Doc27 Motion To Intervene As Defs

Case 3:20-cv-00243-MMD-WGC Document 27 Filed 04/27/20 Page 1 of 14
1 MARC E. ELIAS, ESQ. (D.C. Bar No. 442007) (pro hac vice forthcoming)
HENRY J. BREWSTER, ESQ. (D.C. Bar No. 1033410) (pro hac vice forthcoming)
2 COURTNEY A. ELGART, ESQ. (D.C. Bar No. 1645065) (pro hac vice forthcoming)
PERKINS COIE LLP
3 700 Thirteenth St. NW, Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20005-3960
4 Tel: (202) 654-6200
melias@perkinscoie.com
5 hbrewster@perkinscoie.com
celgart@perkinscoie.com
6
ABHA KHANNA, ESQ. (Wash. Bar No. 42612) (pro hac vice forthcoming)
7 JONATHAN P. HAWLEY, ESQ. (Cal. Bar. No. 319464) (pro hac vice forthcoming)
PERKINS COIE LLP
8 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
Seattle, Washington 98101-3099
9 Tel: (206) 359-8000
akhanna@perkinscoie.com
10 jhawley@perkinscoie.com
11 BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217)

DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078)
12 WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,
SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
13 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
14 Tel: (702) 341-5200
bschrager@wrslawyers.com
15 dbravo@wrslawyers.com
16 Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants

Nevada State Democratic Party, DNC Services
17 Corporation/Democratic National Committee,
DCCC, Priorities USA, and John Solomon
18
19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA
20
21 STANLEY WILLIAM PAHER, TERRESA Case No.: 3:20-cv-00243-MMD-WGC

MONROE-HAMILTON, and GARRY
22 HAMILTON,
MOTION TO INTERVENE AS
23 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANTS
24 vs.
25 BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official
capacity as Nevada Secretary of State, and
26 DEANNA SPIKULA, in her official capacity
as Registrar of Voters for Washoe County,
27
28
1 Defendants,
2 and
3 NEVADA STATE DEMOCRATIC PARTY,

DNC SERVICES
4 CORPORATION/DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL COMMITTEE, DCCC,
5 PRIORITIES USA, and JOHN SOLOMON,
6 Proposed
Intervenor-
7 Defendants.
9 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Nevada

10 State Democratic Party (“NSDP”), DNC Services Corporation/Democratic National Committee
11 (“DNC”), DCCC, Priorities USA, and John Solomon (collectively, “Proposed Intervenors”)
12 move to intervene as defendants in the above-titled action.
13 Plaintiffs Stanley William Paher, Terresa Monroe-Hamilton, and Garry Hamilton

14 challenge the election plans instituted by Defendants Barbara Cegavske, the Nevada Secretary of
15 State (the “Secretary”), and Deanna Spikula, the Registrar of Voters for Washoe County (the
16 “Washoe Registrar”), for the June 9, 2020 Nevada primary election (the “June Primary”).
17 Defendants’ decision to implement a nearly all-mail election for the June Primary is not just
18 reasonable, but constitutionally required to ensure that Nevada voters can safely exercise their
19 franchise in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic. Plaintiffs allege a hodgepodge of claims,
20 none of them viable, all in an attempt to undermine Defendants’ effort to protect Nevada voters
21 during an unprecedented public health crisis. In so doing, they pose a clear and direct threat to
22 Proposed Intervenors’ rights and legal interests.
23 For the reasons set forth below, Proposed Intervenors are entitled to intervene in this case
24 as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2). Such intervention is needed to ensure not only the
25 fairness of the June Primary, but also the substantial and distinct legal interests of Proposed
26 Intervenors, which will otherwise be inadequately represented in the litigation. In the alternative,
27 Proposed Intervenors should be granted permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b). In
28
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1 accordance with Rule 24(c), a proposed Answer is attached as Exhibit 2. Also attached as
2 Exhibit 1 is Proposed Intervenors’ brief in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
3 injunction.1
4 BACKGROUND
5 In response to the unprecedented public health crisis dominating headlines and impacting
6 daily lives across the globe, on March 24, 2020, the Secretary announced plans to “conduct an
7 all-mail election” for the June Primary. Press Release, Nev. Sec’y of State, Secretary Cegavske
8 Announces Plan to Conduct the June 9, 2020 Primary Election by All Mail (Mar. 24, 2010),
9 https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/Home/Components/News/News/2823/23; see also Complaint, ECF
10 No. 1, ¶¶ 13–18. In the weeks that followed, county officials, including the Washoe Registrar,
11 released details of their respective plans implementing the all-mail election. See, e.g., Washoe
12 Cty. Registrar of Voters, Notice of Vote-By-Mail Election of Official Sample Ballot,
13 https://www.washoecounty.us/voters/vote-by-mail/Vote-by-Mail-Notice.pdf (last visited Apr.
14 24, 2020); Clark Cty. Election Dep’t, June 9, 2020, Primary Election Notice of All-Mail Ballot
15 Election (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/election/Documents/2020/Mailer-
16 Notice-20P-EXPANDED.pdf; see also Complaint ¶¶ 19–21.
17 Concerned about various statutory and constitutional infirmities that threaten to restrict
18 access to the franchise in the June Primary and beyond, NSDP, DNC, DCCC, and Priorities
19 USA, joined by four Nevada voters (collectively, the “State Court Plaintiffs”), filed a lawsuit in
20 Nevada state court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (the “State Court Action”) on April
21 16, 2020. See Ex. 3. The complaint was followed by a motion for a preliminary injunction
22 shortly thereafter. See Ex. 4. Significantly, the State Court Plaintiffs “do not object to
23
24
1
25 While Proposed Intervenors believe, for the reasons discussed in their brief in opposition
to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, that Plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed
26 in its entirety, they are including a proposed Answer to fully comply with the requirements of
Rule 24(c). See Landry’s, Inc. v. Sandoval, No. 2:15-cv-00160-GMN-PAL, 2016 WL 1239254,
27 at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 28, 2016).
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1 Defendants’ expansion of vote by mail; indeed, the current public health crisis necessitates that
2 states allow voters to cast ballots without leaving their homes.” Ex. 3 ¶ 2; see also Ex. 4 at 3.
3 Instead, they initiated the State Court Action “to ensure that all eligible Nevada voters have a fair
4 opportunity to exercise their right to the franchise,” which requires both vote by mail and
5 meaningful opportunities for in-person voting. Ex. 3 ¶¶ 1–6.2
6 STANDARD OF LAW
7 “Rule 24 traditionally receives liberal construction in favor of applicants for
8 intervention.” Arkaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003); see also W. Expl. LLC v.
9 U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 3:15-cv-00491-MMD-VPC, 2016 WL 355122, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 28,
10 2016) (noting Rule 24’s liberal construction and “focus[] on practical considerations rather than
11 technical distinctions”).
12 The Ninth Circuit “require[s] applicants for intervention as of right pursuant to Rule
13 24(a)(2) to meet a four-part test”:
14 (1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a “significantly
protectable” interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
15 the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and
16 (4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the parties to the
action.
17
18 United States v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 606 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting California ex
19 rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2006)).
20 “Rule 24(b) permits the Court to allow anyone to intervene who submits a timely motion
21 and ‘has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.’”
22
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24 The State Court Plaintiffs primarily challenge four attributes of Nevada’s election laws
and procedures: the closure of all but one in-person polling location in each county for the June
25 Primary, Ex. 3 ¶¶ 89–113; the exclusion of inactive voters from Defendants’ planned mailing of
ballots for the June Primary, id. ¶¶ 114–29; Nevada’s Voter Assistance Ban, which prohibits
26 anyone other than a voter’s family member from assisting with the return of a mail ballot, id.
¶¶ 135–61; and the Ballot Rejection Rules, Defendants’ policies for rejecting ballots due to
27 missing or mismatched signatures on mail ballots, id. ¶¶ 162–73.
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1 Nevada v. United States, No. 3:18-cv-569-MMD-CBC, 2019 WL 718825, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 14,
2 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B)). In addition to a common question of law or fact,
3 permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) also requires (1) a timely motion and (2) an
4 independent basis for the court’s jurisdiction. See Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th
5 Cir. 1998).
6 ARGUMENT
7 I. Proposed Intervenors satisfy Rule 24(a)’s requirements for intervention as a matter
of right.
8
9 Proposed Intervenors satisfy each of the four requirements of Rule 24(a).
10 First, the motion is timely. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on April 21, 2020; this motion
11 follows six days later, and in advance of the deadline provided by the Court for Defendants’
12 responses to Plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction and to consolidate. See ECF No. 14.
13 There has therefore been no delay, and no possible risk of prejudice to the other parties. See
14 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997); see also
15 Nevada, 2019 WL 718825, at *2 (granting motion to intervene filed several weeks after action
16 commenced); W. Expl., 2016 WL 355122, at *2 (granting motion to intervene filed nearly two
17 months after action commenced).
18 Second and third, Proposed Intervenors have significant protectable interests in this
19 lawsuit that might be impaired by Plaintiffs’ causes of action. “An applicant [for intervention]
20 has a ‘significant protectable interest’ in an action if (1) it asserts an interest that is protected
21 under some law, and (2) there is a ‘relationship’ between its legally protected interest and the
22 plaintiff’s claims.” W. Expl., 2016 WL 355122, at *2 (quoting Lockyer, 450 F.3d at 441). In
23 assessing whether such an interest is sufficiently “impair[ed] or impede[d],” Fed. R. Civ. P.
24 24(a)(2), courts “look[] to the ‘practical consequences’ of denying intervention.” Nat. Res. Def.
25 Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694,
26 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
27 Plaintiffs’ challenge to the all-mail June Primary compromises legally protected interests
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1 for each of the Proposed Intervenors. If Plaintiffs succeed and Defendants’ plans to mail ballots
2 to registered voters are thwarted, then NSDP, DNC, DCCC, and Priorities USA—each of which
3 is an organization dedicated to promoting the franchise and ensuring the election of Democratic
4 Party candidates—will suffer direct injury because fewer Democratic voters will have an
5 opportunity to vote in the June Primary. See Ex. 3 ¶¶ 14–16. Without expansive options to vote
6 by mail, many voters will be forced to choose between risking their health to vote in person and
7 participating in the June primary, and the result will be far less robust voter turnout in the
8 primary. Courts have routinely concluded that interference with a political party’s electoral
9 prospects constitutes a direct injury that satisfies Article III standing, which goes beyond the
10 requirement needed for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) in this case. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic
11 Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 586–87 (5th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that “harm to [] election
12 prospects” constitutes “a concrete and particularized injury”); Ohio Org. Collaborative v.
13 Husted, 189 F. Supp. 3d 708, 726 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (political party “established an injury in fact”
14 where “the challenged provisions will make it more difficult for its members and constituents to
15 vote”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620 (6th
16 Cir. 2016); N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 342 (M.D.N.C.
17 2014) (political party has “direct, particularized interest in the outcome of an election”), aff’d in
18 part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North
19 Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S.
20 Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017) (noting that an intervenor of right only needs “Article III standing in order
21 to pursue relief that is different from that which is sought by a party with standing”).
22 Moreover, the disruptive and disenfranchising effects of Plaintiffs’ action would require
23 each of these organizations to divert resources to address the lack of mail ballots, see Ex. 3
24 ¶¶ 14-17—another legally protected interest that is implicated by Plaintiffs’ claims. See, e.g.,
25 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that “new
26 law injures the Democratic Party by compelling the party to devote resources” it would not need
27 to absent law), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d
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1 824, 841 (D. Ariz. 2018) (finding standing where law “require[d] Democratic organizations . . .
2 to retool their [get-out-the-vote] strategies and divert [] resources”), rev’d on other grounds sub
3 nom. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
4 Proposed Intervenor John Solomon also has a distinct, legally protected interest in this
5 action. Solomon expects to receive a mail ballot under Defendants’ current plans for the all-mail
6 June Primary. If Plaintiffs prevail and he is not sent a mail ballot, Solomon’s expectations will be
7 upended and he might not be able to receive a mail ballot in time to cast it. The deprivation of
8 the right to vote is a significant and irreparable harm, one that is defended against by both the
9 U.S. and Nevada Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amends. 1, 14; Nev. Const. art. II, § 1; see also,
10 e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (“It is beyond cavil that ‘voting is of the most
11 fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.’” (quoting Ill. State Bd. of Elections
12 v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979))); State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev.
13 131, 170, 58 P. 284, 288 (1899) (“The right to vote for all officers[ in Article 2, Section 1] could
14 not be given in stronger or broader language.”).3
15 Fourth, Proposed Intervenors cannot rely on the parties in this case to adequately
16 represent their interests. “Courts consider three factors when assessing whether a present party
17 will adequately represent the interests of an applicant for intervention”:
18 (1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all
of a proposed intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and
19 willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would
offer any necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect.
20
21 W. Expl., 2016 WL 355122, at *3 (quoting Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086). “[T]he requirement of
22 inadequacy of representation is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of its interests
23 ‘may be’ inadequate,” and therefore “the burden of making this showing is minimal.” Id.
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26 As one court has observed, “once the election occurs, there can be no do-over and no
redress.” League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 247; see also Fla. Democratic Party v. Scott, 215
27 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1258 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (“This isn’t golf: there are no mulligans.”).
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1 (quoting Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Trbovich
2 v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972).
3 As an overarching matter, Defendants’ inability to adequately safeguard Proposed
4 Intervenors’ interests is evidenced by the very existence of the State Court Action, in which all
5 but one of the Proposed Intervenors is a plaintiff.4 While Proposed Intervenors support the
6 expansion of vote by mail for the June Primary—and vigorously dispute Plaintiffs’ contentions
7 that mail voting is either unconstitutional or likely to result in increased fraud, see, e.g., Ex. 6
8 ¶ 25—Proposed Intervenors have legitimate, articulated concerns that Defendants’ policies do
9 not go far enough in ensuring the franchise for all Nevada voters. See generally Ex. 3.
10 Defendants’ expansion of vote by mail is necessary given the specter of a global pandemic, but it
11 is not a panacea, and fully protecting Proposed Intervenors’ significant interests articulated
12 above requires both expansion of mail voting and meaningful opportunities for in-person voting.
13 Defendants’ reluctance to fully protect these interests is evidenced by the Secretary’s hostile
14 response to a letter from the NSDP that sought to address its ongoing concerns with the June
15 Primary. See April Corbin Girnus, Nevada Dems Push for Changes to Upcoming All-Mail
16 Primary, Nev. Current (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.nevadacurrent.com/2020/04/15/nevada-
17 dems-push-for-changes-to-upcoming-all-mail-primary. The dispute between NSDP and the
18 Secretary ultimately led to the filing of the State Court Action, and now persuades Proposed
19 Intervenors that Defendants cannot be relied upon to adequately safeguard their legally protected
20 interests.
21 Phrased in the parlance of Rule 24, neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have interests “such
22 that [they] will undoubtedly make all of” Proposed Intervenors’ arguments. W. Expl., 2016 WL
23 355122, at *3 (quoting Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086). While Defendants are expected to defend the
24 expansion of vote by mail generally, they will not join Proposed Intervenors in advocating for
25
26 4
John Solomon is not one of the State Court Plaintiffs, but he served as a declarant in
27 support of their motion for a preliminary injunction. See Ex. 4 at 16; Ex. 5.
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1 expanding the all-mail election to include inactive voters or providing accompanying in-person
2 voting opportunities. See Ex. 3 ¶¶ 89–129. Defendants and Proposed Intervenors further part
3 ways on the validity of Nevada’s Voter Assistance Ban and Ballot Rejection Rules, see id.
4 ¶¶ 135-73—the latter of which are referenced in Plaintiffs’ complaint and might therefore be at
5 issue in this lawsuit as well as the State Court Action. See Complaint ¶¶ 31–32. By rejecting the
6 NSDP’s overtures and necessitating the filing of the State Court Action, Defendants have clearly
7 demonstrated that they are neither “capable [nor] willing to make such” critical arguments. W.
8 Expl., 2016 WL 355122, at *3 (quoting Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086); see also, e.g., Kleissler v.
9 U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1998) (granting motion to intervene as of right
10 where private parties’ interests diverged from the government’s interest in representation, and
11 where “[t]he early presence of intervenors may serve to prevent errors from creeping into the
12 proceedings, clarify some issues, and perhaps contribute to an amicable settlement”); Ohio River
13 Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Salazar, No. 3:09-0149, 2009 WL 1734420, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. June
14 18, 2009) (granting motion to intervene as of right where defendant and proposed intervenor had
15 identical goals but the “difference in degree of interest could motivate the [intervenor] to mount
16 a more vigorous defense” and “[t]he possibility that this difference in vigor could unearth a
17 meritorious argument overlooked by the current Defendant justifies the potential burden on
18 having an additional party in litigation”).
19 Proposed Intervenors intend to forcefully promote the ability of all eligible Nevadans to
20 cast ballots in the June Primary, including but not limited to those who are able to vote by mail
21 under Defendants’ all-mail election plans, and to protect the electoral and financial interests of
22 organizations like the NSDP, DNC, DCCC, and Priorities USA—“necessary elements” to ensure
23 that Nevadans’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as
24 well as Article 2, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution, are not “neglect[ed].” W. Expl., 2016 WL
25 355122, at *3 (quoting Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086). Because these arguments will not be made by
26 the current parties to the litigation, Proposed Intervenors cannot rely on Defendants to provide
27 adequate representation.
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1 II. Alternatively, Proposed Intervenors satisfy Rule 24(b)’s requirements for

permissive intervention.
2
3 Even if this Court were to find Proposed Intervenors ineligible for intervention as of
4 right, Proposed Intervenors easily satisfy the requirements for permissive intervention under
5 Rule 24(b), which provides the Court with broad discretion “to allow anyone to intervene who
6 submits a timely motion and ‘has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common
7 question of law or fact.’” Nevada, 2019 WL 718825, at *2 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B)).5
8 “Because a court has discretion in deciding whether to permit intervention, it should consider
9 whether intervention will cause undue delay or prejudice to the original parties, whether the
10 applicant’s interests are adequately represented by the existing parties, and whether judicial
11 economy favors intervention.” Id. (citing Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 530–31 (9th Cir. 1989)).
12 For the reasons discussed in Part I supra, Proposed Intervenors’ motion is timely, and
13 they cannot rely on Defendants to adequately protect their interests. Proposed Intervenors also
14 have defenses to Plaintiffs’ claims that share common questions of law and fact. For example,
15 the State Court Plaintiffs have emphasized that Defendants do, contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments,
16 retain the power to designate all-mail elections. See Ex. 3 ¶¶ 29–31 (discussing Defendants’
17 power to create mailing precincts pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes §§ 293.343–293.355).
18 And significantly, intervention will result in neither prejudice nor undue delay. Proposed
19 Intervenors have an undeniable interest in a swift resolution of both this action and the State
20 Court Action, to ensure that Defendants have sufficient time to allow every Nevada voter to cast
21 a ballot in the June Primary. Indeed, Proposed Intervenors contend that this action itself will
22 cause harmful delays that will stymie Defendants’ efforts to circulate mail ballots. Proposed
23 Intervenors therefore have a strong interest in both opposing Plaintiffs’ pending motion for a
24
25 5
Although permissive intervention also generally requires that “the court has an
26 independent basis for jurisdiction,” that finding “is unnecessary where, as here, in a federal
question case the proposed intervener raises no new claims.” Nevada, 2019 WL 718825, at *2
27 (quoting Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 412).
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1 preliminary injunction and moving to dismiss their baseless complaint as soon as possible. Given
2 the legal and factual shortcomings of Plaintiffs’ claims, Proposed Intervenors are confident that
3 their intervention in this case, and the filings that will follow, will result in expeditious resolution
4 of this litigation.
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1 CONCLUSION
2 For the reasons stated above, Proposed Intervenors respectfully request that the Court
3 grant their motion to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) or, in the alternative,
4 permit them to intervene under Rule 24(b).6
5 DATED this 27th day of April, 2020
6
WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,
7 SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
8 By: /s/ Bradley S. Schrager
Bradley S. Schrager, Esq., SBN 10217
9 Daniel Bravo, Esq., SBN 13078
3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor
10 Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
11 Marc E. Elias, Esq.*
Henry J. Brewster, Esq.*
12 Courtney A. Elgart, Esq.*
PERKINS COIE LLP
14
Abha Khanna, Esq.*
15 Jonathan P. Hawley, Esq.*
PERKINS COIE LLP
17
Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants
18 Nevada State Democratic Party, DNC Services
Corporation/Democratic National Committee,
19 DCCC, Priorities USA, and John Solomon
20 *Pro hac vice applications forthcoming
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25 Alternatively, should the Court decline to grant Proposed Intervenors’ motion to
intervene, they respectfully request permission to file the accompanying brief in opposition to
26 Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Exhibit 1) as an amicus brief. See People’s
Legislature v. Miller, No. 2:12-cv-00272-MMD-VCF, 2012 WL 3536767, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug.
27 15, 2012).
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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 I hereby certify that on this 27th of April, 2020 a true and correct copy of MOTION TO
3 INTERVENE AS DEFENDANTS was served via the United States District Court’s CM/ECF
4 system on all parties or persons requiring notice.
6 By: /s/ Dannielle Fresquez

Dannielle Fresquez, an Employee of
7 WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN &
RABKIN, LLP
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1 Index of Exhibits
2 Exhibit Description No. of Pages
3 1 Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary 21
4 Injunction
5 2 Proposed Answer 10
6 3 Complaint, Corona v. Cegavske, No. 20-OC-00064-1B (Nev. 66
7 Dist. Ct.), filed April 16, 2020.
8 4 Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 43
9 Declaratory Relief, Corona v. Cegavske, No. 20-OC-00064-
10 1B (Nev. Dist. Ct.), filed April 22, 2020.
11 5 Declaration of John D. Solomon, filed in support of Plaintiffs’ 4
12 Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
14 1B (Nev. Dist. Ct.), dated April 21, 2020.
15 6 Declaration of Dr. Daniel C. McCool, filed in support of 19
16 Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
18 1B (Nev. Dist. Ct.), dated April 22, 2020.
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Case 3:20-cv-00243-MMD-WGC Document 27-1 Filed 04/27/20 Page 1 of 22
Exhibit 1
Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion

for a Preliminary Injunction
Exhibit 1
PERKINS COIE LLP
4 Tel: (202) 654-6200
6
PERKINS COIE LLP
9 Tel: (206) 359-8000

14 Tel: (702) 341-5200
16 Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendants Nevada

State Democratic Party, DNC Services
18

DISTRICT OF NEVADA
20

22 HAMILTON,
Plaintiffs, BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
23 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A
vs. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
24
BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official
25 capacity as Nevada Secretary of State, and
DEANNA SPIKULA, in her official capacity
26 as Registrar of Voters for Washoe County,
27 Defendants,
28
1
and
2
NEVADA STATE DEMOCRATIC PARTY,
3 DNC SERVICES
CORPORATION/DEMOCRATIC
4 NATIONAL COMMITTEE, DCCC,
PRIORITIES USA, and JOHN SOLOMON,
5
(Proposed)
6 Intervenor-
Defendants.
7
8 INTRODUCTION
9 The United States is in the throes of an unprecedented public health crisis, with a highly
10 infectious coronavirus spreading rapidly throughout the country. As of the date of this filing,
11 Nevada has 4,398 reported cases, including 203 deaths, and that number is growing by the day.
12 President Trump declared a national emergency on March 13, and as of the date of this filing 95
13 percent of the American population is subject to “stay at home” orders issued by their local
14 governments in a concerted effort to slow the spread of the dangerous virus and protect the
15 health care system and employees battling against it. Nevada’s residents have been among that
16 number since April 1, when the Governor ordered all Nevadans to stay home and all non-
17 essential business to close until at least April 30. Even if the stay at home order is modified or
18 lifted―on April 30 or after―life will not be returning to normal for some time. Any vaccine is
19 likely still over a year away, and the virus has proved to be not only highly contagious, but
20 stealth in its transmission, with asymptomatic people unwittingly passing it through the
21 population.
22 Against this backdrop, Defendant Barbara Cegavske, the Nevada Secretary of State (the
23 “Secretary”), announced a plan on March 24, “in partnership with Nevada’s 17 county election
24 officials,”—including Defendant Deanna Spikula, the Registrar of Voters for Washoe County
25 (the “Washoe Registrar”)—to proactively mail ballots to all registered voters with an “active”
26 registration status for the swiftly approaching June 9 primary (the “June Primary”). See
27 Complaint, ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 13–18.
28
2
1 Plaintiffs are individual Nevada voters represented by True the Vote,1 and have filed this
2 lawsuit in an effort to prevent Defendants from acting to protect the electorate in the face of the
3 pandemic. Plaintiffs not only lack standing to invoke the federal judiciary’s powers to attempt to
4 block access to the franchise by millions of their fellow Nevadans, they fail to state a cognizable
5 federal claim. Plaintiffs’ claims are grounded in their contention that the Secretary’s decisions
6 violate Nevada law. But the Eleventh Amendment squarely prevents this Court from ordering the
7 Secretary, a state official, to obey state law. Even absent this insurmountable hurdle, Plaintiffs’
8 claims fail as a matter of law. Because Plaintiffs’ claims fail at the outset, Plaintiffs are unable to
9 establish that they are likely to succeed on the merits.
10 Moreover, if this Court grants Plaintiffs’ requested injunction, countless Nevadans would
11 suffer severe and extraordinary irreparable harm—including many members of the
12 organizational Intervenor-Defendants, as well as Intervenor-Defendant John Solomon himself.
13 Those who cannot get a ballot through the absent ballot system, whether because they do not
14 know how to navigate the absent ballot voting system, their ballot does not arrive in time, or
15 otherwise, will be required to choose between serious risk to their health or sacrificing their right
16 to vote. Thus, even if there were some basis for concluding that Plaintiffs had any chance of the
17 success on the merits (and they have none), each of the remaining factors weighs heavily against
18 granting Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.
19 For all of these reasons, the Court should deny the pending motion for a preliminary
20 injunction.
21 BACKGROUND
22 On March 24, 2020, the Secretary, the Washoe Registrar, and the registrars for Nevada’s
23 16 other counties announced their intention to conduct the June Primary predominantly by mail,
24
25 1
See Suevonn Lee, A Reading Guide to True the Vote, the Controversial Voter Fraud
Watchdog, ProPublica (Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.propublica.org/article/a-reading-guide-to-
26 true-the-vote-the-controversial-voter-fraud-watchdog.
27
28
3
1 to protect voters and elections officials in the face of the growing health crisis. In the weeks that
2 followed, county officials began posting notices describing their specific plans to adapt voting in
3 light of the pandemic. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 19–21. The essential features of these plans are
4 that county clerks intend to: (1) mail ballots to every registered voter with active status in early
5 May, and (2) restrict in-person voting to one polling location per county.
6 On April 16, Intervenor-Defendants the Nevada State Democratic Party, Democratic
7 National Committee, DCCC, and Priorities USA, along with several individual voters
8 (collectively, the “State Court Plaintiffs”), filed a lawsuit in Nevada state court (the “State Court
9 Action”) challenging certain aspects of Defendants’ plans as unduly restrictive on the right to
10 vote as afforded Nevadans under Nevada law and the state and federal constitutions. See Motion
11 to Intervene as Defendants, Ex. 3 (Complaint, Corona v. Cegavkse, No. 20-OC-00064-1B (Nev.
12 Dist. Ct.), filed April 16, 2020). Specifically, the State Court Plaintiffs argue that those legal
13 authorities prohibit the Secretary and county registrars from (1) excluding registered voters with
14 an “inactive” status from the population of voters who will be affirmatively mailed ballots in
15 advance of the upcoming primary, and (2) limiting in-person voting to a single polling location
16 in every county, regardless of the county’s geographic or population size. The State Court
17 Plaintiffs also allege that the ongoing pandemic exacerbates the disenfranchising impact of two
18 preexisting Nevada laws—one that makes it a crime to assist a voter with returning a mail ballot,
19 and another that allows election officials, untrained in signature analysis, to reject mail ballots if
20 they determine that the signature on a ballot return envelope does not belong to the voter. The
21 State Court Action is ongoing, and the State Court Plaintiffs have moved for a preliminary
22 injunction.2
23
24
2
To be perfectly clear, the State Court Plaintiffs do not contend, nor do they believe, that
25 Nevada’s decision to move to a primarily mail election violates state or federal law. See, e.g.,
Motion to Intervene as Defendants, Ex. 3 ¶ 2. To the contrary, had Defendants not voluntarily
26 acted to do so, and instead forced all voters to vote in person despite the ongoing pandemic—
precisely the relief that Plaintiffs in the instant action seek from this Court—they would have
27 (footnote continued)
28
4
1 On April 21, Plaintiffs filed the present case challenging Defendants’ decision to mail
2 ballots to registered voters in Nevada. On the same day, they moved for a preliminary and
3 permanent injunction, seeking an order from this Court requiring Defendants to comply with
4 state law. See generally Complaint; Plaintiffs’ Preliminary-Injunction Motion (“Motion”), ECF
5 No. 2.3 The Court ordered responsive pleadings to be filed by Monday, April 27, 2020. See ECF
6 No. 14. Intervenor-Defendants have moved to intervene and file this opposition to the motion for
7 a preliminary injunction.
8 LEGAL STANDARD
9 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter
10 v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The party requesting an injunction must
11 demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm absent
12 injunctive relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in the party’s favor, and (4) that “an
13 injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. A court may deny preliminary injunctive relief if
14 defendants are likely to succeed on the merits of their defense. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
15 Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente
16 Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006)). The failure to state a claim for relief is further
17 grounds for denying a motion for preliminary injunction. See Villagrana v. Recontrust Co., N.A.,
18 No. 3:11-cv-00652-ECR-WGC, 2012 WL 1890236, at *7 (D. Nev. May 22, 2012) (“preliminary
19 injunction will not issue” where claims must be dismissed).
20
21
22 violated state and federal law. The State Court Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ policies do not
23 go far enough in ensuring the franchise for all Nevada voters—expanding vote by mail is
necessary given the specter of a global pandemic, but it is not a panacea, and the law requires
24 both availability of mail voting and meaningful opportunities for in-person voting. See generally
id., Ex. 3.
25 3
After filing the complaint in this case, True the Vote, representing two different
individual voters, filed a motion to intervene in the State Court Action, raising exactly the same
26 arguments they have raised in this case.
27
28
5
1 ARGUMENT
2 I. Plaintiffs cannot succeed on the claims alleged in their complaint.
3 The lynchpin of Plaintiffs’ claims is their assertion that Defendants and other state
4 election officials are violating Nevada’s election laws. Plaintiffs’ complaint and motion for a
5 preliminary injunction are replete with references to what Nevada’s election laws require, what
6 the Nevada Legislature did and did not intend, and how Defendants’ actions do or do not
7 comport with those requirements and that intent.4
8 Plaintiffs’ claims fail from the outset for at least three reasons. First, this Court is barred
9 by the Eleventh Amendment from enjoining state officials based on purported violations of state
10 law. Second, Plaintiffs assert nothing more than a generalizable interest in having Nevada
11 officials follow the law and accordingly lack Article III standing. Third, federal law does not
12 provide Plaintiffs a cause of action to enforce state law or otherwise address their grievances. For
13 all of these reasons, not only are Plaintiffs unlikely to succeed on the merits, this Court should
14
15 4
See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 12 (“Under Nevada law . . .”); id. ¶ 22 (“The Nevada Legislature
16 has enacted detailed legislation . . .”); id. ¶ 23 (“Chapter 293 requires the Secretary . . .”); id.
¶¶ 24–29, 31–35 (summarizing Nevada election law); id. ¶ 30 (“Nevada requires . . .”); id. ¶ 44
17 (“The Plan violates the Voters’ right to vote by diluting their votes with illegal votes given the
removal of safeguards against illegal voting established by the [Nevada] Legislature.”) id. ¶ 49
18 (“The Plan would overrule and replace the [Nevada] representatives’ chosen manner of election
. . .”); id. ¶ 55 (“The Plan alters the nature of Nevada’s election . . .”); id. ¶ 59 (“[T]he Plan is not
19 at all what the [Nevada] Legislature chose . . .”) id. ¶ 64 (“A republican form of government is
lost if a Secretary of State and County Administrators supplant the people’s elected
representative in exercising powers entrusted entirely to the [Nevada] Legislature, in this case
20 establishing the manner of elections.”); id. at 13 (seeking to “enjoin the Secretary and County
Administrators to implement the primary election in the manner the Nevada Legislature
21 prescribed”); Motion at 2 (“[T]he Plan strips the [Nevada] Legislature’s vote-fraud-prevention
safeguards . . .”); id. at 3–6 (summarizing Nevada election law); id. at 7–15 (describing vote
22 dilution claim premised on “weakened safeguards” provided by Nevada law); id. at 15–16
(“[T]he Plan would overrule and replace the [Nevada] representatives’ chosen manner of election
23 . . .”); id. at 16–17 (arguing that “state and local election administrators” should not be permitted
to alter procedures that “the [Nevada] Legislature established”); id. at 17–18 (“[T]he Primary
24 must be conducted in the [Nevada] Legislature’s prescribed manner.”); id. at 18–20 (“The Plan
substitutes the Secretary and County Administrators for the [Nevada] Legislature . . .”); id. at
25 20–21 (“[The] Plan [] is not authorized by the [Nevada] Legislature” and is “in violation of
controlling laws”); id. at 21–22 (“The public interest favors having elections held under
26 controlling authorities.”).
27
28
6
1 not even reach the merits.
2 Even if this Court were to evaluate the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, they are woefully
3 deficient. Plaintiffs’ central premise, that Defendants are not authorized to mail ballots to all
4 registered voters under Nevada’s election laws, is simply incorrect. And, as both a legal and
5 factual matter, Plaintiffs cannot establish a likelihood of success on their claim of vote dilution
6 based on the specter of voter fraud. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits
7 of their claims.
8 A. The Eleventh Amendment bars this Court from entering Plaintiffs’

requested relief.
9
Plaintiffs’ claims rely wholly and unequivocally on the assertion that Defendants are
10
violating Nevada state election law by proactively mailing ballots to registered voters instead of
11
requiring voters to request ballots through the absent voting process.5 Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask
12
this Court to (1) adjudicate whether Defendants—state election officials—have violated state
13
law, and (2) assuming that the Court interprets Nevada law in the way Plaintiffs urge, issue a
14
preliminary injunction requiring state officials to comply with state law. See Complaint at 12–13
15
(“Wherefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court [to]: . . . Preliminarily and permanently
16
enjoin the Secretary and County Administrators to implement the primary election in the manner
17
the Nevada Legislature prescribed.” (emphasis added)). But as the U.S. Supreme Court
18
explained decades ago in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, “the principles of
19
federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment” prohibit a federal court from granting “relief
20
against state officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive.” 465 U.S. 89,
21
22
23 5
Counts I and II challenge the plan to mail ballots to all voters on the premise that the right
to vote enshrined in the U.S. and Nevada Constitutions guarantees them the right to have the
24 state election laws enforced. See Complaint ¶¶ 44, 49. Count III raises a claim under the Purcell
doctrine, casting Defendants’ plans to mail ballots to registered voters as a “change” in the rules
25 governing elections from those prescribed by the Legislature. Id. ¶¶ 50–55. Counts IV and V
allege that Defendants’ all-mail election infringes upon the Nevada Legislature’s authority to
26 establish election laws. Id. ¶¶ 57, 64.
27
28
7
1 106 (1984). Because Plaintiffs’ entire complaint rests on their misconception that a federal court
2 can order state officials to comply with state law, it should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
3 and their motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.
4 Pennhurst announced a bright line rule that has been applied countless times by federal
5 courts since. Simply put: “The Eleventh Amendment prevents a federal court from issuing an
6 injunction against state officials solely to require them to adhere to state law.” Thompson v.
7 Alabama, No. 2:16-CV-783-WKW, 2017 WL 3223915, at *8 (M.D. Ala. July 28, 2017)
8 (emphasis added); see also Neuwirth v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 845 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir.
9 1988) (The Eleventh Amendment “‘allows federal courts to hear suits against state officials if the
10 suit seeks to force them to conform their conduct to federal law,’ but does not apply to ‘suits
11 which would seek to have federal judges order state officials to conform their conduct to state
12 law.’” (quoting Ronald A. Rotunda et al., Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 2:12
13 (1986)); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 815 F.2d 1034, 1034 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“Pennhurst
14 prohibits a federal court from ordering a state to follow state law.”). This is true even when the
15 request to order state officials to conform to state law is cloaked in a federal claim to relief. See,
16 e.g., Thompson, 2017 WL 3223915, at *8 (denying preliminary injunction because plaintiffs’
17 federal constitutional claims rested wholly on the premise that state officials were violating state
18 law); see also Neuwirth, 845 F.2d at 561 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (“If not restrained in some
19 way, federal power under the fourteenth amendment could raise any state law wrong to the level
20 of a due process violation.”).
21 At bottom, Plaintiffs’ only grievance is that Defendants are not following state law, and
22 the only relief they request is an order requiring Defendants to follow Nevada law.
23 Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment bars their suit, rendering it not just unlikely but
24 impossible for them to succeed on the merits.
25 B. Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims.

26 Plaintiffs lack Article III standing for at least two reasons, both of which deprive this
27 Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
28
8
1 First, Plaintiffs have not suffered an injury-in-fact as required to establish Article III
2 standing. Plaintiffs claim an interest in having Nevada’s election laws enforced based on their
3 status as registered voters, and suggest that Defendants’ failure to enforce Nevada’s laws in the
4 manner Plaintiffs see fit could lead to an increase in illegal votes which would harm them as
5 rightful voters. See generally Complaint. The problem with this theory of injury is two-fold. For
6 one, this purported injury is no different than that of any other voter in Nevada (or any other
7 citizen who will be governed by the candidates elected through Nevada’s elections, for that
8 matter). The U.S. Supreme Court’s case law has “consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a
9 generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s
10 interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more
11 directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III
12 case or controversy.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992); see also id. at 575-
13 76 (“[A]n injury amounting only to the alleged violation of a right to have the Government act in
14 accordance with law [is] not judicially cognizable . . . [and] cannot alone satisfy the requirements
15 of Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning.”) (internal quotation marks and
16 citation omitted).
17 Second, Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is wholly “conjectural,” and neither “actual nor
18 imminent.” Id. at 560 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Their claim that the switch from an
19 absent ballot system to a vote by mail system will lead to voter fraud is not supported by any
20 allegations of fact (or, in their motion for preliminary injunction, any actual evidence). Instead, it
21 is supported wholly by unfounded and speculative assertions. Accordingly, it does not confer
22 Article III standing. See Am. Civil Rights Union v. Martinez-Rivera, 166 F. Supp. 3d 779, 789
23 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (“[T]he risk of vote dilution[ is] speculative and, as such, [is] more akin to a
24 generalized grievance about the government than an injury in fact.”); cf. United States v. Florida,
25 No. 4:12cv285-RH/CAS, 2012 WL 13034013, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2012) (rejecting True the
26 Vote’s motion to intervene under Rule 24 based on the same theory of vote dilution because its
27 “asserted interests are the same . . . as for every other registered voter in the state”).
28
9
1 Because Plaintiffs lack standing to even assert their claims, those claims are unlikely to
2 succeed.
3 C. Plaintiffs fail to allege a cognizable federal cause of action.

4 Even if Plaintiffs had standing or could obtain the relief they seek (and for the reasons
5 discussed above, they cannot), they have not cited a single federal statute, constitutional
6 provision, or case that provides a cognizable private right of action to enforce Nevada’s election
7 laws. This provides further reason to deny Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
8 Counts I and II broadly invoke the right to vote as protected by the U.S. Constitution, but
9 Plaintiffs allege neither that Defendants’ policies prevent them from casting ballots nor that their
10 right to vote is burdened in any way by Defendants’ actions. Instead, they suggest, in wholly
11 conclusory fashion and without any support, that the right to vote as enshrined in the U.S.
12 Constitution also gives voters a private right of action in federal court to broadly enforce state
13 election laws. But this ignores that voting rights cases permit plaintiffs to bring suit in federal
14 court under two circumstances: (1) where the defendants’ actions violate a federal statute, see,
15 e.g., Sanchez v. Cegavske, 214 F. Supp. 3d 961, 965–66 (D. Nev. 2016), or (2) where the
16 defendants are applying state elections law in a manner that violates the federal constitution, see,
17 e.g., PEST Comm. v. Miller, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1214–15 (D. Nev. 2009). There is no
18 precedent for voters who simply contend—as Plaintiffs here do—that a state elections official is
19 acting in contravention of state law to obtain relief on that basis from a federal court. Because
20 the U.S. Constitution does not provide the right that Plaintiffs seek to vindicate in Counts I and
21 II, they fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted and thus cannot succeed on the merits
22 of these claims.
23 With Count III, Plaintiffs again attempt to create a brand new cause of action never
24 before recognized by a federal court, by reading a handful of sentences out of context from the
25 U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam). Count III
26 asserts that Defendants’ “[p]lan alters the nature of Nevada’s election” in violation of the
27 “Purcell Principle.” Complaint ¶¶ 50–55; see also Motion at 16–17. Plaintiffs appear to concede
28
10
1 that the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Purcell generally stands for the proposition that federal
2 courts should refrain from altering or enjoining a state’s election rules on the eve of an election.
3 See 549 U.S. at 5–6; Complaint ¶¶ 51–52. But no court has done what Plaintiffs now ask this
4 Court to do—extend the doctrine of federal judicial restraint that Purcell announced to create a
5 private cause of action for voters who seek to enjoin state election officials from altering or
6 amending their own election rules. Accordingly, this claim cannot serve as a basis for injunctive
7 relief.
8 Plaintiffs’ reliance on the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause in Count IV, and its
9 guarantee “to every State . . . a Republican Form of Government” in Count V, is similarly, and
10 fatally, defective. See Complaint ¶¶ 56–66; Mot. at 17–20. Again, Plaintiffs do not and cannot
11 produce any authority establishing a private cause of action under these clauses. Cf. U.S. House
12 of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 78 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting private citizens
13 generally lack power to “deputiz[e] themselves in an effort to enforce federal law”). Indeed,
14 courts have rejected similar efforts to build a claim in this way. See Largess v. Supreme Judicial
15 Court, 373 F.3d 219, 228 & n.9 (1st Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (affirming denial of injunctive relief
16 where “individuals . . . attempt[ed] to invoke the Guarantee Clause against state officials”).
17 In the absence of cognizable hooks for their ostensibly federal causes of action, Plaintiffs
18 has no likelihood of succeeding on their claims Accordingly, Intervenor-Defendants’ motion for
19 a preliminary injunction should be denied. See Villagrana, 2012 WL 1890236, at *7.
20 D. Plaintiffs’ claims also fail on the merits.

21 Even if the Court were to examine the actual merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiffs
22 motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied because they have no chance of success.
23 This conclusion necessarily follows for at least two reasons: (1) Plaintiffs are simply wrong on
24 their reading of Nevada law, which undergirds the entirety of their complaint; and (2) Plaintiffs’
25 claims fail under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, which applies to these types of challenges
26 to elections laws.
27
28
11
1 1. Defendant’s decision to mail ballots to registered voters is

contemplated by, and consistent with, Nevada law.
2
3 Defendants’ decision to mail ballots to registered voters in Nevada is explicitly

4 countenanced by Nevada statutes. Through the laws governing mailing precincts—specifically,
5 Nevada Revised Statutes (“N.R.S.”) 293.343 through 293.355—the Nevada Legislature has
6 given the Secretary and the county clerks authority to mail ballots to all registered voters rather
7 than requiring voters to request those ballots through the absent ballot process.
8 N.R.S. 293.213 gives the county clerk unilateral authority to designate a precinct as a
9 mailing precinct if one of two conditions is met: (1) if fewer than 20 registered voters reside in
10 that precinct, or (2) if fewer than 200 ballots were cast in the last general election. N.R.S.
11 293.213. Critically, however, “[a] county clerk may establish a mailing precinct or an absent
12 ballot mailing precinct that does not meet the [enumerated] requirements . . . if the county clerk
13 obtains prior approval from the Secretary of State.” NRS 293.213(4) (emphasis added). Put
14 differently, the Nevada Legislature has permitted the Secretary, working in concert with the
15 county clerks, to designate any precinct in the state a mailing precinct. Given that the Secretary
16 announced that she worked with the 17 county clerks to reach the decision to mail ballots to
17 voters, that condition has clearly been satisfied for the June Primary.
18 Plaintiffs all but ignore N.R.S. 293.213(4). Instead, their argument hinges on a labored
19 reading of a different statute, N.R.S. 293.205, which governs the physical boundaries of
20 precincts. See Complaint ¶¶ 25–26; Motion at 4. Under that statute, election officials are time-
21 limited as to when they may “establish,” “abolish, alter, consolidate,” or “define the boundaries”
22 of “election precincts.” NRS 293.205(1). Section 293.205 is inapplicable here because, on its
23 face, the statute is concerned merely with the physical boundaries of a precinct and not the
24 means of conducting an election within a precinct. See id.; see also N.R.S. 293.205(2) (“The
25 boundaries of each election precinct must follow visible ground features.”); N.R.S. 293.208(3)
26
27
28
12
1 (“Election precincts must be composed only of contiguous territory.”).6 Defendants have not
2 created a new precinct, divided an existing precinct, abolished a precinct, altered a precinct,
3 consolidated two existing precincts, or in any other way defined the physical geography of
4 Nevada’s election precincts; all Defendants have done is designate preexisting precincts as
5 mailing precincts. Accordingly, Section 293.205 provides no basis for Plaintiffs’ claims.7
6 In short, Nevada’s laws governing mailing precincts allow the Secretary and county
7 clerks, working together, to designate any precinct in the state as a mailing precinct and to mail
8 ballots to voters within that precinct without solicitation. Defendants’ announced plan is
9 consistent with their exercise of that authority. Therefore, to the extent that each of Plaintiffs’
10 claims hinges on their assertion that Defendants are violating Nevada law, those claims fail, and
11 the motion for preliminary injunction should therefore be denied.
12 2. Plaintiffs cannot succeed under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.

13 Plaintiffs’ claims rest on a second faulty premise: that mail-based voting leads to an
14 increase in voter fraud. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ plan to mail ballots to registered
15 voters, without first requiring those voters to fill out an absent ballot application, somehow
16 violates Plaintiffs’ right to vote under the U.S. Constitution. Even if Plaintiffs could overcome
17 the various hurdles outlined above, there is no likelihood of success on the merits of this claim
18 under the appropriate legal standard. Plaintiffs’ claim of vote dilution based on the potential for
19 voter fraud is legally and factually unfounded, and outweighed by the State’s compelling interest
20 in expanding access to mail voting in the midst of a pandemic.
21
22 6
Even if Section 293.205 were applicable to the manner of conducting elections within a
precinct, it explicitly imports another statute, Section 293.208, which allows a new precinct to be
23 created “at any time if it lies entirely within the boundaries of any existing precinct.” N.R.S.
293.208(3). Because each existing precinct has been converted to a mailing precinct without any
24 further change, the now-designated mailing precincts share overlapping boundaries, and
therefore lie entirely within, the existing precincts.
25
7
Plaintiffs also cite N.R.S. 293.206, which merely requires county clerks to submit maps
26 of the physical boundaries of a precinct to the Secretary for approval.
27
28
13
1 Courts apply the Anderson-Burdick balancing test when Plaintiffs raise claims that an
2 election law or policy violates their right to vote. Short v. Brown, 893 F.3d 671, 676–77 (9th Cir.
3 2018) (applying Anderson-Burdick to vote dilution challenge to vote by mail law); see also Ohio
4 State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 538 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated as moot, 2014
5 WL 10384647 (Oct. 1, 2014) (applying Anderson-Burdick to equal protection challenge to
6 Secretary of State directive). Under Anderson-Burdick, a court “must first consider the character
7 and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights . . . that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.” Short,
8 893 F.3d at 676 (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789
9 (1983)). Then the court must weigh those interests against the state’s justification for the
10 challenged policy. Id. Those interests must be “sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.” Id.
11 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992)).
12 Plaintiffs cannot establish any burden on their right to vote under the U.S. Constitution.
13 While it is true that vote dilution is a viable basis for federal claims in certain contexts, such as
14 when laws are crafted that structurally devalue one community’s or group of people’s votes over
15 another’s, see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563–64 (1964), it is also true that “[t]he
16 Constitution is not an election fraud statute.” Minn. Voters Alliance v. Ritchie, 720 F.3d 1029,
17 1031 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bodine v. Elkhart Cty. Election Bd., 788 F.2d 1270, 1271 (7th Cir.
18 1986)). There is simply no authority for transmogrifying the vote dilution line of cases into a
19 weapon that voters may use to enlist the federal judiciary to make it more difficult for millions of
20 their fellow citizens to vote, based entirely on unfounded and speculative fears about voter fraud.
21 Cf. Short, 893 F.3d at 677–78 (“Nor have the appellants cited any authority explaining how a law
22 that makes it easier to vote would violate the Constitution.”). To the contrary, courts have
23 routinely—and appropriately—rejected such efforts. See Minn. Voters Alliance, 720 F.3d at
24 1031–32 (rejecting challenge grounded in vote dilution theory to decision by election
25 administrators to allow same-day registrants to vote before verifying their voting eligibility to the
26 satisfaction of plaintiffs); Republican Party of Pa. v. Cortés, , 218 F. Supp. 3d 396, 406–07 (E.D.
27 Pa. 2016) (rejecting claim that rested on premise that voter fraud would dilute weight of the
28
14
1 plaintiffs’ votes); see also Lee v. Va. Bd. of Elections, No. 3:15CV357-HEH, 2015 WL 5178993,
2 at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 4, 2015) (denying motion to intervene in challenge to voter ID laws where
3 proposed-intervenors’ interest was predicated on the “right not to have their votes diluted by the
4 fraudulent votes they allege will be cast if the Voter ID law is declared invalid”). Plaintiffs do
5 not cite a single case holding that a plaintiff can challenge an election law or practice on the basis
6 that the prospect of voter fraud will dilute their lawfully cast ballot. This Court should not be the
7 first.
8 Even if Plaintiffs could conceivably advance this legal theory to establish an undue
9 burden on the right to vote, Plaintiffs have not identified any evidence, and indeed none exists,
10 that mail-based voting is particularly susceptible to voter fraud or that mailing ballots to voters
11 will increase illegal voting. Voting by mail is ubiquitous in the United States, either through vote
12 by mail or absent ballot procedures. In federal elections, about 5 percent of the country votes by
13 mail ballot, and another 20 percent by absent ballot. EAVS Deep Dive: Early, Absentee and Mail
14 Voting, U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.eac.gov/documents/
15 2017/10/17/eavs-deep-dive-early-absentee-and-mail-voting-data-statutory-overview; see also
16 Wendy R. Weiser & Harold Ekeh, The False Narrative of Vote-by-Mail Fraud, Brennan Ctr. for
17 Just. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/false-narrative-
18 vote-mail-fraud. Five states conduct their elections predominantly through vote by mail, see
19 Weiser & Ekeh, supra, and even in Nevada, some citizens have voted by mail long before the
20 current public health crisis arose. See, e.g., 2016 Primary Election Turnout: In Person Voting,
21 Absent, and Mailing Precincts, Nev. Sec’y of State (last updated June 23, 2016),
22 https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=4310 (showing that 2,910 people voted by
23 mail ballot in the 2016 June Primary).
24 Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction does not cite a single study, or any
25 evidence for the matter, suggesting that vote by mail is more vulnerable to fraud than an absent
26 voting scheme. Nor do they identify even a single instance of fraud tied to vote by mail. In
27 reality, there is no correlation between vote by mail and voter fraud. See Weiser & Ekeh, supra
28
15
1 (“Despite this dramatic increase in mail voting over time, fraud rates remain infinitesimally
2 small. None of the five states that hold their elections primarily by mail has had any voter fraud
3 scandals since making that change.”); Richard L. Hasen, Trump Is Wrong About the Dangers of
4 Absentee Ballots, Wash. Post (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/
5 04/09/trump-is-wrong-about-dangers-absentee-ballots (citing database of voter fraud and
6 explaining that voter fraud is “extremely rare in the five states that rely primarily on vote-by-
7 mail.”); see also Motion to Intervene as Defendants, Ex. 6 ¶ 25 (database of voter fraud showed
8 only six cases in Nevada since the early 1980s). Because there is no relationship between voting
9 by mail and voter fraud, Nevada’s switch to a vote by mail model will not lead to an increase in
10 voter fraud. Because Plaintiffs are unable to establish a relationship between voting by mail and
11 voter fraud, Plaintiffs cannot prove that their right to vote has been, in any way, burdened.
12 On the other side of the ledger is Defendants’ compelling interest in protecting both the
13 fundamental right to vote and the health and safety of voters and elections officials in the middle
14 of an unprecedented pandemic. But because Plaintiffs have not shown that the challenged policy
15 “burdens their fundamental right to vote or in any way limits their range of choices in the voting
16 booth,” the state’s interest need not even be compelling; instead, rational basis review applies.
17 Cortés, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 408 (applying rational basis review where Plaintiffs’ “vote-dilution
18 theory is based on speculation that fraudulent voters may be casting ballots elsewhere in the”
19 state); see also Short, 893 F.3d at 679 (analyzing challenge to California’s implementation of
20 vote by mail in some counties under rational basis review). Under rational basis review, a
21 challenged policy must only be “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Green
22 v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2003).
23 In light of the current public health crisis, Defendants’ decision to mail ballots to
24 registered voters is critically important to serving the State’s compelling interest in allowing
25 voters to vote safely from home. Because of the highly contagious coronavirus, voting at home
26 will be the best option for most Nevadans. The State has an interest in facilitating voting by mail
27 not only as a matter of public health, but also to ensure that Nevadans are not disenfranchised.
28
16
1 Vote by mail has several key advantages over an absent ballot system. On the voter side,
2 it eliminates obstacles to participation in mail voting. Many Nevadans will be voting through the
3 mail for the first time in the June Primary,8 and will be unfamiliar with the obstacles they must
4 navigate to successfully vote in an absent ballot system. An absent ballot system requires a voter
5 to obtain, fill out, and submit an application, and do so in a timely manner that allows the voter
6 to receive her ballot with sufficient time to vote. N.R.S. 293.313. Defendants’ plans for vote by
7 mail eliminates these potentially deleterious steps. Vote by mail is also easier to administer for
8 election officials. In an absent ballot system, election officials must receive, process, track, and
9 respond to requests for absent ballots on an ad hoc basis. In a vote by mail system, election
10 officials can prepare, in bulk and at one time, mail ballots for every registered voter, and send
11 them out well in advance of the election.
12 Wisconsin’s disastrous April 7, 2020 primary illustrates the merits of Defendants’
13 decision to expand vote by mail. In Wisconsin, state election officials enforced the state’s
14 preexisting absent voting scheme. The coronavirus-inspired surge of interest in absent voting
15 crashed the system, and thousands of voters either never received their requested absent ballots
16 or received them too late. See Nick Corasaniti & Stephanie Saul, Inside Wisconsin’s Election
17 Disaster: Thousands of Missing or Nullified Ballots, Chi. Trib. (Apr. 10, 2020),
18 https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/elections/ct-nw-nyt-wisconsin-election-problems-
19 20200410-rdea6424ynecjemkwwfyjqcyqq-story.html; Jeanine Santucci, US Postal Service
20 Investigating Issues with Absentee Ballots in Wisconsin That Went Undelivered, USA Today
21 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/04/10/usps-
22 investigating-undelivered-wisconsin-absentee-ballot-issues/5135563002. These failures occurred
23
24 8
For example, in the June 2016 primary, 90 percent of Nevada voters voted in person. See
Turnout, supra. In the 2018 General Election, 91 percent of Nevada
25 voters voted in Election
2016 Primary
person. See 2018 General Election Turnout: In Person Early Voting, Absent, and
Precincts, Nev. Sec’y of State (last updated Nov. 20, 2018),
26 Mailing
https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=6050.
27
28
17
1 at the voter, election administrator, and postal service levels. As a result, voters who could not
2 vote by mail either crowded into a few polling places or sacrificed altogether their right to vote.
3 See Jim Malewitz, Their Wisconsin Ballots Never Arrived. So They Risked a Pandemic. Or
4 Stayed Home., Wis. Watch (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.wisconsinwatch.org/2020/04/ballots-
5 never-arrived-pandemic-or-stay-home.
6 Defendants’ efforts to avoid another Wisconsin more than justify their decision to mail
7 ballots to registered voters without enforcing an absent ballot system. Because the state interest
8 in expanding access to mail voting outweighs any burden Plaintiffs could conceivably assert on
9 their right to vote (and there is none), Plaintiffs’ right to vote claims are entirely unlikely to
10 succeed.
11 II. The balance of the harms weighs strongly against Plaintiffs’ requested injunction.
12 Enjoining Defendants’ plans for a primarily all-mail election would have a devastating
13 impact on Nevadans’ opportunities to participate meaningfully in the June Primary. Defendants’
14 decision to implement vote by mail is a necessary response to a public health crisis, one that
15 severely curtails the ability to travel and interact with others. Whether by necessity or choice,
16 many Nevadans will continue to exercise social distancing and remain sheltered in their homes
17 for the foreseeable future, thus necessitating the ability to vote by mail.9 Without the ability to
18 cast mail ballots, these voters—denied the opportunity to vote by mail and unable or unwilling to
19 risk voting in person—will be effectively disenfranchised.
20 “It is clear that abridgement of the right to vote constitutes an irreparable injury.”
21 Sanchez, 214 F. Supp. 3d at 976; see also, e.g., Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th
22 Cir. 2012) (“A restriction on the fundamental right to vote [] constitutes irreparable injury.”). If
23
24
9
It is therefore unsurprising that a host of other states have also chosen to increase their
25 uses of vote by mail in response to the pandemic. See, e.g., Zach Montellaro & Laura Barrón-
López, States Rush to Prepare for Huge Surge of Mail Voting, Politico (Apr. 25, 2020),
26 https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/25/states-mail-voting-surge-207596.
27
28
18
1 this Court were to prevent Defendants from utilizing mail ballots for the June Primary, countless
2 eligible Nevadans will suffer disenfranchisement because they will be unable to vote in any other
3 way. Depriving a voter of their opportunity to cast a ballot is not only a significant harm—“[t]o
4 disenfranchise a single voter is a matter for grave concern,” Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1 v.
5 Husted, 906 F. Supp. 2d 745, 750 (S.D. Ohio 2012)—but an irreparable harm as well. See
6 League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[O]nce
7 the election occurs, there can be no do-over and no redress.”); Fla. Democratic Party v. Scott,
8 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1258 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (“This isn’t golf: there are no mulligans.”).
9 The only harm identified by Plaintiffs, by contrast, is the specter of voter fraud. But as set
10 forth above, supra at I.D.2., Plaintiffs are litigating against a mere apparition of alleged fraud
11 that vanishes under the light of even limited scrutiny. As one court has perceptively noted, “a
12 preoccupation with mostly phantom election fraud leads to real incidents of disenfranchisement,
13 which undermine rather than enhance confidence in elections.” One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen,
14 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 903 (W.D. Wis. 2016). Enjoining Defendants’ plans for vote by mail will
15 not prevent any harms to Plaintiffs—their supposed harms are, ultimately, imaginary—but will
16 indisputably disenfranchise Nevada voters who are unable, due to the pandemic and myriad other
17 issues, to cast a ballot in the June Primary.
18 III. The public interest weighs heavily against the requested injunction.
19 An injunction precluding Defendants’ use of mail ballots in the June Primary, and
20 therefore disenfranchising countless Nevada voters, will not serve the public interest. “By
21 definition, ‘[t]he public interest . . . favors permitting as many qualified voters to vote as
22 possible.’” League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 247 (alterations in original) (quoting Husted,
23 697 F.3d at 437); see also, e.g., Wash. Ass’n of Churches v. Reed, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1271
24 (W.D. Wash. 2006). This includes not only Intervenor-Defendant John Solomon, but all eligible
25 Nevadans who would risk disenfranchisement if Plaintiffs receive their requested injunctive
26 relief. See League of Wilderness Defs./Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Connaughton, 752
27 F.3d 755, 766 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The public interest inquiry primarily addresses impact on non-
28
19
1 parties rather than parties.” (quoting Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 974
2 (9th Cir. 2002))). By contrast, the public interest would most assuredly be ill-served if voters’
3 constitutional rights were violated to safeguard against nonexistence instances voter fraud. See,
4 e.g., Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1359–60 (N.D. Ga. 2006).10
5 ///
6 ///
7 ///
8 ///
9 ///
10 / / /
11 / / /
12 / / /
13 / / /
14 / / /
15 / / /
16 / / /
17 / / /
18 / / /
19 / / /
20 / / /
21 / / /
22
23 10
This is especially true given that Nevada law already provides numerous safeguards to
24 [] requestthe
preserve integrity of elections. It is, for example, already a felony in Nevada to “fraudulently
an absent ballot in the name of another person,” N.R.S. 293.313(4); threaten,
25 intimidate, coerce, or exercise undue influence on any voter, N.R.S. 293.710(1)(a)–(c); impede
or prevent a voter from voting, N.R.S. 293.710(1)(d); “vote[] or attempt[] to vote using the name
26 of another person,” N.R.S. 293.775(2); or “attempt to vote more than once at the same election,”
N.R.S. 293.780(1).
27
28
20
1 CONCLUSION
2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction should be
3 denied.
4 DATED this 27th day of April, 2020
5
WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,
6 SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
7 By: /s/ Bradley S. Schrager
Bradley S. Schrager, Esq., SBN 10217
8 Daniel Bravo, Esq., SBN 13078
3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor
9 Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
10 Marc E. Elias, Esq.*
Henry J. Brewster, Esq.*
11 Courtney A. Elgart, Esq.*
PERKINS COIE LLP
13
Abha Khanna, Esq.*
14 Jonathan P. Hawley, Esq.*
PERKINS COIE LLP
16
Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor–Defendants
18 DCCC, Priorities USA, and John Solomon
19 *Pro hac vice applications forthcoming
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
21
Exhibit 2
Proposed Answer
Exhibit 2
PERKINS COIE LLP
4 Tel: (202) 654-6200
6
PERKINS COIE LLP
9 Tel: (206) 359-8000

14 Tel: (702) 341-5200
16 Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor–Defendants

18

DISTRICT OF NEVADA
20

22 HAMILTON,
Plaintiffs, [PROPOSED] ANSWER TO
23 VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
vs. DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE
24 RELIEF
25 capacity as Nevada Secretary of State, and
DEANNA SPIKULA, in her official capacity
26 as Registrar of Voters for Washoe County,
27 Defendants,
28
[PROPOSED] ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1
and
2
3 DNC SERVICES
4 NATIONAL COMMITTEE, DCCC,
PRIORITIES USA, and JOHN SOLOMON,
5
(Proposed)
6 Intervenor-
Defendants.
7
8 Proposed Intervenor–Defendants Nevada State Democratic Party, DNC Services

9 Corporation/Democratic National Committee, DCCC, Priorities USA, and John Solomon
10 (“Proposed Intervenors”), by and through their attorneys, submit the following Answer to
11 Plaintiffs’ Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Complaint”). Proposed
12 Intervenors respond to the allegations in the Complaint as follows:
13 1. Proposed Intervenors admit that the Nevada Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske
14 (the “Secretary”) intends to conduct the June 9, 2020, Nevada state and federal primary election
15 (the “June Primary”) under the “all-mail election” plan (the “Plan”) on the Secretary’s website,
16 and the Secretary’s website is the best source of the full content and context of the Plan. To the
17 extent Paragraph 1 does not contain the full content and context of the Secretary’s Plan,
18 Proposed Intervenors deny the allegations.
19 2. Paragraph 2 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to

20 which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenors deny
21 the allegations.

24 the allegations.
25 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

28
2
1 the allegations.
2 5. Proposed Intervenors deny that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear
3 and resolve this present controversy.
4 6. Proposed Intervenors deny that venue is proper.
5 PARTIES
6 7. Proposed Intervenors are without sufficient information or knowledge with which
7 to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in Paragraph 7.
12 10. Proposed Intervenors admit the allegations contained in Paragraph 10. To the
13 extent Paragraph 10 does not contain the full list of the Secretary’s responsibilities, Proposed
14 Intervenors deny the allegations.
16 extent Paragraph 10 does not contain the full list of the Deanna Spikula’s, Registrar of Voters in
17 Washoe County, Nevada (the “Washoe Registrar”), responsibilities, Proposed Intervenors deny
18 the allegations.
19 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
20 12. Proposed Intervenors admit the allegations contained in Paragraph 12.
22 extent Paragraph 13 does not contain the full content and context of the Secretary’s Plan,
24 14. Paragraph 14 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions
25 to which no response is required. To the extent Paragraph 14 does not contain the full content
26 and context of the Secretary’s Plan, Proposed Intervenors deny the allegations.
28
3
13 to which no response is required. The Washoe Registrar’s April 10, 2020 Notice (“April 10,
14 2020 Notice”) is the best source of the full content and context of the April 10, 2020 Notice. To
15 the extent Paragraph 19 does not contain the full content and context of the April 10, 2020
16 Notice, Proposed Intervenors deny the allegations.
19 and context of the Elk County clerk’s office Plan, Proposed Intervenors deny the allegations.
21 to which no response is required. The Clark County clerk’s April 2, 2020 Notice (“April 2, 2020
22 Notice”) is the best source of the full content and context of the April 2, 2020 Notice. To the
23 extent Paragraph 21 does not contain the full content and context of the April 2, 2020 Notice,
26 to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenors deny
27 the allegations.
28
4
3 the allegations.
6 the allegations.
9 the allegations.
12 the allegations.
15 the allegations.
18 the allegations.
21 the allegations.
24 the allegations.
27 the allegations.
28
5
3 the allegations.
6 the allegations.
9 the allegations.
12 the allegations.
13 COUNT I
14 36. Proposed Intervenors incorporate by reference all of its allegations in the
15 preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

18 the allegations.
21 the allegations.
24 the allegations.
27 the allegations.
28
6
3 the allegations.
6 the allegations.
9 the allegations.
12 the allegations.
13 COUNT II

18 the allegations.
21 the allegations.
24 the allegations.
27 the allegations.
28
7
1 COUNT III
6 the allegations.
9 the allegations.
12 the allegations.
15 the allegations.
18 the allegations.
19 COUNT IV
24 the allegations.
25 58. Proposed Intervenors admit that candidates for the office of U.S. Representative
26 are on the ballot for the June Primary. Paragraph 58 also contains mere characterizations, legal
27 contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is
28
8
1 required, Proposed Intervenors deny the allegations.
2 59. Paragraph 59 also contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and
3 conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed
11 COUNT V

16 the allegations.

19 the allegations.
22 the allegations.
25 the allegations.
26 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
27 Proposed Intervenors set forth their affirmative defenses without assuming the burden of
28
9
1 proving any fact, issue, or element of a cause of action where such burden properly belongs to
2 Plaintiffs. Moreover, nothing stated here is intended or shall be construed as an admission that
3 any particular issue or subject matter is relevant to the allegations in the complaint. Proposed
4 Intervenors reserves the right to amend or supplement its affirmative defenses as additional facts
5 concerning defenses become known.
6 As separate and distinct affirmative defenses, Proposed Intervenors alleges as follows:
7 1. This Court lacks jurisdiction to issue the requested relief under the Eleventh
8 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
9 2. This Court lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiffs do not have Article III standing.
10 Plaintiffs lack Article III standing because they have not alleged an injury in fact and their
11 claimed injury is not redressable by this Court.
12 3. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
13
14 / / /
15 / / /
16 / / /
17 / / /
18 / / /
19 / / /
20 / / /
21 / / /
22 / / /
23 / / /
24 / / /
25 / / /
26 / / /
27 / / /
28
10
1 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

2 WHEREFORE, Proposed Intervenors respectfully requests that this Court:
3 A. Deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to any relief;
4 B. Dismiss the complaint in its entirety, with prejudice; and
5 C. Grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
6
DATED this 27th day of April, 2020
7

9
By: /s/ Bradley S. Schrager
10 Bradley S. Schrager, Esq., SBN 10217
Daniel Bravo, Esq., SBN 13078
12
Marc E. Elias, Esq.*
13 Henry J. Brewster, Esq.*
Courtney A. Elgart, Esq.*
14
PERKINS COIE LLP
700 Thirteenth St. NW, Suite 800
15 Washington, D.C. 20005-3960
16 Abha Khanna, Esq.*
Jonathan P. Hawley, Esq.*
17
PERKINS COIE LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
18 Seattle, Washington 98101-3099
19 Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor–Defendants
_____________
20
*Pro hac vice applications forthcoming
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
11
Exhibit 3
Complaint, Corona v. Cegavske, No. 20-

OC-00064-1B (Nev. Dist. Ct.), filed
April 16, 2020.
Exhibit 3
Exhibit 4
Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for

Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory
Relief, Corona v. Cegavske, No. 20-OC-
00064-1B (Nev. Dist. Ct.), filed
April 22, 2020.
Exhibit 4
PERKINS COIE LLP
4 Tel: (202) 654-6200
6
PERKINS COIE LLP
9 Tel: (206) 359-8000

14 Tel: (702) 341-5200
16 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Daniel Corona, Darin

Mains, Brian Melendez, Teresa Melendez,
18 DCCC, and Priorities USA
19 FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARSON CITY, STATE OF NEVADA
20
DANIEL CORONA, DARIN MAINS, BRIAN Case No.: 20-OC-00064-1B
21 MELENDEZ, TERESA MELENDEZ,
22 DNC SERVICES Dept. No.: I
23 NATIONAL COMMITTEE, DCCC, and
PRIORITIES USA, PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION
24 FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiffs, AND DECLARATORY RELIEF, ON
25 ORDER SHORTENING TIME
vs.
26
27 capacity as Nevada Secretary of State, JOSEPH
P. GLORIA, in his official capacity as Registrar
28
PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

1 of Voters for Clark County, Nevada, DEANNA

SPIKULA, in her official capacity as Registrar
2 of Voters for Washoe County, Nevada,
KRISTINE JAKEMAN, in her official capacity
3 as the Elko County Clerk, and AARON FORD,
in his official capacity as the Attorney General
4 of the State of Nevada,
5 Defendants,
7 Plaintiffs DANIEL CORONA, DARIN MAINS, BRIAN MELENDEZ, TERESA
8 MELENDEZ, THE NEVADA STATE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, DNC SERVICES
9 CORPORATION/DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, DCCC, and PRIORITIES USA,
10 by and through their attorneys, here submit their emergency motion for preliminary injunction
11 and declaratory relief, and submit concurrently their request for briefing and hearing on an order
12 shortening time, pursuant to FJDCR 9 and DCR 17. This motion is based upon all papers and
13 exhibits herein and on file in this action, the declarations made herewith, and any oral argument
14 the Court sees fit to allow at hearing on this matter.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
ii
2 TABLE OF CONTENTS
3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 1
4 BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................. 3
5 STANDARD OF LAW..................................................................................................................... 5
6 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................... 5
7 I. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the broad elimination of
in-person voting violates the Nevada and U.S. Constitutions. ................................. 5
8
A. The drastic reduction of in-person voting locations violates the
9 right of suffrage under the Nevada Constitution........................................... 5
10 B. The drastic reduction of in-person voting locations
unconstitutionally burdens the right to equal protection under the
11 Nevada and U.S. Constitutions. .................................................................. 10
12 II. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims that Defendants are required
to mail ballots to all registered voters. .................................................................... 12
13
A. Nevada law requires Defendants to mail ballots to all registered
14 voters. .......................................................................................................... 12
15 B. The exclusion of inactive voters violates of the right of suffrage
under the Nevada Constitution.................................................................... 13
16
C. The disparate treatment of similarly situated, qualified electors
17 violates the right to equal protection under the Nevada and U.S.
Constitutions. .............................................................................................. 15
18
III. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in challenging the Voter Assistance Ban. .............. 16
19
A. The Ban is superseded by the Voters’ Bill of Rights. ................................. 16
20
B. The Ban violates the right of suffrage under the Nevada
21 Constitution. ................................................................................................ 18
22 C. The Ban violates due process. ..................................................................... 19
23 D. The Ban violates the right to take concerted action guaranteed by
Article 1, Section 10 of the Nevada Constitution. ...................................... 21
24
IV. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their challenges to the
25 Ballot Rejection Rules. ........................................................................................... 21
26 A. The Ballot Rejection Rules ......................................................................... 22
27
28
iii
1 B. The Ballot Rejection Rules will arbitrarily disenfranchise

Nevadans who have properly cast ballots. .................................................. 22
2
C. The Ballot Rejection Rules violate of the right of suffrage under
3 the Nevada Constitution. ............................................................................. 29
4 D. The Ballot Rejection Rules violate due process. ........................................ 30
5 V. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that Nevada Administrative

Code § 293.217(1) violates N.R.S. 293.317. .......................................................... 32
6
VI. Absent a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury. ............. 32
7
VII. The balance of harms favors issuing a preliminary injunction. .............................. 33
8
VIII. The issuance of a preliminary injunction is in the public interest. ......................... 34
9
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 35
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
iv
1 INTRODUCTION
2 The United States is in the throes of an unprecedented public health crisis, with a highly
3 infections coronavirus spreading rapidly throughout the country. As of the date of this filing,
4 Nevada has 3,937 reported cases of the novel coronavirus, including 163 deaths, and that number
5 is growing by the day. The Governor has issued a stay at home order requiring all Nevadans to
6 stay in their residences and closing all non-essential business until at least April 30, 2020, though
7 these restrictions (or some version of them) are highly likely to be in place for far longer.
8 As the Nevada Supreme Court explained more than a century ago, “[t]he right of voting,
9 and, of course, of having the vote counted, is one of most transcendent importance,—the highest
10 under our form of government.” Buckner v. Lynip, 22 Nev. 426, 438, 41 P. 762, 764 (1895). That
11 right is not any less important in the wake of the current pandemic. As in other states with
12 impending elections, this unprecedented and sudden crisis has required Nevada to reevaluate the
13 manner by which the State’s upcoming election will be conducted. Toward that end, Secretary of
14 State Barbara Cegavske (the “Secretary”) has announced her intention to hold an “all-mail
15 election” for the June 9 primary (the “June Primary”).
16 Plaintiffs agree that it is necessary for Nevada to dramatically expand mail voting in light
17 of the pandemic, but Nevada law—as well as both the state and federal constitutions—require
18 that certain safeguards be put in place to ensure that the right to vote remains accessible to all
19 Nevadans. Here, the Secretary’s designation of the June Primary as an all-mail election has both
20 introduced and exacerbated severe burdens on Nevadans’ fundamental right to vote, in five
21 different respects.
22 First, the Secretary has directed county clerks and registrars to drastically limit
23 availability of in-person voting opportunities, requiring only one in-person polling location per
24 county, regardless of county population, demographics, or geographic size. This broad, one-size-
25 fits-all approach is contrary to the Nevada and U.S. Constitutions, and ignores the reality that
26 Wisconsin confronted when it took similar steps in its primary two weeks ago—that expansion
27 of vote by mail cannot and will not eliminate the need for in-person voting for thousands of
28
1
1 voters, who will have to risk their health and safety to vote. In Nevada, where 87 percent of the
2 state’s registered voters will be required to share just two polling locations, the result will be
3 broad disenfranchisement and a far more elevated risk to the voters who do turn out to vote.
4 Second, while the Secretary has publicly assured voters that they will be mailed ballots
5 unsolicited, Defendants have repeatedly confirmed that they intend to send ballots only to voters
6 classified as “active.” But Nevada law requires that, in precincts designated as mailing precincts,
7 Defendants must send ballots to all registered voters—active and inactive alike—regardless of
8 whether the voter requests one. History proves that “inactive” voters—voters who failed to return
9 a postcard to the county registrar after a piece of their mail was auto-forwarded from their
10 registration address—can and do participate in elections. And the Secretary may not, consistent
11 with Nevada law, exclude this sizeable subset of voters from the state’s vote by mail response to
12 the pandemic.
13 Third, the shift to an all-mail election exacerbates the already formidable constitutional
14 burdens imposed by Nevada’s Voter Assistance Ban (or the “Ban”), which criminalizes efforts to
15 assist voters in returning both absent ballots and mailing ballots (collectively “mail ballots”).
16 While constitutionally suspect under any circumstance, the burdens that the Ban will impose on
17 voters in the present pandemic cannot possibly be outweighed by the State’s meager
18 justifications for it. This is true not only for the large number of Nevada voters who do not
19 generally have access to reliable mail service, but for countless others, as the pandemic continues
20 to tax a struggling U.S. Postal Service and limits voters’ ability to interact with family members.
21 The Ban cannot be constitutionally applied in this context.
22 Fourth, the shift to an all-mail election also exacerbates the serious threat of
23 disenfranchisement posed by Nevada’s Ballot Rejection Rules, whereby election officials are
24 given broad discretion to reject mail ballots that either lack a signature on the return envelope, or
25 where they “question” the authenticity of the signature. As thousands more Nevadans vote by
26 mail than ever before, the Ballot Rejection Rules will disenfranchise large swaths of eligible
27 voters based on little more than a technical error or the arbitrary and untrained discretion of local
28
2
1 election officials.
2 Fifth, the Secretary’s regulations fail to comply with the Nevada Legislature’s 2019
3 amendment to the ballot return laws, which allows all mail ballots postmarked not just
4 received by election day to be counted. As Nevada prepares for the all-mail June Primary, it is
5 critical that the Secretary comply with this statute to ensure that properly cast ballots are counted.
6 Plaintiffs sought assurances from the Secretary that the safeguards necessary to protect
7 the right to vote would be put in place for the June Primary, but the Secretary concluded she
8 could not or would not implement them. Thus, Plaintiffs now seek urgent relief from this Court,
9 to protect Nevada’s voters, and avoid expansive—and avoidable—disenfranchisement. Plaintiffs
10 request a preliminary injunction (1) requiring Defendants to expand the number of polling
11 locations in the June Primary to reflect the population and geographic size of each county;
12 (2) requiring Defendants to mail ballots to all registered voters; (3) enjoining enforcement of the
13 Voter Assistance Ban; (4) enjoining enforcement of the Ballot Rejection Rules; and (5) enjoining
14 enforcement of Administrative Code § 293.217(1).
15 BACKGROUND
16 On March 24, 2020, citing the “many uncertainties surrounding the COVID-19
17 pandemic,” the Secretary announced plans to “conduct an all-mail election” for the June
18 Primary. Ex. 12. The announcement stated that “at least one in-person polling location will be
19 available in each county,” indicating that virtually all other in-person polling locations—
20 typically available in every precinct—will be closed during the early voting period and on
21 election day. Id. Citing the limited availability of in-person polling locations, the Secretary
22 encouraged Nevadans “to register to vote now and not rely on the same-day registration
23 process.” Id. She assured voters that “[n]o action or steps . . . will be required by individual
24 voters in order to receive a ballot by mail,” stating that “[a]ll active registered voters in Nevada
25 will be mailed” a ballot. Id. (emphasis added). Over the last week, Nevada counties have begun
26 circulating information regarding how they intend to implement the Secretary’s direction.
27 Clark County. On April 13, Clark County announced that voters will receive a mail-in
28
3
1 ballot on or before May 18, and may personally return them through the U.S. Postal Service or
2 by dropping them off in person at designated locations around the county. Ex. 13. Clark County
3 voters who vote in person (on election day or during the two-week early voting period) will all
4 have to vote at a single voting center located in North Las Vegas. Id.
5 Washoe County. According to the Washoe County Registrar’s website, voters will
6 receive a mail-in ballot that they can personally return by mail or drop off at the Registrar’s
7 Office in Reno. Ex. 14. The Registrar’s Office will also serve as the only in-person voting
8 location for Washoe County during early voting and on election day. Id.
9 Elko County. The Elko County Clerk’s Office has stated it will mail ballots to “[a]ll
10 active registered voters . . . during the first part of May 2020.” Ex. 15. While Elko County
11 initially planned on seven geographically diverse polling locations, see Ex. 16, it now intends to
12 maintain only one—the County Library during early voting and the County Clerk’s Office on
13 election day—which will be open for “mail-in ballot deliveries, replacement ballot requests
14 or same-day registration ONLY.” Ex. 17.
15 On April 10, Plaintiff Nevada State Democratic Party (the “Party”) sent a letter outlining
16 its concerns to the Secretary and every county clerk or registrar of voters in the state. See Ex. 19.
17 The letter stated the same positions that provide the basis for Plaintiffs’ complaint and this
18 motion for a preliminary injunction, and expressed the Party’s hope to “work collaboratively”
19 with the Secretary to address its concerns. Id. The Secretary and the county clerks never formally
20 responded to the letter, but, through the media, the Secretary rejected the Party’s requests. See
21 Ex. 20, Attach. A.
22 As a result, Plaintiffs—including the Party, DNC Services Corporation/Democratic
23 National Committee, DCCC, and Priorities USA (collectively, the “Organizational Plaintiffs”),
24 as well as Nevada voters Daniel Corona, Darin Mains, Brian Melendez, and Teresa Melendez
25 (collectively, the “Voter Plaintiffs”)—now bring this motion for a preliminary injunction to
26 ensure that the June Primary be conducted consistent with the requirements of state and federal
27 law.
28
4
1 STANDARD OF LAW
2 Nevada Revised Statutes (“N.R.S.”) 33.010 “authorizes an injunction when it appears
3 from the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested and at least part of the relief
4 consists of restraining the challenged act.” Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Nevadans for Sound
5 Gov’t, 120 Nev. 712, 721, 100 P.3d 179, 187 (2004) (per curiam). Plaintiffs must show “(1) a
6 likelihood of success on the merits; and (2) a reasonable probability that the non-moving party’s
7 conduct, if allowed to continue, will cause irreparable harm for which compensatory damage is
8 an inadequate remedy.” Id. (quoting S.O.C., Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, 117 Nev. 403, 408, 23
9 P.3d 243, 246 (2001)). “In considering preliminary injunctions, courts also weigh the potential
10 hardships to the relative parties and others, and the public interest.” Id. (citing Clark Cty. Sch.
11 Dist. v. Buchanan, 112 Nev. 1146, 1150, 924 P.2d 716, 719 (1996)).
12 ARGUMENT
13
I. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the broad elimination of in-person
14 voting violates the Nevada and U.S. Constitutions.
15 Plaintiffs support Defendants’ decision to expand access to vote by mail to Nevada
16 voters. This decision is not only the right one, but constitutionally required in the face of the
17 present pandemic. But expanding access to vote by mail does not eliminate the need to provide
18 in-person voting for thousands of Nevada voters, many of whom will be unable to cast a mail
19 ballot. Defendants’ elimination of all but one in-person polling location per county, regardless of
20 county population or size, will impose severe burdens on thousands of Nevada voters, who will
21 have to either bear the significant burdens associated with attempting to vote in person at a
22 single, overcrowded polling location in the middle of a dangerous pandemic, or forego their
23 fundamental right to vote altogether. The broad elimination of in-person voting thus violates
24 fundamental rights under both the Nevada and U.S. Constitutions.
25
A. The drastic reduction of in-person voting locations violates the right of
26 suffrage under the Nevada Constitution.
27 Defendants’ plan to eliminate all but one polling location in each county, regardless of
28
5
1 population or geographic size, violates the right of suffrage enshrined in the Nevada Constitution
2 because it will, in practice, disenfranchise many voters for whom in-person voting is the only
3 viable option, to the particular disadvantage of voters in large and highly-populated counties.
4 The Nevada Constitution provides broad protection of the right to vote. See Nev. Const.
5 art. 2, § 1 (“All [qualified voters] shall be entitled to vote for all officers that now or hereafter
6 may be elected by the people, and upon all questions submitted to the electors at such election.”);
7 cf. State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131, 170, 58 P. 284, 288 (1899) (“The right to vote
8 for all officers, from governor to and including all assemblymen and state senators [in Article 2,
9 Section 1] could not be given in stronger or broader language.”). Pursuant to this right, Nevada
10 election laws must “be reasonable, uniform, and impartial.” State ex rel. Boyle v. State Bd. of
11 Exam’rs, 21 Nev. 67, 71, 24 P. 614, 616 (1890); State v. Findley, 20 Nev. 198, 202, 19 P. 241,
12 243 (1888).
13 As the Nevada Supreme Court explained more than a century ago, “[t]he right of voting,
14 and, of course, of having the vote counted, is one of most transcendent importance,—the highest
15 under our form of government.” Buckner, 22 Nev. at 438. Accordingly, restrictions on the right
16 to vote, or the right to have one’s vote counted, must be strictly scrutinized, and they cannot
17 stand if they result in any qualified voter’s disenfranchisement. See id. (“That one entitled to vote
18 shall not be deprived of his privilege by action of the authorities is a fundamental principle.”
19 (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the
20 Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 680 (2d ed. 1871)); Davies v. McKeeby, 5
21 Nev. 369, 371 (1870) (“The form of the law by which an individual is deprived of a
22 constitutional right is immaterial. The test of its constitutionality is, whether it operates to
23 deprive any person of a right guaranteed or given to him by the Constitution. If it does, it is a
24 nullity—whatever may be its form.” (emphasis added)); accord Simmons v. McDaniel, 680 P.2d
25 977, 980 (N.M. 1984) (“[W]e are [] committed to examine ‘most carefully, and rather
26 unsympathetically’ any challenge to a voter’s right to participate in an election, and will not deny
27 that right ‘absent bad faith, fraud or reasonable opportunity for fraud.’” (quoting Valdez v.
28
6
1 Herrera, 145 P.2d 864, 869 (N.M. 1944))); see generally Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote
2 Under State Constitutions, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 89, 110–29 (2014) (explaining states with an
3 enumerated right to vote should and do apply closer scrutiny to claims arising under their own
4 constitutions than under the federal constitution, which lacks an enumerated right to vote).
5 The broad and undifferentiated elimination of in-person voting is unconstitutional for a
6 very simple reason: it will effectively disenfranchise qualified voters for whom in-person voting
7 is the only viable option. Some Nevadans, for instance, are ineligible to vote by mail under
8 current Nevada law, including all “same day registrants,” which for the June Primary means
9 anyone who registers to vote between May 22 and June 9. Others who are eligible to vote by
10 mail will not receive their ballots through no fault of their own. See, e.g., Ex. 1 ¶¶ 13–14; Ex. 2
11 ¶¶ 7–9; Ex. 3 ¶¶ 6, 9–10. As the postal system attempts to deliver an unprecedented number of
12 ballots from county elections officials to voters, and then back again—an already struggling
13 system will be under increasing pressure, causing delays that will result in some number of
14 ballots that are not received by voters in time. See, e.g., Ex. 20, Attachs. B–C.
15 The novel coronavirus outbreak has also exacerbated factors that will make it difficult for
16 some mailed ballots to reach their intended recipients. Rates of unemployment have skyrocketed,
17 including in Nevada. See, e.g., Ex. 20, Attach. D; id., Attach. E (Nevada has experienced second
18 highest increase in unemployment in the country). Combined with Nevada’s traditionally high
19 rate of migration, this rising unemployment will lead to increased transience and dislocation,
20 making it exponentially harder for many to receive ballots mailed to their addresses on file. This
21 is especially true of younger voters with less permanent residences, including students like
22 Plaintiff Darin Mains who have been forced to leave their on-campus housing. See Ex. ¶¶ 7–8.
23 Among Nevada’s significant Native and rural populations, many voters do not receive
24 personal mail delivery services. Ex. 10 ¶¶ 13–15. Instead, they must travel to post offices miles
25 away from where they live to pick up and drop off mail, which is especially difficult for those
26 without access to cars or valid drivers’ licenses. Id. ¶¶ 13–15, 19. Many are unable to visit post
27 offices with regularity. It is particularly difficult for rural voters to pick up ballots at a post office
28
7
1 a few weeks before an election and then drop them off shortly thereafter to meet the appropriate
2 deadlines. Id. Voting in person, if available and accessible, will mean just one trip outside their
3 homes during the pandemic as opposed to two or more trips to vote by mail.
4 Those voters who must vote in person will face numerous unnecessary obstacles as a
5 result of the elimination of all but one polling location per county. For some, the commute alone
6 will be daunting, if not insurmountable. Ex. 11 ¶¶ 11, 19. Clark County, for instance, spans
7 nearly 8,000 square miles, such that a resident of Laughlin would have to drive more than 100
8 miles each way to reach the polling place in North Las Vegas. Compl. ¶ 99; see also Ex. 11 ¶¶
9 11–12; Ex. 20, Attach. F. Once there, Clark County voters will be sharing the single polling
10 place with a multitude of other voters. Clark County is home to more than 1.1 million registered
11 voters, Ex. 20, Attach. G, and in the past two elections, more than 90 percent of voters who voted
12 in Clark County did so in person, either during early voting or on election day. See, e.g., id.,
13 Attach. H.
14 As the nation witnessed during the Wisconsin primary earlier this month, the result of
15 switching quickly to a vote by mail system, while simultaneously closing all but a handful of
16 polling locations, are predictably devastating: lines stretch around the block and last for hours;
17 numerous people pack into small spaces without the ability to properly socially distance; and poll
18 workers are exposed to too many other people. See Compl. ¶¶ 51–56; Ex. 20, Attach. I (“In
19 Milwaukee—where the number of polling stations was reduced from 180 to only five—voters
20 tried to exercise proper social distancing as they waited, in some cases, for more than two
21 hours.”); Ex. 20, Attach. J (“So voters faced a grim choice—go to a small number of crowded
22 polling places and risk infection or give up their right to vote. Thousands went to the polls in
23 scenes that horrified public health experts around the nation.”). Many voters were unable to
24 overcome these obstacles to cast a ballot. See, e.g., Ex. 20, Attach. K (describing story of a voter
25 who, because of poor health, was not able to wait in line and was disenfranchised as a result); id.,
26 Attach. L (interviewing voters who did not vote in the Wisconsin primary because they were not
27 able to vote by mail).
28
8
1 Defendants’ decision to allocate polling locations based on county lines, with one polling
2 location per county, will not have a “uniform” impact on voters; instead, the burden created by
3 this policy, and its disenfranchising impact, will fall most heavily on voters from highly
4 populated and geographically large counties. See Boyle, 21 Nev. at 71 (right of suffrage requires
5 that election laws “be reasonable, uniform, and impartial”). The concentration of registered
6 voters varies significantly across counties.
7 County Registered
Voters
8
Carson City 37,033
9
Churchill County 15,546
10 Clark County 1,326,277
11 Douglas County 41,047
12 Elko County 28,524
13 Esmeralda County 569

Eureka County 1,089
14
Humboldt County 9,817
15
Lander County 3,164
16 Lincoln County 2,982
17 Lyon County 40,211
18 Mineral County 2,949
Nye County 34,033
19
Pershing County 2,940
20
Storey County 3,486
21 Washoe County 314,362
22 White Pine County 5,442
23
24 Ex. 20, Attach. M. Thus, Clark County’s 1,326,277 voters will be served by only one location,
25 while Esmeralda County’s single polling location will service only 569 registered voters. Indeed,
26 Clark and Washoe Counties alone account for more than 87 percent of registered voters in
27 Nevada, all of whom will be forced to share just two polling locations.
28
9
1 The geographic spread of counties is similarly disparate: While Plaintiff Daniel Corona,
2 for instance, must travel over 100 miles one way from his home in West Wendover to Elko to
3 vote in person, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 10–11, a voter in Carson City will have to travel no more than 20 miles.
4 Given these significant disparities, county lines are not a reasonable or impartial basis by which
5 to allocate polling locations.
6 While voting by mail will be the best option for most Nevada voters in June, Defendants
7 cannot effectively deny voters the opportunity to vote in person, safely at a reasonably accessible
8 location. As a direct result of Defendants’ actions, voters from Nevada’s most populous and
9 geographically expansive counties who must vote in person will have to either overcome the
10 severe burdens imposed by traveling to and packing into their county’s single polling location or
11 forego their right to vote altogether. Because the drastic reduction of in-person voting will
12 “deprive” thousands of voters the right to vote “provided . . . by the Constitution,” “it is a
13 nullity” under Article 2, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution. Davies, 5 Nev. at 371–72.
14 B. The drastic reduction of in-person voting locations unconstitutionally

burdens the right to equal protection under the Nevada and U.S.
15 Constitutions.
16 In addition to violating the express right of suffrage under the Nevada Constitution,
17 Defendants’ closure of all but one polling location per county also violates both the state and
18 federal constitutions’ equal protection guarantees. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV (“No state
19 shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Nev.
20 Const. art. IV, § 21 (“[A]ll laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the
21 State.”). Nevada courts employ the Anderson-Burdick framework to analyze claims that election
22 laws create barriers to voting that violate equal protection. See Nevada Judges Ass’n v. Lau, 112
23 Nev. 51, 54, 910 P.2d 898, 900 (1996); see also Armijo v. State, 111 Nev. 1303, 1304, 904 P.2d
24 1028, 1029 (1995) (per curiam) (Nevada courts “look to federal precedent for guidance” for
25 equal protection claims); Obama for Am. v. Husted (OFA), 697 F.3d 423, 430 (6th Cir. 2012)
26 (“[W]hen a state regulation . . . treat[s] voters differently in a way that burdens the fundamental
27 right to vote, the Anderson-Burdick standard applies.”). Thus, a court considers “(1) the nature of
28
10
1 the asserted injury to the protected rights; (2) the interests put forward by the state as justification
2 for that injury; and (3) the necessity for imposing the burden on the petitioners’ rights rather than
3 some less restrictive alternative.” Lau, 112 Nev. at 54–55, 910 P.2d at 900. The scrutiny applied
4 depends on the “character and magnitude of the asserted injury to” First and Fourteenth
5 Amendment rights. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
6 The severe burdens imposed on voters as a result of Defendants’ decision to close all but
7 one polling location per county cannot be justified by the state’s interests under the
8 circumstances. As described above, Defendants’ actions will severely burden those voters who
9 must vote in person for the June Primary, by increasing their exposure to other voters in
10 overcrowded polling locations, requiring them to travel long distances to reach their polling
11 locations, or both. Cf. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, No. 20-CV-249-WMC, 2020 WL
12 1638374, at *13 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2020) (holding decision of going forward with recent
13 primary such that voters had to choose to “literally risk[] their health and lives in order to cast a
14 vote” constituted a “severe burden[]” on right to vote), judgment stayed on other grounds,
15 Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 19A1016, 2020 WL 1672702, at *1
16 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2020). While some voters will have the option to cast a ballot close to home and in
17 sparsely-populated centers, others will have to travel substantially farther and stand in long lines
18 in large crowds in the hopes of exercising their right to vote. See supra at I.A.
19 Defendants can advance no state interest to justify these severe burdens. Maintaining the
20 health and safety of the electorate militates in favor of more polling locations in highly populated
21 counties and cannot justify Defendants’ decision to open only one, no matter the county’s size or
22 population. Larger counties require additional in-person voting sites to enable voters to vote
23 efficiently while maintaining recommended social distancing. The same holds true for the safety
24 of poll workers; operating more polling locations in places like Clark and Washoe Counties will
25 decrease the number of voters to whom poll workers are ultimately exposed.
26 Under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, the magnitude of the injury on those voters
27 who must vote in person, and even more so on those who must travel long distances and wait
28
11
1 alongside large crowds to do so, outweighs any purported state interest in closing polling
2 locations. See OFA, 697 F.3d at 434 (holding state could not justify electoral burdens “placed on
3 some but not all Ohio voters”). As a result, Defendants’ policy violates Plaintiffs’ rights to equal
4 protection in the exercise of the franchise under the Nevada and U.S. Constitutions.
5
II. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims that Defendants are required to mail
6 ballots to all registered voters.
7 Defendants plan to mail ballots only to “‘active’ registered voters,” not all registered
8 voters. See Exs. 12, 15. Critically, “inactive” voters are still duly registered voters who can and
9 regularly do vote in Nevada elections. A voter becomes labeled “inactive” simply by failing to
10 return a postcard to the registrar within 30 days of receipt after a piece of their mail was auto-
11 forwarded from their registration address. N.R.S. 293.530(c), (g). Only when an “inactive” voter
12 fails to vote in the second general election after not returning the card is she purged from the
13 voter rolls. N.R.S. 293.530(1)(c)(4).
14 Defendants’ decision to mail ballots only to active voters squarely contradicts Nevada
15 law governing all-mail elections. It also violates the requirement under the Nevada Constitution
16 that election laws be “reasonable, uniform, and impartial,” Boyle, 21 Nev. at 71, and places an
17 undue burden on the right to vote on equal terms under the Nevada and U.S. Constitutions.
18 A. Nevada law requires Defendants to mail ballots to all registered voters.

19 The decision to mail ballots to only a subset of qualified voters exceeds Defendants’
20 statutory authority under Nevada law. Defendants’ authority to hold an all-mail election arises
21 from the state’s laws governing mailing precincts. Mailing precincts are, unsurprisingly,
22 precincts that vote predominantly by mail. See N.R.S. 293.343–293.355. While Nevada law
23 contemplates that only smaller precincts with few voters will be deemed mailing precincts, see
24 N.R.S. 293.213(1), (3), county clerks are permitted to otherwise establish mailing precincts with
25 the prior approval of the Secretary, N.R.S. 293.213(4).
26 The Secretary and the county clerks have invoked this authority to set mailing precincts.
27 See Ex. 12 (“We are working with our 17 county election officials to implement the changes
28
12
1 necessary to successfully administer this election.”); see also Exs. 13–15, 17. Having done so,
2 they must abide by N.R.S. 293.345, which unequivocally requires that a ballot be mailed to all
3 registered voters—not just those classified as “active.” See N.R.S. 293.345 (“Before 5 p.m. on
4 the last business day preceding the first day of the period for early voting for any primary
5 election or general election, the county clerk shall cause to be mailed to each registered voter in
6 each mailing precinct and in each absent ballot mailing precinct an official mailing ballot . . .”
7 (emphasis added)).
8 Nevada law makes clear that inactive voters are registered voters, see N.R.S. 293.530;
9 Nev. Admin. Code § 293.454(3)(a) (“A person whose registration is classified as ‘active,’ ‘active
10 pending’ or ‘inactive’ is eligible to vote.” (emphasis added)), and Defendants must treat them as
11 such. Cf. State v. Salge, 1 Nev. 455, 458 (1865) (“All persons who were qualified voters under
12 the Constitution would certainly continue to be so until they became disqualified by a failure to
13 comply with the requirements of the registry law.”). In the context of mailing precincts, this
14 means that Defendants are required to mail ballots to registered voters with “inactive” status.
15
B. The exclusion of inactive voters violates of the right of suffrage under the
16 Nevada Constitution.
17 Because Defendants’ decision not to send mail ballots to inactive voters expressly
18 violates the governing statute, the Court need not consider Plaintiffs’ arguments as to its
19 constitutionality. See White v. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co., No. 5:09 CV 2193, 2010 WL
20 1948290, at *8 n.16 (N.D. Ohio May 13, 2010); cf. Barnett v. State, 96 Nev. 753, 754, 616 P.2d
21 1107, 1108 (1980). But the right of suffrage under the Nevada Constitution provides an
22 independent ground to enjoin Defendants’ selective application of the all-mail June Primary to
23 active voters only. Buckner, 22 Nev. at 438 (“That one entitled to vote shall not be deprived of
24 his privilege by action of the authorities is a fundamental principle.” (quoting Cooley, supra, at
25 680)). As discussed above, this Court must closely scrutinize Defendants’ exclusionary policy
26 because it erects a barrier to voting for qualified voters. See supra at I.A.
27 Excluding inactive voters from the universe of voters to whom ballots will automatically
28
13
1 be sent will almost certainly mean that many will not be able to vote at all. Most voters do not
2 know that they have been labeled “inactive.” See Ex. 8; Ex. 9. Inactive voters are likely to expect
3 to receive a ballot in the mail, unaware that they must take steps to proactively request one, only
4 realizing too late that it will not be arriving. Such voters will have no option but to vote in
5 person, which for many will mean foregoing the right to vote altogether, particularly in light of
6 Defendants’ decision to severely limit access to in-person voting opportunities. See supra at I.A.
7 Make no mistake: inactive voters vote. In Clark County alone, more than 43,000 voters
8 classified as inactive showed up to the polls and cast ballots in the 2016 and 2018 primary and
9 general elections.
10 Inactive Voters Who Voted in Clark County

Election Number
11
2016 Primary 1,373
12 2016 General 24,436
2018 Primary 2,893
13 2018 General 14,440
14 Total 43,142
15 Ex. 19, Attach. D. And the Secretary’s decision has the potential to impact substantial numbers
16 of voters. Indeed, according to the Secretary’s own data, there were 250,195 inactive voters as of
17 March 2020. See Ex. 20, Attach. NError! Hyperlink reference not valid..
18 Defendants’ exclusionary policy cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny for at least three
19 reasons. First, by treating the two categories of qualified voters differently, the policy, on its
20 face, violates the constitutional principle that election laws must be “reasonable, uniform, and
21 impartial.” Findley, 20 Nev. at 202; see also Boyle, 21 Nev. at 71. Second, by refusing to treat
22 inactive voters as registered voters even though they meet the qualifications for voting and have
23 complied with the registration laws, Defendants have impermissibly erected an additional
24 requirement to vote not found in the Nevada Constitution or state laws. Defendants may not
25 lawfully set the standards for testing an elector’s qualification to vote, see Boyle, 21 Nev. at 69,
26 or impose additional qualifications on voters, see Davies, 5 Nev. at 373–74; Clayton v. Harris, 7
27 Nev. 64, 67 (1871). Third, Defendants’ actions, which have the effect of making it more difficult
28
14
1 to vote, are not “calculated to facilitate and secure,” but instead “subvert or impede, the exercise
2 of the right to vote.” Boyle, 21 Nev. at 71. For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs are also highly
3 likely to succeed on their claims that Defendants’ actions are unconstitutional.
4
C. The disparate treatment of similarly situated, qualified electors violates the
5 right to equal protection under the Nevada and U.S. Constitutions.
6 Defendants’ decision to send ballots only to active voters, and not to inactive voters, also
7 violates the equal protection guarantees of the Nevada and U.S. Constitutions. See U.S. Const.
8 amend. XIV; Nev. Const. art. IV, § 21; see also supra at I.B. (Anderson-Burdick applies to equal
9 protection claims regarding right to vote).
10 “Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later
11 arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.” Bush v. Gore,
12 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000); see also Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 899 (N.D. Ill.
13 2002) (where voters in “different counties have significantly different probabilities of having
14 their votes counted, solely because of the nature of the system,” the “system does not afford the
15 ‘equal dignity owed to each voter’” (quoting Bush, 531 U.S. at 104)).1 Defendants’ decision to
16 send ballots only to active voters makes an arbitrary distinction among Nevada’s registered
17 voters that offends these constitutional principles of equal protection. See Soltysik v. Padilla, 910
18 F.3d 438, 446 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding burden that “falls entirely” on one category of candidates
19 “‘serious enough’ to warrant more exacting review” (quoting Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098,
20 1114 n.27 (9th Cir. 2011))). The discriminatory character of Defendants’ actions, coupled with
21 the high likelihood that they will disenfranchise many inactive voters, warrants heightened
22 scrutiny under Anderson-Burdick. See Jacobson v. Lee, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1282 (N.D. Fla.
23 2019) (finding Florida statute that “is not a neutral, nondiscriminatory restriction on Plaintiffs’
24
25
1
Nevada has specifically adopted this fundamental principle as part of the state’s Voters’
26 Bill of Rights. See N.R.S. 293.2546 (providing voters should “have nondiscriminatory equal
access to the elections system,” and “each voter has the right . . . [t]o receive and cast a ballot”).
27
28
15
1 voting rights” triggers heightened scrutiny), appeal docketed, No. 19-14621 (11th Cir. Nov. 20,
2 2019).
3 But Defendants cannot justify their arbitrary distinction among voters under any standard
4 of review. Not only are the added costs or administrative burdens associated with mailing ballots
5 to inactive voters marginal in the context of an all-mail election, they cannot justify the State’s
6 disparate treatment. See Ohio State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 548 (6th
7 Cir. 2014) (affirming court’s finding administrative costs did not justify burdening right to vote),
8 vacated on other grounds, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014). Indeed,
9 Defendants can identify no state interest in burdening one group of voters where Nevada law
10 expressly requires that all voters receive a mailed ballot. See supra at II.A.
11 Thus, from any angle, Defendants’ discriminatory policy fails to pass constitutional
12 muster and should be enjoined.
13 III. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in challenging the Voter Assistance Ban.
14 The upcoming all-mail election throws into sharp relief the burdens imposed by the Voter
15 Assistance Ban, which makes it a felony—punishable by a prison term of up to four years and a
16 fine of $5,000—for anyone other than a voter’s family members to help return a voted mail
17 ballot to election officials. See N.R.S. 293.330(4) (absent ballots); N.R.S. 293.353(4) (mailing
18 ballots); see also N.R.S. 193.130(2)(e). The Ban thus severely limits the ability of voters to
19 request, and effectively prohibits organizations from providing, assistance in delivering a voter’s
20 completed voted ballot. This poses a significant hurdle to vote by mail for countless voters,
21 because Nevada law otherwise requires mail ballots to be returned by mail or hand delivery to
22 the county clerk. See N.R.S. 293.317, 293.353(1)–(2)(a). While the Ban fails review under any
23 circumstance, the hardships it imposes in the context of the unprecedented and fast-approaching
24 state-wide all-mail election warrant immediate injunctive relief.
25 A. The Ban is superseded by the Voters’ Bill of Rights.

26 The Nevada Voters’ Bill of Rights guarantees to every qualified voter 11 enumerated
27 rights. See N.R.S. 293.2546. The Legislature first enacted the Voters’ Bill of Rights in 2003 and
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16
1 last amended it in 2019, see 2019 Nev. Laws ch. 619, § 24, and in 2017 and 2019, voted to
2 enshrine these rights in the Nevada Constitution, subject to approval by the people in the
3 November 2020 election, see Ex. 20, Attach. O. The Voter Assistance Ban, which was enacted
4 for absent ballots in 1993 and applied to mailing ballots in 2007, see 1993 Nev. Laws ch. 523,
5 § 52; 2007 Nev. Laws ch. 314, § 6, cannot be reconciled with at least one of the rights
6 guaranteed by the Voters’ Bill of Rights—specifically, the right “[t]o request assistance in
7 voting, if necessary.” N.R.S. 293.2546(6).
8 Not every Nevadan has access to mail at their residence. Many Native voters living on
9 reservations have to travel far distances to get to the post office. See Ex. 10 ¶¶ 13–15. Similarly,
10 in West Wendover, where Plaintiff Daniel Corona serves as mayor, U.S. Postal Service home
11 delivery is not available to the town’s 4000-plus residents. See Ex. 1 ¶ 14. In these communities,
12 voters with mobility issues, or who lack reliable access to private transportation, all require
13 assistance in dropping off ballots to vote. Ex. 10 ¶¶ 21–24. If those voters do not live with or
14 close to family members, they will effectively be prevented from voting by mail.
15 The current public health crisis has only made matters worse. To give just one example,
16 the novel coronavirus outbreak has dramatically impacted Nevada seniors who live in assisted
17 living facilities. See, e.g., Ex. 20, Attach. P. As these facilities take the precautions necessary to
18 protect their residents, it will become more difficult for family members even to visit, let alone
19 provide assistance returning mail ballots.2 Many other Nevadans have decided or are required to
20 shelter at home, away from relatives outside their households, to protect their health and the
21
22
2
The Ban as applied to absent ballots includes an exception for “[a]ny registered voter
23 who is unable to go to the polls . . . [b]ecause of an illness or disability resulting in confinement
in a hospital, sanatorium, dwelling or nursing home.” N.R.S. 293.316(1); see also N.R.S.
24 293.330(4) (listing exception). This exception, however, is at best ambiguous, at one point
allowing an ill or disabled voter to designate another person “to obtain, deliver and return the
25 ballot,” N.R.S. 293.316(3)(b) (emphasis added), but in the next subsection mandating that “the
voter,” rather than the designee, “must . . . [r]eturn it to the office of the county clerk,” N.R.S.
26 293.316(4) (emphasis added); see also N.R.S. 293.3165 (second exception to Ban similarly
allows designees to mark and sign, but not return, ballots).
27
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17
1 health of their loved ones. See, e.g., Ex. 3 ¶ 4.
2 The transition to an all-mail election further exacerbates the hardships imposed by the
3 Ban. Not only will many Nevada voters be required to use mail ballots for the first time, but due
4 to the pandemic, the risks of simply leaving home to return a ballot might prove insurmountable.
5 In short, the pandemic will require more voters than ever to seek assistance—which, due to the
6 Ban, will be harder than ever to receive. The Ban is problematic under the best of circumstances;
7 unless it is enjoined for the upcoming primary, it is virtually certain to disenfranchise entirely
8 lawful voters.
9 Ensuring that a mail ballot is delivered to election officials is a necessary prerequisite to
10 having that ballot counted. Cf. OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 614–15 (5th Cir.
11 2017) (holding assistance in voting in Voting Rights Act context includes all steps necessary to
12 voting). The Voter Assistance Ban, a decades-old law that unreasonably prevents voters from
13 requesting assistance in a vital aspect of the voting process, is in direct conflict with the Voters’
14 Bill of Rights. As the Nevada Supreme Court has made clear, “when statutes are in conflict, the
15 one more recent in time controls over the provisions of an earlier enactment.” Laird v. State of
16 Nev. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 98 Nev. 42, 45, 639 P.2d 1171, 1173 (1982). Therefore, the Voters’
17 Bill of Rights controls.
18 B. The Ban violates the right of suffrage under the Nevada Constitution.
19 As described above, the Nevada Constitution specifically guarantees the right to vote. See
20 supra at I.A.; Nev. Const. art. 2, § 1. Laws that “impede[] the exercise of” that right offend this
21 constitutional provision. Boyle, 21 Nev. at 71; see also Simmons, 680 P.2d at 980 (examining
22 “‘most carefully, and rather unsympathetically’ any challenge to a voter’s right to participate in
23 an election” (quoting Valdez, 145 P.2d at 869)). The Ban will effectively disenfranchise any
24 voters who require assistance returning their ballots but lack access to family members who can
25 provide it. The number of Nevadans for whom this is true has only increased since the pandemic
26 began. Absent relief from this Court, the Ban will significantly impede the exercise of franchise,
27 in violation of Article 2, Section 1.
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18
1 C. The Ban violates due process.

2 The Voter Assistance Ban also violates the due process clauses of the Nevada and U.S.
3 Constitutions. Each provides that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property,
4 without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8. Because
5 “[t]he language in Article 1, Section 8(5) of the Nevada Constitution mirrors the due process
6 clause[]” of the U.S. Constitution, Nevada courts “look to federal precedent for guidance.”
7 Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, 128 Nev. 580, 587, 287 P.3d 305, 310 (2012) (alteration in
8 original) (quoting Rodriguez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 120 Nev.
9 798, 808 n.22, 102 P.3d 41, 48 n.22 (2004)); see also City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev.
10 327, 330, 580 P.2d 460, 462 (1978). A claim that an election law poses an undue burden on the
11 right to vote in violation of due process is analyzed under Anderson-Burdick. See Lau, 112 Nev.
12 at 54, 910 P.2d at 900; see also supra at I.B.
13 For those affected by the Ban, the burden it imposes is severe. If voters lack the ability to
14 return their ballots, their ballot will not be counted; thus, the Ban completely disenfranchises any
15 voters who cannot secure the assistance needed to deliver ballots. Disenfranchisement is
16 indisputably a severe burden on the right to vote. See, e.g., Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1 v.
17 Husted, 906 F. Supp. 2d 745, 750 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (“To disenfranchise a single voter is a matter
18 for grave concern.”). It is thus not surprising that, earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
19 the Ninth Circuit, in the similar context of the federal Voting Rights Act, concluded that a ballot
20 collection and delivery ban posed an undue hardship on voters—even before the rise of the
21 current health crisis. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1034 (9th Cir. 2020)
22 (en banc).
23 Nor is the Ban fairly calculated to serve a government interest that outweighs its
24 consequent burdens on voters’ rights. The needs to ensure the integrity of mail voting and
25 prevent undue influence on voters are already amply addressed by other measures. See McIntyre
26 v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995) (under Anderson-Burdick, courts
27 “evaluate[] the extent to which the State’s interests necessitated the contested restrictions”). For
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19
1 instance, it is already a felony in Nevada to “fraudulently [] request an absent ballot in the name
2 of another person,” N.R.S. 293.313(4); threaten, intimidate, coerce, or exercise undue influence
3 on any voter, N.R.S. 293.710(1)(a)–(c); impede or prevent a voter from voting, N.R.S.
4 293.710(1)(d); “vote[] or attempt[] to vote using the name of another person,” N.R.S.
5 293.775(2); or “attempt to vote more than once at the same election,” N.R.S. 293.780(1).
6 Layered over this, the burdens imposed by the Ban—an overbroad, superfluous
7 prohibition that prevents countless lawful Nevada voters from safely exercising their franchise in
8 the middle of an unprecedented pandemic—cannot be justified by a generalized interest in
9 preserving the integrity of elections, especially where it is not apparent that the Ban actually
10 serves that interest. See Ex. 10 ¶ 25; cf. Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1035–37 (“Ballot-collection-related
11 fraud was already criminalized under Arizona law when [the challenged law] was enacted. . . .
12 [The challenged law] does not forbid fraudulent third-party ballot collection. It forbids non-
13 fraudulent third-party ballot collection.”); Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 217–19 (Mo.
14 2006) (striking down voter ID requirement where “the type of fraud that has been shown to
15 exist . . . is not addressed by the [] Requirement”); Simmons, 680 P.2d at 980 (refusing to deny “a
16 voter’s right to participate in an election . . . ‘absent bad faith, fraud or reasonable opportunity
17 for fraud’” (quoting Valdez, 145 P.2d at 869)). As one court noted, “a preoccupation with mostly
18 phantom election fraud leads to real incidents of disenfranchisement, which undermine rather
19 than enhance confidence in elections.” One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 903
20 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
21 Simply put, the Voter Assistance Ban erects severe burdens for voters who need
22 assistance and lack family members to provide it, and is highly likely to lead to
23 disenfranchisement as a result. The State’s need to enforce the Ban is minimal given that is has
24 “less restrictive alternative[s]” for achieving the interests the Ban ostensibly promotes. Lau, 112
25 Nev. at 55, 910 P.2d at 900. Plaintiffs are highly likely to succeed on this claim.
26
27
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1 D. The Ban violates the right to take concerted action guaranteed by Article 1,
Section 10 of the Nevada Constitution.
2
3 Finally, the Voter Assistance Ban violates Article 1, Section 10 of the Nevada
4 Constitution, which provides that “[t]he people shall have the right freely to assemble together to
5 consult for the common good, to instruct their representatives and to petition the Legislature for
6 redress of Grievances.”
7 The Organizational Plaintiffs formed when individuals assembled to advance common
8 political beliefs. Helping Nevadans to vote—to exercise that most “precious” and “fundamental”
9 of rights, Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)—is an essential
10 component of their mission to promote the democratic process. See Ex. 5 ¶¶ 7–8; Ex. 6 ¶¶ 5, 8.
11 Their right to do so through collective action, both amongst their members and with voters they
12 assist, is at the heart of the freedom of assembly that is enshrined in the Nevada Constitution.
13 The Voter Assistance Ban violates this guarantee on its face because it prohibits group action to
14 promote democratic values. Specifically, it prevents individuals and organizations from working
15 together with voters to ensure that voters can participate in the core mechanism through which
16 Nevada citizens affect political change: voting. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are highly likely to
17 succeed on this claim.
18
IV. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their challenges to the Ballot
19 Rejection Rules.
20 As tens of thousands of Nevadans transition to vote by mail for the first time in the June
21 Primary, they will find themselves disenfranchised, not because they were deterred from voting
22 by the hurdles just described, but because of already highly problematic provisions of Nevada
23 law that require elections officials to reject mail-in ballots when the return envelope is not
24 signed, or when election officials—untrained in the dubious art of signature matching—conclude
25 that the voter’s signature on the ballot return envelope does not sufficiently resemble a signature
26 that the voter provided to election officials at some point in the past (together, the Ballot
27 Rejection Rules, codified at N.R.S. 293.325 and 293.333). The Ballot Rejection Rules have
28
21
1 operated and will continue to operate to unjustifiably and arbitrarily disenfranchise countless
2 qualified voters, like declarant John Porter, whose properly cast ballot was rejected in the 2016
3 primary. Ex. 7 ¶¶ 3–5. For the reasons that follow, the Ballot Rejection Rules violate the Nevada
4 and U.S. Constitutions and should be enjoined.
5 A. The Ballot Rejection Rules

6 When voting by mail, a voter is required to place the ballot in a return envelope and sign
7 the envelope. N.R.S. 293.330(1), 293.353(1). This requirement engenders three opportunities for
8 election officials to reject mail ballots cast by entirely lawful voters. First, if the return envelope
9 is not signed at all, and the voter does not cure the missing signature by the means required by
10 the county clerk and within seven days of the election, the ballot is rejected. N.R.S.
11 293.325(4)(c), 293.333(2). Second, “[i]f at least two employees in the office of the county clerk
12 believe there is a reasonable question of fact as to whether the signature on the [mail] ballot
13 matches the signature of the voter,” using samples of past signatures in the elections officials’
14 possession, it is flagged a mismatch. N.R.S. 293.325(1)(b). The ballot will be rejected unless the
15 county clerk concludes, applying their own standard-less discretion, that the ballot should be
16 counted. N.R.S. 293.325(2). Third, every mail ballot is reviewed again by the election board, this
17 time to determine if the signature on the return envelope specifically matches the signature on
18 the voter’s registration card. N.R.S. 293.333(1)(b). This second review provides yet another
19 opportunity for election officials to reject a ballot cast by a qualified voter based on the highly
20 questionable process of signature matching. At each stage, the people identifying signature
21 mismatches are elections officials who are doing so without the benefit of uniform, statewide
22 standards, training, or an adequate sample size to make any kind of accurate assessment of the
23 signatures presented to them.
24
B. The Ballot Rejection Rules will arbitrarily disenfranchise Nevadans who
25 have properly cast ballots.
26 Courts have repeatedly found that signature matching is fraught with serious reliability
27 issues even for highly trained experts with substantial resources and multiple samples of
28
22
1 contemporaneous signatures by the subject whose signature is being matched. Democratic Exec.
2 Comm. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[E]ven if election officials uniformly and
3 expertly judged signatures, rightful ballots still would be rejected just because of the inherent
4 nature of signatures.”); Saucedo v. Gardner, 335 F. Supp. 3d 202, 206 (D.N.H. 2018) (“As will
5 become evident, this signature-matching process is fundamentally flawed.”); Martin v. Kemp,
6 341 F. Supp. 3d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (invalidating signature match scheme because it violated
7 due process guarantees); Fla. Democratic Party v. Detzner (FDP), No. 4:16-cv-607-MW/CAS,
8 2016 WL 6090943, at *7 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2016) (state “has categorically disenfranchised
9 thousands of voters arguably for no reason other than they have poor handwriting or their
10 handwriting has changed over time”); LULAC v. Pate, No. CVCV056403, 2019 WL 6358335
11 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2019) (rejecting signature match scheme as violation of due process and
12 equal protection). The Ballot Rejection Rules virtually guarantee that the June Primary will be
13 plagued with extensive false “mis-matches,” severely burdening voters in a manner that cannot
14 be justified by the state’s interest in the same. See FDP, 2016 WL 6090943, at *6 (“If
15 disenfranchising thousands of eligible voters does not amount to a severe burden on the right to
16 vote, then this Court is at a loss as to what does.”).
17 As Dr. Linton Mohammed, a U.S.-certified and internationally recognized forensic
18 document examiner with decades of experience researching and conducting signature matching,
19 explains in his attached declaration, experts in handwriting have long observed that an
20 individual’s signature varies substantially for many well-documented and entirely innocuous
21 reasons, including, for example, age, illness, injury, medication, eyesight, pen type, ink, writing
22 surface or position, paper quality, or psychological factors.3 Ex. 11 ¶¶ 22, 34, 35, 37; see also
23 Lee, 915 F.3d at 1320; Saucedo, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 205. Voters who are elderly, disabled, suffer
24 from poor health, are young, or are non-native English speakers are more likely to have greater
25
3
26 Dr. Mohammed’s expert opinion on signature matching has been credited by many
courts. See, e.g., Lee, 915 F.3d at 1320; Saucedo, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 212–13.
27
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23
1 signature variability. Ex. 11 ¶¶ 22, 24, 26, 35–36; see also Saucedo, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 205–06.
2 For this reason, even experts with years of experience evaluating handwriting, and signatures in
3 particular, often struggle to make accurate matches particularly where they only have one or
4 two samples, or where the sample or samples they are matching against are not contemporaneous
5 or made under similar circumstances to the signature that they are attempting to verify. Ex. 11
6 ¶¶ 24, 33–34, 42–43; Saucedo, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 206. Laypersons are much more likely to make
7 an error in comparing signatures, and those errors skew substantially towards flagging false
8 positives; in other words, laypersons are much more likely to wrongly conclude that an authentic
9 signature is not genuine. Ex. 11 ¶ 25, 27–30; Saucedo, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 217 (“[T]he task of
10 handwriting analysis by laypersons . . . is fraught with error.”).
11 There are three principal problems with Nevada’s Ballot Rejection Rules that are highly
12 likely to lead to disenfranchisement of lawful registered voters: (1) the statute’s use of an
13 ambiguous and overly inclusive standard for signature matching, (2) the lack of adequate
14 safeguards to ensure that ballots cast and signed by qualified voters are not discarded, and (3) the
15 lack of an adequate opportunity for voters to cure problems with their signatures. Each of these
16 problems independently undermines the Ballot Rejection Rules and is a basis for striking them
17 down; together, they compel the result.
18 1. The Signature Matching Standard

19 When signature matching occurs, election officials are essentially acting in an
20 adjudicatory role to determine if the mail ballot they are inspecting will be counted. Put
21 differently, election officials are granting or denying a voter’s ability to exercise a fundamental
22 right. Whenever a government actor makes such a determination, it is critically important that the
23 decision-making process be governed by adequate standards to avoid the arbitrary exercise of
24 discretion. Bush 531 U.S. 110; Lee, 915 F.3d at 1320; Saucedo, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 206; FDP,
25
26
27
28
24
1 2016 WL 6090943, at *7; LULAC, 2019 WL 6358335, at *17.4 Nevada’s signature match
2 standards fall well short of this minimum requirement.
3 For signature matching that occurs in the county clerk’s office, two employees must find
4 only that there is a “reasonable question of fact” as to whether the signatures match. N.R.S.
5 293.325(1)(b). The problem with this standard is two-fold. First, the standard is sufficiently
6 vague that it invites different election officials to provide their own meaning and provides no
7 functional guidelines to channel their discretion. Ex. 11 ¶¶ 14–15, 18–19, 34, 42; Lee, 915 F.3d
8 at 1320; Saucedo, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 206; FDP, 2016 WL 6090943, at *7; LULAC, 2019 WL
9 6358335, at *17. Second, it sets too low a bar. A “reasonable question of fact” appears to invite
10 election officials to reject a ballot on something less than a preponderance of the evidence, let
11 alone clear and convincing evidence or the beyond a reasonable doubt standard employed in
12 some states. See Fla. Stat. § 101.68(c)(1)(b) (“[A]ny canvassing board finding that an elector’s
13 signatures do not match must be by majority vote and beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
14 For signature matching that occurs at the election board, election officials must compare
15 the signature on the envelope to a single reference signature from the voter’s registration card
16 and decide if the “voter is entitled to cast a ballot.” N.R.S. 293.333(1)(b), (c). This standard is no
17 standard at all. It likewise invites every election board, and each member thereof, to apply their
18 own standard, “virtually guaranteeing a crazy quilt of enforcement of the requirement from
19 county to county.” Lee, 915 F.3d at 1320; see also FDP, 2016 WL 6090943, at *7 (“The result is
20
21
4
This principle holds true outside of the election context as well, where courts have struck
22 down laws that allow government officials to deny fundamental rights without sufficient
standards to guide their discretion. See, e.g., Eddmonds v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 894, 897–98 (1984)
23 (explaining postconviction review of death sentences must have adequate standards to avoid
“arbitrary and capricious” action); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966)
24 (invalidating law that allowed juries to impose cost of prosecution on a criminal defendant under
the due process clause “because of vagueness and the absence of any standards sufficient to
25 enable defendants to protect themselves against arbitrary and discriminatory impositions of
costs”); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951) (holding laws that govern ability to
26 exercise First Amendment rights must be “narrowly drawn” with “reasonable and definite
standards”).
27
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25
1 a crazy quilt of conflicting and diverging procedures. And this Court is deeply troubled by that
2 complete lack of uniformity.”).
3 2. Inadequate Safeguards
4 Nevada’s signature matching scheme lacks numerous features critical to safeguard
5 against the rejection of ballots cast and signed by qualified voters. See Lee, 915 F.3d at 1315;
6 Saucedo, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 206. Specifically:
7 The signature matching rules do not require experts to conduct signature matching, Ex.
11 ¶¶ 17, 21, 22, 26–29, 35, 38–40;
8
The rules do not require that the officials conducting signature matching be screened for
9 their ability to accurately match signatures, id. ¶ 40;
10 The rules do not require that officials conducting signature matching undergo training,
and, in practice, it appears they are provided with little to no training, Ex. 19, Attach. C;
11 Ex. 11 ¶¶ 19, 25, 33–34, 36;
12 The rules do not require that officials conducting signature matching be provided with
adequate equipment such as magnification and lighting equipment, Ex. 11 ¶¶ 19, 33, 41,
13 46–47;
14 The rules do not require that officials conducting signature matching spend the minimum
required time, approximately two hours, to accurately authenticate a signature, id. ¶¶ 24,
15 33; and
16 The rules do not require the use of adequate reference signatures for determining if the
wet-ink signature on the return envelope is genuine (i.e., they do not require matching be
17 done with multiple contemporaneous signature samples as a reference, which is standard
practice in the field), and they do allow the use of digital signatures, a poor basis to
18 compare a wet-ink signature against, Ex. 19, Attach. D; Ex. 11 ¶¶ 24, 34, 41–45, 47.
19 These features and failures betray a fundamentally flawed signature matching scheme that
20 creates an unacceptable risk, nay certainty, that properly cast ballots will be rejected by election
21 officials. Lee, 915 F.3d at 1315 (“Florida’s lack of . . . formal training requirements for those
22 who assess the signatures as mismatched can also contribute to false positives for signature
23 mismatches.”); Saucedo, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 210 (“[Election officials] receive no training in
24 handwriting analysis, and they are not screened for conditions, such as poor eyesight, that may
25 impede their ability to discern subtle variations in signatures. The assumption seems to be that
26 the substantive task of signature comparison is one of common sense.”); see also Saucedo, 335
27 F. Supp. 3d at 217–18 (noting lack of training, lack of screening, lack of equipment, and
28
26
1 insufficient time to compare signatures); FDP, 2016 WL 6090943, at *8 (“Rather, thousands of
2 mismatched-signature voters, arguably through no fault of their own, will have their ballots
3 declared ‘illegal’ by canvassing boards—whose members, I might add, lack any formal
4 handwriting-comparison training or education.”); LULAC, 2019 WL 6358335, at *17 (noting
5 lack of expertise, training, and sufficient reference signatures).
6 3. The Cure Process

7 Despite the high rate of error inherent in signature matching, particularly by non-experts,
8 Nevada law provides an inadequate mechanism by which voters whose ballots are flagged for
9 rejection may “cure” the purported issue. See N.R.S. 293.325(4).
10 If a ballot is rejected by the county clerk’s office, the statute provides for cure
11 mechanisms on its face; but this opportunity is illusory because of the time limits imposed by the
12 statute.5 The entire process must be completed within seven days of the election. N.R.S.
13 293.325(c), 293.333(2). That is not enough time to notify voters and give them a meaningful
14 opportunity to cure a technical defect or correct a falsely flagged signature—particularly under
15 the current circumstances. It is hardly even enough time to notify voters that there is an issue
16 with their ballots in the first place.
17 There are three steps between when a voter drops her ballot in the mail and when she
18 receives notice that there was an issue with her ballot; each step spans several days. First, voters
19 are permitted to place their ballot in the mail up until election day. N.R.S. 293.317. The statute
20 anticipates that it may take a ballot three days to reach elections officials, N.R.S. 293.317(2), a
21 time frame that reflects normal postal service and does not account for the impact of the
22 pandemic.6 Thus, even under ordinary circumstances, ballots may not be received by election
23
24 5
If a voter forgets to sign the return envelope, the county clerk is required to contact the
25 potential cure
voter to the signature. N.R.S. 293.325(c). Similarly, if the county clerk’s office flags a
signature mismatch at the first stage of review, the county clerk must contact the voter
26 to confirm the signature. N.R.S. 293.325(1)(a).
6
The U.S. Postal Service states that first class mail takes up to 3 days to be delivered. Ex.
27 (footnote continued)
28
27
1 officials until several days into the cure period. Second, there is no deadline prescribed by the
2 statute or implementing regulations for when county officials are required to notify voters. In
3 general, but particularly in the June Primary where election officials will be processing
4 exponentially more mail ballots than they have in the past, it could take election officials days to
5 receive, sort, and review mail ballots and then create and process notices to voters. Third,
6 election officials intend to notify voters of the need to cure their ballots by mail. Ex. 19, Attach.
7 A. Those voters will not even be able to begin the cure process until they receive that notice—
8 which may take three (or more) days, assuming that they are sheltering at the residence to which
9 it is mailed and check their mail daily. Thus, many voters will not even receive notice that there
10 is an issue with their ballot until after the cure period has expired, rendering the cure provisions
11 in the statute “illusory.” Lee, 915 F.3d at 1324.
12 Then there are the actual steps voters must take to cure an issue with their ballots. Each
13 county has broad discretion to design their own rules. In Clark County, voters have three options
14 for curing an issue with their ballots: (1) they can mail back the notice with a copy of their
15 Nevada ID or driver’s license, (2) they can email back the notice with a copy of their Nevada ID
16 or driver’s license, or (3) they can go in person to the election department. Ex. 19, Attach. A.7
17 Each of these methods is problematic, particularly in the current pandemic. The first option,
18 mailing a notice back to the election department, is all but guaranteed to take longer than the
19 time permitted to cure a signature issue. And both the first and second method require both a
20 Nevada ID or driver’s license and access to a scanner and printer. Voters without one of these
21 identifications or without access to a scanner will be left only with the option of curing their
22
23 20, Attach Q. But mail service may take even longer in rural areas. In 2012, the U.S. Postal
Service closed the Elko County mail processing plant, meaning that mail from that county is now
24 processed in Salt Lake City, Utah—227 miles away. See Ex. 20, Attach. R. Nevada now has only
two mail processing plants in the state, one in Reno and one in Las Vegas. Id.
25
7
Plaintiff Nevada State Democratic Party, through counsel, also sent a public records
26 request to Registrar Spikula. requesting more information on the standards adopted by Washoe
county.. Ex. 19 ¶ 2.
27
28
28
1 signature in person. But many voters who have decided to vote by mail have done so because
2 going in person is not practicable, either because of work or family obligations, or, in the case of
3 the current public health crisis, to avoid exposure to the novel coronavirus. Requiring them to go
4 in person to present an ID negates the benefits of voting by mail, and will be too high a cost for
5 many voters. Martin, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 1339.
6 And for voters whose ballots are rejected by the election board, the statute simply affords
7 no cure process at all. See N.R.S. 293.333, 293.335.
8
C. The Ballot Rejection Rules violate of the right of suffrage under the Nevada
9 Constitution.
10 The Ballot Rejection Rules violate Article 2, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution by
11 denying to qualified voters their right to have their vote counted. See Buckner, 22 Nev. at 438
12 (“The right of voting, and, of course, of having the vote counted, is one of most transcendent
13 importance,—the highest under our form of government.” (emphasis added)). Unless enjoined,
14 they will result in the disenfranchisement of qualified voters who have cast a ballot because of
15 either (1) a technical error that could, with an adequate cure period, be corrected or (2) the
16 untrained judgment of election officials. Because voters who are entitled to vote will have their
17 votes rejected, the Ballot Rejection Rules violate the Nevada Constitution. See id. (“That one
18 entitled to vote shall not be deprived of his privilege by action of the authorities is a fundamental
19 principle.” (quoting Cooley, supra, at 680)); Davies, 5 Nev. at 371 (“The form of the law by
20 which an individual is deprived of a constitutional right is immaterial. The test of its
21 constitutionality is, whether it operates to deprive any person of a right guaranteed or given to
22 him by the Constitution.”).
23 The Ballot Rejection Rules also violate the principle that election laws be “reasonable,
24 uniform, and impartial.” Boyle, 21 Nev. at 71; see also Findley, 20 Nev. at 202. By failing to
25 proscribe sufficient standards for signature matching, the statute invites different counties, and
26 different personnel within those counties, to apply their own standards. And because the statute
27 and implementing regulations allow untrained laypersons to conduct signature matching—
28
29
1 without screening, without proper equipment or time, and without adequate reference signatures
2 with which to conduct the matching—some voters will have their ballots properly counted, while
3 others will have their ballots thrown out.
4 D. The Ballot Rejection Rules violate due process.

5 “There is more to the right to vote than the right to mark a piece of paper and drop it in a
6 box or the right to pull a lever in a voting booth. The right to vote includes the right to have the
7 ballot counted.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 n.29 (1964) (quoting South v. Peters, 339
8 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting)); see also Lee, 915 F.3d at 1315 (“‘Voting is the
9 beating heart of democracy.’ . . . But, of course, voting alone is not enough to keep democracy’s
10 heart beating. Legitimately cast votes must then be counted.” (quoting League of Women Voters
11 of Fla. v. Detzner, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1205, 1215 (N.D. Fla. 2018)). Because the Ballot Rejection
12 Rules deny Nevadans the right to have their votes counted, they violate the due process clauses
13 of Nevada and U.S. Constitutions.
14 The Ballot Rejection Rules violate these constitutional safeguards by arbitrarily
15 disenfranchising lawful, qualified voters. See LULAC, 2019 WL 6358335, at *16 (“There are
16 potentially myriad different, arbitrary classifications of voters including, but not limited to,
17 which of the 99 counties a voter lives in; the training of a county auditor or staff; the availability,
18 type, age and quality of any signatures ‘on record’ for a voter.”). When a ballot is rejected
19 because of the flawed use of signature matching, or because a voter was not provided an
20 adequate opportunity to cure, the result is outright disenfranchisement, a severe burden on the
21 right to vote. See FDP, 2016 WL 6090943, at *6 (“If disenfranchising thousands of eligible
22 voters does not amount to a severe burden on the right to vote, then this Court is at a loss as to
23 what does.”); Saucedo, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 218 (“It cannot be emphasized enough that the
24 consequence of [the election official’s] decision—disenfranchisement—is irremediable.”). Given
25 this burden, courts across the country have struck down signature matching laws. See, e.g., Lee,
26 915 F.3d at 1319–20, 1324 (affirming preliminary injunction against signature match law
27 pursuant to Anderson-Burdick claim); Saucedo, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 222 (granting summary
28
30
1 judgment for plaintiffs that signature match law violated procedural due process); Martin, 341 F.
2 Supp. 3d at 1339–40 (enjoining signature match law pursuant to a due process claim); FDP,
3 2016 WL 6090943, at *8 (enjoining signature match law pursuant to Anderson-Burdick claim);
4 LULAC, 2019 WL 6358335, at *17 (enjoining signature match law pursuant to equal protection
5 and due process claims).
6 The severe burden on the right to vote is not justified by the State’s interest in imposing a
7 signature matching regime. Lee, 915 F.3d at 1322 (rejecting fraud prevention and efficient
8 administration of elections as an adequate justification for signature match law); Saucedo, 335 F.
9 Supp. 3d at 220 (rejecting fraud prevention as an adequate justification for signature match law);
10 FDP, 2016 WL 6090943, at *7 (same); LULAC, 2019 WL 6358335, at *16 (same). As discussed
11 supra at III.C., state officials have myriad other tools for preserving the integrity of Nevada’s
12 elections. The disenfranchisement of qualified voters is certainly not justified by the State’s
13 interest in imposing this signature matching regime. Having chosen to implement signature
14 matching, a highly suspect method for verifying identity in the best of circumstances, Nevada is
15 required to articulate a sufficiently specific and rigorous standard to ensure that properly cast
16 ballots are not rejected, and Defendants are required to adopt adequate safeguards and a cure
17 process to ensure that qualified voters have their ballots counted.
18 While ballot rejection rules based on signature requirements and signature matching
19 disenfranchise voters in every election, they threaten to be particularly harmful in the upcoming
20 June Primary. Typically, about 90 percent of Nevadans vote in person and only 10 percent by
21 mail. See, e.g., Ex. 20, Attachs. S–V. In the June Primary, tens of thousands of Nevadans will be
22 shifted from voting in person, where there are no signature requirements for voters to comply
23 with or for election officials to enforce, to vote by mail. Voters will face the added prerequisite
24 to voting imposed by the signature requirement on the front end, and an onerous cure process on
25 the back end if their ballot is rejected because the return envelope lacks a signature or is
26 improperly flagged as having the wrong signature. Election officials will be faced with an
27 unprecedented volume of mail ballots to inspect, process, follow up with voters on, and count, all
28
31
1 in the midst of a pandemic which threatens to slow mail service, and all within the same seven
2 days in which ballots must be processed during a normal election. Put simply, the Ballot
3 Rejection Rules are incompatible with honoring each Nevadan’s right to vote and have that vote
4 counted in the normal course, and are especially so in the upcoming election.
5
V. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that Nevada Administrative Code
6 § 293.217(1) violates N.R.S. 293.317.
7 In 2019, the Nevada Legislature amended the ballot return laws to allow a mail ballot that
8 is postmarked by election day to be counted. See N.R.S. 293.317(1)(b). Before that change in the
9 law, a ballot had to be received by election day to be counted. See 2019 Nev. Laws ch. 619, § 45.
10 Nevada Administrative Code § 293.317 continues to reflect the old rules. See Nev. Admin. Code
11 § 293.317(1) (“To be counted, an absent ballot must be received by the office of the county clerk
12 by 7 p.m. on the day of the election.”). Because Nevada Administrative Code § 293.317(1)
13 conflicts with the statute it is intended to implement, it is invalid. See Roberts v. State, 104 Nev.
14 33, 37, 752 P.2d 221, 223 (1988) (“Administrative regulations cannot contradict or conflict with
15 the statute they are intended to implement.”).
16 VI. Absent a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury.

17 “A preliminary injunction is proper where the moving party can demonstrate . . . that,
18 absent a preliminary injunction, it will suffer irreparable harm for which compensatory damages
19 would not suffice.” Excellence Cmty. Mgmt., LLC v. Gilmore, 131 Nev. 347, 350–51, 351 P.3d
20 720, 722 (2015).
21 As courts routinely recognize, “abridgement of the right to vote constitutes an irreparable
22 injury.” Sanchez v. Cegavske, 214 F. Supp. 3d 961, 976 (D. Nev. 2016); see also OFA, 697 F.3d
23 at 436 (“A restriction on the fundamental right to vote [] constitutes irreparable injury.”);
24 Cardona v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 785 F. Supp. 837, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Abridgement
25 or dilution of a right so fundamental as the right to vote constitutes irreparable injury.”).
26 Moreover, “[a]s a constitutional violation may be difficult or impossible to remedy through
27 money damages, such a violation may, by itself, be sufficient to constitute irreparable harm.”
28
32
1 City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Court, 129 Nev. 348, 357, 302 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2013).
2 Absent an injunction, the Voter Plaintiffs in this case—as well as other Nevadans who
3 are disenfranchised as a result of Defendants’ actions as challenged in this suit—will suffer
4 constitutional violations that will result in irreparable, non-compensable injuries. If Nevada
5 voters do not have access to reasonable in-person voting facilities, do not receive a mail ballot
6 because of the arbitrary distinction between active and inactive voters, cannot return a mail ballot
7 because of the unnecessary restrictions imposed by the Voter Assistance Ban, or have a ballot
8 improperly rejected due to an erroneous signature mismatch, their ability to vote will be severely
9 curtailed. Such a deprivation is undoubtedly irreparable; “once the election occurs, there can be
10 no do-over and no redress.” League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224,
11 247 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Fla. Democratic Party v. Scott, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1258 (N.D.
12 Fla. 2016) (“This isn’t golf: there are no mulligans.”).8
13 VII. The balance of harms favors issuing a preliminary injunction.

14 The balance of harms also strongly favors issuance of a preliminary injunction. Absent
15 such relief, Plaintiffs will suffer serious injury to their most fundamental rights under both the
16 Nevada and U.S. Constitutions, hardships that clearly “outweigh any hardships to [Defendants]
17 caused by implementing the injunction.” Indep. Asphalt Consultants, Inc. v. Studebaker, No.
18 53908, 2010 WL 4278416, at *2 (Nev. Oct. 25, 2010); see also, e.g., Taylor v. Las Vegas Metro.
19 Police Dep’t, No. 2:19-CV-995 JCM (NJK), 2019 WL 5839255, at *10 (D. Nev. Nov. 7, 2019)
20 (“The fact that plaintiffs have raised serious First Amendment questions compels a finding
21
22
8
The Organizational Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed in ways even beyond
23 abridgement of their right of assembly. The disenfranchising effects of the challenged policies
threaten the associational rights of the Organizational Plaintiffs and, ultimately, electoral harm
24 for the Democratic Party, against the interests and objectives of the Organizational Plaintiffs. See
Ex. 4 ¶ 5; Ex. 5 ¶¶ 9–11; Ex. 6 ¶¶ 4–5. They will also need to divert precious resources to
25 remedying the effects of Defendants’ unlawful policies. See Ex. 4 ¶ 10; Ex. 5 ¶¶ 5–6, 12–14; Ex.
6 ¶¶ 9–10. And finally, not only will the Organizational Plaintiffs themselves be harmed, but
26 their members will be harmed individually, resulting in an associational injury as well. See Ex. 6
¶ 4.
27
28
33
1 that . . . the balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiffs’ favor.” (alteration in original) (quoting
2 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2019))).
3 Defendants cannot point to any substantial harm that they will experience as a result of a
4 preliminary injunction, let alone harms that outweigh the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ rights.
5 Defendants will not experience any harm from enjoinment of the Voter Assistance Ban and
6 Ballot Rejection Rules for the same reason that the State has no legitimate reason for the laws in
7 the first place—the laws are not effectively designed to ensure the integrity of elections, and a
8 litany of other statutes already address this issue. See supra at III.C. And although the State
9 might incur additional costs maintaining additional polling locations and printing and mailing
10 ballots to all registered voters, “[i]t is difficult . . . to balance a financial and logistical hardship
11 with a burden on constitutional rights.” Sanchez, 214 F. Supp. 3d at 976.
12 VIII. The issuance of a preliminary injunction is in the public interest.
13 “By definition, ‘[t]he public interest . . . favors permitting as many qualified voters to
14 vote as possible.’” League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 247 (quoting OFA, 697 F.3d at 437).
15 Enjoining the policies and laws challenged by Plaintiffs will protect not only their constitutional
16 rights, but all Nevadans who would otherwise risk disenfranchisement. See League of Wilderness
17 Defs./Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Connaughton, 752 F.3d 755, 766 (9th Cir. 2014)
18 (“The public interest inquiry primarily addresses impact on non-parties rather than parties.”
19 (quoting Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 974 (9th Cir. 2002))). A
20 preliminary injunction would not prevent Defendants and the State from timely conducting the
21 June Primary; it would instead ensure, in light of the current pandemic, that their policies are
22 consistent with state statute and the Nevada and U.S. Constitutions. Cf. Sanchez, 214 F. Supp. 3d
23 at 976–77 (granting preliminary injunction to vindicate voting rights where “there is no
24 indication it would interfere with the state’s ability to move forward with the November election
25 as scheduled”). A preliminary injunction will allow all Nevada voters to exercise their franchise
26 and constitutional rights—and therefore serve the public interest.
27
28
34
1 CONCLUSION
2 Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Court should grant Plaintiffs’ motion for a
3 preliminary injunction to prevent the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and ensure that
4 voters have every opportunity to fully engage in the democratic process and exercise their
5 fundamental right to vote. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request a preliminary injunction
6 from this Court (1) requiring Defendants to expand the number of polling locations in the June
7 Primary to reflect the population and geographic size of each county; (2) requiring Defendants to
8 mail ballots to all registered voters, active and inactive alike, in the June Primary; (3) enjoining
9 enforcement of the Voter Assistance Ban; (4) enjoining enforcement of Nevada’s Ballot
10 Rejection Rules; and (5) enjoining enforcement of Nevada Administrative Code § 293.217(1).
11
Dated: April 22, 2020 PERKINS COIE LLP
12
13 By:
Marc E. Elias*
14 Henry J. Brewster*
Courtney A. Elgart*
15 PERKINS COIE LLP
700 Thirteenth Street, N.W., Suite 600
16 Washington, D.C. 20005-3960
17 Abha Khanna*
Jonathan P. Hawley*
18 PERKINS COIE LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
19 Seattle, Washington 98101-3099
20 Bradley S. Schrager
Daniel Bravo
21 WOLF RIFKIN SHAPIRO SCHULMAN
& RABKIN, LLP
22 3556 East Russell Road, Second Floor
23
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Daniel Corona, Darin
24 Mains, Brian Melendez, Teresa Melendez,
DCCC, and Priorities USA
26
*Pro hac vice application forthcoming
27
28
35
1 INDEX OF EXHIBITS
2
Exhibit No. Description No. of Pages
3
1 Declaration of Daniel J. Corona dated April 4
4 21, 2020.
5 2 Declaration of Darin Mains dated April 22, 3

2020.
6
3 Declaration of Teresa Melendez dated April 4
7 21, 2020.
8 4 Declaration of Reyna Walters-Morgan dated 5

April 22, 2020.
9
5 Declaration of Alexander Edelman dated 5
10 April 21, 2020.
11 6 Declaration of Alana Mounce, Executive 5

Director of Nevada State Democratic Party
12 dated April 21, 2020.
13 7 Declaration of John Porter dated April 21, 3

2020.
14
8 Declaration of Tammi Tiger dated April 22, 3
15 2020.
16 9 Declaration of John D. Solomon dated April 4

21, 2020.
17
10 Declaration of Dr. Daniel C. McCool dated 19
18 April 22, 2020.
19 11 Declaration of Dr. Linton A. Mohammed 24
dated April 22, 2020.
20
12 Press Release: Secretary Cegavske 3
21 Announces Plan to Conduct the June 9, 2020
Primary Election by All Mail.
22
13 June 9, 2020, Primary Election Notice of 9
23 All-Mail Ballot Election (Clark County).
24 14 Notice of Vote-by-Mail Election and Official 21

Sample Ballot (Washoe County).
25
15 Notice of Primary Election (Elko County). 2
26
16 2020 Election Dates (Elko County). 2
27
28
37
1 Exhibit No. Description No. of Pages
2 17 Voter and Sample Ballot Information (Elko 5

County).
3
18 Letter from Marc Erik Elias & Bradley S. 5
4 Schrager to Hon. Barbara Cegavske,
Secretary of State dated April 10, 2020.
5
19 Declaration of Daniel Bravo dated April 22, 58
6 2020.
7 20 Declaration of Bradley S. Schrager dated 116

April 22, 2020.
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
38
Exhibit 5
Declaration of John D. Solomon, filed in

support of Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion
for Preliminary Injunction and
Declaratory Relief, Corona v. Cegavske,
No. 20-OC-00064-1B (Nev. Dist. Ct.),
Exhibit 5
3 of 3
Exhibit 6
Declaration of Dr. Daniel C. McCool,

filed in support of Plaintiffs’ Emergency
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Declaratory Relief, Corona v. Cegavske,
No. 20-OC-00064-1B (Nev. Dist. Ct.),
Exhibit 6
1
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
2 IN AND FOR CARSON CITY, STATE OF NEVADA
3 DANIEL CORONA, DARIN MAINS, BRIAN Case No.: 20-OC-00064-1B
4 MELENDEZ, TERESA MELENDEZ,
Dept. No.: I
5 DNC SERVICES
6 NATIONAL COMMITTEE, DCCC, AND DECLARATION OF DR. DANIEL C.
PRIORITIES USA, MCCOOL
7
8 Plaintiffs,
9 vs.
10 BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official

capacity as Nevada Secretary of State, JOSEPH
11 P. GLORIA, in his official capacity as Registrar
of Voters for Clark County, Nevada, DEANNA
12 SPIKULA, in her official capacity as Registrar
of Voters for Washoe County, Nevada,
13 KRISTINE JAKEMAN, in her official capacity
14 as the Elko County Clerk, and AARON FORD,

in his official capacity as the Attorney General
15 of the State of Nevada,
16 Defendants,
17
DECLARATION OF DR. DANIEL C. MCCOOL
18
I, DR. DANIEL C. MCCOOL do hereby declare and say:
19
20 I. Introduction
21 1. The plaintiffs in this case have asked to answer the following research questions: 1.
22 Does the closing of polling places except one in each county create a disproportionate and undue
23 burden on some groups of voters in Nevada? 2. Does the voter assistance ban in Nevada create a
24
disproportionate and undue burden on some voters?
25
2. In this report I utilize a well-recognized methodology known as “Qualitative
26
Methods,” which is widely recognized in the social sciences (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, 2011;
27
Consortium on Qualitative Research. n. d.). This is the same methodology I have used in nearly all
28
Page 1 of 18
1 my academic work, as well as all of my previous expert witness reports. For this short report I
2 relied primarily on the political science literature focusing on voting behavior and the design of
3
electoral systems. The widespread use and acceptance of Qualitative Methods, along with its
4
applicability to large-scale analytical problems, is why I have consistently relied on it for both my
5
academic work and my expert witness reports.
6
7 II. Qualifications
8 3. I am Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Utah. I received a

9 B.A. in Sociology from Purdue University, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of
10
Arizona. I have a doctoral minor in Latin American History. For over thirty-five years I have
11
conducted research on voting rights. In 2007 I co-authored Native Vote: American Indians, The
12
Voting Rights Act, and the Right to Vote (Cambridge University Press). In 2012 I edited a book
13
14 titled The Most Fundamental Right: Contrasting Perspectives on the Voting Rights Act (Indiana
15 University Press). I also have several peer-reviewed publications that focus on public policy
16 methodology and theory. I utilized “qualitative methods” for nearly all of the ten books, 25
17
articles, and 19 book chapters that I have published. From 1998 to 2007 I directed the American
18
West Center, which conducted research on behalf of rural people in Utah and the West.
19
4. I have served as an expert witness in 12 voting rights cases. These cases are listed
20
at the end of this report as Appendix A. Two of these cases were filed in state courts, and the
21
22 others involved claims under Section 2 or Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act. I applied the
23 same methodology, described above, in all of these cases. My reports have never been rejected by
24 a court. My vita is attached. I have been hired by the plaintiffs for this case and I am compensated
25
at the rate of $250/hour. The conclusions I present in this report are mine alone, are not related to
26
or endorsed by the University where I have an appointment, and were reached through an
27
independent process of research and inquiry.
28
Page 2 of 18
1 III. Research on “Voter Costs” and “Voter Tradition”
2 5. Before I examine the specifics of the proposed reduction in polling places and the
3 impact of the voter assistance ban, it is useful to understand the prevailing themes in the political
4
science literature that are relevant to the two research questions posed in this report. A large body
5
of research has found that many variables affect voter behavior and voter turnout, but the two most
6
important and relevant trends in the literature concern “voter costs” and “voter tradition.”
7
8 6. The concept of “voter costs” is well-defined in the political science literature (for
9 an excellent review of this literature, see: Berinsky. 2005). As Brady and McNulty note “…costs
10 do matter to voter turnout” (2011: 115). Rosenstone and Hansen put it in blunt terms:
11
“Participation in politics… has a price, a price that is some combination of money, time, skill,
12
knowledge, and self-confidence” (1993:12-14). These voter costs have a direct impact on voter
13
behavior and turnout. Even the weather can affect the costs of voting (Hansford and Gomez.
14
2010). The key point is that certain attributes of an electoral system can increase, or decrease,
15
16 those costs. Any attribute of an electoral system that increases voter costs tends to decrease voter
17 participation and turnout. Thus, if the goal is to increase participation, inclusivity, and turnout,
18 then voter costs should be minimized.
19
7. A second theme in the literature concerns voter tradition. Voters are creatures of
20
habit, and when their expected and accustomed vote tradition is disrupted, it tends to decrease
21
turnout. As one study put it, “Voting may be habit-forming” (Gerber, Green, and Shachar. 2003).
22
23 For example, Brady and McNulty found that the outcome of elections could be changed by the
24 “extensive manipulation of polling place locations” (2011: 115). Changes to polling locations,
25 new limits on “convenience voting,” and changes in voter criteria (such as a new ID requirement),
26 can reduce turnout. Furthermore, these reductions do not occur equally across all demographic
27
subsets of voters; some groups of voters are more affected than others. Thus, perturbations in
28
Page 3 of 18
1 voting procedure tend to have a negative impact on turnout that is unevenly distributed across
2 voting populations.
3
IV. Does the closing of polling places except one in each county create a disproportionate
4 and undue burden on some groups of voters in Nevada?
5 8. In response to the unprecedented challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic,
6
The Nevada Secretary of State announced on March 24, 2020, that the June 9th primary would be
7
conducted as an all-mail election, with only one in-person polling place in each county (Cegavske.
8
2020). The political science literature supports the assumption that this dramatic change may
9
10 decrease turnout in specific groups of voters unless efforts are made to lower voter costs for those
11 voters.
12
A. Closing Polling Places
13
9. Research on the impact of closing traditional polling places uniformly indicates that
14
such closures decrease turnout. McNulty, Dowling, and Ariotti found that “polling consolidation
15
decreases voter turnout substantially… suggesting that even habitual voters can be dissuaded from
16
17 going to the polls (2017: 435):” Brady and McNulty reached a similar conclusion: “Changes in
18 polling places and increased distances to polling places change turnout behavior due to increased
19 inconvenience (2011: 12).” Haspel and Knotts also found that “small differences in distance from
20
the polls can have a significant impact on voter turnout. We also find that moving a polling place
21
can affect the decision to vote” (2005: 560). Similarly, Stein and Vonnahme found that “voting
22
places that are more accessible and open… significantly enhance voter performance and
23
24 evaluation” (2012: 692).
25 10. Closing or consolidating polling places can dramatically increase voter costs
26 (Yoder. 2018). A recent U.S. House Subcommittee report found that “Polling place closures can
27 lead to long lines and extreme wait times and can require voters to drive for miles to reach a
28
Page 4 of 18
1 polling place” (U. S. House. 2020). One of the biggest negative factors with the closure of polls is
2 the increased distance that many voters must travel to a new polling location; greater travel
3
distance lowers turnout. Gimpel and Schuknecht concluded that: “Even after controlling for
4
variables that account for the motivation, information and resource levels of local precinct
5
populations, we find that accessibility does make a significant difference to turnout.” (Gimpel and
6
7 Schuknecht. 2003: 471).
8 B. Impact on Native American Voters

9
i. Distance to In-person Voting for Native Americans
10
11. Many Native American voters will face a significantly longer drive to a polling
11
location if there is only one location in each county. If the only polling location is in the county
12
13 seat, the distances that must be traveled by some tribal members is extreme if they want to vote in-
14 person. Nixon, on the Pyramid Lake Reservation, is a 96-mile drive round-trip to Reno where
15 Washoe County plans to locate its only polling place. Shurz, on the Walker River Reservation, is a
16
68-mile drive round-trip to Hawthorne, the Mineral County seat. The Moapa Reservation is in
17
Clark County; it is a 96-mile drive round-trip to North Las Vegas where the county plans to locate
18
its single polling place. Residents of the Duck Valley Reservation will have to drive 200 miles
19
round-trip to vote at the polling place in Elko.
20
21 12. An additional issue is the confusion that will be caused if a single polling place is
22 located in the county seat and traditional polling locations are closed. That means that residents of
23 the Pyramid Lake and Walker River Reservations will have to go to three separate counties to vote
24
in-person. This confusion is exacerbated by the fact that, on two reservations, the state had only
25
recently agreed to add satellite polling locations for early voting and Election Day voting. These
26
additional sites were the result of a lawsuit filed by tribal members (Sanchez v. Cegavske. 2016;
27
28
Page 5 of 18
1 Solis. 2018; Richardson. 2016). If the Secretary of State’s March 24 directive is implemented,
2 these tribes will lose their newly-won satellite polling locations.
3
ii. Problems with Mail Service on Indian Reservations
4
13. Native voters may opt to vote by mail, but that option is only helpful if there is
5
6 either reliable home mail delivery or a nearby post office. On many Indian reservations, that is not
7 the case. For the Pyramid Lake Reservation, which is 742 square miles and spread over three
8 counties, there is one post office in Nixon. For the Walker River Reservation, which is 507 square
9 miles and also spread over three counties, there is one post office in Shurz. The Duke Valley
10
Reservation is 450 square miles, in two states, with one post office in Owyhee.
11
14. The problem of long distances to either post offices or polling places is exacerbated
12
by poor reservation roads, the lack of street addresses for some homes on the reservation, and the
13
14 common practice of many people sharing one PO box. Native people are also less likely to own a
15 car or afford the gas money to drive long distances to either a polling place or a post office (see
16 demographic data, below). All of these factors increase voter costs and create an undue burden on
17
Native Americans
18
15. In sum, the proposed plan to close all but one polling location in each county will
19
dramatically increase voter costs and greatly affect voter tradition—actions that result in
20
significant reductions in turnout, especially for specific populations.
21
22 iii. Demographic Factors

23 16. The voter costs of eliminating all but one poll in each county are compounded by
24
socio-economic factors that have a major impact on turnout, especially in Hispanic and Native
25
American communities with lower income levels. It is well established in political science that
26
socio-economic well-being correlates positively with political participation: “The SES [socio-
27
28 economic status] model does an excellent job predicting political participation” (Brady, Verba and
Page 6 of 18
1 Schlozman. 1995: 272). This is especially true for voting (Wolfinger and Rosenstone. 1980;
2 Brady and McNulty. 2011; Leighley and Nagler. 2014). This fact has particular relevance to
3
minorities that tend to have lower income than their white counterparts: “In general, minority
4
participation can be suppressed by socioeconomic factors such as less education and lower
5
income” (Lien. 2000). Another political scientist framed the SES/participation link as “the issue of
6
7 our time” (Williams. 2004). Thus, unequal resources—money, education, internet connection,
8 knowledge of the system, civic skills, and the time and means to access polling sites and
9 mailboxes—result in unequal opportunities to elect the candidate of one’s choice. Nearly 13
10 percent of Nevadans live in poverty, so the number of voters affected by these systemic biases in
11
the electoral process is significant (U. S. Census, Quick Facts. 2020).
12
17. These studies that link income and political participation are important because
13
Native people have significantly lower incomes. The chart below shows the relationship between
14
15 race/ethnicity and poverty in Nevada, and clearly demonstrates the stark poverty level of Native
16 Americans compared to other racial and ethnic groups.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Chart showing how households in Nevada from different racial and ethnic groups based on data measurements.
26 Source: Solis. 2019. Data from the 2017 American Community Survey
27
28
Page 7 of 18
1 Of all the people living in poverty in Nevada, nearly a quarter are Native American, even though
2 they are only 1.7 percent of the population (Talk Poverty. 2020; U. S. Census, Quick Facts. 2020).
3
18. Poverty and unemployment are particularly severe on Nevada’s Indian reservations.
4
The website for the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe indicates the Tribe has an unemployment rate of 44
5
percent (Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe. n.d.). An article on the fifteen tribes in the U. S. with the
6
7 worst unemployment rates includes the Walker River Paiutes, with unemployment at 83 percent
8 (Schilling. 2013). In Nixon (96.4 percent Native American, on the Pyramid Lake Reservation),
9 half the residents are not in the workforce; the median household income is $26,607, compared to
10 the state average of $57,598. In Shurz (83.4 percent Native American, on the Walker River
11
Reservation), the unemployment rate is 24.9 percent; just down the road in Hawthorne,
12
unemployment is 6.7 percent (U. S. Census, American Community Survey, 2010-2014: DP030).
13
19. In sum, long distances to a single in-person polling place in each county, poor
14
15 reservation transportation systems, unreliable and slow mail delivery in remote areas of Indian
16 reservations, and socio-economic factors combine to create a serious disadvantage for Native
17 Americans. Closing polling places except for one in each county will exacerbate these negative
18 factors and create a significant additional burden for Native American voters.
19
V. Does the voter assistance ban in Nevada create a disproportionate and undue burden
20 on some voters?
21
20. Nevada law bans any individual other than a family member from assisting a voter
22
with returning a mail-in ballot (Nev. Rev. Stat.). Thus, it is a felony to help someone deliver their
23
ballot, even if they have requested this service. This results in significant increases in voter costs,
24
but cannot be justified by any reasonable criteria of public good.
25
26
27
28
Page 8 of 18
1 A. Increased Voter Cost
2 21. A voter assistance ban makes it illegal for a voter to have someone assist them with
3 their ballot by delivering that ballot to a mailbox or polling location. In states that allow ballot
4
collection, an individual voter may, at their discretion, opt to have someone collect their ballot and
5
deliver it to a mailbox or polling place. Thus, it is a voluntary act on the part of the voter as to
6
whether they want to accept the services of a ballot collector. If a voter chooses to have their ballot
7
8 collected by another person, they do not have to travel to a mailbox or polling site; this eliminates
9 travel costs, and during a pandemic, protects them from potential exposure to COVID-19.
10 22. A voter assistance ban effectively moves the polling place from someone’s front
11
porch to a point that may be quite distant and inaccessible to some people. If there is only polling
12
location for each county, the distance to in-person polling sites will be greatly increased for many
13
voters. Also, one polling place in each county will concentrate the entire in-person voting
14
population of that county into one location, potentially increasing the risk of infection. Voter
15
16 assistance bans significantly increase voter costs by exposing voters to potential COVID-19
17 infection and requiring voters to travel to a mailbox or a polling location.
18 23. Ballot collection in other states has often been utilized in low-income Hispanic
19
neighborhoods where people lack the time and financial resources to take time off work and travel
20
to a polling place or post office (Hendley. 2014; Nevarez. 2016; Democratic National Committee
21
v. Hobbs. 2020; Daley. 2020). For example, Hispanic groups in Arizona used ballot collection
22
23 extensively as a “means of outreach” before it was outlawed (Columbus and Copper. 2016).
24 Ballot collection has also taken place on Indian reservations to help voters overcome long
25 distances, poor roads, and limited ability to travel (Western Native Voice v. Stapleton. 2020;
26 Michels. 2020a, 2020b). Because ballot collection has often been popular in Hispanic
27
neighborhoods and Indian reservations, there have been charges of discrimination when voter
28
Page 9 of 18
1 assistance bans are proposed or implemented (Re. 2020; Los Angeles Times. 2018; Arizona
2 Independent News Network. 2014; Democratic National Committee v. Hobbs. 2020: 102). 1
3
24. It is important to note that voter assistance bans prohibit legitimate voter assistance,
4
not just those that involve fraud, deception, intimidation, or bribery, all of which are prohibited by
5
other laws. The Nevada voter assistance ban prohibits assistance even when the voter desires
6
th
7 assistance and the collector acts in good faith and follows all voting laws to the letter. The 9
8 Circuit made this point in a case on ballot collection in Arizona; the law didn’t just “forbid
9 fraudulent third-party ballot collection. It forbids non-fraudulent third-party ballot collection
10 (Democratic National Committee v. Hobbs. 2020: 91).
11
B. No Justification
12
25. The usual rationale provided for banning voter assistance is to prevent voter fraud
13
14 (Chaffetz. 2020; Blood and Ohlemacher. 2018; Morefield. 2018; The Federalist. 2018). However,
15 there is virtually no evidence that voter fraud is a problem in Nevada. The most complete
16 compendium of actual convictions for voter fraud is compiled by the conservative think tank, The
17
Heritage Foundation. Their total count of “proven instances of voter fraud” is 1,277, out of a data
18
bank that covers local, state, and federal elections beginning in the early 1980s (i.e. hundreds of
19
millions of votes). For Nevada, there are six cases; two involved voter registration, one involved
20
petition signatures, and three convictions were for illegal voting. None of these convictions
21
2
22 involved ballot collection. (Heritage Foundation. 2020). In short, voter assistance bans take away
23
1
24 In the Arizona case of Democratic National Committee v Hobbs, the 9th Circuit concluded that
the state’s criminalization of ballot collection would not have been enacted “without the
25 motivating factor of racial discrimination” (2020: 102).
2
26 This absence of voter fraud is not limited to Nevada. For complete nation-wide analyses see:
Chapter 2 of The Voting Wars, by Richard Hasen (2012); chapter 6 of Stealing Democracy, by
27 Spencer Overton (2006); and The Myth of Voter Fraud, by Lorraine Minnite (2010). Also see:
Urbina (26 Oct. 2010) and Levitt (2007). Even the U. S. Justice Department under President
28 George W. Bush could not find evidence of significant voter fraud; see: Lipton and Urbina (12
Page 10 of 18
1 an important freedom exercised by millions of voters in other states—to assist a fellow voter in a
2 legal manner with their approval—for a rationale that cannot be substantiated.
3
VI. Conclusion
4
26. In the 2018 elections, turnout in Nevada was 48 percent; only eleven states had a
5
6 lower turnout rate (U. S. Election Assistance Commission. 2018: 6). If fully implemented, the
7 Secretary of State’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to dramatically
8 decrease this already low turnout rate, especially for low-income people, minorities, and Native
9 people living on remote reservations. The political science literature makes it clear that such
10
changes have a negative impact on turnout because they create additional burdens for voters, and
11
those burdens are not distributed equally across the electorate. But with COVID-19, the calculus
12
of “voter costs” now has to include the threat of serious illness and possibly death. In sum, if the
13
14 state’s proposal is implemented, the lack of reasonable options for voting in-person in some
15 situations and the option to have someone assist a voter through ballot collection, there is a high
16 probability it will depress turnout. This will effectively deprive some groups of people, especially
17
Native Americans, of access to the ballot box.
18
27. The evidence that I have compiled for this report leads me to conclude that some
19
groups of voters, especially Native American voters, will be disadvantaged by the proposal to
20
close all polling places except one in each county, and the voter assistance ban; as a result, they
21
22 will face increased difficulty in accessing polling locations and voting by mail. If a voter cannot
23 take his/her ballot to a distant mailbox or polling location, and others are prohibited from assisting
24
April 2007).; Levitt (2007). One legal scholar calculated that the likelihood of voter fraud was
25 more than 12 times less likely than being struck by lightning (Sobel 2014: 7). For a list of studies
confirming the absence of widespread voter fraud, see: https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
26 work/research-reports/debunking-voter-fraud-myth. The only significant instance of verifiable
voter fraud involved a Republican candidate for the 9th Congressional District in North Carolina;
27 see: Blinder. 2019: North Carolina v. Dowless. 2019.
28
Page 11 of 18
1 them by collecting and delivering that ballot, they effectively cannot vote; a ballot that is not
2 delivered is a vote that is denied.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Page 12 of 18
1 SOURCES CITED
2
American Heritage Foundation. 2020. “Election Fraud Cases.”
3
https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud/search?state=NV
4
Arizona Independent News Network. 2014. “Maricopa Ballot Harvesting Video Spurs Reagan,
5 Goddard ad.” https://arizonadailyindependent.com/2014/10/23/maricopa-ballot-harvesting-video-
spurs-reagan-goddard-ad/
6
7 Berinsky, Adam. “The Perverse Consequences of Electoral Reform in the United States.”
American Politics Research 33: 471-491.
8
Blinder, Alan. 2019. “Election Fraud in North Carolina Leads to New Charges for Republican
9 Operative.” The New York Times. July 30.
10 Blood, Michael, and Stephen Ohlemacher. 2018. “Democratic Sweep in California Raises GOP
11 Suspicion.” AP News. Nov. 30.
12 Brady, Henry, Sidney Verba and Kay Schlozman. 1995. “Beyond SES: A Resource Model of
Political Participation.” American Political Science Review 89 (Issue 2, June): 271-294.
13
Brady, Henry, John McNulty. 2011. “Turning Out to Vote: The Costs of Finding and Getting to
14 the Polling Place.” American Political science Review 105 (1): 115-134.
15
Cegavske, Barbara. 2020. “Secretary Cegavske Announces Plan to Conduct the June 9, 2020
16 Primary Election by All Mail.” Press Release, March. 24.
17 Chaffetz, Jason. 2020. “Ballot Harvesting—California’s Model to Steal 2020.” Fox News. Sept.
15.
18
19 Columbus, Courtney, and Anna Copper. 2016. “Ballot Harvesting Law Could Impact Latinos and
Seniors in General Election.” Cronkite News. May 10.
20
Consortium on Qualitative Research Methods.
21 http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/programs/cqrm/
22
Daley, David. 2020. “Coronavirus Could Normalize Voting by Mail. That Will Create Other
23 Problems.” The Washington Post. Mar. 12.
24 Democratic National Committee v. Hobbs. 2020. U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. No.
18-15845. “Opinion.”
25
Denzin, Norman K. and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds. 2000, 2011. The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative
26
Research, 1st ed., 4th ed. SAGE Publications.
27
The Federalist. 2018. “How Ballot-Harvesting Became the New Way to Steal an Election.”
28 Dec. 14. https://thefederalist.com/2018/12/14/ballot-harvesting-became-new-way-steal-election/
Page 13 of 18
1
Gerber, Alan, Donald Green, and Ron Sachar. 2003. “Voting May Be Habit-Forming: Evidence
2 from a Randomized Field Experiment.” American Journal of Political Science. 47 (Issue 3): 540-
550.
3
4 Gimpel, J. G., and J. E. Schuknecht. 2003. “Political Participation and the Accessibility of the
Ballot Box.” Political Geography 22: 471-488.
5
Hansford, Thomas, and Brad Gomez. 2010. “Estimating the Electoral Effects of Voter Turnout.”
6 American Political Science Review 104: 268-288.
7
Hasen, Richard (2012). The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown.
8 Yale University Press.
9 Haspel, Moshe, and Gibbs Knotts. 2005. “Location, Location, Location: Precinct Placement and
the Costs of Voting.” Journal of Politics 67: 560-573.
10
11 Hendley, Matthew. 2014. “Viral Video of ‘Ballot Stuffing’ in Phoenix Shows a Perfectly Legal
Practice.” Phoenix New Times. Oct. 23.
12
Leighley, Jan, and Jonathan Nagler. 2014. Who Votes Now?: Demographics, Issues, Inequality,
13 and Turnout in the United States. Princeton University Press.
14 Levitt, Justin. 2007. “The Truth About Voter Fraud.’ Brennan Center for Justice.
15 https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Truth-About-Voter-Fraud.pdf
16 Lien, Pe-te. 2000. “Who Votes in Multiracial America? An Analysis of Voting Registration and
Turnout by Race and Ethnicity.” In: Black and Multiracial Politics in America, ed. by Yvette
17 Alexander and Lawrence Hanks. NYU Press.
18 Lipton, Eric, and Ian Urbina (12 April 2007). “In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud.”
19 The New York Times.
20 Los Angeles Times Editorial Staff. 2018. “Editorial: No, Republicans Didn’t Lose California
Because of Ballot Harvesting. But the Practice is Concerning.” Los Angeles Times. Dec. 7.
21
McCool, Daniel. 2007. Native Vote: American Indians, The Voting Rights Act, and the Right to
22
Vote. Cambridge University Press.
23
McCool, Daniel. The Most Fundamental Right: Contrasting Perspectives on the Voting Rights
24 Act. 2012. Indiana University Press.
25 McNulty, John, Conor Dowling, and Margaret Ariotti. 2009. “Driving Saints to Sin: How
Increasing the Difficulty of Voting Dissuades Even the Most Motivated Voters.” Political
26
Analysis. 17 (Autumn): 435-455.
27
Minnite, Lorraine (2010). The Myth of Voter Fraud. Cornell University Press.
28
Page 14 of 18
1 Michels, Holly. 2020a. “Lawsuit: Ballot Collection Law Harms Native Voters.” Helena
Independent Record. Mar. 12.
2
Michels, Holly. 2020b. “Clerk and recorder: Ballot Submission Act 'Voter Suppression'.” Helena
3
Independent Record. Feb. 28.
4
Morefield, Scott. 2018. “‘Ballot Harvesting,’ California Dems’ Latest Election Stealing Tool.”
5 Townhall. Dec. 3. https://townhall.com/columnists/scottmorefield/2018/12/03/ballot-harvesting-
california-dems-latest-election-stealing-tool-n2536860
6
7 Nevada Revised Statutes. Sec. 293.330, Sec. 295.353.
8 Nevarez, Griselda. 2016. “Latino Activists Mobilize After Arizona Law Banning Ballot
Collection.” NBC News. June 23.
9
North Carolina v. Dowless. 2019. In the General Court of Justice Sup. Ct. Div. 19CRS001934.
10
11 Overton, Spencer (2006). Stealing Democracy: The New Politics of Voter Suppression. W. W.
Norton & Co.
12
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe. Tribal Website. http://plpt.nsn.us/plpt.html
13
Re, Gregg. 2020. “What is Ballot Harvesting?” Fox News. April 14.
14 https://www.foxnews.com/politics/what-is-ballot-harvesting
15
Richardson, Seth. 2016. “Nine More Tribes in Nevada Request Early Polling Sites.” Reno Gazette
16 Journal. Oct. 21.
17 Rosenstone, Steven, and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in
America. MacMillan Publishing.
18
19 Sanchez v. Cegavske. 2016. U.S. Dist. Court for Nevada. Case No. 3:16-CV-00523 (MMD-
WGC).
20
Schilling, Vincent. 2013. “Terrible Statistics: 15 Native Tribes with Unemployment Rates Over 80
21 Percent.” Indian Country Today. Aug. 29.
22
Sobel, Richard (2014). “The High Cost of ‘Free’ Photo Voter Identification Cards.” Charles
23 Hamilton Hughes Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard University. June.
24 Solis, Jennifer. 2018. “Tribes Get Their Own Polling Places, Some for the First Time.” The
Nevada Current, Oct. 31.
25
Solis, Jennifer. 2019. “Nevada Ranks Ninth Nationwide in Racial Economic Disparity.” The
26
Nevada Current. Feb. 1.
27
Stein, Robert, and Greg Vonnahme. 2008. “Engaging the Unengaged Voter: Vote Centers and
28 Voter Turnout.” Journal of Politics 70 (2): 487-497.
Page 15 of 18
1
Stewart, Charles. 2010. 2011. “Adding Up the Costs and Benefits of Voting by Mail.” Election
2 Law Journal 10 (#3): 297-301.
3
Stewart, Charles. 2016. “2016 Survey of the Performance of American Elections.” Final Report.
4 https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/Y38VIQ
Talk Poverty. A Project of the Center for American Progress. https://talkpoverty.org/state-year-
5 report/nevada-2018-report/
6 Urbina, Ian (26 Oct. 2010). “Fraudulent Voting Reemerges as a Campaign Issue.” The New York
7 Times.
8 U. S. Census Bureau. 2020. “Quick Facts: Nevada.”
9 U. S. Census Bureau. U. S. Census, American Community Survey, 2010-2014: DP030.
10 U. S. Election Assistance Commission. 2018. “Election Administration And Voting Survey.’

th
11 2018 Comprehensive Report, a Report to the 116 Congress.
12 U. S. House of Representatives. 2020. Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on

Elections. Report on: “Voting Rights and Election Administration in the United States of
13 America.” https://cha.house.gov/report-voting-rights-and-election-administration-united-states-
america
14
th
15 Western Native Voice v. Stapleton. Mont. 13 Jud. Dist. (March, 2020).
16 Williams, Linda Faye. 2004. “The Issue of Our Time: Economic Inequality and Political Power in
America.” Perspectives on Politics. 2 (4): 683-89.
17
Wolfinger, Raymond, and Steven Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes? Yale University Press.
18
19 Yoder, Jesse. 2018. “How Polling Place Changes Reduce Turnout: Evidence from Administrative
Data in North Carolina.” SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3178184
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Page 16 of 18
1 APPENDIX A:
LIST OF CASES FOR WHICH I SUBMITTED EXPORT REPORTS
2
> U. S. v. South Dakota. 615 NW 2d 590 Dist. Ct. SD (2000)
3
> U.S. v. Blaine County. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1145 Dist. Ct. MT (2001)
4 > Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine. 336 F.Supp.2d 976 Dist. Ct. SD (2004)
> Cottier v. City of Martin. No. CIV. 2002-5021 Dist. Ct. SD (2005)
5 > Koyukak v. Treadwell. Case No. 3:13-cv-00137-JWS Dist. Ct. AK (2014)
> Navajo Nation v. San Juan County, Utah. Case No. 2:12-cv-00039-RJS-DPB. Dist. Ct.
6 UT (2016)
> Brakebill v. Jaeger. Civ. 1: 16-CV-08 Dist. Ct. ND (2016)
7
> Sanchez et. al. v. Cegavske. Case No. 3:16-cv-00523-MMD-WGC Dist. Ct. NV (2016)
8 > Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission v. San Juan County, Utah. Case No. 2:16-
cv00154-JNP-BCW Dist. Ct. UT (2017)
9 > Voto Latino v. Hobbs. CV-05685-PHX-DWL. Dist. Ct. AZ (2019)
> DSCC v. Simon. 2nd Jud. Dist. Minn. (Jan. 2020).
10 > Western Native Voice v. Stapleton. Mont. 13th Jud. Dist. (March, 2020)
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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Case 3:20-cv-00243-MMD-WGC Document 27 Filed 04/27/20 Page 1 of 14

11 BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217)

16 Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor-Defendants

19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

21 STANLEY WILLIAM PAHER, TERRESA Case No.: 3:20-cv-00243-MMD-WGC

3 NEVADA STATE DEMOCRATIC PARTY,

9 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, Proposed Intervenor-Defendants Nevada

12 move to intervene as defendants in the above-titled action.

13 Plaintiffs Stanley William Paher, Terresa Monroe-Hamilton, and Garry Hamilton

22 Proposed Intervenors’ rights and legal interests.

27 Proposed Intervenors should be granted permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b). In

2 Exhibit 1 is Proposed Intervenors’ brief in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary

9 https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/Home/Components/News/News/2823/23; see also Complaint, ECF

12 Cty. Registrar of Voters, Notice of Vote-By-Mail Election of Official Sample Ballot,

13 https://www.washoecounty.us/voters/vote-by-mail/Vote-by-Mail-Notice.pdf (last visited Apr.

15 Election (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/election/Documents/2020/Mailer-

16 Notice-20P-EXPANDED.pdf; see also Complaint ¶¶ 19–21.

5 meaningful opportunities for in-person voting. Ex. 3 ¶¶ 1–6.2

13 24(a)(2) to meet a four-part test”:

9 Proposed Intervenors satisfy each of the four requirements of Rule 24(a).

17 months after action commenced).

23 assessing whether such an interest is sufficiently “impair[ed] or impede[d],” Fed. R. Civ. P.

26 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).

12 prospects” constitutes “a concrete and particularized injury”); Ohio Org. Collaborative v.

14 not be given in stronger or broader language.”).3

17 will adequately represent the interests of an applicant for intervention”:

3 As an overarching matter, Defendants’ inability to adequately safeguard Proposed

8 ¶ 25—Proposed Intervenors have legitimate, articulated concerns that Defendants’ policies do

16 Primary, Nev. Current (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.nevadacurrent.com/2020/04/15/nevada-

17 dems-push-for-changes-to-upcoming-all-mail-primary. The dispute between NSDP and the

18 having an additional party in litigation”).

1 II. Alternatively, Proposed Intervenors satisfy Rule 24(b)’s requirements for

17 power to create mailing precincts pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes §§ 293.343–293.355).

4 permit them to intervene under Rule 24(b).6

5 DATED this 27th day of April, 2020

4 system on all parties or persons requiring notice.

6 By: /s/ Dannielle Fresquez

Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion

11 BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217)

16 Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendants Nevada

19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

21 STANLEY WILLIAM PAHER, TERRESA Case No.: 3:20-cv-00243-MMD-WGC

27 Complaint, ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 13–18.

9 establish that they are likely to succeed on the merits.

11 suffer severe and extraordinary irreparable harm—including many members of the

12 organizational Intervenor-Defendants, as well as Intervenor-Defendant John Solomon himself.

18 granting Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.

6 On April 16, Intervenor-Defendants the Nevada State Democratic Party, Democratic

11 to Intervene as Defendants, Ex. 3 (Complaint, Corona v. Cegavkse, No. 20-OC-00064-1B (Nev.

19 injunction will not issue” where claims must be dismissed).

7 comport with those requirements and that intent.4

1 not even reach the merits.

8 A. The Eleventh Amendment bars this Court from entering Plaintiffs’

3 and their motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.

16 e.g., Thompson, 2017 WL 3223915, at *8 (denying preliminary injunction because plaintiffs’

20 of a due process violation.”).

24 impossible for them to succeed on the merits.

25 B. Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims.

27 Court of subject matter jurisdiction.

3 C. Plaintiffs fail to allege a cognizable federal cause of action.

18 has no likelihood of succeeding on their claims Accordingly, Intervenor-Defendants’ motion for

19 a preliminary injunction should be denied. See Villagrana, 2012 WL 1890236, at *7.

20 D. Plaintiffs’ claims also fail on the merits.