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An Analysis of the Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyya: Realpolitik or Utopia?

Abstract:

This paper is a study of the political thought of 13th century Mamlūk-era theologian-jurist, Taqī al-
Dīn Ibn Taymiyya, who is increasingly being recognized as one of the major influences of
contemporary Islamic political thought. This study addresses the question of what Ibn Taymiyya’s
normative political theory entailed, and more specifically whether or not his writing on Islamic law
in politics can be reduced to a religious justification of political realism. It is argued that while Ibn
Taymiyya accepted the political legitimacy of the status quo authority, he nonetheless maintained an
independent, normative conception of a political society derived from the sharī‘a (Islamic law),
which he bases on the historical precedence of the Khulafā’ al-Rāshidūn (Rightly Guided Caliphs), a
short-lived succession of rule that followed the death of the prophet Muhammad.

Keywords: Islamic Political Thought; Caliphate; Divine Law; Ibn Taymiyya; Utopianism.

Introduction
Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya (661-728/1263-1328) was a prominent theologian and
jurist of Islamic law under the Mamlūk Sultanate in the 13th century.1 While Ibn Taymiyya is well
known for his polemical works in theological issues especially in his refutations of non-Ḥanbalite
schools of thought, he is less known for his contributions to the political thought of Islam.2 As Mona
Hassan notes, it was only recently, with the surge in popular discourse concerning the Islamic
justification for terrorism, that scholars began to take an interest in the substance of Ibn Taymiyya’s
political thought. In this paper, I will examine the various aspects of Ibn Taymiyya’s central works
on politics, and address several questions concerning existing debates.3 The main debate concerns
the level to which Ibn Taymiyya’s political thought was used to justify the existing political status
quo, i.e., the Mamlūk Sultanate in Egypt and the (then) recently toppled Abbasid Caliphate,
following the Mongol invasions. On this note, in answering this central question, there falls under it
a number of important questions which have been answered by historians of Islam and diverge
greatly in interpretation.4 The first question concerns where, or in which works, we can find and
identify as Ibn Taymiyya’s normative work on political theory, as a number of his writings are
interpreted as contradictory, or as a way of reconciling theory (a utopian caliphate) with ‘on-the-
1
Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya, Waẓīfat al-Hukūma al-Islāmiyya (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub
al-‘Ilmiyya, 1997), 5.
2
Mona Hassan, "Modern interpretations and misinterpretations of a medieval scholar: Apprehending
the political thought of Ibn Taymiyya" in Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, ed. Yossef Rapoport and
Shahab Ahmed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 338-366.
3
Ibid, 335.
4
The main debates are discussed in detail with reference to primary source evidence. Scholars and
works commenting on the political thought of Ibn Taymiyya include: H. A. R. Gibb, "Constitutional
Organization: The Muslim Community and the State” in Origin and Development of Islamic Law,
ed. Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2008), 3-27; Mona
Hassan, ibid; Mona Hassan,  Longing for the lost Caliphate: A transregional history (Princeton
University Press, 2017); Henri Laoust, "Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taḳī-d-Dīn
Aḥmad b. Taimīya, canoniste ḥanbalite, né à Ḥarrān en 661/1262" (PhD diss., 1939); Erwin Isak
Jakob Rosenthal, Political thought in medieval Islam: an introductory outline (CUP Archive, 1962);
Charles E. Butterworth, "Prudence versus legitimacy: the persistent theme in Islamic political
thought,” Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (1982): 84-114; Antony Black, History of Islamic
Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present: From the Prophet to the Present (Edinburgh
University Press, 2011).

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ground’ political realities.5 The second related question concerns the way in which Ibn Taymiyya
approaches the issue of politics in the first place; is it polemical, strictly legal, or in another way
somehow influenced by his theological orientation? Answering this question will inevitably give us
insight into what the aim of what his works on politics was. Finally, this paper will indirectly address
the question of whether or not Ibn Taymiyya maintained that violent revolution was a legitimate
means of establishing righteous rule – the acceptance of which is often used by radical Muslim
organizations to justify violent rebellion.
My position and main argument in this paper will be that a comprehensive and context-based
reading of Ibn Taymiyya’s major texts on political thought demonstrate a unique and coherent
argument. This argument is grounded in a strictly juridical approach not necessarily dependent of
theological orientation (e.g., Atharī versus Ash‘arī); which can be found in the three main works
which I will use for reference; Waẓīfat al-Hukūma al-Islamiyya6 or The Function of Islamic
Government, Minhāj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya fī Naqd Kalām al-Shī‘a wa al-Qadariyya,7 or The
Prophetic Way Concerning its Invalidation of the Teachings of the Shiites and Qadarites, and
Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā, or the Great Compilation of Fatwas.8 I further argue that the way Ibn
Taymiyya justified the existence of Islamic political authority outside his normative ideal
government, is justified on a legalistic basis; that is, in contrast to interpretations that distance Ibn
Taymiyyah from legalism and/or view his political work as a justification of the status quo. In both
cases, Ibn Taymiyya is strictly opposed to both pacifism (i.e., indifference towards the government’s
application of Islamic law), and violent rebellion.
I will now present the various opinions surrounding the questions I have highlighted, and
with reference to the works I cited above, I will advance my own interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya’s
political thought. The way I do this is by first identifying various interpretations of one of the
questions according to the leading scholars, and then providing my own analysis based on the
primary sources.
The First Cut: The Orientalist Interpretation
As I noted above, especially during the last century, little attention has been paid to Ibn
Taymiyya as a political theorist, or even Islamic political thought as a field of study. The few studies
of Ibn Taymiyya’s political thought were not very nuanced and lacked comprehensiveness and
connection to more than one of his texts, as well as to the larger body of Islamic literature in his time.
Let us take the example of Henri Laoust, who wrote about Ibn Tamyiyyah’s political works in “Essai
sur les doctrines sociales et politique de Taḳī-d-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taimīyah.”9 The force of the argument
Laoust makes is that Ibn Taymiyya – in his polemics against the Shiite conception of the Caliphate
and the Mahdī (the awaited imām) – views the Shiite claim to political authority as unjustified
because they claim that the establishment of religious authority is an Islamic obligation, and that
belief in this religious political ruler is an essential part of the Muslim faith. Since Ibn Taymiyyah
rejected this concept of religio-political authority—or the “imamate”—as a part of the essential creed
of Muslims, he was in fact rejecting the need for religious political authority entirely.10
Following Laoust’s original interpretation, other scholars like E.I.J. Rosenthal and H.A.R.
Gibb argue that Ibn Taymiyya takes staunchly anti-Shiite and anti-Kharajite11 positions because he
rejected any claim to religious authority besides the ruling political authority. That is to say, for
5
This is the predominant opinion amongst the various orientalist philosophers, such as: Gibb,
“Constitutional Organization”; Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam; Laoust, “Essai sur
les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taḳī-d-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taimīya”.
6
Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya fī Naqd Kalam al-Shī‘a wa al-
Qadariyya (Riyadh: al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa‘ūd Islamic University, 1986).
7
Ibn Taymiyya, Waẓīfat.
8
Ibn Taymiyya, Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1997).
9
Laoust, Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taḳī-d-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taimīya.
10
Laoust, Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taḳī-d-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taimīya, 282-283.

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Gibb, Ibn Taymiyya believed that “their authority as imāms is acquired by a mutual contract with the
Community in general, whereby the temporal princes…carry out their religious and political
functions as the sharī‘ah directs”12 and therefore that it is possible to have multiple caliphates ruling
over Muslim territory. This implicitly accepts that for Ibn Taymiyyah, any prospect for a utopian, let
alone united, caliphate is out of the question and not worth considering. Likewise, Rosenthal, while
not focused on Ibn Taymiyya’s criticism of Shiites, argued that Ibn Taymiyya’s political
conservatism is the reason why he opposed any alternative forms of government presented, since,
from a legal perspective, they would be illegal.13 In fact, he argues that his contribution to “naṣīḥat
al-mulūk”14 literature—in books like his famous al-Siyāsa al-Sharī’a—is explained by understanding
Ibn Taymiyya through the lens of “political realism”. This has also been adopted by contemporary
scholars.15 On that note, I should point out that there are two main claims at play here. The first is
that the Minhāj al-Sunna implies the legitimacy of political plurality; the second is that political
authority is acceptable from the Islamic perspective insofar as it is the existing political authority and
not merely a challenger to the status quo.
For both claims, several scholars of Ibn Taymiyya who came after this first generation of
thinkers opposed the various interpretations proposed, especially Laoust’s argument that Ibn
Taymiyya rejected the obligation to establish an ideal Islamic government altogether.16 Mona Hassan
signals towards several of the critiques of these interpretations, and notes that “Ibn Tamiyyah does
not explicitly or even implicitly broach the opinions attributed to him by Laoust regarding the Sunni
caliphate,” but is rather an extensive critique of the beliefs and political demands of Shiite scholars,
specifically in response to Shiite scholar Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 1325 CE).17 Furthermore, concerning
the claim that Ibn Taymiyya accepted plurality within the Muslim community (umma), Hassan,18 as
well as others,19 take Henri Laoust et al. to charge by pointing out that the prophetic traditions, or
ḥadīths that Laoust quotes from Ibn Taymiyyah to make his point – i.e., that Muslims are expected to
pledge allegiance to the multitude of caliphs to come – are in fact used by traditional Sunni scholars
to affirm the Sunni doctrine of single authority, which I discuss myself below.
I will now respond to the claims of the thinkers above—by looking at their claims of Ibn
Taymiyya’s view on plurality and the obligation of Islamic government—by analyzing Ibn
Taymiyya’s Minhāj al-Sunna and other works.
The first major misinterpretation to clear in starting to develop a positive conception of Ibn
Taymiyya’s political thought goes back to the Minhāj al-Sunna. The purpose of the first part of the
book, which speaks of the Islamic concept of ‘Imāma,’ or the spiritual and political position ascribed
to various heads of state in Sunni thought, which is at the same time believed by Shiites to be a

11
The Kharajites were a sect of Muslims who rebelled against the political authority and rejected the
right to rule of anybody except one who strives to establish pure Islamic law. See: Levi Della Vida,
G., “K̲h̲ārid̲j̲ites”, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E.
Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (Leiden: Brill, 2012).
12
Gibb, “Constitutional Organization,” 24.
13
Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, 52.
14
"Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk” (lit. “advice to the kings") literature refers to a genre of Islamic literature with
the state aim of advising the ruling authority on how to morally and effectively rule of its people.
15
Black, History of Islamic Political Thought, 159-161.
16
Laoust, Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taḳī-d-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taimīya, 282.
17
Hassan, “Modern Interpretations and Misinterpretations,” 341.
18
Hassan, Ibid, 343-346.
19
See: Hassan, Longing for the Lost Caliphate, 113; political analysts of Ibn Taymiyya in the Arab
world have made the same point: Muhammad ‘Abdul Haqq Ansari, Ibn Taymiyya Expounds on
Islam: Selected Writings of Shaykh al-Islam Taqi ad-Din Ibn Taymiyya on Islamic Faith, Life, and
Society (Riyadh: Al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud Islamic University, 2000), 65-68.

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spiritual position of leadership ascribed to the twelve successors of the prophet Muhammad.20 As
Henri Laoust is right to point out, one of the beliefs of the Shiite creed that Ibn Taymiyya refutes is
the ascribing of the concept of the Imamate as one of the essential pillars of faith in Islam, whom Ibn
Tamyiyyah accuses the Shiites with including. He instead argues that the Imamate is not an issue of
faith akin to belief in God or the six articles of faith in Islam:21
Indeed, faith in Allah and His Messenger is more important than the issue of the Imamate,
and this is known by necessity from the religion of Islam, as the infidel does not believe until
he has witnessed that there is no deity but Allah and that Muhammad is the messenger of
Allah…and as such the Prophet - peace and blessings be upon him - would travel to the
infidels and protect their blood as a result of their repentance from disbelief, and he did not
mention the [concept of] the Imamate to them at all.
He then goes on to explain the importance of the six articles of faith – in God, the messengers,
prophets, books, angels, predestination and the day of judgement – demonstrating that the Prophet
himself never considered the Imamate a core matter of faith.22 What is clear, however, is that the
reason Ibn Tamyiyah would even bring up the Imamate and refute it as a pillar faith is in order to
dispel and refute the Shiite belief which did make the Imamate a central tenet of belief. This is clear
throughout the text in various passages which point to the Shiites as being the direction of his attack.
This is made even more clear with the various sections dedicated to and named after deconstructing
the Shiite version of the Imamate, specifically concerning the return of the “Imām al-Muntaẓar”, or
the Shiite conception of the messianic figure, the Mahdi.23 Ibn Taymiyya’s refutation of the concept
of imāma never expressed opposition to the idea of Islamic political governance; rather, he was
opposed to portraying the concept of imāma as a spiritual, non-political authority, which is what the
Shiites had done:24
And that it is said, ‘the Imamate is the most important requirement of the religion, and the
most noble affairs of the Muslims,’ then the people who are the furthest away from this most
noble affair are the Shiites, as they say the worst things concerning the Imamate, and they
rendered it [Imamate] null logically and religiously…this is because they are entrusting the
Imamate to someone who is not even known [i.e., the Muntaẓar] and is non-existent…and
they thus do not satisfy the purpose of the Imamate at all.
Ibn Taymiyya then explains that according to the Shiite criterion, by not having a leader who
is actually capable of rule (physically), it will inevitably lead to someone else taking control of the
political affairs of the community—most likely an unbeliever or oppressor.25
20
Sabrina Mervin, "On Sunnite-Shiite Doctrinal and Contemporary Geopolitical Tensions", in The
Dynamics of Sunni-Shia Relationships: Doctrine, Transnationalism, Intellectuals and the Media, ed.
Brigitte Marechal and Sami Zemini (Hurst Publishers: 2013), 13-14.
21
Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al Sunna, 75-76. “fa’inna al-īmān bi-allāh wa-rasūlih ahammu min
mas’alat al-imāma, wa-hādhā ma‘lūm bi-l-’iḍtirār min dīn al-islām, fa’al-kāfir lā yaṣīr mu'minā
hattā yashhad an lā ilāha illa allāh, wa-anna muhammadā rasūl allah…wakadhālik ka-l-nabiy -
ṣalla allāh 'alayhi wa sallam - yaṣīr fī al-kuffār, fayaḥqin dima'ahum bi-l-tawbah min al-kufr la
yadhkur lahum al-imāma bi-ḥāl.”
22
Ibid, 77-80; 106-110.
23
Ibid, e.g., the section: “Writing of the Rāfidhīs [shiites] concerning the Awaited Imām” (al-kalām
‘alā al-imām al-muntaẓar ‘ida al-rāfiḍa).
24
That is, the Shiites, by entrusting the awaited Mahdi – who is believed to be in occultation – with
the Imamate, they in fact left no possibility for the existence of a political ruler before the arrival of
the Mahdi. Ibid, 100. “an yuqāl: in kānat al-imāma ahammu maṭālib al-dīn wa ashraf masā’il al-
muslimīn fa’ab‘ad al-nās ‘an hādhā al-ahamm al-ashraf hum al-rāfiḍiyya, fa-innahum qālū fī al-
imāmah askhaf qawl, wa-afsad fī al-‘aql wa-l-dīn…fa-innahum yaḥtālūn ‘alā majhūl, wa-ma‘dūm…
falam yaḥṣul lahum min al-amr al-maqsūd bi-l-imāma shay’.”
25
Ibid, 101.

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This is all to say that Ibn Taymiyya, in Minhāj al-Sunna, never expresses any disapproval of
the concept of the Imamate outside of what he viewed as ‘perversions’ that the Shiites had made to
the religion. In fact, even in Minhāj al-Sunna, there are several instances of Ibn Tamyiyyah affirming
the doctrine and obligation of the Imamate. Even during his heated exchanges with al-Ḥillī, Ibn
Taymiyya is explicit in affirming the obligation of Islamic government (the Imamate) as a religious
obligation. For instance, after showing that the Imamate is not an essential pillar of faith like that in
the prophets or angels, he tells us, concerning the rightly-guided caliphs (the four political successors
of the Prophet Muhammad), that “every commander whose obedience is an obligation, he is an
implementation of the command of the Prophet of Allah upon him be peace, because Allah sent him
to the people, and obligated obedience upon him”26 Elsewhere, Ibn Taymiyya prescribes the Imamate
as an obligation similar to other religious obligations, including prayer, fasting, and the pilgrimage,
which while being obligatory actions that fall under ‘obedience to God in general, are not essential
pillars of faith.27
In fact, Ibn Taymiyya was very adamant on the establishment of Islamic law on a political
level and the need to have a single, unified political authority amongst the Muslim umma (nation),
contrary to Henri Laoust’s findings. For instance, when Laoust interprets Ibn Taymiyya’s affirmation
of a ḥadīth (prophetic tradition) indicating the future existence of a plurality of leaders as indicating
an affirmation of pluralism within the umma, Ibn Taymiyya’s own understanding of the ḥadīth
actually implies submission to the existing authority: “and this ḥadīth was narrated by ‘Abdullāh Ibn
‘Umar to Abdullāh Ibn Muṭī‘ when he removed his obedience to the leader of their time, Yazīd…and
proves that it is not permitted to leave obedience to the entrusted authorities of the Muslims by the
sword”.28 This understanding of Ibn Taymiyya’s conception of the Imamate and the purpose of the
text is confirmed by scholars like Mona Hassan who note that Ibn Taymiyya in fact affirms the
general orthodox consensus among Sunni political theorists (including Ash‘arī thinkers).29
The question that still remains is what Ibn Taymiyya did think about the obligation and
nature of the Imamate, or Islamic government, and the various debates that scholars of Ibn Taymiyya
had concerning it.

The Second Cut: Normative Political Thought in Ibn Taymiyya

As I have shown in the previous section, interpretations of Ibn Taymiyya that acknowledge
his confirmation of the Sunni Orthodoxy vis-à-vis the obligation to establish and obey Islamic rule
are reflective of his own views of the caliphate as a jurist. Yet, we know very little from the Minhāj
al-Sunna about this normative political theory. Current literature focused on interpreting the Minhāj
al-Sunna and Al-Siyāsa al-Sharī‘a, still maintain simplistic understandings of Ibn Taymiyya’s
political thought. For instance, Antony Black’s analysis of these texts tells us, in his view, that for
Ibn Taymiyya, even if Islamic government were to be established on religious principles in theory,
the “ancient Middle Eastern and Iranian image of the absolute monarch was … fully Islamicised”.30
Likewise, Rosenthal states that Ibn Taymiyya avoids discussion of the concept of caliphate (i.e.,
khilāfa), or an ideal form of Islamic government separate from monarchical rule, since it is absent
from his thought altogether.31 This is still a common theme amongst scholars of Ibn Taymiyya as
26
Ibid, 82. “fakullu āmir bi-amr yajibu tā'atahu fīh innamā huwa munaffiḍ li’amr rasūl allāh - ṣallā
allāh 'alayhi wa sallam - li-anna allāh arsalahu ilā al-nās wa faraḍa 'alayhim ṭā’atahu.”
27
Ibid, 98.
28
Ibid, 111. “wa'hādhā ḥaddatha bihi ‘abdullāh ibn ‘umar li ‘abdullāh ibn muṭī‘ ibn al-aswad
lammā khala’ū tā’at amīr waqtihim yazīd…fa ‘ulima anna hadha al-ḥadīth dalla ‘alayh sā’ir al-
ahādīth al-ātiyah min annahu lā yakhruju ‘alā wulāt umūr al-muslimīn bi-l-sayf.”
29
Hassan, “Mona Hassan, "Modern interpretations and misinterpretations of a medieval scholar,”
342-343.
30
Black, History of Islamic Political Thought, 157.
31
Rosenthal, Political thought in medieval Islam, 51.

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discussed below. While I am not denying the fact that Ibn Taymiyya clearly obeyed and supported
the Islamic rule of his time (including physically fighting for them),32 and that the Al-Siyāsa al-
Sharī‘a is an example of some adaptation of Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk literature,33 I will make the case in
this section that Ibn Taymiyya made a clear differentiation between two types of fiqhī (legal) issues:
the first, the establishment of an idealized caliphate fully upholding Islamic law; and the second, the
way in which Muslims are expected to deal with authority even when the government does not meet
these ideal circumstances. In the end, I will cite and discuss various interpretations of Ibn
Taymiyya’s struggle to balance between these two fundamentally different legal problems.
One of Ibn Taymiyya’s shortest but most telling works of his normative political thought is
found in a book entitled Waẓīfat al-Hukūma al-Islāmiyya, or, The Function of Islamic Government.34
In the Muqaddima, or Introduction, Ibn Taymiyya starts by informing us that political authority must
necessarily be a component of any way of life, citing Aristotle’s (Arabicised) famous dictum, “man
is social by nature”.35 He continues, telling us that since “none of the son of Adam carries out their
own wellbeing in this world or in the hereafter…all the sons of Adam must necessarily have a group
of those who command and prohibit”.36 While some political thinkers see this as the basis for Ibn
Tamyiyyah’s political thought,37 Ibn Taymiyya, after explaining several verses of the Qur’an that
implement rule of law in all matters (and therefore, including politics: e.g., 4:13; 4:64-65; 56:25), he
is adamant on providing scriptural evidence for the need to appoint a ruler specifically: “if any of
you go out for a journey in a group of three or more, then appoint one of you as your leader,”38 citing
a ḥadīth. After establishing the prophetic dictum commanding the appointment of a leader tasked
with managing the religious and material affairs of the people, Ibn Taymiyya dedicates the rest of the
book to using scriptural evidence to establish the various authorities and types of laws that different
levels of government can apply. These are all considered a branch of the general fiqhī principle
known as “ordering the good and prohibiting the evil” (al-amr bi’al-ma‘rūf wa'l-nahy ‘an al-
munkar). Consider the way in which Ibn Taymiyya deals with the question of price-fixing (al-tas‘īr)
in cases where suppliers of products commit the offense of price gouging. He opens the subject by
quoting a ḥadīth that establishes the government’s right to intervene in the free market in such a
situation, then saying:
Thus, the leader of affairs should prohibit people from sales that are not of their analogous
value, which causes harm to the people, such as one who has food that he does not need and
the people are in famine…This is why the jurists have said: whoever is forced to eat the food
of others may take from it, regardless of his choice, for the analogous value; and if he refrains
from buying it except at a price larger than its [regular] price, he does not have the right
except to its price.39

32
Mohd Farid bin Mohd Sharif, The Concept of Jihād and Baghy in Islamic Law: With Special
Reference to Ibn Taymiyya (University of Edinburgh DPhil Thesis, 2006), 50-55.
33
Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, 55. Rosenthal takes it to mean that Ibn Tamyiyya
was presenting a form of “political realism” as separate from the concern of legality in Islamic law.
34
Ibn Taymiyya, Waẓīfat al-Hukūmah al-Islāmiyyah, 1-67.
35
Ibid, 7. “Al-insān madanī bi al-ṭab’.”
36
Ibid, 7. “kullu banī ādam la tatammu maṣlaḥatahum lā fī al-dunyā wa-lā fī’al-ākhirah…fajamī‘u
banī ādam lā budd min ṭā’ifati āmirin wa nāhin”.
37
Black, History of Islamic Political Thought, 155-6.
38
Ibn Taymiyya, Waẓīfat, 9. “idhā kharaja thalātha fī safarin fa-lyu’ammirū aḥadakum”.
39
Ibid, 21: “wa li-hādhā kāna wali al-amr an yakraha al-nāsi ‘alā bay‘i mā ‘indahum bi-qīmat al-
mithl, ‘inda ḍarūrat al-nās ilayhi, mithlu min ‘indihi ṭa‘ām lā yuḥtāju ilāyh wa’al-nās
mukhammaṣa…wa-li-hādhā qāla al-fuqahā’: man aḍṭarra ilā ṭa‘ām al-ghayr akhadhahu minhu bi-
ghayri ikhtiyārihi bi-qīma mithlih, wa-law imtana‘a min bay‘ihi illā bi-akthara min si‘rihi lam
yastahiq illā si’ra.”

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Keep in mind that Ibn Tamyiyyah is clearly operating within the theoretical paradigm of proper
‘fiqh’, where he almost always cites and sometimes follows the opinions of the Ḥanbalite school of
thought. What is clear throughout the text and in many others that deal with political authority is that
he relegates deliberation of the legitimacy, role, and powers of the ruling authority (Imām) to a
question of legal legitimacy.
This is even more clear when it comes to his discussion of the types of government that are
considered legitimate in the sharī‘a. In his main work, Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā, Ibn Tamyiyya
answers the fiqhī question of whether or not monarchical regimes can be considered legally
legitimate. He first differentiates between the forms of government by quoting the ḥadīth, “the
caliphate on the path of prophetic governance will last for thirty years, then, God will give his
Kingdom to whom he wills”.40 While monarchy follows the prophetic caliphate, Ibn Taymiyya tells
us that it is permissible to give Kings the title of ‘caliph’ even if they are not righteous, since other
ḥadīths have referred to all Muslim political rulers as caliphs.41 While he maintains that those caliphs
cannot be considered fully legitimate, they are of course to be obeyed as the legal evidence requires.
Here, I argue, is where Ibn Taymiyya differentiates between the normative and practical
fiqhī issues: shortly after telling us that he prefers the implementation of prophetic caliphate as
opposed to hereditary monarchy, he accepts an alternative legal position which accepts monarchy as
legitimate insofar as the religious principles are applied by that given king—that is, he accepts this
position as incorrect, but not heretical.42 However, as noted above, one may not rebel against the
caliph—real or monarchical—even if he oppresses the people.
What is clear from this discussion is that Ibn Taymiyya differentiates between two situations;
one situation in which we can choose to establish a prophetic caliphate—in which we should follow
the fiqhī rulings Ibn Tamyiyya derived in his various works (like the Waẓīfat);—and one situation in
which the monarch who exists must be obeyed whether or not he is just. This interpretation allows to
explain both why he takes a strong normative position on the ideal Islamic state, and also why he
commands the Shiites in Minhāj al-Sunna to obey the ‘caliph’ (e.g., from Mu‘āwiya to the present
day).
Ovamir Anjum and a number of other scholars of Ibn Taymiyya in communication with him
take different positions concerning the extent to which Ibn Taymiyya establishes robust legality in
his political writings. Ḥasan Kūnākātā in al-Naẓarīya al-Siyāsīyya ʻinda Ibn Taymīyya (Ibn
Taymiyya’s Political Outlook) poses the question of Ibn Tamiyya’s normative political thought as
40
Ibn Taymiyya, Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā, vol. 35, 18. “khilāfatu al-nubuwwa thalathūn sana, thumma
yu‘ṭī allāh mulkuhu man yashā’.”
41
Ibid, 20.
42
Ibid, 22-23. “Thus we prove that it is not permissible in principle, rather, caliphate upon the path of
prophecy is obligatory [to establish], as his—peace and blessings be upon him—saying goes: “and
upon you to follow is my practice, and the practice of the rightly-guided caliphs after me, hold onto it
and bite onto it with your molar teeth…thus, this is an order and a restriction upon the requirement of
the caliphate” (“fanaḥtajju bi-annahu laysa bijā’izin fī al-aṣl bal al-wājib khilāfat al-nubuwwa li-
qawlih ṣalla allāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam: “wa ‘alaykum bisunnatī wa sunnat al-khilafā’ al-rāshidīn
min ba’dī tamsikū bi-hā wa-‘aḍḍū ‘alayhā bi-l-nawājidh…fa-hādhā amr wa tahdhīdh ‘alā luzūm
sunnat al-khilāfa”). Ibn Taymiyyah also accepts the second opinion as permissible according to one
scholarly view: “and those who permit monarchical rule with textual evidence do so with his [the
prophet’s] saying to Mu‘āwiya: “if you rule, then do so gracefully”, etc., but this is speculation …
and these are the two moderate views: that it is said: ‘the caliphate is obligatory’, and that it is
permissible to leave it with an excuse [i.e., lack of knowledge], and that it is said: ‘monarchy is
acceptable as long as it achieves the purpose of governance’” (“qad tahtajju man yajūz al-mulk bi-l-
nuṣūṣ allatī minhā qawluhu mu‘āwiya: in malakta fa-’aḥsin wa fīhi naẓr…fahādhān al-qawlān
mutawassiṭā: an yuqāl al-khilāfa wājiba wa innamā yajūz al-khurūj ‘anhā bi-qadr al-ḥājjah aw an
yuqāl yajūz qabūluhā min al-mulk bi-mā yaysar fi‘l al-maqsūd bi-l-wilāyah”).

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being a matter of fiqh, made clear in the way he addresses the question of the caliphate in Majmū‘ al-
Fatāwā. However, the conclusion he brings it to, Anjum tells us, is that the ideal caliphate was
“religiously mandated for the individuals designated by the Prophet, and therefore unique and
irreproducible”.43 Clearly, as the textual evidence cited above shows, this is simply a clear
misinterpretation of Ibn Taymiyya’s view,44 which is where I side with Anjum’s reading, also against
the orientalists and other scholars who reached similar conclusions, mostly due to misconstrual of
Ibn Taymiyya in Minhāj al-Sunna.
There is, however a greater debate between Anjum and many contemporary scholars
concerning my original proposition: that Ibn Taymiyya differentiated between the fiqh of the ideal
caliphate, and fiqh of living under and obeying the sovereign—legitimate or not. Charles Butterworth
differentiated between two tensions Ibn Taymiyya needed to negotiate between: prudence, in the
sense that existing leaders must be obeyed; and legalism, which stated what forms/actions of
government were right and which were wrong according to the Qur'an and Sunna.45 Anjum argues
that unlike al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī who addressed the legalistic aspect of Islamic governance
devoid of practical considerations, Ibn Taymiyya wrote al-Siyāsa al-Shar‘iyya for monarchical
rulers, and argued for a prohibition of rebellion against those in authority regardless of their
legitimacy. In doing so, he also argues against Johansen46 who claimed that Ibn Taymiyya was
merely being a political realist that was interested in preserving the existing state in the face of the
Mongol invasion. Anjum seems to find the middle path between Butterworth and Johansen in saying
that Ibn Taymiyya was fighting a war “on two sides”: the first, against the “mainstream jurists [like
Al-Ghazālī] who rejected political prudence and considerations of public welfare”, and the second,
the Mamlūkids who abused “the Sharīʿa[h] and abused personal discretion to the point of tyranny.”47
While I agree with Anjum’s objection to Johansen’s casting of Ibn Taymiyya’s political
thought as merely being a justification of the status quo, he ends up construing Ibn Taymiyya’s
position into a rejection of the judicial formalism promoted by the likes of the Ash‘arī thinkers.
Anjum argues that Ibn Taymiyya’s approach to the caliphate included, within its normative ideal
model, the acceptance of the legitimacy of the non-caliphate model of government, since his work,
he argues, could not possibly be classified as an example of “naṣīḥat al-mulūk” literature due to its
unending justification of writing in the Qur’an and sunna, not found in classical ‘advice literature’
texts, ending with the bold claim that “Such a treatise could not be written without conceptually
expanding the scope of the Sharīʿa to include politics, and hence to include the rulers and the
Community in the circle of normativity”.48 He argues that Ibn Taymiyya’s position on the prophetic
caliphate versus monarchy (mulk) results in his acceptance of monarchy as legitimate because
“reason is a valid measure of the effectiveness of government, and mulk [monarchy] and caliphate
are commensurate institutions”—49 and hence, he accepts the legitimacy of monarchy.
It is first important to establish Ibn Taymiyya’s view on monarchical rule, and reconcile the
fact that he advises non-caliphate ruling authorities while using the Qur’an and ḥadīth with what he
wrote on the theory in abstract. The interpretation I will support in terms of Ibn Taymiyya’s non-
43
Ovamir Anjum, Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought: The Taymiyyan Moment
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), 255.
44
Ḥasan Kūnākātā, al-Naẓarīya al-Siyāsīyya ʻinda Ibn Taymīyya (Dammam: Dār al-akhlā', 1994), 82.
45
C. E. Butterworth, "Prudence Versus Legitimacy: the Persistant Them in Islamic Political
Thought", in Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World, ed. A. E. A. Dessouki (New York: Praeger,
1982).
46
B. Johansen, "A Perfect Law in an Imperfect Soceity", in The Law Applied: Contextualizing the
Islamic Shari'a, eds. P. Bearman, W. Heinrichs, and B. Weiss (I. B. Tauris, 2008); Anjum, Politics,
Law, and Community in Islamic Thought, 28-29.
47
Ibid, 236-237.
48
Ibid, 252-255.
49
Ibid, 260.

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normative position is that he believed that even if states are not outright prophetic caliphates, it
would still be preferable for them to follow the sharī‘ah rather than oppose it. Yet, this position Ibn
Taymiyya takes is explicit in demarcating his own interpretation or independent reasoning on the
issue50—which is that the caliphate is an obligation—from one that views it as merely recommended
(mustaḥabb) in comparison to monarchy: “and if [monarchy is established instead of caliphate] and
there is the knowledge and ability [to establish a caliphate], and if people view that monarchy is
acceptable in our law [Qur’anic] as it was with the others [pre-Islam], then there is no sin upon an
upright king.”51 In no way does Ibn Taymiyya’s advice to followers of this alternative viewpoint, as a
jurist responsible for demarcating the permissible and impermissible, contradict his support for a
prophetic caliphate. This is because everything, in Anjum’s words, is “within the circle of
normativity” for Ibn Taymiyya—yet it should not prevent us from isolating between two types of
normative theory; the ideal, and the practical. It is on this note that I believe Eryiğit’s study of Ibn
Taymiyya’s ‘circle of normativity’ strikes a chord. In fact, not only does Eryiğit agree make the same
differentiation I do with normative versus practical fiqh, but he connects it to the long tradition
within Islamic political thought, including amongst the ‘proper’ jurists like al-Juwaynī and al-
Ghazālī, who took the exact same view as Ibn Taymiyya: that we can still try to correct the behavior
of a caliph even if he be illegitimate:52
Concerning Sunni Muslim thought on the appointment of the leader, even when they are not
deemed as permissible, [e.g.,] by virtue of the fact that they took it by force, it always
supported the prevention of sedition that would cause rifts in the Muslim ummah ...What
becomes clear is that Ibn Taymiyya merely continued this tradition.

The Third Cut: Fault-Lines and Logical Discontinuity in Ibn Tamyiyya

I will argue in the this section that Ibn Taymiyya on his distinction between ideal and non-
ideal government is further complicated by two issues Ibn Tamyiyyah must also address: (a) the fact
that Islamic law is normative and legalistic and does censure monarchical rule; and (b) the fact that
those who followed, Mu‘āwiya and his son Yazīd, are held to be legitimate rulers in Sunni thought
despite the fact that they did not implement the divinely-sanctioned form of caliphate. To my
knowledge, scholars of Ibn Taymiyya in English-speaking academia have not brought up the
question of the transition from the ‘righteous’ to ‘monarchical’ caliphate in any level of detail, and as
such this part of my interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya does not take place in direct conversation with
other scholars.
In reference to (a) it is clear from the previous sections that Ibn Taymiyya understood the
caliphate to be a prescriptive, legal issue as opposed to one detached from ideals and action to
implement it. However, to continue the discussion from the previous section, Ibn Taymiyya at the
credit of Anjum still remains adamant that even if the righteous caliphate is the ideal situation, it is
still permissible to mix aspects of righteous caliphate with monarchical rule: “it is permissible to mix

50
And it in many ways resembles the position that legalistic scholars make when discussing various
interpretations of fiqh—i.e., to diplomatically negotiate between opposing opinions without attacking
alternative interpretations or schools of thought, as he commonly does in Waẓīfat al-Ḥukūma al-
Islāmiyya.
51
Ibid, 25. “wa-in kāna ma‘ al-qudra 'ilmā wa 'amalā wa qadara anna khilāfat al-nubuwwa
mustaḥabb laysat wājiba wa-anna ikhtiyār al-mulk jā'iz fī sharī‘atinā ka-jawāzihi fī ghayri
sharī‘atinā fahādhā al-taqdīr idhā faraḍa annahu haqq fa-lā ithma 'alā al-malik al-‘ādil ayḍā.”
52
Adem Eryiğit, “Ibn Teymiyye'nin Imamet Teorisinde Yöneticinin Tayini Problemi” [The Problem
of Legitimacy in Ibn Taymiyya's Theory of Imāma], Igdir University Ilahiyat Fakülesi Dergisi, 12
(2018): 48-49. “Yöneticinin tayini hususunda, ideal kurallar ortaya koymuş olan Sünnî İslam
düşünürleri, değişen şartlar karşısında…İslam ümmeti içinde fitne çıkmasından çekinmişlerdir…
Görünen o ki İbn Teymiyye’de bu geleneği devam ettirmiştir”.

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caliphate with monarchy in our sharī‘a…even if pure caliphate is the best”.53 But does this not
contradict Ibn Taymiyya’s own professed opinion that monarchy is not permissible when
implementation of caliphate is possible? One way to interpret this is to say that a ‘mix’ in caliphate
with monarchy is still permissible as opposed to ‘pure monarchy’, but this interpretation no longer
holds if we consider that Ibn Taymiyya’s opinion in the previous section prohibited any form of
monarchy (i.e., anything apart from prophetic caliphate). That Ibn Taymiyya considered this
monarchy-caliphate hybrid as still being classified as mulk (monarchy) is indicated to by Ibn
Taymiyya’s classification of Solomon and David – who had “righteous kingship” – as monarchical.54
If we probe into the reason why Ibn Taymiyya is concerned with legitimizing monarchy later
on, once again the context of his writing is important. After answering the original question of
monarchy versus caliphate—and supporting caliphate as necessary and an obligation—Ibn Taymiyya
then addresses the question of whether or not Mu‘āwiya’s rule is therefore considered unjust. In
Sunni-Shiite thought as well as within Sunni thought—as Minhāj al-Sunna attests to—the notion of
the caliphate and which leaders are considered legitimate were for a long time associated with
theological and political sects: between the Sunnis and Shiites, and between various schools amongst
Sunnis.55 Ibn Taymiyya in Minhāj al-Sunna and many other texts is known for defending the ‘Sunni
orthodoxy’ in the widely accepted position that all ‘Alī Ibn Abī Talib (4th caliph of Islam, d. 661) is
considered amongst rightly guided caliphs, as well as that his successors (including Mu‘āwiya)—
who established the Umayyad Dynasty—are also considered legitimate.56 In Ibn Taymiyya’s
discussion of legitimate political regimes, he clearly defends the Sunni doctrine in accepting that
Mu‘āwiya and son Yazīd—regardless of any differences or oppression they committed—were
legitimate and that questioning them, let alone attacking or rebelling against was legally prohibited.57
To clarify, the Sunni orthodox position is one of indifference between the major rebellions which
took place in early Islamic history. This includes, firstly, what was largely viewed as a transition to
monarchical rule with the rebellion and consolidation of power by Mu‘āwiya Ibn Abī Sufyān, and
secondly, the rebellion against Mu‘āwiya’s son, Yazīd, by the prophet’s grandson, Ḥuṣayn.58 The
Shiite position holds that the rebellion of Mu‘āwiya was unjustified and therefore an illegitimate
form of rule – and that the counter-rebellion by Ḥuṣayn was justified.
Following this tradition, Ibn Taymiyya understood that his stipulation of a purely prophetic
caliphate would conflict with the orthodox Sunni position that Mu‘āwiya and Yazīd were legitimate
caliphs.59 It is for this reason that he brings up the question of Mu‘āwiya as a legitimate caliph in his
discussion of whether or not pure caliphate is obligatory in Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā:
And Mu‘āwiya mixed monarchy with [caliphate], but this is not a nullification of caliphate…
I say: and this indicates that mixing of caliphate with monarchy is permissible…And as for
the people of innovation and the Mu‘tazilites, they commit injustice [i.e., in their criticism] to

53
Ibn Taymiyya, Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā, vol. 35, p. 27. “shawb al-khilāfa bi-l-mulk jā’iz fī sharī’atinā…
wa-in kāna al-khilāfa al-mahaḍḍa afḍal.”
54
Ibid. “Amongst the righteous monarchies” (“bi’l-mulūk al-‘ādilīn”).
55
For a brief history of the Imāmate and the various theological debates concerning political
legitimacy and Islam, see: Hayrettin Yücesoy, “Imamate,” in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic
Political Thought, ed. Muhammad Qasim Zaman and Devin J. Stewart (Princeton University Press,
2013), 247-250.
56
Aran A. Shahin, “In Defense of Mu‘āwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān: Treatises and Monogaphs on
Mu’āwiyah from the Eighth to the nineteenth Centuries” in: The Lineaments of Islam: Studies in
Honor of Fred McGraw Donner, ed. Paul Cobb (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 177-208.
57
He uploads this view in Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā: vol. 35, p. 25-27.
58
See: Jaan Islam, True Islam, Jihad and Terrorism: The Science of Islamic Foreign Policy (New
York: Nova Publishers, 2016), ch. 6.
59
Reference

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Mu‘āwiya for his fighting of ‘Alī and other such things, based upon the principle that this is a
great sin, which requires delegitimization.60
Ibn Taymiyya first systematically rejects, and even invokes theological difference to strengthen his
statement that the Umayyad rulers were illegitimate. On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyya, right after
this statement, once again considers the question of whether or not—according to his original
opinion that all forms of monarchy are absolutely prohibited—one ought to consider a lack of
implementing prophetic caliphate to be a major or minor sin!61
This is not only found in Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā, but even in Minhāj al-Sunna. In Ibn Taymiyya’s
opposition to the Shiites for opposing the ruling authority, Ibn Taymiyya tells us about the rule of
Yazīd, the son and successor to Mu‘āwiya: “[Ibn ‘Umar] told Ibn Muṭī‘ this when he went against
the ruler of their time, Yazīd, even though it was oppressive…and committed evils against the people
of Ḥarra.”62 He also rejects criticisms of the Prophet’s grandson Ḥuṣayn who was killed fighting
Yazīd’s rule; not claiming that Yazīd was right to be fought against, but rather that Ḥuṣayn did not
actually challenge Yazīd’s rule, and therefore was killed of a crime he did not commit.63 Ibn
Taymiyya takes this position knowingly because this is his response to people who say Ḥuṣayn
deserved to be killed because of the order of the Prophet: “whoever comes to you and orders you to
obey anyone who trying to split your community, decapitate him immediately.”64 Yet, one would
think that this applies to the Umayyad revolt and consolidation of power itself. One study of Ibn
Taymiyya’s treatment of Mu‘āwiya’s rule suggests that he did not enter into detail to defend their
actions through the Qur’an and ḥadīth or relate it to his ideal political thought.65 While it is possible
for us to understand his emphasis that the status quo authority not be challenged after having come to
60
Ibid. “wa mu‘āwiya qad shābahā bi-l-mulk, wa laysa hunāka kādiḥā li-l-khilāfah…qult: fahādhā
yaqtaḍī anna shawb al-khilafā bi-l-mulk jā’iz…wa amma ahl al-bida‘ ka’al-mu‘tazila: fa-yufsiqūn
mu’āwiya bi-harb ‘alī, wa ghayr dhālik, binā’ ‘alā annahū fi’l kabīra.”
61
Ibid, 27-28. “wa amma idhā kānat khilāfa al-nubuwwa wājibah wa hiya maqdūrah, wa qad tarkta:
fatark al-wājib sabab li-l-dhamm wa-l-‘iqāb? thumma hal tarkuhā kabīrah aw saghīrah?”
62
This in reference to a massacre that occurred against the people of Madīnah during the rule of
Yazīd. Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-Sunna, 111: “wa-hādhā ḥaddatha bih (‘abdullāh) ibn ‘umar li-
abdullāh ibn muṭī‘ lammā khala‘ū amīr waqtihim yazīd ma‘a annahu kāna fīhi min al-ẓulm mā
kān…wa-fa‘ala bi-ahl al-ḥarrah umūr munkaratā.” Similar descriptions of Yazīd and Ibn
Taymiyya’s rebuke of his unconditional supporters as “people deserving of disparagement and
punishment” (mustaḥiqqīn li-l-dham wa-l-‘iqāb) can also be found in: Minhāj al-Sunna, vol. 4, 544.
63
Ibid, p. 585-586.
64
Ibid, 585. The editor of the book notes that this ḥadīth was narrated by Muslim in his Ṣahīh. It is
also worth noting that nowhere does Ibn Taymiyya examine the question of people widely viewed to
be Ḥussayn’s successor, ‘Abdullāh Ibn al-Zubayr, who successfully declared an autonomous state
(i.e., caliphate), and, by Ibn Taymiyya’s definition, would fall under someone who divided the
community—not to mention that most historical sources (e.g., al-Ṭabarī in Tārīkh Ṭabarī [History of
Ṭabarī]): Muḥammad Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (trans. G. R. Hawking), History of Tabari Vol. 17: The First
Civil War (New York: SUNY Press, 1996), esp. 1-99. Another important aspect to consider, is that
Ibn Taymiyyah entirely avoided discussion of Ibn Zubayr in Minhāj al-Sunna, possibly in order to
avoid calling Ibn al-Zubayr an outcast deserving of the death penalty (which is unlikely), or because
he was genuinely torn on the issue of the normative legitimacy of the Umayyad (and succeeding)
caliphates. The only place Ibn Taymiyya mentions Ibn Zubayr’s rebellion is in passing and without
providing any definitive stance besides perhaps using it as an example of oppression against Ibn
Zubayr and his supports: “The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, did not praise the Battle of
the Camel that took place…or the siege of Ibn Zubayr in Mecca”: Ibn Tamyiyya, Minhāj al-Sunna,
vol. 4, 532 (also see 545): “wa-li-hādhā lam yuthn al-nabiy sallā allāh 'alayhi wa sallam 'ala aḥad
bi-mā jarā min al-qitāl yawm al-jamal...wa-mā jarā bi-makka fī ḥisār ibn al-zubayr.”
65
Shahin, In Defense of Mu‘āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān.

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power due to explicit prophetic injunctions, the deliberate lack of attention paid to the legitimacy of a
usurping power does not at all fit Ibn Taymiyya’s normative political model. That is, the normative
model which requires obedience to the ruler and establishment of pure prophetic caliphate
contradicts the empirical reality: usurping, hybrid-caliphate regimes succeeding one-another.
Based on the textual evidence quoted above, there remains only one interpretation able to
account for the contexts of the conflicting statements. I argue that Ibn Taymiyya’s accepts a
caliphate-monarchy hybrid on two contextual constraints. The first is that Ibn Taymiyya is
constrained by his self-admitted acceptance of the caliphate in contradistinction to monarchy, which
is the position he arrives at through judicial reasoning. The second constraint is that he would be
contradicting the widely accepted Sunni doctrine of the legitimacy of Mu‘āwiya and Yazīd as
legitimate caliphs, were he to delegitimize them completely. However, Ibn Taymiyya’s
acknowledgement of the Umayyads as legitimate necessarily entails the acceptance of a caliphate-
monarchy hybrid as legally permissible (jā’iz). The way he manages to accept this position without
diminishing from his ideal, normative vision of pure caliphate, is by holding this position (of a
monarchy-caliphate mix) as a legitimate, but not the most legitimate position. That is to say, Ibn
Taymiyya, as cited above, delineates the existence of two judicial positions on the matter: one which
requires pure caliphate, and the other which accepts monarchy provided the sharī‘a is upheld by the
state. By holding that the monarchy-caliphate hybrid is not the most correct, but still an acceptable
opinion (i.e., non-heretical), he manages to both have the cake and eat it, as it were: he is able to
maintain the requirement of pure caliphate and delineate the various rulings and the distribution of
power it entails (his normative political thought), while at the same time considering various
monarchical regimes as legitimate so as to stay within the Sunni doctrine.

Conclusion
Ibn Taymiyya is a highly controversial and influential thinker among Muslims and non-
Muslims alike. With renewed calls for a prophetic caliphate – manifest in its most extreme form in
the likes of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – the question of how to implement Islamic law is a
major point of conflict in the Muslim world. While it is not possible to engage here with the various
interpretations and misinterpretations of Ibn Tamyiyya made by Muslim fundamentalist
organizations and ideologues, what I have attempted to do in this paper can further our understanding
of what exactly Ibn Taymiyya’s normative political thought entails, as well as how he viewed the
Muslim nation (umma) achieving this ultimate goal. There are a number of important findings that
can be discerned from this study. Firstly, I have established that Ibn Taymiyya’s method by which he
determined his ideal political model was strictly juridical and follows the tradition established by his
predecessors, including al-Ghazālī and al-Juwaynī, even if he held disagreements in their legal
methods and conclusions. Secondly, I have proposed a number of reasons explaining Ibn Taymiyya’s
cognitive discord vis-à-vis his reluctance to deem non-prophetic governance as completely
illegitimate, including contextual pressures such as identifying with the ‘Sunni orthodox’ creed
which could be questioned were he to declare the post-prophetic caliphate period as illegitimate.
Finally, I hope to have established indirectly that Ibn Taymiyya’s political thought was
nonetheless consistent in both rejecting vigilantism as well as undue pacifism. Ibn Taymiyya argues
that any Muslim state, despite their legitimacy in the eyes of God, may not be rebelled against; this
position explains why he remains apparently indifferent on the examples of rebellion in Islamic
history (in Minhāj al-Sunnah). On the other hand, he holds that it is necessary to hold the
government accountable to the application of Islamic law regardless of its legal legitimacy. Further
research must be conducted on cases in which the state refuses the uphold the most basic principles
of Islamic law and whether or not Ibn Taymiyya viewed rebellion permissible in these
circumstances. Understanding this position could shed light on the interpretation of contemporary
fundamentalist groups that justify violent rebellion against the state.

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