Released: May 1, 2020

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________

1171151
____________________

Michael Moore, Wesley Farmer, and Briana DeBose

v.

City of Center Point and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court

(CV-18-900527)

BOLIN, Justice.

Michael Moore, Wesley Farmer, and Briana DeBose

(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs")

appeal from the Jefferson Circuit Court's dismissal of their

declaratory-judgment action challenging the Center Point

1171151

Automated Traffic Safety Act and the implementing City of

Center Point ordinance providing for the automated

photographic enforcement of red lights, stop signs, and speed

limits within the corporate limits of the City of Center Point

("the City") on constitutional and statutory grounds.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2013, the Alabama Legislature enacted Act No. 2013-

228, Ala. Acts 2013, a local act known as the "Center Point

Automated Traffic Safety Act" ("the Act"), which authorized

the automated photographic enforcement of traffic lights, stop

signs, and speed limits within the corporate limits of the

City. The Act became effective July 12, 2013. The

legislature found in § 2(b) of the Act that vehicles that

violate traffic-control regulations and signage within the

corporate limits of the City were a dangerous problem; that

automated traffic-camera enforcement was a highly accurate

method of detecting traffic-control violations and reducing

the number of traffic accidents, deaths, and injuries; that

current Alabama law provides that failing to stop at a

traffic-control signal and failing to abide by traffic signage

and speed limits were criminal misdemeanors; and that a

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reduction in the number of drivers exceeding speed limits and

running red lights and stop signs through a program using

photographic evidence and enforcement to impose civil fines

would promote and protect the health and welfare of the

citizens of the City.

Section 4 of the Act empowered the City to

"adopt an ordinance providing for the utilization by

the City or its designee of a photographic traffic
signal enforcement system, a photographic stop sign
enforcement system, and a photographic vehicle speed
enforcement system to detect and record traffic
signal violations, stop sign violations, and
speeding violations in the City, to issue notices of
civil violations by mail, and to collect fines for
the recorded traffic signal violations, stop sign
violations and speeding violations which may occur
within the corporate limits of the City as provided
in this act."

The legislature categorized a violation of the provisions of

the ordinance authorized by the Act as a "civil violation" and

made the penalty for such violation the payment of a civil

fine. § 3(3). Section 3(10) of the Act defined a speeding

violation as

"[a]ny violation of a motor vehicle at a speed that

exceeds the legal maximum speed limits set forth in
or adopted pursuant to Article 8, Chapter 5A, Title
32, Sections 32-5A-170 to 32-5A-178, inclusive, Code
of 1975, or of any combination thereof; provided,
however, that speed limits set by action of the
Center Point City Council, if any, shall supersede

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the limits set in Article 8, Chapter 5A, Title 32,

Sections 32-5A-170 to 32-5A-178, inclusive, Code of
Alabama 1975. A speeding violation shall be a civil
violation as defined in this act."

Section 3(12) of the Act defined a stop-sign violation as

"[a]ny violation of Section 32-5A-112, Code of

Alabama 1975, wherein a vehicle proceeds into an
intersection after failing to stop at a clearly
marked stop line. A stop sign violation shall be a
civil violation as defined in this act."

Section 3(14) of the Act defined a traffic-signal violation as

"[a]ny violation of Section 32-5A-31, Section 32-5A-

32, or Section 32-5A-35, Code of Alabama 1975, or of
any combination thereof, wherein a vehicle proceeds
into a signalized intersection at a time while the
traffic-control signal for that vehicle's lane of
travel is emitting a steady red signal. A traffic
signal violation shall be a civil violation as
defined in the act."

On October 22, 2015, the City adopted Ordinance No. 2015-

05 ("the ordinance"), which provided for the automated

traffic-camera enforcement of red lights, stop signs, and

speed limits within the corporate limits of the City through

the imposition of a civil penalty for those motorists

photographed violating traffic-control regulations.1 Section

1.1 of the ordinance states that the Center Point City Council

found that there was a high incidence of drivers "running" red

1
The language of the ordinance closely tracks the language
of the Act.
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lights and stop signs and violating speed limits; that

automated traffic-camera enforcement is an effective method

for detecting violations of traffic-control regulations and

for reducing the number of those violations and decreasing the

number of traffic accidents, deaths, and injuries; and that a

reduction in the number of violations of traffic-control

regulations through the use of automated photographic

enforcement and the imposition of civil liability would help

to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of

the City.

Section 2.1 of the ordinance categorized a violation of

the provisions of the ordinance as a "civil violation" and

imposed the payment of a civil fine as a penalty. The

definitions of a "speeding violation," a "stop sign

violation," and a "traffic signal violation" in the ordinance

are identical to the definitions of those terms in the Act.

Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the ordinance impose a $60 civil fine

for a traffic-signal violation and a stop-sign violation,

respectively. Section 3.3 of the ordinance imposes a civil

fine of between $60 and $160 for speeding violations,

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depending on the number of miles per hour the violator is

traveling over the speed limit.

Moore and Farmer allege that they were ticketed through

the use of the automated photographic equipment in 2017 for

running a red light within the corporate limits of the City.

DeBose alleges that she was ticketed through the use of the

automated photographic equipment in 2017 for not stopping at

a stop sign within the corporate limits of the City.

On February 6, 2018, the plaintiffs, individually and on

behalf of a putative class of individuals who had received

notice of violation pursuant to the Act, sued the City and

Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.2 (hereinafter referred to

collectively as "the defendants"), seeking, among other

things, a judgment declaring that the Act and the ordinance

are unconstitutional and violative of Alabama law. The

plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Act violated §§ 89,

104(14), and 105, Ala. Const. 1901. The plaintiffs further

sought a declaration that the ordinance violated §§ 11-45-1

and 32-5-1, Ala. Code 1975. Additionally, the plaintiffs

2
Redflex is the entity retained by the City responsible
for installing, maintaining, and monitoring the automated
photographic equipment.
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sought an order enjoining the City from ticketing individuals

through the use of automatic traffic-enforcement cameras and

a refund of all fines collected based on the use of the

automatic traffic-enforcement cameras.

On March 14, 2018, the defendants moved the trial court,

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss the

declaratory-judgment complaint against them, arguing that the

plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could

be granted.3 On May 8, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a response

in opposition to the motion to dismiss. On June 27, 2018, the

trial court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss,

holding, among other things, that neither the Act nor the

ordinance violated §§ 89, 104, and 105 of the Alabama

Constitution of 1901. This appeal followed.

3
The defendants dispute Moore's and Farmer's assertion
that they were cited for running a red light because, they
say, the City did not have any automated cameras monitoring
red lights within the corporate limits of the City. The
defendants stated that, for purposes of their motion to
dismiss, they would assume that Moore and Farmer had been
cited for running a stop sign. The defendants further
acknowledged in their motion to dismiss that, for purposes of
addressing the legal issues presented in this case, it did not
matter whether the plaintiffs were cited for running a red
light, running a stop sign, or speeding. This Court agrees
that, for purposes of addressing the issues presented by this
appeal, it does not matter whether the plaintiffs were cited
for running a red light, running a stop sign, or speeding.
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Standard of Review

This Court has stated the appropriate standard of review

for an appeal from an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss as follows:

"'On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a

presumption of correctness.... The appropriate
standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R.
Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the
complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's
favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any
set of circumstances that would entitle [the
pleader] to relief. ... In making this
determination, this Court does not consider whether
the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only
whether [the plaintiff] may possibly prevail. ... We
note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only
when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of the claim that
would entitle the plaintiff to relief.'"

Carr v. International Refining & Mfg. Co., 13 So. 3d 947, 952

(Ala. 2009) (quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299

(Ala. 1993)). Further,

"'[f]or a declaratory-judgment action

to withstand a motion to dismiss there must
be a bona fide justiciable controversy that
should be settled. Anonymous v. Anonymous,
472 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984);
Smith v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding
Co., 293 Ala. 644, 309 So. 2d 424, 427
(1975). The test for the sufficiency of a
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment is
whether the pleader is entitled to a
declaration of rights at all, not whether
the pleader will prevail in the

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declaratory-judgment action. Anonymous, 472

So. 2d at 641.

"'The lack of a justiciable

controversy may be raised by either a
motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary
judgment. Smith, [293 Ala. at 649,] 309 So.
2d at 427. See also Rule 12, Ala. R. Civ.
P.; Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. However, a
motion to dismiss is rarely appropriate in
a declaratory-judgment action. Wallace v.
Burleson, 361 So. 2d 554, 555 (Ala. 1978).
If there is a justiciable controversy at
the commencement of the
declaratory-judgment action, the motion to
dismiss should be overruled and a
declaration of rights made only after an
answer has been submitted and evidence has
been presented. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d at
641. However, if there is not a justiciable
controversy, a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim should be granted.
Curjel v. Ash, 263 Ala. 585, 83 So. 2d 293,
296 (1955).'

"Harper v. Brown, Stagner, Richardson, Inc., 873 So.

2d 220, 223 (Ala. 2003)."

Muhammad v. Ford, 986 So. 2d 1158, 1161-62 (Ala. 2007).

Discussion

The plaintiffs on appeal challenge the constitutionality

of the Act and the ordinance. However, we must first address

the threshold issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. This

Court has explained:

"'This Court has often said that, as

a general rule, it will not decide

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questions after a decision has become

useless or moot. Ex parte McFry, 219 Ala.
492, 122 So. 641 (1929); Byrd v. Sorrells,
265 Ala. 589, 93 So. 2d 146 (1957); Chisolm
v. Crook, 272 Ala. 192, 130 So. 2d 191
(1961); Jacobs Banking Company v. Campbell,
406 So. 2d 834 (Ala. 1981). Alabama courts
do not give opinions in which there is no
longer a justiciable controversy; yet,
Alabama has recognized two exceptions to
the mootness doctrine: questions of great
public interest and questions that are
likely of repetition of the situation. Byrd
v. Sorrells, supra, State ex rel. Eagerton
v. Corwin, 359 So. 2d 767 (Ala. 1977).
...'

"Arrington v. State ex rel. Parsons, 422 So. 2d 759,

760 (Ala. 1982).

"'"'A moot case or question is a case

or question in or on which there is no real
controversy; a case which seeks to
determine an abstract question which does
not rest on existing facts or rights, or
involve conflicting rights so far as
plaintiff is concerned.'" Case v. Alabama
State Bar, 939 So. 2d 881, 884 (Ala. 2006)
(quoting American Fed'n of State, County &
Mun. Employees v. Dawkins, 268 Ala. 13, 18,
104 So. 2d 827, 830–31 (1958)). "The test
for mootness is commonly stated as whether
the court's action on the merits would
affect the rights of the parties." Crawford
v. State, 153 S.W.3d 497, 501 (Tex. App.
2004) (citing VE Corp. v. Ernst & Young,
860 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993)). "A case
becomes moot if at any stage there ceases
to be an actual controversy between the
parties." Id. (emphasis added) (citing
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999)).

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1171151

"'"There must be a bona fide existing

controversy of a justiciable character to
confer upon the court jurisdiction to grant
declaratory relief under the declaratory
judgment statutes, and if there was no
justiciable controversy existing when the
suit was commenced the trial court had no
jurisdiction." State ex rel. Baxley v.
Johnson, 293 Ala. 69, 73, 300 So. 2d 106,
110 (1974). "'"Unless the trial court has
before it a justiciable controversy, it
lacks subject matter jurisdiction and any
judgment entered by it is void ab
initio."'" Sustainable Forests, L.L.C. v.
Alabama Power Co., 805 So. 2d 681, 683
(Ala. 2001) (quoting Hunt Transition &
Inaugural Fund, Inc. v. Grenier, 782 So. 2d
270, 272 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Ex
parte State ex rel. James, 711 So. 2d 952,
960 n. 2 (Ala. 1998)). "A moot case lacks
justiciability." Crawford, 153 S.W.3d at
501. Thus, "[a]n action that originally was
based upon a justiciable controversy cannot
be maintained on appeal if the questions
raised in it have become moot by subsequent
acts or events." Case, 939 So. 2d at 884
(citing Employees of Montgomery County
Sheriff's Dep't v. Marshall, 893 So. 2d
326, 330 (Ala. 2004)).

"'"'The lack of a justiciable

controversy may be raised either by a
motion to dismiss, Rule 12, [Ala. R. Civ.
P.], or a motion for summary judgment.'"
Hornsby v. Sessions, 703 So. 2d 932, 937
(Ala. 1997)(quoting Smith v. Alabama Dry
Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 293 Ala. 644, 649,
309 So. 2d 424, 427 (1975)). Indeed, "[i]t
is well settled that lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction can be raised at any time by
the parties or by the court ex mero motu."
Ex parte V.S., 918 So. 2d 908, 912 (Ala.

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2005). "'"[I]f there is an absence of

jurisdiction over ... the subject matter,
a court has no power to act, and
jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot
be created by waiver or consent."'" Id.
(quoting Flannigan v. Jordan, 871 So. 2d
767, 768 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn
Norton v. Liddell, 280 Ala. 353, 356, 194
So. 2d 514, 517 (1967)). A court without
subject-matter jurisdiction "'may take no
action other than to exercise its power to
dismiss the action .... Any other action
... is null and void.'" State v. Property
at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025,
1029 (Ala. 1999) (quoting Beach v. Director
of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996))....'

"Chapman v. Gooden, 974 So. 2d 972, 983–84 (Ala.

2007). ...

"A declaratory-judgment action may be rendered

moot.

"'Declaratory-judgment actions in
Alabama are governed by the Declaratory
Judgment Act, codified at §§ 6–6–220
through –232, Ala. Code 1975 ("the Act").
The Act does not "'empower courts to decide
moot questions, abstract propositions, or
to give advisory opinions, however
convenient it might be to have these
questions decided for the government of
future cases.'" Stamps v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 642 So. 2d 941, 944 (Ala.
1994) (quoting Town of Warrior v. Blaylock,
275 Ala. 113, 114, 152 So. 2d 661, 662
(1963))(emphasis added in Stamps). Pursuant
to § 6–6–226, declaratory relief may be
afforded in cases "in which a judgment will
terminate the controversy or remove the
uncertainty," but § 6–6–229 emphasizes the

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corollary that "[t]he court may refuse to

enter a declaratory judgment where such
judgment, if entered, would not terminate
the uncertainty or controversy giving rise
to the proceeding."'

"Bruner v. Geneva County Forestry Dep't, 865 So. 2d

1167, 1175 (Ala. 2003). See also Hunt Transition &
Inaugural Fund, Inc. v. Grenier, 782 So. 2d 270, 272
(Ala. 2000) ('For a court to grant declaratory
relief, it must have before it a bona fide,
presently existing justiciable controversy that
affects the legal rights or obligations of the
parties.'); VanLoock v. Curran, 489 So. 2d 525, 531
(Ala. 1986) ('Indeed, moot questions are not
properly the subject of declaratory judgment
actions.' (citing City of Mobile v. Scott, 278 Ala.
388, 178 So. 2d 545 (1965)))."

Underwood v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 39 So. 3d 120, 127–28

(Ala. 2009). The parties have not addressed the

justiciability of the issues presented. Because a trial court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction if there is no justiciable

controversy, we address ex mero motu the justiciability of the

issues presented here.

Section 6(a) of the Act states that "[a]n Administrative

Hearing Officer appointed by the Mayor of the City is vested

with the power and jurisdiction to conduct administrative

hearings of civil violations provided for in this act."

Section 6(b) of the Act provides:

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"A person who receives a notice of violation may

contest the imposition of the fine by submitting a
request for an administrative hearing of the civil
violation, in writing, within 15 days of the 10th
day after the date the notice of violation is
mailed."

Section 6(c) of the Act states that "[f]ailure to pay a fine

or to contest liability in a timely manner is an admission of

liability in the full amount of the fine assessed in the

notice of violation." Section 7(c) provides:

"A person who is found liable after an

administrative hearing may challenge that finding of
civil liability in the Jefferson County Circuit
Court, by filing a petition for judicial review with
the Jefferson County Circuit Court. The petition for
judicial review must be filed not later than the
14th day after the date on which the Administrative
Hearing Officer entered the finding of civil
liability. The filing of a petition for judicial
review shall stay the enforcement of the fine.
After a petition for judicial review has been filed,
civil liability will be determined by the circuit
court by trial de novo pursuant to the jurisdiction
granted in Section 12-11-30, Code of Alabama 1975."

Section 6.1 of the ordinance states that, "[p]ursuant to

the Act, the Mayor shall appoint an Administrative Hearing

Officer vested with the power and jurisdiction to conduct

administrative hearings of Civil Violations provided for in

the Act and this ordinance." Section 6.2 of the ordinance

provides that "[a] person who receives a notice of violation

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may contest the imposition of the fine by submitting a request

for an administrative hearing of the Civil Violation, in

writing, within 15 days of the 10th day after the date the

notice of violation is mailed." Section 6.3 of the ordinance

states that "[f]ailure to pay a Fine or to contest liability

in a timely manner is an admission of liability in the full

amount of the Fine assessed in the notice of violation."

Section 7.1 of the ordinance provides:

"A person who is found liable after an

administrative hearing may challenge that finding of
Civil Liability in the Jefferson County Circuit
Court, by filing a petition for judicial review with
the Jefferson County Circuit Court as provided in
Section [7] of the Act. The petition for judicial
review must be filed not later than the 14th day
after the date on which the Administrative Hearing
Officer entered the finding of Civil Liability. The
filing of a petition for judicial review shall stay
the enforcement of the Fine. After a petition for
judicial review has been filed, Civil Liability will
be determined by the Circuit Court by trial de novo
pursuant to the Act...."

In Woodgett v. City of Midfield, [Ms. 1180051, May 1,

2020] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2020) -- a case involving a very

similar act and ordinance, the opinion in which we are

releasing simultaneously with this opinion -- this Court

concluded that the acceptance of liability under an automated

camera-enforcement act and ordinance by payment of the civil

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violation, without asserting a challenge to the act and

ordinance within the time or in the manner provided for in the

act and ordinance, settled the matter of the civil violation

and mooted the controversy between the parties, which could

not then be revived by filing a declaratory-judgment action

challenging the act and ordinance. This Court held that,

because a justiciable controversy no longer existed between

the parties, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the

plaintiffs' subsequently filed declaratory-judgment action

challenging the act and ordinance. City of Midfield, supra.

Here, the plaintiffs received notices of civil violations

under the Act and the ordinance sometime in 2017. It does not

appear from the record, and the parties have not asserted,

that the plaintiffs paid the fines assessed or that they

challenged the Act and the ordinance within the time and

manner provided for in the Act and the ordinance. The

plaintiffs filed their declaratory-judgment action on February

6, 2018. Based on this Court's reasoning in City of Midfield,

we conclude that no justiciable controversy existed between

the parties at the time the plaintiffs filed their

declaratory-judgment action; thus, the trial court lacked

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subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter. Although the

plaintiffs in this case did not accept liability under the Act

and the ordinance by paying the fines and thus settling the

matter between the parties, the plaintiffs accepted liability

under the Act and the ordinance by failing to challenge their

liability within the time and in the manner provided for in

the Act and the ordinance. See § 6(c) of the Act and § 6.3 of

the ordinance quoted supra, which provide that the failure to

pay a the fine or to contest liability in a timely manner is

an admission of liability under the Act and the ordinance. As

was the case in City of Midfield, the plaintiffs' acceptance

of liability under the Act and the ordinance settled the

matter and mooted the controversy between the parties.

Because there was no justiciable controversy between the

parties at the time the declaratory-judgment action was filed,

the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and the

trial court properly dismissed the action. City of Midfield,

supra; Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So. 2d 303, 307 (Ala. 2004)

("'"Lacking subject matter jurisdiction [a court] may take no

action other than to exercise its power to dismiss the action

.... Any other action taken by a court lacking subject matter

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jurisdiction is null and void."'" (quoting State v. Property

at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Ala. 1999),

quoting in turn Beach v. Director of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 315,

318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996))).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing

the plaintiffs' declaratory-judgment action.

AFFIRMED.

Bryan, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., concur.

Parker, C.J., and Mendheim, J., concur in the result.

Shaw, Wise, and Mitchell, JJ., recuse themselves.

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