Introduction

remained unsolved, and, as a result have constituted part of what might be turned Pakistan’s
‘identity crisis’. This also involves the relative roles of ethnic, linguistic, and allegiances.

The long-term trend for Pakistan society has been to become more religiously
conservative. This is the legacy not so much for the state-sponsored Islamization of the Zia
era as of the reformist activities of such organizations as Tablighi Jamaat, Jammat-i-Islami,
and Tanzim-e-Islami. Conservation should not of course be confused with extremism, which
is limited to small individuals. Support for militancy rests not just on educational
indoctrination, but on a sense of injustice arising from disillusionment with the country’s
judicial system and resentment at the widespread socio-economic in equalities. Adherence to
a ‘secular’ vision for Pakistan is a minority view held only by small numbers of the Western-
educated elite. The circumstances attending the rise of a jihadist mind-set and sub culture, as
we have seen, have dominated much contemporary study of Pakistan. It is important to bear
in mind that there was a long-established tradition of jihadist activity in the future Pakistan
areas of the sub-continent which even predated the colonial era. Furthermore, sectarianism,
which has been identified as a breeding ground for militant recruitment, again has historical
roots which run far deeper than the Zia-ul-Haq era, which is the focus of much contemporary
study. It is also important, however, not to overlook the established pluralist traditions of
Islam embodied in the Sufi influence in the Pakistan areas.