Chinabank vs CA, Heirs of Avelina, and Piero | G.R. No.

155299

Principle: The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert witnesses applies only to
such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are
within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar
with the facts. 

Facts:
A certain Kipte obtained a loan from China Bank which was alleged to have been
secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage signed by Avelina over the
latter’s properties. Also, a surety agreement was made where Kipte was the principal
and Avelina was alleged to be the surety. As Kipte failed to pay, Petitioner Bank
foreclosed the mortgaged properties.
Respondents Avelina and Piero filed a case before the RTC, with Avelina
denying having signed the documents. She alleged that years ago, she was made to
sign documents by her daughter-in-law which she did not know the contents of as she is
blind. Further, she was told that she had to sign only as a witness.
Petitioner BANK, however, contends that at the time of the execution of the
documents, though physically weak, she was mentally sound and she understood the
nature of the transactions; and Avelina personally appeared before the notary public;
and that the respondents could have easily submitted a medical certificate attesting to
the supposed blindness of Avelina or made an ophthalmologist take the witness stand,
but they did neither.
RTC rendered its decision in favor of China Bank.
CA ruled in favor of Avelina.

Issue: Whether or not Avelina signed the real estate mortgage and surety agreement
knowingly and voluntarily, with full knowledge of its contents.

Ruling:
No.

The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert witnesses applies only to
such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are
within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar
with the facts. Thus, to prove whether one is blind, it is not necessary to submit a
medical certificate attesting to the blindness or to require an expert witness, such as an
ophthalmologist, to testify to such fact, since the fact of blindness can be determined
through common knowledge and by anyone with sufficient familiarity of such fact. 

In this case, Avelina, categorically testified and attested to her own blindness.

Her blindness was further confirmed by testimonies of her children. Even the notary
before whom she supposedly appeared testified to the fact that she was indeed blind
and that she was not made to understand the documents. Thus, Avelina did not know
that the Surety Agreement and Real Estate Mortgage she signed were to secure the
loan Kipte contracted from the petitioner; that she was made to understand that she was
to sign only as witness; and that Kipte was a total stranger to her, and, by this reason, it
is implausible that she agreed to be his surety.  In fact, it was only after Avelina received
the notices of foreclosure that she learned that there was a mortgage document among
the papers she signed.

DAUBERT et ux., individually and as guardians and litem for DAUBERT, et

al. v. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 92-102. Argued March 30, 1993 -- Decided June 28, 1993
Petitioners, two minor children and their parents, alleged in their suit against respondent
that the children's serious birth defects had been caused by the mothers' prenatal
ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription drug marketed by respondent. The District Court
granted respondent summary judgment based on a well credentialed expert's affidavit
concluding, upon reviewing the extensive published scientific literature on the subject,
that maternal use of Bendectin has not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth
defects. Although petitioners had responded with the testimony of eight other well
credentialed experts, who based their conclusion that Bendectin can cause birth defects
on animal studies, chemical structure analyses, and the unpublished "reanalysis" of
previously published human statistical studies, the court determined that this evidence
did not meet the applicable "general acceptance" standard for the admission of expert
testimony. The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed, citing Frye v. United States, 54
App. D. C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014, for the rule that expert opinion based on a
scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is "generally accepted" as
reliable in the relevant scientific community.
Held: The Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye, provide the standard for admitting
expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. Pp. 4-17.
(a) Frye's "general acceptance" test was superseded by the Rules' adoption. The Rules
occupy the field, United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49, and, although the common law
of evidence may serve as an aid to their application, id., at 51-52, respondent's
assertion that they somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Nothing in theRules as a
whole or in the text and drafting history of Rule 702, which specifically governs expert
testimony, gives any indication that "general acceptance" is a necessary precondition to
the admissibility of scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at
odds with the Rules' liberal thrust and their general approach of relaxing the traditional
barriers to "opinion" testimony. Pp. 4-8.
(b) The Rules--especially Rule 702--place appropriate limits on the admissibility of
purportedly scientific evidence by assigning to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an
expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.
The reliability standard is established by Rule 702's requirement that an expert's
testimony pertain to "scientific . . . knowledge," since the adjective "scientific" implies a
grounding in science's methods and procedures, while the word "knowledge" connotes
a body of known facts or of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as true on good
grounds. The Rule's requirement that the testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" goes primarily to relevance by demanding
a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.
Pp. 9-12.
(c) Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702, the trial judge,
pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make a preliminary assessment of whether the
testimony's underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and properly can
be applied to the facts at issue. Many considerations will bear on the inquiry, including
whether the theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether it
has been subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate, and
the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and whether it has
attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community. The inquiry is a
flexible one, and its focus must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate. Throughout, the judge should also be mindful of other
applicable Rules. Pp. 12-15.
(d) Cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising "general
acceptance" standard, is the appropriate means by which evidence based on valid
principles may be challenged. That even limited screening by the trial judge, on
occasion, will prevent the jury from hearing of authentic scientific breakthroughs is
simply a consequence of the fact that the Rules are not designed to seek cosmic
understanding but, rather, to resolve legal disputes. Pp. 15-17.
951 F. 2d 1128, vacated and remanded.
Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II-
A, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II-B, II-C, III, and IV, in which
White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, J., joined.

US V. Pineda

FACTS:
 Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription
obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to
his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. (Santiago Pineda, the
defendant, is a registered pharmacist)
 Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to
Santos in the form of 6 papers marked Botica Pineda
 Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate
which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water the doses to two of his sick
horses. 
 Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not
used. The two horses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly
afterwards. 
 Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of
Science for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on
analysis found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium
chlorate. 
 At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of
the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to
be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium
chlorate is not.) 
 Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and
found that death was the result of poisoning
 RTC: held Pineda liable
ISSUE: W/N Pineda should be liable for negligence

HELD: YES. The judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of
P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is
affirmed with the cost of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to any civil
action which may be instituted
 Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals,
medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for any
person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any prescription,
drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or
pretense, or to adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so used, sold or
offered for sale. Any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison shall be held to be
adulterated or deteriorated within the meaning of this section if it differs from the
standard of quality or purity given in the United States Pharmacopoeia.
 The same section of the Pharmacy Law also contains the following penal
provision: "Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollar." The Administrative Code,
section 2676, changes the penalty somewhat by providing that: Any person
engaging in the practice of pharmacy in the Philippine Islands contrary to any
provision of the Pharmacy Law or violating any provisions of said law for which no
specific penalty s provided shall, for each offense, be punished by a fine not to
exceed two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
 As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons
which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any
drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the one word "fraudulent" which
has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this
restrictive adjective?
 Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud, which the appellant
vigorously insists upon, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist
of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable
 degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it was
false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without
any knowledge of its truth and as positive assertion; that he made it with the
intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in
reliance upon it, and that the purchased thereby suffered injury.
 Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the case we consider
are civil in nature, the question of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist
is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells.  Instead of caveat emptor,
it should be caveat venditor. 

People v. Irang
64 Phil 285 (1937)

Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another
time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. (Rule 130, Rules of Court)

Applicability

Sec. 34 is the second branch of the rule of res inter alios acta (Rule 130, Sec. 28) and
applies to both civil and criminal cases.

Facts: After barging into her home, a man ordered Maximiniana to bring out her money
and jewelry. As she turned over the items, she looked at the man's face and saw that he
had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. Irang was identified by Maximiana from a
police line-up and was charged. During the trial, Maximiana’s neighbor, Juana, testified
that on the night in question, her house was assaulted by malefactors. Juana noticed
that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid. She identified that man to
be Irang.

Held: The testimony of Juana indirectly corroborates Maximiniana’s testimony that the
man of the same description was the one who went to her house and demanded
delivery of her money and jewelry. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not
admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as
where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends
to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or
when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime.