Backgrounder

Sudan's Fractured Internal Politics

Authors: Toni Johnson, Senior Staff Writer, Stephanie Hanson

Updated: October 7, 2010

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Introduction

For the past several years, significant U.S. attention has been focused on the crisis in Sudan's Darfur
region, in which roughly three hundred thousand have died and nearly three million have been displaced.
Meanwhile, continued violence in South Sudan--along with uneven implementation of the fragile peace
brought by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and an impending 2011 referendum on
allowing South Sudan to break away--raises fears that the country's civil strife will expand to disastrous
levels. The country's major opposition parties boycotted Sudan's presidential election scheduled in April
2010--part of the first multi-party general elections in twenty-four years--citing concerns of irregularities in
voter registration and insecurity in Darfur (SudanTribune).With much of the opposition boycotting,
controversial President Omar al-Bashir received 68 percent of more than 10 million valid ballots and won
another five year term.

U.S. foreign policy has treated Darfur and South Sudan as separate issues. But experts say both
situations can be traced to Khartoum's central government, which has historically maintained control of
the country's periphery through divide-and-rule policies. There is wide disagreement about the best policy
course for the United States to pursue in Sudan, but analysts agree that any effective policy will have to
consider Sudan's internal politics and the center's relationship with its periphery.

Khartoum and its Periphery

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, approximately the size of Western Europe. Since its independence
in 1956, it has been roiled by civil war almost continuously. This war was initially between northern Sudan
and the south, which objected to its isolation and lack of development relative to the north. Following the
military coup that brought Bashir to power in 1989, his National Congress Party (NCP) spurred an Islamist
revolution that empowered the center's security and business interests at the expense of rural areas.

In response, groups from each peripheral area of Sudan entered conflict with the central government.
Although a series of agreements have been enacted to patch relations between the government and
these periphery territories--the CPA, the Darfur Peace Agreement, and the East Sudan Peace
agreement--"all suffer from lack of implementation," according to a 2009 briefing paper from the
International Crisis Group. The government maintains that peripheral areas in the south were
underdeveloped because of the long civil war.

In a 2009 article for International Affairs, Sudan expert Alex de Waal says insight into these conflicts
requires an understanding of Sudan's "political marketplace" (PDF), in which provincial leaders bargain
with Khartoum for the price of their loyalty. Each time they start a new round of negotiations with the
government, they launch "a targeted assault on the economic and human assets of the metropolitan
elites," he writes. For example, a group might attack a merchant or army outpost as a way of drawing
attention and demanding that the government bargain with it. The government usually retaliates with
another act of violence, de Waal writes, and then the two sides will settle, or the violence escalates. The
regions with ongoing conflicts are as follows:

•Darfur. In February 2003, rebels from the western Darfur region of Sudan launched an uprising and
demanded equal representation in the government and improved infrastructure in the region. The
government retaliated by sending armed Arab militias, known as janjaweed, to target the villages of the
rebel groups. In February and March 2010, the government signed separate tentative peace deals with
two of Darfur's major opposition groups (SudanTribune), the Justice and Equality Movement and the
Liberation and Justice Movement. Yet continued clashes between rebel forces and the government and
disagreements over the power-sharing and election process have put the ceasefire in jeopardy.

•Southern Sudan. Southern Sudan, which holds roughly 85 percent of Sudan's oil, fought to achieve
independence from 1955 to 1972, and again from 1983 until 2005. In its second iteration, the war in the
south was fought by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which gained political legitimacy under
the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and become known as the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM). The CPA gave the oil-rich south autonomy for six years, to be followed by a January
2011 referendum on secession, and there are indications the south will overwhelmingly vote to separate.
In an April 2010 election, Salva Kiir was elected president of Sudan's semi-autonomous south, paving the
way for the referendum. But continuing conflict between the north and south could jeopardize the vote.

•Southern Kordofan. Created by the CPA, this new state straddles the border area between north and
south. It has fertile land for agriculture and the only proven oil reserves in northern Sudan. It is also one of
the poorest states in the country. During the north-south war, Southern Kordofan was a critical
battleground. The CPA has a special protocol related to the region, but its neglect has led to "insecurity
and growing dissatisfaction," according to an International Crisis Group briefing on South Kordofan from
2008. The briefing says the state's inhabitants "are armed and organized, and feel increasingly
abandoned by their former patrons, who have not fulfilled their promise to provide peace dividends."
Experts note that if there is to be war between the south and Khartoum, it is likely to start in Southern
Kordofan. And humanitarian experts are particularly concerned about the appointment of Ahmed Harun
as the region's governor, since he is wanted internationally for war crimes in Darfur.

•Eastern Sudan. Fighting erupted in northeastern Sudan in 2005 between the Eastern Front, a group of
rebels, and government troops. Rebels signed a peace deal with the central government in 2006.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Is Not Comprehensive

Experts agree that Sudan will not be a stable state until inequalities between the center and the periphery
are addressed, but they differ on whether the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement facilitates or
hinders that process. The CPA has been criticized for being nothing more than a bilateral deal between
the north's ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the south's SPLM that excludes other conflict-ridden
parts of the country, such as Darfur. But the negotiators from the south believe the CPA is "a panacea for
other problems in Sudan," according to Omer Ismail, a Sudanese policy fellow at Harvard's Kennedy
School of Government. The International Crisis Group asserts that "the CPA is the linchpin for peace
throughout Sudan--[and] Darfur must be resolved within this context."

Resolving conflict in [Sudan's] periphery will require resolving land problems, particularly in areas like
Darfur, where massive displacement has complicated ownership issues.

Though the CPA excludes actors in large peripheral areas such as Darfur and eastern Sudan, it does call
for state restructuring that could address what is viewed by many provinces as the central government's
excessive power. Edward Thomas, writing in a January 2009 report for UK-based think tank Chatham
House, calls it "the most important political framework in Sudan." Its provisions on power-sharing, wealth-
sharing, land, and elections "still offer Sudan an alternative to permanent crisis, fragmentation, or
breakdown," he adds. Ismail cautions, however, that clauses applying to the entire country are much
vaguer than those that apply specifically to the south.

The elements of the CPA that affect the whole of Sudan include:

•Elections. The CPA had called for general elections before mid-2009, with the aim of replacing appointed
politicians with elected officials. Elections are meant to include state governors, state assemblies, the
presidencies of northern and southern Sudan, the National Assembly in Khartoum, and the Legislative
Assembly of southern Sudan. After several rounds of postponements, in part over a dispute over the
country-wide census, general elections were held in Sudan from April 11-15, 2010. Various independent
organizations, including Human Rights Watch and the Rift Valley Institute, published detailed accounts of
the elections, citing abuses such as widespread intimidation against opponents and the manipulation of
electoral districts.

•Wealth-sharing. The CPA calls for the distribution of a greater share of oil revenues to the south, but it
also commits to development funds that invest in conflict-affected areas, and the transfer of more
resources to states. According to the World Bank, the percentage of government expenditures distributed
by states rose from 8 percent in 2000 to 35 percent in 2007. The north and south have begun splitting the
revenues from southern oil fields. However, there are questions about whether Khartoum is
underreporting total revenues from these fields. Also in question is whether revenue sharing will continue
in the case of the south's independence.

•Land. The CPA is supposed to establish a National Land Commission to resolve the multiple legal
regimes for land ownership--but it has not yet been created. In some areas, the state leases tribal lands,
while in others, ownership is market-based. Experts say resolving conflict in the periphery will require
resolving land problems, particularly in areas like Darfur, where massive displacement has complicated
ownership issues. Khartoum and the People's Liberation Movement have used international arbitrators to
decide control over disputed lands, especially in contentious southern regions surrounding oil fields and
the Nile oil pipeline. In July 2009, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, based at The Hague, granted the
southern region of Abyei to the Khartoum government (al-Jazeera). Such decisions are temporary; they
only hold until the referendum decides whether Abyei will remain within northern Sudan or join the south
which will simultaneously vote on its own independence. The region's powerful Missiriya tribe, who spend
months each year grazing cattle in Abyei, have threatened war with anyone who interferes with their
voting in the January referendum (Reuters).

Continued delays and neglect of the CPA raise serious questions about how much of the agreement can
be executed before 2011, when southern Sudan can hold a referendum on its independence. A March
2010 report from the Enough Project, an anti-genocide advocacy group, notes "the current environment
remains incredibly fluid (PDF), and anything could happen before the expiration date on the CPA's official
'interim period' at the end of July 2011."

Searching for Stability in Sudan

The United States was instrumental in the negotiation of the CPA, but since then has focused on the
crisis in Darfur. In 2008, some analysts began to call for an "all Sudan" policy that examined both the
problems of CPA implementation and the crisis in Darfur. On October 19, 2009, the U.S. State
Department announced a new U.S. policy on Sudan that seeks engagement with the Sudanese
government to end atrocities in Darfur, implement the CPA, and prevent Sudan from becoming a haven
for terrorism. Reviews of the Obama administration policy have been mixed. Ray Walser, a policy analyst
at the Heritage Foundation, wrote that a "soft U.S. approach that curries favor with the present regime in
Khartoum will permit those wedded to absolute power and unafraid of committing genocide to continue
perpetuating tyranny and terror over the people of Sudan indefinitely." But CFR Senior Fellow John
Campbell called the policy "a positive development" and said engagement is a necessary part of
diplomacy.

In remarks on the fifth anniversary of the CPA in January 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
emphasized that the situation in Darfur must be seen in tandem with the CPA. "Threats to progress are
real, reform of key institutions has been sporadic, and true democratic transformation--envisioned in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement--remains elusive," Clinton said in a statement. In response to the
Clinton speech, John Prendergast, cofounder of the Enough Project, says the Obama administration
should do more to get both sides to meet the commitments under the CPA.

In September 2010, the United States dispatched Special Envoy Scott Gration to the region to offer new
incentives to the government in Khartoum to encourage a smooth referendum process (AP) including
restoration of full diplomatic relations with the United States. The visit preceded President Obama's
attendance at a UN-organized summit on Sudan, which focused on the upcoming January referendum.
Participants stressed the importance of ensuring that the referendum occurs as scheduled.
But experts note that the International Criminal Court's investigation of Bashir, which resulted in an
indictment in March 2009, has put the NCP on the defensive. Many government officials now spend much
of their time trying to figure out how to handle the ICC, to the detriment of work on the CPA. "The NCP
badly wants [2010] elections to go ahead in order to re-legitimize its rule and protect Bashir from the
International Criminal Court's arrest warrant issued against him earlier this year," International Crisis
Group's François Grignon wrote in late 2009 (Reuters).

A few experts suggest that there is little the United States can do to affect the political situation in Sudan.
They argue that Sudan's internal political upheaval--the weakening and fragmenting NCP, the changing
aims of Southern Sudan, the ongoing conflict in Darfur--can only be resolved by a domestic political deal
that has buy-in from all relevant parties. The Kennedy School's Ismail, who grew up in Darfur, suggests
that the "CPA needs to be revisited and other regions need to be included."

The Potential Split

Many experts believe the south will vote for secession if a referendum is held. A 2009 U.S. Institute of
Peace Report on scenarios for the secession referendum predicts large-scale political violence (PDF) as
a likely outcome. Another 2009 report, from the Netherland Institute for International Relations, on
scenarios for Sudan in 2012 notes that even if the north and south separate peacefully, each region is
likely to face internal conflicts (PDF). And Refugees International notes that donor states are not doing
enough to prepare for the potential breakup of Sudan, especially the kind of aid southern Sudan will need
to meet the needs of its people.

However, Payton Knopf, CFR's International Affairs Fellow in Residence, argues that the United States
and other nations must realistically assess the possibility that Sudan will be ready for the January
referendum. He suggests that international participants in the Sudan peace process "must also, without
inadvertently encouraging northern obstructionism, begin to develop alternative scenarios through quiet
discussions with the parties."

With the threat of renewed civil conflict looming large in the months leading up to the scheduled
referendum on southern secession, Katherine Almquist outlines the possible triggers for outright civil war
in Sudan and discusses U.S. policy options for the prevention and/or mitigation of such conflict in this
Center for Preventative Action Contingency Planning Memorandum. Almquist, a senior fellow for security
and development, concludes that U.S.-led international support for self-determination should be
unambiguously affirmed without prejudice toward unity, and that it must be backed by preparations to
recognize and assist an independent southern Sudan.

Corrine Baldwin and Caitlin O'Connell contributed to this report.