Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Table of Contents............................................................................................. 1
Title 2: Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State...............................7
Art. 124: Arbitrary Detention.........................................................................7
Milo v. Salanga (G.R. No. L-37007).............................................................7
Cayao v. Del Mundo (A.M. No. MTJ-93-813)................................................9
Astorga v. People (G.R. No. 154130)........................................................11
Art. 125: Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial
Authorities................................................................................................... 13
People vs. Garcia (G.R. No. 126252)........................................................13
Jasper Agbay vs. Deputy Ombudsman for Military (G.R. No. 134503)......15
Title 3: Crimes Against Public Order...............................................................17
Art.134: Rebellion or Insurrection...............................................................17
People vs. Silongan (G.R. No. 137182).....................................................17
Enrile vs. Amin (G.R. No. 93335)..............................................................18
People vs. Manglallan (G.R. No. L-38538)................................................19
Title 4: Crimes Against Public Interest............................................................21
Art. 168: Illegal Possession and Use of False Treasury or Bank Notes and
Other Instruments of Credit........................................................................21
Tecson v. CA (370 SCRA 181)..................................................................21
Art. 171: Falsification by Public Officer, Employee; or Notary or
Ecclesiastical Minister................................................................................. 23
Art. 172: Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents
.................................................................................................................... 23
Amora v. CA (155 SCRA 388).................................................................23
Pajelga V. Scareal (167 SCRA 350)..........................................................25
Recebido v. People (346 SCRA 88)...........................................................27
Art. 183: Perjury ......................................................................................... 29
Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice (475 SCRA 495).................................29
Acuna vs. Deputy Ombudsman (450 SCRA 237)......................................31
Choa vs. People (299 SCRA 145)..............................................................33
Art. 185: Machinations in Public Auctions...................................................35
Ouano v. CA............................................................................................. 35
Art. 201: Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibitions, and
Indecent Shows........................................................................................... 37
Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA (G.R. No. 119673)..................................................37
Pita v. CA (G.R. No. 80806)......................................................................39
Fernando v. CA (G.R. No. 159751)...........................................................41
Title 7: Crimes Committed by Public Officers.................................................43
Art. 204: Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment.........................................43
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Diego v. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673)..................................................43
Vuitton v. Villanueva (A.M. No. MTJ-92-643).............................................45
Buenavista v. Garcia (A.M. No. RTJ-88-246).............................................47
Art. 206: Unjust Interlocutory Order............................................................50
Layola v. Judge Gabo, Jr. (323 SCRA 348)................................................50
Art. 211: Indirect Bribery............................................................................. 53
Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 149152)......................................53
Art. 212: Corruption of Public Officials........................................................55
Chua vs. Nuestro (A.M. No. P-88-256)......................................................55
Art. 217: Malversation of Public Funds or Property.....................................56
Davalos v. People (G.R. No. 145229).......................................................56
People v. Uy (G.R. No. 157399)................................................................60
Chan v. Sandiganbayan (G. R. No. 149613).............................................63
Art. 220: Illegal Use of Public Funds or Property.........................................65
Tetangco v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 156427)............................................65
Abdulla v. People (G.R. No. 150129)........................................................67
Parungao v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 96025).........................................69
Title 8: Crimes Againt Persons........................................................................71
Art. 247: Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional
Circumstances............................................................................................. 71
People v. Gelaver..................................................................................... 71
People v. Amamongpong.........................................................................72
People v. Oyanib...................................................................................... 74
Art. 248: Murder.......................................................................................... 76
People vs Mallari (G.R. No. 145993).........................................................76
People vs Gonzales (G.R. No. 139542) ....................................................78
People vs Avecilla (G.R. No. 117033).......................................................81
Art. 249: Homicide...................................................................................... 83
Navarro vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 121087) .....................................83
People vs Ullep (G.R. No. 132547)...........................................................85
People vs Antonio (G.R. No. 128900).......................................................87
Art. 251: Death Caused in a Tumultous Affray............................................89
People v. Anecito Unlagada y Suanque (G.R. No. 141080)......................89
Sison vs. People (G.R. No. 108280-83).....................................................91
People v. Cresenciano Maramara (G.R. No. 110994)...............................94
Art. 254: Discharge of Firearms..................................................................96
Dado v. People (G.R. No. 131421)............................................................96
Art. 257: Unintentional Abortion..................................................................99
People v. Salufrania (G.R. No. L-50884)...................................................99
People v. Genoves (G.R. No. L-42819)...................................................101
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Art 266: Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment....................................102
Kingston(e) Li v. People and CA (G.R. No. 127962).............................102
Art. 266-A: Rape........................................................................................ 104
People v. Hermocilla (G.R. No. 175830).................................................104
People v. Basquez (G.R No. 144035)......................................................106
People v. Oga (G.R. No. 152302)...........................................................107
Title 9: Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security..................................109
Art. 267: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention...................................109
People v. Ejandra (G.R. No. 134203)
............................................................................................................... 109
People v. Silongan y Linandang (G.R. No. 137182)................................113
People v. Castro (G.R. No. 132726)........................................................116
Art. 268: Slight Illegal Detention...............................................................118
People v. Dadles (G.R. Nos. 118620-21)................................................118
People v. Llaguno (G.R. No. 91262).......................................................120
People v. Roluna (G.R. No. 101797).......................................................122
Art. 270: Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor..................................124
People v. Rubi-Rosa Pastrana (G.R. No. 143644)...................................124
People v. Teresa Bernardo (G.R. No. 144316)........................................126
People v. Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty (G.R. No. 121519)........................128
Art. 287: Light Coercions...........................................................................130
Baleros v. People (G.R. No. 138099)......................................................130
Ong Chiu Kwan vs. CA (G.R. No. 113006)..............................................132
Title 10: Crimes Aganst Property..................................................................133
Art. 293: Robbery...................................................................................... 133
People v. Romeo Apolinario and Antonio Rivera (G.R. No. 97426).........133
People v. Calixto Zinampan, Artemio Apostol, Roger Allan (at large), and
Elvis Doca (G.R. No. 126781).................................................................135
People v. Donato Del Rosario (G.R. No. 13106).....................................137
Art. 308: Theft........................................................................................... 139
Laurel v. Abrogar (G.R. No. 155076)......................................................139
Alfonso D. Gaviola v. People G.R. No. 163297.......................................144
Santos v. People (G.R. No. 77429).........................................................146
Art. 310: Qualified Theft............................................................................149
People v. Salonga (G.R. No. 131131).....................................................149
Roque v. People (G.R. No. 138954)........................................................152
People v. Bustinera (G. R. No. 148233)..................................................157
Art. 312: Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in
Property.................................................................................................... 162
Quinao v. People (335 SCRA 741)..........................................................162
Art. 315: Estafa......................................................................................... 164
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Ong v. People (G.R. No. 165275)...........................................................164
.............................................................................................................. 166
Chua v. People (G.R. Nos. 150926 and 30)............................................167
Gonzaludo v. People (G.R. No. 150910).................................................169
Art. 318: Other Deceits............................................................................. 172
Jaime Guinhawa vs. People (G.R. No. 162822).......................................172
Title 11: Crimes against Chastity..................................................................175
Art. 333, 334: Adultery and Concubinage.................................................175
Beltran v. People (G.R. No. 137567)......................................................175
Vera Neri v. People (G.R. No. 96602).....................................................177
Art. 338: Simple Seduction........................................................................179
People v. Pascua (GR No. 128159-62)....................................................179
People v. Teodosio (GR. No. 97496).......................................................181
Art. 344: Prosecution of the Crimes of Adultery, Concubinage, Seduction,
Abduction, Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness ...........................................186
Beltran v. People (334 SCRA 106)..........................................................186
People v. Tipay (329 SCRA 52)...............................................................188
Alonte v. Savellano (287 SCRA 245)......................................................190
Art.336: Acts of Lasciviousness.................................................................192
Amployo vs. People (457 SCRA 340)......................................................192
People vs. Collado (353 SCRA 381)........................................................194
Dulla vs. Court of Appeals (326 SCRA 32)..............................................196
Art. 337: Qualified Seduction....................................................................197
People v. Javier (G.R. No. 126096).........................................................197
People v. Manansala (G.R. Nos. 110974-81)..........................................198
People v. Alvarez (G.R. No. L-34644).....................................................201
Art. 342: Forcible Abduction......................................................................205
People vs. Egan (GR No. 139338)..........................................................205
People vs. Ablaneda (G.R. No. 131914).................................................208
People vs. Sabrado (G.R. No. 126114)...................................................210
Art. 349: Bigamy....................................................................................... 215
Diego v. Castillo..................................................................................... 215
Abunado v. People.................................................................................216
Cacho v. People..................................................................................... 217
Title 13: Crimes against Honor.....................................................................219
Art. 353: Libel............................................................................................ 219
Fermin v. People (G.R. No. 157643).......................................................219
Magno v. People (G.R. No. 133896).......................................................224
Buatis v. People (G.R. No. 142509)........................................................231
Art. 358: Slander....................................................................................... 236
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Villanueva v. People (G.R. No. 160351).................................................236
Cañal v. People (G.R. No. 163181).........................................................238
Pader v. People (G.R. No. 139157).........................................................239
Title 14: Quasi-Offenses...............................................................................240
Art. 365: Imprudence and Negligence.......................................................240
Loney vs. People (G.R. No. 152644).......................................................240
Abueva vs. People (G.R. No. 134387)....................................................242
People v. De los Santos (G.R. No. 131588)............................................244
Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200)...........................................................247
Socorro D. Ramirez vs. CA and Ester S. Garcia (G.R. No. 93833)...........247
Felipe Navarro vs. CA and People (G.R. No. 121087).............................249
Edgardo A. Gaanan vs. IAC and People (G.R. No. L- 69809)...................251
Anti-Carnapping Law (R.A. 6539).................................................................254
People v. Bustinera (G.R. No. 148233)...................................................254
People v. Garcia (G.R. No. 138470)........................................................256
People v. Lobitania (G.R. No. 142380)...................................................258
Probation Law............................................................................................... 260
Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin v. People (G.R. No. 152044)..........260
Lilia Vicoy v. People (G.R. No. 138203)..................................................262
Alejandra Pablo v. Hon. Silverio Castillo and People (G.R. No. 125108). 264
Anti-Fencing Law.......................................................................................... 266
Fransisco v. People (GR No. 146584).....................................................266
Tan v. People (GR No. 134298)............................................................270
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)..........................................276
People v. Arturo F. Pacificador (G.R. No. 139405)..................................276
Rosalia M. Dugayon vs. People (G.R. No. 147333).................................278
Arturo A. Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. L-51065-72).............280
Anti-Highway Robbery (P.D. 532).................................................................282
People v. Pascual (G.R. No. 132870)......................................................282
People v. Reanzares (G.R. No. 130656).................................................283
People v. Cerbito (G.R. No. 126397)......................................................284
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act..........................................................285
People v. Bongcarawan (384 SCRA 525)................................................285
Suson v. People (494 SCRA 691)............................................................287
People v. Lagata (404 SCRA 671)...........................................................289
Illegal Possession of Firearms/Explosives Law (R.A. 8294)...........................291
Sayco v. People (G.R. No. 159703)........................................................291
People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559)....................................................293
People v. Tadeo (G.R. Nos. 127660 & 144011-12).................................296
Anti –Fencing Law (P.D. 1612)......................................................................298
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Francisco v. People (G.R. No. 146584)...................................................298
Anti-Bouning Checks Law (B.P. 22)...............................................................301
Marigomen v. People (G.R. No. 153451)................................................301
Sycip v. CA (328 SCRA 447)...................................................................304
Recuerdo v. People (G.R. No. 133036)...................................................307
Art. 294(B): Robbery with Rape.................................................................309
People v. Moreno .................................................................................. 309
People v. Domingo (383 SCRA 43).........................................................310
People v. Verceles (388 SCRA 515)........................................................312
Art. 148: Direct Assault.............................................................................313
People vs. Dural (223 SCRA 201)...........................................................313
People vs. Abalos (258 SCRA 523).........................................................314
People vs. Tac-an (182 SCRA 201).........................................................315
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John Aceveda
2008-0032
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that long before the enactment of P.D. 299,
Barrio lieutenants, who were later named Barrio Captains and now Barangay
Captains , were recognized as persons in authority. The Court ruled on its
various decisions, ruled them as deemed persons in authority. Under R.A. No.
3590, otherwise known as the Revised Barrio Chapter, the powers and duties of
a barrio Captain include the following; to took after the maintenance of public
order in the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor
in charge of the district in the performance of their duties in such barrio, to look
after the general welfare of the barrio, to enforce all laws and ordinances, and
organize and lead an emergency group for the maintenance of peace and order
within the barrio. He is a peace officer in the in the barrio considered under the
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law as a person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons
within legal limits.
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John Aceveda
2008-0032
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was unduly deprived of his liberty and that
respondent judge can be held liable for arbitrary detention?
Decision:
Yes. The Supreme court ruled that while it is true that complainant was not
put behind bars as respondent had intended, however, complainant was not
allowed to leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of confinement is not
synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to qualify as
confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically, of his
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personal liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270 [1979]). Under the circumstances,
respondent judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public
officer, ordered the arrest and detention of complainant without legal. In
overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had not
actually committed a crime in the presence of respondent judge. Such being the
case, the warrantless arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were
illegal. In the case at bar, it was duly proved that petitioner was indeed deprived
of his liberty for three days on the ground of mere personal vengeance and the
abusive attitude of respondent contrary to the law.
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John Aceveda
2008-0032
Issue:
Decision:
No. the Supreme Court ruled that the determinative factor in Arbitrary
Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. The elements of the
crime of Arbitrary Detention are: 1.) That the offender is a public officer or
employee, 2.) That he detains a person and 3.) That the detention is without legal
grounds.There is no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private
offended parties. There was no actual restraint imposed on the private offended
parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house
and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at
that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented the team from leaving the
island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat. Petitioner, being then a
municipal mayor, merely extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR
Team in his house. The testimony made by the private offended parties negate
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the element of detention. Fear is a state of mind and is necessarily subjective.
Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot be tested by any hard-
and-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light of the perception and
judgment of the victim at the time of the crime.
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Gil Acosta
2008-0085
Facts:
On Nov. 18, 1994 herein accused Jesus Garcia boarded a jeep carrying a
plastic bag, and occupied the seat next to the driver. Also in that jeepney two
policeman who were in civilian clothes. After herein accused boarder smelled
marijuana of which seemed to emanate from the plastic bag carried by Garcia.
To confirm their suspicion, they decided to follow the accused when he gets of
the jeepney. When the two policeman were certain that it was indeed marijuana
that the accused was in possession they quickly identified themselves and
arrested Garcia. The accused after the arrest was turned over to the CIS office at
the Baguio Water district compound for further investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not there was delay in the delivery of the person as provided
for in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Decision:
NO. The Sc held that there was no irregularity with the turn over of the
appellants to the CIS office. It was clarified that this has been the practice of the
arresting officers as their office had previously arranged with the CIS for
assistance with respect to investigations of suspected criminals, the CIS office
being more specialized in the area of investigation. Neither can the police officers
be held liable for arbitrarily detaining appellant at the CIS office. Art. 125 of the
RPC, penalizes a public officer who shall detain another for some legal ground
and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for 36 hours for crimes punishable
by the afflictive or capital penalties. In the present case, the record bears that
appellant was arrested for possession of 5 kls. Of marijuana in Nov. 28, 1994 at
2 p.m. a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. He was detained for
further investigation and delivered by the arresting officers to the court in the
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afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the detention of appellant for purposes of
investigation did not exceed the duration allowed by law. i.e., 36 hours from the
time of his arrest.
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Gil Acosta
2008-0085
Jasper Agbay vs. Deputy Ombudsman for Military (G.R. No. 134503)
Facts:
On September 10, 1997 the petitioner argued to the Chief of Police that
they be released, considering that the latter had failed to deliver the detained
petitioner to the proper judicial authority within 36 hours from Sept. 7, 1997.
The Main argument of herein petitioners that they were not delivered to
the proper judicial authority, hence herein private respondent policemen were in
violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner contends that the act
of Gicarya in filing the complaint before the MCTC was for the purposes of P.I.
as the MCTC has no jurisdiction to try the case, thus not falling within the
requirements of Art. 25.
Isuue:
Decision:
NO. The SC Held that upon filing of the Complaint to the MCTC, the intent
behind Art. 125 of the RPC is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained
person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application
with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this
power of the MCTC to order release when he applied for and was granted his
release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Art. 125 of the RPC
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has been duly served with the MCTC. That the filing of the complaint with the
MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
Ranvylle Albano
16 | P a g e
2008-0052
Facts:
The appellants in this case, who are a Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebel surrenderees, were
convicted in the Regional Trial Court for the crime of kidnapping with Serious
Illegal Detention of Alexander Saldaña and his three companions. The four
victims were taken to a mountain hideout and the appellants demanded ransom
money for their release. Alexander was detained for six months until he was
finally released.
Issue:
Decision:
As regards the argument that the crime was politically motivated and that
consequently, the charge should have been rebellion and not kidnapping, we find
the same likewise to be without merit. As held in Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. CA, the political motivation for the crime
must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion.
Merely because it is alleged that appellants were members of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front or of the Moro National Liberation Front does not necessarily
mean that the crime of kidnapping was committed in furtherance of a rebellion.
Here, the evidence adduced is insufficient for a finding that the crime committed
was politically motivated. Neither have the appellants sufficiently proven their
allegation that the present case was filed against them because they are rebel
surrenderees. This court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with
disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.
Ranvylle Albano
17 | P a g e
2008-0052
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce
Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with
murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot
complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it
prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It
should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the
independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.
Ranvylle Albano
18 | P a g e
2008-0052
Facts:
Ka Daniel, the leader of the New People's Army (NPA) in Sta. Ana,
Cagayan directed accused Andres Manglallan, Cesar Alvarez, Domingo Ramos,
and Virgilio Ballesteros, members of the NPA to go to Barrio Punti and kill one
Apolonio Ragual who was suspected by Ka Daniel to be a Philippine
Constabulary (PC) informer. Said four went to the barrio of Ragual carrying with
them their firearms. They arrived at Punti at 9:00 A.M. and they saw Ragual at
the river bank giving his carabao a bath. Ramos went to him and after a while
shot him with his gun. Manglallan also shot him followed with another shot by
Alvarez, as a result of which Ragual fell down and died. Manglallan then placed
on the dead body of Ragual a writing and drawing made by their association
warning the people and the PC of their activities.
Issue:
Decision:
In the case of People vs. Agarin, which was a prosecution for murder, like
the present case, where the accused Huk member with his companions killed the
victim because he was a PC informer, this Court held that the crime committed is
simple rebellion and not murder, as follows:
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Huks in that region, we find Federico Agarin alias
Commander "Smith" guilty of the crime of simple rebellion
only (People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515; 52 Off. Gaz.
[12] 5506; Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 116; People vs. Melecio
Aquino, et al., 108 Phil 814; 57 Off. Gaz [51] 91 80)'" [People
vs. Agarin, 109 Phil. 430, 436]"
The Court, therefore, sustains the contention of the appellant that the
crime he committed is not murder but the crime of rebellion punishable under
Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
20 | P a g e
2007-0388
Facts:
On April 28, 1990, a buy-bust operation was held by the Central Bank
Operatives in order to capture a certain Mang Andy who is involved in a
syndicate engaging in the business of counterfeit US dollar notes. Labita and
Marqueta (members of the buy-bust operation team) acted as poseur-buyer,
approached Mang Andy inside the Jollibee restaurant. When the civilian informer
introduced them to Mang Andy, the latter was convinced and drew 10 pieces of
US dollar notes from his wallet. At that moment, Labita and Marqueta introduced
themselves as Central Bank operatives and apprehended Mang Andy whom they
later identified as herein petitioner, Alejandro Tecson.
Petitioner denies liability for the crime of illegal possession and use of
false treasury bank notes and other instruments of credit as defined in Art, 168 of
the Revised Penal Code. According to him, to make him liable under the said
provision, his possession of counterfeit dollar notes should be coupled with intent
to use. In other words, petitioner contends that possession without intent to use
counterfeit US dollar notes would not make him criminally liable.
Issue:
Whether or not from the facts of the case, Alejandro Tecson is liable under
Art. 168 of the Revised Penal Code?
Decision:
It is true that in Art. 168, possession of fake dollar notes must be coupled
with intent to use the same by a clear and deliberate overt act in order to
constitute a crime. However, from the facts of the case it can be inferred that the
accused had the intent to use the fake dollar notes. In the course of the
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entrapment, petitioner’s natural reaction from the seeming interest of the of the
poseur-buyer to buy fake US dollar notes constitutes an overt act which clearly
shows his intent to use or sell the counterfeit US dollar notes. It is worthy to note
that prior to the buy-bust operation, the civilian informer had an agreement with
the petitioner to arrange a meeting with the prospective buyers. It was actually
the petitioner who planned and arranged said meeting and what the informer did
was only to convince the petitioner that there are prospective buyers. Clearly
therefore, prior to the buy-bust operation, the petitioner had already the intention
to sell fake US dollar notes and from that fact alone he cannot claim that he was
only instigated to commit the crime. The petitioner also failed to overcome the
legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their official duties.
Melencio S. Faustino
22 | P a g e
2008-0094
Facts:
Petitioners Inocentes Amora, Jr. and Claudio Murillo were accused of four
(4) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. Petitioners allegedly
falsify the Time Book and Payroll Voucher of the municipality of Guindulman,
Bohol, covering the period from September 1 to 30, 1972 by making it appear
that Vicente Begamano and Alfredo Bagtasos rendered 21 days services each in
"gathering boulders for shore protection" for the period from September 1 to 30,
1972 when they did not in fact render said services. After trial, the Court of First
Instance of Bohol finds the accused Guilty as charged.
The Court of Appeals held that the accused were not guilty of estafa
because evidently the Municipality of Guindulman did not suffer any loss or
damage arising from the payrolls. On the contrary, the government gained from
the said project. However, the Court of Appeals found that Inocentes Amora, Jr.
was a municipal employee and convicted him of falsification by public officer.
Although Claudio Murillo was not in the government service he was also
convicted of falsification by public officer on the ground that there was a
conspiracy between him and Amora. The Court of Appeals also held that the
appellants were motivated by a single intention and so found them guilty of only
one (1) instead of four (4) crimes.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding their defense of
good faith.
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that although the accused altered a public
document or made a misstatement or erroneous assertion therein, he would
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not be guilty of falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was
prejudiced by the alteration or error."
In the instant case, It is quite obvious that the proper method for claiming
payment under the pakyaw contract was for Murillo to simply bill the town for so
many cubic meters of boulders which had been delivered and piled at the
municipal wharf. Instead he and Inocentes Amora, Jr. resorted to the payroll
system which is not only cumbersome but also involved falsification. The reason
could only be that they were ignorant and ill-advised as claimed.
From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman
suffered no damage and even gained on the project (the cost of the boulders
actually delivered was P18,285.00 but Murillo was paid only P13,455.00) plus the
additional fact that the alleged complaining witness mentioned in the informations
suffered no damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no indemnity, it is
obvious that the falsifications made by the petitioners were done in good faith.
The petition is hereby granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals which
adjudged the petitioners guilty of falsification is hereby reversed and the
petitioners are acquitted.
24 | P a g e
Melencio S. Faustino
2008-0094
Facts:
The Solicitor General, upon the other hand, maintains that the offense
committed is falsification, defined and penalized under paragraph (4) of Art. 171
of the Revised Penal Code since the claim of the petitioner that Ablat was the
owner of the motorcycle is untruthful and petitioner was an active participant in
the making of the untruthful narration of facts.
Issue:
25 | P a g e
Decision:
In the instant case, the deed of absolute sale executed by Ablat was
adjudged to be a falsified document because it conveyed the impression that
Ablat was the owner of the motorcycle, subject matter of the transaction, when
such was not the case, as the petitioner Fajelga is the true and registered owner
of the said motorcycle, thereby making an untruthful narration of facts.
It should be noted, however, that the statement that Ablat was the owner
of the motorcycle in question is not altogether untruthful since the petitioner
Fajelga had previously sold the motorcycle to him. While the deed of sale may
not have been registered with the Bureau of Land Transportation, Ablat
nevertheless became the owner thereof before its aborted sale to the provincial
government of Batanes.
26 | P a g e
Melencio S. Faustino
2008-0094
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of
Public Document.
Petitioner was charged and convicted by the trial court of falsifying the
signature of Caridad Dorol, causing it to appear that said Caridad Dorol has
signed her name on a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property in his favor, when
in truth and in fact he well knew, that Caridad Dorol did not execute said
document, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
except for the award for damage.
Issue:
Decision:
We hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion when it affirmed petitioner's conviction by the trial court.
The petitioner admits that the deed of sale that was in his possession is a
forged document as found by the trial and appellate court. Petitioner,
nonetheless, argues that notwithstanding this admission, the fact remains that
there is no proof that the petitioner authored such falsification or that the forgery
was done under his direction.
27 | P a g e
This argument is without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no
need of any direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As
keenly observed by the Solicitor General, "the questioned document was
submitted by petitioner himself when the same was requested by the NBI for
examination. Clearly in possession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and
not Caridad Dorol who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial
Assessor's Office of Sorsogon.” In other words, the petitioner was in possession
of the forged deed of sale which purports to sell the subject land from the private
complainant to him. Given this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be
the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence
of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood
to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is
presumed that he is the material author of the falsification. As it stands, therefore,
we are unable to discern any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals.
Jaypee Garcia
28 | P a g e
2007-0280
Facts:
Because of such protest a conference was made among and between the
parties in order for them to reach a compromise agreement.
The petitioner filed a case of perjury against the respondents which was
dismissed by the Secretary of Justice for lack of probable cause.
Issue:
Decision:
Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code,
thus:
29 | P a g e
preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit upon
any material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made
by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the
defendant did not believe those statements to be true.
Jaypee Garcia
30 | P a g e
2007-0280
Facts:
A meeting within the school was conducted between teachers and personnels
of the school regarding matters which were arising among them. As on offshoot
of the meeting, series of misconduct case were file by and among them.
Such cases though filed administratively, others still filed a cases for violation
of perjury under the Revised Penal Code. Because of different acts which prove
or tend to prove the same.
Issue:
Decision:
31 | P a g e
affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose.
Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and third elements are
absent here in that private respondents’ statements were not material to that
case nor do they constitute willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.
Jaypee Garcia
2007-0280
32 | P a g e
Choa vs. People (299 SCRA 145)
Facts:
Later on, the petitioner withdrew such petition for naturalization for some
unknown reason.
After 2 years, a case was filed against him by his wife for perjury, stating that
during within the time the petitioner is asking for naturalization, he committed
acts of perjury by stating material facts which his wife said was all false.
Issue:
Decision:
We cannot go along with the submission of the petitioner and the Solicitor
General that petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for perjury in view of the
withdrawal of the petition for naturalization containing his false material
statements. In this jurisdiction, it is not necessary that the proceeding in which
the perjury is alleged to have been committed be first terminated before a
prosecution for the said crime is commenced. At the time he filed his petition for
naturalization, he had committed perjury. As discussed earlier, all the elements
of the crime were already present then. He knew all along that he wilfully stated
material falsities in his verified petition. Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition
without even stating any reason therefore. But such withdrawal only terminated
the proceedings for naturalization. It did not extinguish his culpability for perjury
he already committed. Indeed, the fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar the State
from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not only of the
33 | P a g e
Philippine naturalization law but the judicial proceedings as well. And the
petition for naturalization tainted with material falsities can be used as evidence
of his unlawful act.
Jm Sandino Imperial
2007-0297
34 | P a g e
Art. 185: Machinations in Public Auctions
Ouano v. CA
Facts:
On June 8, 1977, Julieta Ouano obtained a loan from PNB. As security for
said loan, she executed a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land locataed
at Opao, Mandaue City. She default;ted on her obligation.
On September 29, 1980, PNB filed a petition for extra judicial foreclosure
with the City Sheriff.
However, the sale as scheduled and published did not take place as the
parties, on four separate dates, executed Agreements to Postpone Sale.
Finally, on May 29, 1981, the sheriff conducted the auction sale, awarding
the two parcels of land to PNB, the only bidder.
On March 28, 1983, Julieta sent demand letters to PNB and petitioner,
pointing out irregularities in the foreclosure sale. Julieta filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu for the nullification of the foreclosure sale.
The RTC of Cebu rendered a decision saying that want of republication rendered
the foreclosure sale void.
PNB and petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals and said
Court affirmed the ruling of the Trial Court.
Issue:
35 | P a g e
Whether or not the requirements of Act. No. 3135, the governing law for
extra-judicial foreclosures were complied with?
Decision:
No, the republication and reposting of notice were not complied with. The
waiver by the parties only authorized the adjournment of the execution sale.
There is nothing in the statute that states that republication and reposting may be
waived.
Shaun Jayoma
2005-0016
36 | P a g e
Art. 201: Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and
Exhibitions, and Indecent Shows
Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA (G.R. No. 119673)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
37 | P a g e
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize "attack against any
religion" as a ground allegedly because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the
showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials which are
contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes
anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion." We respectfully
disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word
"offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be
invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any
religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be
emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any
religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over
by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent.
Shaun Jayoma
2005-0016
38 | P a g e
Pita v. CA (G.R. No. 80806)
Facts:
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial
court and, in effect, holding that the police officers could without any court
warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply
of their determination that they are obscene?
Decision:
39 | P a g e
this decree results in an acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints,
engravings, sculptures, paintings or other materials and articles involved in the
violation referred to in Section 1 (referring to Art. 201) hereof shall nevertheless
be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed, after forfeiture
proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary. (c) The person aggrieved
by the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary may, within fifteen (15) days
after his receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal the matter to the Secretary of
National Defense for review. The decision of the Secretary of National Defense
shall be final and unappealable.
The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court
(1964 rev.) (the Rules then prevailing), provide: SEC. 12. Search without warrant
of person arrested. — A person charged with an offense may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense. But as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an
incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime
committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being
readied against any party, under Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal
Code. To say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a
result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his
opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent
Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very
complaint of the petitioner.
Shaun Jayoma
2005-0016
40 | P a g e
Fernando v. CA (G.R. No. 159751)
Facts:
Petitioners, with Warren Tingchuy, were charged for selling and exhibiting
obscene copies of x-rated VHS Tapes, lewd films depicting men and women
having sexual intercourse, lewd photographs of nude men and women in
explicating positions which acts serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market
for lust or pornography to public view.
Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of
the search, they were selling pornographic materials. Fernando contends that
since he was not charged as the owner of an establishment selling obscene
materials, the prosecution must prove that he was present during the raid and
that he was selling the said materials. Moreover, he contends that the appellate
court’s reason for convicting him, on a presumption of continuing ownership
shown by an expired mayor’s permit, has no sufficient basis since the
prosecution failed to prove his ownership of the establishment. Estorninos, on the
other hand, insists that he was not an attendant in Music Fair, nor did he
introduce himself so.
Issue:
41 | P a g e
Whether petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of
obscene materials?
Decision:
42 | P a g e
Title 7: Crimes Committed by Public Officers
Art. 204: Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment
Diego v. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673)
Facts:
A criminal case for bigamy was filed before respondent Judge and
promulgated a decision, on February 24, 1999 acquittal said accused.
Issue:
Decsion:
43 | P a g e
is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was
made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a
judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d)
he knew that said judgment is unjust. This Court reiterates that in order to hold a
judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made
with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a
defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the
law.
44 | P a g e
Vuitton v. Villanueva (A.M. No. MTJ-92-643)
Facts:
A criminal case was file by entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose V.
Rosario", Louis Vuitton, S.A. accusing the latter of unfair competition as defined
by paragraph 1 of Article 189, Revised Penal Code. But the trial court acquitted
the accused because of lack of the element constituting said crime. complainant
assailed the judge decision for failure to consider the alleged lack of credibility of
Felix Lizardo, violated the constitutional mandate that decisions should be
rendered within three (3) months from submission of the case and ignoring the
ruling Converse Rubber Corp. vs. Jacinto Rubber & Plastics Co., Inc., that "the
statute on unfair competition extends protection to the goodwill of a manufacturer
or dealer"
Issue:
Decision:
The Revised Penal Code holds a judge liable for knowingly rendering a
manifestly unjust judgment. Article 204 thereof provides:
The law requires that the (a) offender is a judge; (b) he renders a
judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d)
he knew that said judgment is unjust. In some administrative cases decided by
this Court, We have ruled that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown
45 | P a g e
beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
The decision herein rests on two legal grounds: first, that there was no
unfair competition because the elements of the crime were not sufficiently
proven; second, that Jose V. Rosarion who was accused as owner/proprietor of
COD was not properly charged as his personality is distinct from that of the
COD's.
46 | P a g e
Buenavista v. Garcia (A.M. No. RTJ-88-246)
Facts:
In January 1987, Buenavista filed two complaints for rape in the Municipal
Trial Court of Aborlan Palawan , against Samuel M. Ledesma of having raped
Gail Buenavista, the 11-year-old daughter of the complainant. A no bail was
recommended but the judge admitted the accused to bail and directed that he be
released from custody.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law and for
knowingly issuing an unjust order or judgment?
Decision:
47 | P a g e
determine whether the judgment or order is unjust, may be inferred
from the circumstance that it is contrary to law or is not supported
by evidence. (In re: Rafael C. Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan.
21, 1974; 55 SCRA 107). Judgment may be said to be unjust when
it is manifestly against the law and contrary to the weight of
evidence. (Sec. 1, par. [c], Rule 37, Rules of Court). An unjust
judgment is one contrary to the standards of right and justice or
standards of conduct prescribed by the law. (US vs. Oglesby
Grocery Co., 264 F. 691; Komen vs. City of St. Louis, 316 Mo. 9;
289 S.W. 838).' (p. 4, Report and Recommendation.)
Judge Garcia's allegation that "ample amount" had been paid by the
accused to the complainant to settle the case "during a sort of a conference
between the parties in the chambers of the presiding judge" (Emphasis supplied;
p. 13, Rollo) while evidently intended to impugn the motives of the complainant in
prosecuting the rapist and kidnapper of his daughter has only succeeded in
revealing Judge Garcia's improper and immoral intervention in brokering a
compromise of the criminal cases against Ledesma. It is an admission that he is
either ignorant of the rule that criminal cases are not allowed by law to be
compromised, and that an offer of compromise by the accused is an implied
admission of guilt (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court), or that he does not know
that his participation in such a transaction is unbecoming of a judge.
Respondent Judge also admitted that the offended party, Gail Buenavista,
has never appeared before him "even for once" (p. 13, Rollo), That circumstance
would have aroused suspicion in a more alert Judge that she was being
sequestered by the accused to prevent her from disowning the letter she
supposedly signed in defense of the accused (Annex B, p. 24, Rollo) and her
affidavit of desistance (Annex B-2, p. 17, Rollo).
48 | P a g e
For all the foregoing, we find respondent Judge Marcelo G. Garcia guilty
of serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an
unjust order or judgment. The last is punishable under Article 204 of the Revised
Penal Code as follows:
Art. 204. Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in a
case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by prision mayor and
perpetual disqualification.
Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386
49 | P a g e
Art. 206: Unjust Interlocutory Order
Layola v. Judge Gabo, Jr. (323 SCRA 348)
Facts:
50 | P a g e
With respect to the alleged rendering of an unjust interlocutory order, in
connection with the denial by respondent judge of the motion for reconsideration
of the order granting the petition of the Chief of Police, Sta. Maria Station to take
custody of accused SPO2 German, the OCA found such a charge to be
unfounded.
The OCA perceived no evidence that the respondent judge issued the
questioned order knowing it to be unjust, and neither is there any proof of
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
Issue:
Decision:
51 | P a g e
injustice. In other words, the quantum of proof required to hold respondent judge
guilty for alleged violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 206 of the
Revised Penal Code, is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the Supreme Court found Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.
Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290
52 | P a g e
Art. 211: Indirect Bribery
Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 149152)
Facts:
After the money had been delivered and received, pictures were taken,
one of them depicting the accused held by member of the PC on the left hand
and another showing the accused also held on the left hand by one of the PC
men, and the complainant, Mrs. Mutia, drinking from a glass .
The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to the
entrapment. She denied having accepted the supposed bribe money.
The case was brought to the respondent court which ruled that the crime
committed by the petitioner was not Direct Bribery as defined in Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code cited in the Information but Indirect Bribery as defined under
Article 211 of the same code.
Issue:
53 | P a g e
Decision:
Alexander Santos
2006-0205
54 | P a g e
Art. 212: Corruption of Public Officials
Chua vs. Nuestro (A.M. No. P-88-256)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
Yes, the court agreeing with the trial court adopts the recommendation
that appropriate directive be issued to the City Prosecutor of Manila after
preliminary investigation to charge complainant Rina Chua and Atty. Victoriano
R. Yabut, Jr. with corruption of public official under Article 212 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Renato Segubiense
2006-0040
55 | P a g e
Art. 217: Malversation of Public Funds or Property
Davalos v. People (G.R. No. 145229)
Facts:
In a letter dated August 16, 1990, the new Provincial Treasurer, Norma
Cabungal, informed the Provincial Prosecutor of Marinduque of the Commission
on Audit's findings on the examination of the cash accounts of the province
wherein petitioner was found to have an unsettled cash advance in the amount of
P18,000.00.
56 | P a g e
Despite his belief that he was then no longer obligated to liquidate his
P18,000.00 cash advance, petitioner nonetheless settled his account. Petitioner
brushed aside the charge of malversation and declared that he had already been
relieved of his accountabilities by the Commission on Audit. He, however,
admitted receiving from the provincial treasurer the two demand letters earlier
adverted to dated May 5, 1988 and May 26, 1988 requiring him to submit his
liquidation of the P18,000.00 cash advance on the dates respectively indicated
therein.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged acts of the petitioner constitute the crime
charge?
Decision:
The elements essential for the conviction of an accused under the above
penal provision are; that the offender is a public officer; that he has the custody
or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that the funds
or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them.
The Supreme court ruled that there can hardly be no dispute about the
presence of the first three elements. Petitioner is a public officer occupying the
position of a supply officer at the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Marinduque.
In that capacity, he receives money or property belonging to the provincial
government for which he is bound to account.
57 | P a g e
misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as long as the accused
cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put such missing fund or property to
personal uses. When the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof
by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the
presumption is never deemed to have existed at all. The petitioner failed to
overcome this prima facie evidence of guilt.
Petitioner does not at all dispute the fact that he did receive a cash
advance. He also admitted receiving the demand letters of the provincial
treasurer for him to submit a liquidation of the cash advance on two occasions,
which he failed to do. He harps on Memorandum No. 88-63 issued by then
Marinduque Governor Reyes that he can offset his unliquidated cash advance of
from the commutation of his unused vacation and sick leave credits to justify his
failure to liquidate his cash advance. He also invites attention to the fact that,
even before the approval of his application for the commutation of his leave
credits, he already paid his cash advance on January 27, 1995.
58 | P a g e
Renato Segubiense
2006-0040
59 | P a g e
People v. Uy (G.R. No. 157399)
Facts:
The accused in this case accused Uy at the time stated in the information
was a Treasurer at the NPC; accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned
in the information was the Manager of Loan Management and Foreign Exchange
Division (LOMAFED); Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst,
LOMAFED, at the time mentioned in the information; Gamus does not have any
custody to public funds; Ochoa’s position as Sr. Financial Analyst did not require
him to take custody or control of public funds.
On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank)
remitted Japanese Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch.
Likewise, per routing procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to
have remitted on said value date the amount of US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M.
Kalaw, however, despite the fact that the PNB had already issued two (2)
manager’s/cashier’s checks for such purpose, did not make the agreed
remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no payment for the
60 | P a g e
funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the
accused have offered explanations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to
remit the dollar equivalent of P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais. Both
explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed.
The accused allegedly diverted the funds covered by the two PNB
Manager’s checks by falsifying a commercial document called an “Application for
Cashier’s Check” (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C #111-1212-04) of a
private individual after the name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It
claims that NPC did not authorize the insertion considering that the Payment
Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to prepare a Manager’s check to
be charged to NPC’s savings account did not contain any account number.
Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded in diverting the funds
from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez, Raul Nicolas,
George Añonuevo and Mara Añonuevo.
On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, finding the
accused Jaime B. Ochoa guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds thru
falsification of commercial documents. On the ground of reasonable doubt
accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, was acquitted. An alias warrant of arrest was issued
against Raul Gutierrez.
Issue:
Decision:
61 | P a g e
passively through negligence by allowing another to commit such
misappropriation. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be
criminal intent or criminal negligence and while the prevailing facts of a case may
not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude
the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are
equally punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is
committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and
prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges willful
malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be
adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the
offense.
The Supreme Court explicitly stated that even on the putative assumption
that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence
but the information was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of
this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in
order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo
or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. The question of
whether or not an information charging the commission of the crime by means of
deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is neither novel nor of
first impression. An accused charged with willful or intentional falsification can
validly be convicted of falsification through negligence.
Renato Segubiense
2006-0040
62 | P a g e
Chan v. Sandiganbayan (G. R. No. 149613)
Facts:
The COA Region VII thus filed a complaint against petitioner for
Malversation of Public Funds in the amount of P333,360.00 with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) on April 10, 1996. The said office found probable
cause against petitioner and recommended the filing of the corresponding
information against her.
Petitioner was thus indicted before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
for Malversation of Public Funds.
Issue:
63 | P a g e
Whether or not the petitioner herein is guilty of the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition lacks merit and guilty of te crime
charge. In affirming the courts below the Supreme Court pointed out the following
reasons, that the fact that Bas was given official designation during all the times
that she acted as collection officer, petitioner's liability is not, by that fact alone,
mitigated. Petitioner could still be held liable for the amount unremitted by Bas if
it can be shown that the latter was under her supervision. The questioned
amount on time because it is incumbent upon him to exercise the strictest
supervision on the person he designated, otherwise, he would suffer the
consequences of the acts of his designated employee through negligence. In
short, by failing to exercise strict supervision he could be liable for malversation
through negligence. The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to
petitioner's account the shortage in the collections actually done by Bas. The
failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use. The petitioner not only did omit to report the shortages of Bas to
the proper authority upon her discovery thereof; she even practically admitted to
having assisted Bas in covering up such shortages. Petitioner did not only lend
Bas those amounts given on November 7, 9, and 15, 1995. She admittedly
extended 'vales to her and to others, also out of public funds.
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Art. 220: Illegal Use of Public Funds or Property
Tetangco v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 156427)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
It is well-settled that the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman’s determination of whether or not probable cause exists except
when it commits grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists
where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to
amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by, or in contemplation of law.
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Abdulla v. People (G.R. No. 150129)
Facts:
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime
of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation,
appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review under
Rule 45.
Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under
an Information, both public officers, being then the President and cashier,
respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions
and duties are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in
the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with Darkis, also
a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply
for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of Php 40,000, which amount
was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school
teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service.
Issue:
Decision:
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to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were
entitled to under existing civil service laws.
There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose –
payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality.
It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as claims
against the employers’ funds and resources.
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence
of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required
quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The
Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the
day for the prosecution’s deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor
could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that
of guilt.
Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the Php 40,000 released by
the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of
other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical
malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically
appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the
third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code are lacking in this case.
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Parungao v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 96025)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
The essential elements of the crime of malversation are: (a) the offender is
a public officer; (b) by reason of his duties he is accountable for public funds and
property; and (c) he appropriates, takes, or misappropriates, or permits other
persons to take such public funds or property, or otherwise is guilty of
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
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to take such public funds for the latter's personal use. In technical malversation,
the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or
another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was
appropriated by law or ordinance.
Considering however that all the evidence given during the trial in the
malversation case is the same evidence that will be presented and evaluated to
determine his guilt or innocence in the technical malversation case in the event
that one is filed and in order to spare the petitioner from the rigors and harshness
compounded by another trial, not to mention the unnecessary burden on our
overloaded judicial system, the Court deems it best to pass upon the issue of
whether or not the petitioner indeed is guilty of illegal use of public funds.
Lacsamana's testimony shows that the CRBI fund is a general fund, and
the utilization of this fund specifically for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung
Road was merely an internal arrangement between the Department of Public
Works and Highways and the barangay captain and was not particularly provided
for by law or ordinance. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a
public purpose—payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in
the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers' wages
enjoy as claims against the employers' funds and resources. In the absence of a
law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of the Barangay
Jalung Road, the petitioner cannot be declared guilty of the crime of illegal use of
public funds.
Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178
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Title 8: Crimes Againt Persons
Art. 247: Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional
Circumstances
People v. Gelaver
Facts:
Eduardo Gelaver was charged with parricide for the killing of his wife
Victoira by multiple stab wounds at the latter’s residence. Husband and wife were
already living separately at the time of the killing.
Issue:
Decision:
In order to appreciate Art. 247 of the RPC, the accused must be able to
prove that: 1) he/she/ catches the other spouse by surprise having sex with a
lover; 2) as a result of the rage, the accused kills or inflicts physical injuries to
the spouse and/or the lover; and 3) the accused never consented to the carnal
acts done by the spouse.
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Unfortunately for Eduardo, he wasn’t able to establish the existence of the
aforesaid circumstances. His version of how things went down were too full of
inconsistencies. First off, he stabbed his wife several times which is not
consistent with an accidental killing (because he claimed he was aiming for the
lover). Another was that he claimed that the paramour was able to GET
DRESSED while under attack. And another was that even his daughter testified
that she did not tell her father anything about her mother’s residence or
whereabouts as even she did not know where her mother was staying.
Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178
People v. Amamongpong
Facts:
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Amamompong was charged with homicide for the killing of SPO1 Flores in
their house. The accused contends that not only was the killing done under
exceptional circumstances (Art. 247 of the RPC), but that he was also justified in
killing Flores under Art 11 of the RPC because his act was done in defense of the
honor of his wife.
Another prosecution witness testified that although the accused claims this
all happened in the second floor, large quantities of blood was found in the first
floor and even on the stairs and that on the second floor, no apparent signs of
struggle can be seen as all the furniture and appliances were in order. And
except for the victim’s bloody carcass, nothing else seemed out of the ordinary.
Issue:
Should the accused be afforded the benefit under Art. 11 as well as Art.
247 of the RPC?
Decision:
No. Not only is the accused’ version of the events not credible, but the fact
that the accused claims BOTH Art 11 and 247 of the RPC is contradictory in
itself. One cannot claim that rage was brought upon when an accused sees his
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wife engaged in sexual intercourse willingly with a lover, and at same time claim
that his acts were to defend the honor of his wife.
Add to this the testimony of the prosecution witness that he saw the
accused strike the victim with a scythe on the first floor, as well as the forensic
evidence pointing to the fact that the body of the victim could have been just
carried on the second floor to make it seem like the victim was attempting to
have intercourse, then the Court has no reason to reverse the finding of the trial
court that Art 11 and 247 of the RPC can not be appreciated in the case at bar.
Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178
People v. Oyanib
Facts:
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Michael Oyanib was charged with parricide and homicide for the killing of
his wife and her lover at Michael’s wife’s residence.
That Michael and his wife Tita started living separately a year earlier.
Michael tried to win back Tita but the latter was openly flaunting his new lover
Jesus Esquirdo.
In one occasion, Micheal and Jesus almost came to blows when Michael
saw his wife and Jesus in a loving embrace at the plaza. After this incident,
Jesus and Tita were heard threatening Michael that they would kill him the next
time they see each other.
A day before the killings, One of Michael and Tita’s children was asked by
the school to call her parents for a meeting. But because Michael was
indisposed, he went to his wife’s residence the next day to ask her if she could
come. But because of the threats of Jesus and his wife in the previous incident,
he brought with him a hunting knife.
Unfortunately, when the accused arrived at Tita’s house, he saw Tita and
Jesus having sex. Jesus launched at Michael but he (Mike) was able to draw his
knife and stab Jesus. Tita, meanwhile got a hold of a liquor bottle whereby she
attacked Michael. And so, Michael also stabbed Tita.
Issue
Should the exempting circumstance under Art. 247 be applied under the
circumstances?
Decision:
In order for Art. 247 to apply, the accused or the defense must be able to
show the following elements: 1) he/she/ catches the other spouse by surprise
having sex with a lover; 2) as a result of the rage, the accused kills or inflicts
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physical injuries to the spouse and/or the lover; and 3) the accused never
consented to the carnal acts done by the spouse.
The evidence show that all three elements are present in this case.
Michael was still married to Tita (albeit living separately), he caught his wife and
Jesus by surprise having sex, and Michael certainly did not approve of their
relationship, much less their carnal act.
The fact that Mike brought with him a hunting knife is consistent with his
excuse that he was fearful of an attack by either Jesus or Tita because of past
events.
So the decision of the RTC is modified. Mike is found guilty only under Art.
247 of the RPC.
Mark Vergara
2008-0323
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Facts:
While Joseph and Liza (wife) were watching a basketball game at the
barangay basketball court, Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying
bladed weapons, arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to
run away. When they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and
drove the truck parked near the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph
until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous death.
Issue:
Decision:
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing
Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of
which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means
used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.
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Mark Vergara
2008-0323
Facts:
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Noel Andres overtook the car driven of the accused and cut cross his
path. Noel Andres alighted from his vehicle and confronted Inocencio. Noel later
on also had an argument with Dino Gonzalez, the son of the accused. Inocencio
seeing his son having confrontation with Noel, got his gun to protect
Dino. Accused fired on Noel Andres but instead hit and caused the fatal injuries
to the victims John Kenneth Andres, Kevin Valdez and Feliber Andres resulting
to the ultimate death of the latter. The Trial court rendered judgement finding that
the shooting was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and held
the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder for the death of Feliber
Andres and for two counts of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by
Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez.
Issue:
Decision:
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by
itself amount to treachery. There is no evidence on record that the appellant
deliberately positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him
when he fired the shot. On the contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the
position of the appellant’s car was not of his own doing but it became so when
Noel Andres overtook his car and cut off his path.
Appellant did not act belligerently towards Noel Andres even after the
latter cut off the appellant’s path. Andres stated in court that the appellant did not
alight from his car nor opened his window until he, Andres, tapped on it. For his
part Gonzalez categorically stated in court that he did not point his gun nor
threatened Andres during their short spat. Gonzalez, although he had his gun in
his car, did not react to Andres’ cursing until the latter was having an altercation
with the appellant’s son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his son
was in imminent danger.
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There is no indication that Gonzalez had any opportunity to see the
passengers when he fired the shot. The totality of the evidence on record fails to
support a conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately employed the mode of attack to
gain undue advantage over the intended nor the actual victim. Without any
decisive evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime
committed is homicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime
committed are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines
whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is
made manifest by the acts of the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill
the victim. In a case wherein the accused did not know that a person was hiding
behind a table who was hit by a stray bullet causing superficial injuries requiring
treatment for three days, the crime committed is slight physical injuries. In case of
doubt as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he should be convicted of the
lesser offense of physical injuries.
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Mark Vergara
2008-0323
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
Republic Act No. 8294, which took effect on July 6, 1994. The pertinent
provision of the said law provides:
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correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, that no other
crime was committed.
It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide results from
the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal
possession, but murder or homicide, as the case may be.
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Mark Vergara
2008-0323
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
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The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule
that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In People v.
Castro, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him
guilty of homicide.
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Mark Vergara
2008-0323
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the killing was attended with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery for the crime of murder?
Decision:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. Considering the rule that
treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved as fully and convincingly as the
crime itself, any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of accused-
appellant. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove treachery to qualify
the killing to murder, accused-appellant may only be convicted of homicide.
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Indeed, to hold him criminally liable for murder and sentence him to death under
the circumstances would certainly have the effect of demoralizing other police
officers who may be called upon to discharge official functions under similar or
identical conditions. We would then have a dispirited police force who may be
half-hearted, if not totally unwilling, to perform their assigned duties for fear that
they would suffer the same fate as that of accused-appellant.
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Mark Vergara
2008-0323
Facts:
Prior to the shooting, appellant and the victim spent several hours having fun
playing "pusoy dos." The situation turned ugly, however, when Tuadles could not pay to
appellant Antonio his alleged winnings. An argument arose, with appellant Antonio and
Tuadles standing face to face three (3) feet away from each other.
According SG Bobis who witnessed the said crime; Tuadles and Antonio were
arguing. Antonio even called out: Sarge! Sarge! Sarge! Just before the shooting, Bobis
heard Antonio saying: Putang ina ka kasi.
Issue:
Whether or not the shooting was attended with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery for the crime of murder?
Decision:
If Antonio had consciously adopted means and methods to kill Tuadles, there
was no reason to call for a Sergeant (Sarge) or any eyewitness for that matter.
The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes the killing a
murder because of treachery is not consistent with the decisions of this Court.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar, where we held that
there was no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal altercation. More
recently, in People v. Salvador, we pronounced that:
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There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as
when a heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to
face with his assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforseen.
Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article 249
of the Revised Penal code.
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Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
Facts:
On January 27, 1989 at around 9:00 in the evening Danilo Laurel left his
house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a public
dance at Negros Occidental. After two hours, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short
break from dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside the dance hall.
Once outside, they decided to have a drink and bought beer.
Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to
relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only about three meters from Danilo
who was relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him,
approached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated by striking his
assailant with half- filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of men
numbering of seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons.
Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo was being
mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died
before he could be given medical attention.
Edwin Selda confirmed the identity of the suspect who was then in the
custody of the police. Thereat, he executed an affidavit and affirmed before the
police authorities, that the man under detention, Anecito Unlagada, was the
same man who stabbed his friend Danilo. The accused assails his conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Unlagada guilty of murder
instead of tumultuous affray under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code?
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Decision:
Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the
identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by an
eyewitness because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of
which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of
individuals , one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the
killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests,
a “tumultuous affray” within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code,
that is, a melee or free- for- all, where several persons not comprising definite or
identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner,
resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving
himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused
walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the
side. There was hardly any risk at all to accused- appellant; the attack was
completely without warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no
chance to put up any defense.
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Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
Facts:
Tension and animosity between Cory loyalists and Marcos loyalists broke
into violence. On July 27, 198, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a
known “Coryista.”
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled
to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalist. They applied a permit to hold a
rally but it was denied. Despite this setback, three thousand gathered at the Rizal
Monument led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. No ticket could be
produced. Colonel Dula Torres gave them ten minutes to disperse. Atty. Lozano
turned towards his group and said “gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory
infiltrators.” The police pushed the crowds and used tear gas to disperse them.
Salcedo managed to get away but accused Tan, Pacadar pursued him, mauling
Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleadfed for his life. The mauling resumed at
the Rizal monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo
collap[sed and lost consciousness. Sumilang with a help of traffic enforcer
brought Salcedo to Medical Center Manila but was refused admission. So they
took him to PGH where he died upon arrival.
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The trial court rendered decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel
Tan, Richard De Los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime
of murder qualified by treachery. Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting
Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused except for Tamayo.
The court convicts Tamayo of homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the crime
committed is murder and not death caused in a tumultuous affray?
Decision:
For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established
that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a
confused and tumultuous manner;(4) someone was killed in the course of the
affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that
the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence be can be identified.
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between
one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of
the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after
the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said
dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless
individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks
and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor
was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
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As the lower courts found, the victim’s assailant’s were numerous by as
much as fifty in number and were armed with stones with which they hit the
victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and
frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. Salcedo pleaded
for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The
deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim
qualifies the killing of murder.
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Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
Facts:
Their father immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to
the Pio Duran Hospital where the latter died early in the morning of the next day.
Before Miguelito expired, Regarder Donato, the father, asked who shot him and
Miguelito replied that it was accused- appellant.
The autopsy report revealed that aside from gunshot, the body of
Miguelito bore lacerated wounds. That the wounds could have inflicted by more
than two persons.
The trial court ruled against the accused- appellant and was held guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
Issue:
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Held:
Assuming that a rumble or a free- for- all fight occurred at the benefit
dance, Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution
witness Ricardo and Regarder Donato positively identified accused- appellant as
Miguelito’s killer.
Wherefore, the Court modifies the judgment appealed from. The Court
finds Cresenciano Maramara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
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Jasmine Calaycay
2005-0049
Facts:
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fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet. However, on cross-examination, he
declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments recovered
from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of a copper jacket of a caliber
5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.
The trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of
homicide which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Accused Eraso filed a Petition for Review but was denied by CA; on the
other hand petitioner, filed this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the
petitioner guilty of homicide?
Decision:
The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his .45
caliber pistol towards the victim. However, it appears that there is no evidence to
prove that petitioner had intent to kill the victim. The prosecution witnesses did
not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim. Intent to kill cannot be
automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to
life. Intent to kill must be established with the same degree of certainty as is
required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should
not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner
should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254
of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender
discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender has
no intention to kill that person
.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction of
petitioner for the crime of homicide is set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the
crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
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However, petitioner Geronimo Dado is guilty of the crime of illegal
discharge of firearm.
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Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused for the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion is proper?
Decision:
No. Filomeno Salufrania should not be held guilty of the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion but of the complex crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion.
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It has been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to
eight (8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily
exerted upon her by her husband Filomeno; and (c) that, as a result of said
violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the fetus in her womb. The abortion
was caused by the same violence that caused the death of the wife, Marciana
Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by Filomeno upon her. However,
the intent to cause the abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere
boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim
in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show intent to cause an abortion. In fact,
Filomeno must have merely intended to kill his wife but not necessarily to cause
an abortion.
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
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People v. Genoves (G.R. No. L-42819)
Facts:
Soledad Rivera tried to take back by force from Genoves a yoke of a plow
she claims she owned. Genoves however, repeatedly struck Soledad with his
fist causing her to fall to the ground several times. During which time, Soledad
was heavy with child. Soledad by such fall suffered pains in the abdomen.
According to testimony deceased was in good health the day before. From the
time of the incident there was hemorrhage and pain, which were symptoms of
premature delivery. Soledad remained in said condition for days until it
culminated in the painful and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies
that she way carrying, but the other baby could not be delivered. Soledad and
both babies died. Genoves was then charged and convicted by CFI Occidental
Negros of the complex crime of homicide with abortion.
Issue:
Held:
Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406
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Art 266: Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment
Kingston(e) Li v. People and CA (G.R. No. 127962)
Facts:
Petitioner Li was charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of
homicide for the death of Christopher Arugay. The prosecution alleged that
Arugay was watching television at home with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane,
his girlfriend dela Camara and Baby Jane’s boyfriend, Tan. They suddenly heard
a noise outside. Peering through the window, they saw Li and a certain Eduardo
Sangalang taking a bath completely naked. The two were facing the house of the
Arugays. Enraged, the deceased shouted something to Li and Sangalang. Then
petitioner Li shouted back. An incensed Arugay went out the house where he
was met by petitioner carrying a baseball bat. Li struck Arugay on the head with
the bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran back to his house. The witnesses Tan and
dela Camara assisted Arugay and were trying to drag him back to his house
when Li re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once.
Immediately thereafter, they were able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at least
once.
After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal. His conviction was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Aggrieved, Li filed a petition for review, seeking the reversal of his
conviction for the crime of homicide.
Issue:
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Whether or not petitioner should be convicted for the crime of slight
physical injury instead of homicide?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the only injury
attributable to Li is the contusion on the victim’s right arm that resulted from Li
striking Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victim’s supervening death from
injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of
the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of
speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party
for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries.
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Art. 266-A: Rape
People v. Hermocilla (G.R. No. 175830)
Facts:
Hermocilla was charged with two counts of rape. The records show that
M was born out of wedlock on May 30, 1989 to S and L. After they separated, M
stayed with her mother L who subsequently cohabited with appellant Hermocilla.
Sometime in 1999, while M was preparing dinner, appellant suddenly grabbed
and pulled her to the bed. He ripped off her shorts and underwear and made her
lie on the bed. After undressing himself, appellant inserted his finger into M’s
vagina and penetrated her with his penis. M cried and begged appellant to stop.
Thereafter, appellant would insert his finger into M’s vagina whenever her mother
is out of the house. Such abuse temporarily ceased when M lived with her father
S in Baguio City. But when he left t work abroad, M went back to live with her
mother and appellant. The abuse resumed and culminated in second rape
incident which took place sometime 2002. On said day, while M was cleaning
their house, appellant suddenly grabbed her and pulled her towards the bed. He
took off her clothes, undressed himself and inserted his finger into her vagina.
Issue:
Whether or not the insertion of the appellant’s fingers into the victim’s
vagina constituted the crime of rape trough sexual assault?
Decision:
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The second incident committed in 2002 whereby appellant inserted his
fingers into M’s vagina likewise constitute rape through sexual assault. In People
v. Palma, we held that the insertion of the appellant’s finger into the victim’s
vagina constituted the crime of rape through sexual assault under Republic Act
No. 8252 or the “Anti-Rape Law of 1997”.
105 | P a g e
People v. Basquez (G.R No. 144035)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
106 | P a g e
People v. Oga (G.R. No. 152302)
Facts:
At around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 1998, Ignacio and his wife were
awakened by the loud banging of corrugated GI sheet coming from the barracks
of his co-construction worker which was about 3 meters away. Ignacio and his
wife proceeded in haste to investigate but they were surprised and disarrayed to
see his co-worker, herein appellant, naked on top of their daughter, Irene, who
was also naked.
Irene testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of August 9, 1999, the ap pellant
summoned her to his barracks. Thinking he had the usual errand for her she
approached him. However, appellant suddenly pulled her and laid her on a
wooden bed (papag). The appellant then took off her pants and panty, as well as
his clothes. He inserted his penis into her vagina. It was only at around 2:00
a.m. that she was able to finally kick the galvanized iron sheet that enclosed the
appellant’s barracks.
Appellant did not deny that he had several intercourse with Irene but
interposed “sweetheart story”.
Issue:
Decision:
Neither was intimidation employed against her. Even if she was pulled
down to the bed, she was not threatened with bodily or physical harm by a knife,
bolo or any object or instrument that the appellant could have employed so as “to
create a real apprehension of dangerous consequences or serious bodily harm”.
Irene’s overall deportment during her ordeal defies comprehension and the
reasonable standard of human conduct when faced with a similar situation. It is
unnatural for an intended rape victim, as in the case at bar, not to make even a
feeble attempt to free herself despite a myriad of opportunities to do so. This
constrained us to entertain a reasonable doubt on the guilt of the appellant.
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Maricris Ella
2007-0030
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Title 9: Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security
Art. 267: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
People v. Ejandra (G.R. No. 134203)
Facts:
Ed Henderson Tan, the nine-year old son of the spouses Eddie and
Marileen Tan, was a Grade III student at the Philippine Institute of Quezon City,
located at Kitanlad, Quezon City. At about 4:00 p.m. on July 2, 1997, Ed
Henderson was dismissed from his classes and proceeded to the nearby house
of his tutor in Chinese language, Huang Lao Shih. Ed Henderson and his father,
Eddie Tan, had earlier agreed that after the tutorial classes ended at 7:00 p.m.,
Ed Henderson would phone his father, who would then fetch him from his
mentor’s house. The tutorial classes ended at 7:00 p.m., as scheduled, and Ed
Henderson then proceeded to the store near the gate of the school to have his
periodic test papers photocopied. He left the store and was on his way back to
the house of his tutor to wait for his father.
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At 12:30 a.m., Eddie received a call through his home phone, informing
him that his son had been kidnapped. The caller demanded P10,000,000.00 for
the safe release of his son which was reduce to P5,000,000.00. Thereafter,
Eddie received several calls threatening him that if he refused to pay the ransom
they demanded, the kidnappers would cut Ed Henderson’s ear and finger, and
thereafter kill the boy and dump his body in an isolated place. Eddie pleaded for
mercy but the caller would simply hang up the telephone.
At 10:00 a.m. the next day, July 4, 1997, another call from the kidnappers
came through, and Eddie reiterated that he could no longer raise any additional
amount. The caller hung up, but called again and informed Eddie that the
kidnappers had agreed to accept a ransom of P548,000.00. At about noon, the
caller contacted Eddie and instructed him to place the money in a newspaper
and to bring the money to the parking lot in front of the Sto. Domingo Church in
Quezon City within ten minutes. The caller further instructed Eddie to open the
doors and windows of his car upon arriving at the designated spot. Eddie was
also told that a man would approach him and call him "Eddie."
Eddie did as he was told. Suddenly, a man approached him and called
him “Eddie,” so he immdiately he handed over the plastic bag which contained
the money. He asked her how his son was, she told him not to worry because
she would bring the boy home. Shortly after his arrival at their house, Eddie
received two telephone calls from a male and a female, respectively, who
informed him of his son’s impending release.
Between 3:20 to 3:30 p.m. of July 4, 1997, Ed Henderson was told that he
would be brought back home. The boy then called up his mother and told her
that he would be back soon. Tampos and Calunod boarded Ed Henderson in a
taxi. Calunod ordered the boy to pretend that she was his aunt. The taxi
stopped near the Imperial Drugstore at E. Rodriguez Avenue, where Calunod
instructed Ed Henderson to get down. She gave the boy P50.00 for his fare back
home. The boy took a taxi and was soon reunited with his waiting family.
Issue:
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Whether or not the accused could be held liable for the crime of
kidnapping?
Decision:
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 reads: “Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any
other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death; (1) If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than
three days; (2) If it shall have committed simulating public authority; (3) If any
serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made; or (4) If the person
kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is
killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.”
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release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a
qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before,
during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual
demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be
committed. Ransom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary
sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration
paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment
that releases from captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary
which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victim’s release.
In this case, the appellants not only demanded but also received ransom
for the release of the victim.
Maricris Ella
2007-0030
112 | P a g e
People v. Silongan y Linandang (G.R. No. 137182)
Facts:
Seven days later, Alexander Saldaña and Americo Rejuso, Jr., were
transferred to the town proper of Maganoy. Commander Palito, Jumbrah Manap,
Sacaria Alon alias Jack Moro, Ramon Pasawilan, guarded them. When the
kidnappers learned that the military was looking for Alexander, they returned to
the mountain hideout and stayed there for two weeks.
On September 24, 1996, Mayangkang released Alexander Saldaña to the
military in exchange for a relative who was caught delivering a ransom note to
Alexander's family.
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Issue:
Whether or not the accused the guilt of the appellants has been proven by
credible evidence beyond reasonable doubt?
Decision:
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ordered the driver to proceed slowly towards the highway. During this time, he
was busy talking on his handheld radio with someone and the victims heard him
say "ok." When they were near the highway, he ordered the driver to stop
whereupon 15 armed men appeared and blocked their vehicle. Finally, while the
15 men took away Alexander Saldaña and his three companions, nothing was
done to Macapagal or to Teddy Silongan. By their own admission, they were just
left behind after being hogtied. How they managed to escape was not explained.
All these taken together give rise to the reasonable inference that Macapagal had
concocted the funeral for a supposed recently deceased relative purposely to
afford his co-conspirators time to stage the kidnapping. Then, also, it was
through Macapagal's indispensable contribution that the armed men were able to
stop the vehicle at a precise location near the highway.
Maricris Ella
2007-0030
115 | P a g e
People v. Castro (G.R. No. 132726)
Facts:
On January 17, 1997, at about six o’clock in the afternoon, Alfonso Saez
came home. He was informed by his siblings that Jesse Castro called up to say
that he (Castro) wanted to speak with Saez. Subsequently, Saez repaired to
Castro's residence. Just as Castro opened the gate for Saez, Castro pointed and
fired his 9 mm. handgun at Saez, its bullet whizzing by his right ear. Saez was
thrown against the concrete wall of the house. He was then taken inside the
house. Two men, identified to be Edgardo Reyes and Jesus de los Angeles,
joined Castro in mauling Saez. Castro hit Saez with an iron club.
At around nine o'clock in the evening, Castro handed over to him a phone
and ordered him to tell his family to raise P20,000.00 and intstruct them to bring
the money to a place near Bautista Hospital. About half an hour later, another
call was placed to follow-up the demand. Turning to de los Angeles and Reyes,
Castro instructed the two to go to the "drop-off point." Nobody showed up. After
an hour, Saez was ordered to call again, this time to designate another place
where the money was to be delivered. Castro told Saez to have his relatives
bring the money to the vicinity of the Aglipay Church in Caridad. Again, no
meeting materialized.
Around midnight, Castro, de los Angeles and Reyes left the house and
stayed by the gate conversing with one another. The victim took the opportunity
to flee. He was able to untie his legs and tackle the stairs towards the second
storey. He jumped out through the window but the noise he created caught the
attention of Castro. The latter fired his gun, hitting the fleeing victim and planting
a bullet in his buttocks. His plea for help alarmed some barangay officials who
immediately came to his rescue and brought him to the nearest hospital.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be held liable for the crime of kidnapping
even if detention was made to merely compel Saez to pay his debt?
Decision:
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Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides: “Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; (1) If the
kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days; (2) If it shall
have been committed simulating public authority; (3) If any serious physical
injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have been made; or (4) If the person kidnapped or
detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female
or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the
commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of
the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed."
The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an
individual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Whether or not the ransom
is actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no moment.
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Art. 268: Slight Illegal Detention
People v. Dadles (G.R. Nos. 118620-21)
Facts:
The accused Dadles was charged with kidnapping two farmers, Tehidor
and Alipan, along with their sons, in Barangay Amontay, Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental. The accused denied the charges stating that on the night of the
alleged kidnapping, he had fallen asleep at the home of one of the defense
witness after a night of drinking. The RTC rendered a decision conviction the
accused of 2 counts of kidnapping and serious detention.
Issue:
Decision:
The accused argued that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses fail
to make out a case for kidnapping, referring to particular witness testimony that
he believed showed that the victims were not deprived of their liberty because
they went with the Dadles and his companions peacefully without being
subjected to threats and coercion. The SC disagreed, stating “that the victims
hands were not tied nor guns poked at their sides when they were taken by the
appellants group do not conclusively preclude the deprivation of their liberty. The
circumstances surrounding the taking of Salvador and Antonio, particularly the
appellant and his companions previous conduct in kidnapping victims Alipio and
Dionisio, plainly demonstrate their intent to likewise deprive Salvador and
Antonio of their liberty”. The Court likewise added that “ the general rule is that
evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that the accused in a
criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which
he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like
nature for the purpose of showing that he would be likely to commit the crime
charged in the indictment”. Where a person is charged with the commission of a
specific crime, testimony may be received of other similar acts, committed at
about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of
118 | P a g e
the accused. The Court found that both incidents of kidnapping were related in
that proof of one kidnapping tends to prove the other, thereby establishing the
accused’s intent to deprive the victims of their liberty.
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People v. Llaguno (G.R. No. 91262)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
The Court found the accused guilty only for serious illegal detention and
not for murder. It held that the Trial Court erred in convicting the accused for
murder when the circumstances do not clearly and sufficiently prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that accused was guilty of murder. “Parenthetically, when the
prosecution’s case is anchored only on circumstantial evidence, all the
circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty
of the crime sought to be proven, and no other. In addition, the circumstances
under consideration must not support any rational hypothesis consistent with the
innocence of the accused. Consequently, appellant may not be held criminally
liable for killing the victim”. The TC also erred in finding the accused not guilty of
serious illegal detention as the period of detention was less that 5 days. The
evidence presented by the prosecution, which was sustained by the trial court,
clearly established that appellant had in fact detained the victim without authority
to do so. “At this juncture, we deem it significant to reiterate that the trial court
merely made a finding that appellant could not be convicted of serious illegal
detention for the sole reason that the victim’s detention did not exceed five days.
The court a quo, however, found that appellant illegally detained the victim for at
least one day, which act by itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides, the
trial court appreciated the act constituting slight illegal detention as a qualifying
circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the defense. While we find no
proof beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the records
indisputably prove culpability for slight illegal detention. ”
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Maria Criselda Fojas
2010-0226
121 | P a g e
People v. Roluna (G.R. No. 101797)
Facts:
Issue:
Was the death of the victim sufficiently proved and may the accused be
held liable or it?
Decision:
The Rules of Court provides that the death shall be presumed if a person
who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence
has not been known for four years. However, the SC decided that there were
insufficient circumstances to hold the accused responsible for the death of the
victim. The testimony of the witnesses stating that the victim’s hands were bound
by a companion of the accused is not enough to prove that the accused killed
him. “The conviction of accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping
with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts
established by the prosecution. As discussed earlier, the evidence presented by
the prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient
to establish the alleged liability of accused-appellant for the death of Moronia”.
The SC thus decided that “Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was
proved and only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia was established, we
find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code. ”
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Maria Garalde
2008-0326
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Art. 270: Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor
People v. Rubi-Rosa Pastrana (G.R. No. 143644)
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal
Code?
Decision:
No, the Court ruled that Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code has two essential elements, namely: (1)
the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender
deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. What is
actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the
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deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents
or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply something
more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly
daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses.
As consistently ruled by the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment of the
trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Factual
findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded
great weight and respect. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood. In the instant case, there is no reason for us to disregard the trial
court’s finding that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full
faith and credit.
Maria Garalde
2008-0326
125 | P a g e
People v. Teresa Bernardo (G.R. No. 144316)
Facts:
On May 13, 1999, around 11:30 in the morning, Rosita Tolibas brought
with her in Fabella Memorial Hospital her two daughters, 12-year old Roselle and
15-day old Rosalyn. Rosita went to the hospital for medical check-up and tooth
extraction. While the mother, Rosita, was undergoing a medical check-up, her
two daughters waited for her in the lobby. Roselle sat on a bench carrying on her
lap her 15-day old sister. Accused-appellant sat beside them and befriended
Roselle. After a while, accused-appellant asked Roselle to buy ice water and the
latter entrusted her sister with the accused. Roselle didn’t see any ice water
being sold so she returned to the bench. Upon returning, she saw accused-
appellant running away with her sister. Roselle ran after the accused and clung
on to the leg of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the accused-appellant,
Teresa Bernardo, is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping
and failure to return a minor under article 270 of the Revised Penal Code?
Decision:
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No, the Court ruled that a person whose only intention is to look for the
child’s mother would generally return the child to the person who entrusted the
child to her. This did not happen in the present case. The only logical conclusion
we can derive from appellant’s actions is that her intention was really to kidnap
the child – not to look for the child’s mother.
Maria Garalde
2008-0326
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People v. Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty (G.R. No. 121519)
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the accused appellants are guilty of kidnapping and failure
to return a minor?
Decision:
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No, the Court ruled that before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to
return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two
elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the
custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor
to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is
entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the
kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the
deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to
his parents or guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be
deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of
the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.
Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
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Art. 287: Light Coercions
Baleros v. People (G.R. No. 138099)
Facts:
The security guard testified that on the same day, at around 1:30 am,
Renato Baleros, Jr. (Chito) arrived at the building wearing a white shirt with
Greek letters and the words and a black Adidas shorts. He went to room 306
where Joseph Africa was. Africa was awakened by another knocking at around
3pm by Bernard Baptista, occupant of room 310, and was told of the incident that
happened that morning. At around 6-6.30am, Chito was told that they cannot
leave the building due to the incident.
Other occupants of room 310, Christian Alcala and Rommel Montes were
asked by the CIS to inspect their room (310) for any object not belonging to
them. Montes found a grey bag not belonging to them and surrendered it to the
authorities. Upon seeing the bag, they knew that the bag belonged to Chito.
When the bag was opened by the authorities, they found a white shirt with
Greek letters, black Adidas shorts, a handkerchief, 3 white shirts, socks and
underwear. Alcala identified the items belonged to Chito. The items were
examined and it was found that the handkerchief contained chloroform, the same
chemical found in the salmon pink night dress owned by Malou.
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Issue:
Decision:
The Supreme Court held the acquittal of Chito from the crime of attempted
rape. There was no overt act of rape in this case. Overt act is some physical
activity or deed indicating the intention to commit a particular crime. It is more
than a mere planning or preparation. Considering the facts of the case, it cannot
be construed that the act of pressing chemical-soaked cloth on the face of Malou
constitutes an overt act of rape when there was no commencement of any act
indicating the intent to rape the victim.
The acts committed by Chito are not indicative of rape but rather of unjust
vexation under Article 287, second paragraph. Unjust vexation exists when an
act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of
the offended. Unjust vexation includes any conduct which would unjustly annoy
or irritate a person.
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Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
Facts:
The Court declared Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation hence this
petition.
Issue:
Decision:
The court ruled that petitioner is liable for unjust vexation. Having
admitted that he ordered the cutting of electric, water and telephone lines without
the permit to relocate such, he caused the annoyance and vexation of Mildred
Ong. To add, the electric, water and telephone interruption happened during the
operation of the business.
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Kristine Gonzales
2008-0192
Facts:
Pedro testified that when he first reported the crime he withheld the
identity of the three assailants because an Anacleto Habana whose stepson was
married to the daughter of one of the assailants, Romeo Apolinario, was present
at the police station. He was afraid that if he had named the three at the
presence of Patrolman Habana, they would be warned and could flee.
The Regional TrialCourt of Capiz City found the appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
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Issue:
Decision:
Yes, the essential elements of the crime of robbery with homicide was
proven by the prosecution. Add to that that the homicide was committed by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery, appellants are guilty of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code.
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Kristine Gonzales
2008-0192
Facts:
Elvis Doca, Artemio Apostol, Calixto Zinampan and Roger Allan entered
the sari-sari store of Henry and Gaspara Narag of Linao, Tuguegarao, Cagayan
and forced their way into the house adjacent to the store. The housekeeper,
Marlyn Calaycay was pulled back to the store by Elvis Doca as Henry was taken
to the sala. Henry was repeatedly ordered to produce his gun and money and
when he refused Artemio hit him in the head with his gun. Henry gave them
money but insisted that he did not have a gun for which Calixto hit him with the
butt of a gun at the back of his head while Gaspara pleaded for their lives. The
intruders then carried away property and money that they had obtained from the
couple. Henry died five days later due to the injuries suffered from the robbery.
Gaspara Narag passed away while the criminal case was pending with the trial
court leaving Marlyn as the lone witness left. The trial court found Elvis Doca
guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused for the crime of robbery with
homicide was proven by the testimony of the single witness?
Decision:
Yes, the guilt of the accused was sufficiently proven by the sole
prosecution witness for the crime of robbery.
The accused was positively identified by the prosecution witness who has
no motive whatsoever against him that would cause her to fabricate evidence. It
is clear from the facts of the case that there exist a conspiracy between the
appellant and his co-accused as can be inferred from their acts.
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The court found the testimony of the sole prosecution eyewitness as
honest and credible and further holds that a credible and positive testimony of a
single eyewitness is sufficient. A conviction for the truth is determined by the
quality of the testimony and not by the number of witnesses.
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Kristine Gonzales
2008-0192
Facts:
Emelita Paragua’s house was set on fire, some of her jewelries were
missing and niece Raquel Lopez was found dead at the kitchen. The police
received information that Donato Del Rosario was seen outside the house of
Paragua before the incident happened and disappeared since then.
A few days later, Del Rosario surrendered himself to a police officer and
volunteered that he will accompany them in recovering the stolen jewelries from
where he sold them. After the jewelries were recovered, with the assistance of
his lawyer, the suspect signed a waiver and confession for killing Raquel Lopez,
robbery and setting the house of Paragua on fire.
Del Rosario was charged for Robbery with Homicide before the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City. During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not
guilty for the crime charged. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt hence, an appeal.
Issue:
Decision:
Yes, the essential requisites of the crime of robbery with homicide are
present.
Case law has it that when a stolen property is found in the possession of a
person who is not the owner thereof, will be presumed the thief if he can not
137 | P a g e
satisfactorily explain his possession. The accused knew exactly where he can
recover the stolen jewelries and was positively identified by witnesses.
Intent to gain is assumed in an information where it is alleged that there
was unlawful taking and appropriation by the offender of the properties stolen.
The jewelries recovered were pawned and sold by the accused and was
positively identified by the owner of the establishments.
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Divina Gracia Maramba
2007-0321
Facts:
PLDT sued petitioner for violation of Art. 308 of the RPC, or theft, for
allegedly using, without its previous knowledge and consent, the international
long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale
(ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance
calls using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency which connect
directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is
destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in
the estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT,
in the said amount.
Petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with this Court. In his
petition for review petitioner argued that the Revised Penal Code should be
interpreted in the context of the Civil Code’s definition of real and personal
property. The enumeration of real properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is
exclusive such that all those not included therein are personal properties. Since
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code used the words "personal property"
without qualification, it follows that all "personal properties" as understood in the
context of the Civil Code, may be the subject of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code. PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of
providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties
capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
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the "right to carry on a business." This right is what is considered as property.
Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered as "property," the same may
not be subject of theft.
Issue:
Held:
The court granted PLDT’s petition but remanded the case to the trial court
with direction to the Public Prosecutor of Makati City to amend the Amended
Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services and
business of the private offended party because the international calls, although
considered as personal properties, are not owned by PLDT hence petitioner
cannot be liable for theft on that matter; but the business of providing
telecommunication is a personal property which is capable of being appropriated
hence subject to theft.
140 | P a g e
"personal property" in interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in United
States v. Carlos.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word
"take" in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer
possession which, as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed through
the use of the offenders’ own hands, as well as any mechanical device, such as
an access device or card as in the instant case. This includes controlling the
destination of the property stolen to deprive the owner of the property, such as
the use of a meter tampering, as held in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,10 use of
a device to fraudulently obtain gas, as held in United States v. Tambunting, and
the use of a jumper to divert electricity, as held in the cases of United States v.
Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v. Menagas.
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The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or
other apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or
measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise
wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other
apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of
which one may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or
telephone service.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting
various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDT’s telephone system,
through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance
calls using respondent PLDT’s facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction
mentioned above.
It was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the human
voice is converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are
transmitted to the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It
was also held in the assailed Decision that intangible property such as electrical
energy is capable of appropriation because it may be taken and carried away.
Electricity is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which
enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under control by science."
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properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership
over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and
transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and
facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not
validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the
use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that
constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone
services and business.
143 | P a g e
Divina Gracia Maramba
2007-0321
Facts:
The RTC convicted Alfonso Gaviola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of qualified theft. On September 6, 1997 at 7:00 AM, Jovencio Mejarito, a
nephew of Cleto Mejarito, and a barangay councilman saw Gavino Gaviola,
Rodrigo Gaviola and Domingo Caingcoy climbing the coconut trees and
deliberately took, harvested and gathered 1500 coconuts thru the supervision of
Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola from the plantation of Cleto Mejarito without his
authority and consent. The said accused admitted that the coconuts were taken
upon his instruction but insisted that the trees were planted from the lot he
inherited from his father.
Issue:
Whether or not the said accused is guilty of the crime of qualified theft?
Decision:
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code states that theft is committed by
any person, who with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of
neither persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latter’s consent. Theft is likewise committed by: (1.) Any
person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner; (2.) Any person who, after having maliciously
damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or
objects of the damage caused by him; and (3.) Any person who shall enter an
enclosed state or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another
and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather fruits, cereals or other forest or farm products. Thus, the elements of theft
are: 1). That there be taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs to
another; 3) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner and 5) that
the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. According to Article 310: Qualified theft - The crime
of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degree than those
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respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. For one to be guilty of
theft, the accused must have intent to steal (animu furandi) personal property,
meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of
personal property which intent is apart from but concurrent with the general
criminal intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo. Thus, petitioner’s
claim of good faith in taking the coconuts from private complainant’s land is a
mere pretense to escape criminal liability.
145 | P a g e
Divina Gracia Maramba
2007-0321
Facts:
Peñalosa was to learn later that Santos had abandoned his shop in
Malabon. Unable to recover her car, she filed a complaint for carnapping against
Santos with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group in Camp Crame. The case
was dismissed when the petitioner convinced the military authorities that the
complainant had sold the vehicle to him. He submitted for this purpose a Deed of
Sale with Right of Repurchase in his favor.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of qualified theft?
146 | P a g e
Decision:
Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime
committed was theft. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the
offense but the description thereof as alleged in the information. And as
described therein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential
elements of theft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that
said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things.
The petitioner argues that there was no intent to gain at the time of the
taking of the vehicle and so no crime was committed. In U.S. v. De Vera, we
held that the subsequent appropriation by the accused of the thing earlier
delivered to him supplied the third element that made the crime theft instead of
estafa.
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This shows, to our mind, that the theory of the defense is untenable,
according to which, when the thing is received and then appropriated or
converted to one's own use without the consent of the owner, the crime
committed is not that of theft.
It was erroneous for the respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of
qualified theft because the fact that the object of the crime was a car was not
alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance. Santos would have had
reason to argue that he had not been properly informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, as qualified theft carries a higher penalty.
But although not pleaded and so not considered qualifying, the same
circumstance may be considered aggravating, having been proved at the trial.
Hence the imposable penalty for the theft, there being no other modifying
circumstances, should be in the maximum degree.
148 | P a g e
Cheryl Navarro
2007-0026
Facts:
This case was certified to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of
the Rules of Court from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR NO. 18551 which modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 142 in Criminal Case No. 33127, by increasing the penalty
imposed on the accused to reclusion perpetua.
On July 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision finding Salonga guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial
Document.
149 | P a g e
Issues:
Decsion:
Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group testified that the amount of
accounts payable for October 23, 1986 as reflected in the proof sheet did not
tally with the debit tickets of the same date, showing that the check was issued
without any transaction.
Mariano also testified that after finding basic differences in the signature of
bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on the subject check with other
specimens he conferred with the latter who told him that the signature appearing
therein was not hers. Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that the
signature appearing in the cashiers check varies with the way she signs.
Significantly, in a letter dated September 15, 1987 to Atty. Severino S. Tabios of
Metrobank, accused-appellant confirmed the statements in his extra-judicial
confession and offered to return the amount of P8,500.00.
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officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was resorted to in order to
obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused.
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Cheryl Navarro
2007-0026
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR
No. 20411, entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Asuncion Galang Roque,”
which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua,
Pampanga, Branch 49, where petitioner was found guilty of the crime of qualified
theft.
Issues:
Whether or not qualified theft may be committed when the personal property
is in the lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged
felony?
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Decision:
In the case of the United States vs. De Vera (43 Phil., 1000, 1003), Justice
Villamor enumerated the essential elements of the crime of theft, which are as
follows:
If the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony
committed is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a position of
confidence, and the bank places money in the teller’s possession due to the
confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.
The elements of qualified theft include the elements of theft and any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC. The elements of theft,
which is defined in Article 308 of the RPC, are the following:
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3. That said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent; and
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things.
The specific qualifying circumstance in Article 310 of the RPC which the
information indicated was that the felony was committed with grave abuse of
confidence. Hence, to warrant a conviction, the prosecution should have also
proven the fact that it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
In the case at bar, regarding the first element, the taking of personal property,
the prosecution was not able to present direct evidence that petitioner took the
PHP 10,000 on November 16, 1989. The prosecution attempted to prove the
taking through circumstantial evidence. One of the pieces of evidence that the
prosecution adduced was the withdrawal slip for PHP 10,000 dated November
16, 1989.
A careful inspection of all the withdrawal slips including the withdrawal slip
stated above shows that the date and the initial of petitioner were written across
the stamped word “paid.” This indicates that petitioner’s initial was placed in her
capacity as a teller which, therefore, only proves that this transaction passed
through her hands in such capacity. It does not in any manner show that
petitioner prepared the withdrawal slip or that the proceeds of the withdrawal
increased her patrimony.
The presumption that being in possession of said withdrawal slip before its
delivery to Reynaldo Manlulu, the accused is the one who prepared the said
withdrawal slip is without basis in law. The presumption under paragraph (j),
Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
154 | P a g e
which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him;”
Thas always applied to a situation where property has been stolen and the
stolen property is found in the possession of the accused. In these cases the
possession of the accused gives rise to the presumption that the accused is the
taker of the stolen property.
The presumption used by the lower court and the one found in paragraph (j),
Section 3 of Rule 131 are different. The lower court presumed that the petitioner
was the maker of the withdrawal slip and not that the petitioner stole anything. It
is plain that there is no basis for the finding that the withdrawal slip was prepared
by the petitioner.
The other pieces of evidence such as the Teller’s Daily Report and Abstract
of Payment merely reveal that on 16 November 1989, a withdrawal was made on
the account of Sgt. Antonio Salazar and that this withdrawal passed through the
hands of petitioner in her capacity as a teller of the BABSLA. Again, they prove
neither that petitioner prepared the subject withdrawal slip nor that she took the
P10,000 on that date.
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It is plain that the prosecution failed to prove by direct or sufficient circumstantial
evidence that there was a taking of personal property by petitioner.
Cheryl Navarro
2007-0026
156 | P a g e
People v. Bustinera (G. R. No. 148233)
Facts:
From the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City
finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
theft for the unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.
ISSUES:
Decision:
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
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However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles,
by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT
PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING.”
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the RPC
are:
158 | P a g e
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the
concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same.
The anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery
and theft included in the RPC. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things.
But a careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of robbery and
theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful
taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken
without the latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals
with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to
have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the
owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force
upon things.
While the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles,
it excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, street-
sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on
public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers
and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By
implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on
robbery, respectively.
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The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as
one for qualified theft notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the
crime of carnapping.For while it is necessary that the statutory designation be
stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating
the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation
that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the
real nature of the crime.
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain,
took the taxi owned by Cipriano without the latter’s consent. Thus, the indictment
alleges every element of the crime of carnapping, and the prosecution proved the
same.
That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return
it on the same day as he was supposed to is admitted.
While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he
was hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not
returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and against the
owner’s consent transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful
one. Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi
was no longer with Cipriano’s consent as the latter was already demanding its
return.
Appellant assails the trial court’s conclusion that there was intent to gain with
the mere taking of the taxi without the owner’s consent.
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Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain. The term “gain” is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be
derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the
thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.
Christine Perez
161 | P a g e
2006-0104
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
162 | P a g e
In Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense
are (1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right
belonging to another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in
possessing the real property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the accused
should be animated by the intent to gain. Petitioner failed to give any cogent
reason for this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.
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Bernadette Remalla
2007-0392
Facts:
Petitioner had for years been buying jewelry from Gold Asia which is
owned and operated by the family of private complainant Rosa Cabuso. While
she normally bought jewelry on cash basis, she was allowed to issue postdated
checks to cover the jewelry she bought in December 1994 up to February 1995,
upon her assurance that the checks would be funded on their due dates. When,
on maturity, the checks were deposited, they were returned with the stamp
"Account Closed."
Hence, petitioner was indicted for Estafa. She was likewise indicted for 10
counts of violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manila. RTC convicted petitioner
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Held:
Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution grants the accused the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. This is to enable the
accused to adequately prepare for his defense. An accused cannot thus be
convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
information.
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From the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime
charged is determined. In the case at bar, the Information alleged that petitioner
issued the questioned checks knowing that she had no funds in the bank and
failing to fund them despite notice that they were dishonored. These allegations
clearly constitute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as the lower courts found
but, under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately quoted
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 have a common element – false pretenses or
fraudulent acts – the law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a
check or issuing a bouncing check differently. Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure
to fund the check despite notice of dishonor creates a prima facie presumption of
deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act, which is not an element of a
violation of paragraph 2(a).
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In fine, the prosecution having failed to establish all the elements of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, her
acquittal is in order. The judgment bearing on her civil liability stands, however.
Bernadette Remalla
166 | P a g e
2007-0392
Facts:
Private complainant Araceli Estigoy was engaged in the buy and sell of
imported goods from 1982 to 1984 when she met appellant (Anita Chua) who
transacted twice with her. n November 25, 1982, appellant issued to complainant
in payment of imported (PX) items postdated checks drawn against Pacific Bank,
Tarlac branch. On December 4, 1982, appellant again went to complainant’s
house, purchased some imported items and issued another set of postdated
checks drawn against the same bank in Tarlac. On their due dates, complainant
deposited the checks in the bank but they were dishonored, as evidenced by the
check return slips with annotations as follows: "drawn against insufficient funds"
and/or "account closed". Complainant notified appellant of the dishonor and
demanded payment of the checks. Appellant failed to redeem or pay the
amounts of the checks despite several demands. Appellant admitted issuing the
checks but interposed the defense that she issued the checks as collateral and
by way of accommodation of the complainant who requested for the checks. The
Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty of violation of Article 315 (2)(d) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of
conviction rendered by the court a quo, with a slight modification as to the
penalty imposed. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Anita Chua is guilty of Estafa under Article 315 (2)(d) of
the RPC?
Decision:
Article 315 (2)(d) of the RPC penalizes any person who defrauds another
by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender has no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein are not sufficient
to cover the amount of the check.
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The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC, as
amended by RA 4885, are:
All the elements of the crime of estafa under par. 2(d) of Art. 315, RPC are
present in this case. The evidence showed and petitioner Chua admitted issuing
the questioned checks in favor of private respondent in exchange for the
imported goods she obtained from the latter. It is likewise not disputed that the
checks she issued bounced or were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds
and/or because her bank account had already been closed by the bank due to
lack of funds. As a result, private respondent suffered damage. She had to close
down her business because she could not recoup her losses due to the huge
amount petitioner owed her.
168 | P a g e
Bernadette Remalla
2007-0392
Facts:
Before his death in 1992, one Ulysses Villaflor was a member of the
Bacolod City Police Office. On January 11, 1978, Ulysses married Anita
Manlangit in Bacolod City. Thereafter, the couple stayed with Ulysses’s mother at
the latter’s house at Bacolod City. Later, Ulysses was assigned to Pagadian City.
Meanwhile, his wife Anita secured a teaching job in Catubig, Samar prompting
her to leave Bacolod City and live in Samar.
169 | P a g e
Issue:
Decision:
There is no question that the first, second and fourth elements are
present: there was false or fraudulent misrepresentation by Rosemarie Gelogo
when she used the fictitious surname "Villaflor"; the misrepresentation or false
pretense was made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud;
and private complainant Anita Manlangit’s right to the subject 2-storey house was
lost or at the very least prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases.
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the settled principle that
the deceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act of
defraudation, must be the efficient cause or primary consideration which induced
the offended party to part with his money or property and rule differently in the
present case.
170 | P a g e
was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who parted with
their money when they bought the house. However, the Information charging
Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the
Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit
or fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part
with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all
the more reason must this be for herein petitioner.
The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily
absolve petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of
public document under the same Information charging the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document.
171 | P a g e
Michelle Ricaza
2008-0040
Facts:
Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor
vehicles, including Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox Motor
Sales. His office and display room for cars were located along Panganiban
Avenue, Naga City. He employed Gil Azotea as his sales manager.
A day after Spouses Silos’ purchase of the van, they heard a squeaking
sound which seemed to be coming from underneath the van. Believing that the
van merely needed grease, they stopped at a Shell gasoline station where it was
examined. The mechanic discovered that some parts underneath the van had
been welded. When they complained to Guinhawa, the latter told them that the
defects were mere factory defects. As the defects persisted, the spouses Silo
requested that Guinhawa change the van with two Charade-Daihatsu vehicles.
Guinhawa initially agreed to the couple’s proposal, but later changed his mind
and told them that he had to sell the van first. The spouses then brought the
vehicle to the Rx Auto Clinic in Naga City for examination. The mechanic
discovered that it was the left front stabilizer that was producing the annoying
sound, and that it had been repaired.
Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the refund
of their money before the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). During the
confrontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned that Guinhawa had
bought the van from UMC before it was sold to them, and after it was damaged in
172 | P a g e
the vehicular accident. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint
from the DTI.
Issue:
Whether or not Jaime Guinhawa violated Article 318 of the RPC covering
other deceits?
Decision:
Petitioner insists that the private complainant merely assumed that the van
was brand new, and that he did not make any misrepresentation to that effect.
He avers that deceit cannot be committed by concealment, the absence of any
notice to the public that the van was not brand new does not amount to deceit.
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner cannot barefacedly claim that
he made no personal representation that the herein subject van was brand new
for the simple reason that nowhere in the records did he ever refute the
allegation in the complaint, which held him out as a dealer of brand new cars. It
has thus become admitted that the petitioner was dealing with brand new
vehicles – a fact which, up to now, petitioner has not categorically denied.
Therefore, when private complainant went to petitioner’s showroom, the former
had every right to assume that she was being sold brand new vehicles there
being nothing to indicate otherwise. But as it turned out, not only did private
complainant get a defective and used van, the vehicle had also earlier figured in
a road accident when driven by no less than petitioner’s own driver.
173 | P a g e
bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation. Moreover,
a representation is not confined to words or positive assertions; it may consist as
well of deeds, acts or artifacts of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus
allow the fraud-feasor to obtain an undue advantage.
The petitioner knew that the van had figured in an accident, was damaged
and had to be repaired. Nevertheless, the van was placed in the showroom, thus
making it appear to the public that it was a brand new unit. The petitioner was
mandated to reveal the foregoing facts to the private complainant. But the
petitioner even obdurately declared when they testified in the court a quo that the
vehicle did not figure in an accident, nor had it been repaired; they maintained
that the van was brand new. Thus, the private complainant bought the van,
believing it was brand new.
Sheryll Tablico
174 | P a g e
2008-0341
Facts:
In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion
to Defer Proceedings including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the
criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration
of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the petition for the declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s marriage is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of
the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife?
Decision:
175 | P a g e
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that
the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner
need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce
evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a
final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the
charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to
state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense.
Therefore, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents
and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming
the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a
civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for concubinage.
Sheryll Tablico
176 | P a g e
2008-0341
Facts:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo
Arroyo in the City of Baguio.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Neri’s alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from
filing the criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto.
Decision:
177 | P a g e
The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but
only in Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the
Civil Code relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar
does not involve any illegal contract which either of the contracting parties is now
seeking to enforce. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining
husband, by entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to
live separately and could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about
a year after discovering his wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced
in, the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is therefore, not
authorized by law to institute the criminal proceedings." In fine,
the Guinucud case refers not to the notion of pari delicto but to consent as a bar
to the institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, no such
acquiescence can be implied: the accused did not enter into any agreement with
Dr. Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with other persons and Dr. Neri
promptly filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair.
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code
provides that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended
spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case
passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on adultery is not
exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of
the offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social
hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic
social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the
State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most
fundamental kind.
178 | P a g e
Art. 338: Simple Seduction
People v. Pascua (GR No. 128159-62)
Facts:
Fearing for their lives, the twins did not tell their mother about what
happened. It was only when their older sister, Rosalina, had told their mother
about it, based on the confession of accused-appellant’s granddaughter who saw
him rape Liza, had she learned of the incidents.
Wasting no time and propelled by her rage of what she had learned, their
mother filed four separate complaints for rape against accused-appellant. This
was after she had her twins physically examined by a doctor who, based on his
findings, confirmed that the twins were indeed sexually-abused.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of all the charges, sentenced
him with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay each twin with
P100,000 as indemnity for moral damages.
179 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant may be held liable for the crime of rape
even if allegedly he did not employ force in order to have sexual intercourse with
the twins?
Decision:
Yes. It is clear from the foregoing testimony that private complainants tried to
scream but the appellant prevented them by threatening to kill them. Also, after
each rape incident, private complainants were warned by the appellant not to tell
their mother what happened to them. It is settled that a rape victim is not required
to resist her attacker unto death. Force, as an element of rape, need not be
irresistible; it need only be present and so long as it brings about the desired
result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the
point. Indeed, physical resistance need not be established in rape when, as in
this case, intimidation was used on the victim and she submitted to the rapist’s
lust for fear of her life or her personal safety. Jurisprudence holds that even
though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet, if by an array of physical forces, he
so overpowers her mind that she does not resist or she ceases resistance
through fear of greater harm, the consummation of unlawful intercourse by the
man is rape. Without question, the prosecution was able to prove that force or
intimidation was actually employed by the appellant on the two victims to satisfy
his lust.
No. Equally untenable is the argument of the appellant that, if he is at all liable
for anything, it should only be for simple seduction. Under Article 338 of the
Revised Penal Code, to constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some
deceitful promise or inducement. The woman should have yielded because of
this promise or inducement. In this case, the appellant claims that the acts of
sexual intercourse with the private complainants were in exchange for money. He
declared that, prior to every sexual intercourse with Liza and Anna, he would
promise them P20. However, aside from his bare testimony, the appellant
presented no proof that private complainants’ consent was secured by means of
such promise. As aptly opined by the trial court, the money given by the appellant
to private complainants was not intended to lure them to have sex with him.
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Rather, it was for the purpose of buying their silence to ensure that nobody
discovered his dastardly acts. The evidence for the prosecution was more than
enough to show that the element of voluntariness on the part of private
complainants was totally absent. Liza and Anna’s respective testimonies
established that the appellant had sexual intercourse with them without their
consent and against their will. Considering that the victims’ accounts of what the
appellant did to them were absolutely credible and believable, the trial court
correctly convicted the appellant of several crimes of rape against the 12-year-
old twins, Liza and Anna Paragas.
181 | P a g e
Facts:
Fernando for his part denied in his answer that she forced her in having
sexual intercourse with him because according to him she agreed to go and stay
with him at Champion Lodge Inn.
Based on the record, it was undisputed that prior to the said incident,
Fernando and Elaine were together. Earlier that day he accompanied her to her
Christmas party at her school in Manila Central University in the morning; went to
Luneta Park and took a stroll; thereafter went to Cubao and ate at a fastfood
restaurant; then she accompanied him to his school at Lyceum where he took his
examination; and then finally they went to Champion Lodge Inn where said
incident took place.
After said incident, Elaine told it to her mother who, without wasting time,
brought her to PC Crime Laboratory for a physical examination, the result of
which revealed that she had a fresh laceration on her hymen. Based on said
findings, a complaint was filed against Fernando.
After arraignment, Fernando pleaded not guilty. In the meantime during her
testimony before the court, Elaine admitted that she knew Fernando because
they were neighbors. She even admitted that they were sweethearts and that she
had given him her photo, at the back of which, she had her personal message for
him.
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Issues:
Whether or not the trial court had proven the guilt of defendant for the crime
of rape beyond reasonable doubt?
Whether or not defendant may be held liable for the crime of simple
seduction?
Decision:
Firstly, while Elaine claimed she was dragged to the hotel, her medical
examination did not reveal any contusions on her body showing use of any force
on her. Indeed, if she was under any compulsion, she could easily have escaped
during the many hours they were together going from one place to another, but
she did not. She was enjoying their tryst.
Secondly, if she was really drugged she should have been given at least a
blood and urine test to determine if there were any remaining chemicals in her
system. This was not done.
Thirdly, after the incident, Elaine was composed and was not disturbed at all.
She did not show any sign of having had a traumatic experience. It was only
when her mother scolded her that she contrived her story.
Fourthly, in one part of her Sagot Salaysay submitted to the fiscal's office, she
said she did not accept the invitation of appellant for them to go to the Luneta. In
another part thereof, she said she accepted the same. 6 In court, she said she
agreed to go to the Luneta and thereafter she said she was
forced.
She also stated in her Sagot Salaysay that she was only persuaded to give
appellant her photograph and appellant dictated what she wrote thereon. In court
she admitted she gave the photograph to appellant and that appellant did not ask
her to write the dedication thereon.
183 | P a g e
Verily, the foregoing circumstances effectively disprove the theory of force
and involuntariness in the sexual interlude of the two.
What is obvious and clear is that these two young lovers, carried by their
mutual desire for each other, in a moment of recklessness, slept together and
thus consummated the fruition of their brief love affair. Appellant cannot be held
liable for rape as there was none committed. It was a consensual affair.
Appellant said he planned to marry Elaine and for this reason he successfully
persuaded her to give up her virginity. This is the deceit contemplated by law that
attended the commission of the offense.
184 | P a g e
Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz
2007-0388
185 | P a g e
Art. 344: Prosecution of the Crimes of Adultery, Concubinage,
Seduction, Abduction, Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
The pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. Article 40 of the Civil Code
provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. In view of this provision, it follows that for purposes other
than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. Therefore in a case for
concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner, need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal
186 | P a g e
case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring
his marriage void.
187 | P a g e
People v. Tipay (329 SCRA 52)
Facts:
Susan Pelaez, 15 years old, suffering from mild mental retardation and
transient psychotic illness, was assisted by her grandmother Flora Deguino to file
a criminal complaint for the crime of rape against her stepfather named Romeo
Tipay.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that the accused raped his
stepdaughter Susan several times whenever the latter’s mother and siblings
were out of the house. Susan was threatened by the accused that he would kill
Susan’s family member if she would tell anyone about it. One day, Susan
complained to her grandmother that her head was aching. Flora had Susan
checked up by a midwife. The midwife found out that Susan is 4-months
pregnant and it was at this moment that Susan confided to her grandmother that
she was being raped by her stepfather.
Sometime in 1996, the lower court convicted the accused of the crime of
rape under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 and
sentenced the accused to Death Penalty which caused the automatic review by
the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court committed grave error when it convicted the
accused under a fatally defective complaint as it was Susan’s grandmother who
filed the same, when it should have been Marilyn (Susan’s mother), in
accordance with Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court?
Decision:
Under Sec. 5, par. 3 of Rule 110, where the offended party is a minor, her
parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the complaint. The right to file the
action granted to parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all other
persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided.
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However, with the advent of RA 8353, which reclassified rape as a crime against
person and no longer a private crime, for which reason, the complaint can now
be instituted by any person. It is also worthy to note that in the case of People vs.
Estrebella, it was held that any technical defect in a complaint for rape would be
remedied by testimony showing the consent and willingness of the family of the
complainant who cannot give her consent (due to minority or mental retardation,
for instance) to have the private offense publicly tried. In the case at bar, Marilyn
Deguino (complainant’s mother) herself requested Susan’s grandmother to take
care of the case.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the trial court erred in imposing
death penalty on accused-appellant. In view of RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law)
applicability in the crime of rape, which imposes death penalty when the victim is
under 18 years of age and the offender is her parent, ascendant, step-parent.. it
is required that the prosecution proved with certainty the fact that the victim was
under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order to justify the
imposition of death penalty. In the case at bar, the allegation in the complaint that
complainant is under 16 years of age when the crime was committed and that the
accused-appellant lack of denial in that regard is not sufficient to excuse the
prosecution of its burden to prove said qualifying circumstance by competent
evidence.
189 | P a g e
Alonte v. Savellano (287 SCRA 245)
Facts:
In 1996, Juvie-lyn, through her counsel, Atty. Balbin, and Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a
Petition for Change of Venue to have the case transferred and tried by any of the
Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila. The same has been approved on
September 20, 1997. On the other hand, during the pendency of the petition for
change of venue, Juvie-lyn, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an
affidavit of desistance.
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Whether or not the affidavit of desistance filed by the offended party
extinguished the criminal liability of the accused?
Decision:
Eileen S. Tan
2007-0027
191 | P a g e
Art.336: Acts of Lasciviousness
Amployo vs. People (457 SCRA 340)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
In the present case it would have been easy to entertain the possibility
that what happened was merely an accident if it only happened once. Such is
not the case, however, as Alvin Ampayo did the very same act to Kristine Joy in
the past. As to Alvin’s argument that human experience negates the presence of
lewd design as Kristine Joy had no developed breasts with which to entice him,
human experience has taught us painfully well that sexual misconduct defies
categorization and what might be an unusual, unlikely or impossible sexual
conduct for most might very well be the norm for some.
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Pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA 7610, before an accused can be convicted of
child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the
requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in
addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610.
Thus, Alvin Ampayo is guilty for the crime of Child Abuse because the
prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of acts of lasciviousness.
Eileen S. Tan
2007-0027
193 | P a g e
People vs. Collado (353 SCRA 381)
Facts:
Messeah confronted her mother about the sexual abuses she sustained
from her distant cousin, accused Jessie Ventura Collado who also lives with
them in one roof. Since Messeah’s father was a seaman, their children were left
in the care of Jessie. Messeah recounted four occasions where she was
molested. The first of which happened on 27 April 1993 when Jessie tied her on
the bed and attempted to insert his penis to her vagina. When he was
unsuccessful, he then inserted the same to her anus.
On 7 July 1993, the third molestation occurred when Messeah and her
brother Metheor were again left home with Jessie. Armed with a knife, Jessie
forced Messeah to sit on a chair. He took off her shorts and underwear and
spread her legs. He inserted and rubbed his penis between her thighs until it
touched her vagina.
Isue:
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Whether or not Jessie should be held liable for acts of lasciviousness and
statutory rape?
Decision:
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellant guilty of three (3)
counts of acts of lasciviousness. However, RTC erred in sentencing him guilty
for statutory rape because he should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness.
While Jessie succeeded in touching her genitalia with his private parts there was
no indication that it successfully penetrated at least the labia of the victim.
Eileen S. Tan
2007-0027
195 | P a g e
Dulla vs. Court of Appeals (326 SCRA 32)
Facts:
An information for rape was filed against Nicanor Dulla. During the trial, it
was established that three year old Andrea Ortega came home crying with
bruises on her thighs saying that his uncle showed his penis to her. In her own
words she said “inaano ako ni uncle” while doing a pumping motion on her lower
body. The medical report on Andrea showed that her hymen was still intact.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court found petitioner guilty of acts of
lasciviousness and not of rape.
Issue:
Decision:
Andrea Ortega recounted the event while she was on witness stand and
was given full credence by the trial court. The lewd design of petitioner is evident
and, although the information filed was for the crime of rape, he can be convicted
of acts of lasciviousness because the latter is necessarily included in rape.
196 | P a g e
Art. 337: Qualified Seduction
People v. Javier (G.R. No. 126096)
Facts:
Julia Ratunil Javier, a 16-year old girl, was raped three times by her father,
Amado Sandrias Javier, one on October 20, 1994 and sometime on November,
1994 and December, 1994, which resulted to Julia’s pregnancy.
Three complaints were filed. The trial court found Amado guilty of the
crime of incestuous rape in the first complaint and sentenced to death. Upon
failure of the prosecution to prove the use of force by Amado in the second and
third complaints, he was just convicted of qualified seduction.
Issue:
Decision:
No. Assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force by
accused, the latter cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only when the
complaint for rape contains allegations for qualified seduction that the accused
may be convicted of the latter in case the prosecution fails to prove the use of
force by the accused (People vs. Antido, 278 SCRA 425 [1997]). To do otherwise
would be violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to
be informed of the accusation against him. The accused charged with rape
cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the same information (People
vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144 [1976]). Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are
not identical offenses. While the two felonies have one common element which is
carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects
(Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667 [1994]).
What the trial court should have done was to dismiss the charges for rape
in Criminal Cases No. 95-147 and 95-148, if indeed, in its opinion, the
prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the existence of force and intimidation,
and order instead the filing of the appropriate information. Be that as it may, this
197 | P a g e
Court believes otherwise and is fully convinced that accused-appellant is guilty
as well of these two other counts of rape.
Facts:
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Jennifer Manansala, a 14-year old girl, was raped eight times by her
father, a 44-year old “taho” vendor, Rodante Manansala, on November of 1991.
On direct examination, Jennifer testified that she was raped eight times in
the “taho” factory in Tondo, the workplace of her father. On cross examination,
however, Jennifer changed her statement that the first rape incident was
committed in the “taho” factory in Tondo but the rest of the seven rape incidents
were committed in Tarlac. She also mentioned that her father gave her money
every time they had sexual intercourse.
The trial court found Rodante Manansala guilty of having raped his
daughter in Manila but dismissed those committed in Tarlac on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape or quite possibly,
the crime of qualified seduction, taking into account the inconsistencies of the
victim’s statement?
Decision:
No. SC acquitted the accused, both on the crime of rape and qualified
seduction.
199 | P a g e
proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection.
Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be
overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually
abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought
to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes
through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind
that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows
that it was not an ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One
subjected to sexual torture can hardly be expected to see what was being done
to her. What is clear from complainant’s testimony is that although accused-
appellant had had sexual intercourse with her, it was not done by force or
intimidation. Nor was the rape made possible because of accused-appellant’s
moral ascendancy over her, for the fact is that accused-appellant was not living
with them, having separated from complainant’s mother in 1986.
Considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in this case was
committed “by means of force, violence and intimidation,” accused-appellant
cannot possibly be convicted of qualified seduction without offense to the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
accusation against him. That charge does not include qualified seduction. Neither
can qualified seduction include rape.
200 | P a g e
Marie Joan Tusi
2007-0276
201 | P a g e
Facts:
Loreta narrated that the accused raped her in the presence of her sister
(wife of the accused) while they were sleeping in the sala. Loreta resisted but she
was not able to shout because she was allegedly weak and tired. She told the
incident to her sister the following morning but the latter did not pay heed. She
eventually got pregnant and a child was born.
An Information was filed. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape or quite possibly, of the crime
of qualified seduction?
Decision:
SC acquitted the accused for the crime of rape but charged him of the
crime of qualified seduction, the elements of which were included in the facts
alleged in the Information.
Viewed from human observation and experience not even a confirmed sex
maniac would dare do his thing before the eyes of strangers, how much more for
a healthy husband before the eyes of his very wife? Then, again, testimony that
her sister before whose very eyes the alleged raping incident took place did not
lift a finger to her, mocks at human sensibility. In the natural course of things, this
piece of evidence is repugnant to common experience and observation in that
the natural reaction wife would be that of righteous indignation rather than
passive [acquiescence] and the natural response of a sister would be to protect
the virtue of a younger sister from abuse of her husband.
Our criminal law is not susceptible to such a reproach, it being clear from
the information that the elements of the crime of qualified seduction were
included in the facts alleged. He cannot be heard to complain thereafter that he is
entitled to complete acquittal. As a matter of fact, in his defense, rightfully given
202 | P a g e
credence by us, he did admit his having taken advantage of an inexperienced
adolescent, the younger sister of his wife, to whom he ought to have been bound
by the closest ties of affinity, considering also, as testified to by him, how close
she felt towards him.
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Nothing remains to be added except that in a situation like the present,
where, in keeping with Filipino mores, a younger sister is called upon to be of
help to those ahead of her and to stay, even if intermittently, in the latter's house,
especially so after marital ties are formed and children born, may give rise to
situations of this character considering that among the poorer elements of our
society, all the members of a family are huddled together within briefest confines,
and insistence on personal modesty and privacy is practically out of the question.
If the ascendancy of a brother-in-law, instead, were used for moral purposes,
then, certainly, there is more than a justification for adherence to the view first
announce in the landmark Arlante decision that thereby the offense qualified
seduction was in fact committed.
Katherine Yarte
2011-0296
204 | P a g e
Art. 342: Forcible Abduction
People vs. Egan (GR No. 139338)
Facts:
Lito Egan, alias Akiao, 36 years old, a Manobo was an avid admirer of a
fellow Manobo, Lenie Camad, 12 years old. Both are residents of Sitio Salaysay,
Marilog, Davao City.
For four (4) months, the datus attempted a customary settlement of the
abduction in accordance with Manobo traditions. In exchange of the hand of Lenie in
marriage, the accused agreed to give 2 horses to the family of Lenie. When the
accused failed to fulfill his promise, the father demanded the unconditional return of
his daughter to his custody.
Since the amicable settlement was not realized, Akiao forcibly relocated Lenie
to Cabalantian, Kataotao, Bukidnon, where the latter was successfully rescued on
15 May 1997.
An Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape was filed against the
accused. After several warrants of arrest and attempts to arrest him, he was finally
arrested at Arakan, Cotabato.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the trial,
accused tried to prove that he and Lenie had actually been living together under
Manobo rites in the house of her father after he has given the family, the dowry. The
accused allegedly delivered the horse to the father, but was again refused when the
latter increased the number of horses from one to two. The accused concluded that
because he failed to deliver two wild horses, the instant case was filed against him.
205 | P a g e
The trial court rejected the defenses of the accused and convicted him of
forcible abduction with rape. The accused appealed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Between the accused and the victim, whose version is more credible, more
plausible and more trustworthy considering the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime charged?
Decision:
All the elements of forcible abduction were proved in this case. The victim
who is a young girl was taken against her will as shown by the fact that at knife-
point, she was dragged and taken by accused-appellant to a place far from her
abode. At her tender age, she could not be expected to physically resist considering
the fact that even her companion, Jessica, had to run home to escape accused-
appellant’s wrath as he brandished a haunting knife.
The evidence likewise shows that the taking of the young victim against her
will was done con miras deshonestas or in furtherance of lewd and unchaste
designs. The word lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious,
lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or
that which is carried on in a wanton manner. Such lewd designs were established by
the prurient and lustful acts which accused-appellant displayed towards the victim
after she was abducted. This element may also be inferred from the fact that while
Lenie was then a naive twelve (12)-year old, accused-appellant was thirty-six (36)
years old and although unmarried was much wiser in the ways of the world than she
Given the straightforward and candid testimony of Lenie and her father
Palmones as well as the absence of any motive to testify falsely against accused-
appellant, the logical conclusion is that there was no improper motive on their part,
and their respective testimonies as to facts proving forcible abduction are worthy of
full faith and credit
206 | P a g e
horses forthcoming, he had given her father in exchange for her hand in
marriage. In moving from one place to another to look for the horses which the
old man Palmones had demanded, it was allegedly only his intention to realize
his matrimonial aspiration with Lenie.
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Katherine Yarte
2011-0296
208 | P a g e
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman,
was taken against her will, as shown by the fact that she was intentionally
directed by accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her tender age, Magdalena
could not be expected to physically resist considering that the lewd designs of
accused-appellant could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical
resistance need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was against her
will. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering that it was
209 | P a g e
raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the purpose
was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the
taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving
minds. Finally, the evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against
her will was effected in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd
designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim
In the case at bar, Magdalena testified in open court that accused-appellant
inserted his penis into her private parts. The fact of sexual intercourse is
corroborated by the medical findings wherein it was found that the victim suffered
from complete hymenal laceration. Whether or not she consented to the sexual
contact is immaterial considering that at the time thereof, she was below twelve
years of age. Sex with a girl below twelve years, regardless of whether she
consented thereto or not, constitutes statutory rape.
However, the trial court erred in failing to award civil indemnity to the
victim. Whenever the crime of rape is committed, a civil indemnity is awarded to
the victim without necessity of proof or pleading, and the same is automatically
granted together with moral damages, generally in the amount of P50,000.00
each. In this connection, the prayer of the Solicitor General that the civil
indemnity be increased to P75,000.00 cannot be granted, the same being
contrary to jurisprudence In cases where the death penalty cannot be imposed,
the civil indemnity is reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00
Katherine Yarte
2011-0296
210 | P a g e
Facts:
Judeliza went to the well near their house, to take a bath. There, Jimmy
grabbed and forcibly dragged her at knife's point, to the highway where he made her
board a truck for Bogo, Cebu. Impelled by fear, she complied, since Jimmy
continuously poked a knife under cover of his jacket at her. From Bogo, he took her
by passenger motorboat to Placer, Masbate. Thence he brought her to Estampar,
Cataingan, Masbate, where they stayed at the house of Conchita Tipnit, Jimmy's
sister and Judeliza's aunt. Though aunt and niece did not know each other. In
Estampar, Judeliza tried to escape but was caught by Jimmy, who severely mauled
her until she lost consciousness
Nilda noticed the victim's weak and wan condition and offered her
medicine. Nilda brought her to the police where Judeliza reported her ordeal.
After the initial police investigation, Judeliza was brought to Masbate Provincial
Hospital, where she was confined for four days. The medico-legal officer
examined her.
An information for forcible abduction with rape was filed. The accused
pleaded not guilty. During the trial, accused admitted having sexual relations
with Judeliza, but insisted that it was consensual. He claimed that they were
lovers and had been engaging in sexual intimacies for three months before
running away. He explained that they had gone to Masbate after Judeliza had
revealed to him that she was not really her father's daughter. They then lived
together as husband and wife. He admitted having boxed and kicked her but
claimed that he got mad at her after she confided that she really was his niece,
contrary to what she earlier told him. He likewise admitted having pinched the
211 | P a g e
victim's vagina, but only to punish her for deceiving him about their kinship. He
claimed the instant case was filed against him because of the maltreatment she
received. Pedsc
The trial court found appellant's version of the incident preposterous and
his defense untenable. |The trial Court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape under
Article 48 in relation to Article[s] 335 and 342 of the Revised Penal Code and is
meted the extreme penalty of death.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court gravely err in its evaluation of the honesty of
private complainant, in effect giving full weight and credence to the evidence of the
prosecution than that of the defense?
Whether or not the trial court gravely err in finding the accused appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged?
Decision:
Appellant next insists that the intercourse between him and Judeliza was
consensual, since they were sweethearts. A "sweetheart defense" should be
substantiated by some documentary and/or other evidence of the relationship .In this
case, there is no showing of mementos, love letters, notes, pictures, or any concrete
proof of a romantic nature. Besides, as observed by the trial judge, it is contrary to
human experience that a naive rural lass like Judeliza, barely nineteen years old,
would willingly consent to be her uncle's paramour. Nor, would he if he were indeed
212 | P a g e
her sweetheart maltreat her repeatedly for no justifiable cause, without over-straining
our credulity
The elements of forcible abduction are: (1) that the person abducted is
any woman, regardless of age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that the abduction is
against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. The
prosecution's evidence clearly shows that the victim was forcibly taken at
knifepoint from Borbon, Cebu by appellant and through threats and intimidation
brought to various towns in Masbate, where he passed her off as his "wife". That
appellant was moved by lewd designs was shown in regard to rape by his having
carnal knowledge of private complainant, against her will, on July 4, 1994 at
Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate. While it may appear at first blush that forcible
abduction, as defined and penalized by Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code
was also committed, we are not totally disposed to convict appellant for the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. When a complex crime under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, such as forcible abduction with
rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of
all the elements of forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime of
rape. When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for the
purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then
absorb forcible abduction. Hence, the crime committed by appellant is simple
rape only.
The imposable penalty for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. But where the rape
is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. The use of the
bladed weapon already qualified the rape. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crucial factor in determining whether appellant should be meted the
death penalty is the presence of an aggravating circumstance which attended the
commission of the crime. A perusal of the record shows that none of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
was alleged and proven by the prosecution. Where there is no aggravating
circumstance proved in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.
In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted that the victim was
his niece, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. Section 11 (1)
of R.A. No. 7659 imposes the death penalty when the rape victim is under 18
213 | P a g e
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim. However, R.A. No. 7659 cannot be made
to apply in the instant case for two reasons: First, at the time the rape was
committed, private complainant was already more than eighteen years of age.
Second, the information did not allege that offender and offended party were
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity. We have held that the seven
circumstances in R.A. No. 7659 which warrant the automatic imposition of the
death penalty partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and as such
should be alleged in the information to be appreciated as such. In view of the
failure of the information to comply with this requirement, said degree of relation
could not be taken into account in considering the penalty to be imposed. For
these reasons, the sentence on appellant should only be reclusion perpetua
Jm Sandino Imperial
2007-0297
214 | P a g e
Art. 349: Bigamy
Diego v. Castillo
Facts:
Prior that filing of the case, the Family District Court of Texas granted a
decree of Divorce on Lucena Escoto and Jorge de Perio, Jr.
Issue:
Decision:
No, the court applied the case of Guillermo vs. Reyes, Jr. which explained
that: “a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous
order or decision he renders. The error must be gross or patent, malicious,
deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge
acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance that administrative sanctions are called
for as an imperative duty of this Court.”
Jm Sandino Imperial
2007-0297
215 | P a g e
Abunado v. People
Facts:
On May 18, 2001, the Trial Court of San Mateo Rizal convicted Salvador
of the crime of bigamy.
Salvador avers that the information filed against him was defective as it
stated that the alleged bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it
should have been 1989.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him?
Decision:
No, the statement in the information that the crime was committed in
“January 1995” was an obvious typographical error, for the same information
clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida
Abunado on January 10, 1989.
Also, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information during the
trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
Jm Sandino Imperial
2007-0297
216 | P a g e
Cacho v. People
Facts:
On October 19, 1993, appelant was charged with bigamy filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals and the same affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Decision:
No, the first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense
cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
217 | P a g e
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own.
Under the aforementioned circumstance, the Court held that petitioner has
not committed bigamy.
Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386
218 | P a g e
Title 13: Crimes against Honor
Art. 353: Libel
Fermin v. People (G.R. No. 157643)
Facts:
This is a case for Libel filed by a showbiz couple namely, Annabelle Rama
Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez against Cristinelli S. Fermin and Bogs C
Tugas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Brach 218. The two
(2) criminal informations uniformly read, as follows:
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KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA
STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA
NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI
LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA
KANYA
when in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the
same are entirely false and untrue but were publicly made
for no other purpose than to expose said ANNABELLE
RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as it depicts
her to be a fugitive from justice and a swindler, thereby
causing dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of
the offended party, to the damage and prejudice of the said
ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ.
CONTRARY TO LAW”
After trial on the merits, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, in its Joint
Decisions dated January 27, 1997, found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel.
Petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA. The appellate court, in its
Decision dated September 3, 2002, affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but
acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous
article.
Issues:
Whether or not Tugas and Fermin can be held liable for liable?
220 | P a g e
Decision:
The Supreme Court noted that, in the first issue, the CA erred in
acquitting Tugas. It said that Tugas cannot feign lack of participation in the
publication of the questioned article as was evident from his and petitioners Joint
Counter-Affidavit and as gleaned from his testimony before the trial court, to wit:
ATTY. ALENTAJAN:
221 | P a g e
A: Yes, your honor.
In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277
which provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or
serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any
part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the
author of the same. However, proof adduced during the trial showed that
accused was the manager of the publication without the corresponding evidence
that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of
the matter contained in the said libelous article.
As regards to the second issue, petitioner Fermin argues that the subject
article in the June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by
the mantle of press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest
comment. The Supreme Court disagrees on her arguments by analyzing the
libelous articles, to wit:
222 | P a g e
The banner headlines of the offending article read:
On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller
but bold letters, are:
To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs ones
sensibilities; it would certainly prick ones conscience. There is evident imputation
223 | P a g e
of the crime of malversation (that the complainants converted for their personal
use the money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in America in their business of
distributing high-end cookware); of vices or defects for being fugitives from the
law (that complainants and their family returned to the Philippines to evade
prosecution in America); and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez
lost the earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos).
The attribution was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a
nationwide circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable. More
importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of the complainants.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the conviction of petitioner Fermin for
libel should be upheld.
Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386
224 | P a g e
Facts:
Feeling that he was the 'Cere', 'Lito or 'Cedring being alluded to,
Cerelito reported the matter to the local police and filed an affidavit-
complaint with the Fiscal's Office.
Again, feeling that he was the maniac and dog thief being referred to,
Cerelito lost no time in filing a complaint with the Baguio City Police (BCP).
Pictures were then taken of the aforesaid writing on the wall. Eventually, the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio, finding, following an investigation,
probable cause for libel against Dolores, filed the corresponding information
giving rise to Criminal Case No. 8804-R.
225 | P a g e
At around 12:20 p.m. of the same day, March 15, 1991, Dolores handed to
and instructed Evelyn Arcartado, Cerelito's sister, to deliver an unsealed white,
long, ordinary envelope to Fe Alejandro, Cerelito's wife.Since Fe was out of the
house at that time, Evelyn gave the unsealed envelope to Cerelito, who
immediately read the three (3) separate letters contained in the envelope. Evelyn
followed suit afterwards. Fe read the contents of the envelope upon reaching
home late in the afternoon of March 15, 1991.
The first letter, unsigned and undated and written on yellow pad, was
addressed to spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro. Quoted, in part, in the
information in Criminal Case No. 8806-R, this unsigned letter reads:
“If your husband can't show any proof of his makating dila
then comply & if your husband can't understand this simple
English dahil mangmang, dayukdok na galing sa isang kahig
isang tukang pamilya at walang pinagaralan, illiterate, mal
educado kaya bastos eh huag na niya kaming idamay sa
kaniyang katangahan na alam na trabaho eh humawak ng
grasa sa Saudi.Kaya iyong pambabastos mo at pagdudumi
niya sa pangalan naming at higit pa siyang marumi at putang
ina rin niya.Galing siya sa p ng baboy at hindi sa p ng
tao.Huag niyang ikumpara ang pinangalingan niya sa
pinangalingan namin.Siya ang magnanakaw at
mandaraya.Malinaw na ibidensiya iyan kinalagyan ng
hagdan ninyo, di ba lampas kayo sa lote ninyo.Pinalakad
ninyo ang mojon para lumaki ang lote ninyo.Bago kayo
magsalita mambintang ng kapitbahay ninyo, tignan ninyo
muna ang sarili ninyo. Mas mukha pang magnanakaw ang
asawa mo para malinaw.”
The second letter is a photo-copy of the first, but with the following
addendum written in ink at the back page thereof which reads:
226 | P a g e
masasabi na pumasok sa bakuran mo para mamirhuesyo sa
inyo. Tanga.”
Dear sir:
cralawxxxxxxxxx
227 | P a g e
1993, finding her guilty of libel in both Criminal Cases Nos. 8804-R and
8806-R and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment and ordering her to
indemnify the offended party a certain sum as moral damages. In Criminal
Cases Nos. 8803-R and 8805-R, however, she was acquitted.
Issue:
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that to be liable for libel under Article 353
of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be shown to
exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning
another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed;
and (d) existence of malice.
228 | P a g e
and he voluntarily discloses the contents of the libelous communication to
others, the originator of the libel is not responsible for the
publication."Dolores argues that since the obnoxious letter was addressed
to spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro, Fe was, insofar as Cerelito is
concerned, not a third person for purposes of publication. She further
declares that to call the husband (Cerelito) a thief in connection with a
charge that he and his wife had stolen goods, is not to speak words of
defamation of him alone so as to make the utterance in the presence of
his wife a publication.
In People vs. Silvela, the Court ruled that sending an unsealed libelous
letter to the offended party constitutes publication. In the present case, there is
no dispute that the unsealed envelope containing the libelous letter was handed
by Dolores to Evelyn Arcartado. Contextually, there was a reasonable probability
that the contents of the unsealed envelope, particularly the libelous letter, could
have been exposed to be read by Evelyn before delivering the same to Cerelito.
However, Evelyn categorically admitted not reading the letter at the first instance,
reading it only after securing Cerelito's permission.
229 | P a g e
The Supreme Court finds all the elements of libel to have been sufficiently
established. Accordingly, the ascription of reversible errors on the part of the CA
and the trial court in adjudging Dolores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of libel cannot be sustained.
Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386
230 | P a g e
Buatis v. People (G.R. No. 142509)
Facts:
You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full
consequence of the law. Needless for you to cite specific
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is
irrelevant to the present case. As a matter of fact, the same
shall be used by no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in
231 | P a g e
filing administrative charge against you and all persons
behind these nefarious activities.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had
signed that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither
could he remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated
August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit
which he filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office, however, Buatis, Jr.
could not deny its contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he had
232 | P a g e
sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty.
Pieraz.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30,
1997 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of libel.
Issue:
Decision:
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead.
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution.
There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the
defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person
against whom it has been written. Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states that
the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the
233 | P a g e
letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has
communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the
mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply
was addressed to respondent himself.
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter
dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using
words such as 'lousy', 'inutile', 'carabao English', 'stupidity', and 'satan', the letter,
as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of
respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need
234 | P a g e
be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of petitioner have
caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him:
'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.
Thus, the Supreme Court find that the CA did not commit any error in
affirming the findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290
235 | P a g e
Art. 358: Slander
Villanueva v. People (G.R. No. 160351)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
236 | P a g e
defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their
sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them
separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or
relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to
prove the intention of the offender at the time.
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the
position of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society
against the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party
was a Vice-Mayor. However, it should be noted that such scathing words were
uttered by petitioner in the heat of anger triggered by the fact, as found by the
Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid justification to approve
the monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner.
The rule that all possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be
taken in his favor. The slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as
slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of
anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a
light felony.
Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290
237 | P a g e
Cañal v. People (G.R. No. 163181)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290
238 | P a g e
Pader v. People (G.R. No. 139157)
Facts:
On April 20, 1995, at about 8:00 p.m., Atty. Benjamin C. Escolango was
conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan
when petitioner appeared at the gate and shouted “Putang ina mo Atty.
Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo!” The latter was dumbfounded and
embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor of
Morong, Bataan in the elections of May 8, 1995.
Issue:
Decision:
Alexander Santos
2006-0205
239 | P a g e
Title 14: Quasi-Offenses
Art. 365: Imprudence and Negligence
Loney vs. People (G.R. No. 152644)
Facts:
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the
Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete
plug at the tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the
tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of
tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
Issue:
Whether or not the charge of the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942?
Decision:
240 | P a g e
The petition has no merit, The Court had continuously ruled that a single
act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one
offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is
the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to
abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art.
365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution,
negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent
damage to property. This element is not required under the previous laws.
The claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs"
the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 must fail, suffice it to
say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD
1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent
(dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them.
Alexander Santos
2006-0205
241 | P a g e
Abueva vs. People (G.R. No. 134387)
Facts:
The information alleged that petitioner drove and moved a passenger bus
out of the terminal building even before Lourdes Mangruban, a passenger of said
bus, could properly find and safely take her seat, and that as a direct result of
said negligence, recklessness and carelessness, LOURDES MANGRUBAN fell
down to the cemented pavement of the terminal road and sustained the injuries
which caused her death.
The facts showed that the victim, Lourdes Mangruban, fell rather than
jumped off the bus. The claim of the defense that the deceased jumped off the
bus is incredible and contrary to human experience.
Issues:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance, that the offender failed to lend
on the spot to the injured parties such assistance as may be in his hands to give,
should be considered against the petitioner?
Decision:
Yes, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless
imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of
242 | P a g e
intelligence; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Having failed to exercise due diligence that resulted in the tragic incident,
petitioners liability for the death of passenger Lourdes Mangruban, as found by
the lower courts, must be sustained.
No, The records show that petitioner stated under oath that he alighted
from the bus and saw that several people were assisting the injured party and
corroborated by other witnesses.
The assistance required by Article 365, Revised Penal Code, is one which
may be in the hands of the offender to give. We must therefore take into
consideration the type and degree of assistance that the offender, at the time and
place of the incident, is capable of giving.
Alexander Santos
2006-0205
243 | P a g e
People v. De los Santos (G.R. No. 131588)
Facts:
GLENN was then charged with the crimes of Multiple Murder, Multiple
Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder in only one information filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The information read that
the accused driving an Isuzu Elf, hit and killed members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), undergoing a Special Training Course (Scout Class 07-
95), wearing black T-shirts and black short pants, performing an "Endurance
Run" of 35 kilometers coming from their camp in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, as a
result thereof, some PNP members were killed on the spot, while another
trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Mino, died few days after the incident, while
eleven (11) other trainee/victims were seriously wounded, and some sustained
minor injuries.
After which said accused thereafter escaped from the scene of the
incident, leaving behind the victims afore-enumerated helpless.
The trial court convicted GLENN of the complex crime of multiple murder,
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor
vehicle as the qualifying circumstance.
Issue:
Whether the filing of only one information for the offenses as charged is
valid?
Decision:
No, from the convergence of circumstances, the court held that the tragic
event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on
accused’ part. The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG the accused
intentionally rammed and hit the jogging trainees was premised on the
assumption that despite the first bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his
244 | P a g e
vehicle instead of applying his brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks
or skid marks along the traffic scene. For its part, the defense attributed the
continuous movement of accused vehicle to the confluence that the Isuzu Elf
truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were applied the
truck would have still proceeded further on account of its momentum, albeit at a
reduced speed, and would have stopped only after a certain distance.
The court is convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the
number of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an
intentional felony.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but
rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, accused should be held guilty
of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with
serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
245 | P a g e
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since
No, The slight physical injuries caused by the accused to the ten other
victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have
constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article
48, they should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate
informations should have, therefore, been filed.
However, It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder,
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial
court. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to the
multiplicity of the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence,
he is deemed to have waived such defect.
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as
are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
246 | P a g e
Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200)
Socorro D. Ramirez vs. CA and Ester S. Garcia (G.R. No. 93833)
Facts:
A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez in the RTC of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation
in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and
furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,”
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. The petitioner produced the
verbatim transcript on which civil case was based culled from a tape recording of
the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said
act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled, “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations
of private communication, and other purposes.”
Issue:
Held:
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of tape recorder. The law makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to
be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute’s intent is to penalize all persons unauthorized to
247 | P a g e
make such recordings is underscored by the use of a qualifier “any.”
Consequently, as respondent CA correctly concluded, “even a person (privy) to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. No
4200.
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts
and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity,
and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized “recording” of private
communications with the use of tape- recorders as among the acts punishable.
Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
248 | P a g e
Felipe Navarro vs. CA and People (G.R. No. 121087)
Facts:
After the three had seated and ordered beer, a dancer appeared on stage
and began to perform a strip act. As the dancer removed her bra, Jalbuena took
a picture.
The floor manager, Dante Liquin, with security guard, Alex Sioco,
approached Jalbuena and demanded why he took picture. Jalbuena replied:
“wala kang pakialam, because this is my job.” When Jalbuena saw that Sioco
was about to pull out his gun, he ran out followed by his companions.
Jalbuena and his companion went to the police station to report the
matter. Three of the policemen on duty including Navarro, were having drinks in
front of the police station and they asked Jalbuena to join them. Jalbuena
declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Anonuevo, to report the incident.
Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle.
Sioco and Liquin were met by Navarro who talked with them in a corner
for around fifteen minutes. Navarro turned to Jalbuena and pushing him to the
wall, Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, pressing it on the face of
Jalbuena. At this point, Lingan intervened and said to Navarro: “huwag namang
ganyan, pumarito kami para magpa blotter. Navarro replied: “walang press,
press, mag- sampu pa kayo.” He then turned to Sgt. Anonuevo and told him to
make of record the behaviour of Jalbuena and Lingan.
249 | P a g e
forehead which floored him. Unknown to Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record
on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.
Issue:
Held:
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording
is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the
conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3)
that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.
In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation
was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
The voice recording made by Jalbuena established : (1) that there was a
heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the
police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of
violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting
the worst of it.
250 | P a g e
2006-0021
Facts:
It appears that in the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito
Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on
the proposed conditions, complainant made telephone call to Laconico.
The trial court ruled that Gaanan and Laconico violated Section 1 of R.A.
4200. The petitioner appealed to the appellate court. However the appellate court
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this appeal.
251 | P a g e
Issue:
Decision:
252 | P a g e
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The petitioner is Acquitted of the crime
of violation of Republic Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti- Wiretapping
Act.
Tablico, Sheryll G.
2008-0341
253 | P a g e
Anti-Carnapping Law (R.A. 6539)
People v. Bustinera (G.R. No. 148233)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
No. The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that
said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. Theft is qualified when any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2)
the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is
either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists
of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion
254 | P a g e
of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.
Tablico, Sheryll G.
2008-0341
255 | P a g e
People v. Garcia (G.R. No. 138470)
Facts:
However, four days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe.
Cortez began to worry about the vehicle he had borrowed from Ferdinand
Ignacio so he informed the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. It was
later found out that the two accused attempted to sell the vehicle. They stabbed
and dumped Elis him along the highway near the sabana in San Rafael, Bulacan
when Elis refused to join their plan to sell the Tamaraw FX. The RTC found
Artemio Garcia and Regalado Bernabe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of special
complex crime of carnapping with homicide. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the two accused are guilty of the crime charged?
Decision:
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing and
Penalizing Carnapping", defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."
More specifically, the elements of the crime are as follows: 1. That there is an
actual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of
the vehicle; 3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender
256 | P a g e
himself; 4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things.
Tablico, Sheryll G.
2008-0341
257 | P a g e
People v. Lobitania (G.R. No. 142380)
Facts:
That on or about December 6, 1998, in the City or Urdaneta and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused SPO1 Danilo Lobitania with grave
abuse of authority being a member of the Navotas PNP-NPD Command,
Navotas, Metro Manila, together with three still unidentified companions, armed
with firearms by means of force and intimidation with intent to gain, conspiring
with one another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take,
steal and carry away one Yamaha motorized tricycle with Plate No. 2N-7910
owned by David Sarto and driven at the time by Alexander de Guzman against
the latter’s will and without his consent and on the occasion of the carnapping or
by reason thereof, accused with intent to kill, treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength conspiring with one another, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously box, hogtie, shoot and push out of the moving tricycle
which caused the instantaneous death of said Alexander de Guzman, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Issue:
Decision:
Yes. After a thorough review of the records, we find that the prosecution
was able to prove that accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Based
on the facts proven, the offense committed by accused-appellant is the special
complex crime of qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form
under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1992, as
amended by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, the Death Penalty Law, which
took effect on 31 December 1993.
In Section 2 of R. A. 6536 as amended, defines the crime of carnapping
as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without
258 | P a g e
the latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things. It becomes qualified when in the course of the
commission or on occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped. When the carnapping is qualified, the
penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, all the
elements were duly proven by the prosecution. Based on the testimony of
Sanchez, accused-appellant and his companions shot the driver of the tricycle,
abandoned him and took possession of the vehicle. The testimony of Sanchez
that the driver was unknown to the group clearly establishes the fact that the
motive of accused-appellant was to steal the tricycle and that the killing of the
driver was incidental thereto.
Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406
259 | P a g e
Probation Law
Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin v. People (G.R. No. 152044)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that probation may be
granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Under Section 9 (a)
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of the Probation Law, offenders who are sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years are disqualified from seeking probation.
In the case at bar, upon interposing an appeal petitioners should be precluded
from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto
relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose
of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an
accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but
did so only after failing in his appeal.
Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406
261 | P a g e
Lilia Vicoy v. People (G.R. No. 138203)
Facts:
Petitioner Vicoy was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Tagbilaran City for violation of City Ordinance No. 365-B for peddling
fish outside the Agora Public Market, and accordingly sentences her to suffer the
penalty of a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Also, she was found to be guilty for the crime of Resistance and
Serious Disobedience to Agents of a Person in Authority, and accordingly
sentences her to suffer the penalty of three (3) months of Arresto Mayor and to
pay a fine of two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Thereafter, she filed an application for probation but later on, petitioner
filed a motion to withdraw her application for probation and simultaneously filed a
notice of appeal. The MTCC granted petitioner’s withdrawal of application for
probation but denied her notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court
but it was dismissed. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment rendered by the MTCC became final despite
the withdrawal of the application for probation?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It held that under Section 7,
Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a
criminal case becomes final when the accused has applied for probation. This is
totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of
1976, as amended), which in part provides that the filing of an application for
probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there was no more
opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having
become final by the filing of an application for probation.
262 | P a g e
Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406
263 | P a g e
Alejandra Pablo v. Hon. Silverio Castillo and People (G.R. No. 125108)
Facts:
Information was filed before the RTC of Dagupan against petitioner Pablo
charging her with a violation for BP 22 (Bouncing Check Law) for issuing and
delivering various checks to Nelson Mandap in partial payment of a loan she
obtained from the latter. When Mandap draw those checks from the bank, it was
dishonored upon presentment for payment because the current account of the
petitioner had been closed. The trial court rendered its judgment convicting
petitioner for the crime charged, sentencing her to pay a fine and to serve a
prison term of 30 days.
Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation. Her application was given due
course and was given a favorable evaluation upon recommendation of the local
probation office. However, such recommendation was overruled by the National
Probation Office and denied petitioner’s application on the ground that she is
disqualified under Section 9 ( c ) of the Probation Law: c) those who have
previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less than
two hundred pesos. Respondent judge denied petitioner’s application for
probation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner’s application for probation on the ground of disqualification
from probation under Section 9 of P.D. 968?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that Section 9 paragraph
(c) is in clear and plain language, to the effect that a person, who was previously
convicted by final judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less
than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos, is
disqualified from applying for probation. This provision of law is definitive and
unqualified. There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph (c) which qualifies "previous
264 | P a g e
conviction" as referring to a conviction for a crime which is entirely different from
that for which the offender is applying for probation or a crime which arose out of
a single act or transaction as petitioner would have the court to understand. As
held in Rura vs. Lopeña, the word “previous" refers to conviction, and not to
commission of a crime.
It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute; and therefore,
the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And when the meaning is
clearly discernible from the language of the statute, there is no room for
construction or interpretation.
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Anti-Fencing Law
Fransisco v. People (GR No. 146584)
Facts:
The private complainant in this case, Jovita Rodriquez, was the wife of the
former mayor of Rodriguez Rizal and was engaged in business as a general
contractor. She and her husband own pieces of jewelry which they kept inside a
locked cabinet in a locked room in their main house. Aside from her family, she
also had under her employ one Macario Linghon and the latter’s sister, Pacita,
who was their household helper charged with sweeping and cleaning the room
periodically. Pacita later on left her employ.
Sometime on August 1992, she was surprised to discover that the box
where the jewelries were kept inside the cabinet were empty. There appears no
indication however that the lock of the cabinet was broken. Among the pieces of
jewelry missing were one heart-shaped diamond ring worth P100,000; one white
gold bracelet with diamond stones worth P150,000; and a pair of diamond heart-
shaped earrings worth P400,000.
Believing that Pacita, her previous helper, had taken said jewelries, she
filed a complaint for theft against her and her mother Adoracion. When the latter
was invited to the police station, she admitted selling one pair of heart-shaped
earrings with diamond, one white gold bracelet, one heart-shaped diamond ring,
and one ring “with big and small stones” to petitioner whom she identified as
Mang Erning. The amount she obtained from said sale, was, according to her,
intended for her father’s operation and for food.
266 | P a g e
Subsequently, the trial court also rendered judgment in the case of petitioner and
found him also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating PD 1612.
Issue:
Decision:
No. We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution
mustered the requisite quantum of evidence, on the basis of the testimony of
Jovita, that Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main
house of her then employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and
the loss thereof, and narrated that Pacita had access to the cabinet containing
the pieces of jewelry.
We, however, agree with the petitioner that the decision of the RTC of Rizal,
Branch 76, in Criminal Case No. 2005 convicting Pacita of theft does not
constitute proof against him in this case, that Pacita had, indeed, stolen the
jewelry. There is no showing that the said decision in Criminal Case No. 2005
was already final and executory when the trial court rendered its decision in the
instant case.
No. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime
of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
267 | P a g e
any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4)
there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie
presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good,
article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.33 The
stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is
merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove the crime of fencing.
On the second element of the crime, the trial and appellate courts held that
the prosecution proved the same beyond reasonable doubt based on the
testimony of Jovita during the trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; that
Pacita had confessed to Jovita that she sold some of the jewelry to the petitioner;
the joint affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta on their investigation of
the complaint of Jovita; the testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr. relating to said
investigation; the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; the
testimonies of Pacita and her brother Macario during the preliminary investigation
of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 before the MTC of Meycauayan as shown by the
transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the proceedings; the
supplemental sworn statement of Pacita on August 23, 1992 in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, and, the testimony of Macario before the trial court.
First. Jovita’s testimony in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, that Pacita
had confessed to her that she had sold four pieces of jewelry to the petitioner, is
inadmissible in evidence against the latter to prove the truth of the said
admission. It bears stressing that the petitioner was not a party in the said
criminal cases. The well-entrenched rule is that only parties to a case are bound
by a judgment of the trial court. Strangers to a case are not bound by the
judgment of said case.34 Jovita did not reiterate her testimony in the said
criminal cases during the trial in the court a quo. The prosecution did not present
Pacita as witness therein to testify on the admission she purportedly made to
Jovita; hence, the petitioner was not able to cross-examine Pacita. The rule is
that the acts or declarations of a person are not admissible in evidence against a
third party.
268 | P a g e
Second. The testimony of Pacita during the preliminary investigation in
Criminal Case No. 92-13841, as well as her supplemental affidavit, is, likewise,
inadmissible against the petitioner since Pacita did not testify in the court a quo.
The petitioner was, thus, deprived of his constitutional right to confront and cross-
examine a witness against him.
Third. The testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr., that on August 23, 1992, Pacita
pointed to the petitioner, while the latter was having a drinking spree, as the
person who bought the subject jewelry from her, is indeed admissible in evidence
against the petitioner. It is, likewise, corroborative of the testimony of Macario.
However, such testimony is admissible only to prove such fact - that Pacita
pointed to the petitioner as the person to whom she sold the subject jewelry; it is
inadmissible to prove the truth of Pacita’s declaration to the policemen, that the
petitioner was the one who purchased the jewelry from her. It must be stressed
that the policemen had no personal knowledge of the said sale, and, more
importantly, Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. Indeed, the petitioner was
deprived of his right to cross-examine Pacita on the truth of what she told the
policemen.
Fourth. On the other hand, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 is admissible in evidence against
the petitioner since he testified for the prosecution and was cross-examined on
his testimony during the preliminary investigation.
In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to prove that the petitioner
purchased the jewelry from Macario and Pacita are the following: the testimony
and affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the testimony of Macario during the
preliminary investigation and trial in the court a quo.
It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused
had knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove
facts and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should
have known that the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves
two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and,
(b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime,
since the penalty depends on the value of the property; otherwise, the court will
269 | P a g e
fix the value of the property at P5.00, conformably to our ruling in People v.
Dator.
270 | P a g e
Facts:
Acting on the matter, Victor had Manuel arrested and brought to Manila.
However, when asked about the incident, Manuel, after admitting the taking of
the lost items asked for forgiveness from Rosita and as a result the latter did not
file a complaint against him. Instead, she filed a complaint for violation of PD
1612, against Ramon Tan, the petitioner, whom Manuel identified as the person
with whom he had sold the stolen items for P13,000. Despite the filing of said
complaint, Rosita, however, failed to report the incident of theft with the police
authorities.
In the meantime, Rosita, together with the confessed thief Manuelito, and
the latter’s uncle, Victor Sy, all testified for the prosecution. Manuelito testified
that it was Mr. Tan who had personally accepted the stolen items and paid him
P13,000.
For his part, Ramon Tan, in his Counter-Affidavit, denied all the charges,
alleging that while he is engaged in the selling hardware (marine spare parts) he
did not buy the stolen spare parts and that he never talked nor met Manuelito.
The trial court found him guilty of violating PD 1612. When he appealed, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, hence the present appeal.
Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt hence he should be acquitted.
Issue:
271 | P a g e
Decision:
No. “Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is ‘the act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in
any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft.’”
“The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in
the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the
commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.”
Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be
prosecuted as an accessory after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is
defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it
was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal.
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deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
“3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and
“4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.”
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito
Mendez confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused.
However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She
admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the
unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is
a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private
complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim
reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of
theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of
robbery or theft has been committed.
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admitting. Here, the extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given
with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither
may such extra-judicial confession be considered evidence against accused.
There must be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of
guilt. Corpus delicti means the “body or substance of the crime, and, in its
primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed.” The
“essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4)
the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking
away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force
upon things (U. S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000).” In theft, corpus delicti has two
elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was
lost by felonious taking. In this case, the theft was not proved because
complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious
taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez,
who confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the
complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to
convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.
What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or
should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. “One
is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or
awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the
acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind’s grasp with
certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an
element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist.
On the other hand, the words “should know” denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of
his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the
court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is
contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt
acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental
awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional
presumption of innocence.”
274 | P a g e
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be
guilty of “fencing”.
Gil Acosta
2008-0085
275 | P a g e
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)
People v. Arturo F. Pacificador (G.R. No. 139405)
Facts:
On Oct. 27, 1988 Pacificador and a certain Jose Marcelo were charged
before the Sandiganbayan for violation of R.A. NO. 3019 otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information alleges that on or about
Dec. 6, 1975 to Jan. 6, 1976 Pacificador together with Mr. Marcelo who was then
chairman of a private corporation Philippine Smelters Corporation , conspired to
cause the transfer and conveyance of parcels of land owned by the NSSC
located in Camarines Norte to the private corporation Philippine Smelters
Corporation by virtue of a contract of sale. That in relation to that sale the
Government was in a serious disadvantage for the contract price of such land
was only P 85, 144.50 compared to the fairmarket value of P862,150.
The Deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of said province
on May Dec. 29, 1975
Pacificador main defense was that the crime charged had been
extinguished by prescription.
Petitioner argument on the other hand was that the crime was not
extinguished first on the ground that R.A. 3019 provides for its own prescription
of 15 years. 2nd on the ground that the case should have been deemed
discovered only on May 13, 1987, when a complaint was filed with the PCGG,
hence the filing to the Sandiganbayan on Oct. 27, 1988 was well within the
prescriptive period.Lastly, it is the petitioners contention that respondent
effectively prevented the discovery of the offense in such way the ordinary
principles of prescription do not apply in this case.
Issue:
276 | P a g e
Decision:
In the case at bar Pacificador allegedly committed the acts from Dec. of
1975 to Jan. of 1976. The Highcourt stated that the provision on R.A. 3019 in
which crimes prescribed in 15 years could not be appreciated in this case
because it seems to show that prior to the amendment of Sec. 11 of 3019 by B.P.
195 which was approved on March, 1982, the prescriptive period then was only
10 years, wherefore it could not be applied on the ground that such amendment
is not favourable to the accused. The SC also held that while petitioners herein
allegation of having no knowledge of the crime, well entrenched is the
jurisprudential rule that the registration of deeds in the public real registry is a
notice thereof to the whole world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of
what it contains. Hence, even If the period of prescription is reckoned from Feb.
18, 1977, the crime had already prescribed when the Information in this case was
filed with the Sandiganbayan on Oct. 27, 1988.
Gil Acosta
2008-0085
277 | P a g e
Rosalia M. Dugayon vs. People (G.R. No. 147333)
Facts:
However, upon pos-audit it was discovered that all the 19 typewriters were
not brand new but merely rebuilt and reconditioned and thus failing to comply
with the specification requirements. The petitioner together with Director Arafiles,
Callangan and Hipolito were charged for violation of section 3 ( e ) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The sandiganbayan adjudged herein petitioner
as guilty of the charge hence this petition to the Supreme Court.
Petitioners main contentions are that the elements of conspiracy were not
established beyond reasonable ground and that there is no sufficient evidence to
prove the alleged crime.
Issue:
Decision:
278 | P a g e
infraction consists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of
office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a
clear sense of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held to prevail. Petitioner
cannot seek refuge in the cases of Magsuci and Arias when she relied on the
recommendations of her subordinates. Petitioner is an Assistant Regional
Director, not the head of office or the final approving authority whom the Arias
doctrine is applicable.
Gil Acosta
2008-0085
279 | P a g e
Arturo A. Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. L-51065-72)
Facts:
For his defense the main contention of the accused is that the element of
damage to the parties must have caused by the public officer in the discharge of
his official functions, in as much as when the damage to the complainants, he
was no longer discharging his official duties, therefore he is not liable for the
charge. Furthermore it was also the argument of the petitioner herein that the
280 | P a g e
evidence adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of R.A. 3019 but that of
robbery.
Issue:
Decision:
Yes. The SC Held that the first argument of the petitioner as stated above
is devoid of merit. It was clearly established that the petitioner took advantage of
his position as right of way agent by making the claimants sign the
aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained
falsified declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was
evident bad faith on the part of Mejorada when he inflated the values of the true
claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due
them.
Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
281 | P a g e
Anti-Highway Robbery (P.D. 532)
People v. Pascual (G.R. No. 132870)
Facts:
On January 16, 1992, two men alighted from a taxi cab parked near a
dead-end in Purok Maligaya. Arnold Nuarin, the driver, came out of the cab
asking for help as he had been stabbed. Nuarin's body was found by Andro
Paglinawan's group and they saw two men escaping. They ran after the two men
and caught Olegario Pascual. A bloody balisong knife was found in his
possession. Investigation revealed that Nuarin was robbed by Pascual and
another person identified as Johnny Bonglay. Nuarin was later stabbed who
consequently died.
Pascual was found guilty of the crime of violation of P.D. 532 or the Anti-
highway Robbery Law. He appealed the decision.
Issue:
Decision:
The court ruled that Pasual is liable for the crime of robbery with homicide
and not of the violation of P.D. 532. For a person to be convicted for highway
robbery, it is required that there must be an organization of a group of persons
for the purpose of committing indiscriminate robbery. In the present case, no
proof was shown that a group was organized by Pascual and Bonglay to commit
the robbery. P.D. 532 punishes the commission of robbery of persons who travel
from one place to another, disturbing peace. In this case, there was a single act
of robbery and homicide committed by the accused.
Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
282 | P a g e
People v. Reanzares (G.R. No. 130656)
Facts:
On May 10, 1994, Gregorio and Lilia Tactacan were on board their
passenger jeepney on their way to San Roque, Batangas from San Miguel,
Batangas. Two unidentified men climbed their vehicle. One pointed a revolver at
Gregorio and the other a balisong on Lilia's neck. They were asked to pull over.
Once they pulled over, 2 more persons, one identified as Armando Reanzares,
approached the vehicle. Gregorio was gagged and blindfolded by one of the
culprits. His hands and feet were tied and his Seiko watch was taken. While the
vehicle was driven by one of the accused, he heard his wife beg for mercy and
cry in pain. After which, he was told not to move, then the culprits left. He untied
himself and ran for help. When he returned to the jeep, he found his wife in the
passenger's seat, bloody and her bag containing their earnings gone.
Issue:
Decision:
The court held that the accused is not liable for highway robbery but of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide. For conviction under P.D. 532
to prosper, proof that several accused organized for the purpose of committing
indiscriminate robbery must be established. There was no proof, in this case,
showing that there was organization by several persons to commit this purpose.
There was only the establishment of a single act of robbery which is not
contemplated under the law.
Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
283 | P a g e
People v. Cerbito (G.R. No. 126397)
Facts:
The Trial Court found the accused guilty of violation of P.D. 532 and of
homicide. It was appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Decision:
Christine Perez
2006-0104
284 | P a g e
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
People v. Bongcarawan (384 SCRA 525)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
285 | P a g e
It has been ruled that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence,
the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi.
Christine Perez
2006-0104
286 | P a g e
Suson v. People (494 SCRA 691)
Facts:
3 cases were tried jointly in Branch 25, RTC of Danao City. Petitioners
Suson and Fortich were charged with violation of sec.15, Art. 3 in relation to Sec.
21, Art. 4 of RA 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Also, Petitioner Suson together with Andres Camargo were charged with Illegal
Possession of Shabu and Illegal Possession of Firearm.
Issue:
Decision:
287 | P a g e
recording thereof in an official record will not necessarily lead to an acquittal as
long as the sale of the prohibited drug is adequately proven. In the case at bar,
SPO2 Patiño, the poseur-buyer, testified on the circumstances regarding the sale
of the shabu for which petitioners were charged and convicted.
Settled is the rule that in the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs,
the absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the
prosecution as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the
drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor
jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust
operation What is material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In the instant case, both
were sufficiently shown by the prosecution.
Petitioners deny that a buy-bust operation took place and claim that the
evidence against them is planted evidence. Denial is a weak form of defense,
particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence just like
in the case before us.
Christine Perez
2006-0104
288 | P a g e
People v. Lagata (404 SCRA 671)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
The prosecution failed to prove that she had knowledge of the contents of
the package. Thus, it cannot be said that she was caught in flagrante delicto,
since she was not consciously committing a crime when the NBI agents accosted
her.
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Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that
appellants explanation of how she came into possession of the package without
knowing that it contained shabu is credible and sufficient to rebut the prima
facie presumption of animus possidendi.
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
290 | P a g e
Illegal Possession of Firearms/Explosives Law (R.A. 8294)
Sayco v. People (G.R. No. 159703)
Facts:
Sayco a confidential civilian agent of the AFP was found guilty of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions under the provisions of PD 1866 as
amended by RA 8294. Sayco committed the crime by possessing and carrying a
9MM caliber with 14 live ammunitions while in Bais City visiting and attending to
a family emergency. The court found him guilty as charged on the ground that
that the possession and carrying of the aforementioned firearm and ammunitions
was without proper license and authority. Sayco, without denying possession of
the same, insisted that he had the requisite permits for having been issued a
Memorandum Receipt and a Mission Order by the Commanding Officer of the
Philippine Army. However, the court said that Memorandum Receipts and
Mission Orders do not constitute the license required by law for these were not
issued by the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit, who is the one authorized by
law to issue the required license. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that
Sayco’s reliance in good faith on the said documents is not a valid defense in the
crime of illegal possession of firearms.
Issue:
Decision:
291 | P a g e
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the
accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession
itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has
the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or
carry the same.
Sayco, a mere confidential civilian agent (as defined under Section 6(a) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866) is not authorized to
receive the subject government-owned firearm and ammunitions. The
memorandum receipt he signed to account for said government properties did
not legitimize his possession thereof. Neither was Sayco authorized to bear the
subject firearm and ammunitions outside of his residence. The mission order
issued to petitioner was illegal, given that he is not a regular civilian agent but a
mere confidential civilian agent. Worse, he was not even acting as such
confidential civilian agent at the time he was carrying the subject firearm and
ammunitions.
While this Court sustains the conviction for illegal possession of firearms,
a further revision of the penalty is warranted in view of the special provision in the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable to crimes penalized by a special law. RA
8294, amending PD 1866, lowered the penalty to be imposed provided no other
crime was committed.
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
292 | P a g e
People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559)
Facts:
Comadre et al. were charged with Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder
through conspiracy, treachery, and “use of an explosive”. The accused
committed the crime by lobbing a hand grenade over the roof of the house of the
Agbanlog’s that eventually exploded, killing Robert Agbanlog and injuring 6
others. After trial, the court a quo convicted Comadre et al. of the complex crime
of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of death, hence this automatic review.
293 | P a g e
amend the definition of murder under Article 248, but merely made the use of
explosives an aggravating circumstance when resorted to in committing “any of
the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code.” The legislative purpose is to do
away with the use of explosives as a separate crime and to make such use
merely an aggravating circumstance in the commission of any crime already
defined in the Revised Penal Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of
unlicensed explosives as one of the aggravating circumstances specified in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like the aggravating circumstance of
“explosion” in paragraph 12, “evident premeditation” in paragraph 13, or
“treachery” in paragraph 16 of Article 14, the new aggravating circumstance
added by RA No. 8294 does not change the definition of murder in Article 248.
Issue:
Whether or not the killing be qualified by explosion under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code or by the “use of an explosive” under the provisions of RA
8294?
Decision:
R.A. 8294 is inapplicable in the instant case and thus what may be
properly considered, the accused-appellant having been sufficiently informed of
the nature of the accusation against them, the crime is Murder committed “by
means of explosion” in accordance with Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code.
R.A. No. 8294, even though favorable to the accused, cannot be made
applicable in this case because before the use of unlawfully possessed
explosives can be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must
be adequately established that the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the
accused is without the corresponding authority or permit to possess. This follows
the same requisites in the prosecution of crimes involving illegal possession of
firearm, which is a kindred or related offense under P.D. 1866, as
amended. This proof does not obtain in the present case. Not only was it not
alleged in the information, no evidence was also adduced by the prosecution to
show that the possession by Comadre of the explosive was unlawful. What the
law emphasizes is the act’s lack of authority. What is per se aggravating is the
294 | P a g e
use of unlawfully “manufactured … or possessed” explosives. The mere use of
explosives is not.
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
295 | P a g e
People v. Tadeo (G.R. Nos. 127660 & 144011-12)
Facts:
After trial, the court a quo convicted Tadeo of the crimes charged and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for murder; an indeterminate prison term of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum,
for frustrated murder; reclusion perpetua for qualified illegal possession of
firearms.
Tadeo appealed not to challenge the finding of the trial court that he killed
Mayolito Cabatu and injured his mother Florencia Cabatu, nor that he was the
possessor of the .38 cal. revolver, but questions among others his conviction of
the crime of illegal possession of firearms despite the absence of any evidence
indicating that the gun he used was unlicensed.
The Solicitor General agrees with Tadeo that his verdict in the qualified
illegal possession of firearm is incorrect hence must be reversed and set aside.
Issue:
Decision:
The conviction of Tadeo in the case for qualified illegal possession firearm
used in perpetrating the homicide and attempted homicide must be reversed and
set aside, as a result of the decriminalization of violations of PD 1866 by RA
8294 where the unlicensed firearm is used in carrying out the commission of
other crimes. These amendments obviously blur the distinctions between murder
296 | P a g e
and homicide on one hand, and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in
murder or homicide on the other. We have declared that the formulation in RA
8294, i.e., "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance," signifies a legislative intent to treat as a single offense the illegal
possession of firearms and the commission of murder or homicide with the use of
an unlicensed firearm. Thus where an accused used an unlicensed firearm in
committing homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to
be the two (2) separate offenses of homicide or murder under The Revised Penal
Code and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder
under PD 1866; in other words, where murder or homicide was committed, the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes
merely a special aggravating circumstance.
Jasmine Calaycay
297 | P a g e
2005-0049
Facts:
Sometime in November 1991, Jovita was shocked when she found out
that the box containing her jewelry was empty. She noticed that the lock to the
cabinet was not broken. Among the pieces of jewelry missing were one pair of
diamond heart-shaped earrings worth P400,000; one heart-shaped diamond ring
worth P100,000; one white gold bracelet with diamond stones worth P150,000;
and one ring with a small diamond stone worth P5,000. She suspected that it
was Pacita who stole her jewelry.
Jovita filed a complaint for theft against Pacita and her mother Adoracion
Linghon. Police investigators invited Pacita and Adoracion to Camp Crame,
Quezon City, for investigation. Pacita arrived in Camp Crame without counsel
and gave a sworn statement pointing to the petitioner as the person to whom she
298 | P a g e
sold Jovita’s jewelry. Thus, petitioner was invited for questioning in Camp Crame.
Nonetheless, Pacita was charged with qualified theft and Adoracion was also
charged with violating P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law).
A criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1612
was filed. During the preliminary investigation, Pacita and Macario testified that
they sold pieces of jewelry to the petitioner at his shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
The court found probable cause against the petitioner, and issued a warrant for
his arrest. Thereafter, an Information was filed with the RTC charging the
petitioner with violating P.D. No. 1612.
Judgment was rendered finding Pacita guilty of theft and Adoracion guilty
of fencing under P.D. No. 1612, beyond reasonable doubt.
While the trial court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating P.D. No. 1612, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the
petitioner guilty for violation of the Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise
known as the Anti-Fencing Law?
Decision:
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime
of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4)
there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
299 | P a g e
In the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the
jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances
from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the
property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes:
(a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the
trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty
depends on the value of the property.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie
presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good,
article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. The
stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is
merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove the crime of fencing.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the Decision of the trial
court is reversed and set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the crime of
violating P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
300 | P a g e
Miguel Paolo Soliman
2010-0204
Facts:
Petitioner was the finance officer of INSURECO, who was granted a credit
line to purchase gasoline and lubricants from Caltex. The latter has agreed to
accept post dated checks from INSURECO to pay for its purchases from them.
When presented to the bank, they were dishonoured by reason of being “drawn
against insufficient funds” and “account closed”, respectively.
Issue:
Decision:
It is difficult for the prosecution to prove the second element of the crime
because the knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such checks in full upon its presentation is a state of the mind.
However, Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides that if the prosecution proves that the
making, drawing and issuing of a check, payment of which is refused by the
drawee bank because of insufficiency of funds or credit with the said bank within
90 days from the date of the check, such shall be prima facie evidence of the
301 | P a g e
second element of the crime. The drawee or maker of the check may overcome
the prima facie evidence, either by paying the amount of the check, or by making
arrangements for its payment in full within five banking days after receipt of
notice that such check was not paid by the drawee bank.
302 | P a g e
dishonor is necessary. Consequently, constructive notice to the corporation is
not enough to satisfy due process. Moreover, it is the petitioner, as an officer of
the corporation, who is the latter’s agent for purposes of receiving notices and
other documents, and not the other way around. It is but axiomatic that notice to
the corporation, which has a personality distinct and separate from the petitioner,
does not constitute notice to the latter.
In this case, the prosecution failed to present any employee of the PT&T
to prove that the telegrams from the offended party were in fact transmitted to
INSURECO and that the latter received the same. Furthermore, there is no
evidence on record that the petitioner ever received the said telegrams from
INSURECO, or that separate copies thereof were transmitted to and received by
the petitioner. In fine, the respondent failed to prove the second element of the
crime. Hence, the petitioner should be acquitted of the crimes charged.
303 | P a g e
Miguel Paolo Soliman
2010-0204
Facts:
Issue:
304 | P a g e
Decision:
Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), an
offense is committed when the following elements are present:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(4) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
In this case, the Court found that although the first element of the offense
exists, the other elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the
issuer at the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or
credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates
a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the
first and third elements of the offense are present. But such evidence may be
rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in
favor of the issue, which it supports. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such
knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the
dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds." But such presumption cannot
hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party
has presented evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence, the prosecution
is duty bound to prove every element of the offense charged, and not merely rely
on a rebuttable presumption.
Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply
means that on the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded,
not that the checks should be deemed as issued only then. The checks in this
case were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August
1989. But we find from the records no showing that the time said checks were
issued, petitioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank would be
insufficient to cover them when presented for encashment. On the contrary, there
305 | P a g e
is testimony by petitioner that at the time of presentation of the checks, he had
P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank.
306 | P a g e
Recuerdo v. People (G.R. No. 133036)
Facts:
Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she
issued as payment for the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were
dishonored by the bank. A demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to
make payments, a complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On petition
for certiorari, she contends that BP 22 is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Decision:
B.P. 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be
envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the
stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency.
It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for
which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before
an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made
307 | P a g e
from the bank the checks returned unpaid with a notation ‘drawn against
insufficient funds’ stamped or written on the dorsal side of the checks
themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly given to the
complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks
or make arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.
Winny Mahor
2008-0306
308 | P a g e
Art. 294(B): Robbery with Rape
People v. Moreno
Facts:
Issue:
Whether the court erred in ruling that Moreno was guilty of the crime of
robbery only?
Decision:
No, the ruling of the court is correct. Moreno took no part in the rape thus
he is guilty of robbery only.
The special complex crime of robbery with rape defined in Article 293 in
relation to paragraph 2 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
employs the clause "when the robbery shall have been accompanied with rape."
In other words, to be liable for such crime, the offender must have the intent to
take the personal property of another under circumstances that makes the taking
one of robbery, and such intent must precede the rape. If the original plan was to
commit rape, but the accused after committing the rape also committed robbery
when the opportunity presented itself, the robbery should be viewed as a
separate and distinct crime.
Winny Mahor
2008-0306
309 | P a g e
People v. Domingo (383 SCRA 43)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
The RTC erred in ruling that the accused is guilty of robbery with multiple
rapes. He should have been convicted of the crime under Art. 294(b) that is
robbery with rape.
In the special complex crime of robbery with rape, the true intent of the
accused must first be determined, because their intent determines the offense
they committed. To sustain a conviction for robbery with rape, it is imperative that
the robbery itself must be conclusively established. To support a conviction
therefor, proof of the rape alone is not sufficient. Robbery with rape occurs when
the following elements are present: (1) personal property is taken with violence or
intimidation against persons, (2) the property taken belongs to another, (3) the
taking is done with animo lucrandi, and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.
In the case at bar, all the foregoing elements are present. The
contemporaneous acts of appellant and his co-accused stress the fact that they
were initially motivated by animus lucrandi. They first demanded guns, moneys
and animals from Valentin Gabertan. Apparently, it was only when they entered
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the house and saw his wife when they thought of raping her. The prosecution
likewise established that appellant and his co-accused took chickens, a watch
and money from complainants through violence.
Winny Mahor
2008-0306
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People v. Verceles (388 SCRA 515)
Facts:
Issue:
Decision:
Luis Celestino
2006-0354
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Art. 148: Direct Assault
People vs. Dural (223 SCRA 201)
Facts:
In1998, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal were charged with double
murder with assault upon agents of persons in authority for the death of two
CAPCOM soldiers. Positively identified by witnesses, Dural was seen firing upon
the two CAPCOM soldiers on board a CAPCOM mobile car. Dural and Itucal
were convicted by the Caloocan RTC, hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not they are liable for double murder with assault upon agents
of person in authority.
Decision:
Luis Celestino
2006-0354
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People vs. Abalos (258 SCRA 523)
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is criminally liable for direct assault with
murder?
Decision:
As correctly observed by the trial court, there can be no doubt that the
accused knew that the victim is an agent of a person in authority. The lighting in
the area were enough to afford him to identify the victim. He even testified that he
personally knew the victim to be a policeman and in fact, Labine was then
wearing his uniform. Tiburcio Abalos committed the second form of assault when
he attacked with the use of force an agent of person in authority on the occasion
of the performance of the latter’s duty.
Luis Celestino
2006-0354
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People vs. Tac-an (182 SCRA 201)
Facts:
Renato Tac-an and Francis Escano III were classmates in high School
and close friends before their relationship turned sour. In 1984, a fight ensued
between them in the classroom prompting Tac-an to go home and get a gun
which he used to kill Escano in the presence of their classmates and teacher.
Issue:
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in applying the
provisions of Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. While a teacher is
deemed to be a person in authority under the last paragraph of Art.152, such
teacher is so deemed only for purposes of application of Art.148, direct assault
upon a person in authority. In the case at bar, the assault was not directed upon
the teacher, hence, there was no violation of Art.148. The accused is however
guilty for the crime of murder.
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