Citizenship

 and  the  Constitution  

 
-­‐ Gautam  Bhatia  
 
       India’s   Constitution   was   framed   in   extraordinary   circumstances.   During   the  
three   years   (January   1947   –   January   1950)   that   the   Constituent   Assembly   sat,  
debated,   and   drafted,   the   country   gained   independence,   was   partitioned,   and  
more  than  five  hundred  “princely  states”  were  integrated  into  what  became  the  
Indian  Union.  These  events  were  often  accompanied  by  bloodshed  and  violence.1    
 
         The   Constituent   Assembly’s   own   character   reflected   these   extraordinary  
circumstances.   The   Assembly   began   as   a   creature   of   British   statute,   but   swiftly  
declared   itself   unbound   and   free   to   determine   its   own   powers.   Its   composition  
changed  as  time  went  by,  and  as  the  country  split  up.  And  until  the  first  elections,  
it   was   the   same   men   and   women   who   sat   both   as   the   Constituent   Assembly  
framing  the  national  Charter,  and  as  a  provisional  Parliament,  passing  laws  and  
administering  the  country  (often  in  the  course  of  the  same  day).    
 
       The  framers  of  the  Constitution,  therefore,  were  faced  with  a  challenging  and  
unprecedented   task.   They   had   to   frame   a   document   that   would   endure   for  
generations   –   an   endeavour   that   required   them   to   take   a   step   back   from   the  
immediacy   of   their   context,   and   think   in   general   and   universal   terms.   At   the  
same   time,   they   had   to   respond   and   react   on   an   almost   daily   basis   to   a   rapidly  
shifting  national  landscape.    
 
       Unsurprisingly,   the   Constitution   that   finally   emerged   reflected   the  
circumstances   under   which   it   had   been   framed:   grand   and   lofty   principles,  
embodied  in  the  Preamble  and  the  fundamental  rights  chapter,  jostled  for  space  
with   provisions   dealing   with   the   governance   of   everyday   life   and   the   details   of  
administration.  And  perhaps  nowhere  was  this  contrast  more  evident  than  in  the  
Constitution’s   citizenship   chapter   (Part   II).2   The   mass   migration   that  
accompanied   the   Partition   required   a   concrete   and   definite   solution.   After  
significant   debate,   this   solution   emerged   from   Articles   5   to   8   of   the   Constitution,  
which   spelt   out   the   citizenship   status   of   those   who   were   born   in   undivided   India  
but  lived  abroad,  those  who  had  come  into  India  from  Pakistan,  and  those  who  
had   left   India   –   but   decided   to   come   back.   And   then,   without   anything   further   on  
the  general  principles  governing  citizenship,  there  came  Article  11:    
 
Nothing   in   the   foregoing   provisions   of   this   Part   shall   derogate   from   the  
power   of   Parliament   to   make   any   provision   with   respect   to   the  

                                                                                                               
1   For   the   standard   account   of   the   framing   of   India’s   Constitution,   see   Granville   Austin,   India’s  

Constitution:  Cornerstone  of  a  Nation  (OUP  1966);  see  also  Uday  Singh  Mehta,  “Constitutionalism”  
in  The  Oxford  Companion  to  Politics  in  India  (OUP  2010).    
2   For   accounts   of   citizenship   in   India   from   a   constitutional   perspective,   see,   e.g.,   Niraja   Gopal  

Jayal,   Citizenship   and   its   Discontents   (Harvard   University   Press   2013);   Niraja   Gopal   Jayal,  
“Citizenship”   in   The   Oxford   Handbook   of   the   Indian   Constitution   (OUP   2016);   Anupama   Roy,  
Gendered  Citizenship  (Orient  Blackswan  2005).    
 acquisition   and   termination   of   citizenship   and   all   other   matters   relating  
to  citizenship.3  
 
       In  effect,  therefore,  on  a  simple  reading  of  Part  II  of  the  Constitution,  it  appears  
that   the   framers   in   the   Constituent   Assembly   devoted   their   energies   to   solving  
the  problems  of  Partition,  while  leaving  the  citizenship  question  –  as  it  were  –  to  a  
future  Parliament  (Parliament  did  indeed  enact  the  Citizenship  Act  in  1955).    
 
         Consequently,   there   is   a   simple   and   brief   answer   to   the   question:   what   does  
the  Constitution  say  about  citizenship?  The  answer:  nothing.  Partition   –  and  its  
legal   consequences   –   are   over,   and   those   provisions,   with   their   quaint   cut-­‐off  
dates   of   July   1948   –   have   no   more   than   a   vestigial   role   to   play.   It   is   the   Indian  
Parliament   that   is   empowered   to   lay   down   the   conditions   of   citizenship   (subject,  
of   course,   to   the   Constitution’s   fundamental   rights   chapter),   conditions   that   it  
can  –  and  has  –  altered  from  time  to  time.    
 
       This   “plenary”   power   of   Parliament   –   and   Article   11,   which   guarantees   it   –   has  
been   a   central   part   of   the   debate   around   the   2019   amendments   to   the  
Citizenship   Act.   These   amendments   provide   that   migrants   (a)   from   three  
countries   –   Pakistan,   Bangladesh,   and   Afghanistan,   (b)   belonging   to   any   one   of  
six   religions   –   Hindu,   Jain,   Buddhist,   Sikh,   Parsi,   and   Christian,   and   (c)   having  
come   to   India   before   December   31,   2014,   would   be   granted   immunity   from  
prosecution  as  illegal  immigrants,  and  a  fast-­‐track  to  citizenship.4  Objections  to  
this  “religious  test”  for  citizenship  had  been  made  for  months,  while  the  CAA  had  
still   been   a   Bill,   and   were   made   again   when   it   was   passed,   both   in   the   public  
sphere,   and   in   the   many   petitions   that   were   filed   before   the   Supreme   Court,  
challenging  it.    
 
         Article   11   has   played   a   central   role   in   the   CAA’s   defence.   This   defence   has  
taken  two  forms,  which  we  can  helpfully  label  a  “strong  form”  and  a  “weak  form”.  
In   its   strong   form,   the   argument   goes   that   Article   11   exempts   citizenship   law  
from  any  form  of  constitutional  objection,  including  (effectively)  a  fundamental  
rights  challenge.  The  words  “any  provision”  and  “all  other  matters”  suggest  that  
questions   of   citizenship   lie   within   the   exclusive   domain   of   Parliament.5   In   this  
essay,  I  will  not  engage  in  detail  with  this  argument:  a  look  at  the  text  of  Article  
11   demonstrates   that   it   is   meant   to   operate   as   an   exception   to   the   rest   of   Part   II,  
but  not  to  the  Constitution  as  a  whole.  Article  13  of  the  Constitution  clarifies  that  
any   law   passed   by   Parliament   must   comply   with   the   fundamental   rights  
chapter.6  There  is  no  specific  exemption  for  citizenship  laws,  and  it  is  difficult  to  
read  any  such  exemption  into  Article  11  either.    
 

                                                                                                               
3  Article  11,  Constitution  of  India.    
4  The  Citizenship  (Amendment)  Act,  2019.    
5  For   a   version   of   this   argument   –   not,   albeit,   founded   on   Article   11,   see   Kanu   Agrawal,   “In  
Defence  of  Citizenship  Amendment  Act:  Plenary  powers  and  the  idea  of  Indian  Citizenship”,  Bar  &  
Bench   (December   19,   2019),   available   at   https://www.barandbench.com/columns/plenary-­‐
powers-­‐the-­‐idea-­‐of-­‐indian-­‐citizenship.    
6  Article  13,  Constitution  of  India.    
          The  argument  also,  however,  has  a  weaker  –  and  more  nuanced  –  form.  What  
the   text   of   Article   11   reveals   –   according   to   this   weaker   version   –   is   that   the  
Constituent   Assembly   never   intended   to   bind   Parliament   to   a   particular  
principle,  or  set  of  principles,  when  it  came  to  questions  of  citizenship.  Subject  to  
the   constraints   of   the   fundamental   rights   chapter   –   many   of   whose   provisions  
are  in  any  case  limited  to  those  who  are  already  citizens  –  Parliament  was  free  to  
decide   to   whom   –   and   on   what   bases   –   to   accord   citizenship.   This   could   even  
include   religious   bases   (as   the   Constitution’s   non-­‐discrimination   provisions   are  
limited  to  citizens7),  as  long  as  there  was  a  rational  reason  for  Parliament  to  do  
so.   The   “Article   11   defence”   goes   on   to   argue,   then,   that   the   discrimination   of  
religious  minorities  in  these  three  neighbouring  countries  provides  the  rational  
basis  for  Parliament  to  pick  them  out  for  special  treatment.    
 
         It  is  this  second  version  of  the  “Article  11  defence”  that  I  shall  engage  with  in  
this  essay.  My  task  here  is  not,  of  course,  to  examine  the  constitutionality  of  the  
CAA.  Nonetheless,  the  manner  in  which  Article  11  has  been  deployed  to  defend  
the   CAA   provides   an   ideal   starting   point,   I   suggest,   from   which   to   begin   an  
answer  to  that  fundamental  question:  what,  if  anything,  does  the  Constitution  say  
about  citizenship?    
 
         My   answer   –   that   I   shall   elaborate   over   the   course   of   this   essay   –   will   be   as  
follows:   through   its   specific   provisions   in   Part   II,   the   Constitution   articulates   a  
vision  of  Indian  citizenship  that  is  interwoven  with  Indian  constitutional  identity  
as   a   whole:   secular,   egalitarian,   and   non-­‐discriminatory.  Drawing  upon  universal  
humanist   principles   –   and   in   specific   and   conscious   contrast   to   the   State   of  
Pakistan  –  the  Constituent  Assembly  crafted  an  idea  of  citizenship  that  rejected  
markers   of   identity,   whether   ethnic   or   religious.   A   careful   reading   of   the  
Constituent   Assembly   Debates   reveals,   therefore,   that   while   Parliament   was   free  
to   legislate   on   citizenship,   it   was   to   be   bound   –   always   –   by   the   defining   features  
of  the  Indian  polity.  Parliament  could  not  –  and  was  not  intended  to  –  ever  create  
conditions   for   entry   into   the   polity   (through   citizenship   laws)   that   were  
fundamentally   at   odds   with   its   secular   and   civic-­‐nationalist   identity.   This   was  
meant   to   act   as   an   “implied   limitation”   (a   concept   familiar   to   students   of  
constitutional   law)   upon   Parliament’s   powers   under   Article   11.   Under   this  
Constitution,  therefore,  religion  cannot  become  a  basis  for  citizenship.    
 
       Method:  Reading  the  Constituent  Assembly  Debates  
       The  complexity  of  the  Constituent  Assembly  Debates  requires  a  brief  excursion  
into   method.8   The   drafting   of   the   Indian   Constitution   was   a   long   process   that  
lasted   over   three   years.   The   process   was   marked   by   a   dialogue   between   the  
larger  Constituent  Assembly,  and  the  smaller  Drafting  Committees  that  were  in  
charge  of  separate  parts  of  the  document.  Through  three  distinct  phases,  drafts  

                                                                                                               
7  See,  e.g.,  Article  15,  Constitution  of  India.    
8  See  Gautam  Bhatia,  “How  to  Read  the  Constituent  Assembly  Debates  –  I”,  Indian  Constitutional  

Law   and   Philosophy,   (June   27,   2018),   available   at  

https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2018/06/27/how-to-read-the-constituent-assembly-debates-i/, and
accompanying posts.
prepared   in   the   Committee   came   before   the   Constituent   Assembly,   were  
debated,  amended,  ratified  or  rejected,  and  sometimes  sent  back  for  fine-­‐tuning.9  
 
       In   this   essay,   I   will   examine   the   debates   chronologically,   looking   at   how   the  
Constituent  Assembly  considered  the  question  of  citizenship  during  each  of  the  
three  readings  of  the  Draft  Constitution.  This,  I  suggest,  provides  an  insight  into  
how  the  Assembly’s  thinking  evolved  on  the  issue  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  
of   the   process,   finally   culminating   in   the   constitutional   text   that   was   ratified   in  
January   1950.   And   it   is   such   a   reading,   I   will   contend,   that   shows   us   how  
questions   of   citizenship   were   gradually   woven   into   the   broader   question   of  
constitutional  identity,  in  the  deliberations  of  the  Assembly.    
 
       Phase  One:  Universal  Citizenship  –  an  Idea  Crystallises    
 
It   is   for   you   to   consider   whether   our   conception   of   citizenship   should   be  
universal,  or  should  be  racial  or  should  be  sectarian.  
-­‐ Alladi  Krishnaswamy  Ayyar,  
Constituent   Assembly  
Debates,  29  April  1947  
 
     On  29th  April  1947,  the  Constituent  Assembly  met  to  consider,  for  the  first  time,  
the   various   constitutional   drafts   that   had   been   prepared   by   the   several   sub-­‐
committees.   On   the   anvil   was   the   Interim   Report   on   Fundamental   Rights,  
prepared  under  the  chairmanship  of  Sardar  Vallabhai  Patel.  Clause  3  of  the  of  the  
Draft  was  titled,  simply,  “Citizenship.”  Its  text  was  as  simple:  
 
Every  person  born  in  the  Union  or  naturalised  in  the  Union  according  to  
its   laws   and   subject   to   the   jurisdiction   thereof   shall   be   a   citizen   of   the  
Union.  
Further  provision  governing  Union  citizenship  may  be  made  by  the  laws  
of  the  Union.10  
 
       The   austere   –   almost   Delphic   –   character   of   the   initial   citizenship   provision  
prompted   intense   debate   in   the   Assembly.   The   first   objection   was   raised   by   B.  
Das,   who   drew   a   distinction   between   the   concepts   of   citizenship   and  
nationality.11  Das  wanted  an  additional  provision  that  would  allow  people  born  
in   the   territory   of   India   to   “declare   for   the   nationality”   open   to   them   “through  
descent.”12   Thus,   the   battle-­‐lines   were   drawn:   “citizenship”,   that   was   delinked  
from   an   individual’s   identity,   and   “nationality”,   that   –   through   the   initially  
innocuous  framing  of  “descent”  –  did  indeed  take  identity  into  account.    
 

                                                                                                               
9  
For   a   complete   account,   readers   are   advised   to   consult   the   six-­‐volume   B.   Shiva   Rao,   The  
Framing  of  India’s  Constitution  (Universal  Law  Publishing  2015).    
10    Clause  3,  Interim  Report  on  Fundamental  Rights,  as  introduced  in  the  Constituent  Assembly  on  

29th  April,  1947.  See  Parliament  of  India,  Constituent  Assembly  Debates,  Vol.  III  (29th  April,  1947)  
(speech  of  Sardar  Vallabhbhai  Patel)  (Emphasis  Supplied).    
11  Parliament  of  India,  Constituent  Assembly  Debates,  Vol.  III  (29th  April,  1947)  (speech  of  B.  Das).  
12  Ibid.    
        The   stakes   of   the   debate   were   immediately   clear   to   the   members   of   the  
Constituent   Assembly.   Alladi   Krishnaswamy   Ayyar   –   one   of   the   foremost  
members  of  the  Assembly  –  rose  to  defend  the  Clause,  noting  that:  
 
There  are  two   ideas   of   citizenship.   In   the   Continental   countries  
citizenship   is   based   upon   race:   it   has   nothing   to   do   with   the   birth   of   a  
person  in  any  particular  place.  In  the  Anglo-­‐American  system  if  a  person  
is  born  in  a  particular  place,  he  gets  his  citizenship.  If  you  want  to  adopt  a  
different  system  you  may.13  
 
         The   purpose   of   the   first   part   of   the   first   sentence   of   the   citizenship   clause,  
Ayyar   noted,   was   to   commit   India   to   the   second   principle.   The   purpose   of   the  
second   part,   and   of   the   second   sub-­‐clause,   was   to   deal   with   the   inevitable  
complications  that  would  arise  in  the  implementation  of  the  principle:  children  
born   to   nationals   who   went   abroad,   to   diplomats,   and   so   on.   A   constitutional  
charter  could  not  provide  for  these  details  –  parliamentary  legislation  would.    
 
       Members  of  the  Constituent  Assembly  were  not  satisfied  with  Ayyar’s  answer.  
In   the   course   of   the   debate,   numerous   hypothetical   examples   were   put   to   him  
about   foreigners   giving   birth   while   transiting   through   the   country,   children   of  
temporary  residents,  statelessness,  dual  citizenship,  and  so  on.  In  responding  to  
these   questions,   Ayyar   reiterated   that   while   the   details   would   be   worked   out  
through  statute  law,  the  Constitution  was  committed  to  the  overarching  principle  
of  “universal  citizenship”,  a  principle  that  was  embedded  in  India’s  anti-­‐colonial  
history:  
 
In  dealing  with  citizenship  we  have  to  remember  we  are  fighting  against  
discrimination  and  all  that  against  South  Africa  and  other  States.  It  is  for  
you   to   consider   whether   our   conception   of   citizenship   should   be  
universal,  or  should  be  racial  or  should  be  sectarian.14  
 
       Among   the   Assembly,   there   was   a   broad   consensus   that   supported   Ayyar’s  
interpretation   of   the   citizenship   clause:   namely,   that   it   set   out   a   principle   of  
universal  citizenship,  and  left  implementational  details  to  be  worked  out  through  
legislation.   Ananthasayanam   Ayyangar,   for   instance,   cautioned   against   “making  
any  distinction  between  foreigners  in  the  matter  of  citizenship.”15  And  the  point  
was  reiterated  by  Sardar  Patel  himself,  who  made  it  clear  that:  
 
There  are  two  ideas  about  nationality  in  the  modern  world,  one  is  broad-­‐
based  nationally  and  the  other  is  narrow  nationality.  Now,  in  South  Africa  
we   claim   for   Indians   born   there   South   African   nationality.   It   is   not   right  
for   us   to   take   a   narrow   view...   It   is   a   curious   idea   that   ...   you   [want   to]  
introduce  racial  phraseology  in  our  Constitution...  our  general  preface  or  
the  general  right  of  citizenship  under  these  fundamental  rights  should  be  
                                                                                                               
13   Parliament   of   India,   Constituent   Assembly   Debates,   Vol.   III   (29th   April,   1947)   (speech   of   Alladi  

Krishnaswamy  Ayyar).    
14  Ibid.    
15  
Parliament   of   India,   Constituent   Assembly   Debates,   Vol.   III   (29th   April,   1947)   (speech   of  
Ananthasayanam  Ayyangar).    
 so   broad-­‐based   that  any   one  who   reads   our   laws   cannot   take   any   other  
view  than  that  we  have  taken  an  enlightened  modern  civilised  view.16  
 
       In  similar  terms,  K.M.  Munshi  observed:  
 
After  all  we  are  not  making  a  law  of  nationality.  We  are  only  enacting  two  
indispensable   conditions,   namely,   persons   born   in   India  
and  naturalised  according   to   the   law   of   the   Union   shall   be   citizens.   The  
world   is   divided   between   the   ideas   of   racial   citizenship   and   democratic  
citizenship,  and  therefore,  the  words  'born  in  India'  become  necessary  to  
indicate  that  we  align  ourselves  with  the  democratic  principle.17  
 
       As   the   debate   over   the   details   continued,   however,   the   Constituent   Assembly  
was   unable   to   arrive   at   a   satisfactory   wording,   and   decided   to   postpone  
consideration   of   the   clause.   It   is   worth   noting,   however,   that   at   this   time,  
Partition   had   not   yet   happened,   and   the   mass   migration   that   would   later   force  
the   Constituent   Assembly’s   hand   was   still   an   eventuality   that   people   hoped   to  
avoid.   Shorn   of   the   Partition-­‐specific   provisions,   then,   the   initial   citizenship  
clause   reads   a   lot   like   what   we   find   in   the   final   constitutional   text:   an   initial  
provision   that   guarantees   citizenship   by   birth,   and   then   an   umbrella   provision  
that   allows   for   the   modalities   of   citizenship   to   be   worked   out   through   a   law.   A  
close  reading  of  the  first  phase  of  the  debates  –  as  indicated  above  –  gives  us  an  
insight  into  what  the  Consituent  Assembly  was  intended  to  achieve  through  this  
combination:   a   restatement   of   universal   citizenship   as   a   principle,   with   the  
acknowledgment   that   details   of   implementation   would   have   to   be   left   to  
legislation.    
       
       Phase  Two:  Partition  –  an  Idea  Challenged    
       The  Drafting  Committee  worked  through  the  fag  end  of  1947,  and  then  1948,  
to   prepare   a   draft   Constitution.18   But   when   the   Constituent   Assembly   met   to  
consider  it,  the  world  had  changed.  India  was  independent,  and  partitioned.  The  
creation  of  Pakistan  had  taken  place  on  explicitly  communal  lines.  The  violence  
of  Partition  remained  fresh  in  memory.  It  was  inevitable  that  when  the  Assembly  
considered   the   Draft   Constitution   in   the   months   of   November   and   December  
1948   –   and   then   again   in   August   and   September   1949   –   the   Partition   would   cast  
a   long   shadow   over   its   deliberations  –   and   especially   its   deliberations   on   what   it  
meant  to  be  an  Indian.    
 
       The  first  illustration  of  this  occurred  in  the  text  of  the  citizenship  clause  itself.  
The  simplicity  of  the  original  clause  now  needed  to  be  complemented  by  a  host  
of   detailed   provisions   dealing   with   Partition   –   the   very   kind   of   detail   that   the  
members  of  the  Constituent  Assembly  had  been  averse  to  go  into  the  first  time  
around.   Faced   with   a   host   of   amendments   and   additions,   the   Chairman   of   the  
Drafting  Committee,  Dr.  B.R.  Ambedkar,  collated  them  and  came  up  with  a  fresh  
                                                                                                               
16  Parliament  of  India,  Constituent  Assembly  Debates,  Vol.  III  (29th  April,  1947)  (speech  of  Sardar  

Vallabhbhai  Patel).    
17   Parliament   of   India,   Constituent   Assembly   Debates,   Vol.   III   (29th   April,   1947)   (speech   of   K.M.  

Munshi).    
18    
draft  of  the  citizenship  clause,  which  he  submitted  to  the  Constituent  Assembly  
in  the  autumn  of  1949  (noting  wryly  that  it  was  one  of  the  two  clauses  that  had  
given  the  Committee  “maximum  headache”).  The  fresh  clause  now  provided  for  
citizenship   to   those   were   born   in   the   territory   of   India   (in   line   with   the   previous  
draft),  whose  parents  were  born  in  India,  or  who  had  been  resident  in  India  for  
five   years   before   the   commencement   of   the   Constitution;   then   it   came   to  
Partition:   based   on   when   an   individual   had   migrated   from   Pakistan   into   India  
(before   or   after   19th   July   1948),   they   were   either   unconditionally   Indian   citizens,  
or  had  to  apply  to  register  to  be  Indian  citizens;  and  then  there  were  provisions  
for  citizens  who  had  migrated  back  to  India  after  initially  migrating  to  Pakistan,  
subject  to  a  license  system.19  
 
       Ambedkar  acknowledged  that  this  bewildering  profusion  of  provisions  (5,  5A,  
5AA,   5B,   5C)   were   designed   to   solve   the   immediate   and   specific   problems  
presented  by  Partition,  and  were  essentially  “ad-­‐hoc”.  These,  he  went  on  to  state,  
were   not   meant   to   be   “permanent.”   “The   business   of   laying   down   a   permanent  
law  of  citizenship,”  he  observed,  “has  been  left  to  Parliament  ...  [and]  Parliament  
may  make  altogether  a  new  law  embodying  new  principles.”20  
 
       Was  Ambedkar  here  providing  a  carte  blanche  to  future  Parliaments  in  laying  
down  principles  of  citizenship?  His  words  were  certainly  broad  in  character,  and  
the  “Article  11  defence”  rests  upon  attributing  to  him  an  unqualified  acceptance  
of   this   proposition.   As   I   shall   show,   however,   a   closer   reading   of   the   debates  
demonstrates  that  this  would  be  too  quick  –  and  too  easy  –  an  interpretation.    
 
         Because,  as  the  more  than  ten-­‐hour  long  debate  on  the  citizenship  provisions  
went   on   to   show,   there   was   a   complex   factual   and   principled   matrix   that  
underlay   Ambedkar’s   sparse   language,   much   of   which   would   be   strongly  
challenged  in  the  Assembly.  The  first  set  of  challenges  arrived  long  before  even  
Ambedkar   presented   his   fresh   draft:   on   the   8th   of   November   1948,   during   the  
second  reading  of  the  Draft  Constitution,  Gurmukh  Singh  Musafir  was  the  first  to  
ask  for  a  religious  test  for  citizenship,  in  view  of  the  Partition:    
 
...  in  this  Article  no  distinction  has  been  made  between  a  foreigner  and  the  
Hindus  and  the  Sikhs  coming  from  Pakistan.  Those  that  are  still  perforce  
in   Pakistan   will   have   no   right   of   acquiring   citizenship   after   this  
Constitution   has   been   framed.   I   think   this   Article   should   be   so   amended  
that   they   might   be   regarded   as   the   citizens   of   this   land,   whenever   they  
come  here.21  
 
       Musafir   was   the   first   to   voice   the   argument   that   individuals   belonging   to  
specific   religions   had   a   claim   of   priority   on   Indian   citizenship,   rooted   in   the  

                                                                                                               
19   See   Draft   Article   5,   as   introduced   into   the   Constituent   Assembly   on   10th   August,   1949.  
Parliament   of   India,   Constituent   Assembly   Debates,   Vol.   IX   (August   10,   1949)   (speech   of   Dr.   B.R.  
Ambedkar).    
20  Ibid.    
21   Parliament   of   India,   Constituent   Assembly   Debates,   Vol.   VII   (November   8,   1948)   (speech   of  

Gurmukh  Singh  Musafir).    

 
historical  circumstances  of  the  Partition.  His  argument  was  taken  up  on  a  more  
formal  basis  once  Ambedkar  had  finalized  his  citizenship  provisions  (see  above),  
during   the   1949   debates.   P.S.   Deshmukh   proposed   an   amendment   to   the  
Citizenship  Act,  adding  the  following  language:  
 
...   every   person   who   is   a   Hindu   or   a   Sikh   by   religion   and   is   not   a   citizen   of  
any  other  State,  wherever  he  resides  ...  shall  be  entitled  to  be  a  citizen  of  
India.22  
 
       Deshmukh,  thus,  went  far  beyond  Musafir’s  original  formulation,  that  had  been  
limited   to   Pakistan.   His   was   a   more   radical   conception,   but   one   that   was  
thoroughly   grounded   in   a   racial   vision   of   what   it   meant   to   be   Indian.   In  
categorical   terms,   Deshmukh   placed   himself   in   opposition   to   the   idea   of  
“secularity”,   asking   rhetorically   whether   the   Assembly   was   prepared   to   wipe   out  
“our   own   people”23   (i.e.,   Hindus   and   Sikhs)   in   the   name   of   “secularity.”  
Deshmukh  then  brought  the  discussion  back  to  Pakistan:    
 
We   have   seen   the   formation   and   establishment   of   Pakistan.   Why   was   it  
established?   It   was   established   because   the   Muslims   claimed   that   they  
must  have  a  home  of  their  own  and  a  country  of  their  own.  Here  we  are  an  
entire   nation   with   a   history   of  thousands   of   years   and   we   are   going   to  
discard  it,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  neither  the  Hindu  nor  the  Sikh  has  any  
other   place   in   the   wide   world   to   go   to.   By   the   mere   fact   that   he   is   a   Hindu  
or   a   Sikh,   he   should   get   Indian   citizenship   because   it   is   this   one  
circumstance   that   makes   him   disliked   by   others   ...   If   the   Muslims   want   an  
exclusive   place   for   themselves   called   Pakistan,   why   should   not   Hindus  
and  Sikhs  have  India  as  their  home.24  
 
       There   was,   therefore,   no   ambiguity   in   Deshmukh’s   stance.   Just   like   Pakistan  
had  been  established  as  the  homeland  of  the  Muslims,  India  –  in  its  mirror  image  
–  was  to  be  the  homeland  of  the  Hindus  and  the  Sikhs.    
 
       How  did  the  Assembly  respond  to  Deshmukh’s  suggestion?  There  were  some  
who   voiced   support.   Shibban   Lal   Saksena,   for   example,   took   the   view   that   “the  
Hindus  and  Sikhs  have  no  other  home  than  India”25,  and  that  therefore,  priority  
had   to   be   accorded   to   them   in   so   many   terms.   Bhopinder   Singh   Man   panned  
Ambedkar’s   text  –   and   especially  the  July  1948  cut-­‐off  date  as  exhibiting  a  “weak  
secularism”   and   “unfair   partiality   to   those   who   least   deserve   it.”26   He   too   argued  
for  a  permanent  right  of  citizenship  for  Hindus  or  Sikhs,  albeit  for  those  coming  
over  from  Pakistan.27  
 
                                                                                                               
22   Parliament   of   India,   Constituent   Assembly   Debates,   Vol.   IX   (August   11,   1949)   (speech   of   P.S.  

Deshmukh).  
23  Ibid.  
24  Ibid.    
25  Parliament  of  India,   Constituent  Assembly  Debates,  Vol.  IX  (August  11,  1949)  (speech  of  Shibban  

Lal  Saksena).  
26   Parliament   of   India,   Constituent   Assembly   Debates,   Vol.   IX   (August   12,   1949)   (speech   of  
Bhopinder  Singh  Man).  
27  Ibid.    
        But  the  argument  was,  however,  resisted  equally  strongly.  R.K.  Sidhva  cited  the  
example   of   the   Parsis,   and   asked   why   specific   communities   needed   to   be  
mentioned   at   all.28   Other   members   of   the   Assembly   criticized   the   “invidious  
distinction”29  between  communities  that  this  proposal  underlined;  and  no  less  a  
figure   than   Nehru   himself   rose   to   outrightly   reject   writing   discrimination  
formally  into  the  citizenship  law:  “You  cannot  have  rules  for  Hindus,  for  Muslims  
or  for  Christians  only.  It  is  absurd  on  the  face  of  it.”30  Nehru  went  on  to  note   that  
in   framing   citizenship   in   secular   terms,   India   had   only   “done   something   which  
every  country  does  except  a  very  few  misguided  and  backward  countries  in  the  
world.”31   The   position   was   summed   by   –   once   again   –   by   Alladi   Krishnaswmi  
Ayyar,   who   –   we   may   recall   –   had   first   drawn   the   distinction   between   the  
“narrow”  and  the  “broad”  conceptions  of  citizenship,  and  committed  the  Indian  
Constitution  to  a  “universal”  vision.  Ayyar  noted:    
 
We   are   plighted   to   the   principles   of   a   secular   State.   We   may   make   a  
distinction   between   people   who   have   voluntarily   and   deliberately   chosen  
another   country   as   their   home   and   those   who   want   to   retain   their  
connection   with   this   country.   But   we   cannot   on   any   racial   or   religious   or  
other  grounds  make  a  distinction  between  one  kind  of  persons  and  another,  
or   one   sect   of   persons   and   another   sect   of   persons,   having   regard   to   our  
commitments  and  the  formulation  of  our  policy  on  various  occasions.32  
 
       It  is  in  the  words  of  Ayyar,  then,  that  we  see  the  clear  and  unambiguous  link  
between  the  secular  character  of  the  Indian  polity,  and  the  rejection  of  racial  or  
religious  criteria  as  grounds  for  citizenship.  And  ultimately,  it  was  this  position  
that   carried   the   day:   Deshmukh’s   amendment   was   defeated,   and   Ambedkar’s  
draft  clauses  –  that  remained  scrupulously  religion-­‐neutral  –  were  adopted.    
 
       There   was   also,   however,   another   debate   that   was   proceeding   side-­‐by-­‐side.  
Members   of   the   Constituent   Assembly   took   strong   exception   to   granting  
citizenship   to   those   who   had   re-­migrated   back   from   Pakistan,   after   having  
migrated   there   in   the   first   place.   Lurking   underneath   that   objection   was   the  
lingering   bitterness   from   the   wounds   of   partition,   and   a   fear   –   rarely   voiced  
explicitly,   but   present   nonetheless   –   of   Fifth   Columnists.   Pandit   Thakur   Das  
Bhargava,  therefore,  wanted  to  preface  this  clause  by  the  phrase  “on  account  of  
civil   disturbances”,   on   the   basis   that   a   “man   should   not   come   here   and   become   a  
citizen   just   to   bloster   up   a   Muslim   majority   in   one   of   the   provinces   of   India.  
Therefore   the   first   condition   of   migration   would   be   that   he   comes   here   on  
account   of   disturbances.”33   This   argument   was   repeated   multiple   times,   and   by  
                                                                                                               
28   Parliament   of   India,   Constituent   Assembly   Debates,   Vol.   IX   (August   12,   1949)   (speech   of   R.K.  

Sidhva).  
29   Parliament   of   India,   Constituent   Assembly   Debates,   Vol.   IX   (August   12,   1949)   (speech   of  
Mahboob  Ali  Baig).  
30  Parliament  of  India,  Constituent  Assembly  Debates,  Vol.  IX  (August  12,  1949)  (speech  of  Jawahar  

Lal  Nehru).  
31  Ibid.    
32  Parliament  of  India,  Constituent  Assembly  Debates,  Vol.  IX  (August  12,  1949)  (speech  of  Alladi  

Krishnaswamy  Ayyar).  
33   Parliament   of   India,  Constituent   Assembly   Debates,   Vol.   IX   (August   11,   1949)   (speech   of   Thakur  

Das  Bhargava).  
multiple   members   of   the   Assembly.   Ultimately,   however,   these   objections   were  
defeated,   and   the   19th   July   cut-­‐off   date,   as   well   as   the   permit   qualification   for  
those  who  came  after  it,  was  retained.  Specific  attempts  –  such  as  that  by  Thakur  
Das   Bhargava   to   narrow   the   clause   to   “on   account   of   civil   disturbances”   –   with  
the   assumption   that   Muslims   would   not   flee   Pakistan   for   that   reason   –   were  
rejected.   What   is   important   to   note   however   –   as   Abhinav   Chandrachud   points  
out   –   is   that   the   permit   system   did   hve   the   indirect   effect   of   disadvantaging  
Muslim  migrants34;  Nehru  himself  pointed  out  that  the  “first  wave”  of  migrants  
(pre-­‐July  1948)  had  been  Hindus  and  Sikhs.35  While  this  was  used  to  assuage  the  
concerns  of  the  objectors,  the  language  of  the  draft  clause,  nonetheless,  remained  
neutral.    
 
       The  August  1949  debates  reveal  something  of  crucial  importance.  Even  as  the  
Drafting  Committee  worked  to  prepre  an  “ad-­‐hoc”  set  of  provisions  dealing   with  
the  bloody  fall-­‐out  of  Partition,  it  –  and  the  Constituent  Assembly  –  held  fast  to  
the  broader,  “universal”  notion  of  citizenship  with  which  they  had  first  set  forth  
in   April   1947.   The   specificity   of   the   Partition   –   including   the   mass   religious  
violence   meted   out   to   Hindus   and   Sikhs   in   what   would   become   Pakistan   –  
presented   a   tempting   set   of   reasons   to   the   Assembly   to   frame   these   “ad-­‐hoc”  
provisions   in   a   manner   that   would   have   responded   in   an   equivalent   fashion,  
namely  –  as  Deshmukh’s  amendment  sought  to  do  –  by  placing  religion  as  a  basis  
of  priority  claims  to  citizenship.  Yet  despite  that  –  and  despite  concessions  to  that  
in   the   form   of   the   post-­‐July   1948   Permit   regime   –   the   Committee   and   the  
Assembly  deliberately  drafted  and  adopted  provisions  that  remained  consistent  
with  what  K.  Santhanam  had  described  on  the  6th  of  November,  1948,  as  one  of  
the   founding   principles   of   the   Constitution:   “a   single,   equal   and   secular  
citizenship.”36  
 
       Phase  Three:  Finalising  the  Constitution  –  The  Warp  and  the  Weft  
 
       “Citizenship  constitutes  the  rock  foundation  of  our  Constitution.”    
-­‐ Ajit  Prasad  Jain,    
Constituent  Assembly  Debates,    
         
 
       In   November   1949,   the   Constituent   Assembly   met   for   the   third   and   final  
reading  of  the  draft  Constitution.  The  third  reading  was  different  from  the  first  
two:  the  debates  over  the  great  constitutional  questions  had  been  resolved  –  to  
the   satisfaction   of   some   and   the   dissatisfaction   of   others,   but   resolved  
nonetheless.37  The  third  reading,  therefore,  did  not  see  the  fractious  disputations  
and  the  lengthy  wrangles  that  had  occupied  the  Assembly  for  almost  two  years.    
                                                                                                               
34  Abhinav  Chandrachud,  “Secularism  and  the  Citizenship  Amendment  Act”,  (forthcoming,  Indian  

Law  Review),  available  at  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3513828.

35  Parliament  of  India,  Constituent  Assembly  Debates,  Vol.  IX  (August  12,  1949)  (speech  of  Jawahar  

Lal  Nehru).  
36   Parliament   of   India,   Constituent   Assembly   Debates,   Vol.   VII   (November   6,   1949)   (speech   of   K.  

Santhanam).  
37   Algu   Raj   Shastri,   for   example,   specifically   complained   about   the   denial   of   automatic   citizenship  

to   Hindus   and   Sikhs   during   the   Third   Reading.   See   Parliament   of   India,   Constituent   Assembly  
Debates,  Vol.  XI  (November  21,  1949)  (speech  of  Algu  Raj  Shastri).  
  
       The  third  reading,  however,  is  important  for  another  reason.  It  was  here  that  
the   members   of   the   Constituent   Assembly   rose,   looked   back   on   the   work   that  
they  had  done,  and  offered  a  synthesis  of  the  core  principles  of  the  Constitution,  
and   the   vision   that   it   set   out   for   Indian   society.   And   it   is   through   a   reading   of  
those   speeches,   I   suggest,   that   we   can   glean   a   fundamental   insight:   the  
citizenship  provisions  were  never  intended  to  be  read  in  isolation.  Rather,  they  
formed  one  strand  in  a  web  of  harmonious  and  mutually  reinforcing  principles,  
which,   woven   together,   made   up   the   Constitution.   And   this,   I   suggest,   is   the  
fundamental   flaw   of   the   “Article   11   defence”:   it   attempts   to   read   the   text   of  
Article   11   in   glorious   isolation,   ignoring   the   fact   that   citizenship   –   like   the  
fundamental   rights,   the   directive   principles,   the   federal   structure,   and   the   rest   of  
the   Constitution   –   were   part   of   a   coherent   web   of   principle,   not   single   strands  
floating  in  the  air.      
 
         This  vision  of  the  Constitution  as  a  seamless  whole  comes  through  many  of  the  
speeches  delivered  at  the  Third  Reading.  For  our  purposes  here,  we  need  extract  
only  a  sampling  of  the  most  relevant.  As  Ajit  Prasad  Jain  noted:    
 
In   Part   II,   which   defines   citizenship,   all   persons   born   in   India   or   who  
are  bona  fide  residents  of  India  or  who  have  migrated  from  Pakistan  and  
made   India   their   home   have   been   given   equal   recognition   as   citizens  
without   distinction   of   religion,   race,   caste   or   class.   Citizenship   constitutes  
the  rock  foundation  of  our  Constitution.  All  the  rights  in  the  Constitution  
are   equally   guaranteed   to   all   citizens.   Every   citizen   of   India   shall   have   the  
right   to   freedom   of   speech   and   expression   to   assemble   peacefully   and  
without  arms  to  form  associations  and  unions,  to  move,  settle  and  acquire  
property   in   any   part   of   India   and   to   practise   any   profession   or   trade   or  
business.38  
 
       In  similar  terms,  Kamaleshwari  Prasad  Yadav  observed:    
 
Our   Constitution   contains   many   noteworthy   features.   It   lays   down   that  
India  shall  be  a  Union  of  States  and  that  there  will  be  one  official  language  
for  the  whole  of  the  Union;  it  provides  for  the  abolition  of  untouchability  –  
a   great   sin   –   that   has   been   tarnishing   the   name   of   our   country.   We   are  
proud   to   have   embodied   such   provisions   in   our   constitution.   The  
provision  regarding  adult  franchise  surpasses  those  of  Australia,  Canada  
and   other   countries.   The   same   thing   applies   in   case   of   the   provisions  
regarding   citizenship.   Under   the   able   leadership   of   Pandit   Jawaharlal  
Nehru,  we  have  made  our  Sate  a  secular  one  and  have  thereby  maintained  
a   very   high   ideal.   There   was   a   time,   Sir,   when   the   whole   of   Asia   was  
looking  to  Japan  but  today  the  eyes  of  the  whole  of  Asia  are  fixed  towards  
India.   They   are   watching   if   we   are   making   any   discrimination   or   not   in  
our   treatment   to   the   citizens   on   the   ground   of   religion,   caste,   language  

                                                                                                               
38  Parliament  of  India,  Constituent  Assembly  Debates,  Vol.  XI  (November  21,  1949)  (speech  of  Ajit  

Prasad  Jain).  
 and  race;  they  are  keenly  watching  the  progress  we  are  making  towards  
achieving  our  ideals.39  
 
       I  extract  these  speeches  out  of  a  profusion  of  similar  ones,  because  they  make  
the   two   points   pellucidly   clear:   first   –   as   pointed   out   above   –   the   citizenship  
provisions   were   consciously   non-­‐discriminatory   in   character,   because   they   –  
along  with  other  core  constitutional  principles  such  as  secularism  –  were  meant  
to   present   a   coherent   and   morally   consistent   political   vision.   And   secondly,  
unlike   a   lot   of   present-­‐day   discourse,   and   –   indeed   –   the   Supreme   Court’s  
observations   on   occasion   –   the   Constituent   Assembly   did   not   consider  
citizenship  to  be  an  ancillary  privilege  that  was  of  no  great  consequence  from  a  
constitutional   perspective:   a   few   years   before   Hannah   Arendt’s   famous  
formulation   of   citizenship   being   the   “right   to   have   rights”,   Ajit   Prasad   Jain   hit  
upon   the   same   idea   when   he   called   citizenship   the   “rock   foundation”   of   the  
Constitution.   It   was   precisely   because   so   much   rested   on   citizenship   –   rights   to  
free   speech,   assembly,   trade,   movement,   and   so   on   –   that   the   criteria   for  
citizenship   couldn’t   be   whimsical,   arbitrary,   or   discriminatory,   but   instead,  
consistent   with   the   normative   vision   that   underpinned   the   rest   of   the  
Constitution.    
 
         Conclusion  
         In  1947,  when  it  began  its  great  project  of  framing  the  Indian  Constitution,  the  
Constituent  Assembly  was  faced  with  a  stark  choice:  an  inclusive  and  universal  
vision   of   Indian   citizenship,   or   a   narrow   vision   that   privileged   ascriptive  
identities   in   prioritizing   claims   to   Indianness.   Even   before   Independence,   the  
Constituent  Assembly  was  clear  in  its  choice:  it  chose  the  former.  
 
       Independence,  the  violence  and  bitterness  of  partition,  and  the  establishment  
of   Pakistan   as   a   State   based   on   religion,   put   that   commitment   to   severe   test.   The  
mass   migration   that   followed   Partition   forced   the   Constituent   Assembly   to  
scramble   to   accommodate   the   refugees   who   came   from   across   the   newly-­‐born  
borders,   many   of   them   fleeing   religious   violence.   There   were   some   in   the  
Assembly   who   suggested   that   the   only   way   to   meet   this   moment   was   –   like  
Pakistan  –  to  model  Indianness  on  religious  lines,  and  to  treat  India  as  a  default  
homeland   for   some   identities   –   but   not   others.   The   stakes   were   clear,   and   the  
Constituent   Assembly   turned   down   that   proposal.   Even   as   it   drafted,   worked,  
and   reworked   provisions   to   deal   with   the   largest   human   exodus   in   history,   it   did  
not  let  go  of  the  constitutional  commitment  to  universal  citizenship,  and  to  civic  
rather  than  religious  or  ethnic  nationalism.    
 
         Through  debate  and  dissension,  the  Assembly  finally  came  around  to  endorse  
a  holistic  constitutional  vision,  a  vision  founded  on  principles  of  republicanism,  
secularism,   equality   and   non-­‐discrimination,   and   inclusion.   The   citizenship  
chapter  formed  an  integral  part  of  the  web,  a  thread  in  the  design.  In  this  essay,  I  
have   tried   to   show   that   taking   the   citizenship   clauses   in   isolation,   and   reading  
into   them   a   permission   to   introduce   religious   tests   for   citizenship,   will   mean  

                                                                                                               
39   Parliament   of   India,   Constituent   Assembly   Debates,   Vol.   XI   (November   25,   1949)   (speech   of  

Kamaleshwari  Prasad  Yadav).  

nothing   less   than   an   unraveling   of   that   design.   Or,   to   put   it   in   constitutional  
terms,  the  Constitutional  commitment  to  secularism  and  non-­‐discrimination  acts  
as  an  implied  limitation  on  Parliament’s  powers  to  determine  citizenship  under  
Article   11   of   the   Constitution.   Citizenship   –   as   a   condition   of   entry   into   the  
political   community   –   cannot   be   such   as   to   defeat   the   founding   identity   of   that  
polity,  an  identity  enshrined  in  the  Constitution.    
 
         This   reading,   I   hope,   will   help   to   bring   to   life   the   long-­‐dead   provisions   in  
Chapter  II  of  the  Constitution.  The  relevance  of  Articles  5  to  8  did  not  end  with  
the   end   of   the   refugee   crisis   after   Partition.   Seventy   years   later,   the   rigorously  
universal  and  non-­‐discriminatory  language  of  these  provisions  is  a  reminder  of  
the   path   that   the   Constituent   Assembly   could   have   chosen   to   walk   –   but   didn’t.   It  
is   in   the   rejection   of   sectarian   citizenship,   at   a   moment   when   the   fire   of   religious  
hatred   and   persecution   was   at   its   peak,   that   the   universal   humanism   of   the  
Indian  Constitution’s  citizenship  chapter  truly  shines  through.