April 20 to 25, 2020 – Recap/Unfair Labor Practice

2. De La Salle v. DLSUEA-NAFTU, G.R. No. 177283, April 7, 2009

Facts: In 2001, respondent DLSUEA-NAFTU and the Aliazas group, a splinter group of the respondent, had an
intra-union dispute with regard to the election of officers in the union.1

The Aliazas group thereupon sent a letter to the President of petitioner DLSU. The University responded by saying it
has no other alternative but to temporarily establish a savings account for the Union where all collected union dues
and agency fees will be deposited and held in trust and discontinue normal relations with any group within the
Union including the incumbent set of officers. The University decided this way because it does not want itself to be
unnecessarily involved in the intra-union dispute between the two. This is the only way that the University can
maintain neutrality on this matter of grave concern. Because of this, it led for the respondent to file a complaint
against petitioners for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP complaint), claiming that petitioners unduly interfered with its
internal affairs and discriminated against its members.

Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent’s ULP complaint. Respondent appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals overturned the NLRC decision and granted the petition of the
respondent. Hence, petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari in the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the petitioners were guilty of unfair labor practice, considering that the temporary measures
implemented by the university were undertaken in good faith and only to maintain its neutrality amid the intra-union
dispute.

Held: Yes, the petitioners were guilty of unfair labor practice. The acts of the petitioners of withholding union and
agency dues and suspension of normal relations with respondent’s incumbent set of officers pending the intra-union
dispute constitute interference.

It bears noting that at the time petitioners’ questioned moves were adopted, a valid and existing CBA had been
entered between the parties. It thus behooved petitioners to observe the terms and conditions thereof bearing on
union dues and representation. It is axiomatic in labor relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor
organization and an employer becomes the law between the parties, compliance with which is mandated by express
policy of the law.

5. General Milling Corporation v. Casio, G.R. No. 149552, March 10, 2010

Facts: The labor union Ilaw at Buklod ng Mangagawa (IBM)-Local 31 Chapter (Local 31) was the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of GMC in Lapu-Lapu City. IBM-Local 31, through its
officers and board members, entered into a CBA with GMC.

Casio, et al. were regular employees of GMC. Casio was elected IBM-Local 31 President for a three-year term in
June 1991, while his co-respondents were union shop stewards.

In a letter, Rodolfo Gabiana, the IBM Regional Director for Visayas and Mindanao, furnished Casio, et al. with
copies of the Affidavits of GMC employees Basilio Inoc and Juan Potot, charging Casio, et al. with "acts inimical to
the interest of the union." However, Casio, et al. refused to acknowledge receipt of Gabiana’s letter. After, a
Resolution was issued expelling Casio, et al. from the union.

1
The Aliazas group filed a petition for conduct of elections with DOLE, alleging that the then incumbent officers of respondent had failed to call for a regular election
since 1985. It is disputed by the respondent claiming that an election was conducted in 1987 but by virtue of the enactment of R.A. No. 6715, which amended the
Labor Code, the term of office of its officers was extended to five years or until 1992 during which a general assembly was held affirming their hold-over tenure until
the termination of collective bargaining negotiations; and that a CBA was executed only on March 30, 2000.

Acting on the petition for the conduct of election filed by the Aliazas group, the DOLE-NCR held that the holdover authority of respondent’s incumbent set of officers
had been extinguished by virtue of the execution of the CBA. It accordingly ordered the conduct of elections. The conditions for the conduct of election imposed by
the DOLE-NCR notwithstanding, respondent called for a regular election on July 9, 2001, without prior notice to the DOLE and without the conduct of pre-election
conference.
In a follow-up letter, Gabiana reiterated the demand of IBM-Local 31 that GMC dismiss Casio, et al., with the
warning that failure of GMC to do so would constitute gross violation of the existing CBA and constrain the union
to file a case for unfair labor practice against GMC.

Pressured by the threatened filing of a suit for unfair labor practice, GMC acceded to Gabiana’s request to terminate
the employment of Casio, et al.

Casio, et al. sought recourse from the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch VII by filing a Complaint against GMC
for unfair labor practice, particularly, the termination of legitimate union officers, illegal suspension, illegal
dismissal, and moral and exemplary damages.

Issue: Whether GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice.

Held: Yes.

Union security clauses are recognized and explicitly allowed under Article 248(e) of the Labor Code. It is State
policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more
persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer. For this reason, the law
has allowed stipulations for "union shop" and "closed shop" as means of encouraging workers to join and support
the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interest vis-à-vis the employer.

Moreover, a stipulation in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory
provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code, since "a CBA is the law between the company and the union and
compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor."

In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer needs only to
determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement
of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union
to expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on
the union security provision of the CBA.

In this case, it is the third requisite – that there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of IBM-Local 31 to
expel Casio, et al. – which appears to be lacking.

8. Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle, G.R. No. 158930-31, August 22, 2006

Facts: In consideration of the impending expiration of the existing CBA between Nestlé and UFE-DFA-KMU, in a
Letter of Intent, the Presidents of the Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions of UFE-DFA-KMU informed Nestlé of their
intent to open a new Collective Bargaining Negotiation for the year 2001-2004. Nestlé acknowledged receipt of the
aforementioned letter. It also informed UFE-DFA-KMU that it was preparing its own counter-proposal. Dialogue
between the company and the union ensued.

Nestlé, claiming to have reached an impasse in said dialogue, requested the NCMB to conduct preventive mediation
proceedings between it and UFE-DFA-KMU. Nestlé alleged that despite 15 meetings between them, the parties
failed to reach any agreement on the proposed CBA. Conciliation proceedings nevertheless proved ineffective.

The Union filed 2 Notices of Strike, the second one was predicated on Nestlé’s alleged unfair labor practices i.e.,
bargaining in bad faith in that it was setting pre-conditions in the ground rules by refusing to include the issue of the
Retirement Plan in the CBA negotiations.

In an attempt to finally resolve the crippling labor dispute between the parties, then Acting Secretary of the DOLE
dismissed the Union’s charge of unfair labor practice against the Company for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
ruled that Nestlé is free and clear from any unfair labor practice.

Issue: Whether Nestlé is guilty of unfair labor practice.

Held: No. The concept of "unfair labor practice" is defined by the Labor Code. The same code likewise provides the
acts constituting unfair labor practices committed by employers.

Basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. By
imputing bad faith unto the actuations of Nestlé, it was UFE-DFA-KMU, therefore, who had the burden of proof to
present substantial evidence to support the allegation of unfair labor practice. A perusal of the allegations and
arguments raised by UFE-DFA-KMU in the Memorandum will readily disclose that it failed to discharge said onus
probandi as there is still a need for the presentation of evidence other than its bare contention of unfair labor practice
in order to make certain the propriety or impropriety of the unfair labor practice charge hurled against Nestlé. Under
Rule XIII, Sec. 4, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code: “In cases of unfair labor practices, the
notice of strike shall as far as practicable, state the acts complained of and the efforts to resolve the dispute
amicably.”

Except for the assertion put forth by UFE-DFA-KMU, neither the second Notice of Strike nor the records of these
cases substantiate a finding of unfair labor practice. It is not enough that the union believed that the employer
committed acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant
such a belief.

To be sure, it must be shown that Nestlé was motivated by ill will, “bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation,
wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted” in disclaiming unilateral grants as proper subjects in their collective
bargaining negotiations.

11. Lepanto Ceramics v. Lepanto Ceramics Employees, G.R. No. 180866, March 2, 2010

Facts: Lepanto Ceramics, Incorporated is a duly organized corporation existing and operating by virtue of
Philippine Laws. Its business is primarily to manufacture, make, buy and sell, on wholesale basis, among others,
tiles, marbles, mosaics and other similar products. Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association is a legitimate labor
organization duly registered with DOLE. It is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in the establishment of
petitioner.

Lepanto Ceramics and the Association entered into a CBA which provides for, among others, the grant of a
Christmas gift package/bonus to the members of the Association. The Christmas bonus was one of the enumerated
“existing benefit, practice of traditional rights” which “shall remain in full force and effect.”

The bonus for 2002 is the root of the present dispute. Lepanto Ceramics gave a year-end cash benefit of ₱600.00 and
offered a cash advance to interested employees equivalent to 1 month salary payable in one year. The Association
objected to the ₱600.00 cash benefit and argued that this was in violation of the CBA it executed with Lepanto
Ceramics.

The parties failed to amicably settle the dispute. The Association filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB alleging
the violation of the CBA. The case was placed under preventive mediation. The efforts to conciliate failed.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the voluntary arbitrator that Lepanto
Ceramics is obliged to give the members of the Association a Christmas bonus in the amount of ₱3,000.00 in 2002.

Held: No. Generally, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. For a bonus to be enforceable, it must
have been promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by the parties. Given that the bonus in this case is
integrated in the CBA, the same partakes the nature of a demandable obligation. Verily, by virtue of its
incorporation in the CBA, the Christmas bonus due to the Association has become more than just an act of
generosity on the part of Lepanto Ceramics but a contractual obligation it has undertaken.

A reading of the provision of the CBA reveals that the same provides for the giving of a "Christmas gift
package/bonus" without qualification. Terse and clear, the said provision did not state that the Christmas package
shall be made to depend on Lepanto Ceramic’s financial standing. The records are also bereft of any showing that
Lepanto Ceramics made it clear during CBA negotiations that the bonus was dependent on any condition. Indeed, if
Lepanto Ceramics and the Association intended that the ₱3,000.00 bonus would be dependent on the company
earnings, such intention should have been expressed in the CBA.

Hence, absent any proof that Lepanto Ceramic’s consent was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, it is presumed that
it entered into the CBA voluntarily and had full knowledge of the contents thereof and was aware of its
commitments under the contract.

The Court is fully aware that implementation to the letter of the subject CBA provision may further deplete Lepanto
Ceramic’s resources. Lepanto Ceramic’s remedy though lies not in the Court’s invalidation of the provision but in
the parties’ clarification of the same in subsequent CBA negotiations. In this case, Article 253 of the Labor Code is
relevant.