
Esteem,” Japan Times, April 15, 2011, http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/print/nn20110415fl.html, accessed May 20, 2013.
PART III
Civilian Control and the Search for

Acceptance
CHAPTER 6
The Ground Self-Defense Force and

Civilian Control
Katsuhiro Musashi
Introduction
The Japanese military, particularly the Imperial Japanese Army, regularly
intervened in politics prior to and during World War II and negatively
influenced national affairs by, for example, forcing cabinet resignations.
The severe limitations on the authority of the cabinet and national parlia-
ment (known as the Diet, or Kokkai), the civilian bodies expected to con-
trol the military, have been given as reasons why the civilian leadership was
unable to stop military extremism in the period between the Manchurian
Incident in 1931 and the Pacific War. The independence of the Emperor’s
command over the military allowed his authority over military operations
to be de facto monopolized by the high command (the chiefs of the army
and naval general staffs). The organization of the military could not be
altered through laws or Imperial edits, but only through military orders
countersigned by the army or navy minister.1 Additionally, the require-
ment that only active duty officers could serve as Minister of the Army
or Navy made it possible for the military to determine whether a cabinet
would survive.2
K. Musashi (*)
Faculty of Policy Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto-shi, Japan

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8_6
234 K. MUSASHI
Important posts were monopolized by military officers during the gov-

ernment of active duty general Tō jo Hideki (who served as army minis-
ter and home minister as well as prime minister).3 A military dictatorship
was established by means of the 1942 general elections (which followed
the unification of all political parties into the Imperial Rule Assistance
Association, or Taisei Yokusankai) and control over the freedoms of speech
and press by the secret police or Kempeitai.4
Having experienced the hardships of defeat under this militarism,
Japan disbanded its army and navy with its acceptance of the Potsdam
Declaration and started the postwar anew as a demilitarized nation under
Article 9 of the Constitution. The new constitution included a clause lim-
iting cabinet minister appointments to civilians, eliminating the possibility
of military personnel serving.5 The aim was to prevent a reoccurrence of
the control over the government that the prewar military had achieved
through monopolizing key government positions.
Japan gradually began rearming, however, following the outbreak of the
Korean War in 1950, first establishing the National Police Reserve (NPR)
and then creating the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces
(GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, respectively) after the restoration of indepen-
dence. During this process, the government sought to introduce policies and
systems that would ensure civilian supremacy and eliminate the possibility
of another military intervention in politics. The Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
Law, or Jieitaihō, specifies that the prime minister, as the representative of
the cabinet, is the supreme commander of the SDF and that the director
general of the Defense Agency, or Bōeichō (the Ministry of Defense [MOD]
or Bōeishō since 2007, although the former title will be used below) presides
over their administration under the command and supervision of the prime
minister. It makes clear that the defense affairs of the nation fall completely
within the purview of the cabinet’s administrative powers as part of general
administrative affairs and that all matters relating to military command and
administration are under the control of the cabinet. It was expected that by
thus centralizing command authority over the military within the cabinet,
there would be no reoccurrence of the prewar command independence.
The National Defense Council (Kokubō Kaigi) was also established under
the cabinet to deliberate on important matters of national defense. The prime
minister served as its head, with the foreign minister, finance minister, direc-
tor general of the Defense Agency, and director general of the Economic
Planning Agency (Keizai Kikakuchō) serving as members (the council was
reformed as the Security Council [Anzen Hoshō Kaigi] in 1986 and actions to
THE GROUND SELF-DEFENSE FORCE AND CIVILIAN CONTROL 235
be taken in serious emergencies were added to its remit).6 Under the postwar
constitution, the Diet, as the representative of the people, became the sole
legislative body. Through its laws and budgets, it determines the size and
major organs of the SDF and exercises final approval over defense operations.
Nonetheless, has the establishment of this system functioned adequately
to provide civilian control over Japan’s uniformed personnel, from the NPR
to the SDF of present day? The “civil official control (bunkan tōsei)” theory,
which argues that it is the civil officials of the Internal Bureau (Naikyoku)
of the Defense Agency rather than the civilian prime minister and Defense
Agency director general that actually have primary control over the deciding
and implementation of Japanese defense policy, has become influential.7 In
addressing this question, this paper first focuses on a period stretching from
the establishment of the GSDF through the Cold War, examining confron-
tations between the director general (and the Internal Bureau which advised
him) and the uniformed personnel of the GSDF during the decision-making
process for defense policy. It examines how the Internal Bureau of the Cold
War era effectively took the politicians’ place as the center of control by
providing an overview of cases where the director general exercised civilian
control over the GSDF leadership. It also analyzes the shift in the nature of
the control exercised by the Internal Bureau and politicians like the director
general over the GSDF from suppressive to proactive as the Cold War struc-
ture faded away in the 1990s, and the GSDF expanded the range and nature
of its activities. It does this from the perspective of changes in the attributes
of the director generals, the unification of interests between the Internal
Bureau and uniformed personnel, and the increasing internal and external
needs for the proactive use of the post-Cold War SDF. Finally, the effects of
organizational reform of the MOD, the body primarily responsible for con-
trol of the GSDF, and changes in government will be touched on in relation
to this post-Cold War shift in the center and nature of civilian control.
The Realities of Civilian

Control Prior
to the Cold War
Institution Formation at the Time of the Defense Agency and SDF

Creation
It was then-Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru who created the institu-
tional framework for civilian control in the period leading up to the
establishment of the Defense Agency and SDF, as the NPR was created
236 K. MUSASHI
and then reorganized into the National Safety Agency (NSA). Yoshida,
who had bitter experiences of the prewar military control of the govern-
ment, assiduously prevented the return of former military officers to the
newly established NPR.8 For this reason, former Home Ministry bureau-
crats dominated the leadership of both the Internal Bureau and the uni-
formed personnel of the SDF precursors (the NPR and National Safety
Forces [NSF]). Both Masuhara Keikichi, director general of the NPR,
and his deputy Eguchi Mitoru had bureaucratic backgrounds. Masuhara
would continue in office, serving first as deputy director general of the
NSA following its creation and then as deputy director general of the
Defense Agency. At the same time, the NPR’s highest uniformed posi-
tion of senior superintendent went to Hayashi Keizō of the Imperial
Household Agency, a former Home Ministry official. Hayashi remained
in office until 1964, a period of fourteen years; during that time, he
served as chief of staff of the NSF and then as joint staff chief of staff for
the SDF. Military personnel had dominated leadership positions down
to the level of division director in the prewar Ministry of the Army; in
contrast, the postwar National Safety and Defense Agencies prevented
uniformed personnel from serving in the Internal Bureau in order to
ensure thorough control by civil officials. These former Home Ministry
and police bureaucrats would dominate key Internal Bureau positions
until the 1970s. They feared that allowing individuals with a military
background into the NPR would cause a restoration of the old mili-
tary’s influence and, for this reason, the Internal Bureau’s control was
strengthened and the authority of the uniformed personnel severely
restricted. Naturally, the need for former military personnel with com-
mand experience increased as the NPR became the NSF, and SDF and
its military capabilities expanded. The use of former military officers
became inevitable, and in October 1951, approximately 400 former field
grade officers were recruited.9 By the 1960s, the core of the uniformed
leadership had shifted from those with police bureaucrat backgrounds to
former members of the military.10
The Reform (Kaishintō) and Liberal (Jiyutō) Parties came into con-
flict during the decision-making process for the two laws that would
control the NSA’s transition into the new Defense Agency. The Liberal
Party and Internal Bureau wanted the Defense Agency and SDF to be
a continuation of the previous NSA and NSF, while the Reform Party
called for the creation of a “self-defense military (jieigun).”11 It was
absolutely necessary for Yoshida’s Liberal Party, which held a minor-
ity government, to gain the support of the Reform Party during the
negotiations over the issue between the three conservative parties (the
Liberal, Reform, and Japan Liberal [Nihon Jiyutō] Parties) and the
agreement reached over the foundation of the SDF reflected Reform’s
demands for this reason, making the SDF an organization with a clear
military character.12 The restrictions on the appointment of uniformed
personnel to Internal Bureau leadership positions were also lifted, as
called for by the Reform Party. Internal Bureau control over personnel
affairs meant that uniformed personnel were not actually appointed to
Internal Bureau leadership positions even after the law was amended,
however.
The civil official control structure of the Internal Bureau was also pre-
served in the Defense Agency in the same way that it had been in the
NSA. The basis for this control derives from the authority to assist the
director general (also called the civil official control assistance author-
ity) found in Article 20 of the former Defense Agency Establishment
Act (Bōeichō Secchihō) and Article 12 of the former Ministry of Defense
Establishment Act (Bōeishō Secchihō). The same system laid out its rela-
tionship with the Internal Bureau chiefs and the SDF chiefs of staff, stat-
ing that “the director general of the secretariat (kanbōchō) and bureau
chiefs, as related to their jurisdictional duties, assist the director general
in the following areas.” Those areas then listed included drawing up poli-
cies and basic implementation plans related to the SDF chiefs of staff,
instructions and endorsements given by the director general to the chiefs
to staff, instructions and endorsements given by the director general
related to items under the jurisdiction of the Joint Staff Council (JSC,
or Tōgō Bakuryō Kaigi), and the director general’s general supervision of
the branches of the SDF. In other words, by assisting the director general
in giving instructions and endorsements to the chiefs of staff, including
those involving the organization, planning, and tactics of the SDF, the
Internal Bureau was able to assume a leading role with regard to plan-
ning by the SDF staff offices. There exists a strongly held and plausible
belief among the uniformed personnel that the references to the director
general’s instructions, endorsements, and general supervision were based
on an assumption that the Internal Bureau’s authority was restricted to
“items related to the basics” of its jurisdictional duties and that details
would be left to the SDF chiefs of staff since Article 9, Section 2 of the
Self-Defense Forces Act states that each chief of staff assists the director
general as the highest specialist advisor concerning their units.13 National
238 K. MUSASHI
Safety Agency Order No. 9, which was also maintained following the
establishment of the Defense Agency, restricted the contact that uni-
formed personnel were permitted to have with politicians and bureau-
crats from other ministries. This came to be the institutional basis for the
Internal Bureau’s monopolization of negotiations with those outside the
Defense Agency.
As a result, the relationship between the Internal Bureau and the SDF
became one where it was possible for the Internal Bureau, through their
authority to assist the director general, to become involved not just in
the work of administrative management but in the planning and imple-
mentation of specialized military policy as well. This included matters
related to the operation of SDF units, based on the interpretation that
they were under the supervision of the administrative vice-minister of
defense.14 Unlike in the United States, where the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (largely composed of civilians) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have a balanced relationship, each having equal status under the Secretary
of Defense, Japan can be said to have a distinct form of civil official control
where the Internal Bureau, an administrative agency, ranks above the Joint
Staff Office.15
As for the politicians nominally at the center of control, a leader-
ship struggle waged within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, or Jiyū
Minshutō) during the early years of the 1955 System between hawks
who called for constitutional revision to allow active rearmament and
Yoshida Doctrine conservatives who supported maintaining a lightly
armed force as part of a policy centered on the US–Japan relationship.
But after Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke resigned as a result of the
demonstrations following the passage of the revised US–Japan Security
Treaty in 1960, he was followed by Prime Ministers Ikeda Hayato and
Satō Eisaku, both of whom maintained the lightly armed force policy
established by Yoshida Shigeru.16 Suffering fierce criticism by opposi-
tion parties on the defense issue, the primary response by LDP politi-
cians to the civilian control system for the SDF was to take a suppressive
stance, limiting the role of the SDF to one within the framework of the
US–Japan Security Treaty and strengthening the position of the Internal
Bureau, which had de facto control over SDF operations. The system of
civil official superiority that thus came to be codified would continue
throughout the Cold War.
The Defense Policy Decision-Making Process During the Cold War

Defense policies during the Cold War placed more emphasis on improv-
ing defense strength than the operation of the SDF. For that reason, the
focus of civilian control came to be the relationships between politicians,
Internal Bureau officials, and uniformed personnel during the drafting and
adoption of the annual defense budget and long-term defense plans such
as the Defense Program (Bōei Seibi Keikaku), National Defense Program
Outline (Bōei Keikaku no Taikō), and Mid-Term Defense Program
(Chūki Bōeiryoku Seibi Keikaku). For example, as part of the procedure
for defense planning, the joint staff chief of staff and branch chiefs of
staff submitted the Joint Long-Term Defense Estimate (Tōgō Chōki Bōei
Mitsumori), currently the Joint Long-Term Defense Strategy (Tōgō Chōki
Bōeiryoku Seibi Keikaku) and the Mid-Term Capability Estimate (Chūki
Nōr yoku Bōei Mitsumori) to the director general to be used as resources.
As the Internal Bureau (Bureau of Defense Policy) coordinated between
each staff office, the substantive drafts of these reports were drawn up
under its control.17 In the assessment of each year’s budget as well, the
Internal Bureau (Bureau of Finance) went over the requests from each
branch and effectively decided on them. Although the uniformed person-
nel were extremely dissatisfied with this Internal Bureau leadership in the
determination of defense plans and budgets, bureaucratic control by the
Internal Bureau operated throughout the Cold War.
The Defense Agency drafted defense plans on a regular schedule from
the First Defense Plan (the First Three-Year Defense Capability Plan) in
1958 to the Fourth Defense Plan (the Fourth Five-Year Defense Capability
Plan) in 1976. It was the former Home Ministry and police bureaucrats
making up the leadership of the Internal Bureau who took the lead during
the development of these plans; they sought to restrict Japan’s defense
capabilities to the bare minimum necessary assuming that the US–Japan
Security Treaty remained in force.
For example, the First Defense Plan (for 1958–1960) was the first time
a long-term plan had been drawn up and the question of which bureau
would have responsibility became a point of contention. The possibility of
placing the JSC in charge was explored, as the plan covered all branches of
the SDF, but its actual capabilities for coordination between the branches
were limited. Ultimately, the Internal Bureau (Bureau of Defense Policy),
with its wide authority over defense administration as a whole, got the
240 K. MUSASHI
job.18 While the First Defense Plan set a target size for the GSDF of
180,000 personnel, the importance of the US–Japan Security Treaty and
financial considerations were also incorporated, and through this, the
growth of the influence of the uniformed personnel within Japan’s auton-
omous defense concept was suppressed.
The uniformed personnel took the lead in the Second Defense Plan
(for 1961–1966) drawn up under Director General Akagi Munenori. This
plan revealed the “Akagi Concept,” a shift away from the emphasis on
ground forces in the first plan to one where the order of priority was air,
sea, and then the ground. However, this plan encountered opposition not
only from the Ministry of Finance (Ō kurashō) for its greatly increased
spending, but also from Kaihara Osamu, director of the Bureau of Defense
Policy; the plan was forced to undergo a complete re-examination.19 As a
result, although a relatively low-cost plan to reorganize the GSDF into
thirteen divisions was approved, the expensive proposal to provide the
MSDF with helicopter carriers was shelved. The Internal Bureau would,
like the Ministry of Finance, adopt financial limitations as a shield with
which to fend off the proposals of the uniformed personnel in future long-
term plans as well.
For its part, the decision-making process for the Third Defense Plan
(for 1967–1971) adopted under the Satō Cabinet (1964–1972) was
entirely concerned with the issue of whether the plan should be treated
as an extension of the previous plan and be limited to the same budget.
Prime Minister Satō ’s passiveness was also a factor. The plan incorporated
policies emphasizing naval defense strength and made the policy of pursu-
ing the domestic production of defense equipment clear. The transfer of
Kaihara, a strong advocate of ground forces, from the head of the Bureau
of Defense Policy (which was in charge of drawing up defense plans) to
director general of the secretariat has been given as a reason for the shift
away from ground defense, which had been emphasized in the first two
plans, toward naval defense.20
In comparison, Nakasone Yasuhiro, who had been appointed direc-
tor general in 1970, advocated a change toward a policy of independent
defense capabilities (the New Defense Capabilities Concept, or Shin
Bōeiryoku Seibi Kōsō) during the drafting of the Fourth Defense Plan.
Public criticism of this as a restoration of militarism and the negative influ-
ence of the Nixon Shocks caused Nakasone’s plans to be rejected by the
director generals that followed him, however. Kaihara, who had become
director general of the National Defense Council, opposed basic policies of
this fourth plan such as its emphasis on naval defense strength and drafted
a private outline; the new version of the plan accepted, an extension of the
third plan centered on the US–Japan Security Treaty, is thought to have
been largely based on this draft.21
After this, with the formation of the Miki Takeo government in
December 1974 and the appointment of the dovish Sakata Michita as
head of the Defense Agency, Kubo Takuya rose to the top of the Internal
Bureau, moving from head of the Bureau of Defense Policy to administra-
tive vice-minister of defense.22 The National Defense Program Outline
(the [Shō wa] “51 Outline”) based on the “Basic Defense Force Concept
(Kibanteki Bōoeiryoku Kōsō)” proposed by Kubo was adopted in 1976.
This concept rejected the traditional “requirement-based defense force
concept (Shoyō Bōeiryoku Kōsō)” and was derived from the mindset that
the defense force should be restricted to that necessary to respond to
limited, small-scale direct invasions. The uniformed personnel strongly
opposed Kubo’s concept, but although they were successful in changing
the outline’s wording to say that the SDF was to “independently elimi-
nate” rather than “flexibly react to” limited, small-scale direct invasions,
they ultimately had no choice but to accede to Kubo’s concept.23
It was thus the leadership of the Internal Bureau that led the defense
policy formation process in the Cold War period through the 1970s.
Following the adoption of the National Defense Program Outline, the
ability of outside groups such as the Finance Ministry to influence defense
planning was reduced by having defense planning take the form of the
Mid-Term Planning Estimates, an internal Defense Agency report rather
than a government plan. This change meant that the Internal Bureau took
on the director general’s role of suppressing the uniformed personnel’s
demands for greater defense strength so as to conform to the domestic
political environment.24
The monopolization of the top posts of the Internal Bureau by for-
mer Home Ministry and police bureaucrats can be pinpointed as a human
factor making this form of civil official control possible. The Defense
Agency had become available as a career path for bureaucrats following
its establishment in 1955, but it would take years for these “homegrown”
bureaucrats to be eligible for leadership positions. Thus, the core of the
Internal Bureau leadership was made up of people who had transferred
in: those with Home Ministry (Naimushō) and National Police Agency
(Keisatsuchō) backgrounds until the late 1970s, followed by bureaucrats
from the Ministry of Finance as that ministry increased its importance in
242 K. MUSASHI
determining the Defense Agency’s budget.25 Together with those from

other ministries, these external personnel made up the leadership. Many
of these transferees in the Internal Bureau leadership had prewar and war-
time military experience and the mindset that the role of the Internal
Bureau was to keep the uniformed personnel down to prevent the old
military’s despotism had been handed down since the establishment of the
Defense Agency.26 Based on this background, it can be said that there was
a strong tendency among the former Home Ministry and National Police
Agency officials who made up the mainstream of the Internal Bureau lead-
ership until the 1970s to take a strongly suppressive line toward the opera-
tion of the SDF. At the same time, the transferees from the Ministry of
Finance who strengthened their influence within the Internal Bureau from
the 1970s on were relatively closer to the uniformed personnel because
of the defense budget process, and can be seen as having been relatively
flexible in their relationship with the staff offices as well.27 However, the
Internal Bureau’s role as the “SDF Administration Agency,” more con-
cerned with the administration of the SDF’s equipment and organization
than its actual operation, was dominant throughout the Cold War until
the 1980s. It did not go beyond the traditional realm of suppressive civil
official control.28
In the 1980s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered a “new Cold
War” between the United States and Soviet Union, however, changing
the security environment. In response to American requests for security
burden-sharing, Nakasone, who had become prime minister in 1982, had
the cabinet approve the Mid-Term Defense Program in 1985, returning
defense planning to the government plan level and causing the defense
budget to break one percent of Gross National Product (GNP). By
planning to strengthen Japanese maritime and airspace control capabili-
ties, the Japanese commitment to the US–Japan alliance was also made
clear. Under the Nakasone government (1982–1987), the new Cold War
became an opportunity for the defense policy decision-making process,
which had been centered on the Internal Bureau, to show a new trend
toward political leadership in which the prime minister took the initiative.
Civilian Control Issues Which Became Evident During

the Cold War
While the Internal Bureau’s civil official control thus continued through-
out the Cold War, a number of incidents can be pointed to where actions
by uniformed personnel made civilian control problems evident and led to

the director general to make use of his command authority. The Mitsuya
Incident and the forced resignation of Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff,
Kurisu Hiroomi, were notable incidents of this type.
The Mitsuya Incident was a major political scandal in which the
Socialist Okada Haruo revealed at a February 1965 meeting of the
House of Representatives Budget Committee that Tanaka Yoshio, head
of the JSC’s executive office, had headed a group of fifty-three uniformed
officers that secretly created the 1963 General Defense Plan of Operation
(known as the Mitsuya Study).29 This study hypothesized that an armed
conflict had broken out on the Korean peninsula and spread to the point
that it affected Japan; the study included addressing what steps Japan
should take in response, including what emergency legislation should
be passed. The opposition parties noted that this research had been
undertaken without the involvement of the Defense Agency’s director
general and criticized the government for failing to adequately control
the SDF. They further accused the uniformed personnel of intending to
intervene in politics with the goal of re-establishing the prewar national
mobilization system. In response, Director General Koizumi Junya
explained that the legislative research had been improper and Prime
Minister Satō promised to take adequate action, alluding to the potential
for misunderstanding by the public.30 The Defense Agency also submit-
ted a report to both houses of the Diet stating that there was no inten-
tion in the Mitsuya Study for the intervention by uniformed personnel in
politics. It further explained that the study was not an independent act of
the uniformed personnel; that it was merely research and nothing formal
or official like a defense plan and that members of the Internal Bureau
had participated as observers. Topics outside of the organizational opera-
tion of the SDF were only listed and not actually gone into during the
research. Concerning the so-called mobilization system, the study envi-
sioned that it would be handled by those agencies authorized to do so.
As for the introduction of American nuclear weapons and actions by
the SDF outside of Japanese territorial waters and airspace, decisions on
those matters were to await decisions made at the highest political levels.
The matter was tentatively resolved when the House of Representatives
Budget Committee’s Subcommittee on the Defense Plan of Operation
Issue (Shūugiin Yosan Iinkai Bōei Zujō Kenkyū Mondaitō Shōiinkai)
accepted this explanation from the government and gave a final report
to the Budget Committee that included the necessity of establishing a
244 K. MUSASHI
special committee in the Diet for the purpose of controlling the SDF.31
Satō tried to calm down public criticism after the incident was exposed
by dismissing Major General Tanaka Yoshio, who as secretary general of
the Joint Staff headed the study, and twenty-six others involved in the
incident for breaching confidentiality, and appointing Matsuno Raizō ,
the head of the subcommittee, as the new director general of the Defense
Agency.32 A strong tendency developed for research into emergency situ-
ations to be seen as taboo by those in the Diet as a result of this incident.
Policy debate over defense issues also stagnated.
As for the second incident, in July 1978, Chief of Staff Kurisu made
a problematic statement, saying that SDF field commanders would have
to take extralegal actions in the case of a sneak attack or other emergency
due to the absence of a sufficient legal framework. Kurisu was then essen-
tially removed from office by Defense Agency Director General Kanemaru
Shin. Kanemaru gave as the reason for Kurisu’s dismissal that the idea
of the SDF taking extralegal action violated the principle of civilian con-
trol and the statement was misleading and inappropriate for someone in
Kurisu’s position to make publicly.33 However, examination of the issue
of legislation on emergency measures had actually begun in August 1977
when Director General Mihara Asao directed the Defense Agency to study
the issue with the approval of then-Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo. The
Defense Agency accepted Kurisu’s resignation, making clear its opinion
that the study of legislation for emergencies was something to be taken up
by the Defense Agency as a whole.34 Following this, the issue was reviewed
by the government with the Defense Agency taking the lead; in addition
to the laws under the governance of the Defense Agency (Class 1), laws
under the governance of other agencies (Class 2) were also studied in
order to ensure the smooth operation of the SDF. A breakdown of the
government’s findings was released in October 1984.
Regarding the use of initiative by the director general of the Defense
Agency in civilian control issues, it is evident from these incidents that the
director general, a politician, made use of his authority over personnel to
put out fires in response to public criticism and questioning by the oppo-
sition party in the Diet when problems related to the uniformed person-
nel were detected. This was only a passive response taken when problems
came to light; the director general did not make proactive use of his con-
trol. For this reason, legislation on emergency situations was never actually
taken up in the political process during the Cold War and remained at the
level of internal government studies.
Changes in Civilian Control Following

the Cold War
Control by the Director General of the Defense Agency

and Changes in the Attributes of the Director General
The director generals of the Cold War period were generally passive in
their involvement in defense policy and lacked necessary expertise. It
became the norm for director generals to be regularly changed; the aver-
age time in office for a director general was a mere nine months. This
was one reason why the form of civilian control in which control over the
uniformed personnel was entrusted to the Internal Bureau came about.
However, this largely passive nature changed greatly following the end
of the Cold War. The reason for this was a transformation in the defense
zoku, or tribe, of members of the LDP. During the Cold War, membership
in the defense zoku was dominated by former military officers, those with
Defense Agency and SDF backgrounds such as former uniformed person-
nel and Internal Bureau bureaucrats, and those with experience as direc-
tor general.35 A politician becoming a member of the defense zoku and
assuming a key position within the party in the determination of defense
policy after ending their time as director general was a common pattern,
as seen in cases like those of Funada Naka, Mihara, Kurihara Yūkō , and
Ō mura Jō ji.36 The expectation of support from defense industries and
those involved with the SDF in the form of political funds and votes was
an incentive to join the defense zoku.
After the Cold War, however, a new pattern emerged; it became com-
mon for director generals to have pursued the position, building up a
career as a member of the defense zoku beforehand and serving in posi-
tions such as parliamentary vice-minister of defense or as head of the
LDP’s national defense section. The interest of politicians in defense issues
increased as a result of changes to the electoral process for the House of
Representatives and Diet reform, and the incentive for joining the defense
zoku shifted from the traditional benefits of money and votes to a mis-
sion of fulfilling the national interest through constitutional revision and
security policy.37 The demanding of policies ahead of the government
by organizations related to defense such as the LDP Security Research
Council (Kokubō Kankei Bukai) came to be a lever that could be used to
make the government act. Examples of such demands include the revi-
sion of the US–Japan Defense Guidelines, the preparation of legislation
246 K. MUSASHI
for emergency situations, the enactment of a permanent law on the over-

seas deployment of the SDF, and the international standardization of
the use of arms. Leading these defense-related groups were members of
the defense zoku such as Yamazaki Taku, Ishiba Shigeru, Kyūma Fumio,
Nakatani Gen, and Hamada Yasukazu. A tendency became apparent in
which director generals with defense zoku backgrounds led the way for the
active use of the SDF, as if concertedly trying to expand the role of the
post-Cold War SDF. They also strengthened their ties with the uniformed
personnel during their careers as members of the defense zoku and were
more sympathetic to them than the pacifist director generals had been.
In the post-Cold War era, issues related to the use of the SDF became
the core of defense policy, issues such as SDF participation in peacekeep-
ing operations (PKO), intercepting unidentified ships, its dispatch to Iraq
and the Indian Ocean, and the establishment of legislation on emergen-
cies. For that reason the director generals themselves came to feel the need
for direct assistance from the uniformed personnel. Inefficiencies caused
by the inability of the branches of the SDF to work together and the dupli-
cation of roles between the Internal Bureau and the SDF staff offices also
became issues. Although strengthening joint operations capabilities and
revision of the civil official control system were issues put forward by the
uniformed personnel, it was initiatives by director generals (ministers of
defense) such as Nakatani, Ishiba, and Ō no Yoshinori that actually made
these official topics for discussion.38
The Shift Toward Direct/Proactive Control by the Director

General
That American foreign and security policy came to seek more defense
cooperation from Japan on a global scale due to new threats from ten-
sions in the East Asia and the 9/11 attacks can be raised as a factor in
this shift toward active use (and active control) of the SDF by the post-
Cold War director generals. Restrictions on the director general were
also relaxed by domestic factors like changes in the security environment
surrounding Japan, shifts in popular sentiment toward the SDF following
its performance in disaster relief operations and involvement in interna-
tional contributions, and differences in the political situation caused by
government changes and the formation of coalition governments. The
normalization of coalition governments with the end of the 1955 System
and the great transformation in the stance taken by opposition parties such
as the Socialist Party toward the SDF following the end of the Cold War
especially spurred on the government and LDP to promote the enactment
of defense policy into law, something that had been restrained during the
Cold War.
The public’s perception of the SDF changed greatly after the end of
the Cold War with the appearance of new threats such as the 1990s North
Korean nuclear issue, cases of unidentified ships, and the emergence of the
SDF’s crisis management role in cases of terrorism and natural disasters.
Taking in this change, dovish Diet members were sidelined in the gov-
ernment and party during the Koizumi Junichirō (Junya’s son) and Abe
Shinzō (Kishi’s grandson) governments that came to power in the 2000s;
hawks and members of the defense zoku took hold of positions at the
center of government such as director general and LDP secretary general,
gaining control of defense policy decision-making authority within the
government party. By making active use of the SDF, this change in control
affected the very nature of that control. Research analyzing changes in
the topics taken up for deliberation by the Security Council, which deter-
mines the content of security policy at the cabinet level, shows that debate
related to the use of the SDF increased rapidly. Debate related to the use
of the SDF in roles such as making international contributions increased
following the 1990 Gulf Crisis; cases considering or actually implementing
the use of the SDF in the case of a crisis then became normal under the
Koizumi government following the 9/11 attacks in 2001.39 This attests
to the direct and active involvement by politicians in the use of the SDF.
This change in the environment encompassing the SDF also brought
about the re-examination of the Cold War era civil official control system.
National Safety Agency Order No. 9, which restricted contact between
uniformed personnel and politicians or central ministry bureaucrats, was
abolished in 1997 at the wishes of Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutarō ,
who placed value in relationships with uniformed personnel. Close rela-
tionships between the various chiefs of staff and bodies outside of the
Defense Agency such as the foreign ministry and the cabinet secretariat
formed as they worked together on legislation for emergencies and the
overseas deployment of the SDF.40
Within the Defense Agency as well, the joint staff chief of staff has been
able to centralize the advice given to ministers on the use of the SDF from
the perspective of military specialists by strengthening joint operations.
This move toward a joint operation framework has reduced the Internal
Bureau’s role coordinating between the staff offices, one of its resources
248 K. MUSASHI
for civil official control. In reality, the influence of the uniformed person-
nel on the director general became pervasive from the time of Director
General Nakatani on as their advisory functions expanded and they devel-
oped an increasingly close relationship with the director general.
Changes to Civil Official Control
Agreement Between the Internal Bureau and Uniformed

Personnel
The civil official control of the Cold War era preserved civil official suprem-
acy in the clash between the opposing interests of the Internal Bureau who
controlled and suppressed the SDF for the purpose of adapting it to the
political environment and the uniformed personnel who sought to build
a system in which a capable SDF could optimize military rationality. What
changed this conflict over organizational interests was that by the 1980s,
career bureaucrats hired by the Defense Agency had gained enough senior-
ity to be eligible for high leadership posts such as bureau head and admin-
istrative vice-minister. The first of these homegrown bureaucrats to reach
the post of administrative vice-minister was Nishihiro Seiki, who entered
the Defense Agency in 1956. From 1995 onward, the post of vice-minister
would alternate between homegrown bureaucrats and those from the finance
ministry. Then, beginning with Itō Yasunari’s appointment in 2002, the post
was given to homegrown bureaucrats three times in a row (Table 5.1). As
the homegrown bureaucrats came to monopolize leadership positions at the
bureau chief level and above in the late 1980s, the Internal Bureau’s percep-
tion of the uniformed personnel changed; unlike the situation under the
bureaucrats who had transferred into the Defense Agency at the time of its
creation, a feeling of organizational unity was fostered.41
This trend is also thought to have been reflected in the personnel affairs
of the uniformed personnel leadership. While the director general was the
one with authority over the appointment of SDF leadership positions, in
practice the Internal Bureau had come to carry out the appointment of
flag officers based on reports from each branch’s staff office. The inclina-
tions of politicians and the Internal Bureau leadership are thought to have
had no small amount of influence over this process.42 Until this point,
the promotion path for flag rank had been, in the case of the GSDF,
being selected in turn for the Command and General Staff Course, the
Advanced Command and General Staff Course, the Joint Staff College’s
Table 6.1 Numbers of the Ministries that all the past Administrative Vice-
Ministers of Defense originally belonged to, 1954–2015
Ministry National Ministry of Ministry Ministry % of
of Police Communications of of Ministry
Interior Agency and Finance Defense of
Transportation Defense
1954–1959 2 0 0 0 0 0.0
1960–1969 0 3 1 0 0 0.0
1970–1979 0 4 0 2 0 0.0
1980–1989 0 0 0 4 2 33.3
1990–1999 0 1 0 3 2 33.3
2000–2009 0 0 0 2 3 60.0
2010–2015 0 0 0 0 3 100.0
Total 2 8 1 11 10
Source: Hirose (1989) and Boei Nenkan [Defence Yearbook], edition of each year
Joint Advanced Course, and the National Institute for Defense Studies
general and special courses.43 Since the 1990 appointment of the 22nd
GSDF Chief of Staff Atsushi Shima, the first to graduate from the National
Defense Academy, however, the career paths of all other GSDF Chiefs of
Staff, virtually without exception, have followed the course of staff office
team head, regiment commander, staff office section head, promotion to
major general, army headquarters deputy chief of staff, staff office division
head, promotion to lieutenant general, division commander, staff office
deputy chief of staff, and army commander. The path of promotion to
the top uniformed positions thus became fixed in the 1990s after they
became monopolized by graduates of the National Defense Academy. As
the uniformed personnel made the screening of individuals for positions a
completely routine internal matter, the room for the Internal Bureau and
politicians to intervene in personnel matters became limited to a few top
positions such as that of chief of staff. It is clear that the Cold War idea that
the function of the Internal Bureau was to suppress the uniformed person-
nel also became increasingly weaker from the 1990s onward.44
From the previous points, we can understand that from the late 1980s,
a transition of power had occurred in the Internal Bureau and SDF to a
new generation, making homegrown bureaucrats and National Defense
Academy graduates the new centers of power. Given this background,
it can be understood that there was an increased tendency for the more
proactive among the Internal Bureau civil officials to agree with the SDF’S
250 K. MUSASHI
policy orientations. Closer cooperation between the Internal Bureau and

uniformed personnel naturally had an effect on the hierarchical relation-
ship between the two groups and those who supported the proactive use
of the SDF came to hold influence among the post-Cold War Internal
Bureau leadership. It was the mid-level homegrown bureaucrats who had
become bureau chiefs especially who effectively promoted the proactive
use of the SDF in areas such as negotiations with the United States regard-
ing SDF operations. From their experiences studying in the United States
and being in contact with American military personnel, they had gained a
tendency to conceive defense plans from the perspective of operations.45
As a result, even if the Internal Bureau and uniformed personnel opposed
each other internally, they came to show a tendency to act in unison
against external agencies and powers in the post-Cold War era in areas
that touched on the organizational interests of the Defense Agency and
the SDF, such as the use and authorization of the SDF.46 In other words,
the traditional top-down form of civil official control within the Defense
Agency and SDF came to be transformed into the more horizontal rela-
tionship of naibaku ittai (“Internal Bureau-Staff Offices United”) as the
Internal Bureau and staff offices found a commonality of interests.
With this new generation of Internal Bureau leaders and the need to
respond to post-Cold War environmental changes from the 1990s on, the
nature of the Internal Bureau’s civil official control changed from holding
back the SDF to actively using it.
Specific Changes to Civilian Control Following the End

of the Cold War
After the Cold War, the SDF came to grope for a new role making inter-
national contributions as international opinion, triggered by the Gulf War,
pushed for Japan to make security contributions commensurate with its
economic power. With the passing of the PKO law and the subsequent
dispatch of the GSDF to Cambodia, it has become the norm for the SDF
to participate in international peace cooperation activities such as deploy-
ing engineering units to East Timor. The law was amended based on the
lessons of these PKO to authorize the use of weapons only on the orders of
superior officers rather than leave it to the judgment of individual soldiers.
At the same time, the threat reduction caused by the fall of the Soviet
Union brought about the job of reducing the size of the SDF. In addition
to the Internal Bureau, the SDF chiefs of staff participated in the 1995
revision of the National Defense Program Outline (the “07 Outline”) and
helped set its contents.47 The outline detailed a downsizing to streamline
the SDF; the size of the active duty GSDF was reduced from 180,000 to
145,000. At the same time, the outline made clear the expansion of the
SDF’s role to include international peace cooperation, large-scale disaster
relief, and responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan through
the smooth and efficient operation of the US–Japan security framework.
With this outline in hand, the 1978 US–Japan Defense Guidelines (which
had never really been put into effect) were revised. The new guidelines
agreed upon in 1997 were focused primarily on Japan providing rear
area support to the American military in situations occurring in areas sur-
rounding Japan. The influence of the uniformed personnel was relatively
strengthened by the negotiation process for the guidelines as, for exam-
ple, the forty items on cooperation with the United States were decided
through discussions by military and civil officials from both the United
States and Japan.48
Then, with the emergence of a new threat with the 9/11 attacks, the
special measures laws was passed and the SDF was dispatched to the Indian
Ocean and Iraq. At the same time, the crisis legislation system was pre-
pared for domestic emergencies. The establishment of these laws increased
the importance of deciding how the actual deployment of units overseas
should work. Domestically, it raised the issues of how cooperation and
interaction with other agencies should be planned and how joint SDF
and American actions could be made to go smoothly. These points could
not be addressed by civil officials alone; they did not have the knowledge
necessary to actually manage units. The need for the uniformed personnel
as military specialists thus increased. As a result, there were cases where
the traditional mode of civil official control was turned on its head; during
the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Iraq Special
Measures Law, the Internal Bureau and director general voiced the opin-
ions of the uniformed personnel on topics such as loosening standards
on the use of weapons and the land transport of weapons, ammunition,
and personnel, and negotiated with the Cabinet Legislation Bureau and
New Komeito (a member of the coalition government). Concerning the
dispatch of the SDF overseas as well, while there were those within the
LDP who thought of deploying the SDF to provide medical assistance in
Pakistan or clear landmines in Afghanistan, the Ground Staff Office was
able to avoid this by converting Director General Nakatani and members
of the Diet to its side.49
252 K. MUSASHI
The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was also revised to permit the
use of weapons during SDF overseas activities in the defense of “those who
came under their control in the course of their duties.” This was done with
the defense of people affected by disasters and wounded American soldiers
in mind. This same revision was also made to the Peacekeeping Operation
Cooperation Law and, with the end of the freeze on peacekeeping forces
operations, the same use of weapons became possible in those operations.
The uniformed personnel strongly sought for permission to use weapons
in the execution of their duties to be included in the Iraq Special Measures
Law at the time of the GSDF’s deployment to Iraq. Ultimately, this expan-
sion of weapons usage authorization to international standards did not
come about due to opposition from the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, who
believed such to be equivalent to the “use of force” prohibited by Article
9 of the Japanese constitution. The Ground Staff Office implemented unit
deployments by reinforcing the level of weaponry equipped and the rules
of engagement laid out in the operation’s basic plan as an alternative to an
expansion of weapon use authorization.50 We can see from these examples
the degree and extent of the uniformed personnel’s influence at the actual
operational level of the GSDF.
During the Cold War, there were a certain number of severe restric-
tions on the defense budget deriving from budget negotiations with the
Ministry of Finance and disagreements between the political parties. The
“one percent of GNP” cap on the defense budget was eliminated, albeit
only slightly, in the 1980s, due to American pressure to increase defense
strength, but a streamlining of the defense budget was sought after the
end of the Cold War and year-to-year changes in the budget during the
last ten years of fiscal restructuring have been non-existent or negative.51
The defense budget has lost its Cold War era importance as an important
cause of interparty conflict, however, and, except in the case of special
requests, the content of the budget has become routine and approval is
handled internally by the Internal Bureau.52 The restriction of the budget
under a ceiling can be given as one reason why the relationship between
the Internal Bureau and staff offices has changed to one where they come
together to create a Defense Agency proposal and then negotiate with
the Ministry of Finance.53 The issue of defense strength thus declined
from its Cold War importance as post-Cold War defense policy moved to
actual operational issues such as disaster relief, overseas deployment, and
responding to unidentified ships. This change caused the influence of the
uniformed personnel to increase and a corresponding unavoidable decline

in that of the Internal Bureau.54
In terms of defense policy as well, the proactive use of the SDF was fully
set out in the new National Defense Program Outline created in 2004
which adopted the concept of multifunctional, flexible defense capabilities
capable of responding to new threats and a primary, active approach to
international peace cooperation activities. As a result, international peace
cooperation activities were made one of the SDF’s primary missions in
conjunction with the Defense Agency’s transition to the MOD in 2007.
At the same time, as this active use of the post-Cold War SDF pro-
gressed, objections to the system of civil official control began to come
from within the uniformed personnel. In June 2004, MSDF Chief of Staff
Furushō Kō ichi put forth a reform proposal which included the aboli-
tion of the defense counselor system, the elimination of the administrative
vice-minister’s oversight authority for unit operations, and the granting
of jurisdiction over the administration of SDF operations to the joint staff
chief of staff.55 This proposal reflected the inclinations of the uniformed
personnel (including those of the GSDF and ASDF), but opposition from
the Internal Bureau prevented it from moving beyond an item of study.56
However, the background to the uniformed personnel’s request was that
the planning and operation of military plans and training by the Internal
Bureau, made up of civil officials that were not military specialists, was not
necessarily militarily compatible.57 By being limited to the coordination of
specific requests from the SDF staff offices, specialized groups overseeing
both planning and implementation, it could not ensure effective control.
This had been a structural issue since the creation of the SDF.58
Conclusion
In response to the expansion of the SDF’s role following the end of the
Cold War, the Defense Agency was upgraded to the MOD as the pri-
mary body in charge of defense policy in 2007. However, after Indian
Ocean refueling errors, the corruption case of former Administrative Vice-
Minister of Defense Moriya Takemasa, the collision of the Aegis destroyer
Atago with a fishing boat, and information leaks all occurred in the same
period, pressure built for organizational reform of the entire ministry. In
response to these problems, then-Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo formed
the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense, a group of experts,
putting the Prime Minister’s Office at the lead on the issue. This council
254 K. MUSASHI
put forth reform proposals that strengthened the authority of the uni-
formed personnel with regard to the operational actions of the SDF, such
as the abolition of the defense counselor system, the integration of the
Internal Bureau’s SDF operation functions into the Joint Staff Office, and
the employment of uniformed personnel within the Bureau of Defense
Policy in leadership positions below the deputy level. The transfer and
unification of operational functions within the Joint Staff Office was some-
thing the uniformed personnel had sought for some time for the purpose
of rapid, unified handling of unit operations, and was put forth under
the lead of Minister of Defence Ishiba, who had called for mixing civil
officials and uniformed personnel. This reform plan meant the end of the
Internal Bureau’s operational authority over the uniformed personnel. At
the same time, there was also some dissatisfaction by the uniformed per-
sonnel toward the council’s report, because it also included a proposal for
the restructuring and unification of the groups involved in the improve-
ment of defense capabilities (which were then under the control of the
branch staff offices). This was something that Minister Ishiba had strongly
pushed for. The 171st Diet (2009) amended the law establishing the
MOD during the following Asō Tarō government (2008–2009), abolish-
ing the defense counselor system that had come to symbolize civil official
control. The Defense Council was also established. This is a body made up
of all three groups (advisors, civil officials, and uniformed personnel) that
deliberates on basic ministry policies and advises the minister of defense
on policy decisions.
The organizational reform of the MOD drastically changed in 2009,
however, with the electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ,
or Nihon Minshutō) and the formation of a new coalition government.
The Hatoyama Yukio government (2009–2010) adopted a politician-led
framework in which the three parliamentary officials (the minister, vice-
minister, and parliamentary secretary) drew up the final drafts of proposed
policies instead of the traditional bureaucracy-led system and abolished
the system in which the government party would screen items ahead of
time, unifying all policy decision-making within the government. During
this change to a politician-led policy decision system, the Hatoyama gov-
ernment’s minister of defense, Kitazawa Toshimi, overturned the defense
ministry reform plan reviewed by the prior government and started a
one year investigation of the issue from scratch.59 The Internal Bureau
bureaucrats expected that the change in government would put the brakes
on the prior government’s reform plan, which had increasingly moved
toward giving the uniformed personnel precedence.60 Minister of Defense

Kitazawa appointed former Joint Staff Chief of Staff Nishimoto Tetsuya
as an advisor to the minister of defense.61 In addition to giving himself
a personal advisor, he established a consulting group of experts on the
defense ministry reform plan to give advice to all the parliamentary offi-
cers. This group seriously considered the proposals to move the Internal
Bureau’s operational functions to the joint staff and mix civil officials
and uniformed personnel within the Internal Bureau. The reform plan
had been developing to the advantage of the uniformed personnel, but
the replacement of ASDF Chief of Staff Tamogami Toshio in October
2008 and inappropriate comments criticizing the prime minister made
by a GSDF regiment commander in February 2010 helped bring about
changes. Despite counterarguments from the uniformed personnel within
the MOD, ultimately the organizational reform plan was re-examined at
Minister of Defense Kitazawa’s order. Only small changes are expected in
the existing framework of personnel exchanges and training between the
uniformed personnel and civil officials, a review based on simulations of
operational situations, and a review of the efficiency and effectiveness of
the defense capability improvement groups.62
At the same time, since the formation of the coalition government
headed by the DPJ, a re-examination of the foreign and security poli-
cies of the prior LDP–Komeitō governments had been undertaken by the
Hatoyama and Kan Naoto (2010–2011) governments. It was reflected in
the end of the MSDF’s refueling mission in the Indian Ocean and actions
aimed at reducing American military bases in Okinawa. This was especially
true of the issue of the movement of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma:
Hatoyama’s election pledge to move this base “outside of the prefecture,
at least” was a direct cause of the political confusion that culminated in his
cabinet’s sudden resignation when he ultimately returned to the original
US–Japan agreement reached under a LDP–Komeitō coalition govern-
ment to relocate Futenma within Okinawa Prefecture. Adoption of the
new National Defense Program Outline reviewed by the LDP–Komeitō
coalition government was also re-examined by the DPJ coalition before
being accepted in December 2010. The new plan set forth building
dynamic defense capabilities with a focus on operations instead of the basic
defense concept that placed emphasis on the inherent deterrent effect
of defense strength. Defense Minister Kitazawa resisted the Ministry of
Finance’s goal of a great reduction in the size of the GSDF, and ultimately
an agreement was reached limiting the personnel reduction to 1000 by
256 K. MUSASHI
significantly reducing equipment such as tanks and artillery. At the same

time, Prime Minister Kan, conscious of the Social Democratic Party’s
positions and expecting their cooperation in the Diet, where the ruling
party lacked a majority in the House of Councilors following the 2010
Upper House elections, removed re-examination of the Three Principles
on Arms Exports from the review of the defense outline. Even though the
questions of what kind of plan security policy should be decided under as
a government and what place the SDF should have were important policy
issues for the DPJ coalition government, these policy changes were not
necessarily based on a consistent philosophy. It was the Internal Bureau
bureaucrats rather than the main interested party, the uniformed person-
nel, who assisted in these peacetime decisions by the defense minister and
had the most influence.
Regionally, Joint Task Force Tō hoku (under the command of Lieutenant
General Kimizuka Eiji, commander of the GSDF North Eastern Army)
was created following the March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake
to control joint operations between the SDF branches. At its height,
it included over 100,000 personnel engaged in disaster relief. The first
nuclear disaster relief order was also issued in response to the accident
at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The Nuclear Disaster Relief
Unit, approximately 500 people built around the GSDF’s Central Nuclear
Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, was activated and performed
tasks such as water spraying operations using fire engines and helicopters,
evacuation guidance, and decontamination assistance. In response to this
unparalleled disaster, the MOD and SDF established the internal Ministry
of Defense Disaster Countermeasures Office with Defense Minister
Kitazawa at its head. There were many occasions during the course of
these incidents when the instructions of the minister depended on infor-
mation gathered from local commanders with the assistance of the joint
staff chief of staff and the role of Internal Bureau bureaucrats in advising
the minister could not avoid declining accordingly.
As a result of the December 2012 General Elections, the LDP came
to power again forming another coalition government with Kō meitō ,
and the second Abe Shinzō administration was born (the first one hav-
ing been in office from September 2006 to September 2007). At the
direction of Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori, reforms of the Defense
Ministry, begun during the previous administration, were restarted, and in
August 2013, the Committee to Study Defense Ministry Reforms (Bōeishō
Kaikaku Kentō Iinkai) submitted its report to Minister Onodera calling
for the review of the organizational structure of the operations and plans
division of the Internal Bureau and the integration of the operation of the
actual units of the SDF into the Joint Staff from the perspective of seeing
joint operations strengthened, and from the perspective of strengthening
the overall development of defense capabilities and related procurement,
the establishment of an equipment procurement agency within MOD.63
Based on this report, the Abe Cabinet submitted to the 189th Diet session
revisions to the MOD Law, dissolving the Internal Bureau’s Operations
and Planning Division and unified the affairs relating to the actual unit
operations within the Joint Staff. In addition, it revised Article 12 of the
MOD Law, upon which the principle of civilian control rests, limiting the
role of the support of the Internal Bureau to that of policy matters while
simultaneously empowering the chiefs of staff to support of the defense
minister on military matters. By equalizing the civilians and those in uni-
form in their support of the defense minister, it can be argued that the
influence of those in uniform has grown and may continue to do so in
the future. It is essential, however, that the civilian defense minister main-
tain and strengthen a chain of command that balances such information
received from uniformed personnel with assistance from Internal Bureau
bureaucrats rather than over relying on it; this is necessary in order to
make appropriate decisions based on a broader perspective that takes in
international relations, the domestic political environment, and compat-
ibility with the law, not just military rationality. This is true even of opera-
tions by the SDF in emergencies, to say nothing of peacetime operations.
On July 1, 2014, the Abe Cabinet decided to pursue the “Development
of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its
People” and draft the appropriate legislation after consultations with its
coalition partner and other parties. On May 15, 2015, following another
Cabinet decision approving the draft bill, the “Legislation for Peace and
Security (Heiwa Anzen Hōsei Kanren ni Hōan)” was submitted to the
189th Diet session for deliberations. This legislation creates a new per-
manent type of law called the International Peace Support Law (Kokusai
Heiwa Shienhō), which enables the provision of necessary support to the
armed forces of foreign countries (to include those of the United States)
collectively addressing the situation which threatens the international
peace and security, and amends, predicated on the exercise of the right to
collective self-defense, ten existing laws on responses to an armed attack,
not only on Japan as is currently the case but also against a foreign country
resulting in threats to Japan’s survival. By enactment of the legislation, the
258 K. MUSASHI
SDF will not only be responsible for Japan’s national defense and respond-
ing to disasters, but will also likely see their missions expand globally to
assist the militaries of the United States and other countries in rear area
support as well as PKO and other international peace- and security-related
cooperation. To gain both domestic and international acceptance of this
expansion of SDF activities, there must be an established civilian control
system with adequate checking functions operating within the govern-
ment when decisions are made in order to respond to the ideas of the
uniformed personnel which place an emphasis on military rationality. For
that reason, it is all the more necessary that the government holds itself
accountable to the people and foster trust with neighboring countries by
approving basic plans in the Diet and actively disclosing information dur-
ing overseas deployments of the SDF and joint operations with foreign
militaries.
Notes
1. Tamura Shigenobu, Takahashi Kenichi, and Shimada Kazuhisa,
Nihon no Bōei Hōsei (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 2008), p. 30.
2. Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in
Politics, 2nd Ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 132–134.
3. One in three ministers in Tō jō ’s cabinet was a military officer.
Nagai Kazu, Kindai Nihon no Gunbu to Seiji (Kyoto: Shibunkaku,
2002), pp. 252–253.
4. Yoshida Yutaka, Shiriizu Nihon Kingendaishi, 6: Ajia-Taiheiyō
Senso (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007), pp. 71–76, and Miyake
Masaki, Seigun Kankei Kenkyū (Tokyo: Ashi Shobō , 2001),
pp. 57–59.
5. This clause is said to have been added at the request of the Chinese
representative on the Far Eastern Commission. Tanaka Akihiko,
Anzen Hoshō: Sengo 50 nen no Mōsaku (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun,
1997), pp. 30–33.
6. Following the 2003 amendment of the Act for Establishment of
the Security Council of Japan, the membership of the Security
Council consisted of the prime minister (chairman), vice prime
minister, minister for internal affairs and communications, foreign
minister, finance minister, minister of economy, trade and industry,
minister of land, infrastructure, transport and tourism, defense
minister, chief cabinet secretary, and the chairman of the National
Public Safety Commission, with other ministers temporarily join-

ing the council for certain discussions. An attempt was made in
2007 to create a National Security Council (NSC), but delibera-
tions within the Diet were unsuccessful. Eventually in late 2013,
the Abe Shinzō government was able to have a bill passed which
created an NSC. See Chap. 8 for details.
7. Hirose Katsuya, Kanryō to Gunjin (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1989); Sadō Akihiro, Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji (Tokyo:
Yoshikawa Kō bunkan, 2003).
8. Frank Kowalski, Nihon Saigunbi: Bei Gunji Komondan Bakuryocho
no Kiroku, translated by Katsuyama Kinjiro, (Tokyo: Chūkō
Bunko, 1999), p. 111.
9. Maeda Tetsuo, Jieitai no Rekishi (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō , 1994),
pp. 61–62.
10. Of the nineteen individuals to serve as GSDF chief of staff between
Sugiyama Shigeru, a former IJA colonel and the third chief of staff,
and Ishii Masao, the twentieth chief of staff and the last non-
graduate of the National Defense Academy, fourteen were former
military officers, three had Home Ministry backgrounds, and two
had come up through the SDF.
11. Miyazaki Kō ki, “Bō ei Niho Seitei no Ikisatsu,” Kokubō Vol. 26,
No. 3, (1977), pp. 98–108; Miyazaki Kō ki, “Bō ei Nihō to Bunmin
Tō sei ni tsuite,” Bōeihō Kenkyū, No. 3, (1979), pp. 27–37.
12. Sadō Akihiro, Sengo Seiji to Jieitai (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kō bunkan,
2006), pp. 38–41.
13. Takeda Gorō , Kiki Kanri naki Kokka: Nihon ga Furueru Hi
(Kyoto: PHP Kenkyūsho, 1984), pp. 172–173.
14. Takeda, Kiki Kanri naki Kokka, pp. 172–173; Hirose, Kanryō to
Gunjin, pp. 71–72.
15. Hirose, Kanryō to Gunjin, pp. 60–62.
16. Nakajima Shingo, Sengo Nihon no Bōei Seisaku: “Yoshida Rosen” o
Meguru Seiji-Gaikō-Gunji (Tokyo: Keiō Gijuku Daigaku
Shuppankai, 2006), pp. 208–210.
17. Hirose, Kanryō to Gunjin, pp. 128–130; Bō ei Chishiki Fukyūkai,
ed., Bōeishō Kaikaku, (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 1996),
pp. 216–217.
18. Seisaku Kenkyū Daigakuin Daigaku C.O.E Ō raru-Seisaku Kenkyū
Purojekuto, ed., Kaihara Osamu (Moto Naikaku Kokubō Kaigi
Jimu Kyokuchō) Ō raru Hisutorii (Tokyo: Seisaku Kenkyū
260 K. MUSASHI
Daigakuin Daigaku, 2001), Vol. 1, p. 317, Vol. 2, pp. 10–17,

156–157.
19. Seisaku Kenkyū Daigakuin Daigaku, ed., Kaihara Osamu, Vol. 2,
pp. 69–86.
20. Sadō , Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji, pp. 189–190.
21. Sadō , Sengo Seiji to Jieitai, pp. 93–95.
22. For more on Sakata, see Sase Masamori, Mushiro Shiroto no Hō ga
Yoi: Bōeichō Chōkan Sakata Michita ga Nashitogeta Seisaku no
Daitenkan (Tokyo: Shinchō Sensho, 2014).
23. Sebata Takao, Bōei Keikaku no Taikō to Nichibei Gaidorain: Bōei
Seisaku Kettei Katei no Kanryō Seijiteki Kōsatsu (Tokyo:
Bokutakusha, 1998), pp. 63–68.
24. Hirose, Kanryō to Gunjin, pp. 250–252.
25. Hirose, Kanryō to Gunjin, p. 87.
Hisutorii (Tokyo: Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjo, 2008), pp. 134–135;
Kindai Nihon Shiryō Kenkyūkai, ed., Sakuma Makoto (Moto Tōgō
Bakuryō Kaigi Gichō) Ō raru Hisutorii (Tokyo: Seisaku Kenkyū
Daigakuin Daigaku, 2008), Vol. 2, pp. 54–55.
27. Nakamura Teiji, Shōgai Kaigun Shikan: Sengo Nihon to Kaijō
Jieitai (Tokyo: Chūō Kō ron Shinsha, 2009), pp. 186–187; Kindai
Nihon Shiryō Kenkyūkai, ed., Sakuma Makoto, pp. 20–22; pp.
70–71.
28. Nishikawa Yoshimitsu, “Bō ei Sanjikan Seido no Minaoshi to

Bunmin Tō sei Shisutemu,” Kokusai Chiikigaku Kenkyū, No. 8
(2005), pp. 125–126.
29. Nishioka Akira, Gendai no Shibirian Kontororu (Tokyo:
Chishikisha, 1988), pp. 263–275.
30. Nishioka, Gendai no Shibirian Kontororu, pp. 266–270.
31. Records of the 48th Diet House of Representatives Budget

Committee, No. 21 (May 31, 1965).
32. Kō ketsu Atushi, Bunmin Tōsei: Jieitai ha Doko e Iku no ka (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 2005), pp. 42–44. For more on Matsuno, see his
Oral History conducted by the Graduate Research Institute for
Policy Studies in Tokyo, at: http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~oralreport/
view?item=100065 (accessed May 2014).
33. Kobari Tsukasa, Zoku Bōei Hōsei Kenkyū (Tokyo: Shinzansha,
2000), p. 51. Also see the director general’s memoirs: Kanemaru
Shin, Tachiwaza Newaza: Watashi No Rirekisho (Tokyo: Nihon
Keizai Shimbunsha, 1988), pp. 115–119.
34. Nishioka, Gendai no Shibirian Kontororu, pp. 289–292.

35. For more on this group, see Michael Green, “Boeizoku: Defense
Policy Formation in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party,” Center for
International Studies, The MIT Japan Program Science, Technology,
Management Program Paper, April 1992.
36. Inoguchi Takashi and Iwai Tomoaki, “Zoku Giin” no Kenkyū

(Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1987), p. 119.
37. Peter D. Feaver, Takako Hikotani, and Shaun Narine, “Civilian
Control and Civil-Military Gaps in the United States, Japan, and
China,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2005), pp. 249–251.
38. Ishiba Shigeru, Kokubō (Tokyo: Shinchō sha, 2005), pp. 181–183;
Bō ei Chishiki Fukyūkai, pp. 229–230.
39. Matsuda Yasuhiro, ed., NSC Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi: Kiki

Kanri, Anpo Seisaku Tōgō Mekanizumu no Hikaku Kenkyū (Tō kyō :
Sairyūsha, 2009), pp. 288–295.
40. Musashi Katsuhiro, Reisengo Nihon no Shibirian Kontororu no
Kenkyū (Tokyo: Seibundō , 2009), p. 317.
41. Nagao Yūichirō , “Naisei no Hendo to Seigun Kankei ni tsuite no
Ichi Kosatu,” Shin Bōei Ronshū, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1996), p. 70.
42. Kurisu Hiroomi, Nihon Kokubōgun o Sōsetsu Seyo (Tokyo:
Shō gakukan, 2000), p. 175.
43. Shiroyama Hideaki and Hosono Sukehiro, Zoku Chūo ̄ Shōchō no
Seisaku Keisei Katei: Sono Jizoku to Henyō (Tokyo: Chūō Daigaku
Shuppanbu, 2002), p. 283.
44. Kindai Nihon Shiryō Kenkyūkai, ed., Sakuma Makoto, pp. 54–55.
Purojekuto, ed., Hōshuyama Noboru (Moto Bōei Shisetsuchō
Chōkan) Ō raru Hisutorii (Tokyo: Seisaku Kenkyū Daigakuin
Daigaku, 2005), Vol. 2, p. 203.
46. Former director general of the Secretariat Fujishima Masayuki said
of this that “recently, it’s become a situation where even if there are
initial differences of opinion or mindset between the civilian and
uniformed personnel, we move forward, solving the problem as we
reconcile those differences. We then come together and face out-
siders united.” Fujishima Masayuki, Sora ni Umi ni Riku ni Bōei ni
kaketa Roman (Tokyo: Japan Military Review, 2001), pp. 74–75.
47. A “Study Committee on the State of Defense Strength” was estab-
lished within the ministry for the new National Defense Program
Outline with the director general at its head, and the parliamentary
262 K. MUSASHI
vice-minister, administrative vice-minister, director general of the

secretariat, defense policy bureau chief, joint staff chief of staff, and
service chiefs of staff as members. Bō eichō Bō eikyoku, Bōeiryoku
no Arikata ni Tsuite no Kentō: 21 Seiki ni Mukete no Kadai to
Tenbō (Tokyo: Bō eichō , 1996), p. 113.
48. Akiyama Masahiro, Nichibei no Senryaku Taiwa ga Hajimatta
(Tokyo: Akishobō , 2002), pp. 252–253.
49. Asahi Shimbun Jieitai 50 Nen Shuzaihan, Jieitai Shirarezaru

Henyō (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 2005), pp. 40–41; Handa Shigeru,
Tatakaenai Guntai: Hidaika suru Jieitai no Kumon (Tokyo:
Kō dansha, 2005), pp. 50–53.
50. Asahi Shimbun Jieitai 50 Nen Shuzaihan, Jieitai Shirarezaru

Henyō, pp. 92–93.
51. Bō eishō , ed., Heisei 21 Nenban Nihon no Bōei (Tokyo: Gyō sei,
2009), pp. 344.
Purojekuto, ed., Natsume Haruo (Moto Bōei Jimu Jikan) Ō raru
Hisutorii (Tokyo: Seisaku Kenkyū Daigakuin Daigaku, 2004),
p. 270.
53. Fujishima, Sora ni, p. 75.
Purojekuto, ed., Natsume Haruo, p. 270.
55. Kō ketsu, Bunmin Tōsei, pp. 1–6.
56. Moriya Takemasa, “Futenma” Kōshō Hiroku (Tokyo: Shinchō sha,
2010), pp. 238–239.
57. Miyazaki Kō ki, “Bō eichō Chūō Kikō no Mondaiten,” Bōeihō
Kenkyū, No. 9 (1985), p. 23.
58. Nishikawa Yoshimitsu, “Sengo Nihon no Bunmin Tō sei (Ge):

‘Bunkan Tō seigata Bunmin Tō sei Shisutemu’ no Keisei,” Handai
Hōgaku, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2002), pp. 290–291.
59. “Summary of Interview with the Minister” on MOD (October 6,
2009).
60. “Kyō dō Tsūshin,” October 6, 2009.
61. On the appointment of former Chief of Staff Nishimoto, Defense
Minister Kitazawa stated that he wanted to take advantage of
Nishimoto’s long experience and perceptiveness, and especially
sought his advice on re-examining the reform of the defense min-
istry and the defense outline. “Summary of Interview with the
Minister” on MOD homepage (January 8, 2010). For more on the
former general, see Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjo Senshibu, ed.,

Nishimoto Tetsuya (Moto Tō gō Bakuryō Kaigi Gichō ) Ō raru
Hisutorii (Tokyo: Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjo, 2010).
62. Minister’s Instructions Concerning MOD Reform (“Study

Pillars”) (June 3, 2010), http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/
others/kaikaku/20100603.html
63. MOD, “Bō eishō Kaikaku no Hō kō sei,” August 30, 2013, http://
www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/kaikaku/pdf/hoko_
20130830.pdf, accessed May 2015.
CHAPTER 7
The GSDF and Disaster Relief Dispatches
Tomoaki Murakami
Introduction
The damage caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11,
2011, was the greatest Japan has seen since World War II. To respond
to this unprecedented disaster, the Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF, or
Jieitai) mobilized 100,000 troops to conduct disaster relief operations.
The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF; or Rikujō Jieitai) was the lead
service in these relief operations and contributed 70% of the mobilized
troops. Foreign media, heavily involved in the coverage and being given
unprecedented access to SDF and bilateral operations,1 reported that “it
was the first time Japanese citizens acknowledged the importance of the
SDF as part of the democratic nation of postwar Japan.”2
However, the GSDF’s disaster relief dispatches date back several
decades, and the Japanese citizens’ expectations of these efforts are not
new.3 For a long period of time the GSDF functioned under the diplo-
matic and security policies otherwise known as the “Yoshida Doctrine,”
of “Article 9” of the postwar Constitution and the Japan–US Security
Treaty, which challenged the SDF’s ability to gain legitimacy solely as mili-
T. Murakami (*)
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Mie University, Tsu-shi, Japan

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8_7
266 T. MURAKAMI
tary organization. Article 9 of the Constitution was the basis for postwar
pacifism, declaring the principle of non-militaristic power, which seemed
to undermine the foundation of the very existence of the GSDF. On the
other hand, the overwhelming presence of the American military in Japan
under the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan constantly
caused some to question the need for the SDF in the first place. It was
disaster relief dispatches that enabled the GSDF to gain legitimacy in the
eyes of its citizens and established its importance within Japanese society.
Despite their importance in building SDF legitimacy, there has been little
research about disaster relief dispatches. This chapter examines the his-
torical development of the GSDF’s disaster relief operations that helped it
achieve legitimacy.
Article 83 of the SDF Law (Jieitaihō) serves as the legal basis for the
SDF’s disaster relief dispatches domestically. First, Article 83 states that
prefectural governors may request the dispatch of units for “the protec-
tion of lives or properties because of natural calamities.” This is what
is known as “dispatches upon request, or yōsei haken.” Second, slightly
contradicting this first clause, Article 83 then states that in a situation
such as “natural calamities and other disasters” that are of “pressing emer-
gency (sono jitai ni terashi, tokuni kinkyū o yōshi),” the Defense Agency
Director General (now, Minister of Defense), or individuals designated
by him, such as a regional army commanding general, division command-
ing general, brigade commanding general, or a camp commander, can
dispatch disaster relief units “without such a [governor’s] request.” This
is called “discretionary dispatch, or jishu haken.”4 This chapter will exam-
ine the GSDF’s disaster relief dispatches/operations since the period of
the National Police Reserve (NPR; or Kokka Keisatsu Yobitai), focusing
on how this special type of civilian control, formed by the two pillars of
“dispatches upon request” and “discretionary dispatch,” in disaster relief
deployment has evolved and been exercised.
The Establishment of the GSDF and Disaster Relief Operations
oshida Shigeru and Disaster Relief Dispatches

Y
As described in great detail in Kusunoki’s chapter, American forces sta-
tioned in Japan during the Allied Occupation were deployed to the
Korean Peninsula with the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950.
To compensate for the absence of these forces, Supreme Commander
THE GSDF AND DISASTER RELIEF DISPATCHES 267
for Allied Powers General Douglas MacArthur ordered Prime Minister

Yoshida Shigeru to establish a NPR with a force of 75,000 for the pur-
pose of maintaining public security. The NPR, established in July 1950,
was later reorganized to become the National Safety Force (Hoantai) in
October 1952, and eventually the SDF in July 1954 under the Yoshida
Administration (See Kusunoki’s chapter for more details).
However, Prime Minister Yoshida’s decision to remilitarize without
amending the postwar constitution was criticized by both the Left and
Right in Japan. The Socialist Party (Shakaitō), representing the Left, criti-
cized the SDF by labeling it the “unconstitutional illegitimate child (kenpō
ihan no kakushiko),” while former Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) personnel
on the Right ridiculed the SDF as the “meaningless military (dekisokonai
no guntai).” Yoshida, worried that the Left and Right’s criticisms would
demoralize the SDF, vowed to work to gain the respect of Japanese citi-
zens for the SDF and to instill “pride and confidence” in those serving.5
Then, Yoshida thought disaster relief operations would improve the SDF’s
image in the eyes of citizens. Therefore, he began to advocate for the
SDF’s disaster relief operations as follows:
In order for the Japanese citizens to truly support and put their trust into
the SDF, I thought it was essential for the SDF to work to benefit for citi-
zens at the local level. For example, the SDF would deploy for disaster relief
operations in the case of large scale flooding, damages caused by destructive
winds, or a large fire … I thought and instructed these disaster relief opera-
tions would make a statement that the SDF is helpful and reliable for the
Japanese people.6
Yoshida emphasized the SDF disaster relief dispatches to “benefit citizens

at the local level” for political reasons. One of the biggest issues in the
newly established NPR was to secure enough land for barracks that could
accommodate 75,000 service members (i.e. many of the SDF’s current
bases).7 Many towns and villages in the countryside petitioned to host
a camp in their communities, but the Japanese public strongly opposed
plans to build the NPR barracks and elected officials who had supported
or led the petition drive often failed to get re-elected in the following
election. As a result, the NPR would have to prove itself and remove any
doubt from the citizens before it could establish a camp. To achieve this
goal, Gotōda Masaharu (head of the Police Affairs Division in the NPR)
suggested the NPR conduct disaster relief operations in the aftermath of
natural disasters, in addition to maintaining internal security.8 As a result,
268 T. MURAKAMI
from the NPR’s establishment until well into the 1960s, the NPR (and
after July 1954, the SDF) conducted approximately 1000 disaster relief
missions. These early efforts seemingly had an effect on Japanese citizens,
as by the time of the SDF’s establishment, there were more than 102 base
camps all over the country.9
In addition, following the end of the war, and into the recovery years,
typhoons and heavy rains claimed many lives in many regions due to the
lack of any disaster preparedness policies at the central government level.
Annual death/missing tolls averaged 1992 people by natural disasters dur-
ing the period from 1945 to 1963.10 After Japan joined the Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development, a symbol of having become
an advanced economy, in 1964, the annual death/missing toll significantly
decreased to 247 over the next thirty years, until 1994, just before the
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in Kobe. The need was especially high,
in other words, for the NPR/SDF to participate in disaster relief opera-
tions in their early years.
he First Disaster Relief Mission

T
To reiterate, disaster relief operations were incorporated into the NPR’s
duties in order to support from the citizens. However, the initial disaster
relief missions did not go as smoothly as planned. At the time, Article 3
of NPR Order (Kokka Keisatsu Yobitai Rei), which stated “The NPR …
will conduct its duties according to the Prime Minister’s orders,” was the
only legal basis for the NPR to conduct disaster relief missions since laws
or rules to regulate such missions did not exist. Based on this NPR Order,
Gotō da requested Cabinet approval preceding every dispatch of NPR
forces for disaster relief operations.11 NPR officials worked hard to solidify
the principles of civilian control within the organization to eliminate the
fear of a return of “supreme command independence,” which allowed the
prewar military to take over the government. For this reason, Gotō da pur-
posely made the paperwork procedure for the deployment of NPR forces
tedious and made no exceptions even for disaster relief missions.12
On July 1951, a flood struck Fukuchiyama City in Kyoto Prefecture.
The commander of the NPR camp in Fukuchiyama immediately responded
to the request of the mayor and deployed his units for disaster relief.13
Fukuchiyama City had been one of the first in the entire country to invite
a NPR camp into their community,14 and local officials were quite satisfied
with the aid that the NPR forces had provided.15 However, after Gotō da
received the reports, he pointed out to NPR Director General Masuhara
Keikichi that the commander’s action “exceeded his authority.”16 The

issue for Gotō da, who strictly enforced civilian control, was that the com-
mander acted without waiting for the approval of the prime minister,
which was in violation of the policy of civilian control. As a result, the
commander was punished and the news of the incident spread throughout
the NPR.17
After the incident, the NPR’s attitude toward disaster relief operations
became somewhat reserved due to the issue of the Fukuchiyama com-
mander’s punishment. Typhoon #15 (Typhoon Ruth) struck the Kyūshū
region on October 14, 1951, which caused great damage and resulted
in 945 people being killed or going missing nationwide. Yamaguchi
Prefecture suffered heavy damage from torrential rainfall and Governor
Tanaka Tatsuo requested help from the 11th Infantry Regiment (Dai Jūichi
Tsūka Rentai), locally stationed in Camp Ozuki. However, the Fukuoka
Prefecture-based 4th Region Headquarters (Dai Yon Kanku Sokanbu),
which commanded the 11th Infantry Regiment denied the request of
Governor Tanaka stating that disaster relief missions “should not be dis-
patched lightly (karugarushiku jisshi subeki de ha nai).”18 The damage,
however, was so severe that even US forces stationed in Iwakuni began
their own disaster relief operations. The 11th Infantry Regiment sent
Deputy Regiment Commander Satō Motonobu on an express train down
to Fukuoka with photos in hand to request the Region Headquarters to
seek deployment approval from Prime Minister Yoshida. Initially, he was
rebuffed, saying the decision was made, but waited until Tsutsui Takeo,
commanding general of the 4th Region, was finished for the day and
pleaded with him. Eventually, Tsutsui telephoned Hayashi Keizō , head of
the General Group (Sōtai Sōkan) in Tō kyō seeking approval. After Prime
Minister Yoshida received these reports from Cabinet Secretariat Okazaki
Katsuo, the decision to deploy the NPR to the site of disaster was finally
made days after the disaster had struck.19
The 11th Infantry Regiment received Prime Minister Yoshida’s orders
through Cabinet Secretariat Okazaki and General Tsutsui and deployed
two units of 300 troops on October 21. The units engaged in the res-
toration of roads and transportation of goods to Hirose Town, which
had become isolated due to heavy damage. This disaster relief mission
was widely appreciated by local residents, and a vote of thanks was passed
in the Yamaguchi Prefecture Assembly.20 Prime Minster Yoshida invited
General Tsutsui and General Ō mori Kan, commanding general of the 3rd
Region, or Dai San Kanku (which also deployed units in the aftermath
270 T. MURAKAMI
of the Typhoon Ruth) to a lunch at the prime minister’s residence.21 This

is thought to be an expression of gratitude toward the NPR and at the
same time an expression of appreciation for their adherence to civilian-
control procedures. In contrast to the Fukuchiyama incident, the 11th
Infantry Regiment’s disaster relief mission was recognized as the first offi-
cial deployment of its kind and a “significant precedent” for the NPR.22
This period also served as a time to test if the NPR could conduct such
missions while acknowledging and following civilian control.
he Passage of the SDF Law

T
Typhoon Ruth not only marked the first official deployment of the NPR’s
disaster relief missions but also helped promote the study of regulations
for disaster relief missions. In March 1952, the regulations the NPR
would use as a basis before deploying on disaster relief missions were sent
to all units. Using these provisions as the basis, the NPR dispatched disas-
ter relief missions to the Tokachi Earthquake, otherwise known as the
Hokkaido Earthquake, which was a Magnitude 8.1 quake followed by a
tsunami. That same month, the NPR was sent to fight large fires in Tottori
City, and to other places where their help was needed.23 As a result, when
the National Safety Force was established, disaster relief missions (saigai
haken) were included as part of the National Safety Forces (NSF’s) official
duties (Article 66, National Safety Agency Law, Hoanchōhō). On July 1,
1954, the NSF was reorganized into the SDF, whose “main duties are to
defend the nation against direct and indirect invasions (Article 3, Self-
Defense Forces Law).” However, disaster relief missions were included
as one of the duties in the SDF regulations, which ranked as equivalent
with “Defense Operations (Bōei Kōdō)” (Article 76) and “Public Security
Operations by Order (Meirei ni Yoru Chian Shutsudō)” (Article 78).
In the case of crisis management, which includes disaster response,
generally, authority is given to the regiment closest to the scene, adding
emphasis on disaster management (the so-called subsidiarity principle).
If the disaster becomes unmanageable for the unit on site, it gets “up-
scaled” and the central government increases its involvement with support
(“upscaling principle”).24 Disaster prevention policies at the time focused
on subsidiarity principle, which made the prefectural governor responsible
for the safety of the residents and evacuees and not the central government
(e.g. the Disaster Rescue Law, or Saigai Kyūjohō, established 1947). In
contrast, the prime minister was the only one authorized to give orders
for NPR disaster relief deployments. It is clear from Typhoon Ruth’s case
that these top-down decisions did not take into account regional cir-
cumstances. As the NPR reorganized into the NSF and then eventually
into SDF, the subsidiarity principle was gradually incorporated into the
“deployment for disaster Relief” regulations for disaster policies. This later
became embodied as the “dispatches upon request” and “discretionary
dispatch” procedures under Article 83 of the SDF Law.
First, the “dispatches upon request” procedure will be examined to
see the progression of this policy. Prefectural governors throughout Japan
strongly opposed the fact that disaster relief missions could not be deployed
without the prime minister’s order. In the “Emergency Disaster Provision
Law Outline (Hijō Saigai Taisakuhō Yōkō)” drafted in the 1952 National
Governors’ Conference (Zenkoku Chijikai), the governors requested the
“authority to request the deployment of the NPR when the situation
requires more than public order and rescue/relief operations.”25 In March
1952, the procedures regarding the NPR’s disaster relief operations were
established: “in principle [the deployment] is to be based on the request
of general organizations (ippan kikan).” Subsequently, “general organiza-
tions” was changed to a more concrete expression in the National Safety
Forces Law (Hoanchōhō) and SDF Law: “prefectural governors or other
parties designated by Government ordinance.” This “dispatches upon
request” provision continued in the SDF Law. This operation differs from
other SDF missions, requiring the request of governors, and this special
policy was very much in line with the will of the local governments, and
was a system established to permit reasonable dispatches of the SDF for
disaster relief.
With regard to “discretionary dispatch,” this provision permits the
deployment of disaster relief operations by the SDF without waiting for
the governor’s request. This policy first appeared in the National Safety
Forces Law. However, this law also states that the NSF director general
commands the NSF disaster relief dispatches, making no change to the
top-down decision process.26 Important changes were made after the
establishment of the SDF Law. The authority to order disaster relief opera-
tions was mandated by an order to regional army commanding generals,
local commanding generals, and camp commanders. As a result the deci-
sions to deploy disaster relief operations were able to be decided by the
closest unit to the disaster area.27 In addition, the Ground Staff Office
(GSO, or Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbu) sends a notification to unit command-
ers, and, in time of emergencies, orders the deployment of officers to pre-
fectures without “losing an opportunity.”
272 T. MURAKAMI
“Discretionary dispatch” was the most effective principle for prompt

disaster relief operations, but some worried about negative side-effects. If
“discretionary dispatch” was overly used, there were fears of stirring up
the Japanese people’s anti-military feelings. Thus, it was a double-edged
sword. For this reason, after the SDF Law came into effect, the GSO
issued instructions to unit commanders regarding disaster relief opera-
tions, cautioning them not to “deploy SDF units ignoring the general
public opinion” in the case of “discretionary dispatch”28
The Yoshida Line and Disaster Relief Operations
I se Bay Typhoon Disaster Relief Operation

On September 26, 1959, Typhoon No. 15 (also known as Typhoon Vera)
struck the southern Kii Peninsula (south of Nagoya) and soon after spread
across the Tō kai region causing great damage. The death/missing toll
rose to 5098 people. Tidal waves caused by destructive typhoon winds
submerged villages around the regions of Ise Bay in the prefectures of
Mie, Aichi, and Gifu.
The Ise Bay Typhoon disaster relief dispatch proved to be the largest
disaster relief operation the SDF had undertaken up to that point. On the
same day of the disaster, the 10th Combined Brigade (Dai Jū Konseidan),
currently the 10th Division, with its headquarters in Moriyama City
(present-day Moriyama ward of Nagoya City), Aichi Prefecture, began
disaster relief operations after they received Aichi Prefecture’s request for
aid. However, this was not an official “dispatches upon request” because
the 10th Combined Brigade had already deployed a liaison to assess the
situation with Aichi Prefecture and, according to the then Vice Chief of
Staff of the GSDF Ō mori Kan, “the disaster relief deployment was imme-
diately decided.”29 While Aichi Prefecture could not grasp the entire situa-
tion due to damaged civilian communication facilities, the 10th Combined
Brigade led the disaster relief operation by providing updated reports of
the situation.30
It became clear that the “subsidiarity principle,” with just the 10th
Combined Brigade, responding was not adequate as the scale of the disas-
ter was assessed.31 Vice Chief of Staff Ō mori submitted a request for a rein-
forcement unit of approximately 10,000 service men to Defense Agency
Director General Akagi Munenori after he inspected the damage along
Ise Bay on October 1. Akagi permitted the request for a reinforcement
unit but a former IJA official in the GSDF Staff Office in charge of GSDF
operations took a cautious position stating that “disaster relief operations
are not part of the main duties of the [GSDF].”32 Ō mori responded with
the following statement: “The SDF does not simply protect the nation/
citizens against direct/indirect invasions. It is an important duty for the
SDF to protect the lives of the people during times of disaster as well.”33
Consequently, for the first time in history units from all three SDF services,
the GSDF, Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense
Force (ASDF), 100 units in all, were dispatched from all over the country
to the Ise Bay region and conducted aid/relief missions for over two and
a half months. The following year, the GSO reflected on this disaster relief
mission, stating, “the Ise Bay [disaster relief] was a revolutionary event,
demonstrating the importance of the SDF to the nation while leaving an
impact on the way citizens perceived the SDF.”34
In addition, US forces in Japan worked alongside the SDF during the
disaster, demonstrating their ability to work together during the Ise Bay
Typhoon relief operation. Approximately forty helicopters from the GSDF,
MSDF, and ASDF and the American military worked with the MSDF’s
vessels to rescue residents who remained behind in isolated areas. The
GSDF was in charge of the helicopters of the three services responsible for
Aichi Prefecture, and the ASDF 3rd Wing vice commander was placed in
charge of the helicopter units from each of the US forces (Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marines), that were responsible for Mie Prefecture. As a result,
approximately 7000 refugees were rescued by the SDF and American mili-
tary partnering together in these joint air rescue operations.35 Not only
was the relief operation somewhat joint from an SDF perspective, but was
also a little-known prelude to “Operation Tomodachi,” the bilateral effort
by US and Japanese forces responding to the March 2011 Great East
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami.
isaster Measures Basic Law, “Second Defense Build-Up Plan,”

D
and the GSDF
Following the Ise Bay typhoon, flaws in existing disaster prevention poli-
cies were pointed out. It became clear that an “Upscaling Principle,”
in which the central government assists, was necessary. The “Disaster
Measures Basic Law (Saigai Taisaku Kihonhō)” was passed in October
1961 during the Ikeda Hayato Cabinet, and for the first time, the nation’s
disaster policies were under a unified system/organization. The act estab-
lished the “Central Disaster Prevention Council (Chūo ̄ Bōsai Kaigi)” as
274 T. MURAKAMI
the central organization for disaster prevention. The Central Disaster

Prevention Council made policies for “Basic Disaster Prevention Plans
(Bōsai Kihon Keikaku),” which was the basis for the “Operational Plan for
Disaster Prevention (Bōsai Gyōmu Keikaku)” made by various ministries/
agencies working on disaster prevention measures. During times of crisis,
the committee was to organize the “Major Disaster Counter Measures
Headquarters (Hijō Saigai Taisaku Honbu),” headed by a minister of state,
to push forward emergency measures. In addition, “Emergency Disaster
Countermeasures Headquarters (Kinkyū Saigai Taisaku Honbu),” led by
the prime minister, was to be established to respond to exceptionally mas-
sive disasters.
The Director General of the Defense Agency was also included into the
Central Disaster Management Council, placing the SDF at the center of
the nation’s disaster preparedness policies.36 During this time, the priori-
tization of the SDF’s disaster relief operations in national defense policies
was also discussed. In July 1961, the Ikeda Administration decided on
the Second Defense Build-up Plan (Dai Niji Bōeiryoku Seibi Keikaku, or
Nijibō) emphasizing the importance of “disaster relief and civilian cooper-
ation in public welfare and public works” policies for the SDF. The GSDF
was restructured to better respond to disaster relief deployments and
mobilizations for maintaining law and order. Small units were stationed
across the nation based on Japan’s geographic characteristics of having
many mountains and rivers.37
The Ikeda Cabinet’s policies that put strong emphasis on disaster
relief operations contested the approach of the largest opposition party,
the Socialist Party (Shakaitō), which viewed the SDF as a violation of the
constitution and advocated their reformation into a specialized “National
Land Construction Corps (Kokudo Kensetsutai).”38 In addition, the
Second Defense Build-up Plan resulted in the GSDF’s operations being
narrowed to primarily those in the domestic sphere. The revision of the
US–Japan Security Treaty in 1960 clarified the obligation of US forces
to help respond to a direct invasion of Japan, and the Second Defense
Build-up Plan limited the objective of Japan’s defense capabilities to
responding to “invasions below regional conflicts with the use of existing
weapons.” The plan clarified the roles of US forces and the SDF, reducing
the opportunity or apparent need for American forces to deploy during
domestic disaster relief operations within Japan.
The SDF’s disaster relief deployments increased further after 1961
under the Ikeda Administration through the Disaster Measures Basic Law
and the Second Defense Build-up Plan (Fig. 7.1). For example, the Ikeda
Administration broadly interpreted Article 83 and conducted a large-scale
disaster relief operation to clear the Hokuriku region’s heavy snowfall,
which cannot necessarily qualify as an “emergency” in the traditional
sense.39
Not only did the number of deployments increase, but the contents
of the GSDF’s disaster relief operations became more dynamic and wide-
ranging. For example, the Niigata earthquake relief operation was the
first large-scale earthquake disaster relief operation for the GSDF. A large
earthquake equivalent to the great Kantō earthquake of 1923, which dev-
astated Tokyo, struck Niigata Prefecture around 1:00 P.M. on June 16,
1964.40 The 30th Infantry Regiment (Dai Sanjū Futsū Rentai) stationed
at Camp Shibata immediately deployed to Niigata City and arrived on
site by 2:30 P.M. without waiting for the Niigata governor’s request. The
governor requested the GSDF’s assistance orally when the 30th Infantry
Regiment arrived. This was actually a “discretionary dispatch” case. The
regiment went on to support paralyzed local governments and indepen-
dently repaired roads and bridges while “assisting the prefecture’s and
cities’ administrations to deal with the situation.”41
This unexpected earthquake relief operation was a first and a learning
experience for the GSO. The GSO later commented, “in the case of an
emergency when a major disaster is expected, time could be lost to decide
on the size of units and equipment to be deployed after assessing the situ-
ation, so it is essential for an immediate deployment of a unit that is large
enough to address the initial situation. It is advantageous to be able to
cover the entre [affected] region to secure the stability of public sentiment
and for encouraging the rebuilding efforts.”42
Japanese citizens’ appraisal of the SDF improved as a result of its disas-
ter relief deployments. A public opinion survey conducted by the Cabinet
Office (Naikakufu seifu kō hō shitsu) shows that more than half of the
Japanese citizens had not personally seen the SDF in the early 1960s (Fig.
7.2). The SDF launched publicity campaigns, but these apparently had
very little effect (Fig. 7.3). During this time, public perceptions of the
SDF were largely determined by disaster relief efforts and assisting the
public (Fig. 7.4). Disaster relief efforts had the most positive effect for the
SDF (Fig. 7.5). By the mid-1960s, the percentage of citizens who had a
“positive” evaluation of the SDF was significantly greater than those who
held a negative perception (Fig. 7.6).
276 T. MURAKAMI
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
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1989
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1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
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1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
1957
1956
1955
1954
1953
1952
1951
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Fig. 7.1 Disaster dispatches by GSDF from 1951 to 2012. This graph was made
by the author based on the annual Defense of Japan and other materials in the
National Archives of Japan. It does not include figures for the response to the
Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
Fig. 7.2 How often do See Oen

you see the SDF in your
neighborhood? Source:
Naikakufu seifu
kōhōshitsu polls on the Somemes
SDF (Jieitai ni Kansuru
Yoron Chōsa), 1963
Don't really
see/Do not see
at all
(Multiple Answers Possible)
Movies made by the Defense Agency 4%
Lectures and discussions about the SDF and Japanese defense 2.9%
Defense Expositions 8.4%
Pamphlets and fliers about the SDF and Japanese defense 10.9%
Others 1%
None of the above 77.4%
Fig. 7.3 What things attract your attention about the SDF? (multiple answers
possible). Source: Naikakufu seifu kō hō shitsu polls on the SDF (Jieitai ni Kansuru
Yoron Chō sa), 1963
Moreover, the positive evaluation the SDF received was not directly
related to the SDF’s main duties of “defending the nation from direct/
indirect invasions.” Throughout the Cold War, when asked what they
thought was the most important contribution the SDF have made to date,
an overwhelming number of Japanese citizens polled responded “disaster
relief operations.” (See Fig. 8.4 in Midford’s chapter). Figure 7.6 above
demonstrates that despite some variation, especially in the 1960s and early
1970s, the public’s growing appreciation for the SDF’s involvement in
disaster relief correlated with the public’s increasingly positive image of the
SDF. The GSDF’s involvement in disaster relief operations was ironic in
the sense that former Prime Minister Yoshida, who had originally encour-
aged this, later stated, “Disaster relief operations are part of the duties of
278 T. MURAKAMI
Fig. 7.4 In what con- SDF disaster dispatches 71.2%

nection have you seen
SDF working with the public 23.3%
reports about the SDF in
the media? (multiple SDF weapons and equipment 20.8%
answers possible). Source:
SDF training and exercises 27.2%
Naikakufu seifu
kō hō shitsu polls on the SDF daily life 8.2%
SDF (Jieitai ni Kansuru SDF personnel-committed crimes 16.1%
Yoron Chō sa), 1963
SDF aircraft and ship accidents 49.4%
Have not seen or heard anything 16.7%
(Multiple Answers Possible)
Assistance in Olympics, National Athletic Meets 16%
Observation of exercises and units 1.7%
Personal relationship with SDF member 2.2%
Generosity/volunteerism shown by SDF 3.5%
Disaster Dispatches (including transporting of

31.2%
patients)
Construction projects off-base 7%
Others 2.6%
Don’t know 2%
Fig. 7.5 Why do you have a positive view of the SDF? (multiple answers possi-
ble). Source: Naikakufu seifu kō hō shitsu polls on SDF (“Jieitai no Kō hō oyobi
Bō ei Mondai ni Kansuru Yoron Chō sa), 1965. Note: Asked only of the 56.8% of
respondents who already answered they had a positive view of the SDF. Total adds
up to 56.8%
the SDF. However, they are not the reason for the existence of the SDF. I
fear that this fact will be forgotten.”43 Despite this concern, the Japanese
public’s support of the SDF’s role in disaster dispatches stayed strong and
this trend would continue into the 2000s even as the SDF was dispatched
regularly overseas for peacekeeping and disaster relief (also see Midford’s
chapter regarding public recognition of the SDF’s role in national defense).
Fig. 7.6 Good image of the SDF vs HaDR as the SDF’s main contribution up to
now
asic Defense Capabilities and Urban Disaster

B
In the 1960s, fatalities due to landslides, destructive wind storms, and
floods have drastically declined as the Disaster Measures Basic Law
raised regional governments’ disaster preparedness. In place of flooding,
the disaster that now caught the Japanese public’s attention was earth-
quakes. During the period of rapid economic growth in Japan, popula-
tions grew rapidly in and around urban areas, which increased the sense
of crisis for major urban earthquake disasters. Unlike the typhoon and
flood-related disasters in the countryside, the “subsidiarity principle”
was inadequate in the case of urban earthquake disasters. It became clear
that without the central government’s “upscaling principle” respond-
ing to such situations would be impossible. To prepare for such situ-
ations, the Fukuda Takeo Cabinet (December 1976–December 1978)
established the Major Earthquake Response Special Measures Law
(Daikibo Jishin Taisaku Tokubetsu Sochihō) on June 1978. The Special
Measures Law was aimed at the Tō kai region, and if a major earthquake
was expected, it allowed the prime minister to issue an official warning,
shutting down traffic and public facilities. However, there were many
problems with the Special Measures Law as it was limited to only the
Tō kai region and relied entirely on an incomplete earthquake prediction
technology.
280 T. MURAKAMI
The public’s new focus on major earthquakes also affected defense

policies in the 1970s. In October 1976, the National Defense Program
Outline (Bōei Keikaku no Taikō) was adopted by Cabinet Decision
(kakugi kettei) during the Miki Takeo Administration (December 1974–
December 1976). The NDPO, prepared under Defense Agency Director
General Sakata Michita, shifted the policy of “Necessary Defense
Capability (Shoyō no Bōeiryoku),” which was to directly combat military
threats, to “Basic Defense Capability (Kibanteki Bōeiryoku),” which
secured the minimal required basic defense capability for an independent
nation.44 Through disaster relief operations, the GSDF was to contribute
to securing the safety of the citizens and was highly prioritized during
the peacetime defense capabilities. In the 1970s, after the normalization
of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, the end
of the Vietnam War and during Détente between the superpowers, the
use of the military for non-lethal purposes during peacetime attracted
worldwide attention. Japan’s answer to this question was disaster relief
operations.45
Following changes in Japan’s defense policies and disaster prevention
policies, there were two revisions to the SDF’s disaster relief dispatches
in terms of the “upscaling principle.” First, accompanying the “Major
Earthquake Countermeasure Special Measures Law” the prime minister
could order the Defense Agency director general to deploy the SDF with-
out the governor’s request when a major earthquake was predicted to
strike. Second, the Defense Agency revised the “orders regarding disaster
relief deployment,” so that the Defense Agency director general could
order large-scale disaster relief operations in the case of major earthquake
as “an exception to normal disaster relief dispatch procedures (Major
Earthquake Disaster Relief Deployment Orders, or Daikibo Shinsai Saigai
Haken).”
However, the revision of the SDF’s disaster relief policies and applica-
tions of them did not advance much further. Resistance from both within
the central government and regional governments prevented reinforce-
ment of SDF disaster relief operations. The “Central” government resis-
tance came from within the Ground Staff Office (GSO). Sakata and Kubo
Takuya were contemplating drastic reform that would raise the status of
disaster relief to become one of the SDF’s “main duties” alongside national
defense.46 However, this plan did not go through because the GSO highly
prioritized military emergencies and strongly opposed giving disaster
response the same priority.47 As the threat of the Soviet Union redounded
after Détente collapsed and the “New Cold War” began, the GSDF began
to focus on dealing with a limited direct invasion in Hokkaido.48 As a
result, disaster relief remained a low priority for the GSDF through the
end of the Cold War.49
The latter “regional” resistance came from reformist prefectural and
local governments. From the mid-1960s, reformist leaders were elected
to lead regional governments in various parts of the nation, and by
the 1970s, reformist governors had been elected in two major urban
centers: the Tokyo Metropolitan area and the Kinki region (i.e. the
Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe region) in Western Japan.50 Tension rose between
several local governments and the SDF under the reformist governors
supported by the Socialist Party and Communist Party, which both
viewed the existence of the SDF as a violation of the postwar consti-
tution. As the responsibility for disaster response was mainly in the
hands of local governments, the tension affected the SDF’s ability
to conduct disaster relief operations in a smooth and timely fashion.
For example, on September 1, 1971, director general of the Defense
Agency, Nakasone Yasuhiro, had planned a disaster prevention exer-
cise with the cooperation of Kō tō Ward, Tokyo, following the disaster
response plan the GSDF has prepared in case of a major earthquake in
the nation’s capital.51 However, the reformist Tokyo governor Minobe
Ryō kichi prevented the exercise from taking place.52 Similarly, in Kobe
City, the SDF’s Provincial Liaison Office (Chihō Renraku Honbu) three
times requested the city government to conduct joint exercises, but the
reformist mayor, Miyazaki Tatsuo, denied the request each time. The
relationship between the city’s government and the SDF had still not
been resolved when the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake struck Kobe
and surrounding areas in 1995.53
Disaster Relief After the Cold War: From an SDF That Simply

“Exists” to One That Is Active
S DF and Peacekeeping Operations
The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had
dominated international affairs for over forty years, ended in 1989 with
the latter’s collapse. The resulting changes in the international environ-
ment brought about calls for a “peace dividend” and led to a worldwide
reduction in armaments. The GSDF, too, feared it would be required to
282 T. MURAKAMI
reduce its forces, and used the “Basic Defense Capability Concept” to try
to protect itself from those demands.54 It became necessary for the SDF to
demonstrate its legitimacy to the country in order to maintain the status
quo in its size and budget.
The First Gulf War of 1991 provided an opportunity for the GSDF
to once again build its legitimacy. Yet this opportunity was missed as
Japan’s only ally, the United States, and some others in international
society criticized Japan, an economic superpower, for not contributing
personnel in this international crisis. In June 1992, the Japanese govern-
ment passed the International Peace Cooperation Law (Kokuren Heiwa
Iji Katsudō), which allowed the SDF to be deployed overseas to partici-
pate in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The SDF’s first mission was to
Cambodia in September that year, to participate in the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The main effort of the
PKO mission was provided by GSDF engineering units, who have excelled
in disaster relief over the years within Japan. Through participating in the
UN PKO mission, the GSDF gained not only international experience but
also, by proving their usefulness, the post-Cold War legitimacy they had
sought.
As the International Peace Cooperation Law was established, the
International Emergency Relief Law (Kokusai Kinkyū Enjotai, commonly
known within Japan as the Japan Disaster Relief Law [JDR]), which had
first gone into effect in 1987, was also revised, permitting the deploy-
ment of SDF units in international disaster relief operations. During the
Bangladesh cyclone relief operations in 1991, the Japanese government
observed other countries send their militaries as the core of their relief
operations, and decided to include SDF units in JDR missions, which con-
sisted mainly of fire fighters and medical teams.55
The GSDF has experienced fourteen International Emergency Relief
operations beginning with the Honduras hurricane relief in 1998
(Fig. 7.7), with the GSDF being the primary provider of aid on the
ground. A joint disaster relief operation was conducted by the GSDF,
MSDF, and ASDF for the tsunami relief that struck Indonesia. The
SDF has also conducted rescue missions with helicopters during the
flood that struck Pakistan in 2010, and most recently in 2013, in the
Philippines after Typhoon Yolanda. In 2007, the SDF International
Peace Cooperation Activities which includes the International
Emergency Relief changed from “additional duties” to main duties.
Period Internaonal Emergency Assistance Missions Personnel Region

numbers
Central-
1998.11–1998.12 Relief operaons in Honduras following Hurricane Mitch 185
South
America
1999.9–1999.11 Transportaon of relief supplies following an earthquake in Northwest Turkey 426 Middle-Near
East
2001.2 Relief operaons in India following an earthquake 94 South Asia
2003.12–2004.1 Transportaon of relief supplies following an earthquake in Southeast Iran 31 Middle East
Relief operaons in Indonesia following the Great Sumatra island Earthquake and Southeast
2004.12–2005.3 925
Asia
Tsunami
2005.8 Relief operaons on the Kamchatka Peninsula of the Russian Federaon following 346 North
a Russian submarine accident Pacific
2005.10 –2005.12 Relief Operaons following a large earthquake in Pakistan 261 South Asia
Relief Operaons following an earthquake in the central region of the Indonesian Southeast
2006.6 234
island of Java Asia
Southeast
2009.10 Relief Operaons related to a disaster in Western Sumatra, Indonesia 33 Asia
Central-
2010.1–2010.2 Relief Operaons following a major earthquake in Hai 234 South
America
2010.8–2010.10 Relief operaons related to flooding in Pakistan 514 South Asia
Relief Operaons and delivery of supplies following a major earthquake on the

2011.2–2011.3 40 South Pacific
southern island of New Zealand
Relief Operaons following a typhoon in the Philippines

2013.11–2013.12 Southeast
about 1180
Asia
Search and Rescue Operaons following the disappearance of a Malaysia Airlines

2014.3–2014.4 about 160 Southeast
plane Asia
Fig. 7.7 SDF international emergency missions based on the international emer-
gency assistance law. Source: Prepared by author using data Defense of Japan
reat Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake

G
PKO and other International Peace Cooperation Operations greatly added
to the GSDF’s post-Cold War legitimacy. Through these efforts, public
support, and appreciation, of the SDF further increased. When the admin-
istration headed by Socialist Party Chairman Murayama Tomiichi came
into power in July 1994, the party drastically changed its security policy
of unarmed neutrality and recognized the SDF and the Japan–US Security
Treaty. The SDF, which had long been criticized as the “unconstitutional
284 T. MURAKAMI
illegitimate child,” had finally gained near nationwide legitimacy. Yoshida

Shigeru’s political motives in disaster relief operations had paid off at
long last. Ironically, this success actually led to an effort to eliminate the
mission of disaster relief dispatches.56 As part of the discussions of the
Advisory Group on Defense Problems (Bōei Mondai Kondankai) during
the Hosokawa Morihiro Administration (1993–1994), former Defense
Agency Administrative Vice Minister Nishihiro Seiki led the initiative for
the reduction of the SDF and called for the restructuring/reduction of
GSDF bases nationwide, which had existed for the purpose of disaster
relief operations.57 However, GSDF disaster relief duties did not end with
the Cold War. On January 17, 1995, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
shook the Kansai region. It was the biggest disaster in postwar Japan up
to that time, with 6434 dead. It was also the largest disaster relief opera-
tion for the GSDF since the Ise Bay typhoon operation in 1959 (prior to
the March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami). The
importance of GSDF disaster relief operations following the Kobe disaster
swept away all doubts that had been raised during the above Advisory
Group’s discussions. In the new National Defense Program Outline, the
Murayama Administration placed the “setup of disaster relief operations”
under the section “Necessary postures to be maintained.”
Nevertheless, the GSDF was strongly criticized for their slow ini-
tial response during the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. The disaster
region was under the jurisdiction of the 3rd Division (based in Itami City)
and the division did not deploy until the Hyō go Prefecture Governor’s
request came, some four hours after the disaster struck. In addition, it
was not until the 19th (two days after the initial quake) that all of the
Middle Army’s units, including the 3rd Division, began their disaster relief
operations.58 In order to revise the GSDF disaster relief deployment pol-
icy, the Murayama Administration began to re-evaluate numerous policies
regarding the subject. First, the standards of “discretionary dispatch” were
clarified in order for unit leaders to be able to decide on “subsidiarity prin-
ciple” in a timely manner (particularly for information gathering and situ-
ation assessment, and rescue operations).59 Second, the standby time and
preparation of the on-scene units was revised. Prior to the disaster, some
two to three hours were required to deploy a mid-size unit (one hundred
troops and twenty vehicles).60 After the reorganization, the GSDF’s first
response unit, including troops, vehicles, helicopters, detonation teams,
and chemical protection teams, was able to deploy within one hour.61
The late response of the GSDF during the Great Hanshin-Awaji

Earthquake was primarily the result of the lateness of the governor’s
request because the serious disaster overwhelmed the Hyogo prefec-
ture’s crisis management capacity. However, by the 1970s, it was already
acknowledged that the central government’s “upscaling principle” should
be emphasized in the case of a major earthquake. In order to speed up
the process, the “Major Earthquake Disaster Relief Deployment (Daikibo
Shinsai Saigai Haken)” order, a special measures law for the director
general of the Defense Agency, was established in 1980. The Murayama
Administration should have followed the “upscaling principle” and had
the Defense Agency director general issue the order for a “major earth-
quake disaster relief deployment,” but it did not. As a result, in order to
speed up the decision making in time of a disaster, a “discretionary dis-
patch” policy was established afterward for the ASDF and others to assess
the situation and report to the prime minister when a Level 5 (on the
Japanese scale of Shindo) earthquake or higher strikes.62
One issue that still remained after the disaster was the role of US
forces in Japan. On January 18, 1995, President William J. Clinton called
Prime Minister Murayama to offer American assistance. Soon after, US
cargo planes left Yokota Air Base with blankets, water supplies, and so
on. However, the offer of the USS Independence and other ships of the
7th Fleet, equipped with beds for victims, was never realized. There were
also twelve trucks on standby at Yokota Air Base and forces of III Marine
Expeditionary Force in Okinawa were also ready to participate in relief
efforts.63 During the Ise Bay typhoon relief efforts, US forces cooperated
with the SDF as mentioned before. However, this cooperation was never
subsequently formalized into policy.
estructuring the SDF and the Great East Japan Earthquake

R
Rapid changes in the security environment after the 9/11 terrorist attacks
brought drastic changes to the SDF’s policy, equipment, organization,
and management. During the Cold War, the SDF was only expected to
stop direct invasions, but it was now required to be a “functional force”
that could respond to terrorism, ballistic missiles, and other threats. As
a result, in the revised 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, the
“Dynamic Defense Capability” concept that emphasized the functionality
of the SDF finally replaced the former “Basic Defense Capability.”
The aim of structurally reforming the SDF into a dynamic defense force
also reinforced their disaster relief operations. The first reform was the
286 T. MURAKAMI
establishment of the Joint Staff Office (JSO). With the establishment of

the JSO, the Chief of Staff of the JSO is able to directly offer advice to
the Defense Minister from a military perspective. For example, the JSO
put together a comprehensive disaster relief deployment plan in the event
of a major earthquake directly under the capital city of Tokyo and its
environs called the “Disaster Relief Deployment Plan in Case of a Direct
Earthquake in the Tokyo Area” (Shutoken Chokka Jishin Hasseiji ni Okeru
Saigai Haken). Within this plan, the JSO decided to organize a “Joint
Task Force (Tōgō Ninmu Butai)” with the commanding general of the
Eastern Army serving as the commander in charge of GSDF units as well
as those of the MSDF in Yokosuka and ASDF in order to ensure rapid
deployment to areas affected by a disaster. In addition, the plan also made
it possible for the JSO Chief of Staff, JSO to order GSDF, MSDF, and
ASDF units across the nation to support the “Joint Task Force,” allow-
ing for the deployment of up to 110,000 personnel (including reservists)
to be sent to the stricken area. This plan was the basis for the Great East
Japan Earthquake relief operations, described in detail below, which made
it possible for the 100,000-plus force to be quickly mobilized.64
Second, the “Central Readiness Force (CRF; Chūo ̄ Sokuō Shūdan)”
was established. The CRF is a new task force that has an airborne unit,
helicopter unit, and Central Readiness Regiment (Chūo ̄ Sokuō Rentai).
It also contains units that specialize in the assessment and decontamina-
tion of areas affected by non-conventional weapons (nuclear, biological,
and chemical). The CRF facilitates the rapid deployment of these highly
specialized units to regional regiments dealing with technically demanding
aspects of disaster relief operations.
It was during the GSDF’s response to the Great East Japan Earthquake
that the reforms of the disaster relief system following the Great Hanshin-
Awaji Earthquake and the 9/11 terrorist attacks really displayed their
potential. A major earthquake (Japan seismic level Shindo 7) that struck
off the Sanriku Coast in Northeastern Japan on March 11, 2011, was
immediately followed by a massive tsunami that submerged towns along
the coast, caused great damage to the Tō hoku region, and severely dam-
aged the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
reactor, which released radioactive particles into the air. The GSDF, along
with the ASDF and MSDF, fought this unprecedented crisis by applying
the policy frameworks of “major earthquake countermeasures,” “nuclear
disaster countermeasures,” and “co-operation with the U.S. forces in
Japan.”65
First, regarding “major earthquake countermeasures,” the SDF

responded quickly compared to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
even though the disaster was far worse and covered a much larger area.
The request for disaster relief was quickly sent by municipalities in the
disaster area, which, following the “on scene” principle, allowed for
quick dispatches of disaster relief units. Furthermore, the Kan Naoto
Administration (2010–2011) responded quickly following the “upscal-
ing principle” when Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi ordered a major
earthquake disaster deployment within three hours of the initial quake.
By March 18, over 100,000 SDF members were readied on the order of
Prime Minister Kan. By contrast, nearly 22,00 troops had been assembled
for the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.66 This speedy response allowed
the SDF to rescue 19,286 people, or approximately 70% of the total num-
ber rescued, while only 165 people had been saved by the SDF after the
earthquake in Kobe.
Second, the “nuclear disaster countermeasures” involved the deploy-
ment of the GSDF’s Central Readiness Force’s Central Special Weapons
Protection Unit (Chūo ̄ Tokushu Bukki Bōgotai) to fight the unprecedented
nuclear disaster caused by the earthquake and tsunami’s damage to sev-
eral reactors at the Daiichi Fukushima nuclear plant. The CRF unit was
able to evacuate refugees and transport them using their decontamination
vehicles and chemical protection vehicles. The CRF also conducted water
spraying on the number Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station along with the MSDF and ASDF
units.
Third, regarding “cooperation with U.S. forces” during the Great East
Japan Earthquake relief operations, there were numerous governments
who extended their support to Japan, but none as quickly as US forces in
Japan. This bilateral effort between the SDF and US forces became known
as Operation Tomodachi (or Operation Friendship). US forces provided
over 20,000 troops, twenty ships, including the nuclear aircraft carrier
USS Ronald Reagan, the USS Essex, and 160 aircraft. Coordination
offices were established at three sites: the Ministry of Defense in Ichigaya,
United States Forces Japan (USFJ) Headquarters at Yokota Air Base, and
the headquarters of Joint Task Force-Tohoku at Camp Sendai (Northeast
Army Headquarters) to coordinate the respective levels of the operations
between USFJ and the SDF. The establishment of the coordination offices
was based on the 1997 US–Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline’s
“U.S.-Japan Cooperation Coordination Office” concept. The “coopera-
288 T. MURAKAMI
tion with the USFJ” differed from “major earthquake countermeasures”

and “nuclear disaster countermeasures” in that it was not based on previ-
ous operational experiences, but was a new operation that will serve as an
example for future disaster relief operations.67
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the significance of disaster relief operations
in building legitimacy for the SDF among the public by analyzing the
GSDF’s history of leadership in disaster relief operations. In the early post-
war years, Prime Minister Yoshida had struggled to gain popular support
for the SDF when it was established in the 1950s due to the fresh memories
of military dictatorship prior to and during World War II. As a result, the
mission of disaster relief was included in the SDF Law, and it became the
norm to wait for governors to request “deployment” before the SDF con-
ducted disaster relief operations. This also conformed to Japan’s disaster
response policies that emphasized the “subsidiarity principle” under which
it was believed that local authorities and commanders were best equipped
to judge the situation. With the revision of the US–Japan Security Treaty
in 1960, the SDF’s actual operations focused primarily on disaster relief
during the Cold War as US forces took over the larger role of defending
Japan against external, direct aggression.
As improved prevention measures progressed nationally against disas-
ters caused by floods and destructive winds, the threat of major earth-
quakes in major urban centers that had become increasingly populated
during the period of high economic growth became a growing concern.
However, the SDF never had to deal with a major earthquake under the
“upscaling principle,” by which the central government would fully mobi-
lize its resources. Increasingly, within the SDF, concern was raised that it
was overly focusing on disaster relief operations at the expense of defense-
related military objectives. On the other hand, the reformist prefectural
and local governments were reluctant to request disaster relief or accept
offers of assistance from the SDF. These developments occurred against
the background that a major disaster (causing deaths of more than 1000
people) had not occurred between the Ise Bay typhoon disaster of 1959
and the end of the Cold War.
The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995 that claimed the lives of
6434 people drastically changed public views of the SDF’s role in disaster
relief operations. By that time, the SDF was already widely supported by
the public, and major disaster relief operations were looked upon as few
and far between. However, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake reawak-
ened awareness and demonstrated Japan’s vulnerability to natural disasters.
Soon afterward, the importance of the SDF’s disaster relief operations was
finally reevaluated and disaster relief was given a high priority again.
The shift from the “existing SDF” to the “functional SDF” after the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks also affected the organization’s
disaster relief operations. As the SDF increased its entire organization’s
functionality, disaster response capabilities were reinforced, surpassing the
previous standards. These capabilities were demonstrated during the Great
East Japan Earthquake response in March 2011.
Disaster relief began as Prime Minister Yoshida’s way to overcome the
anti-military feelings of citizens in postwar Japan and build support for the
SDF. However, even Yoshida began to criticize disaster relief operations as
they became an integral function of the SDF, stating that “disaster relief
is not part of the main duties of the SDF.” Nonetheless, today military
engagement in disaster relief operations has become an important duty
globally, and militaries that contribute to disaster relief have come to be
called the “post-modern military.”68 In other words, disaster relief opera-
tions have come to shape the GSDF’s “main duties” and are now more
than ever the basis for their legitimacy, and for overcoming the anti-mil-
itary feelings of citizens. Through more than sixty years of disaster relief
activities, the GSDF has developed humility and compassion for citizens.
These characteristics have earned the GSDF high public appreciation.
“Deployed Units must work without displaying hardships to earn the
citizens’ gratitude and approval”—National Safety Force Ordinance,
Disaster Relief Operation (1952), Article 13 (command for dispatched
personnel).69
Notes
1. Interview with Dr. Robert D. Eldridge, political advisor to the
Forward Command Element, III Marine Expeditionary Brigade,
Camp Sendai, Miyagi Prefecture, on May 5, 2014.
2. See Michael Auslin, “Shinsai no Kyūjo Katsudō de, Jieitai ni tais-
uru Yoron ga Henka,” Wall Street Journal (Japanese online ver-
sion), April 15, 2011. It is perhaps more significant to note that
the Japanese public’s perception of the US military changed even
more. See Robert D. Eldridge, “Quake Relief Efforts Highlight a
290 T. MURAKAMI
Vital U.S. Military Function,” Japan Times, March 31, 2011

(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/03/31/commen-
tary/world-commentary/quake-relief-effort-highlights-a-vital-u-
s-military-function/#.U2bEdPmSxXM, accessed May 5, 2014).
3. The dispatch of SDF for disaster relief falls within the “secondary
mission (jūtaru ninmu)” of the SDF to “maintain public order
(kōkyō no chitsujō no iji),” as per Article 3, Paragraph 1, of the Self-
Defense Forces Law, and is an activity permitted under Article 83
(Disaster Relief Dispatch) of the same law.
4. In addition, according to Article 83 of the SDF Law, so-called
vicinity dispatches (kinbō haken) are permitted as well: “In the
event that a fire and other disasters occur in and around Defense
Agency (now Ministry) facilities including offices and quarters,
commanders of units, etc., may dispatch units.”
5. Yoshida Shigeru, Kaisō Jūnen, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Chūō Kō ronsha,
1998), p. 178.
6. Yoshida, Kaisō Jūnen, pp. 177–178.
7. Asagumo Shimbunsha Henshūkyoku, ed., Haran no Hanseiki:
Rikujō Jieitai no 50 Nen (Tō kyō : Asagumo Shimbunsha, 2000),
p. 13.
8. Kishi Nobusuke, Kō no Ichirō , Fukuda Takeo, Gotō da Masaharu,
Tanaka Kakuei, and Nakasone Yasuhiro, Watashino Rirekisho:
Hoshu Seiken no Ninaite (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun
Shuppansha, 2007), p. 280, and Gotō da Masaharu, Jō to Ri:Gotōda
Masaharu Kaikoroku, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kō dansha, 1998, Volume 1),
p. 120.
9. Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjō Senshibu, ed., Sakuma Makoto Ō raru
Hisutorii, Vol. 1, (Tokyo: Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjo, 2007), p. 112.
10. Please refer to the 2011 version of the Bosai Hakusho, at: http://
www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h13hakusho.html (accessed
June 2014). During the Allied Occupation of Japan, it was the
occupation forces and civil affairs personnel who responded to
natural disasters in local areas. See the report (especially page 132)
written by the Central Disaster Management Council Study Group
on Retaining Lessons Learned from Previous Disasters (Chūō
Bō sai Kaigi Saigai Kyō kun no Keishō ni Kansuru Senmon Chō sakai)
on the 1948 Fukui Earthquake (1948 Fukui Jishin) published by
the Cabinet Office in 2011. At the time of the Fukui Earthquake
in 1948, the extraordinary efforts of Lieutenant Colonel James
F. Hyland, who was serving as the head of the Fukui Military
Government Team, was said to be of “eternal importance on
Japan-U.S. friendship.” Fukui-ken, ed., Fukui Shinsaishi, (Fukui-
shi: Fukui-ken, 1949), p. 290.
11. Gotō da, Jō to Ri, p. 120.
Hisutorii (Keisatsu Yobitai-Hoanchō Jidai) (Tokyo: Bō eishō , Bō ei
Kenkyūjo, 2008), pp. 82–83.
13. Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., Jieitai Jūnenshi (Tokyo:
Ō kurashō Insatsukyoku, 1961), p. 355.
Hisutorii, p. 83.
Hisutorii, p. 83.
Hisutorii, p. 83.
Hisutorii, p. 83.

Rikujō Jieitai no 50 Nen (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 2000),
p. 17.
19. Jō ji Junichirō , “‘Senshi no Kyō kun’ Chō sen Sensō to Nihon
(Kō hen): Zenkokuhatsu no Saigai Haken,” MAMOR, No. 39
(May 2009), p. 49.
20. Ibid.

Rikujō Jieitai no 50 Nen (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 2000),
p. 224.
23. Ibid.
24. Iokibe Makoto, “Kiki Kanri: Gyō sei no Taiō ” in Asahi Shimbun
Ō saka Honsha “Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsaishi” Henshū Iinkai, ed.,
Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsaishi (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1996),
pp. 332–333, Arjen Boin, Paul Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt
Sundelius, The Politics of Crisis Management public Leadership
under Pressure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
p. 58. Funabashi Yō ichi, “Gabanansu Kiki no Kaibatsu (An Autopsy
of the Crisis in Governance),” in Takenaka Heizō and Funabashi
292 T. MURAKAMI
Yō ichi, eds., Nihon Daishinsai no Kyōkun (Tokyo: Tō yō Keizai
Shinpō sha, 2011), p. 304.
25. Kazama Norio, “Saigai Taisaku Kihonhō no Seitei,” Kindai

Hōgaku, Vol. 50, No. 1 (July 2002), p. 16.
26. During the era of the National Safety Forces, “even if the local
camp commander received a request from the governor to respond
to a disaster, he first had to send his recommendations on whether
the disaster dispatch was required or not to the NSF director gen-
eral, and could only proceed with the dispatch after the director
general had given his approval.” Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbu
Sō mukacho, “Saigai Haken ni Kansuru Kunren no Setsumeisho
(October 28, 1954),” Saigai Haken Kankeihō Kisoku (Hei 17 Boei
01474100), National Archives of Japan.
27. Rikujō Jieitaitatsu 63-2, “Rikujō Jieitai no Saigai Haken no Tatsu
no Zenbu o Kaisei Suru Tatsu (May 15, 1970),” Saigai Haken
Kankeihō Kisoku (Hei 17 Boei 01474100), National Archives of
Japan.
28. Rikujō Bakuryō chō , “Rikujō Jieitai no Saigai ni Kansuru Tatsu
(September 1, 1954),” Saigai Haken Kankeihō Kisoku (Hei 17
Boei 01474100), National Archives of Japan. On the other hand,
in the “Saigai Haken ni Kansuru Kunren no Setsumeisho” of
October 28 that year cited above, also sent out by the GSO, it cau-
tions that “the decision [for self-deployments] is very delicate and
is easy to cause misunderstanding and political as well as social
problems if not done well and special caution is necessary.”
29. Toga Muneo, et al., “Isewan Taifū Saigai Haken Zadankai”

Kokubō, Vol. 9, No. 11 (November 1959), p. 42.
30. Ibid., p. 57.
31. At the time, because there was not a clear understanding of disaster
relief dispatches even within the SDF, the common thinking was
that “it was not necessary to rely on other units and instead it was
important to try to handle any situation that arose in one’s area of
responsibility on one’s own.” Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbuhen, Saigai
Haken Kōdōshi: Isewan Taifū (Tokyo: Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbu,
1975), p. 110. In addition, the bulk of the forces making up the
combined brigade that could respond to a request for assistance,
namely the engineering and reconnaissance units, were located
outside the area in Kyoto and Shiga Prefectures. Rikujō Bakuryō

Kanbuhen, Saigai Haken Kōdōshi, pp. 83, 185.
32. At the time, a feeling of resignation that disaster relief dispatches
were “increasingly becoming a part of the SDF’s mission” and
“could not be avoided” dominated the GSO. Rikujō Bakuryō
Kanbuhen, Saigai Haken Kōdōshi, p. 501.
33. Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbuhen, Saigai Haken Kōdōshi, p. 155.
34. Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbuhen, Saigai Haken Kōdōshi, p. 500, Hei 17
Boei 01456100, National Archives of Japan.
35. Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbuhen, Saigai Haken Kōdōshi, pp. 157–167,
494. The request by the governor of Aichi Prefecture for the dis-
patch of US forces in Japan was done through the US Consulate in
Nagoya.
36. Regarding the Disaster Measures Basic Law, including a detailed
discussion of its formation, see Bō sai Gyō sei Kenkyūkai, Saigai
Taisaku Kihonhō (Tokyo: Gyō sei, 2002).
37. Tanaka Akihiko, Anzen Hoshō: Sengo 50 Nen no Mōsaku (Tokyo:
Yomiuri Shimbun, 1997), pp. 203–204.
38. Regarding the debate in the Diet on the Socialist Party’s National
Land Construction Corps, see Namiuchi Chizu, “Jieitai to Saigai
Haken Katsudō : Sengo Nihon no Bō ei Gyō sei ni Kansuru Kenkyū
Nō to,” Shakaigaku Jaanaru, No. 35 (March 2010), pp. 83–96.
39. The local GSDF commander apparently was bothered that his
beloved soldiers were “working alongside simple day laborers
removing snow.” Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbu, S38.1 Gosetsu Saigai
Hakenshi (Tō kyō : Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbu, 1963), p. 285.
40. The early response of the Ikeda Cabinet was quite fast. By

2:00 p.m., the Cabinet decided to establish an Emergency Disaster
Response Headquarters.
41. Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbu, “Niigata Jishin Saigai Haken Jisshi no
Gaiyō (September 16, 1964),” Saigai Haken Kiroku 3, Hei 17
Boei 01451100, National Archives of Japan. The GSO had already
incorporated the lessons learned from the Ise Bay Typhoon, having
instructed the commanders of the responding units “not to waste
time when the preservation of life was at stake.” Rikujō Bakuryō
Kanbuhen, Saigai Haken Kōdōshi, pp. 503–504.
42. Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbu, “Niigata Jishin Saigai Haken Jisshi no
Gaiyō .”
294 T. MURAKAMI
43. Yoshida Shigeru, Sekai to Nihon (Tokyo: Chūō Kō ron, 1991),
pp. 199–200.
44. Bō ei Daigakkō Anzen Hoshō Kenkyūkaihen, Anzen Hoshōgaku
Nyūmon, 4th Ed., (Tokyo: Aki Shobō , 2009), p. 334.
45. Nishioka Akira, “Jieitai to Minsei Kyō r yoku Katsudō ,” Kokubō 23,
No. 6 (June 1974), pp. 46–59.
46. Kubo Takuya, et al., “Tokubetsu Zadankai Tenki ni Tatsu

Boeiryoku no Arikata,” Kokubō, Vol. 25, No. 2 (February 1976),
p. 58. Kubo placed great emphasis on disaster relief dispatches
when apportioning the budget, thinking to dramatically improve
the necessary equipment with which the SDF had to work.
47. “‘Saigai Shutsudō ’ o Shuyō Ninmu ni,” Yomiuri Shimbun, October
5, 1975.
48. Sadō Akihiro, Sengo Seiji to Jieitai (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kō bunkan,
2006), p. 118.
49. Maeda Tetsuo, ed. Kenshō: PKO to Jieitai (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1996), pp. 209–210.
50. For more on these reformist local governments, see Soga Kengo
and Machidori Satoshi, Nihon no Chihō Seiji (Nagoya: Nagoya
Daigaku Shuppannkai, 2007), pp. 145–200.
51. The exercise was based on a Level 5 or 6 (on the Shindo scale)
earthquake occurring in the area of Tokyo and Kanagawa
Prefecture, causing a great deal of damage and disruption to the
government’s main functions. In this scenario, 53,000 SDF per-
sonnel centered on the Eastern Army (Tō bu Hō mentai) were to be
mobilized. See Nakasone Yasuhiro, Nihonjin ni Itte Okitai Koto
(Tokyo: PHP, 1998), pp. 128–132. September 1 is National
Disaster Day (Bōsai no Hi), established in 1960 in honor of the
1923 Kantō Earthquake, which occurred on September 1 and
killed approximately 140,000 people.
52. Nakasone, Nihonjin ni, 132.
53. Rikujō Jieitai Chūbu Hō men Sō kanbu, Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsai
Saigai Haken Kōdōshi (Itami: Rikujō Jieitai Chūbu Hō men
Sō kanbu, 1995), p. 9. It turns out that the city of Kobe had, in
1974, actually received the answer to a study it had commissioned
by an outside group that noted “the possibility of a large-scale
earthquake happening beneath the city,” and that “there would be
substantial damage.” Nevertheless, it did not re-examine its disas-
ter preparations, as it was aggressively trying to develop the city by

inviting companies to set up operations there, making discussion of
worst case scenarios a taboo. In addition, the city was led by an
anti-SDF left-leaning Mayor, Miyazaki Tatsuo (who served from
1969–1989). Also, in March 1975, the Kobe City Assembly passed
a resolution against allowing ships that may be carrying nuclear
weapons from entering its ports. While not legally binding, it was
politically influential, and this discouraged the US Navy, which
adopted a “Neither Confirm, Nor Deny” policy with regard to
nuclear weapons although it is publicly declared that they do not
carry them, from visiting Kobe port. US ships were standing by
ready, along with other US forces, to help Kō be after the 1995
earthquake, to no avail. Central government reluctance to accept
assistance from the United States or other countries was another
important inhibiting factor. See Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster
and Change in Japan (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2013),
pp. 60–61.
54. Akiyama, Masahiro, Nichibei no Senryaku Taiwa ga Hajimatta
(Tokyo: Akishobō , 2002), p. 36.
55. Iwai Fumio, “Kokusai Kinkyū Enjotai e no Jieitai no Sanka o Kanō
Ni,” Toki no Hōrei, No. 1433 (September 15, 1992), pp. 49–57.
56. In fact, the GSDF demonstrated its importance in the relief efforts
at the time of 1991 eruption of Mt. Unzen and the related pyro-
clastic flow. Moriya Takemasa, “Futenma” Kōshō Hiroku (Tokyo:
Shinchō sha, 2010), p. 96.
57. Advisory Group on Defense Issues, “The Modality of the Security
and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st
Century,” August 1994. Also see Akio Watanabe, “Has Japan
Crossed the Rubicon? Defense Policy Since the Higuchi Report,”
Japan Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter
2003), pp. 238–254, and Bō eishō Bō ei Kenkyūjō Senshibu, ed.,
Sakuma Makoto Ō raru Hisutorii, Vol. 2.
58. Iokibe, “Kiki Kanri,” pp. 361–362.
59. Daikibo Saigai Taisaku Kenkyū kaihen, Wagakuni no Atarashii
Daikibo Saigai Ō kyū Taisaku (Tokyo: Gyō sei, 1998), p. 208.
60. Matsushima Yūsuke, Hanshin Daishinsai: Jieitai Kaku Tatakaeri
(Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshin, 1996), p. 162.
61. Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2011 (Tokyo: Gyō sei, 2011),
p. 247.
296 T. MURAKAMI
62. Daikibo Saigai Taisaku Kenkyūkaihen, Wagakuni no Atarashii,

p. 223.
63. Regarding this and earlier US military assistance in disaster relief
operations in 1923, see Hatano Masaru and Iimori Akiko, Kantō
Daishinsai to Nichibei Gaikō (Tokyo: Sō shisha, 1999), pp. 19–22.
Interview by author and Robert D. Eldridge with Steve Town,
May 20, 2007, Fussa, Japan.
64. Fujii Hisashi, “Sai Tō gō Ninmu Butai “JTF-TH” Shidō ! Higashi
Nihon Daishinsai, Jitsuni 10.7 Mannin o Dō in,” Gunji Kenkyū 46,
No. 6 (June 2011), pp. 38–41.
65. For a detailed look at the activities of the SDF during the Great
East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, see Ministry of Defense,
Defense of Japan 2011, 2–22, and Sasamoto Hiroshi, “Higashi
Nihon Daishinsai ni Taisuru Jieitai no Katsudō : Saigai Haken,
Genshiryoku Saigai Haken, Gaikoku Guntai no Katsudō no
Gaiyō ,” Rippō to Chōsa, No. 317 (June 2011), pp. 59–64, accessed
May 31, 2014 at http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/
chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2011pdf/20110601059.
pdf.
66. Naikakufu, “Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsai Sōkatsu, Kenshō, Chōsa

no-tto,” p. 3, as accessed at http://www.bousai.go.jp/kensho-
hanshinawaji/chosa/sheet/010.pdf October 21, 2016.
67. Hiroe Jirō , and Robert D. Eldridge, “Tettei Kenshō Tomodachi
Sakusen no Butai Ura: Beigun Jieitai no Omowaku ga Kō sa Shita
Nichibei Chō seisho,” Chūo ̄ Kōron, Vol. 126, No. 9 (September
2011), pp. 60–68.
68. For more on the postmodern military, see Yamamoto Yoshinobu,
“Kokusai Shisutemu no Henyō to Anzen Hoshō ,” Kaikankō
Senryaku Kenkyū, No. 2 (December 2011), pp. 4–29. For an
application of this concept to the GSDF, See Sabine Frühstück,
Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the
Japanese Army (University of California Press, 2007).
69. “Hoantai no Saigai ni Kansuru Kunrei,” Saigai Haken Kankeihō
Kisoku (Hei 17 Boei 01474100), National Archives of Japan.
CHAPTER 8
The GSDF’s Quest for Public Acceptance

and the “Allergy” Myth
Paul Midford
Introduction
The Ground Self-Defense Force’s (GSDF) efforts to overcome the legacy
of the pre-war Imperial Japanese Army (IJA, Dainippon Teikoku Rikugun)
and achieve domestic legitimacy has deeply influenced the missions, struc-
ture, and even the very name of this military organization. Even while the
GSDF has attempted to distinguish itself from the pre-war land army, it
has also tried to prove its usefulness and relevance, not an easy task for
the land army of an island nation, especially one that also happens to be
aligned with the global air and naval hegemon, the US. In all three areas,
the GSDF has appealed to mass public opinion as well as elites. This chap-
ter uses polling data to examine how the GSDF has fared in their attempt
to build legitimacy and find public acceptance for its existence.
In terms of reputation building, a large share of the GSDF’s post-war
operations can be classified as confidence-building measures designed to
convince citizens that it poses no threat to the public or to peace, and
can benefit them. The literature on reassurance suggests that an actor can
build trust in its intentions in the eyes of others through repeated unilateral
P. Midford (*)
Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University for Science
and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim, Norway

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8_8
298 P. MIDFORD
acts benefiting the observer that are not tied to reciprocity or to social
norms of obligation.
For a reassurance strategy to be successful, it must have three character-
istics. First, it must involve sending costly signals that involve real cost or
risk. Second, these costly signals must benefit the perceiver, either materi-
ally or by affirming their values. Finally, these signals should be iterated
many times over a prolonged period.1
As such, the GSDF’s lead role in disaster relief, and to a lesser extent
civil engineering projects, can be seen as a long-term reassurance strategy
toward the Japanese public. This chapter argues that this strategy has suc-
ceeded over time in replacing negative images of the pre-war IJA with
positive, benign, and even beneficial images of Japan’s post-war land army.
This process has in turn built legitimacy and acceptance of the GSDF
among the Japanese public.
The first evidence supporting this claim can be seen in Fig. 8.1. From a
mere plurality in 1963, those having a “good” image of the Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) overall have been in the majority since 1965, and have had
at least a two-thirds majority since 1975, and since 1995, that majority has
always been over 75%. In short, the SDF’s reassurance and legitimacy build-
ing strategy has been a success. In this sense, the large-scale, highly visible,
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1963 1965 1967 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1988 1991 1995 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
Good Bad DK
Fig. 8.1 Overall image of the SDF. Source: Naikakufu seifu kō hō shitsu, “Jieitai
ni kan suru yoron chō sa,” various years: http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/.
Note: Results for 1963 depicted in this Figure (Q29, SQ2) only include the sub-
set of 73.4% of respondents who answered that their view of the SDF had not
changed in the past 4–5 years. Among the 26.6% who answered their view had
changed, 23.4% said it had become better, versus 1% who said it had become
worse, 2.2% who did not answer.
THE GSDF’S QUEST FOR PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE AND THE “ALLERGY” MYTH 299
and widely praised mobilization of the SDF in the wake of the March 11,
2011, Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident, is not a
radical departure, as some in the international media and even some observ-
ers in Japan portrayed it,2 but rather the continuation and accentuation of a
long-term trend. As the SDF service carrying the heaviest reputational bag-
gage from the pre-war past, and the service that usually has the lead role in
disaster relief, this trend has been especially important for the GSDF.
A more important turning point had come 20 years before, in the early
1990s, after the GSDF had already built up a long and popular record as
a domestic disaster relief organization, when the GSDF, along with the
other SDF services, went overseas for the first time, ostensibly for par-
ticipation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKO). In
terms of the substance of its overseas operations, however, the SDF was
sent overseas to perform disaster-relief-like operations, albeit often within
the framework of UN PKO. Combat was excluded from these missions,
although GSDF members were lightly armed in case they were attacked.
In effect, for the Japanese public, their beloved disaster relief organiza-
tion had “gone international.” Although public opposition and opposition
from Asian countries to GSDF overseas deployments were initially strong,
the TV images and other media reporting of GSDF members benignly
and beneficially repairing roads, purifying water, and providing medical
services in Cambodia and beyond served to reassure the public and neigh-
boring Asian nations. Thus, since the early 1990s, the domestic reassur-
ance strategy has been extended overseas, reassuring neighboring Asian
audiences as well as further reassuring domestic audiences.3 Domestically,
the public had come to overwhelmingly support these missions by the end
of the 1990s. GSDF overseas missions also increasingly assumed a recon-
struction and economic assistance character as they have become increas-
ingly integrated with Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)
policy. Nothing illustrates this trend better than the GSDF deployment
to Samawah in southern Iraq from 2004 to 2006; this chapter presents a
brief case study of this deployment.4
This chapter largely relies on the Jieitai ni kansuru opinion poll (hence-
forth, Poll on the SDF) that the Public Relations Office of the Cabinet
(Naikakufu seifu kōhōshitsu) has conducted at two- or three-year intervals
since 1956.5 Tracking this poll not only offers insights into long-term
public opinion trends regarding the SDF,6 but also allows insight into the
defense policy priorities and concerns of the cabinet in power during the
time the survey was taken; question wording can often tell us as much
about the pollster as the answers to that question tell us about public
300 P. MIDFORD
opinion. This in turn provides insights into the government and GSDF’s
strategy for building public support and legitimacy.
The rest of this chapter is divided into seven sections. The next section
looks at the GSDF’s initial efforts to build public acceptance and support
during the Cold War through domestic disaster relief and civilian coopera-
tion operations. The second section examines support for the GSDF itself
and in comparison with the other SDF services during the latter part of the
Cold War. The third section examines the GSDF’s efforts to demonstrate
its continued relevance and maintain legitimacy at home through domes-
tic disaster relief operations after the end of the Cold War, including the
pivotal influence of the 1995 Kobe earthquake. The fourth section shows
how the GSDF’s popularity and legitimacy as a domestic disaster relief
organization allowed it to expand these operations overseas in the form
of participation in UN peacekeeping and international Humanitarian and
Disaster Relief (HaDR) operations, beginning with an initial deployment
to Cambodia in 1992. The fifth section examines how the GSDF’s role
changed in response to the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war on ter-
ror, and includes a case study of the GSDF’s deployment to southern Iraq
in 2004–2006, which demonstrates the increasing integration of GSDF
overseas operations with ODA. The sixth section examines the GSDF’s
role in response to the 3/11 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident.
The final section evaluates the GSDF’s success in achieving legitimacy and
public support and argues that recurring claims about the lack of public
support for the GSDF are little more than a myth.
Building GSDF Legitimacy During the Cold War:

Disaster Relief and “Civilian Cooperation”
In the 1950s a realist-like recognition on the part of the Japanese public
that Japan needed a military, as shown in Fig. 8.2, co-existed with high
degrees of anti-militarist distrust, typified by distrust of civilian control,
the state’s ability to use the military wisely, and distrust of the SDF itself.
Although largely obscured for observers of the 1950s and 1960s by the
public’s anti-militarist mistrust, this belief in the need for a military dem-
onstrates the public’s “attitudinal defensive realism,” namely attitudes
undergirding public opinion that see military power as having utility for
defending national territory, but not possessing utility as a foreign policy
instrument for advancing national interest overseas.7
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1950 1952 1954 1956 1957
Yes No Other, DK
Fig. 8.2 Asahi Shimbun poll: Does Japan need military forces? Source: Data from
Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., The Japanese people and Foreign policy: A study of public
opinion in post-treaty Japan (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961),
p. 69
The GSDF’s assumption of leading roles in disaster relief was part of

a reassurance strategy8 that provided opportunities to reach out to the
public and build a positive track record as a provider of vital services. The
GSDF’s role in civil engineering projects, especially dangerous aspects of
road construction (e.g. dynamiting and land removal), and more mun-
dane mobilizations to help farmers with rice planting,9 all under the rubric
of “civilian cooperation,” were usually less visible than disaster relief, but
also made a contribution to building public support for the GSDF. The
annual deployment of the GSDF since 1955, shortly after it was estab-
lished, to support the Sapporo Snow Festival and help build its famous
ice sculptures, was an early way to promote the GSDF’s image at a popu-
lar event that achieved national attention. Even more important was the
mobilization of the GSDF to support the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, which,
as discussed below, proved to be by far the most high-profile and popular
form of “civilian cooperation.” In these ways the GSDF was able to gradu-
ally reduce the anti-militarist distrust that had resulted from the behavior
of its predecessor.
The GSDF’s first high-profile opportunity to show off its value to the
Japanese public as a disaster relief organization came in the wake of a
massive typhoon, the Ise Bay typhoon (or typhoon Vera) that devastated
302 P. MIDFORD
coastal regions near Nagoya in September 1959, leaving thousands dead.

GSDF units were dispatched to conduct search and rescue operations and
provide humanitarian relief (e.g. temporary housing, medical services,
purified water, and transportation) and reconstruction (see Murakami’s
chapter for greater detail).
A month after the typhoon the Publicity Bureau of the Cabinet Office
conducted its second Poll on the SDF and defense issues. Unlike the first
poll, this poll added two questions related to disaster relief. One asked
respondents who supported the existence of the SDF why they supported
it. In response, 32% cited the SDF’s role in disaster relief, the most popu-
lar answer, eclipsing national defense at 20%. The second question asked
what the SDF’s most useful role up to now. Responses to this question
favored disaster relief even more: 74% cited disaster relief, versus 4% who
cited national defense, and 28% who cited civilian cooperation outside of
disasters, such as help with road construction (also see Figs. 8.4 and 8.5).10
This same poll also found that 95% of respondents had heard about the
mobilization of the SDF for rescue and reconstruction assistance follow-
ing typhoons and floods. By comparison, only 58% responded that they
knew about the SDF’s role in removing mines from Japan’s waters or
cooperating with civilian engineering projects, etc.11 The mobilization of
the GSDF for rescue and recovery from the Ise-wan typhoon the month
before had obviously been widely noticed by the Japanese public.
At the same time, avoiding negative opportunities that might damage
public support for the GSDF was also crucial for building legitimacy. Nine
months after the Ise-wan typhoon, Tokyo was rocked by massive dem-
onstrations opposing the ratification of a new US–Japan Security Treaty.
These massive anti-security-treaty demonstrations (anpō tōsō in Japanese)
at one point effectively encircled the Diet building with 330,000 demon-
strators, and prompted national strikes of over six million workers. As John
Welfield put it, “by June 1960 Japan had come perilously close to civil
war.”12 In reaction, conservative Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke called
for the mobilization of the GSDF to restore order and ensure the safety
of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s planned visit to Japan. In anticipa-
tion of massive anti-treaty demonstrations, Sugita Ichiji, GSDF Chief of
Staff, drafted a confidential plan to mobilize the GSDF to maintain public
order and shared it with high-ranking GSDF officers. However, many of
these officers opposed this plan, believing it would seriously damage the
GSDF’s standing with the public.13 During the height of the crisis, Kishi
himself urged Japan Defense Agency Director-General Akagi Muneyoshi
to mobilize the GSDF against the demonstrators to ensure the safety and
success of Eisenhower’s impending visit. However Akagi refused, claiming
that Eisenhower’s visit did not warrant the damage mobilization would do
to GSDF and SDF legitimacy. Kishi reluctantly backed down and canceled
what would have been the first visit by a sitting US President to Japan.
(See Kusunoki’s chapter for more details on this.)14
Although Akagi and Sugita were undoubtedly correct that mobilizing
the GSDF would have badly damaged its legitimacy in the eyes of a signifi-
cant proportion of the public, at the same time, it must be pointed out that
the regular Poll on the SDF showed significant support, in the abstract at
least, for the idea of deploying the SDF to maintain law and order. In a
question first added to this poll in 1961, likely in reaction to the contro-
versy about whether to mobilize the GSDF during the 1960 treaty dem-
onstrations, and repeated several times during the 1960s (see Fig. 8.3),
a plurality consistently favored mobilizing the SDF before domestic riots
or chaos became “large,” versus a minority who favored mobilizing the
SDF only as a last resort, and 20–30% who answered “don’t know.”
The 1960 treaty demonstrations probably exceeded the scale necessary
to justify a GSDF mobilization for this plurality, but whether they saw
the demonstrations as “riots” and “chaos,” or instead as justified political
demonstrations appropriate under democracy remains unknown as this
poll never asked that question. However, the 1969 Poll on the SDF did
ask whether the SDF should have been mobilized to deal with the so-
called Shinjuku incident, a disturbance that involved street confrontations
between leftist political groups and police and resulted in nearly 1600
arrests. In response, a plurality of 35% answered that the SDF should not
have been mobilized, versus 25.2% who thought it should have been, and
19.8% who answered that they could not say for certain, and 20% who
had not heard of the Shinjuku incident. These responses suggest that
most Japanese were not ready to support SDF mobilization in response
to small-scale unrest. Moreover, the number of Japanese who regarded
maintaining law and order as a central mission of the SDF consistently
remained under 30% (see Figs. 6.3 and 6.4).
A second major opportunity to demonstrate the GSDF’s ability to posi-
tively contribute to society came in January 1963, when Kanazawa and
much of the Hokuriku region was buried in a deep multi-week snow fall.
GSDF units were dispatched to help local authorities and residents dig
out. Much of their effort involved simple spade work alongside local resi-
dents. This deployment in particular appeared to have a major and posi-
304 P. MIDFORD
50
40
30
20
10
0
1961 1963 1965 1969
Favor mobilization before it becomes large

Only as a last resort
Entirely oppose mobilization
Don't know
Fig. 8.3 Mobilization of the SDF to counter riots and chaos? Source: Naikakufu
seifu kō hō shitsu, “Jieitai ni kansuru yoron chō sa.” various years: http://survey.
gov-online.go.jp/
tive impact on perceptions of the GSDF, especially at the elite level. The
Osaka Defense Council (Osaka Bō ei Kyō kai, 大阪防衛協会), a non-profit
and non-governmental organization, was founded in February 1964 by
business people led by Matsushita Kō nosuke as an auxiliary organization
through which the business community and ordinary citizens could sup-
port the GSDF and the other SDF services.15 This was followed two years
later by the establishment of the Tokyo Defense Council and the National
Leadership of Defense Councils in 1966.16
A true watershed opportunity for the GSDF, and the SDF more gen-
erally, was the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, during which more than 7500
GSDF and other SDF members were deployed to provide manpower for
managing the Games. The SDF established a Tokyo Olympic Support
Command (TOSC, or in Japanese: Tokyo Orinpikku Shien Shudan Junbi
Honbu) consisting of seven groups: ceremonies, communications, medical
services, transportation (ground and air), Olympic Village management,
and event support. Guarding and patrolling were part of GSDF duties
at the Olympic Village, and GSDF helicopters provided aerial views for
photo-journalists. At the opening and closing ceremonies GSDF artillery
units fired canons in salute. An estimated 90% of Japanese watched the
opening ceremony, although the GSDF artillery salute was overshadowed
by the Air Self-Defense Force’s (ASDF) Blue Impulse squadron that drew
the Olympic rings in the sky.17
The GSDF provided training for 68 Japanese athletes from the sum-
mer of 1963, and 21 SDF members joined Japan’s national team, includ-
ing Miyake Yoshinobu, a Second Lieutenant in the GSDF and a weight
lifter who took Japan’s first Gold Medal of the Tokyo Games. Tsuburaya
Kō kichi, a First Lieutenant in the GSDF won the Bronze Medal in the
marathon, Japan’s first track and field medal since 1936.18
The Tokyo Olympics are undoubtedly the most famous example of
GSDF deployment for “civilian cooperation.” Yet, according to Aaron
Skabelund, “the SDF’s contributions to the Tokyo Olympics and to
Japan’s first Winter Games held in Sapporo in February 1972 were not
extraordinary. But compared to other militaries, the Olympics were far
more important to the Japanese armed forces … for the first time [the
SDF had] … an opportunity to make itself widely visible on a stage perme-
ated by national pride.”19 Especially for the GSDF, the Olympics were the
best publicity opportunity ever.20
In the next iteration of the Poll on the SDF, conducted in November
1965, 9% of respondents identified civilian cooperation (which included
the GSDF’s high-profile support for the Tokyo Olympics) as the SDF’s
second most important role up to now, three times the percentage who
so answered in 1963, and the highest number who so answered dur-
ing the 1961–1995 history of this polling question (see Fig. 8.4). The
GSDF’s role in helping maintain internal law and order during the Tokyo
Olympics (mostly in the form of crowd control)21 also received recogni-
tion from the Japanese public, with 25.1% recognizing this as the SDF’s
secondary role, more than eight times the number who so answered in
1963 (3.1%), and nearly four times as many as so answered at any other
time during the history of this question (in 1981, 6.3% so answered).
Moreover, in 1965, 27.8% answered that maintaining internal law and
order was the SDF’s primary duty, the most who so answered during the
history of this question (1959 to 1995, see Fig. 8.4). Among respon-
dents who answered in the same poll that they had a good image of the
SDF, 16% answered that this was because of the support the SDF had
provided for the Olympics, the second most selected reason that year
behind disaster relief. Clearly the GSDF significantly enhanced its image
by supporting the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.
After the Tokyo Olympics the GSDF’s attempts to build legitimacy
and support reverted to its mainstay of domestic disaster relief operations,
306 P. MIDFORD
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1988 1991 1995
Disaster Relief National Defense

Internal Law & Order Civilian Cooperation
International Coop (PKO, HaDR)
Fig. 8.4 The SDF’s main role up to now?* Source: Naikakufu seifu kō hō shitsu,
“Jieitai ni kansuru yoron chō sa.” various years: http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/.
*Note: In 1965, the question asked “what is the SDF’s main secondary role?”
Multiple answers were allowed in 1959 and several other answer categories were
included
although the GSDF and the other services were again able to able to dem-
onstrate their utility and build public support during the 1972 Sapporo
Winter Olympics. Major domestic HaDR operations between 1964 and
the end of the Cold War included the 1964 Niigata earthquake, 1966
Misawa city fire, 1978 Miyagi quake, 1981 Fukui blizzard, 1984 Nagano
quake, and the 1986 Izu-shima volcanic eruption.
Already by the second half of the 1960s, as indicated by Fig. 8.1, a large
and stable majority of the public held a positive image of the SDF. As Fig.
8.4 indicates, from the late 1960s, disaster relief was listed as the primary
contribution of the SDF “up to now” by a large majority of Japanese,
a result that correlates with the emergence of a large majority having a
favorable view of the SDF (see Murakami’s chapter on this point).
Nonetheless, the public made a distinction between the SDF’s “pri-
mary contribution to society up to now,” and its primary mission. As
Fig. 8.5 shows, between 1969 and 1991, a consistent majority identified
national defense as the SDF’s primary reason for existence (in 1995 only
a large plurality did). In fact, disaster relief often trailed closely behind
maintaining internal security as the third most frequently cited reason for
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1988 1991 1995
Disaster Relief National Defense

Internal Law & Order Civilian Cooperation
Fig. 8.5 Primary role/duty of the SDF? Source: Naikakufu seifu kō hō shitsu,
“Jieitai ni kansuru yoron chō sa.” various years: http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/.
Note: In 1959, this question was only asked as a follow-up question of those who
supported the existence of the SDF (65%) of all poll respondents
the SDF’s existence. Figures 8.4 and 8.5, taken together indicate that the
public greatly appreciated the SDF as a disaster relief organization, yet
did not lose sight of the SDF’s potential role and mission for defending
Japanese territory.
Despite these results, many within the SDF, the JDA, the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), and the Cabinet Office worried that the GSDF’s
large role in domestic disaster relief was obscuring its importance for
national security in the eyes of Japanese citizens, as Murakami discusses in
his chapter. We can see indications of this concern in the Poll on the SDF
during the 1960s, when a question that was included four times asked
respondents whether they thought the SDF should seriously train for
national defense. The results can been seen in Fig. 8.6. As indicated there,
the majority of respondents answered that the SDF should train seriously
in preparation for repelling an external attack, except in 1969, when only
a large plurality thought so. On the other hand, those who thought mili-
tary training for national defense were unnecessary never exceeded 30%
of respondents, while those who were unsure hovered between 15% and
308 P. MIDFORD
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1961 1963 1965 1969
Should exercise seriously No real need DK
Fig. 8.6 Should the SDF train seriously for national defense? Source: Naikakufu
seifu kō hō shitsu, “Jieitai ni kansuru yoron chō sa.” various years: http://survey.
gov-online.go.jp/. Note: The “Should seriously exercise” total for 1961 includes
“very much” (28%) and “somewhat” (33%), and only one “no need” category.
This uneven distribution of the answer choices may skew the results favor of
answering there is a need. However, in subsequent years, there is one answer cat-
egory for there “is a need” and one for there is “not a need”
just over 20%. However, in a follow-up question asked in 1961 and 1963,
most of those who answered that the SDF should exercise seriously for
national defense also answered that disaster relief and civilian cooperation
were not secondary to national defense. Among the 61% who answered
in 1961 that the SDF must seriously exercise for national defense, nearly
two-thirds answered that disaster relief and civilian cooperation were
not secondary priorities to national defense,22 versus 16% who answered
that these missions were indeed secondary to national defense. In 1963,
19.4% answered disaster relief and civilian cooperation were secondary to
national defense, versus 31.6% who answered that these missions were not
secondary. Thus, even among the majority to large plurality who thought
the SDF should exercise seriously for national defense there was also the
expectation by most of these respondents that disaster relief and civilian
cooperation should continue to be prioritized and not compromised for
the sake of national defense.
Of those who thought that the SDF did not need to exercise seriously
in preparation for national defense there appear to be three major reasons:
Perceptions that Japan was not threatened as long as it did not pose a
threat to others, an idea summarized in the phrase “a small but bright
and shining Japan” (chiisaku tomo kirari to hikaru kuni nihon),23 the idea
that the SDF did not need to exercise because Japan’s defense was already
guaranteed by the US, and finally, traditional pacifism. The first two rea-
sons again point to a recurring problem identified throughout this book,
especially for the GSDF (as a land invasion is the least plausible type of
threat): proving its relevance as a military force.
The findings of the Poll on the SDF during the Cold War were broadly
mirrored in media polls about the SDF. For example, in a June 1971,
Mainichi Shimbun poll, 71% of respondents answered that the existence
of the SDF are necessary for Japan, with 14% answering that the SDF are
needed to defend against external aggression (consistent with Fig. 8.4), a
result that again appears to reflect low perceptions of external threat and
the US security guarantee. 24% of participants responded that the SDF
are needed for preservation of public order, and 22% for disaster relief
operations.24 Although the preservation of public order slightly exceeded
disaster relief in this poll, over time the public support for domestic disas-
ter relief operations would only continue to grow.
Nonetheless, support for the GSDF’s disaster relief role was far from
universal. For example, an educational consultant writing in a June 1991
letter to Asahi Shimbun called for creating a “Disaster Relief Force”
(Saigai enjyō tai) that would take half or a third of the SDF budget. He
argued that because the SDF has weapons and conducts military exer-
cises, it could not be expected to match a dedicated disaster relief force in
capabilities. Questioning the very constitutionality of the SDF, this letter
writer suggested that the majorities supporting SDF disaster relief dis-
patches are actually approving of the SDF as a disaster relief corps, not as
a military. A “Disaster Relief Force” that had “no connection to weapons”
would be better suited for international as well as domestic disaster relief
operations.25 Although this letter writer was correct in arguing that to
a significant degree the Japanese public saw the SDF as a disaster relief
force, its role in defending national territory was also well supported, as
demonstrated above. The Socialist party tried unsuccessfully to create a
similar force in order to prevent the GSDF from being sent overseas for
HaDR operations.
310 P. MIDFORD
Public Support for the GSDF Versus the ASDF

and Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)
A question included in the Poll on the SDF from 1969 and 1997 asked
respondents their view of the GSDF’s current strength, and thus offers
insight into public support for the GSDF itself, and versus its two sister
services. The results appear in Fig. 8.7. As indicated there, a plurality sup-
ported maintaining the current level of GSDF strength in 1969, a plurality
that grew into a consistent majority from 1972 through 1997. During the
same period, those favoring shrinking the GSDF out-polled those favoring
strengthening it half the time, with advocates of strengthening the GSDF
prevailing during the other half. These two groups polled between 8% and
22%. With the end of the Vietnam War, the drawdown of US forces in East
Asia, and the beginning of the second Cold War, support for strength-
ening the GSDF predominated, while advocates of shrinking the GSDF
predominated as the Cold War was ending in 1988 and during the early
post-Cold War period through 1997. In short, since 1972, a consistent
and growing majority favored maintaining current GSDF strength, while
support for strengthening or shrinking the GSDF fluctuated in response
to the waxing and waning of fears of abandonment by the US, and to vary-
ing perceptions of external threat.
Figure 8.8 tracks those who answered in favor of strengthening the
GSDF, ASDF, and MSDF in three separate questions from the Poll on the
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1988 1991 1995 1997
Strengthen GSDF Maintain current level Shrink
Fig. 8.7 Views of GSDF strength. Source: Naikakufu seifu kō hō shitsu, “Jieitai ni
kansuru yoron chō sa.” various years: http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/
35
30
25
20 Strengthen GSDF
Strengthen MSDF
15
Strengthen ASDF
10 Risk of Entrapment
Fig. 8.8 Support for strengthening the three SDF services and fear of entrap-
ment in war. Source: Naikakufu seifu kō hō shitsu, “Jieitai ni kansuru yoron chō sa.”
various years: http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/. Note: There are no data on fear of
entrapment for 1972 because this question was not asked that year: http://survey.
gov-online.go.jp/
SDF, and the results of another question that track those who feared Japan
becoming entrapped in a war. This figure shows that support for strength-
ening the MSDF and ASDF, like the GSDF, rose and fell in parallel with
the fear of entrapment. Specifically, support for strengthening the three
services fell as the Vietnam War ended, but increased as the US reduced
its military presence in East Asia and the renewed Cold War heated up at
the end of the 1970s and early 1980s. Support fell again as the Cold War
ended.
Figure 8.8 also reveals that the GSDF was, as many suspected, the
“poor cousin” of the other two services in terms of public support, espe-
cially the ASDF, as support for strengthening the GSDF lagged behind
support for strengthening its sister services in all but two years (1975
and 1997), and then it only barely exceeded the other services. In 1995,
support for strengthening the GSDF edged out strengthening the MSDF
by 0.1%. Especially up to 1972 and during the 1980s, the GSDF lagged
behind its sister services; in 1984 and 1988, support for strengthening the
ASDF was approximately 50% higher than for the GSDF. Lower support
for strengthening the GSDF appeared to reflect two factors. One factor
was the reputational baggage it continued to carry as the ostensible suc-
cessor of the IJA, and was probably most influential as a factor up through
312 P. MIDFORD
1972. The burden of wartime history on the other hand was least salient
for the ASDF, which does not have a corresponding pre-war ancestor ser-
vice. A second factor is the nature of the external threat due to Japan’s
geographical position as an island nation, which is first and foremost an air
and sea threat, and only after that a threat to Japan’s control of its islands.
Nonetheless, the GSDF overtook the MSDF and then even the ASDF
in the 1990s. This result that appears to reflect the influence of the first
SDF dispatches overseas to participate in UN PKO and the disaster relief
operations following the 1995 Kobe quake; in both cases, the GSDF was
the lead service. As one GSDF General told Sabine Frühstück several years
after the Kobe earthquake, throughout his career “the Air Self-Defense
Forces had always been the service branch with the cleanest reputation
and the most glamorous image. Then the GSDF began going abroad on
peacekeeping missions and was dispatched after the Kobe-Awaji earth-
quake had occurred and, ‘suddenly, the GSDF became the cool guys.’”26
The GSDF in the Post-Cold War Era

With the end of the Cold War at the beginning of the 1990s, the GSDF
faced a partially altered environment that offered new challenges and
opportunities. The element of continuity in this new environment is most
clearly evident in disaster relief, with the GSDF continuing to be called
upon as the lead disaster relief organization. The biggest change, chal-
lenge, and new opportunity, was posed by growing calls for the GSDF to
go overseas for the first time for HaDR-like operations and development
assistance operations.
The 1991 Unzen volcanic eruption on the southern main island of
Kyushu was the GSDF’s first high-profile disaster relief mission of the
Post-Cold War era, a mission that earned much appreciation for the
GSDF.27 The 1993 Hokkaido earthquake and the 2007 Niigata quake
produced other high-profile GSDF dispatches.
However, it was the dispatch of the SDF to the major port city of Kobe
and its environs in the wake of a devastating earthquake on January 17,
1995, that proved to be a major turning point for the GSDF and domestic
disaster relief operations. The Great Awaji-Hanshin quake inflicted the
worst devastation suffered by a major Japanese urban center since the end
of World War II, and was the worst earthquake-induced destruction since
the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake struck Tokyo. The Kobe quake took the
lives of more than 6400 people (see Murakami’s chapter for more details).
Twenty percent of Kobe’s office space and 80% of its docks were rendered
unusable by the quake. The damage to Kobe and surrounding regions
equaled 2.5% of Japan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).28
In response, the GSDF launched its largest disaster relief operation
since the Ise-wan typhoon of 1959. The Kobe operation lasted for three
months and involved the deployment of 21,760 troops at its peak.29 Yet,
this deployment was surrounded by controversy for being too little (ini-
tially only 9000 GSDF members were mobilized) too late, and for being
inadequately prepared for a large-scale urban disaster. The governor of
Hyogo Prefecture was widely blamed for being anti-SDF and therefore
slow in requesting the dispatch of the GSDF. The Commander of the
GSDF’s Middle Army based in nearby Itami was also blamed for being
inexperienced and ill prepared for the type of large-scale mobilization that
was needed.30
When the next iteration of the Poll on the SDF was conducted in July
1995, reflecting the controversy and heightened attention regarding the
SDF’s role in disaster relief that was generated by the Kobe quake and the
GSDF’s response, a number of new and detailed questions were added
regarding disaster relief. Despite the controversy, the response of the SDF
to natural disasters was positively evaluated by an overwhelming majority.
When asked what image they had of SDF disaster relief operations to date,
88.7% replied that they had a very positive (33.9%) or positive (54.8%)
image, versus 7.3% who held a negative and 0.9% who held a very nega-
tive image.
However, when asked specifically about dispatching the SDF for disaster
relief operations in the wake of the Kobe earthquake “after receiving the
governor’s request,” only 31.6% thought the dispatch was swift (10.7%)
or somewhat swift (20.9%), versus 63.2% thought the dispatch should
have been somewhat quicker (37%) or much quicker (26.2%). While a
clear majority thought the dispatch should have been swifter, a truly over-
whelming majority of 90.2% thought the SDF disaster relief operation
in the wake of the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake had produced great
results (38.4%) or some results (51.8%), versus 7.7% who thought the
SDF operation had produced little (7%) or no positive results (0.7%), and
2.1% who were unsure. In short, except for swiftness, the GSDF-led disas-
ter relief operation in Kobe and its vicinity was highly rated by the pub-
lic, as highly rated as the overall image of SDF disaster relief operations.
Although the GSDF received a lot of criticism for their response, some
of which, namely timeliness, initial scale, equipment, and training, was
314 P. MIDFORD
undoubtedly justified, with the exception of timeliness the vast majority of

the public did not agree with the critics. Pundit claims about public skep-
ticism of the GSDF were thus exaggerated and the public’s views proved
to be relatively independent, rather than merely reflecting media or elite
discourse.
The dispatch of GSDF Chemical units in the wake of the Sarin Gas
attack on the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995, by the Aum Shinrikyo
cult was almost as widely praised by the public as the GSDF dispatch in the
wake of the Kobe quake. A total of 76.6 % thought the GSDF response
to the Sarin attack produced great (26.6%) or some results (50%), ver-
sus 16.1% who thought it produced little (13.9%) or no positive results
(2.2%), and 7.3% who were unsure.
When the same poll asked which form of SDF disaster relief opera-
tions had been most successful, 95% answered operations in response to
large-scale natural disasters such as earthquakes, typhoons, and forest fires.
The next most frequently chosen reply was detonating unexploded bombs
(left over from World War II) at 34.8%, then 34.6% who answered rescu-
ing those in distress in the mountains and on the seas, and 26.2% who
answered transporting medical patients from remote islands and other dif-
ficult to reach areas and 15.6% who answered responding to water main
outages. The range of answers reflects the wide definition of the SDF’s
disaster relief operations in Japan, but nonetheless shows that large-scale
natural disaster relief remains by far the most appreciated form of “disaster
relief” operations.
Overall, domestic disaster relief deployments are consistently a major
part of the GSDF’s operations, even when there are no major disasters.
To take fiscal 2006 as a typical year without any large-scale disasters, the
GSDF dispatched a total of 7000 troops 24 times for natural disaster
responses, involving 1700 vehicles and 148 aircraft. They also played a
large role in the emergency transportation of medical patients together
with the other SDF services. Altogether there were 579 such dispatches of
2563 personnel, two vehicles and 599 planes in fiscal 2006. The SDF was
also dispatched 117 times to assist in firefighting, dispatches that involved
3250 personnel, 333 vehicles and 99 aircraft, again with the GSDF play-
ing the lead role. In these missions the GSDF and the rest of the SDF are
playing an increasingly important role in Japan’s outlying islands where
population decrease, and cuts in essential civilian services, especially in the
availability of doctors and hospitals, renders SDF transportation and medi-
cal services increasingly vital. The GSDF also participates in domestic SDF
search and rescue operations for civilians. Overall in 2006, the SDF made
46 dispatches involving 3200 personnel, 480 vehicles, and 85 aircraft for
search and rescue.31
In view of the SDF’s substantial and continued involvement in large-
and small-scale disaster relief after the Cold War, most notably the contro-
versial Kobe deployment, and the GSDF’s lead role in domestic disaster
relief, it is not at all surprising that domestic relief has continued to domi-
nate as the SDF’s most important mission in the eyes of the Japanese pub-
lic, with national defense a close second. As indicated in Fig. 8.9, disaster
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
Disaster Relief
National Defense
Internal Law & Order
Civilian Cooperation
International Coop (PKO, HADR)
Response mystery ships/armed operatives
Missile Defense
Counter-piracy
Response to International Terror
Cyber Security
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-proliferation Cooperation
Security related Capacity Building in Developing Nations
Fig. 8.9 SDF’s main duties after the Cold War. Source: Naikakufu seifu
kō hō shitsu, “Jieitai ni kansuru yoron chō sa.” various years: http://survey.gov-
online.go.jp/. Note: Until 2000, respondents could give up to two answers, but
from 2003, they could give as many answers as they wished
316 P. MIDFORD
relief and then national defense represent the top tier of most frequently
cited main duties for the SDF, in the 60% to 80% range. A second tier in
the 25% to 50% range consists of overseas deployments of the SDF (with
the GSDF as the lead organization) for disaster relief and PKO, and inter-
nal security.
A third tier between 10% and 25% includes everything else: civilian
cooperation, an answer choice consistently included in this question since
1959, plus several categories added, and sometimes subtracted, between
2003 and 2015. “Response to mystery ships and armed operatives” was
asked between 2003 and 2012, and was a question added in response to
incidents in 1999 and 2001 when unidentified North Korean spy ships
were detected in Japanese waters (in 1999 in Japan’s territorial waters, in
2001, only in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone). “Missile defense was
added in 2006, eight years after a North Korean Taepodong missile flew
over Japan, creating a so-called Taepodong shock32 as Japan began deploy-
ing missile defenses, and the same year North Korea again conducted a
major missile test and conducted its first nuclear weapons test. “Response
to international terrorism” was asked only once, in 2003, two years after
the 9/11 attacks. That this question has not been asked again appears to
reflect the view, perhaps embraced by the Cabinet Office, that counter-
terrorism is not an SDF or military mission and hence does not need to be
asked (see below). Counter-piracy was added in 2012, three years after the
SDF began counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia.
In 2015 four new categories were suddenly added (only three of which
appear in Fig. 8.9 due to space constraints). These are cyber security,
security-related capacity building in developing countries (reflecting a
policy begun by the DPJ’s Noda administration and continued by the Abe
administration to have the SDF provide non-combat police capacity build-
ing assistance), promoting defense cooperation and exchanges (security
dialogues among civilian and uniformed defense officials, exchange vis-
its between military units, confidence-building measures, etc.), and arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation cooperation.
The proliferation of answer choices beyond the four SDF roles offered
throughout the Cold War began in 1995 with the addition of interna-
tional peacekeeping and international HaDR missions as an answer choice,
reflecting the enactment of the UN PKO bill and the first SDF dispatch
overseas in 1992 (see below). In all, five new categories were added
between 1995 and 2012, two were dropped, and then four new catego-
ries were suddenly added in 2015. This burst of new categories in 2015
appears to reflect less changing conditions than the new security activ-
ism of the Abe administration. The proliferation of answer options also
explains why the number of answers a respondent was allowed increased
from one answer until 1995 to two in 1997 and 2000, and then to mul-
tiple answers since 2003, an important point for understanding why all
the answer categories as depicted in Fig. 8.10 are lower in 1997 and 2000
than subsequently.33 The proliferation of answer categories reflects a diver-
sifying range of roles for the SDF after the Cold War’s end, and a widening
array of perceived threat types, including many that had been previously
been considered “non-traditional” security issues, such as piracy. For the
SDF, and especially for the GSDF, the biggest single diversification was
the decision in the early 1990s to begin sending the SDF overseas for
HaDR-type operations, and even for economic development missions.
The Domestic Disaster Relief Force Goes

International
Long before the Gulf War, the issue of dispatching the SDF overseas had
been slowly welling to the surface in Japanese politics. Yet, in light of
public and elite memories of Japan’s disastrous experience with the projec-
tion of the IJA overseas, it is not surprising that any projection of military
power overseas, especially of the GSDF, was extremely controversial. In
summer 1954, just as the GSDF was being established, the Upper House
of the Diet passed a non-binding resolution forbidding the deployment
of the SDF overseas for any reason. Nonetheless, MSDF ships have gone
overseas for unarmed nautical “training” and Antarctic exploration, and
SDF officers, including from the GSDF, have been dispatched to overseas
embassies. As early as 1952, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau had ruled
that SDF overseas dispatch for non-combat operations would be constitu-
tional, but that enabling legislation had to be enacted first.34
When first asked, in 1965, whether they supported the SDF’s dispatch
overseas in order to cooperate with the UN, a poll conducted by the Public
Relations Office of the Cabinet found that 55% of Japanese opposed, ver-
sus less than 10% who approved.35 Due to such lopsided opposition, a bill
drafted in the mid-1960s permitting the GSDF and the other SDF ser-
vices to participate in UN PKO (similar to the one written 26 years later)
was shelved.36
318 P. MIDFORD
Eighteen years later in a poll conducted by the Public Relations Office of

the Cabinet in 1983, respondents were asked whether Japan should coop-
erate with UN PKO in conflict zones by dispatching personnel, equipment,
and extending financial aid within the limits of Japanese law. In response,
42% supported, and 23% opposed dispatching Japanese personnel to
regions of conflict. The same question was repeated in 1986, and this time
39.2% said Japan should dispatch personnel versus 25.3% who opposed,
and 34.6% who were unsure, results almost unchanged from those found in
the 1983 poll. Although not asked specifically about the participation of the
SDF in peacekeeping, the willingness of a plurality to consider dispatching
personnel to conflict zones, and the uncertainty of another third, suggests
that as early as 1983, a significantly larger portion of Japanese was relatively
open to considering this prospect than had been the case in 1965.37
The presence of a plurality in support and, more importantly, the absence
of an opposing majority made it politically safe for the LDP government
to pass legislation in September 1987, the Law Concerning the Dispatch
of Japanese Disaster Relief Teams, which permitted overseas deployments
of government personnel to participate in HaDR. This allowed Japan to
dispatch small numbers of civilian officials to Afghanistan and Pakistan in
June 1988, and to the UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group in August
1988. The Foreign Ministry’s 1989 Diplomatic Bluebook clearly indicated
the government’s intention to send more personnel abroad, but empha-
sized the importance of obtaining public support first.38
While the 1987 law allowed for the dispatch of individual GSDF and
other SDF members in principle, none were deployed due to concern in
the LDP about a lack of public support. An August 1989 Cabinet Office
poll, repeating the same language used in the 1965 poll found that a mere
22% of respondents supported possible SDF participation in UN PKO,
versus a plurality of 46% of who opposed, and 30% who did not know or
could not answer.39 Thus, in the course of 24 years, the public had become
somewhat more open to the idea of dispatching the SDF overseas to par-
ticipate in UN PKO, with a majority either supporting this or unsure.
Nonetheless, a large plurality continued to oppose SDF involvement.40
More significantly, however, an overwhelming majority of 72% sup-
ported overseas SDF deployments for “disaster relief activities,”41 the
GSDF’s main domestic role. Thus, a year before the first Gulf War erupted,
the public, while opposed to SDF participation in UN PKO, was none-
theless becoming comfortable with the idea of the SDF playing a HaDR
role overseas. Subsequent LDP-led governments would gradually come to
realize that they could achieve public support for overseas SDF dispatches
by largely limiting them to HaDR-type missions.
However, the outbreak of the Gulf War appears to have suppressed
support for humanitarian dispatches. A Cabinet Office poll conducted in
February 1991 found a mere 54% supporting SDF participation in overseas
humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities, versus 72% expressing
support when the same question was asked in 1989.42 Evidence of reduced
support for humanitarian dispatches during the Gulf War also emerges
with a differently worded question in a Nihon Keizai Shimbun poll con-
ducted in November 1990 and again in March 1991. In November 1990,
43.7% supported allowing the SDF to cooperate in “non-military aspects
of UN peace-keeping operations,” with support beginning to rebound
following the war, as 47.2% of respondents expressed support for the same
option in March 1991.43
Japanese citizens did not believe their government’s claim in fall 1990
that an SDF dispatch to join the multilateral army in Saudi Arabia was a
“non-military dispatch,” because the SDF would only provide non-lethal
logistical support, and would supposedly flee immediately if hostilities
broke out or were imminent. Japanese public opinion appeared ready to
support SDF overseas dispatch on two conditions: That the SDF’s role be
limited to non-combat disaster relief and humanitarian operations, and
that these operations do not occur in the middle of a conflict or war zone.
When the Kaifu Cabinet introduced the PKO bill to the Diet in
September 1991, it contained language permitting SDF members and
units to participate in UN peacekeeping. It also allowed SDF members
to carry side-arms for personal protection. Although individual mem-
bers could decide, on their own, to use their weapons for personal
self-defense, they were banned from using force as “a unit.” The bill
permitted participation in the full range of PKO, including what the
government of Japan defined as “main-duty” PKO. These included
monitoring cease-fire compliance, patrolling and weapons collection in
a buffer zone, weapons inspection, collection or storage of abandoned
weapons, assistance in prisoner-of-war exchanges, and assistance in des-
ignating cease-fire lines. These were regarded as a distinct set of opera-
tions conducted by a Peacekeeping “Force,” or “army,” [gun’] and were
given the acronym PKF.44
On the other hand, construction, medical services, transportation, and
other rear-support or logistical operations were defined as PKO, and dis-
tinct from PKF. The bill also allowed SDF units to deploy overseas for
320 P. MIDFORD
HaDR operations, including those not specifically covered by a UN man-

date. Unlike the failed bill introduced before the Gulf War, however, the
new PKO bill limited peacekeeping participation to missions authorized
by the UN Security Council, thus excluding participation in multilateral
military forces merely sanctioned by the UN, such as the US-led multi-
lateral force of the Gulf War. In this respect, the PKO bill was a far less
ambitious and scaled-back version of the pre-Gulf-War bill. The new bill
also limited operations to logistical support in areas far removed from any
combat.
Yet, this was not enough to satisfy a public resolutely opposed to
the SDF using force overseas or even getting into situations where this
might become likely. A November 1991 poll showed public opposition
to the bill by a ratio of 58% to 33%. On the other hand, 50% sup-
ported SDF overseas deployments for non-military assistance such as
disaster relief.45 This prompted the LDP and the two small opposition
parties with which it was cooperating, especially Komeito, to further
water down the bill by imposing five conditions on SDF participation: 1.
Conclusion of a cease-fire before deployment; 2. Consent of all the par-
ties, including the territorial state, to SDF deployment; 3. Maintainance
of strict impartiality by UN peacekeeping forces; 4. Immediate with-
drawal of the SDF should any of these requirements should cease to be
upheld; and 5. The use of weapons is limited to the minimum necessary
for individual self-defense.
Nonetheless, this was not enough to overcome public opposition, and
the bill failed to pass in the fall Diet session. In spring 1992 the bill was
reintroduced by the LDP and Komeito and watered down further with the
introduction of a freeze on mainline PKF operations, including disarming
combatants, disposing of weapons, and patrolling buffer zones. The only
operations in which the SDF would be allowed to engage were transporta-
tion, communications, medical assistance, civil engineering projects, water
purification, and so on, exactly the types of operations that the GSDF
conducts during domestic disaster relief. This compromise was enough
to overcome the previous majority opposing the bill, which was enacted
in June 1992. In short, rather than politicians changing public opinion,
public opinion changed the proposals of politicians until the possibility of
using force was removed from the bill.
Initially, the public was reluctant to dispatch the GSDF to join the UN
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the first UN peacekeeping
mission that Tokyo planned for the GSDF. This is clearly demonstrated
Financial and economic

9% assistance
Form Civilian corp for
12%
37% dispatch
Dispatch SDF for non-combat
ops
22% Dispatch SDF for PKF
20% Other/DK
Fig. 8.10 How do you think Japan should cooperate with UNTAC? Source:
Asahi Shimbun, May 1, 1992, p. 1
in Fig. 8.10, which depicts the results of an Asahi Shimbun poll question
asking respondents how Japan should cooperate with UNTAC. Overall
only 34% supported dispatching the SDF to participate in some form in
UNTAC. A Yomiuri Shimbun poll published on the following day similarly
showed that most of the public thought Japan could contribute to inter-
national security in ways other than participating in PKO. Responding to
the question, “How should Japan contribute to international security?”
PKO was the fourth most selected option with a mere 23.9%, whereas
60.4% preferred dispatching “personnel” overseas “for disaster relief and
helping refugees.”46
The Cambodia Deployment: Peacekeeping or

Disaster Relief?
Given the PKF Freeze and the influence of Japanese public opinion more
generally, the operations that the GSDF conducted while deployed to
Cambodia in 1992–1993 closely paralleled those it conducts for domestic
disaster relief. The GSDF concentrated on repairing roads and bridges,
transportation of food and water, sanitation work, and providing medi-
cal services. At its peak, the GSDF’s UNTAC clinic treated up to 600
patients a day. The other major service the GSDF provided was water
322 P. MIDFORD
purification, a proficiency it had honed over several decades of domestic

disaster relief. UNTAC military Commander General John Sanderson
claimed that the GSDF water purification teams were the best in his
experience.47 Moreover, the GSDF members did not get involved in any
firefights or take any casualties. They were guarded by French troops,
thereby largely insuring that this would remain a strictly non-combat
mission, and rendering the issue of possible weapons use more theoreti-
cal than real.
In late September 1992, soon after the GSDF had arrived in Cambodia
to begin operations, the Asahi Shimbun conducted a poll asking respon-
dents whether they approved of the SDF dispatch to Cambodia. In
response, 52% supported the dispatch versus 36% who opposed.48 This
result represented a large increase in support over the results that Asahi
obtained in May. However, support was undoubtedly increased by the
fact this same question was paired with only two answer choices, sup-
port or opposition, instead of giving respondents other answer options.
Nonetheless, the large increase in support suggests a significant shift in
public opinion in favor of the Cambodia deployment. This shift appears
to reflect wall-to-wall media coverage of GSDF members professionally
beginning their duties in Cambodia and engaging in disaster-relief-type
operations that were essentially as far removed from combat or other mili-
tary operations as anyone could imagine.
From 1991, and for over a decade, the Poll on the SDF repeated
questions about the SDF’s participation in overseas disaster relief and
PKO. The results are depicted in Fig. 8.11. Although some variations
in question wording might affect the results,49 the results clearly support
the point made above, namely that following the initial deployment of
the SDF to Cambodia (and to Mozambique and Rwanda) for disaster
relief and humanitarian-type operations support for SDF overseas deploy-
ments for both PKO and HaDR significantly increased. The initial SDF
deployment had a positive demonstration effect on Japanese public opin-
ion. I remember one Japanese telling me that images of the GSDF arriv-
ing in Cambodia surprised her, because the soldiers on TV looked more
like US soldiers rather than Japan’s pre-war military. In short, the begin-
ning of GSDF deployments overseas began to replace long-held images
of overseas deployments by the IJA with more benign images of GSDF
deployments.
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1991 1995 1997 2000 2003 2006 2012
Support Overseas HADR Support PKO Deployment
Fig. 8.11 Support for overseas deployments of the SDF. Source: Naikakufu seifu
kō hō shitsu, “Jieitai ni kansuru yoron chō sa.” various years: http://survey.gov-
online.go.jp/
Post-Cambodia PKO and HaDR Deployments

In the three years following the landmark Cambodia deployment of 600
SDF members Japan followed up with much smaller deployments of 50
SDF members to Mozambique for a UN PKO mission in 1993, 290
troops to Rwanda in 1994 for the first humanitarian relief operation, and a
long deployment of a 45-member GSDF transportation unit to the Golan
Heights in Syria to participate in the UN Disengagement Observer Force
(UNDOF) peacekeeping mission, a deployment that lasted from 1996
until the unit was withdrawn in 2013 due to the Syrian civil war.50 In the
1997 Poll on the SDF, respondents were asked how they evaluate the
results of the Golan Heights deployment. In response, 44.9% positively
(5.2%) or somewhat positively (39.7%) evaluated the results of this deploy-
ment, versus 22.1% who somewhat negatively (18.8%) or very negatively
(3.3%) evaluated the results of this deployment. Strikingly, 33% answered
“don’t know,” confirming that the Golan deployment was indeed relatively
obscure for the public. That obscurity, plus the fact that this was a transpor-
tation deployment in support of a traditional peacekeeping mission (moni-
toring a buffer zone between militaries) explains the relatively high rate of
opposition versus support for this mission. Nonetheless, a solid plurality
324 P. MIDFORD
positively evaluated this mission (among those with an opinion, positive

evaluations exceeded negative evaluations by approximately two to one).
Although the GSDF’s overseas deployments through 1997 were
officially “peacekeeping” deployments (except for Rwanda which was a
humanitarian deployment), they were in substance very similar to the
HaDR deployments for which the GSDF had achieved great support
domestically. However, in 1998, the GSDF was sent on its first official
overseas disaster relief mission in the wake of a destructive hurricane that
struck Honduras. Due to limited ASDF lift capabilities and other issues,
the dispatch was slow. Hurricane Mitch struck on October 29, but the
SDF was only dispatched on November 13. Despite the relatively slow
dispatch, the GSDF, and its small size, only 80 GSDF members were
dispatched, it proved very proficient at helping to re-establish civilian
infrastructure, such as water, electricity, and telephone service. The unit
also treated 4031 outpatients.51 Since Honduras the SDF has deployed
overseas more than a dozen times (including to Iran) for disaster relief,
with the largest deployments being sent to Indonesia following the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami and the Philippines in 2013 following a massive
typhoon.52
In the Poll on the SDF conducted in 1999, respondents were asked
whether they supported overseas disaster relief operations like the medi-
cal and sanitation operations the SDF performed the previous year after
the hurricane in Honduras. In response, 86.3% approved (50.1%) or
somewhat approved (36.2%), versus 5.4% who disapproved (1.4%) or
somewhat disapproved (4%). Interestingly, these results are comparable,
if not better, than how the public evaluated the SDF’s domestic disaster
relief operations. In a separate question in the same poll, 87.2% answered
that the SDF’s domestic disaster relief operations had produced great
results (26.6%) or some results (60.6%), versus 9.3% who thought these
operations had produced little (7.8%) or almost no results (1.5%).53
Although the public strongly supported overseas HaDR operations
such as those in Honduras, in the wake of this first mission, views within
the GSDF were mixed. On the one hand, a Lieutenant Colonel told
Frühstück: “The disaster relief mission to Honduras went very well and
we got a lot of good press. But there is a downside to this kind of suc-
cess as well. People must not forget that we are not a bunch of nurses!
We are a military!”54 However, other officers saw the Honduras deploy-
ment as a turning point for the GSDF’s reputation at home and abroad:
“Now everything will change!”55 Yet another GSDF officer saw overseas
disaster relief as the key for overcoming the GSDF’s reputational problem
at home and in East Asia: “It is terrible to say this but the ideal situa-
tion for the Self-Defense Forces’ reputation and our alleged connection
to the Imperial Army would be a natural disaster somewhere close, here
in East Asia. That would give us the opportunity to show the Japanese
population, to our neighbors, and to the international community that
we have changed-that we are not their fathers’ (and grand-fathers’) army
anymore.”56 While overseas deployments of the GSDF for non-combat
HaDR operations certainly had a reassuring impact on neighboring East
Asian countries,57 the refrain that this was the turning point when the
GSDF and the SDF would finally receive the public support within Japan
they deserved, combined with fears about the public forgetting that the
GSDF was actually a military, was part of a recurring pattern in which the
GSDF was seen as yet again on the verge of receiving public support, or
being misunderstood. Yet, these milestones, aspirations, and fears were
unwarranted, since, as demonstrated above, the GSDF had already long
since realized high public support; its territorial defense mandate was also
well supported.
The War on Terror

In the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks, the US, led by the Bush adminis-
tration, launched a “war on terror,” and asked US allies to join its military-
centric operations against Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Yet, even within the
GSDF community, there were reservations about whether terrorism was
primarily a military problem, or a problem that was better tackled through
a combination of law enforcement and social and economic develop-
ment assistance. Sado Ryuki, a former instructor at the GSDF’s Kodaira
Intelligence School (chōsa gakkō), writing soon after the 9/11 attacks,
called for Japan to respond actively, but independently, to the threat of
global terrorism. According to Sado, “this would be different from the old
policies of just calling for peace” and doing nothing more. Arguing that
“retaliation” would not solve the problem of terrorism, he called for elimi-
nating the sources of terrorism by renewed efforts to provide “medical
support, building wells, bridges and roads, schools, improving agriculture,
and other things related to humanitarian support,”58 in other words, the
things the GSDF was already so famous for doing domestically and during
international deployments.59
326 P. MIDFORD
The GSDF in Iraq: Forging a Nexus Between

the Military, Development Assistance, and Human
Security
The initial Japanese response to the 9/11 attacks was to deploy the MSDF
to the Indian Ocean to provide rear-area refueling support to the US and
other allied navies participating in combat operations against Al Qaeda and
the Taliban in Afghanistan, plus a briefer ASDF airlift of humanitarian sup-
plies to refugees in Pakistan. The GSDF became involved in the American
“war on terror” only in the wake of the US 2003 invasion of Iraq, when
Prime Minister Koizumi promised President George W. Bush that Japan
would dispatch the SDF to Iraq. Rather than supporting US combat oper-
ations in Iraq, the GSDF deployment to Samawah, a city in southern Iraq
considered relatively safe, became a humanitarian relief and development
assistance mission that gave no support to US combat operations.60
Overseas dispatches of the GSDF generally fit the paradigm of for-
eign aid more closely than a military-deployment paradigm.61 Although,
GSDF post-conflict reconstruction activities do not qualify as ODA per
se, this reflects the narrow and rigid Cold-War-rooted definition of ODA
rather than the character of GSDF operations. Moreover, as suggested
above, public support for GSDF overseas deployments is heavily depen-
dent upon the public’s appreciation of these missions’ disaster-relief- and
reconstruction-like characteristics. This in turn reflects the large role of
the GSDF’s domestic relief operations in achieving legitimacy and popular
support for the SDF in Japan. For this reason, and because of the Japanese
public’s defensive-realist attitudes regarding the utility of military force,
public support for overseas dispatches of the SDF, even for highly valued
humanitarian and reconstruction missions, has been predicated upon a
strict non-involvement in combat operations.
The deployment to Samawah in Southern Iraq well illustrates the foreign-
aid-like character of most overseas GSDF deployments. Development
aid generally includes two types of assistance: humanitarian assistance to
relieve human suffering and reconstruction and development assistance,
the latter being the traditional focus of Japan’s ODA. Traditionally, devel-
opment aid has excluded military assistance. By contrast, the traditional
military-deployment paradigm has included involvement in combat, secu-
rity, stabilization, and policing missions, in short, the use of violence and
physical coercion to establish and maintain security. Gray zones between
development aid and military deployments prominently include the use of
development aid to train and supply police, a recent trend in development

aid. This in turn reflects a post 9/11 trend toward the securitization of
development and development assistance.
GSDF operations Samawah included all of the traditional development
aid elements listed above, as they engaged in humanitarian relief, reconstruc-
tion and development projects. On the other hand, their operations did not
overlap with the military-deployment paradigm because the GSDF did not
engage in combat, security, stabilization, or policing functions. They did
not even engage in the gray-zone activity of training local police. The only
gray-zone operation that the GSDF did undertake was providing various
services for allied militaries (especially those who guarded them), such as
water purification, medical services, and transportation services. Of course,
the GSDF is a military organization and the units deployed to Samawah
were organized as military units and were armed. Nonetheless, because
GSDF members were guarded by allied militaries, first Dutch troops and
then later Australian troops (including Special Forces), GSDF armaments
were almost more for show and precedent than for actual use. Moreover,
the GSDF, by virtue of being deployed to a relatively safe and government-
supporting Shia region, was somewhat isolated from combat risks.
Beyond a mere de facto correspondence with ODA, the Japanese gov-
ernment officially recognized and even promoted the GSDF’s involve-
ment in development assistance projects. The Ministry of Defense
highlighted a link between the SDF deployment to Iraq for humanitarian
and reconstruction assistance and ODA: “The dispatched SDF units have
conducted operations for humanitarian assistance in cooperation with sup-
port provided by Official Development Assistance (ODA).”62 Similarly,
the 2008 ODA White Paper argued “to date, Japan has conducted the
reconstruction assistance of Iraq by combining the human contribution of
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and development assistance as an ‘inseparable
pair.’”63
Although GSDF operations included non-development assistance and
gray-area operations in support of allied militaries, providing humanitarian
and reconstruction assistance was officially given priority over providing
support to the UN sponsored multilateral military for the latter’s security
and stabilization missions. “The SDF units have been also assisting troops
of foreign countries in their efforts to restore security and stability in Iraq
to the degree that would not hamper the units’ activities for humanitarian
and reconstruction assistance.”64 This non-combat support was exactly the
same support that was provided to Iraqi civilians: medical services, water
328 P. MIDFORD
purification, sanitation and so on. Only the recipient varied. The GSDF
also provided transportation services for allied soldiers, but it did not trans-
port weapons or ammunition for allied militaries, with the occasional trans-
portation of soldiers carrying personal weapons being a partial exception.65
The GSDF’s humanitarian and reconstruction operations included
helping refugees to return home, distributing food, clothing, medicine,
daily necessities, and providing medical services, purified water, and
sanitation. The GSDF also transported goods and provided communica-
tions, constructed housing for people displaced by war, and restored and
upgraded public facilities.
In terms of medical services, GSDF doctors worked at local hospitals,
where they provided training and advice, including training on how to use
medical equipment from Japan, and technical training for the manage-
ment and storage of medicine and training of ambulance personnel. In
total, GSDF medical staff provided medical technique support 277 times,
improved local emergency medical services, and contributed to a reduc-
tion in Samawah’s infant mortality rate by one-third. Regarding water
purification, the GSDF supplied 53,500 tons of purified water to local
water trucks that visited the GSDF base until February 2005, when a
GSDF-constructed water purification plant, funded by Japanese ODA,
was completed. In terms of public facility restoration, the GSDF repaired
36 schools, one-third of all provincial schools in Al-Muthanna province.
The GSDF also renovated 66 other facilities, including medical clinics and
nursing facilities, low-income housing, water facilities, a sports stadium,
and other cultural facilities.66
GSDF operations in and around Samawah also demonstrated close
integration with ODA projects, an integration that often surpasses that
of national European militaries and aid agencies. Overall, Japan provided
over $200 million in grant assistance for GSDF implemented projects in
Al-Muthanna province under the rubric of “Grass Roots Human Security
Projects.” Beyond the water purification plant, ODA funds paid for medi-
cal equipment for hospitals, with GSDF members providing instructions
on use, road and bridge construction projects, and irrigation projects car-
ried out by the GSDF.67
Because of the nature of the GSDF deployment, which was essentially
a continuation of the Cambodia paradigm of HaDR, with the added
dimension of explicit integration into ODA development projects, the
work of the GSDF in Samawah was well supported by the Japanese public.
Nonetheless, there was significant public opposition to the deployment
because Iraq was seen as a war zone and unsafe. In effect, the Japanese
public supported the GSDF’s good works, but opposed their deploy-
ment to Iraq. This is evident in an NTV poll question asked three times
between November 2004 and December 2005 regarding extending the
SDF deployment in Iraq. In none of these polls did support for extending
the Iraq deployment exceed 31%, while opposition grew from 53.9% to
just under 60% by December 2005.68
Just after the GSDF had left Samawah and returned to Japan, the
Public Relations section of the Cabinet Office conducted a poll regard-
ing the GSDF’s deployment to Samawah. It included a question that first
prompted respondents by telling them that the GSDF had been sent to
Iraq “to provide humanitarian reconstruction” assistance, and that all
GSDF members had returned unharmed to Japan. The question then
asked them to evaluate the “humanitarian reconstruction assistance pro-
vided by the GSDF.” In response, 71.5% strongly (25.6%) or somewhat
(45.9%) favorably evaluated the humanitarian assistance provided, versus
22.5% who somewhat (17.4%) or very (5.1%) negatively evaluated the
GSDF’s assistance, and 5.9% who answered do not know or no answer.69
Although the then recently launched Abe cabinet celebrated these
results as demonstrating that the public had “supported in the end” the
deployment, in fact, the reality was quite different. Rather, these results
reflected the Japanese public’s high evaluation for the GSDF’s HaDR
operations, and the fact that the GSDF was not involved in combat and
did not suffer or inflict any casualties. Given how the question was asked,
it would be hard for a sincere respondent not to express support. One
would have to be extremely misanthropic to oppose water purification
and school repair per se, or a respondent had to be a strategic poll taker to
understand that responding with support for these humanitarian accom-
plishments would be construed as supporting the overall deployment
and future deployments to other war zones. This poll question carefully
avoided Koizumi’s original justification of supporting the US military or
playing a larger role in global security. Nonetheless, this result also showed
a significant decline in support for GSDF “humanitarian and relief opera-
tions” overseas. In the Poll on the SDF, 86.3% of respondents had sup-
ported overseas HaDR deployments, and 79.5% had supported overseas
peacekeeping as recently as 2000.70 While these numbers had slumped to
78.5% and 70.2% respectively by 2003, this appears to reflect the influ-
ence of the Iraq Syndrome71 of reduced support for HaDR deployments
overseas (see Fig. 8.11).
330 P. MIDFORD
Remarkably, this poll did not ask respondents whether they supported
the ASDF’s deployment to Iraq for transportation operations, only if they
had heard about it, with only about half answering that they had. Given
that a recent Asahi Shimbun poll had shown that 55% of respondents
opposed the continuation of the ASDF transportation mission, versus 33%
who approved,72 it is perhaps not surprising that this question was not
asked (or if it was, the results were not published). Overall, this Cabinet
Office poll appeared designed to create an image of public opinion rather
than accurately measure it. In the end, however, its primary impact was to
mislead its sponsors, as it helped to create the false impression in the Abe
cabinet that there was more support (or at least tolerance) of continuing
the ASDF mission in Iraq and actively deploying the GSDF to Afghanistan
and other hotspots than there actually was. This in turn contributed to
political mistakes culminating in the LDP’s historic loss in the July 2007
Upper House election, a loss that paved the way for the party to be voted
out of office for the first time in 2009.73
In sum, the public’s response to the GSDF deployment to Iraq revealed
more continuity than change. The public strongly supported the GSDF’s
humanitarian and reconstruction operations there, operations strongly
resonant with its domestic disaster relief operations and international
peacekeeping participation. The main change was the extension of these
operations into similar development projects, a change that also appears
to have been well supported (although this was not a focus of any poll-
ing questions). At the same time, the public did not support the GSDF’s
deployment to a combat or near-combat zone, even for the sake of carry-
ing out its good works. Consistent majorities praised the GSDF’s achieve-
ments even while calling for its speedy withdrawal.
Coming Full Circle: 3/11 and a Renewed Focus on Disaster Relief

The Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011, at magnitude 9, was
of record-breaking scale for Japan in the modern era of seismology. The
quake triggered a tsunami that reached 40.5 meters at its highest point
and swept as far as 10 kilometers inland. Approximately 16,000 people
lost their lives, 70,000 homes were destroyed, and 160,000 had to seek
temporary shelter. More than 300 hospitals, nursing homes, public health
centers, and other medical institutions were rendered unusable. City halls
in forty municipalities were inundated, and in many, the town leadership
was decimated. In many ways, the nuclear accident at the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear plant triggered by the quake and tsunami proved to be

just as devastating. Approximately 80,000 residents in a 20-km radius sur-
rounding the plant were evacuated. In all, 3/11 proved to be by far the
largest disaster Japan had suffered since World War II, and the largest nat-
ural disaster since the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake devastated Tokyo.74
Regional governors wasted no time requesting SDF mobilization, with
the Governor of Iwate being the fastest at six minutes after the quake
struck; the Governor of Miyagi prefecture followed six minutes later.
Tochigi, Fukushima, and Aomori followed over the next two hours. DPJ
Prime Minister Kan Naoto responded quickly to these requests, order-
ing the mobilization of 50,000 SDF troops on the first day. The SDF
responded rapidly, with 8400 mobilized on the 11th. Within two days,
Kan had ordered the mobilization expanded to 100,000. SDF mobilized
strength had already reached 70,000 by March 15, and peaked at just over
106,000 on March 18, a week after the quake. This constituted almost
half the SDF’s troop strength, and represented the largest mobilization in
SDF history. This was nearly five times as many troops as were mobilized
for Kobe earthquake relief operations in 1995. This approximate level of
mobilization was maintained for two months. Reservists were called up for
the first time, with 2400 called for service. Approximately 70% of mobi-
lized troops came from the GSDF; with ASDF supplying around 20% and
the MSDF about 10%. About 540 SDF aircraft and 60 SDF ships were
deployed for disaster relief.75
As with other disaster relief deployments, the GSDF was the lead ser-
vice. Within three days of the disaster, a joint task force of the three SDF
services was established at the GSDF’s Eastern Headquarters in Sendai
under the command of GSDF General Kimizuka Eiji.76 According to
Richard Samuels, “As a result, decision making was rapid and generally
well coordinated within the military,” although communication with the
Kan Cabinet in Tokyo and private companies and Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) was less smooth.77 This command remained in
place until early July when command for remaining operations was trans-
ferred to GSDF’s Eastern Headquarters. Disaster relief operations related
to the earthquake and tsunami lasted until August 31, while those directed
at the Fukushima nuclear accident continued until December 26.78
The SDF engaged in three types of disaster relief. First, the Japanese
military engaged in search and rescue operations. The SDF rescued over
19000 disaster victims, nearly 70% of all those rescued, and collected the
remains of more than 9500 dead, approximately 60% of those who died.
332 P. MIDFORD
Second, the SDF provided transportation, moving evacuees and medical

teams, and more generally transporting and distributing almost 14,000
tons of relief supplies. The latter mission involved extensive cooperation
with NGOs. The GSDF was able to work with the peace movement for
the first time, as the GSDF and the Peace Boat NGO cooperated in May to
jointly distribute relief supplies to evacuees living at temporary shelters.79
Third, the SDF provided humanitarian or livelihood assistance, as it tradi-
tionally does in disaster relief operations. The SDF served over five million
meals and provided nearly 33,000 tons of purified water. It also provided
heating kerosene, 35 temporary bathing facilities for nearly 1.1 million
visits, and sanitation assistance. Finally, the SDF provided emergency reha-
bilitation assistance. In the short term, it cleared 500 km of roads. After
the first few days, the SDF began repairing vital infrastructure such as
roads, bridges, air and seaports. The SDF also helped clean schools, pump
out seawater, and built temporary overpasses over submerged roadways.
The SDF’s response to the nuclear accident focused on cooling off
the reactors, decontamination, radiation, and temperature monitor-
ing. Radiation resistant tanks were used to clear debris at the crippled
nuclear plant and 160 members of the GSDF’s Central Nuclear Biological
Chemical Weapon Defense Unit were mobilized to pump seawater into
the number one reactor to cool it down.80
As one might expect, a truly overwhelmingly majority of the public
positively evaluated the SDF’s post 3/11 disaster relief operations. When
the Poll on the SDF was conducted in January 2012 and respondents were
asked how they evaluated the SDF’s disaster relief operations in response
to 3/11, a nearly unanimous majority of 97.6% “positively” (79.8%) or
“somewhat positively” (17.9%) evaluated the SDF’s disaster relief opera-
tions. Only 1.3% “somewhat negatively evaluated,” while 0% “negatively
evaluated” these operations, and 1.1% answered “don’t know.” This result
is probably as close to unanimity as one can expect in a poll conducted in a
liberal democracy. Not surprisingly, the SDF’s overall image also improved,
with its favorable image exceeding 90% for the first time (see Fig. 8.1).
However, this last result is not so remarkable considering that the SDF’s
favorable image had been consistently over 80% since 1997. Operation
Tomodachi, the US military operation in support of SDF disaster relief
operations also proved to be extremely popular: 79.2% of respondents
answered that Operation Tomodachi had achieved “great positive results”
(25.8%) or “some positive results” (53.4%), versus 15.5% who answered
that the US military’s support operation had achieved little (14.7%) or
essentially no (0.8%) results. Although an overwhelming majority posi-

tively evaluated Operation Tomodachi, in terms of public appreciation of
its disaster relief operations, the US military simply could not compete
with the SDF.
Thanks to its exemplary performance in post-3/11 disaster relief opera-
tions, the SDF emerged as the most widely trusted institution in Japan in
an annual Yomiuri Shimbun poll, as indicated in Fig. 8.12. Already, before
the 3/11 quake, the SDF was among the most widely trusted institutions
in Japan, comparable to hospitals, courts, close to newspapers, and some-
what more trusted than the Prime Minister or police. Moreover, across
several poll iterations in the years since 3/11 the SDF has continued to
be the most widely trusted institution. After 3/11 Japanese trust in the
SDF approached the levels of trust that Americans give their military as
America’s most trusted public institution.
Although 3/11 brought a new zenith in public support for the SDF,
this did not represent a revolution in public support, as the SDF had long
been very popular. Nonetheless, this did not stop yet another round of “the
SDF has finally won public acceptance” discourse emerging in the wake of
3/11. For example, former defense minister Nakatani Gen claimed that
100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
SDF
70.0%
60.0% PM
50.0% Hospitals
40.0% Courts
30.0% Police
20.0% Newspapers
10.0% US Military
0.0%
Fig. 8.12 Yomiuri Shimbun: Trusted Institutions. Source: Yomiuri Shimbun,

various years. Note: “US Military” reflect poll results from a question asked in the
US. This Yomiuri poll question is usually conducted in December. The 2013I
results were conducted in early 2013 as a substitute for no poll being taken in
December. Multiple answers allowed. This figure only lists several of the most
trusted institutions in the poll
334 P. MIDFORD
the SDF’s exemplary performance during 3/11 provided an opportunity

for the public to “shed the SDF allergy.”81 The right-of-center Yomiuri
Shinbun continued well after 3/11 to argue that the public’s “allergy” was
still inhibiting the SDF.82 Some scholars also made claims about the public
finally shedding its allergy toward the SDF.83
Conclusions
The most important conclusion emerging from this chapter is that the
GSDF has been very successful in building public support and legitimacy
over the 60-plus years since its establishment in 1954. The GSDF’s lead
role in disaster relief, beginning in 1959, and its large role in “civilian
cooperation,” most notably the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, by proving that
the GSDF could make important and beneficial contributions to Japanese
society, played a large role in reassuring the public and building support.
As a reassurance strategy, the GSDF’s provision of disaster relief, and even
some forms of civilian cooperation, entailed real risks and costs, and mate-
rially benefited the perceiver, namely the Japanese public, and later foreign
audiences as well. Moreover, these costly and beneficial signals were iter-
ated many times over the course of sixty years, and continue to this day.
These characteristics meet the definition of a reassurance strategy, as pre-
sented in the introduction, and this strategy was successful.
The expansion of HaDR operations overseas since the early 1990s has
further broadened public support for the GSDF at home. Despite the
importance of HaDR operations, the public never lost sight of the GSDF
and SDF’s primary role for national defense. Although it has been the
service with the heaviest reputational baggage as the perceived post-war
successor of the IJA, the GSDF, through its lead role in domestic and
overseas HaDR operations, has arguably contributed the most among the
SDF services to building support for the SDF overall, benefitting the less
historically burdened ASDF and the MSDF in the process.
Given that a large and stable majority had a favorable view of the SDF
already by the second half of the 1960s, and that this majority continued
gradually increasing overtime, the continuation of the recurrent discourse
that sees the GSDF and SDF more generally as being unpopular with the
Japanese public, but on the verge of finally winning public support, is
striking. The polling results presented in this chapter clearly demonstrate
that this discourse is little more than a myth, and has been so since the late
1960s. This of course begs the question of why this myth persists.
Frühstück suggests there is an institutional interest in this myth built

into the GSDF itself: “the public relations division of the Self-Defense
Forces claims that large portions of the Japanese population still suffer
from the ‘allergic reaction’ to the military of the immediate postwar period
and need to be convinced of the legitimacy, utility, and good intentions
of the armed forces … [and use this] to insist on the supposedly uniquely
fraught military-societal relations; to convince the bureaucratic frame-
work within which the armed forces operate that an enormous effort still
must be put into the improvement of these relations.”84 This institutional
interest in maintaining a large public relations budget and the GSDF’s
complicated organizational identity that she identifies presents a plausible
explanation for why the GSDF itself has continued to cling to the myth of
its own unpopularity.
Yet, this does not explain the broader appeal of the myth. This broader
appeal may simply be that it is part of an easily available and long-standing
media trope about Japan being pacifist, yet in the process of abandoning
pacifism. This discourse can be a convenient tool for time-harried journal-
ists who need a quick heuristic to produce a plausible narrative about the
complex reality of Japanese politics and foreign policy. Academics are not
immune to this myth either. Thus, Skabelund claims that even after the
Tokyo Olympics, the Japanese public was “yet unwilling to accept, much
less embrace its national military,”85 even though public opinion data sim-
ply do not support this claim.
Academics often have their own reasons for embracing the myth.
Ironically, even while challenging aspects of the myth, Frühstück herself
endorses other aspects of it as part of her overall argument that Japanese
public opinion is comparable to German public opinion in increasingly
disliking the traditional military, and that the military is fundamentally a
domestic social institution rather than a response to an anarchical environ-
ment. Thus, she claims the public “does not care much for the military.”
Discussing data from the Poll on the SDF, she argues that the fact that
far fewer Japanese are willing to welcome a relative joining the SDF than
have a favorable view of the SDF means that the polling results are “con-
tradictory.”86 Although these disparate results might be contradictory in a
philosophical or moral sense, politically there is nothing contradictory at
all. Citizens and politicians in many advanced countries can and do vote
to support national militaries with greater resources while simultaneously
not volunteering themselves or their family members to serve in those
militaries.87
336 P. MIDFORD
Frühstück also claims that “opinion poll data do not simply reflect pub-
lic opinion on military matters, but should be examined as vehicles for the
manufacture of a pro-military attitude.”88 There is significant validity to
this claim, especially regarding the poll taken after the end of the GSDF’s
deployment to Iraq, which was discussed above. Also, the Poll on the SDF
sometimes features information cards that appear designed prompt sup-
port for the military. A typical example is an information card provided
respondents before answering question 3 in the 2015 iteration of the poll
about whether the SDF should be strengthened. There, comparisons are
provided of Japan and neighboring countries that appear designed to make
Japan look significantly weaker than most of its neighbors.89 Nonetheless,
most of the questions in the Poll on the SDF, including the ones selected
for use in this chapter, do not include leading prompts. Moreover, media
polls presented throughout this chapter make clear that the results pro-
duced by the Poll on the SDF are reasonably comparable, and are not
outlier results.
The final and perhaps the most politically salient reason for the myth’s
persistence has to do with a confusion of attitudes toward the SDF with
those regarding the use of force, a confusion that hawkish politicians
exploit. In effect, their message is that the SDF is not truly accepted until
the public supports removing all restrictions on the SDF engaging in over-
seas combat. Yet, as this chapter and other research show,90 the Japanese
public have defensive-realist attitudes, meaning that they see the SDF as
having utility for defending national territory, but not for overseas offensive
and power projection missions such as promoting democracy and human
rights, or for suppressing terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destructure
(WMD) proliferation. Thus, as this chapter has clearly demonstrated, the
Japanese public supports the GSDF, not only as a disaster relief organiza-
tion, but also as a traditional military that defends national territory.
Attempts by the Abe Shinzō cabinet to lift restrictions on the SDF
participating in overseas combat (partially) succeeded legislatively.
Nonetheless, politically and in terms of policy they appear likely to fail as
long as the Japanese public’s defensive-realist attitudes remain. The public
appears especially averse to the GSDF engaging in combat on foreign soil.
None of this in any way detracts from the public’s warm embrace of the
GSDF and its sister services. If anything, the very high popularity that the
GSDF now enjoys has become another reason for the public to oppose its
involvement in combat on foreign soil.
Notes
1. These characteristics of effective reassurance are derived from the
social–psychological literature on this topic known as graduated
reciprocation in tension (GRIT) reduction. See Charles E. Osgood,
An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois,
1962); and Charles E. Osgood, “Suggestions for Winning the Real
War with Communism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, no. 4
(December 1959), pp. 295–325; Svenn Lindskold, “Trust
Development, the GRIT Proposal, and the Effects of Conciliatory
Acts on Conflict and Cooperation,” Psychological Bulletin 85, no.
4 (July 1978), p. 774; and Deborah Welch Larson, “Crisis preven-
tion and the Austrian State Treaty,” International Organization
41, no. 1 (winter 1987), p. 33.
2. Clayton Jones, Tokyo bureau chief for the Christian Science
Monitor, 1990–1994, speaking on National Public Radio (NPR)
on March 12, 2012, claimed: “this is the first major quake where
the military was out. A passive nation has decided to let its military
to do relief work. That’s going to be an interesting thing to see
how more and more people accept a larger responsibility for what’s
called the self-defense forces.” Accessed July 5, 2015 at http://
www.npr.org/2011/03/12/134494087/Deadly-1923-Quake-
Changed-Japan-Forever Similarly, another Western journalist
claimed that as a result of the SDF’s 3/11 disaster relief operations
for “the first time Japanese citizens acknowledged the importance
of the SDF as part of the democratic nation of postwar Japan.” See
Michael Auslin, “Public Opinion toward SDF Has Changed with
Relief Efforts in Disaster,” Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2011.
Regarding domestic commentary, see the discussion of 3/11
below.
3. On Japan’s military reassurance toward neighboring East Asian
nations, see Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s
Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 11, no. 3 (Spring 2002),
pp. 1–43.
4. Although not discussed at length in this chapter, the ongoing
deployment of the GSDF to South Sudan, since 2012, represents a
similar case.
5. Poll results for all years can be accessed at http://survey.gov-
online.go.jp/
338 P. MIDFORD
6. Unfortunately, almost all of the available polling data look at the

SDF as a whole, rather than examining opinion toward each of the
three services, with the main exception being the data presented in
section two below. This creates some obvious challenges regarding
the inferences we can draw about public support for the GSDF
based on polling results for the SDF. Nonetheless, this chapter
focuses on areas where the GSDF’s role is most central and most
visible to the public, namely civilian cooperation, disaster relief,
and overseas PKO, areas where perceptions of the GSDF should be
most determinative of perceptions of the SDF overall.
7. See Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security,
Chap. 3.
8. For more on this strategy see Murakami’s chapter.
9. Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular
Culture in the Japanese Army (University of California Press,
2007), p. 85.
10. Questions 32 and 46. See Naikakufu seifu kō hō shitsu, “Kokubō
ishiki ni kan suru yoron chō sa,” conducted October 20–25, 1959,
accessed at http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/s34/S34-10-34-07.
html on March 23, 2015. Unlike other surveys in this series, this
iteration was entitled “Opinion Poll about National Defense
Awareness,” instead of regular title of “Poll on the SDF” (Jieitai ni
kansuru yoron chō sa). One might speculate that this more hawkish
sounding title reflected the rearmament agenda of then Prime
Minister Kishi Nobusuke. The 1965 poll also carried a different
title: Poll about SDF Publicity and Defense Issues,” although most
of the questions asked were consistent with other years.
11. Ibid., questions 54 and 55.
12. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p. 138.
13. Minoru Sase, Jieitai no 30 nen sensō (Kōdansha, 1980), p. 94; and
Ichiji Sugita, Wasurerarete iru anzen hoshō (Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1967),
p. 90.
14. Aiichirō Fujiyama, Seiji waga michi (Asahi Shimbunsha, 1976),
p. 106; Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p. 139; Aaron Skabelund,
“Public Service/Public Relations: The Mobilization of the Self-
Defense Forces for the Tokyo Olympics,” in William M. Tsutsui,
and Michael Baskett, eds., The East Asian Olympiads, 1934–2008:
Building Bodies and Nations in Japan, Korea, and China (Boston:
Brill, 2011), p. 66; and Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors, p. 9. After the
end of his Presidency, Ulysses S. Grant visited Japan.
15. See http://www.o-b-k.jp/ Matsushita, the founder of the

Matsushita (National/Panasonic) consumer electronics corpora-
tion, also established the well-known Matsushita Institute of
Management and Government for training politicians and other
leaders. See http://www.mskj.or.jp/english/index_e.html
16. http://www.ajda.jp/toukyoutoindex.html
17. Skabelund, “Public Service/Public Relations,” pp. 66, 68.
18. Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors, p. 85; Skabelund, “Public Service/
Public Relations,” pp. 67–68; and http://www.chidlovski.net/
liftup/l_galleryResult.asp?a_id=169
19. Skabelund, “Public Service/Public Relations,” pp. 65–66.
20. Tabata Ryō ichi, “Rikujō jieitai no orinpikku shien kō sō ,” Shūshin
6, no. 9 (September 1963), p. 43. 3500 GSDF members were
mobilized for the 1970 Osaka World Expo as well.
21. Skabelund, “Public Service/Public Relations,” p. 69.
22. Forty-five percent of all poll participants so answered, a number
that corresponds to approximately two-thirds of the 61% of respon-
dents who answered that the SDF must train seriously for national
defense and were asked this follow-up question. Figures for the
1963 poll are also given as a percentage of all participants, not of
the 51% who answered this question.
23. A popular phrase from the 1950s, this was also the title of a book
from the mid-1990s by a leading centrist politician who argued
that Japan would not be threatened as long as it did not threaten
others. See Takemura Masayoshi, Chiisaku tomo kirari to hikaru
koku nihon (Tokyo: Kō bunsha, 1994).
24. Mainichi Shimbun, June 14, 1971 (morning edition), pp. 1, 4.
25. “‘Saigai enjyō tai’ dokuji ni secchi wo (koe),” Asahi Shimbun, June
18, 1991 (morning edition), p. 17.
26. Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors, p. 75. Double quote marks denote
Frühstück’s indirect quotation and the single quotation marks
denote a direct quotation of the GSDF General.
27. Defense of Japan 2004: forward.
28. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 11, 2011; Samuels, 3.11: Disaster
and Change in Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 57; and
Lydia Smith, “Kobe earthquake 20th anniversary: Facts about the
devastating 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake,” International
Business Times, January 16, 2015 as accessed June 18, 2015 at
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/kobe-earthquake-20th-anniversary-facts-
about-devastating-1995-great-hanshin-earthquake-1483786.
340 P. MIDFORD
29. Naikakufu, “Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsai sōkatsu, kenshō, chōsa no-

tto,” p. 3, as accessed at http://www.bousai.go.jp/kensho-han-
shinawaji/chosa/sheet/010.pdf October 21, 2016.
30. In an interview with Richard Samuels, former Hyogo Governor
Kaihara Toshitami denied having an “anti-military allergy” and
claimed he issued the request for GSDF mobilization within three
hours of the quake, and that a faster response was hindered by the
lack of information and personnel in the Prefectural Office in the
early morning hours when the quake hit. Middle Army Commander
General Matsushima Yūsuke was subsequently passed over for pro-
motion and his rumored hopes for a political career were dashed.
Samuels, 3/11, p. 60. For Matsushima’s account of the GSDF’s
relief operations, see Hanshin daishinsai jieitai kaku tatakaeri: ima
akiraka sareru saigai haken no shinjitsu (Tokyo: Jiji, 1996).
32. Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security,
pp. 104–107.
33. The answer categories in Figure 7.4 covering the 1959 to 1995
period are even lower because only one answer was allowed during
that period. The change from one answer to two is why the author
decided to have different figures covering the 1959 to 1995 and
the post 1995 periods.
34. See Kotani Hidejiro, “Jieitai no kaigai haken to kokuren kō roku,”
Bōei Ronshū 2, no. 1 (1963), pp. 27–28; and William L. Heinrich,
Seeking An Honored Place: The Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the
Use of Armed Force Abroad, doctoral dissertation (New York:
Department of Political Science, 1997), pp. 108–109. Regarding
the overseas dispatch of MSDF ships see Peter J. Woolley, Japan’s
Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971–2000 (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2000). See Hitoshi Mizuno, Kaigai hihahei no ronri—
Nihonjin no dokuzenteki heiwakan wo to (Tokyo: Shin hyō ron,
1997) for analysis of the arguments against overseas dispatch.
35. Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in contempo-
rary Japan (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 114.
36. This was originally reported by Tokyo Shimbun, February 23, 1965.
For analysis, see Hidejiro Kotani, “Jieitai wa kaigai hahei dekiru
ka,” Jiyū, May 1966, p. 22; and Heinrich, Seeking An Honored
Place, pp. 120–121.
37. Cabinet Office, Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy (Tokyo:

Foreign Press Center, March 1987), p. 13. Shin Joho Center con-
ducted the survey, with a sample of 3000, and valid responses from
of 2385 (79.5%). Accessed from the Japan Data Archive, Roper
Center, University of Connecticut. Also see Hook, Militarization
and Demilitarization, p. 115.
38. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook
(Tokyo: MOFA, 1989), p. 46. Law Concerning the Dispatch of
Japanese Disaster Relief Teams (Bill 93 of September 16, 1987), as
carried in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan’s contribution
to UN peacekeeping operations (Tokyo: MOFA, 2005). Retrieved
April 4, 2009 from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/
pamph2005.html
39. According to Hook, in Prime Minister Office (PMO) polls con-
ducted between 1965 and 1989 that asked this same question, “a
high of two-thirds to three-quarters of those surveyed persistently
opposed, and only up to one-quarter supported the SDF’s dis-
patch…” Militarization and Demilitarization, p. 114.
40. Prime Minister’s Office, Public Opinion Survey on Japan’s Peace
and Security (1989: Foreign Press Center, September 1989),
p. 12.
41. Ibid.
42. See Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization, p. 115.
43. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 29, 1991 (morning edition), p. 1.
44. This acronym and the concept that it is based upon is only used in
Japan, and is little understood elsewhere. The purpose of this con-
cept has been to wall-off non-combat operations that appeared
related to the use of force from HaDR-type operations so as to
build support for the later among the public.
45. Asahi Shimbun, November 10, 1991 (morning edition), p. 2.
46. Yomiuri Shimbun, June 28, 1992 (morning edition), p. 1.
47. Tasuya Fujii “PKO irō gyomu no jissai,” in Tarō Nakayama, ed.,
Kokusai iryō kyōr yoku: Iryō ni kokkyo nashi (Tokyo: Saimul Press,
1993), pp. 14–20.
48. Asahi Shimbun, September 28, 1992, (morning edition), p. 1.
49. Beginning in 1995 questions about PKO included examples of
specific deployments, while the 1991 questions just asked respon-
dents whether they favored participation or not. Also, from 1995,
the question about PKO asked what image respondents had about
the results of SDF PKO deployments. The 1995 question about
342 P. MIDFORD
HaDR deployments only asked about humanitarian relief, not

disaster relief, and several subsequent iterations referred to SDF
disaster relief work in Honduras following a typhoon.
50. Garren Mulloy, “Effective for what form of security? JSDF over-
seas dispatch for international peace cooperation,” in Wilhelm
Vosse, Reinhard Drifte and Verena Blechinger-Talcott, eds.,
Governing Insecurity in Japan: The Domestic Discourse and Policy
Response (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 158–159, 162.
51. Mulloy, “Effective for what form of security?” p. 163.
52. Ibid., p. 163.
53. The higher negative results regarding domestic operations might,
in part, be due to the wording of the question, which asked about
the results of these operations, whereas the question about over-
seas HaDR merely asked whether the respond supported those
operations. Even so, it is hard to conclude that overseas HaDR
operations are less supported than those conducted domestically.
54. Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors, p. 50.
55. Ibid., p. 68.
56. Ibid., p. 67. This comment anticipated the attempt to involve the
SDF in disaster relief in China following the 2008 Sichuan earth-
quake. However, this effort was only partially successful, due to a
Chinese reluctance to see SDF boots on its soil. See Samuels, 3-11,
pp. 72–77.
57. Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy.”
58. Asahi Shinbun, September 16, 2001 (morning edition), p. 17.
Sado also called for turning Japan into a refuge where those want-
ing to give up terrorism could do so safely, a point that echoes
another Japanese strength in post-conflict peace-building: reinte-
grating former combatants into society.
59. More generally this argument also illustrates what has been called
the nexus of security and development, with social and economic
development that promote human security seen as the best means
for combating global non-traditional security threats. See E
uropean
Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN) and the Konrad
Adenuer Stiftung (KAS), A Proposal for a Way Forward on EU-
Japan Cooperation at the Nexus of Security and Development
(Tokyo: Konrad Adenuer Stiftung, Tokyo, 2012); and Paul
Midford, “Japan-EU Non-combat Military Cooperation: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come,” Japan Spotlight, July/August 2013,

pp. 44–47. Available at http://www.jef.or.jp/journal/index.html
60. The GSDF deployment in many ways paralleled the deployment
of the Norwegian military to Iraq in the wake of the invasion to
provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, a striking par-
allel given that Norway opposed the invasion of Iraq. On the com-
parison, see Yukiko Takezawa, Comparing The Responses of Japan
and Norway to the War on Terror, master’s thesis, Department of
Political Science and Sociology, Norwegian University for Science
and Technology (NTNU), June 2009.
61. This section regarding the foreign aid paradigm has been heavily
influenced by my discussions with Marie Söderberg of the
European Institute of Japanese. Studies.
63. ODA White Paper 2008, p. 96.
64. Defense of Japan 2007, p. 336. Emphasis added.
67. 2008 ODA White Paper, p. 97.
68. See Nippon terebi yoron chō sa, accessible at http://www.ntv.

co.jp/yoron/ Undecided/don’t know respondents ranged
between approximately 9% and 19%. For complete results from
these polls and a more detailed analysis of public reaction to the
SDF dispatch to Iraq, see Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public
Opinion and Security, pp. 130–141.
69. “Jieitai no Iraku jindō fukkō shien katsudō ni kansuru tokubetsu
yoron chō sa.” The results were based on 1811 valid responses and
a valid response rate of 60.4%. The poll was conducted from
September 21 to October 1, 2006.
70. When asked in 2000 about the Honduras post-hurricane HaDR
deployment in 1999, 86.3% supported, versus, 5.4% who opposed.
The fact that by comparison 22.5% opposed the Iraq deployment
indicates that opposition increased even more than support fell.
Similarly, only 13% opposed SDF participation in PKO in 2003.
71. See Midford, Rethinking Public Opinion and Security, Chap. 9, for
a detailed analysis on this point.
72. Asahi Shimbun, June 28, 2006 (morning edition): 3. A subsequent
Asahi poll in March 2007 found 69% opposed to continuing the
ASDF transportation mission in Iraq and only 19% favoring a continu-
ation. See Asahi Shimbun, March 15, 2007 (morning edition), p. 9.
344 P. MIDFORD
73. See Midford, Rethinking Public Opinion and Security, Chap. 9, for
a detailed analysis on this point.
74. Samuels, 3.11, p. 3; Government of Japan, Road to Recovery
(Tokyo: Government of Japan, 2012); T.N. Srinivasan, and
T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj “Fukushima and Thereafter,” Energy Policy,
52 (January 2013), pp. 729–30; Yuki Tatsumi, Great Eastern
Japan Earthquake: “Lessons Learned” for Japanese Defense Policy
(Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2012), pp. 9, 11; Yoree Koh,
“Another post-quake controversy: evacuee housing,” Japan Real
Time, May 8, 2011, retrieved from www.blogs.wsj.com/japanreal-
time/2011/05/08/another-post-quake-controversy-evacuee-
housing-2/?mod=WSJBlog on May 13, 2011; and Keisatsuchō ,
“Heisei 23 nen (2011) Tohoku taiheiyō oki jishin no higai jō kyō to
keisatsu sochi,” accessed January 10, 2012. http://www.npa.go.
jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo.pdf, accessed July 5, 2015.
75. Bō eisho, Daijin Rinji Kisha Kaiken Gaiyō , March 19, 2011,
accessed July 5, 2015 at http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/
kisha/2011/03/19.pdf; Bō eisho, Heisei 23-nen (2011 nen)
Tōhoku chihō taiheiyō oki jishin ni okeru jieitai no katsudō jōkyō, May
10, 2011, accessed July 5, 2015 at http://www.mod.go.jp/j/
press/news/2011/05/10a.html; Samuels, 3-11, p. 90; Tatsumi,
Great Eastern Japan Earthquake, pp. 12–14.
76. Bō eisho, “Higashi nihon daishinsai (Heisei 23 nen 3 gatsu 11
nichi) ni okeru saigai haken katsudō ,” December 26, 2011, as
accessed July 5, 2015 at http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/
news/2011/12/26b.pdf. Regarding the establishment of the
joint task force see Bō eisho, “Heisei 23-nen (2011 nen) tō hoku
chihō taiheiyō oki jishin ni taisuru daikibo shinsai saigai haken no
jisshi ni kansuru jieitai kō dō meirei,” March 14, 2011, as accessed
on July 5, 2015 at http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/
saigai/tohokuoki/20110314a.html.
77. Samuels, 3.11, p. 89.
nichi) ni okeru saigai haken katsudō ,” December 26, 2011;
Ministry of Defense Defense of Japan 2011 (Tokyo: Ministry of
Defense, 2011), pp. 3–4; Bō eisho, Heisei 23-nen (2011 nen) tōhoku
chihō taiheiyō oki jishin ni okeru jieitai no katsudō jōkyō, May 10,
2011, as accessed July 5, 2015 at http://www.mod.go.jp/j/
press/news/2011/05/10a.html; Bō eisho, “Higashi nihon
daishinsai e no taiō ni kansuru kyō kun jiko (Saishu tori matome),”

November 2012, as accessed July 3, 2015 at http://www.mod.
go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/pdf/kyoukun.pdf; Tatsumi,
Great Eastern Japan Earthquake, pp. 11–12, 14, 16; and Samuels,
3.11, p. 9–10, 89–90.
79. Asahi Shimbun, May 7, 2011.
nichi) ni okeru saigai haken katsudō ,” December 26, 2011;
Samuels, 3.11, p. 90; Asahi Shimbun, May 7, 2011; Ministry of
Defense, Defense of Japan 2011, pp. 4–11; Tatsumi, Great Eastern
Japan Earthquake, pp. 11–14; “GSDF special forces unite in
water-spraying mission,” Daily Yomiuri, March 22, 2011, accessed
March 22, 2011 at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/
T110321003707.htm; and “2 GSDF tanks sent to clear debris at
Fukushima plant,” Daily Yomiuri, March 22, 2011, as accessed
March 22, 2011 at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/
T110321003392.htm
81. Asahi Shimbunsha, 3.11 go Nippon no ronten (Tokyo: Asahi
Shimbunsha, 2011), p. 43.
82. January 15, 2012.
83. Matake Kamiya, “Don’t Underestimate Japan!” Japan Journal 8,
no. 1 (2011), p. 15.
84. Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors, pp. 184–185.
85. Skabelund, “Public Service/Public Relations,” p. 74.
86. Ibid., p. 184.
87. It is well noted in US politics that some of the most pro-military,
and especially pro-military intervention, politicians are frequently
those with the least connection to the military.
87. Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors, p. 184.
89. Other public relations material from the Ministry of Defense com-
pares Japan’s per capita defense spending with that of Western
European nations, but then compares Japan’s aggregate defense
budget with that of China’s, two comparisons that make Japan
look like an underspender. If Japan’s per capita defense spending
were compared vis-à-vis China and its aggregate defense spending
with that of Western European nations, Japan’s defense spending
would look significantly larger relative to these countries.
90. See the author’s Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security.
CHAPTER 9
Conclusion
Robert D. Eldridge and Paul Midford
This book has examined the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF)’s quest
for legitimacy, specifically the challenges of establishing a good reputa-
tion at home and abroad while proving its military and organizational
relevance in Japan and overseas. It did so by seeking answers to three
questions: How was the GSDF able to emerge as the post-war successor
of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) despite Japan’s war-renouncing and
anti-militarist constitution? How was the GSDF, despite the public’s great
initial skepticism and even hostility that greeted its creation, able to build
both domestic and international legitimacy? Finally, how has the GSDF’s
mission and organization evolved over the decades since its creation in
response to changes in the international and domestic environments in
ways that demonstrate its relevance? These questions were addressed by
focusing on three different issues that have shaped the GSDF’s develop-
ment: civilian control, disaster response, and public opinion.
R.D. Eldridge (*)

P. Midford
Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University for Science
and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim, Norway

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8_9
348 R.D. ELDRIDGE AND P. MIDFORD
Chapter 2, written by Eldridge, provided an overview of the GSDF,

its leadership and organization through the years, the composition of its
forces, and its position in Japanese society and Japan’s defense policy. It
also looked at the relationship of the GSDF with its sister organizations,
the Air and Maritime Self-Defense Forces. The chapter was meant to
introduce aspects of the GSDF that were generally common throughout
the history of the organization.
Kusunoki, in Chap. 3, examined the establishment and early develop-
ment of the GSDF. She focused, in particular, on two aspects. First, she
looked at how the GSDF developed as a military, both organizationally
and functionally. Specifically, she looks at the growth of its camps and
equipment and the systemization of the education of its personnel and
their training regime. Second, this chapter looked at what role the GSDF
was given in the ruling party’s diplomatic and security policies, as a tool
to preserve the domestic political order, and how much power the GSDF
was actually given. This chapter looked at the relationship the post-war
political parties sought to build with the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in
light of the harsh lessons learned over the question of civilian control by
the prewar political parties. The chapter ended with a description of the
internal debate in the government about whether to employ the GSDF
in 1960 to quell protests against the revision of the US–Japan Security
Treaty.
In Chap. 4, Eldridge examined the slow, careful development of the
GSDF through the latter half of the Cold War, noting that its very delib-
erateness is what likely made it difficult for the GSDF to change from a
Cold War footing to a post-Cold War one. This said, the GSDF weathered
several domestic problems and external threats, but it seems that these
challenges hardened the organization and it made it more cautious and
reluctant to change rather than making it more flexible.
Stavale, in Chap. 5, described the last two decades of the GSDF, a
period of great change for that organization facing multiple demands on
its personnel and very identity. Stavale systematically charted the trans-
formation of the GSDF, an organization made to exist in the shadows of
a Japanese society that is otherwise resistant to change, from the end of
the Cold War to today. The rapid changes in the GSDF were both a reac-
tion to the rapid developments internationally and to the belated need to
reform its slow-moving organization.
In Chap. 6, by Musashi, we learned how the personnel and other sys-
tems that formed the basis of civilian control in the early years following
CONCLUSION 349
the establishment of the SDF were created by Prime Minister Yoshida

Shigeru and continued by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as the
Yoshida Line. The initial members of the Internal Bureau, who came from
the former Ministry of Home Affairs and the Police Agency, emphasized,
based on their prewar and wartime experiences, the need to have power
over the military through civilian control. During the Cold War, the
opposition parties and public opinion in general were quite critical of the
SDF. Moreover, the director general (later minister) of the Defense Agency
(later Ministry of Defense, or MOD), who was in charge of issuing orders
to the SDF, was not always interested in defense matters. As a result, civil-
ian control within the Defense Ministry centered on the bureaucrats in the
Internal Bureau, who were essentially given the responsibility by the min-
ister. Because of the above factors, namely, the domestic criticism of the
SDF by the opposition parties and public opinion, the lack of interest in
defense matters by the politicians, and the tendency of the Internal Bureau
to exercise power over the uniformed personnel, defense policy during the
Cold War tended to focus on building up Japan’s defense capabilities, and
civilian control tended to be defined negatively. In other words, rather
than try to use the SDF, in particular, the GSDF, in a positive way, the
focus of civilian control was on how to limit and restrain the GSDF.
However, with the rise of domestic and international demands to see
the SDF play a larger role as a result of the end of the Cold War, the defense
ministers and other politicians became more actively involved in defense
policy, and through the initiatives of the prime ministers and defense min-
isters, there was a marked increase in policies promoting the use of the
GSDF in peace-keeping operations, humanitarian assistance, reconstruc-
tion relief, as well as in domestic contingencies. Moreover, since the end of
the 1980s, the number of bureaucrats seconded from other agencies and
ministries within the Internal Bureau has decreased and there has been a
rise in the number of bureaucrats originating within the Defense Ministry
itself, and thus a closer matching of the concerns and interests between the
bureaucrats and the uniforms. With the changes in the international envi-
ronment from the 1990s, the increased involvement of the politicians in
defense policy, and the unity of effort within the senior staff of the Defense
Ministry, civilian control over the SDF has taken a more positive form,
in which the SDF is used more proactively. As a result of the demands of
the SDF, whose influence had grown, and the initiatives of the defense
ministers who are closer to the uniforms than in the past, there has been
an effort to reexamine the institutions of civilian control governing the
relationship between the Internal Bureau and the uniformed personnel,

since the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century.
By the end of that decade, however, there were a series of scandals,
accidents, and information leaks in the Defense Ministry and SDF that
made organizational reform unavoidable. The Council for Reforming
the Ministry of Defense was established within the Cabinet Office. Its
recommendations, which included the abolition of the Civilian Defense
Counselor (by replacing them with Aides to the Minister of Defense)
and the Bureau of Operational Policy (relocating the execution of opera-
tions under the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff), favored the uniformed person-
nel. However, with the change in government to a Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ)-led administration in September 2009, these recommenda-
tions were scrapped and a new round of debates about reform was begun.
However, after the LDP returned to power under Abe Shinzō in late 2012,
the previous plan of raising the position of uniformed personnel within the
Defense Ministry to a level equal to that of civilian bureaucrats, and con-
solidating operational authority within the SDF Joint Staff was revived.
Murakami, in Chap. 7, analyzed the historical evolution of the
GSDF’s disaster relief dispatches and clarified the significance of these
dispatches for the GSDF’s quest to build legitimacy. In the early 1950s,
Prime Minister Yoshida struggled to gain support for the GSDF from
the Japanese public, who vividly remembered the prewar and wartime
control by the IJA. He sought to ground the GSDF’s legitimacy in its
domestic disaster relief operations. As a result, disaster relief dispatches
became codified in the SDF Establishment Law, and dispatches based on
the request of the prefectural governors became the norm. This matched
the principle of having the local authorities in charge, as found in Japan’s
policies for disaster preparedness. Moreover, with US forces in Japan
focusing on external threats against Japan as a result of the revision of
the security treaty in 1960, the GSDF began to focus more on domestic
disaster response. The GSDF was thus able to demonstrate its relevance
and usefulness in this realm.
However, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995, which killed
6434 people and devastated the port city of Kobe, necessitated a funda-
mental re-evaluation of disaster responses by the GSDF. Up to that point,
it had gained public legitimacy, and consequently, the role of domestic
disaster deployments as the basis for building that legitimacy seemed to
have come to an end. However, the Kobe earthquake caused Japanese soci-
ety to reflect on just how vulnerable Japan is to earthquakes and natural
CONCLUSION 351
disasters, starting in recent memory with the devastating Ise Bay Typhoon
of 1959. Consequently, large-scale disaster relief once again emerged as a
central and much appreciated mission for the GSDF.
Moreover, the transition from an SDF “that exists” to one that “func-
tions” following the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001
affected the policy framework for GSDF disaster relief deployments. The
GSDF, as a result of the introduction of the concept of the “Dynamic
Defense Force,” became better able to respond rapidly to disasters as
compared to the past. This was demonstrated, according to Murakami,
in its quick response to the March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
and Tsunami.
In Chap. 8, Midford looked at how the GSDF, and more broadly
the SDF, have fared in their attempt to build public recognition of their
usefulness and necessity for Japanese society, and thereby achieve legiti-
macy. This chapter measured GSDF success in building public support by
analyzing a range of public opinion polls over the history of the GSDF,
especially more than fifty years of results from the Jieitai ni kansuru poll
(Poll on the SDF) that the Public Relations Office of the Prime Minister’s
Cabinet Office has conducted since 1956. Midford focused on the impact
of the GSDF’s lead role in domestic disaster relief operations, and civilian
cooperation such as supporting the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the annual
Sapporo Winter Festival and its ice sculptures. The public support built
through domestic disaster relief and civilian cooperation in turn paved the
way for the GSDF, with the support of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces
(MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF), to win public acceptance for
overseas deployments, ostensibly for peace-keeping operations. In reality,
however, these “peace-keeping” operations were limited to humanitarian
relief operations, such as water purification and medical services, and to
reconstruction and development projects, operations that closely resemble
the GSDF’s domestic disaster relief operations. These missions in turn
achieved great popularity so long as they remained clearly separated from
combat or from supporting the conduct of combat operations by other
militaries. Consequently, Midford found that recurring discourses about
the public’s “allergy” toward the SDF are little more than a myth. The
public continues to oppose overseas combat operations, especially for the
GSDF, not because of a lack of trust or support for the SDF, but because
the public believes overseas and offensive military operations have little
utility for Japan.
The GSDF’s Future Challenges

Similar to the challenges within any modern state and its government are
the various functions of the bureaucracy struggling to advocate for their
organization and compete for limited resources and funding. The GSDF is
no different, and most of the post-Cold War era has witnessed a decline or
stagnation in Japan’s defense spending. Although the Japanese economy
has experienced periods of minor growth since the “bubble” burst in 1990,
sustained long-term growth has remained elusive. Moreover, many social
and fiscal problems lie ahead that may deliver another blow to the national
economy. A low birthrate, well below replacement level, and low immigra-
tion rates are now resulting in significant population aging and decline,
and pose challenges to recruitment.1 As the largest of the three services,
the GSDF is also the most subject to the potential recruitment constraints
imposed by the decline in youth population. Policies being implemented
are intended to help mitigate the looming impacts of not only the low
birthrate2 but also aging baby boomers and an increasingly burdened social
security system and expansive eldercare (nursing care) system.3
Only time will tell how much Japan can and is willing to spend on its
own defense, and if it can continue to sustain allotting the GSDF 37%
of the defense budget,4 the most of the three services. Although there
have been modest annual increases in defense spending since the LDP
returned to power in late 2012, there is no sign that Japan will remove
the 1970s-era self-imposed 1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) spend-
ing cap on defense.5 And with a public debt to GDP ratio at nearly 250%,
Japan might not have much fiscal room in any case to contemplate large
defense spending increases. Indeed, it may be a struggle just to keep the
defense budget at current levels.
The SDF spends a lot on personnel costs, including salary. Nonetheless,
official pay charts are not made public, but are calculated based on various
factors such as rank, time in service, age, and marital status. When question-
ing MOD and GSDF members as to why pay charts are not made public, the
prevailing justification for non-release has been concern that the Japanese
public would not support current wages for uniformed personnel and may
perceive their wages as too high. In a historical context, this concern for
public opinion and perception is understandable, but it is also irresponsible
and lacks accountability, particularly when compared to other civil servants,
whose salary scales are public. Using public hostility as a justification for
secrecy is surely a self-defeating excuse, but moreover, it also rests on an
CONCLUSION 353
antiquated image of public opinion that the GSDF c uriously clings to. In
fact, as Chap. 7 by Midford demonstrates through polling, and Chap. 3 by
Eldridge supports through historical description, the SDF and GSDF have
long enjoyed broad public support, at least since the late 1960s, and since
the 3/11 disaster, this support has become overwhelming. The perception
of public hostility may reflect lingering GSDF insecurity regarding their
legitimacy, anxiety that this book demonstrates is misplaced. It also helps to
justify large annual budget outlays for the GSDF’s public relations apparatus.
When comparing US Forces Japan (USFJ) facilities to GSDF camps,
one may get the impression that Japan is heavily relying on the Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security between it and the US for most of its
security needs. Many of the facilities in GSDF camps are in need of major
maintenance and upgrades. Many roads are not paved and facilities are
limited to bare essentials, and sometimes even lack items such as cleaning
gear and toilet paper, while other provisions are rationed. Family housing
is limited to modest off-base government apartment complexes.
In summary, enhanced maintenance and modernization are essential for
ensuring a capable GSDF ready to meet the challenges of defense. Japan’s
economic health and political direction will determine the pace and scope
of modernization for the GSDF. There has been some progress toward
this goal with the direction set by the 2010 and 2013 National Defense
Policy Guidelines, and with recent modest increases in defense spending.
The MOD will continue with the transformation of its forces and con-
tinue to find new ways to increase jointness among its forces in order
to leverage the most capabilities and efficiency. While most of the effort
has been top-down, there is also a growing realization at all levels of the
need for the services to work together and actual efforts in that direction,
through an increase in multi-service meetings and conferences, liaison
positions, and joint training opportunities.
Another effort under the direction of MOD is the GSDF plan, effec-
tive March 2018, to restructure itself by creating the Ground Central
Command (Rikujō Sōtai, or GCC), under, which will fall the five regional
army headquarters and the remnants of the Central Readiness Force
(which will be disbanded, with some of the staff moving into the GCC
and some units remaining stand-alone specialized units to support/aug-
ment regional armies or to perform special missions). The 1st Division, for
example, will be renamed the Shuto Bōei Shūdan, or Capital Defense Unit.
In order to establish the GCC, personnel will be transfered from
the Ground Staff Office (GSO), whose size and responsibilities will be
reduced to accommodate the changes. The changes facing the GSO

are “big,” according to a senior GSDF official involved in planning the
reorganization, and the changes can indeed be described as the largest
in more than fifty years.6 The GCC will be established at Camp Asaka,
and will have decision-making authority and will authorize orders.
Currently, the GSO Chief of Staff does not have command authority
(shikkiken). Training and operations, which are currently different divi-
sions, will likely be unified in the new command. The related laws will
be worked out in the months and years preceding the stand-up of the
GCC, most likely in late 2016 or early 2017. Specifically, the SDF Law
among other related laws will have to be revised in the above timeframe.
Fortunately, pragmatic legislation addressing the GSDF’s long-term
structural problems has been making its way through the Diet with rea-
sonable speed. Another factor supporting GSDF structural reform is that
since the 1997 Guidelines, unprecedented cooperation is being observed
between the GSDF and US forces, and better procedures are constantly
being developed, practiced, and honed for a southwest islands contin-
gency, particularly since the updated 2015 Guidelines. The decision to
purchase seventeen V-22B Ospreys from the US, which are intended to
play a large role in the defense of outer islands, and the enhancement of
the existing pilot training program with the US Marine Corps are indica-
tors of this deepening cooperation between the two allies.
In the meantime, Japan continues building a permanent GSDF pres-
ence in the southwest islands of Okinawa prefecture, specifically a GSDF
150–200-man coastal observation and Signals Intelligence (SIGNT)
base on Yonaguni Island, Japan’s southwestern-most island.7 The MOD
has also adopted a plan for deploying another unit armed with surface-
to-ship and surface-to-air missiles, and possibly consisting of 600–800
GSDF members on Miyako Island,8 which abuts the Miyako Strait, an
important international waterway separating the island from the main
island of Okinawa that China’s naval vessels often travel through to
reach the Pacific. Miyako already hosts an ASDF radar and SIGNT base,9
which has good relations with the local community. The location of the
envisaged GSDF facilities have been identified already. While the govern-
ment and Diet have not yet approved MOD’s request, it is likely to be
approved sooner rather than later due to perceptions of a threatening
security environment. Similar plans are being developed for 500 GSDF
troops to be deployed to Ishigaki island, with the location already identi-
fied and much of the local coordination complete. The GSDF also plans
CONCLUSION 355
to dispatch a missile battery unit and others, a total of 550 members, to

Amami Oshima, north of Okinawa in financial year 2018. In response
to these moves, a non-binding referendum was held on February 22,
2015, against the Yonaguni facility, which was already under construc-
tion at the time of the vote, but was defeated. It is likely that some anti-
base forces will, nevertheless, attempt to prevent or limit the dispatch of
forces to the other islands, although the mayors of the accepting com-
munities seem quite willing to host the units.
Another challenge the SDF, and especially the GSDF, will face in
the years to come revolves around the increasing possibility of using
deadly force for the first time since their establishment in 1954. Given
the Japanese public’s strong support for the SDF using force to defend
national territory, the main problem comes in the context of overseas
deployments of the SDF. The SDF, principally the GSDF, was first
deployed overseas to Cambodia in 1992 for essentially humanitarian
relief, reconstruction, and development operations and projects. In the
quarter century since the SDF has had dozens of overseas deployments
for similar missions, and also for logistical support of US forces engaged
in counter-terrorism military operations in Afghanistan and counter-
piracy operations off the Somali coast. Yet, during all that time, and
largely as a matter of policy and careful preparation, the SDF has neither
inflicted nor suffered casualties. Yet, with a very limited reinterpretation
of the Japanese constitution by the Abe cabinet on July 1, 2014, to allow
for the right of collective self-defense (or perhaps more accurately, to
adopt an expanded definition of individual national defense) to defend
allies under attack, and related legislation legalizing these types of mis-
sions and logistical support for US and other nations close to Japan, the
chance of the GSDF and perhaps other branches of the SDF entering
combat situations and suffering and inflicting deadly force seems to be
growing, despite strenuous denials by Abe and other members of his
cabinet.10 If the SDF crosses this Rubicon, there will be a large reaction
in Japan from the very large majority of Japanese who do not want the
SDF to engage in overseas combat, and also from conservatives who
will welcome this latest milestone in Japan’s “normalization” as a mili-
tary power. This will also be a difficult transition for the GSDF, which
during the post-war era has built up a contradictory self-image as a land
army dedicated to defending Japanese territory, yet at the same time, an
organization dedicated to saving life, not taking it.11
Seeking a National Consensus on Defense Issues

As the GSDF continues to transform now and into the future, their
image and the public’s perception of their purpose will continue to be a
contentious issue. Since the end of World War II, the majority of young
Japanese have grown up in an education system that has transmitted
anti-militarist values and culture.12 Moreover, for much of the post-war
era, there prevailed an atmosphere in which military and defense issues
were not highlighted nor even discussed, and the widespread myth that
the GSDF and other SDF services were “not a military” was perpetu-
ated. As is the case in most other advanced industrialized nations, but
more so, university students are generally steered away from the mili-
tary when considering careers. In fact, the vast majority of the Japanese
public ignored service, uniformed or civil, in the defense sector as a
viable career option, as well-educated people did not aspire to, or see,
defense matters as a successful career path, as in other developed coun-
tries. Consequently, widespread support for the GSDF and the SDF has
co-existed with a large number of Japanese refusing to consider mili-
tary service, again a pattern familiar in other advanced industrial nations,
including the US in recent decades following the end of the draft and the
pursuit of an “all volunteer” military.
Despite the SDF’s positive image among the public, since the end of
the 1960s various taboos anchored the prewar past continued. For exam-
ple, the MOD remained a mere “agency” until 2007, when the Defense
Agency was finally raised to ministry status. Generations of Japanese peo-
ple have matured and gained expertise in economics, health, politics, and
other fields of study; however, defense and security have lagged, and as
a result, Japan struggles to find competent experts who are knowledge-
able on defense and security matters. Until about fifteen years ago, many
universities even frowned on professors taking their seminar students on
visits to SDF bases.13
During the first decade of the twenty-first century these lingering
taboos quickly fell by the wayside, with few being left, except for the use
of force overseas, which reflects deeper public attitudes about the util-
ity of military power. While the SDF and GSDF were already extremely
popular, they reached new heights of overwhelming popularity, emerging
from their disaster relief operations following the March 11 triple disas-
ter as the most trusted institution in Japan. We can therefore conclude
that the GSDF has achieved its mission of building legitimacy. While this
CONCLUSION 357
achievement does not mean that the Japanese public or elites will support
the removal of all restraints on military power and its use, it does mean
that those restraints that remain in no way reflect negative views of the
GSDF and its sister services. Indeed, although mostly unrecognized, this
has already largely been the case for decades.
With this being the first book published in English about the GSDF,
and three books already published about the MSDF, it remains for future
researchers to complete the trilogy with a book about the ASDF.
Notes
1. As a result of declining fertility rates, since 1994, the number of
Japanese in the prime SDF recruitment age bracket of 18–26 has
declined 40%, from 17 million down to 11 million. Ministry of
Defense, Defense of Japan 2015, Figure III-1-4-1, accessed
September 4, 2015 at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_
paper/2015.html
2. In 2013 Japan’s fertility rate was 1.43, whereas 2.02 is considered
the minimum rate necessary to maintain a stable population. Japan
has been below this level since the early 1970s, and consequently
Japan’s population is now experiencing significant decline. See
Statistics Japan, Statistical Handbook of Japan 2014, Table 2.6.
Accessed September 4, 2015 at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/
data/handbook/c0117.htm#c02
3. See John Campbell, Unni Edvardsen, Paul Midford and Yayoi
Saito, eds., Eldercare Policies in Japan and Norway: Aging Societies
East and West (New York: Palgrave, 2014). With Japanese having
some of the longest life expectancies in the world (Japanese women
have the longest), combined with the below-replacement-level
birthrate, the dependency ratio of elderly to the working age popu-
lation is becoming heavy. Currently, there are 2.8 workers for every
over-65 person in Japan, and this ratio is projected to fall to 1.39
by 2050. Meanwhile, healthcare costs are expected to nearly dou-
ble, from 6.9% of GDP to 12.8%. With 87% of Japanese viewing
aging society issues as a “major problem” for Japan in a 2014 Pew
poll, it is not surprising that pension and other eldercare issues
frequently trump external security as priorities for the Japanese
public. Regarding this poll result, dependency ratios and health-
care costs in Japan, see Pew Research Center, “Attitudes about
Aging: A Global Perspective.” Accessed February 2, 2014, at

http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/01/Pew-Research-
Center-G lobal-Aging-Report-FINAL-January-30-20141.pdf,
pp. 13, 29, 52, 54. For an analysis of the first Abe administration,
in 2006–2007, when the public rejected prioritizing external secu-
rity in favor of focusing on aging society issues such as pensions,
see Paul Midford, “Balancing threats foreign and domestic: The
case of Japanese public opinion and the 2007 Upper House elec-
tion,” chapter in Wilhelm Vosse, Reinhard Drifte, Verena
Blechinger-Talcott, eds., Governing Insecurity in Japan: The
Domestic Discourse and Policy Response (Abingdon: Routledge,
2014), pp. 32–49.
4. As of March 2015 the GSDF was allocated 36.7% of the defense
budget. See Defense of Japan 2015, Figure III-1-3-3.
5. Although Prime Minister Nakasone officially abolished this limit in
the 1980s, it remains de facto in place due to popular support. See
Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security:
From Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2011), pp. 66–67.
6. Eldridge interview with GSDF official, April 25, 2014, GSO,
MOD, Tokyo, Japan.
7. These troops are reportedly drawn from the augmented 15th
Brigade based in Naha. The deployed unit is reportedly modeled
after the GSDF’s No. 301 Coastal Surveillance Unit deployed in
Wakkanai in northern Hokkaido. See Desmond Ball and Richard
Tanter, Japan’s Signals Intelligence (SIGNT) Ground Stations: A
Visual Guide (Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability
Special Report, August 6, 2015), pp. 191–193.
8. “Rikuji 500 nin, Miyakojima haibi he … bō eishō hō shin,” Yomiuri
Shimbun, April 26, 2014; and “Miyakojima ni rikuji keibi butai
jō chū he, Chūgoku ni taiō , ritō bō ei kyō ka,” Asahi Shimbun, April
26, 2014.
9. Ball and Tanter, Japan’s Signals Intelligence (SIGNT) Ground
Stations, pp. 173–176, 184–187.
10. “SDF will only be deployed to ‘safe’ places, Abe says,” Japan
Times, May 20, 2015, as accessed September 4, 2015 at http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/20/national/politics-
diplomacy/sdf-will-deployed-safe-places-abe-says/#.
VeiykxG8PGe
CONCLUSION 359
11. Sabine Frühstück Uneasy Warriors: gender, memory, and popular

culture in the Japanese Army (Berkeley: University of California,
2007), pp. 10, 85, 183–184. For the mixed reactions of members
of the GSDF and the other SDF services to the enactment of this
legislation allowing the use of force and logistical support for other
militaries to use force, see Jiji, “SDF officers weigh in on security
bills,” Japan Times, September 18, 2015, as accessed on the same
day at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/18/
national/politics-diplomacy/sdf-officers-weigh-security-legisla-
tion/#.Vfx37Jd_lyQ
12. For an analysis of Japan’s post-war culture of anti-militarism, and
how it compares with that found in Germany, see Thomas
U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in
Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2003).
13. Both Eldridge and Midford took their students on visits to SDF
bases while they worked at Japanese universities.
Appendix 1
The SDF’s Ethos

(Jieikan no Kokorogamae),
Adopted on June 28, 1961
(From Defense of Japan, 2005, p. 529)
Ours is a country with a long history and splendid tradition that has
emerged from the many trials it has faced, and is now in the process of
developing as a nation based on the principles of democracy.
Its ideals are to cherish freedom and peace, encourage social welfare,
and contribute to a global peace that is founded on justice and order. In
order to bring about these ideals, it is essential that we ensure the contin-
ued existence and security of a Japan that stands on the premise of democ-
racy by protecting its peace and its independence.
In observing the realities of the world, we find that countries are mak-
ing ever greater efforts to prevent war through international cooperation.
At the same time, the development of weapons of mass destruction means
that the outbreak of large-scale war would be disastrous, and thus efforts
to keep such weapons under control are growing stronger. International
disputes, however, continue unabated, with countries seeking to protect
their own peace and independence by putting in place the defense arrange-
ments they need to serve their continued existence.
While retaining the sincere hope that the wisdom of mankind and the
cooperation of people of all countries will lead to a lasting world peace,

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8
362 Appendix 1
the Japanese people have created the present-day SDF to protect their
own country.
The mission of the Self-Defense Force (SDF)/Ground Self-Defense
Force (GSDF) is to protect the peace and independence of the country
and preserve its security.
The principal task of the SDF is to prevent the occurrence of direct and
indirect aggression against Japan, and to repel any such aggression should
it take place.
The SDF exist as part of the nation. In accordance with the principles of
democratic government, the commander-in-chief of the SDF is, as such,
the prime minister, who represents the Cabinet, and the basic administra-
tion of the SDF is subject to control by the National Diet.
Whether in peacetime or in the event of an emergency, SDF personnel
must, at all times, be prepared to identify themselves with the people and
take pride in serving the public without regard to themselves.
The spirit of SDF personnel is founded on the healthy spirit of the
nation itself. Cultivation of the self, love of others, and concern for the
motherland and its people—these particular attributes provide the SDF
with the proper sense of patriotism and identification with their own peo-
ple that lie at their spiritual heart.
We must remember the true nature of our role as members of the SDF
and refrain from taking part in political activities, reflect deeply on the
distinguished mission bestowed on us as members of the SDF, and take
great pride in our work. By the same token, we must devote ourselves
unstintingly to training and self-discipline and, in the face of events, be
prepared to discharge our duties at risk to ourselves, acting on the basis of
the criteria below.
Awareness of Mission
1. We will protect from external aggression the nation of Japan, its land,
and people, which we have inherited from our forefathers and which
we will bequeath to the next generation, enriched and developed.
2. We will safeguard the peace and the order of our national life, which is
founded on freedom and responsibility.
Individual Development
1. We will strive to make ourselves into positive and upstanding members

of society who are free from prejudice, and cultivate sound judgment.
Appendix 2
Anatomy of GSDF Unit Patches
Major GSDF Units
Northern Army
Northeastern Army
Eastern Army
Middle Army
Western Army
Central Readiness Force
Ground Staff Office
Independent Troops

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8
364 Appendix 2
GSDF patches will be worn on the right sleeve. Patches will reveal the
division marker, type of unit marker, and unit marker of the
organization.
Unit Marker
Type of Unit
Marker
Division Marker
Appendix 2 365
Unit Marker（Various designations are attached dependant on the duty）

UNIT
VARIOUS DUTIES AND UNITS
MARKER
Army, Division, Brigade or Combined Brigade Headquarters H
Nuclear, Biological Chemical Defense Unit C
Military Police Unit P
Finance Unit F
Music Unit B
High-Altitude Missile or Artillery Regiment A
Rear-Area Support Regiment/Rear-Area Support L
Training Regiment or Battalion, Training Unit T
GSDF Air Training Unit AB
GSDF Command and Staff School SC
GSDF OCS O
GSDF Fuji Schools F
GSDF High-Altitude Missile School A
GSDF Kodaira Schools KS
GSDF Chemical School C
GSDF Youth Technical School* Named changed in 2010, new marker N/A YT
JSDF Physical Fitness Training School PT
Ground Material Control Command GMC
Ground Research and Development Command GRD
Tsushima Guard ASF
GROUP=G SCHOOL=S LOGISTICS=D MEDICAL=H
UNIT
UNITS COLOR
TYPES
Red Infantry Unit
Deep Yellow Artillery Unit
Orange Armor Unit
Maroon Engineer Unit
Green Ordnance Unit
Dark Green Medical Unit
Light Blue Air Unit
Blue Communications Unit
Brown Supply Unit
Purple Transport Unit
Indigo Units not listed above
Dependent on equipment, the above colors may differ in some cases.
Appendix 3
SDF Commemorative Ribbons
Order of Precedence
Ribbon #1 Ribbon #2 Ribbon #3
For Special Meritorious For Meritorious Achievement For Meritorious Achievement

Achievement 1st Order 2nd Order
Ribbon #4 Ribbon #5 Ribbon #6 Ribbon #7
For Meritorious Achievement For Meritorious Achievement For Meritorious Achievement For Meritorious Achievement
3rd Order 3rd Order 3rd Order 3rd Order
(For Actions While Deployed to (For Achievement in Aviation Safety) (For Achievement in Research & (For Training and Exercises)
a Disaster) Development and Administrative Reform)
4th Order 4th Order 4th Order 4th Order

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8
368 Appendix 3
5th Order 5th Order 5th Order 5th Order
Ribbon #16 Ribbon #17 Ribbon #18
For Commendation in Safety and For Special Commendation For Commendation 1st Order
Disaster Prevention
Ribbon #19 Ribbon #20 Ribbon #21 Ribbon #22 Ribbon #23
For Service as a Commander in For Service as a Commander in For Service as a Commander in For Service as a Commander in For Service as a Company
the Rank of 3-Star General the Rank of 2-Star General the Rank of Colonel the Ranks of Lieutenant Colonel Grade Commander
and Major
(Regional Army, District/Fleet/Force, (Division/Brigade, Flotilla/Wing, (Regiment, Escort Fleet, or Air Group
Air Defense Force/Command) Wing/Group) Level)
For Service in the Staff of the For Service in the Defense For Service in the Headquarters For Service in the Council of
Internal Bureau of the Defense Ministry Intelligence Headquarters Staff of the Ground, Maritime, or the Joint Staff Office
Air Self-Defense Forces
For Service in the Headquarters For Service in the Technological For Service in the Logistical For Service in the Self-Defense
of the Joint Staff Office Research Headquarters Headquarters Force Inspector General’s Office
Ribbon #32 Ribbon #33
Over 25 Years Continuous Service Over 10 Years Continuous Service

For Service Overseas For Participation in For Participation in a For International Contribution
Anti-Pirating Operations Domestic Large Scale Disaster (PKO ・International Relief Aid)
Appendix 3 369
For International Contribution For International Contribution For Participation in a For Training Overseas
(Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law) (Iraq Humanitarian Relief Support Domestic Event
Special Measures Law)
AUTHORIZEDDEVICES
Gold Sakura Silver Sakura

(Multiple Awards) (Second Award)
Appendix 4
GSDF Occupational Specialty Insignias
INFANTRY ARMOR FIELD ARTILLERY ANTI-AIRCRAFT

ARTILLERY
AVIATION ENGINEER COMMUNICATION ORDANANCE
LOGISTICS/SUPPLY MOTOR TRANSPORT CHEMICAL & SDF POLICE

RADIOLOGICAL

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8
372 Appendix 4
FINANCE MEDICAL MUSIC INTELLIGENCE *
Although a school was

established to better train
personnel executing
intelligence-related duties,
this duty is not a Branch
within the GSDF
Appendix 5
GSDF Central Readiness Force Command Structure

CRF
Commanding
General
1st Airborne Special 1st

HQ Bde* Central Operations
Group**
Helicopter Central NBC
Defense Unit
IPCATEU Anti-NBC Med
Unit****
Readiness Reg Bde***
Camp Zama Camp Narashino Camp Utsunomiga Camp Narashino Camp Kisarazu Camp Omiya Camp Komakado Camp Asaka
KanagawaPref Chiba Pref Tochigi Pref Chiba Pref Chiba Pref Saitama Pref Shikuoka Pref Saitama Pref
NOTE: 1. IPCATEU = International Peace Cooperation Activities Training and Education Unit
2. The Central NBC Defense Unit is a containment and decontamination unit.
* This is the only airborne unit in the GSDF and considered one of the best trained and an elite unit.
** The SOG is the only specially trained force to deal with attacks by guerilla units and SOF.This will be a key unit for
the CRF in participating in domestic operations.
*** Biggest aircraft unit in the GSDF, equipped with CH-47s, LR-2s, and EC-225LPs.
**** This unit is trained, organized, and equipped to “provide medical treatment in response to NBC incidents.” It also has
additional medical capabilities.

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8
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Index
A anpō tōsō. See anti-security treaty

Abe Shinzō , ix, 12, 181n40, 247, 256, demonstrations
259n6, 336, 350 Antarctic, 317
ADIZ. See Air Defense Identification anti-militarism, 14n12, 359n12
Zone (ADIZ) anti-militarist culture, 7, 300, 301,
Advisory Group on Defense Problems 347, 356
(Bōei mondai kondankai), 284 anti-militarist feelings, 272, 289
Afghanistan, 146, 166, 201, 204, 242, anti-militarist values, 7, 356
251, 318, 326, 330, 355 anti-security treaty demonstrations
Agreed Framework (US-North Korea, (anpō tōsō), 302
1994), 190, 191 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law,
Aichi Prefecture, 28, 272, 273, 204, 251, 252, 369
293n35 Anzen Hoshō Kaigi. See Security
Air Defense Identification Zone Council
(ADIZ), 192, 219 Aomori Prefecture, 26
Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF, Asagumo, 16n21, 47, 50n5, 150, 158,
Koukuu Jieitai), 4 171n26, 172n33, 172n34,
3rd Wing Vice Commander, 290n7, 291n18
273 Asahi Jaanaru, 152
Akagi Muneyoshi, 303 Asahi Shimbun, 83, 119n33, 121n48,
Al Qaeda, 325, 326 124n89, 124n94, 124n97, 143,
Amami Oshima, 355 150, 173n41, 181n136,
Amphibious Rapid Deployment 181n137, 262n49, 262n50,
Brigade, 29, 220, 222 291n24, 301, 309, 320–2, 330,
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to foot notes.

Force, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55194-8
404 INDEX
338n14, 339n25, 341n45, Cabinet Office, 275, 290n10, 302,

341n48, 343n72, 345n79, 307, 316, 318, 319, 329, 330
345n80, 345n81, 358n8 341n37, 350, 351
Asami, Takehisa, 217 Cambodia, xvii, 189, 250, 282, 299,
Asanuma Inejirō , 134 300, 321–3, 328, 355
ASDF. See Air Self-Defense Force Camp Asaka, 24, 27, 29, 38, 46, 49,
(ASDF, Koukuu Jieitai) 114, 152, 172n33, 208, 227n62,
Asō Tarō , 254 354
Aum Shinrikyo, 195, 314 Camp Fuji, 37, 38, 164
Australia, 49, 202, 327 Camp Ichigaya, 21, 135, 139,
autonomous defense, 146–8, 154, 148
157, 240 Camp Kaitaichi, 28
Camp Makomanai, 25, 161
Camp Narashino, 114, 207, 373
B Camp Nerima, 140, 152
Baghdad, 205 Camp Ozuki, 78, 269
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), 202, Camp Shibata, 275
227n49 Camp Takigahara, 140, 164
Bangladesh, 282 Carter, James E., 146
Banshō Kō ichirō , ix, 5, 205 Central Counterintellegence
Basic Defense Capability, 280, 282, Command (Chūō shiryōtai),
285 166
Basic Disaster Prevention Plans (Bōsai Central Disaster Prevention Council
kihon keikaku), 274 (Chūō bōsai kaigi), 273, 274
Basic Law on Disaster Control Central Nuclear Biological Chemical
Measures, 273–9 Weapon Defense Unit, 332
Battle of Okinawa, 153 Central Readiness Force (CRF), 29,
Bird Flu, 211 31, 32, 207–8, 220, 221, 286,
BMD. See Ballistic Missile Defense 287, 373
(BMD) Central Readiness Regiment (Chūō
Bōei Kyōkai. See Osaka Defense sokuō rentai), 30, 286
Association Central Special Weapons Protection
Bubble Economy, 32, 40, 184, 187, Unit (Chūō tokushu bukki
188, 224n8 bōgotai), 287
Bull Run, 166 CH-47 helicopter, 141, 172n, 215,
bunkan tōsei. See civil official 373
control checkbook diplomacy, 187
Bush, George W., 204, 325, 326 China, 6, 14n14, 124n83, 134, 142,
146, 154, 184, 191, 192, 219,
280, 338n14, 342n56, 345n89
C civilian control
Cabinet Legislative Bureau (hō sei civilian official control (bunkan
kyoku), 144, 317 tōsei), 235
INDEX 405
civilian official control assistance 186, 196, 202, 209, 224n3,

authority, 237 224n6, 224n7, 225n25, 226n29,
civil official control, 235, 237, 238, 226n31, 226n32, 226n36–n39,
241, 242, 246–8, 250, 251, 253, 227n42, 227n44, 227n54,
254 227n56, 227n57, 228n78,
Clinton, William J., 285 228n80, 229n82, 229n84, 276,
Cold War, viii, 6, 8–10, xvii, 25, 32, 283, 295n61, 296n65, 339n27,
61, 69, 83, 91, 93, 97, 98, 103, 340n31, 343n62, 343n64–n6,
113, 116, 133–81, 183, 185–8, 344n78, 345n80, 357n1, 358n4
196, 197, 200, 203, 235–53, Defense Policy Review Initiative
277, 281–8, 300–12, 315–17, (DPRI), 194
348, 349, 354 Defense Study Group (bōei o kangaeru
Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency kai), 156, 157
Plan, 166 Defense white paper. See Defense of
Council for Reforming the Ministry of Japan
Defense, 253, 350 defense zoku, 245–7
counter-piracy operations, 316 defensive-realist attitudes, 326, 336
CRF. See Central Readiness Force Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), viii,
(CRF) 9, 10, 13n6, 15n19, 211,
Curtis-Kubo Agreement, 151–3 229n93, 254–6, 316, 331, 350
Curtis, Walter L., Jr., 151 Democratic People’s Republic of
cyber security, 315, 316 Korea (DPRK). See North
Korea
dependency ratio, 357n3
D Détente, 8, 134, 146, 154, 156, 162,
Dainippon Teikoku Kaigun. See 166, 179n107, 280, 281
Imperial Japanese Navy Diaoyu islands. See Senkaku islands
(Dainippon Teikoku Kaigun, DIH. See Defense Intelligence
IJN) Headquarters (DIH)
Dainippon Teikoku Rikugun. See Diplomatic Bluebook, 318, 341n38
Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) Disaster Measures Basic Law (Saigai
Defense Association (Bōei kyōkai), 18, taisaku kihonhō), 273
147 disaster relief, vi, 4, 25, 60, 77–9, 246,
Defense Intelligence Headquarters 265–96, 298, 350
(DIH), 32, 199 Disaster Relief Force (Saigai enjyō tai),
defense mobilization, 95, 96, 103, 309
112, 299, 302–4, 331 Disaster Relief Law (Saigai kyūjo hō),
Defense of Japan, 5, 14n15, 15n17, 282
45, 47, 50n1, 55n49, 55n50, 81, discretionary dispatch (jishu haken),
107, 109, 144, 159, 170n21, 266
172n36, 173n45, 179n111–n16, dispatch upon request (yōsei haken),
180n127, 180n129, 180n132, 266
406 INDEX
DPJ. See Democratic Party of Japan Emergency measures legal framework,

(DPJ) 108, 144
DPRI. See Defense Policy Review Etorofu, 32, 192, 193
Initiative (DPRI) European Japan Advanced Research
Dutch, 327 Network (EJARN), 342n59
dynamic defense, 212, 255, 285, 351 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),
192, 316
Exercise IRON FIST, 201, 203
E Exercise YAMASAKURA, 45, 164,
earthquakes 202
Great East Japan earthquake (2011),
vi, 10, 12, 22, 212, 256, 265,
273, 284, 289, 299, 330, 351 F
Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake fertility rates, 357n1
(1995), 96, 214, 281, 283–5, 1st Combined Brigade (Rinji Daiichi
288 Konseidan), 151
Great Kanto earthquake (1923), 74, 1st Infantry Regiment (Daiichi Futsuka
77, 275, 312, 331 Rentai), 140
Hokkaido earthquake (1993), 312 Flying Dragon, 166
Miyagi earthquake (1978), 306 Ford, Gerald R., 163, 180n125
Nagano earthquake (1984), 306 Fort Ord, 165
Niigata earthquake (1964), 306 Frühstück, Sabine, 13n9, 296n68,
Niigata earthquake (2007), 312 312, 338n9, 359n11
Eastern Army Fujieda Sensuke, 137
101st Chemical Protection Fuji School, 26, 37–9, 89, 113, 140,
Unit, 195 147, 172n35
1st Division, 27, 140, 353 Fukuchiyama, 77, 368–70
12th Division, 195 Fukuda Takeo, 244, 279, 290n8
Eastern Headquarters, 331 Fukuda Yasuo, 253
East Fuji Maneuver Area (Higashi Fuji Fukui blizzard (1981), 306
enshūjō), 164 Fukuoka, 22, 28, 35, 37, 55n46,
EEZ. See Exclusive Economic Zone 70, 90, 101, 179n100, 198,
(EEZ) 269
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 302 Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power
EJARN. See European Japan Advanced plant, 286, 287
Research Network (EJARN) Fukushima Prefecture, 215
Emergency Disaster Countermeasures
Headquarters (Kinkyū saigai
taisaku honbu), 274 G
Emergency Disaster Provision Law gender, 13n9, 15n20, 296n68, 338n9,
Outline (Hijō saigai taisakuhō 359n11
yōkō), 271 Gifu Prefecture, 272
INDEX 407
GMCC. See Ground Material Control Hatoyama Ichirō , 83, 87, 93

Center (GMCC) Hatoyama, Yukio, viii, 46, 211, 254
Golan Heights, 323 Hayashi Keizō , 66, 79, 122n63, 236,
Gotō da Masaharu, 65, 119n21, 267, 269
290n8 heuristic, 335
graduated reciprocal reduction in Higashikokubaru, Hideo, 211
tension (GRIT), 337n1 Hinomaru, 30, 204
Great Awaji-Hanshin earthquake. See Hirohito, 141, 154
Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake Hoanchō. See National Safety Agency
(1995) Hoantai. See National Safety Forces
Great East Japan earthquake (2011), Hokkaido, 5, 8, 12n2, 14n16, 24, 32,
vi, 10, 12, 22, 212, 256, 265, 46, 63, 71, 78, 87, 90, 97, 102,
273, 284, 289, 299, 330, 351 109, 113, 116, 142, 154, 158,
Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake 160, 161, 165, 167, 170n19,
(1995), 96, 214, 281, 283–8, 171n31, 171n32, 183, 185, 197,
313 205, 210, 221, 270, 281, 312,
GRIT. See graduated reciprocal 358n7
reduction in tension (GRIT) Hokuriku, 165, 197, 198, 275, 303
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 138, Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK)
188, 313, 352, 357n3 surface to air missile, 145, 160
Gross National Product (GNP). See Honduras, 282, 283, 324, 342n49,
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 343n70
Ground Material Control Center hō sei kyoku. See Cabinet Legislative
(GMCC), 199 Bureau
Ground Staff Office (Rikujō bakuryō Hosoda Hiroshi, 113, 135
kanbu, GSO), 20, 271 Hosokawa Morihiro, 284
GSO. See Ground Staff Office (Rikujō House of Counselors (Upper House of
bakuryō kanbu, GSO) the Diet), 317
Guidelines for US-Japan Defense House of Representatives (Lower
Cooperation House of the Diet), 76, 81, 94,
1976 Guidelines, 163, 196 110, 121n55, 123n74, 243, 245,
1997 Guidelines, 199–203, 251, 260n31
287, 354 Humanitarian and Disaster Relief
2015 Guidelines, 55n56, 219 (HaDR), 12, 279, 300, 306, 309,
Gulf War (1991), 165, 204, 282, 318 312, 315–20, 322–25, 328–29,
334, 341n44, 342n49, 342n53,
343n70
H humanitarian relief, 11, 225n13, 302,
HaDR. See Humanitarian and Disaster 319, 323, 326, 327, 342n49,
Relief (HaDR) 351, 355, 369
Haiti, 31, 208 155mm FH-70 towed howitzer, 186
Haiyan, 190, 216 Hurricane Mitch, 283, 324
408 INDEX
Hyogo Prefecture, 24, 28, 45, 54n38, 343n60, 343n68, 343n70,

171n30, 284, 285, 313 343n72
Iraq Special Measures Law,
251, 252
I Ise bay typhoon (typhoon Vera), 10,
IAEA. See International Atomic 103, 272–3, 284, 285, 288,
Energy Agency (IAEA) 293n41, 301, 351
IJA. See Imperial Japanese Army Ishihara Shintarō , 149
(Dainippon Teikoku Rikugun, Itami, vi, 24, 28, 45, 54n38, 71,
IJA) 171n30, 284, 294n53, 313
Ikeda Hayato, 83, 92, 115, 134, 137, Iwate Prefecture, 16n23, 331
238, 273
Imperial General Headquarters, 135
Imperial Japanese Army (Dainippon J
Teikoku Rikugun, IJA), 3, 22, 297 Japan–America Society, 143
Imperial Japanese Navy (Dainippon Japan Communist Party (JCP), 48,
Teikoku Kaigun, IJN), 4, 22 112, 173n39
Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), 324 Japan Defense Agency, 94–8, 170n21,
Indonesia, 22, 52n19, 208, 282, 283, 170n22, 192, 302
324 Japanese Constitution
Inoki Masamichi, viii, 21, 52n17, Article 9, 95, 96, 98, 187, 188,
118n18, 149, 179n58, 176n75 204, 224n11, 234, 237, 252,
Internal Bureau (Naikyoku), 20, 235 265, 266
International Atomic Energy Agency reinterpretation, 219, 355
(IAEA), 205, 229n83 Japan Socialist Party (JSP, Shakaitō),
International Emergency Relief Law viii, 267, 274
(Kokusai kinkyū enjotai), 282 Japan–US Alliance, 146, 228n68
International Institute for Policy JCP. See Japan Communist Party
Studies (Sekai heiwa kenkyūjyo), (JCP)
148 Jieitaihō. See Self-Defense
International Peace Cooperation Law Forces Law
(Kokuren heiwa iji katsudō), 189, Jieitai ni kansuru yoron chōsa. See Poll
282 on the SDF
International Peace Support Law Joint Internal Bureau Staff Office
(Kokusai heiwa shienhō), 257 (naibaku ittai), 250
Iran, 283, 318, 324 Joint Staff Chief of Staff, 236,
Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group, 239, 247, 253, 255, 256,
318 262n47
Iraq, 21, 183, 184, 187, 201, 204, Joint Staff Council, 51n14, 67, 89,
205, 227n55, 246, 251, 252, 137, 141, 163, 165, 180n128,
299, 300, 318, 326–30, 336, 199, 208, 237
INDEX 409
K Korean Peninsula Energy

Kaifu Toshiki, 319 Development Organization
Kaihara Osamu, 240, 259n18, (KEDO), 190
260m19 Korean War, 8, 13n8, 60, 62, 65, 69,
Kaihara Toshitami, 340n30 71, 83, 91, 142, 234, 266
Kanazawa, 303 Kō saka Masataka, 126n123, 131n184,
Kan Naoto, 5, 10, 215, 255, 287, 156
331 Kowalski, Frank, 118n13, 259n8
Kasai Masae, 140 Kubo Takuya, 151, 157, 179n106,
KEDO. See Korean Peninsula Energy 241, 280, 294n46
Development Organization Kunashir, 32, 192, 193
(KEDO) Kurile island chain, 192, 193
Keisatsu yobitai. See Police Reserve Kurisu Hirō mi, 21, 180n128, 243,
Force 261n42
Kii Peninsula, 272 Kuwae, Ryō hō , 151, 177n80
Kimigayo, 204 Kuwait, 183, 187, 224n8
Kimizuka Eiji, 22, 52n19, 213, 256, Kyoto Prefecture, 268
331 Kyūma Fumio, 227n62, 246
Kinki region, 281 Kyushu, 28, 36, 40, 63, 71, 78, 90,
Kishi, Nobusuke, 93, 100, 128n153, 102, 103, 160, 191, 197, 221,
130n171, 131n181, 135, 238, 228n73, 269, 312
290n8, 302, 338n10
Kitazawa, Toshimi, 10, 23, 53n25,
215, 254, 287 L
Kō no Ichirō , 143, 290n8 Law Concerning the Dispatch of
Kobe, viii, 121n50, 194, 268, 281, Japanese Disaster Relief Teams
284, 287, 294n53, 295n53, 300, (1987), 318, 341n38
312–15, 331, 339n28, 250 Law on Special Countermeasures for
Kobe-Awaji earthquake. See Great Large-Scale Earthquakes, 275,
Hanshin Awaji earthquake (1995) 294n53
Kobe earthquake. See Great Hanshin LDP. See Liberal Democratic Party
Awaji earthquake (1995) (LDP)
Kodaira Intelligence School (chōsa Lee Teng-hui, 191
gakkō), 325 legitimacy, vi, 3, 4, 7, 10, 61, 82, 97,
Koizumi Junichirō , 13n6, 184, 204, 202, 265, 266, 282–4, 288, 289,
247 297, 298, 300, 302, 303, 305,
Koizumi Junya, 140, 243 326, 334, 335, 347, 350, 351,
Kokusai Heiwa Shienhō. See 353, 356
International Peace Support Law Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), viii,
Komeito, 189, 251, 255, 256, 320 ix, 9, 13n6, 111, 112, 116,
Kondō Yasushi, 161 129n157, 140, 143, 146, 147,
Korean Airlines Flight 007, 167 173n47, 188, 189, 219, 238,
410 INDEX
245, 247, 251, 255, 256, 307, 2nd Combined Brigade, 194, 198,
318–20, 330, 350, 352 210
LDP Executive Council (Sōmu), 3rd Division, 28, 284
147 10th Division, 28, 272
Light Armored Vehicle, 199 13th Brigade, 28, 171n30
Lockheed Scandal, 155, 160–2 13th Division, 139, 171n30, 194,
Lower House. See House of 210
Representatives (Lower House of Middle Army Headquarters, 171n30,
the Diet) 172n32
Mie Prefecture, 37, 103, 273
MiG-25 incident, 8
M Ministry of Defense (MOD), viii, x, 9,
MacArthur, Douglas, 8, 13n8, 19, 21, 27, 32, 34, 41–3, 45, 47,
60, 267 50n2, 50n6, 51n7, 55n50, 139,
Mainichi Shimbun, 55n51, 118n18, 177n85, 178n90, 209, 210, 212,
125n115, 128n53, 131n179, 216, 222, 228n70, 234, 235,
309, 339n24 237, 249, 253–7, 287,
Major Disaster Counter Measures 262n61,263n62, 263n63,
Headquarters (Hijō saigai taisaku 295n61, 296n65, 327, 344n78,
honbu), 274 345n80, 345n89, 349, 350,
Major Earthquake Disaster Relief 352–4, 356, 357n1
Deployment (Daikibo shinsai Ministry of Education, Culture,
saigai haken), 280, 285 Sports, Science and Technology,
Major Earthquake Response Special 195
Measures Law (Daikibo jishin Ministry of Finance, 138, 158,
taisaku tokubetsu sochihō), 279 228n70, 240–2, 249, 252, 255
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA),
Kaijō Jieitai), vii, 19, 20, 68, 94, 224n10, 225n17, 341n38
136, 169n9, 273, 310–12, 348, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
351 Transportation, and Tourism, 195
Mashita Kanehiro, 150 Minobe Ryō kichi, 281
Mashita Kanetoshi, 148, 176n78 Misawa city fire (1966), 306
Masuhara Keikichi, 64, 154, 236 Mishima Yukio, 8, 134, 148–50,
Matsuno Raizō , 143, 171n29, 175n66
173n47, 244 missile defense, 55n43, 201, 202, 315,
Matsushima Yūsuke, 295n60, 340n30 316
Matsushita Institute of Management Mitsuya Incident (Mitsuya Kenkyū,
and Government, 339n15 Three Arrows Study), 8, 141, 243
Matsushita Kō nosuke, 304 Mitsuya Kenkyū. See Mitsuya Incident
medical services, 11, 299, 302, 304, Miwa Yoshio, 143
314, 319, 321, 327, 328, 351 Miyagi Prefecture, 24, 26, 214, 217,
Middle Army 331
INDEX 411
Miyake Yoshinobu, 140, 305 National Defense Council

Miyako island (miyakojima), 151, Parliamentarians Group (Kokubō
177n87, 354 kaigi giin konwakai), 157
Miyako Strait, 354 National Defense Program Guidelines
Miyanaga Yukihisa, 166 (NDPG)
Miyazaki Tatsuo, 281, 295n53 2004 NDPG, 206–11, 227n60
Miyazawa Kiichi, 163, 169n5, 187 2010 NDPG, 211
Miyoshi Hideo, 149, 162 2013 NDPG, 219
mobilization for maintaining public National Defense Program Outline
order, 69, 74, 75, 81, 95, 169n9 (NDPO, Bōei Keikaku no Taikō)
Monument for SDF Members Killed 1976 NDPO, 186, 196
in the Line of Duty (Jieitai 1995 NDPO, 32, 192, 196–200,
junshokusha ireihi), 139 203, 207
Mount Komagatake, 210 National Governors’ Conference
Mozambique, 322, 323 (Zenkoku chijikai), 271
MSA. See Mutual Security Act (MSA) National Land Construction Corps
MSDF. See Maritime Self-Defense (Kokudo kensetsutai), 274,
Force (MSDF, Kaijō Jieitai) 293n38
Murayama Tomiichi, 283 National Leadership of Defense
Mutual Security Act (MSA), 91, 92, Associations, 304
94, 97, 102 National Police Agency, 112, 195,
mystery ships, 315, 316 241, 242, 249
National Safety Agency (hoanchō), 61,
84–5, 90, 94, 236, 247, 270
N National Safety Agency Order No.
Nagoya, xvii, 28, 272, 292n31, 9, 247
294n50, 302 National Safety Agency Law
Naibaku ittai. See Joint Internal (Hoanchōhō), 85, 90, 94, 270
Bureau Staff Office Article 66, 85, 270
Naikakufu seifu kōhōshitsu. See Public National Safety Forces (Hoantai), 3,
Relations Office of the Cabinet 61, 80, 85, 86, 94, 236, 270, 271
Naikyoku. See Internal Bureau 292n26
Nakagawa Hirohide, 218 necessary defense capability (shoyōboē
Nakamura Kazuo, 140 iryoku), 157
Nakasone Yasuhiro, 146–8, 170n17, Nepal, 217
175n57, 175n58, 176n69, 240, New Cold War, 134, 162–8, 281
281, 290n8, 294n51 New Look Strategy, 136
Nakatani Gen, 13n7, 246, 333 NGOs. See non-governmental
National Defense Academy, viii, 21, organizations (NGOs)
22, 51n14, 51n15, 54n40, 68, Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei),
150, 156, 167, 223, 249, 259n10 55n46, 319, 339n28, 341n43
National Defense Council (Kokubō Niigata City, 275
kaigi), 157, 218, 234 Niigata Prefecture, 27, 208, 275
412 INDEX
9-11 terror attacks, 325 OH-1 helicopter, 199

1993 Tokyo Declaration, 193 Okada Haruo, 142
1996 US-Japan Joint Declaration Okazaki Katsuo, 64, 269
Security, 203 Okinawa, viii, xv, 8, 28, 43, 47,
Nippon terebi (NTV), 329, 343n68 54n43, 140, 141, 145, 146,
Nishihiro Seiki, 248, 284 151–3, 160, 164, 166, 172n32,
Nixon Shocks, 155, 240 177n80, 177n84, 177n85,
Nobel Peace Prize, 141 177n87, 178n90, 180n132,
Noda Yoshihiko, viii 192–4, 197, 210, 226n34, 255,
Nodong missiles. See Rodong missiles 285, 354
non-governmental organizations Ō mori Kan, 67–8, 269, 272–3
(NGOs), 304, 331, 332 Operational Plan for Disaster
Noro Kyō ichi, 152, 177n82 Prevention (Bōsai gyōmu keikaku),
Northeastern Army, 24, 102, 213, 274
214, 217 Operation Enduring Freedom, 184
Northern Army Operation Iraqi Freedom, 184, 204
2nd Division, 205 Operation Plan “5051”, 165
5th Division, 209 Operation Plan “5053”, 165
7th Division, 185 Operation SANGKAY, 216–19
11th Division (Brigade), 161, Operation Tomodachi, x, 54n34, 214,
179n122 216, 273, 287, 332, 333
Northern Territories, 192 opinion polls, 117n3, 351
North Korea, 62, 136, 142, 165, 190, Organization of Economic
205, 247, 316 Cooperation and Development
abduction issue (Rachi Mondai), (OECD), 268
205 Osaka Defense Association, 48, 153.
Norway, xvi, 343n60 See also Defense Association
NTV. See Nippon terebi (NTV) Ozawa Ichirō , 188
nuclear disaster relief dispatch, 256
nurses, 36, 324
P
pacifism, 60, 61, 93, 266, 309, 335
O Pak Chung Hee, 136
ODA. See Official Development Aid Pakistan, 191, 251, 282, 283, 318,
(ODA) 326
ODA White Paper, 327, 343n63, Peace Boat NGO, 332
343n67 Peace-Keeping Force (PKF), 319–21
Official Development Aid (ODA), peace-keeping operations (PKO), xvii,
204, 205, 299, 300, 326–8, 6, 11, 144, 184, 188–90, 203,
343n63, 343n67 246, 250, 258, 282, 283, 299,
INDEX 413
316, 319–23, 338n6, 341n49, refugees, 25, 273, 287, 321, 326,
343n70, 349, 351 328
Peacetime Defense Capability (Heiwaji regional jurisdiction system, 169n6,
no bōeiryoku), 154, 157 171n30, 237, 253, 284
Persian Gulf, 187 reservists, 32, 33, 54n34, 100, 286,
Persian Gulf War, 187 331
Philippines, 26, 144, 190, 192, 216, Rhee Syngman, 136
217, 220, 282, 324 Ridgway, Matthew B., 68
PKF. See Peace-Keeping Force (PKF) right to collective self-defense, 11,
PKO. See Peace-keeping operations 257
(PKO) Rodong missiles, 191, 202, 205. See
PKO bill, 316, 319, 320 also Nodong 1 missiles
Police Reserve Force (Keisatsu Rwanda, 190, 322–4
yobitai), 63
Poll on the SDF (Jieitai ni kansuru
yoron chōsa), 299, 301–3, 305, S
307, 309, 313, 322–4, 329, 332, SACO. See Special Action Committee
335, 336, 338n10, 351 on Okinawa (SACO)
Provincial Liaison Office (Chihō Sado Ryuki, 325
renraku honbu), 281 Saigai enjyō tai. See Disaster Relief
Publicity Bureau of the Cabinet Office. Force
See Public Relations Office of the Saigai kyūjo hō. See Disaster Relief Law
Cabinet (Saigai kyūjo hō)
Public Relations Office of the Cabinet Sakata Michita, 155, 179n100,
(Naikakufu seifu kōhōshitsu), 299 179n106, 179n108, 208, 241
Sakhalin, 5, 142, 167, 193,
225–6n27
R Samawah, 205, 299, 326–9
Rachi Mondai. See North Korea, Samuels, Richard, 4, 14n13, 295n53,
abduction issue 331, 340n30
Radford, Arthur W., 99–100, 136 Sanderson, John, 322
radiation, 211, 215, 332 Sapporo Snow Festival, 48, 301
Ready Reserve Personnel, 33, 35, 197, Sapporo Winter Olympics (1972), 306
207, 222 Sarin Gas attack, 211, 314
rearmament, 8, 60, 61, 66, 69, 70, 72, Sasebo, 28, 29
75, 79–84, 86, 87, 89–94, 97, Satō Eisaku, 140, 173n41, 238
100, 117n3, 117n4, 122n67, Satō , Hisanori, 217
122n69, 138, 238, 338n10 Satō Motonobu, 269
reassurance, 4, 76, 297–9, 301, 334, Saudi Arabia, 319
337n1, 337n3, 342n57 Schlesinger, James R., 163
reconstruction assistance, 30, 207, SDF Law. See Self-Defense Forces
302, 327, 329, 343n60 Law
414 INDEX
Second Defense Build-up Plan 167, 186, 193, 226n27, 242,

(Dainiji bōeiryoku seibi keikaku), 250, 280, 281
137–41, 273–9 Soya Strait, 14n16
Security Consultative Committee Special Action Committee on Okinawa
(SCC), 151, 163, 224n2, (SACO), 194, 226n34
180n126 Special Unexploded Ordinance Unit
Security Council (Anzen hoshō kaigi), (Tokubetsu fuhatsudan shoritai),
218, 234 153
security treaty disturbances. See Standard Defense Force Concept
anti-security treaty (Kibanteki bōeiryoku kōsō), 157
demonstrations Subcommittee for Defense
Sekieigun (Red Gate Army), 152 Cooperation (SDC), 163,
Self-Defense Forces Law (Jieitaihō, 180n128
SDF Law) Sugita Ichiji, 112, 135, 169n6, 302
Article 3, 74, 95, 169n9, 270 supreme commander, 234, 268
Article 76, 270 Supreme Commander of the Allied
Article 78, 95, 270 Powers (SCAP), 8, 60, 122n71,
Article 83, 95, 266, 271, 275, 123n75–7
290n4 Surface-to-ship missile (SSM), 168,
Article 81, Section 2, 95 222
Sendai, 24, 70, 109, 214, 217, 287, Type-12 SSM, 222
331 Suzuki Zenkō , 166
Senkaku islands (Diaoyu islands), 6, Syria, 184, 323
219
senshu bōei. See defensive defense
Shakaitō. See Japan Socialist Party (JSP, T
Shakaitō) Taepodong missile, 184, 316
Shield Society (Tatenokai), 148 Taepodong shock, 316
Shikotan, 32, 192, 193 Taishō Democracy, 4, 13n10
Shinjuku incident, 303 Takemura Masayoshi, 339n23
Signals Intelligence (SIGNT), 354, Taliban, 326
358n7, 358n9 Tanaka Kakuei, 153, 290n8
SIGNT. See Signals Intelligence Tanaka Shō ji, 161
(SIGNT) Tanaka Tatsuo, 269
Socialist party. See Japan Socialist Tanaka Yoshio, 141, 243, 244
Party tax thieves (zeikindorobo), 4
Song Hyo Chan, 137 Third Five-Year Defense Build-Up
South Korea, 136, 137, 144–6, 190, Plan (Daisanji Bōeiryoku Seibi
192 Keikaku), 145
South Sudan, 337n4 Tō hoku, 26, 27, 51n16, 71, 165, 197,
Soviet Union, 61, 83, 91, 105, 109, 198, 212–15, 256, 286, 287,
116, 134, 146, 153, 161, 166, 344n74, 344n76
INDEX 415
Three Arrows Study. See Mitsuya Ruth, 78, 269, 270

Incident Vera (see Ise Bay)
3-11. See Great East Japan Earthquake Yolanda (see Haiyan)
(2011)
302nd Military Police Company (Dai
302 Hoan Chūtai), 141 U
three non-nuclear principles, 141, 147, Ueda Tetsu, 162
196 UNDOF. See United Nations
tilt-rotor aircraft, 222 Disengagement Observer Forced
Tochigi Prefecture, 31, 48 (UNDOF)
Tō kai region, 195, 272, 279 uniformed personnel, 9, 156, 157,
Tokyo Defense Council, 304. See also 235–58, 261n46, 349, 350, 352
Defense Association United Nations (UN), xvii, 60, 71,
Tokyo Olympics 83, 105, 106, 144, 147, 174n54,
1964 Tokyo Olympics, 6, 10, 301, 188, 189, 196, 197, 282, 299,
304, 305, 334, 351 300, 317, 319, 320, 327
Tokyo Olympic Support Command United Nations Angola Verification
(TOSC, Tokyo orimpikku shien Mission (UNVEM II), 189
shudan junbi honbu), 304 United Nations Disengagement
Tokyo orimpikku shien shudan junbi Observer Forced (UNDOF), 323
honbu. See Tokyo Olympic United States (US)
Support Command (TOSC, Tokyo Congress, 106, 137, 167
orimpikku shien shudan junbi US Air Force, 38, 181n134
honbu) US Army, ix, 21, 22, 30, 32, 38, 41,
TOSC. See Tokyo Olympic Support 49, 54n43, 63, 66, 68, 164,
Command (TOSC, Tokyo 180n132, 197–202, 223
orimpikku shien shudan junbi US Embassy in Tokyo, 138
honbu) US military bases; Iwakuni, 269;
Tsuburaya Kō kichi, 305 Sasebo, 28, 29, 230n103;
Tsutsui Takeo, 68, 269 Yokosuka, 21, 26–8, 37,
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary 51n15, 192; Yokota, xxxiv,
Movement, 202 285, 287
203mm Self-propelled howitzer, 186 UNMIS. See United Nations Mission
Type-10 Tank, 209, 222 in Sudan (UNMIS)
Type-61 Tank, 186 UN Security Council, 320
Type-74 Tank, 186, 224n4 UNTAC. See UN Transitional
Type-90 Tank, 186, 209, 224n6 Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
typhoons UN Transitional Authority in
Haiyan, 190, 216 Cambodia (UNTAC), 189, 190,
Ise Bay, 10, 103, 272, 273, 284, 282, 320–2
285, 288, 293n41, 301, 351 UNVEM II. See United Nations
Mitch (see Hurricane Mitch) Angola Verification Mission
No. 15 (see Ise Bay) (UNVEM II)
416 INDEX
Upper House (of the Diet). See House 15th Brigade, 28, 43, 53n26,
of Counselors 178n88, 210
US force reductions, 188 1st Combined Brigade, 53n26, 151,
Ushiba Nobuhiko, 156 153, 198, 210, 358n7
US-Japan Security Treaty 8th Division, 28, 211
revision of 1951 security treaty, 79 43rd Infantry Regiment, 211
1951 security treaty, 79 Western Army Infantry Regiment,
1960 security treaty, 106, 110, 112, 201
133, 137, 180n126, 238, 274, World War II, vii, viii, 5, 8, 22, 32, 46,
288, 348, 350 (see also anti- 60, 102, 133, 135, 156, 184,
security treaty demonstrations) 188, 192, 204, 233, 265, 288,
US Marines 312, 314, 331, 356
Lieutenant Colonel Shigeishi, LNO,
54n43
Marine Corps Combat Development Y
Command, 53n31, 54n43 Yamaguchi Prefecture, 28, 71, 77, 90,
I Marine Expeditionary Force, 269
III Marine Expeditionary Force, 25, Yamaoka Takeo, 223
54n43, 285 Yamasakura, 45, 164, 202
1995 rape, 193 Yamashita Ganri, 163
US Seventh Fleet, 192 Yara Chō byō , 151
US Navy, 165, 201, 295n53 Yomiuri Shimbun, xvii, 17n25, 52n22,
USS Comstock, 201 54n37, 76, 117n4, 118n10,
USS Independence, 192, 285 118n18, 121n52, 121n53,
USS Kitty Hawk, 191 121n54, 125n115, 126n123,
USS Nimitz, 192 211, 228n64, 228n72, 258n5,
293n37, 294n47, 321, 333,
341n46, 358n8
V Yonaguni, 210–12, 222, 228n73, 354,
V-22, 29, 222 355
Vietnam War, 280, 310, 311 Yoshida Doctrine, 138, 238, 265
volcanic eruptions Yoshida Shigeru, xvi, 8, 60, 112,
Izu-shima volcanic eruption (1986), 117n9, 118n17, 118n18,
306 119n28, 120n34, 120n41,
Unzen volcanic eruption (1991), 122n66, 122n69, 123n73,
312 126n123, 126n129, 127n131,
129n156, 129n161, 135, 137,
141, 223, 235, 238, 266, 267,
W 284, 290n5, 294n43, 349
water purification, 11, 320, 322,
327–9, 351
Western Army Z
Zeikin dorobo. See tax thieves

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The Japanese Ground

The Japanese Ground

ISBN 978-1-137-56531-0 ISBN 978-1-137-55194-8 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016956657

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017

Cover image © Kaneko Masaru

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

invited Ayako Kusunoki, an expert on Japan’s early postwar defense pol-

served as defense minister.7 Expectations for an SDF-friendly government

Ramet for their valuable comments on earlier versions of Chap. 7, and

Robert D. Eldridge is currently a visiting fellow with the Institute for

Paul Midford is Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian

About the Contributors

Ritsumeikan University, in Kyō to. He was a researcher at the International

Part I Overview of the GSDF 1

2 Organization and Structure of the Contemporary

Part II The History of the GSDF 57

3 The Early Years of the Ground Self-Defense Forces,

4 The GSDF During the Cold War Years, 1960–1989 133

5 The GSDF During the Post-Cold War Years, 1989–2015 183

Part III Civilian Control and the Search for Acceptance 231

6 The Ground Self-Defense Force and Civilian Control 233

7 The GSDF and Disaster Relief Dispatches 265

8 The GSDF’s Quest for Public Acceptance and the

Overview of the GSDF

Paul Midford and Robert D. Eldridge

The Challenges of Reputation and Relevance

P. Midford R.D. Eldridge (*)

© The Author(s) 2017 3

get (17%) going to the MOD’s 16,000 civilian bureaucrats, maintenance

good reputation domestically and internationally, helping to distinguish

Chapter 2, written by Kusunoki and entitled, “The Early Years of the

In Chap. 4, entitled “The GSDF in the Post-Cold War Years,

tories, and data on personnel working in the Internal Bureau to analyze

GSDF in particular gained an image among the Japanese public as being

3. Frank Gibney, “The View from Japan,”Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50,

an explanation of the causes of Japan’s over-expansion and its

United Nations Association of the USA and the Asia Pacific

monogatari (Tokyo: Kōjinsha, 2007); and Rikujō jieitai seisaku

ed., Jisedai no rikujyō Jieitai-shōraisen o kaku tatakau (Tokyo: Kaya

Position of the GSDF in National Defense Policy

R.D. Eldridge (*)

© The Author(s) 2017 19

which directly supports the civilian minister of defense. Currently, there

ers of the SDF. He wrote, “the complete monopolizing of the leadership of

the ­recommendations of the GSO, the powerful Internal Bureau may

and Career Transition Division (Boshū Engoka), and Welfare Division

of other units, for a total of approximately 20,000 personnel (including

Middle Army, or MA, also established on January 14, 1960, is respon-

fulfill the roles in international peace cooperation activities and domestic

When established, the original target end-strength of the CRF reached

that complement each other toward providing service and support to

GSDF Brigade Division

3,000 5,000 10,000 20,000

U.S. Army Brigade Division

3,000 5,000 10,000 20,000+

NATO Brigade Division

quent Mid-Term Defense Program of 2000 scheduled completion of the

Assigned to Specific Units and Billets

Defense Operations Defense Operations

TRAINING 5 Days per Year

4,000 yen Monthly Stipend 16,000 yen Monthly Stipend

Part I Overview of the GSDF 1

2 Organization and Structure of the Contemporary

Part II The History of the GSDF 57

3 The Early Years of the Ground Self-Defense Forces,

4 The GSDF During the Cold War Years, 1960–1989 133

5 The GSDF During the Post-Cold War Years, 1989–2015 183

Part III Civilian Control and the Search for Acceptance 231

6 The Ground Self-Defense Force and Civilian Control 233

7 The GSDF and Disaster Relief Dispatches 265

8 The GSDF’s Quest for Public Acceptance and the

the recommendations of the GSO, the powerful Internal Bureau may

Master Sergeant—fifty-four, and Sergeant First class and Sergeant—fifty-