Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Bloomberg
JUNE 28, 2010
FX MARKET INSIGHTS
A REVIEW OF GLOBAL MACRO THEMES &
CURRENCY INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
MICHAEL R. ROSENBERG
?‐Year
8‐Year Downtrend
8‐Year Uptrend
5‐Year 7‐Year Downtrend
Downtrend Uptrend
Volume 5 No.2 Available on the Bloomberg at FXIP <go> <51> or FXMI <go>
1
Bloomberg FX Market Insights June 28, 2010
Overview ........................................................................................................... 3
G-4 ................................................................................................................... 9
China .............................................................................................................. 25
2
June 28, 2010 FX Market Insights Bloomberg
Overview
Figure 1 Figure 2
Long-Term Cycles in the Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate Euro PPP Over/Undervaluation
(1975-2010) (1975-2010)
1992 25% Euro 2008 30% Euro
Overvaluation Overvaluation
Possible
?‐Year Long‐Term
8‐Year Downtrend Path
8‐Year Uptrend
5‐Year 7‐Year Downtrend 2000
Downtrend Uptrend 30% Euro
Undervaluation
1985
50% Euro
Undervaluation
3
Bloomberg FX Market Insights June 28, 2010
Although the fundamental forces driving the euro in each Relatively tight fiscal policies in the Euro-area in the 1990s
of its major upswings or downswings have differed, it has also exerted downward pressure on the euro during that
been the thrust of the policy response to those funda- period (see Figure 6). European governments attempted
mentals that has determined the euro’s direction in each to rein in budgetary imbalances in order to satisfy
of those cycles. During the euro's slide over the 1992- Maastricht Treaty criteria in the run-up to monetary union
2000 period, structural rigidities in the Euro-area's labor (EMU), and in response, central banks in the Euro-area
and product markets contributed to significantly weaker felt compelled to pursue aggressively accommodative
GDP growth in the Euro-area relative to the U.S. (see monetary policies to offset the negative effects of fiscal
Figure 3). Indeed, U.S. productivity growth soared rela- consolidation.
tive to that of the Euro-area beginning in the mid-1990s
(see Figure 4) and that was one of the principal driving
forces pushing the euro lower during that period (see Fig-
ure 5).
Figure 3 Figure 4
U.S. and German Real GDP Growth U.S. and Euro-Area Productivity Growth
(1996-2000) (1991-2001)
Real GDP Growth (%) Productivity Growth Index (1991=100)
6 125
5
120
4
U.S. Tech Boom
3
115
1 110
0
105
-1
-2 100
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Figure 5 Figure 6
Euro-Area/U.S. Productivity Ratio and the Euro Euro-Area Budget Deficit and the Euro
(1987-2001) (1992-2003)
Euro-Area/U.S. Productivity Ratio US$/Euro Exchange Rate Euro-Area Budget Deficit (% of GDP) US$/Euro Exchange Rate
1.05 1.40 8 1.60
4
June 28, 2010 FX Market Insights Bloomberg
As a result, real short-term interest rates in the Euro- Part of the euro's problems today can be traced to the
area drifted lower over much of the 1990s, which contrib- outsized gains that it enjoyed versus the dollar over the
uted to the long-term decline in the euro's value (see Fig- 2000-08 period. The euro-dollar exchange rate rose from
ure 7). Thus, Europe's overall fiscal/monetary policy mix a low of 0.83 in October 2000 to a high of 1.60 in April
acted as a drag on the euro's value (see Figure 8). 2008, which represented a 30% overvaluation versus the
dollar at the euro’s peak. Such an extreme reading made
A strong case can be made that history might be repeat- the euro ripe for a corrective downside move.
ing itself in the present period. Euro-area growth is once
again lagging significantly behind the U.S., fiscal posi- For the most part, the rise in the euro-dollar exchange-
tions in the Euro-area are being tightened (particularly rate during the 2000-08 period was more a dollar than a
among the Euro-area periphery), and the ECB is pursu- euro phenomenon, as several U.S.-centric forces were at
ing an aggressively easy monetary policy stance, hoping work driving the dollar lower. For example, the U.S. cur-
to prevent Euro-area growth from slipping into negative rent-account deficit widened to a record high of 6.1% (see
territory. Just like in 1992-2000, this lethal (for a currency) Figure 9). Given that current-account imbalances of that
policy mix is once again exerting downward pressure on magnitude are widely considered to be unsustainable,
the euro's value. the market responded by driving the dollar sharply lower
to help correct the U.S. current-account shortfall.
Figure 7 Figure 8
Euro-Area Real Short-Term Interest Rates and the Euro Euro-Area 1992-2000 Monetary/Fiscal Policy Mix
(1992-2000) and Its Effect on the Euro
Euro-Area Real 3-Mo. Rate(%) US$/Euro Exchange Rate
6 1.60
Expansionary Restrictive
1.50 Monetary Policy Monetary Policy
1.40
4 Euro
1.30
Expansionary Ambiguous Appreciates
1.20 Fiscal Policy
1.10
2
1.00
Restrictive Euro Ambiguous
0.90
Fiscal Policy Depreciates
0 0.80
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Figure 9
U.S. Current Account as a Percent of GDP
(1970-2010)
2000‐08 Deterioration in U.S.
Current Account Balance
Source: Bloomberg
5
Bloomberg FX Market Insights June 28, 2010
In addition, the U.S. experienced persistently low or nega- The corrective move in the euro-dollar exchange rate since
tive real short-term interest rates—which are generally its July 2008 peak has already erased roughly two-thirds
negative for a currency—over much of the 2000-08 period of the euro's peak PPP overvaluation. We estimate that
(see Figure 10) as Federal Reserve policy was extremely the euro is still overvalued by around 9%-10% versus the
accommodative. Indeed, for much of the 2000-08 period, dollar and we think a strong case can be made for a
the Fed Funds rate setting was significantly below its further corrective slide in the euro's value, not just to our
prescribed Taylor Rule level (see Figure 11). euro-dollar PPP estimate of 1.12, but to perhaps 10%-
20% below fair value. We base this on several criteria.
Furthermore, the U.S. was at the epicenter of the 2007-
09 Global Financial Crisis and the dollar was heavily sold First, Euro-area GDP growth is once again lagging con-
as a result, particularly in the early stages of the crisis. siderably behind the U.S. and is expected to remain so
With the dollar heavily oversold in the summer of 2008, well into the future. As Figure 12 shows, the Euro-area
the euro found itself in the precarious position of being economy contracted more than the U.S. in 2009, despite
30% overvalued versus the dollar. the central role of the U.S. in the financial crisis. Further-
more, the U.S. is recovering at a faster pace than the
Euro-area in 2010 and consensus forecasts are calling
for a continuation of that pattern into 2011.
Figure 10 Figure 12
U.S. Real Short-Term Interest Rates U.S. and Euro-Area Real GDP Growth
(1980-2010) (2006-2009 and OECD Forecasts for 2010-11)
Three-Month T-Bill Rate less CPI (%) Real GDP Growth (%)
8 4
6 3
4 2
2
1
0
0
-1
-2
Persistently Low or Negative -2
-4 Real Three‐Month T‐Bill Rates
-3
-6
-4
-8
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-5
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010p 2011p
Source: Bloomberg U.S. Euro-Area
Source: OECD Economic Outlook
Figure 11
Taylor Rule Estimates of the Fed Funds Rate
(1990-2010)
$55‐$60 Billion
Deficits
Source: Bloomberg
6
June 28, 2010 FX Market Insights Bloomberg
Second, a weaker euro could help sustain Euro-area Third, while it remains the case that on an aggregate
growth in an environment of moderating global growth. basis the euro is presently overvalued by 9%-10%, a case
There are signs that world growth might be at risk of de- could be made that a number of Euro-area members might
celerating in the near future and that could undermine be suffering a greater loss in competitiveness than the
European exports, which have been the principal driver of 9%-10% PPP overvaluation estimate suggests. As Fig-
Euro-area growth. Indeed, the OECD's leading economic ure 16 shows, based on relative unit labor costs, Greece,
indicators for China and Brazil suggest that their growth Spain, Portugal, and Ireland are considerably less com-
cycles might be peaking (see Figures 13-14), and the petitive than Germany and France.
recent slippage in the Economic Cycle Research
Institute's weekly leading economic index suggests that Fourth, euro weakness might be needed to support growth
U.S. growth might slow in the months ahead as well (see at a time when Euro-area fiscal consolidation will likely
Figure 15). be restricting growth. Euro-area member countries, par-
ticularly in the periphery, are currently under pressure to
bring their budgetary balances closer to sustainable lev-
els.
Figure 13 Figure 14
OECD Leading Economic Indicator for China OECD Leading Economic Indicator for Brazil
(1990-2010) (1990-2010)
Signs of a
Slowdown
Signs of a
Slowdown
Figure 15 Figure 16
ECRI Leading Economic Indicator for the U.S. Euro-Member Real Effective Exchange Rates
(1990-2010) (1999=100)
REER Index (1999=100)
120
115
110
105
100
95
90
85
80
Germany France Greece Spain Portugal Ireland
7
Bloomberg FX Market Insights June 28, 2010
Fifth, although long-term interest rates are presently quite On the policy front, the Euro-area appears to be operat-
low in Germany, they are actually quite high in the case ing with far fewer degrees of freedom than the U.S. at the
of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain (see Figure 17). present time. GDP growth in the U.S. is running consid-
Those relatively high yields reflect the credit risk associ- erably faster than the Euro-area, plus the market appears
ated with the sovereign debt of the Euro-area periphery. especially concerned by the deterioration in the credit
Since high long-term interest rates in those countries will quality of peripheral Euro-area sovereign debt instruments.
act as a drag on GDP growth, a weaker euro would help The wide level in credit default swap spreads, despite the
to offset that drag. recent EU/IMF package, is evidence of such concern (see
Figure 18).
Finally, the Euro-area faces significant tail-risk looking
forward. While both ECB and consensus economic fore- Overall, the current sluggish pace of Euro-area growth,
casts call for positive Euro-area GDP growth in the fu- the relatively tight-fiscal/easy-monetary policy mix cur-
ture, the distribution of possible Euro-area economic out- rently being pursued in Europe, the rising risk premium
comes has a fat negative tail, reflecting the economic associated with Euro-area assets, and a still overvalued
and financial risks facing the global economy, and in par- euro are eerily reminiscent of the fundamental forces that
ticular, the Euro-area recovery. helped contribute to a weaker euro over the 1992-2000
period. It would thus appear that the ducks are lining up
Mohammed El-Erian of PIMCO likens the situation fac- for a repeat performance that could see the euro decline
ing Europe and the global economy as similar to driving a on a trend basis in the coming years.
car without a spare tire. Applying this analogy, global
policymakers used their spare tire (massive fiscal stimu- Michael R. Rosenberg (212) 617-3984
lus and near-zero interest rates) in 2008 and 2009 to deal mrosenberg10@bloomberg.net
with the economic and financial crisis during that period.
Unfortunately, the road ahead still appears to be rocky,
but this time around there’s no spare in the trunk if the
world economy gets another flat!
Figure 17 Figure 18
Euro-Member Long-Term Interest Rates Euro-Member Credit Default Swap Rates
(10-Year Government Bond Yields) (5-Year CDS Rates)
(%) (Basis Points)
12 1000
900
10
800
700
8
600
6 500
400
4
300
200
2
100
0 0
Germ any France Italy Spain Ireland Portugal Greece Germ any France Italy Spain Ireland Portugal Greece
Source: Bloomberg Source: Bloomberg
8
June 28, 2010 Financial Conditions Watch Bloomberg
U.S. Economic Outlook
U.S. Economic Indicator May-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10
9
Bloomberg Financial Conditions Watch June 28, 2010
EURUSDV1M BGN Index GP <go> ZCTO CDS EUR SR 5Y MSG1 Curncy GP<go>
10
June 28, 2010 Financial Conditions Watch Bloomberg
Euro-Area Economic Outlook
Euro-Area Economic IndicatorsMay-09Jun-09Jul-09Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10
11
Bloomberg Financial Conditions Watch June 28, 2010
Euro at a Glance
EURUSDV1M BGN Index GP <go> ZCTO CDS EUR SR 5Y MSG1 Curncy GP<go>
12
June 28, 2010 Financial Conditions Watch Bloomberg
Japan Economic Outlook
Japan Economic Indicators May-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10
13
Bloomberg Financial Conditions Watch June 28, 2010
14
June 28, 2010 Financial Conditions Watch Bloomberg
U.K. Economic Outlook
U.K. Economic Indicators May-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10
15
Bloomberg Financial Conditions Watch June 28, 2010
GBPUSDV1M BGN Index GP <go> UKT CDS USD SR 5Y MSG1 Curncy GP<go>
16
June 28, 2010 Financial Conditions Watch Bloomberg
Canada Economic Outlook
Canada Economic IndicatorsMay-09Jun-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10
17
Bloomberg Financial Conditions Watch June 28, 2010
18
June 28, 2010 Financial Conditions Watch Bloomberg
Australian Dollar at a Glance
AUDUSDV1M BGN Index GP <go> AUSTLA CDS USD SR 5Y MSG1 Curncy GP<go>
19
Bloomberg Financial Conditions Watch June 28, 2010
U.S. Dollar/New Zealand Dollar Exchange Rate New Zealand Short-Term Interest Rate
(Spot Rate) (Three-Month Deposit Rate)
New Zealand Dollar PPP % Over/Undervaluation New Zealand Dollar Cumulative Carry Return
(Based on Bloomberg’s Long-Term Averaging Methodology) (Long-NZ$/Short-US$ Carry Return)
New Zealand Dollar Implied Volatility New Zealand Credit Default Swap Spread
(One-Month Implied Volatility) (Five-Year CDS)
20
June 28, 2010 Financial Conditions Watch Bloomberg
Swiss Franc at a Glance
USDCHFV1M BGN Index GP <go> SWISS CDS USD SR 5Y MSG1 Curncy GP<go>
21
Bloomberg Financial Conditions Watch June 28, 2010
USDDKKV1M BGN Index GP <go> DENK CDS USD SR 5Y MSG1 Curncy GP<go>
22
June 28, 2010 Financial Conditions Watch Bloomberg
Norwegian Krone at a Glance
USDNOKV1M BGN Index GP <go> BODO CDS USD SR 5Y MSG1 Curncy GP<go>
23
Bloomberg Financial Conditions Watch June 28, 2010
USDSEKV1M BGN Index GP <go> SWED CDS USD SR 5Y MSG1 Curncy GP<go>
24
June 28, 2010 Financial Conditions Watch Bloomberg
China Economic Outlook
China Economic Indicators May-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10
25
Bloomberg Financial Conditions Watch June 28, 2010
26
June 28, 2010 FX Market Insights Bloomberg
27