GR No.

L-6442 September 21, 1954

TRADERS INSURANCE AND SURETY CO., Recurring,

vs.
JUAN GOLANGCO AND ANOTHER, appealed.

Messrs. Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing and Salazar on behalf of the appellant.

Messrs. Ramon Diokno and Jose W. Diokno representing the respondent.

PAUL, J .:

This is the collection of a fire insurance policy worth P10,000. The plaintiff was entitled to receive
monthly P1,100 from melitona Estrella for rents of the building No. 34 Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila, for a
period of five years. The plaintiff secured this right, paid the premium and the defendant issued the
corresponding policy. Two months after the building burned down, the plaintiff required Traders
Insurance and Surety Co. to pay the insurance amount. As the defendant refused to pay it, the
plaintiff went to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued a ruling in its favor. The Court of
Appeal confirmed the sentence.

In certiorari , the Traders Insurance and Surety Co. goes to this Court, alleging that the Court of
Appeal made mistakes: 1 ( a ) when issuing a judgment without a complete conclusion of facts of all
the issues raised, as required by the article 33 of Law No. 296, and 1 ( b ) by not making factual
conclusions regarding the application of the oral test rule; and (2) when issuing judgment without
factual conclusions regarding Exhibits 10-H and 10-I.

As for error 1 ( a ). What are the issues that had been properly raised before the Court of
Appeal? The best answer is the first page of the appellant's plea (now recurring) that reads as
follows:

BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRE INSURANCE POLICY
EXHIBIT "A" COVERS ALL APPELLEE'S INTERESTS IN THE PREMISES NO. 34 STA
STATION. CROSS, MANILA, ESPECIALLY HIS RIGHT TO COLLECT RENTALS
THEREFROM.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEE HAD INSURANCE
INTEREST CONSISTING OF A RIGHT TO RECEIVE RENTALS BOTH AT THE TIME
WHEN THE INSURANCE TOOK EFFECT AND WHEN THE LOSS OCCURRED.

In resolving these issues, the Court of Appeal, after transcribing the entire decision of the Court of
First Instance, said the following in its decision:

As stated by the lower court, the basic facts on which both parties base their respective
contentions are not disputed, and we have quoted the decision appealed from in full because
 we find that the facts established in the case cannot lead to other conclusions than those
arrived at by the trial judge. There is no doubt in our mind that both at the time of the
execution of the fire policy (Exhibit A) on April 7, 1949, and on June 5, 1949, when the
destruction by fire of the property for which the said policy was issued took place, plaintiff
Juan Golangco had an insurable interest on the property insured which included the rents of
premises No. 34 Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila, Philippines, District 4, Block No. 47; and it is
particularly so because the policy prepared and issued by the very defendant specifically
states that all insurance covered under said policy, includes the " rent or other subject matter
of insurance in respect of or in connection with any building or any property contained in any
building ". Under the evidence on record We cannot alter in the least the decision
aforequoted which is hereby adopted by this Court.

The findings of fact of the Court of First Instance (not including the list of facts) that were adopted by
the Court of Appeal are the following:

After considering the manner of testifying of these witnesses, the evasiveness of the witness
Limpe, the improbability of his testimony, and the failure defendant to present Antonio
Paredes, the clerk who admittedly investigated the premises in question, the Court finds that
plaintiff's version is more credible; that, before the policy (Exhibit A) was issued, plaintiff
made full and clear exposal of his interests in the premises; and that the said fire policy,
(Exhibit A) covers all of plaintiff's interests in the premises No. 34 Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila,
especially his right to collect rentals therefrom under the decision of this Court in Civil Case
No. 6306 (Exhibit C). This finding is further strengthened by the fact that paragraph 4 of the
said fire policy (Exhibit A), above quoted, includes insurance "on rent"; and accords with rule
that a policy is to be interpreted in favor of the assured.

The argument of the defendant that, under section 49 of the Insurance Law, a policy of
insurance must specify the interest of the insured in the property insured, if he is not the
absolute owner thereof, is not meritorious because it was the defendant, not plaintiff, who
prepared that policy, and it cannot take advantage of its own acts to plaintiff's detriment; and,
in any case, this provision was substantially complied with by plaintiff when he made a full
and clear statement of his interests to defendant's manager.

Having found that the policy covered all of plaintiff's interests in the premises described
therein, including his right to receive rentals, we must next determine whether he had any
insurable interest therein when the policy was issued and when the fire occurred. We find
that he did so have. By virtue of the contract between Tomas B. Lianco and the Archbishop,
Lianco erected the building of which the premises in question form part and became owner
thereof (Exhibit 4-D). I have transferred the ownership of the premises in question to Kaw
Eng Si (Exhibit D), who in turn transferred it to plaintiff Juan Golangco (Exhibit E). Lianco and
the actual occupant of the premises acknowledged plaintiff's right to collect rentals thereon in
a compromise agreement which was incorporated in a judicial judgment (Exhibit C). Both at
the time of the issuance of the policy and at the time of the fire, plaintiff Golangco was in
legal possession of the premises, collecting rentals from its occupant (tr., Nov. 7, 1950, pp.
8, 10). It seems plain that if the premises were destroyed - as they were - by fire, Golangco
would be, as he was, directly damnified accordingly; and hence he had an insurable interest
therein (section 12, Insurance Law).

Defendant's contrary contentions are without merit. The contract between Lianco and the
Archbishop only forbade Lianco from transferring "his rights as LESSEE" (Exhibit. 4-D); but
the contracts Lianco made in favor of Kaw Eng Si (Exhibit D) and plaintiff Golangco (Exhibit
C) did not transfer such rights; and hence no written consent thereto was necessary. At
 worst, the contract would be voidable, but not a void contract, at the option of the
Archbishop; but this would not deprive Golangco of his insurable interest until such option
were exercised; and it does not appear that it was ever exercised.

The ejectment case filed by the Archbishop against Lianco did not remove nor destroy
plaintiff's insurable interests: first , because plaintiff was not a party thereto and cannot be
bound consequently; and second , because the judgment of the Municipal Court, at least as
late as February 14, 1950, had not been executed so far as possession of the premises were
concerned (Exhibit G-10). In fact, not even garnishments were issued against Melitona
Estrella, So Eng Si (her husband) or plaintiff Golangco, the actual and legal possessors of
the premises (Exhibit F); so that, as far as plaintiff Golangco was concerned, his right to the
premises and to the rentals thereon continued to exist on June 5, 1949 when the fire took
place. 1âwphïl.nêt

The findings of fact adopted by the Court of Appeal establish that the plaintiff insured his interest in
the building No. 34 Plaza Sta. Cruz, consisting of the right to collect rents and that said insurable
interest existed at the time of the insurance and when the fire occurred .

The contention of the appellant that the decision of the Court of Appeal does not contain factual
conclusions of the issues properly raised is therefore unfounded.

Error 1 ( b ). The contention of the appellant that the Court of Appeal must have stated in its decision
the factual findings regarding the application of the rule on oral evidence is also unfounded. If the
appellant wanted to provoke the improper admission of the plaintiff's oral testimony, or if he wanted
to request the discarding of said testimony, he must have indicated it in the relation of errors, saying
that the judge erred in admitting the plaintiff's oral testimony, or that the Judge erred by not ruling out
the plaintiff's oral testimony despite the duly submitted petition.

In paragraph 3 of the arguments in support of the first error, under the title of Argument, (page 13 of
the allegation presented in the Court of Appeal), it is when such question was first raised, instead of
raising it in the relationship of errors: it was not raised, then, in its proper place and in a timely
manner. (Rule 48, art. 17). The Court of Appeal is not a diver who has to look in the arguments of
the allegation which are the mistakes made.

Regarding the second error, that is, that the Court of Appeal has not established conclusions of fact
on Exhibits 10-H and 10-I, we believe that it is deprived of merit, for two reasons: 1. why it was not
raised in the relation of errors, and 2.a because in the decision there are such conclusions, although
they are not liked by the respondent. She says in her plea, page 31:

The Court of Appeals adopted the finding of the trial court that "not even garnishment was
issued against Melitona Estrella, So Eng Si (her husband), or plaintiff Golangco". The
decision of the Court of Appeals should therefore contain the following finding of fact:

( a ) That Exhibits "10-H" and "10-I" clearly prove that notice of garnishment was
served on No. 34 Plaza Sta. Cruz (the property in question) and the occupants of No.
34 Plaza Sta. Cruz made return to the said garnishment. 1âwphïl.nêt

Apparently, the appellant wishes that this Court amend the findings of fact of the Court of Appeal on
Exhibits 10-H and 10-I, which we cannot do. We do not review the evidence. Whether or not the
Court of Appeal has erred in these conclusions, it is not in us to straighten them. We must not
interfere in the functions that, by provision of the law, correspond to said court.
The law cited by the appellant reads as follows:

Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues
properly raised before it.

But in Spanish it says like this:

Every decision of the Court of Appeals will contain a complete account of the facts of all the
issues that arise before it.

The translation into Spanish is not accurate. If we stick to the translation into Spanish, the decision
of the Court of Appeal should not contain more than a "complete account of the facts of all issues"
that may have arisen therein. Something would be missing, namely the factual findings of the
court. The "complete relation of the facts" is not equivalent to "the complete relation of the
conclusions of fact". The relation of facts "statement of facts" comes to be the narration of the facts
of the matter so that it is known what it is. The law in English speaks of complete findings of fact or
complete conclusions of fact. The findings of fact are those that the court adopts after studying,
discussing and considering the contradictory evidence presented at trial. As Law No.296 was
discussed and passed in English, we have to adopt the English text and not the poor translation into
Spanish.

Article 33 of said law, when talking about issues that arise properly before the Court of Appeal, does
not mean that it has to resolve all issues that arise in any state of the case or in the course of the
arguments. That is not the appropriate place: it must be raised in the relation of errors. Note that he
uses the words "properly raised" and not raised only. It is not enough to raise the question: it is
necessary to raise it in a timely manner. It is a well established forensic practice that no matter that
has not been properly raised in the relationship of errors will be considered, unless it is a lack of
jurisdiction, which may arise in any state of the matter. (Enriquez et al. Against Enriquez et al., 8 Jur.
Fil., 574; Capellania de Tambobong against Antonio, 8 Jur. Fil., 693; Paterno against Ciudad de
Manila, 17 Jur. Fil., 26; Santiago against Felix, 24 Jur. Fil., 391; Tan Me Nio v. Customs
Administrator, 34 Jur. Fil., 992; Granados y Granados against Bandelaria, 45 Jur. Fil., 530;
Gemora against Municipal Council of Ilog, 58 Jur. Fil., 377; Sanchez v. Land Director, 63 Jur. Fil.,
403; Tan Si Kiok, et al. Vs. Macario Tiacho, 45 Off. Gaz., 2466, 79 Phil., 696; and Villareal vs .. The
People of the Philippines, 47 Off. Gaz., 191, 84 Phil., 264.)

Where an appeal is taken to this court from any court, the appellant shall file with the clerk of
the court below, with his petition for appeal, an assignment of errors, which shall set out
separately and particularly each error asserted. No appeal shall be allowed unless such an
assignment of errors shall accompany the petition. (Rule 9, Revised Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States, 11 US Supreme Court Reports Digest.)

The Supreme Court of the United States will not consider a question not raised below, not
discussed by the lower court, and not included in the assignment of errors. (Pacific States
Box and Basket Co. vs. ST White, et al., 80 L ed., 138.)

We could list a long list of decisions of the Supreme Courts of the states of the American Union that
have regulations similar to ours; but the cases cited are enough.

Error not pointed out in the relation of errors in a civil case is considered an error consented
by the interested party. (Vitug vs. Montemayor, 49 Off. Gaz., 5350.)
We declare that an issue not specified in the error relationship is not properly raised, and the Court
of Appeal is not obligated or resolved.

The petition is denied with costs against the appellant.