G.R. No.

L-33720 March 10, 1975

THE PHILIPPINE BRITISH CO. INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent.

BARREDO, J.
FACTS: On June 12, 1970, a fire broke out in the premises of private
respondents, Moises M. Tapia (Tapia, for short) at No. 245 Roosevelt Avenue,
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Being holders of fire insurance policies
from different companies, among them the petitioners, and having failed to
secure extrajudicial settlement of their claims, they filed corresponding civil
actions in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. All of said cases, dealing as
they did with the same facts and issues, were assigned to respondent judge.
On April 13, 1971, counsel for British filed by mail a motion asking for
fifteen (15) days extension of its time to answer, claiming that due to the
intervening Holy Week and pressure of other works, he would be unable to
prepare his answer within the reglementary period. He was granted only five (5)
days ending April 19. No answer came until April 28, 1971, albeit it was mailed
by registered service on April 22, 1971. Cibeles Insurance Corporation (Cibeles,
for brevity) in turn filed its own motion for extension on April 19, 1971, two days
after due date. Obviously, the period could not be extended anymore. Just the
same, it filed its answer on April 22, 1971, which was joint with that of British.
On April 24, 1971, Tapia filed separate motions in the two cases praying
that petitioners be declared in default. On April 28, 1971 an order of default
was issued, directing at the same time that plaintiffs' evidence be received by
the clerk of court. On May 26, 1971, petitioner filed a joint motion to lift
the order of default, unverified and unaccompanied by any affidavit of
merit, which he set for hearing on June 1, 1971. Then, on June 10, 1971, a
notice was received by Atty. Felix, Jr. advising him that his motion had
been set for hearing on June 30, 1971, but on June 22, 1971, respondent
judge issued an order cancelling this notice for the reason that; "for failure of
defendants in the above-entitled cases to comply with the requirements
imposed by Section 3 of Rule 18, Rules of Court and pursuant to the decisions
of the Supreme Court on the matter, this Court can no longer set aside its
order dated April 24, 1971." And on June 28, 1971, the court rendered
judgment against the petitioner. On July 1, 1971, petitioners filed a joint
"Petition for Relief from Judgment." But before said petition could be
acted upon by the court, the instant petition was filed with this Court
on July 2, 1971 and summons, together with the writ of preliminary
injunction was served on public respondents on July 10, 1971. In the
meantime, on the same day that the petition for relief was set for hearing,
so on July 7, 1971, respondent judge found it to be "sufficient in form and
substance" and ordered the respondents "to answer the same within a
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof. Nothing else developed in
the trial court later because the injunction of this Court which was served on
respondent judge on July 10, 1971 enjoined him from "taking further action" in
the two subject cases.
ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Felix has maintained his candor and good behavior
before the Court, regarding the orders and notice of default delivered to them,
when according to him there was none.
RULING: No, He did not. Atty. Alfonso Felix, Jr. is hereby ordered to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice hereof why no administrative action
should be taken against him as a member of the Philippine Bar.
The contention of petitioners that they were erroneously declared in
default has no merit. As regards Cibeles, there can be no question that even its
motion for extension to file its answer filed out of time. It was served summons
on April 2, 1971, and it is not disputed that its motion for extension was filed on
April 19th, two days late. With respect to British, its answer admittedly due on
April 13, 1971, and although it asked for an extension of fifteen (15) days it was
given only five (5) days ending April 19,1971, consequently, its answer jointly
filed with Cibeles on April 22, 1971 was undoubtedly out of time.
Counsel suggests that he was not given enough time, considering that
there was the Holy Week to take into account, but His Honor ruled that precisely,
counsel would have more time because of the holidays. Again, We perceive no
grave abuse of discretion in such a pragmatic ratiocination. Besides, it is settled
that parties and counsel should not assume that courts are bound to grant the
time they ask for compliance with the rules, and therefore, the fact that counsel
received the order of extension by mail only on April 26, 1971, is no reason for
him to complain. Likewise, that he was not notified of the motion to declare his
clients in default is not against the rules, for he had no right to such notice.
Counsel suggests that he was not given enough time, considering that
there was the Holy Week to take into account, but His Honor ruled that precisely,
counsel would have more time because of the holidays. Again, We perceive no
grave abuse of discretion in such a pragmatic ratiocination. Besides, it is settled
that parties and counsel should not assume that courts are bound to grant the
time they ask for compliance with the rules, and therefore, the fact that counsel
received the order of extension by mail only on April 26, 1971, is no reason for
him to complain. Likewise, that he was not notified of the motion to declare his
clients in default is not against the rules, for he had no right to such notice.
Counsel only makes reference to the joint answer he had filed on behalf of
the British and Cibeles but, neither the motion itself nor the joint answer is
supported by any corresponding oath. Particularly, when it is considered that
counsel has never pretended that he had actually made inquiries and asked the
proper personnel of the court about them, which he would naturally have done,
considering that before then he had filed motions for extension followed by the
joint answer. Such lack of candor bordering on conscious misstatements of fact
which has actually misled the Court calls for at least an appropriate explanation
from counsel.
 G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993

DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, respondent.

QUIASON, J.

FACTS: On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a Manifestation and

Supplement to Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with
22 September 1992 Resolution. On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General
submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that: (a) despite the
issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing respondents to maintain
the status quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension; (b) the clear intent and
spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining
the time of the filing of the instant petition; (c) respondent Secretary's acts in
refusing to hold in abeyance implementation of petitioners' preventive
suspension and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC
appointed to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution
dated September 22, 1992; and (d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be
directed to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 immediately,
by restoring the status quo ante contemplated by the aforesaid resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of abusive language by the counsel of

petitioners against the counsel of respondents be a ground for disbarment.

RULING:

The SC take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for

private respondents hurled against petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated:
(1) Comment on Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's
Comment and Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-5). A lawyer should not be carried
away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or
written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession
(Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive language by
counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect
to the dignity of the court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned language in
pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light.

The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil
action, which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the
purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial
officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members of the bar
separate and apart from the present special civil action.
 G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION

AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654

CASTRO, J.

FACTS: Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's

Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he
therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men
who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's
"unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he
ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so
that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never
be repeated."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y.

Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the
defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his
client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty
days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the
adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time
and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff
moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial
court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17,
1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required
registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was
ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of
Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already
perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record
on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision
in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co.,  L-16636, June
24, 1965, dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen‘s petition as the
Court wanted to wait for Almacen to actually surrender his certificate. This Court
resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days
from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall
be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he
preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and
public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also
asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time
to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was
allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
Although he has submitted his explanation, he was in no way apologetic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in
question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.

RULING: Yes, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from
the practice of law indefinitely.

On Atty. Almacen‘s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court
regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous,
grossly disrespectful and derogatory against this Court as well as its individual
members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional. It is true
that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in
a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the
judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal
condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts.

The misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity

cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that
disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish
the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in
the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive
language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is
our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering
apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension
should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be
indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants
us discretion on the matter but also because, even without the comforting
support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely
exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite
suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling
outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown
by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how
long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the
suspension becomes effective, he may prove to this Court that he is once again
fit to resume the practice of law.
 G.R. No. 71169 August 30, 1989

JOSE D. SANGALANG, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.

FACTS: The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against
Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda
Sangalang. On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring,
among other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt for using intemperate and accusatory language.

The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for. His suggestions that the Court might
have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only
unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court's honor and
integrity. To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license
to insult the Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad
hominem. In that event, it is the Court's duty to act to preserve the honor and
dignity and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Sangco should be sanctioned for professional

misconduct or malpractice.

RULING: Yes, Atty. J. Cezar Sangco should be sanctioned. He is to be

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective from receipt
of judgement and ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.00.

The SC was not satisfied with his explanation that he was merely
defending the interests of his clients. A lawyer's first duty is not to his client but
to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly
subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. And while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause
in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty
to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo.

In the SC’s show cause Resolution, Atty. Sangco was held in contempt,
specifically, for resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the
Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly,
however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:

CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE
TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Rule
11.04-A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.