1. Vergara, Sr. v Hon.

Suelto - Gr L-74766 December 21 1987

Facts:

 Petitioner Vergara commenced in the MTC an action for illegal Detainer

 his complaints alleged that he was:
o Owner of a commercial building consisting of 3 sections that were separately occupied by
the defendants
o defendants lease contracts 2 of which were written were on a month to month basis
o defendants defaulted in the payment for several months
o because of the default vergaras atty sent them a letter demanding payment and terminating
the lease
o defendants sent vergara a letter confirming their verbal agreement to leave said premises
 Later however the defendants wrote vergara another letter that announced their refusal to
leave the said premises on the ground that the land on which the building stood was part of a
tract of land which had been ordered reverted to the public domain by the RTC.
 proceedings before the office of the Barangay Cpatain controversy was not settled he instituted
an ejectment suit
 On the date of March 7, 1986 vergara filed a motion for summary judgement. the motion was
verfied and had supporting documents
 against this motion defendants filed an opposition to motions for summary judgment and
motion to dismiss
 defendants argued that:
 a genuine issue exists which cannot be resolved by mere summary judgment
 the incidents were resolved by the respondent judge. the first order denied the defendants
motion to dismiss
 the second order denied vergara's motion for summary judgment

Issue:

W/N the summary judgment is a proper remedy in the case at bar?

Held:

 Yes
 defendants answer appear on its face to tender issues. but the issues thus tender are a sham,
not genuine, as the slightest reflection and anyalysis was readily demonstarte
 the defendants denial of their personal circumstances, as these are stated in the complaint, is
obviously a sham
  their disavowal of the plaintiff's ownership of the building by them, and also that the building is
composed of 3 sections, also cannot be genuine. they had each been occupying those 3 sections
for years and have been paying retals. their answer contains their admission that the plaintiff
has title ovr the land. there are 2 written contracts proving these.
 also patenntly sham is their professed ignorance of the joint letter sent by them to the plaintiff
under date of December 6, 1985. It should be noted that they have not denied writing or
sending the letter. what they say is that "they have no knowledge or information to form the
belief" this is ridiculous.
 their denial of ever having paid rentals is ridiculous
 under the circumstances herein set forth, the fitness and propriety of a summary judgment
cannot be disputed.
 no genuine issue having been tendered by the defendants, judgment should be directed as
matter of right in the plaintiffs favor.

2. Producers bank of the Philippines v. CA Gr No 126620 April 17,2002

Facts:

 March 29, 1988 petitioner through its former counsel, Atty. Antonio M. Pery filed a compaint to
recover the sum of P11,420,000.00 From Asia Trust Development Bank. Before the RTC.
Petitioner then filed an ammended complaint, impeading additional defendants.
 Petitioner sought to recover the proceeds of several treasury bills amounting to P11,420,000.00
according to petitioner, said proceeds were fraudulently credited.
 The defendants filed their respective answers, after which the issues were joined and trial on
the merits ensued.
 On August 30, 1993, the law firm of Quisumbling, Torres and Evangelista entered its appearance
for petitioner in substitution of Atty. Antonio M. Pery.
 Petitioner’s handling counsel, Atty. Alvin Agustin T. Ignacio of QTE arrived late during the
hearing held on May 17, 1995. On motion of Asiatrust’s counsel, the RTC issued an Order on the
same day dismissing the case for lack of interest to prosecute.
 On June 9, 1995, Atty. Ignacio filed a motion to reconsider the Order explaining that his late
arrival at the hearing was due to the unexpected heavy traffic at Roxas Boulevard. He also
offered his apologies to the RTC for his unintended tardiness received a copy of the order dated
August 11, 1995. At the time, Atty. Ignacio was indisposed for allegedly suffering from “fatigue
and stress”. It was only on August 25, 1995 that Atty. Ignacio found out that the Order denying
the motion for reconsideration was received by the law firm on August 11, 1995. He filed a
Notice of Appeal on August 25,1995
 On November 13, 1995, Asiatrust, et. al. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the Court of
Appeal. On March 8, 1995, QTE filed its comment to the Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
 In the Resolution dated September 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals granted the motion to dismiss
petitioner’s appeal.
 Court of Appeals held the failure of plaintiff-appellant to file the Notice of Appeal on time
inexcusable negligence. These are the reasons:
One, plaintiff-appellant states that “On 11 August 1995 at 3:00 pm, plaintiff-appellant
received a copy of the order dated 1 August 1995 denying its motion for reconsideration of the
dismissed order”. Since, the last day for plaintiff-appellant to file the Notice of Appeal was
August 12, 1995 why did it not file the Notice of Appeal right away considering that its
preparation and mailing could not take two hours? If counsel for plaintiff-appellant did not take
advantage of the two remaining office hours on August 11, 1995, why did it not file the Notice of
Appeal at any time, the following day?
Two, if the counsel for plaintiff-appellant did not know that the last day to file the Notice
of Appeal was on August 12, 1995, why did it not ask the handling lawyer about it? There was no
impediment to do that because the handling layer was not comatose. The counsel was
inexcusably negligent for failing to make that inquiry.
Three, the handling lawyer knew that if the Motion for reconsideration would be denied
– as in fact it was – he would have only a day after receipt of the order of denial to file a notice
of appeal. Did he not his law firm about such fact so that even in his absence, the latter could file
said notice?
 The inexcusable negligence of plaintiff-appellant’s counsel is made more glaring by the fact that
the Notice of Appeal was late not 0nly by 2 or 4 days but all of 13 days.
 We are not unaware of the rule that technically should not smother the right of a litigant to a
day in court. But the Supreme Court instruct us that strict adherence to reglementary periods
fixed in the Rules of Court is necessary to ensure the efficient and orderly disposition of cases.
 RESPONDENT COURTS OF APPEALS IN FINDING THAT THE ACTS PETITIONERS PREVIOUS
COUNSEL SHOULD BIND THE PETITIONER, DESPTE THE FINDINGS IN ITS RESOLUTION THAT THE
LAW FIRM COUNSEL WAS GROSSLY AND INEXCUSABY NEGLIGENT.
 Petitioner argues that a client should not be bound by counsel’s gross and inexcusable
negligence. Petitioner admits that its handling counsel, committed two bundles: first, he failed
to arrive on time during one of the hearing allegedly due to the traffic at Roxas Boulevard in
front of Baclaran Church; second, he failed to file the notice of appeal within reglementary
period due to “fatigue and stress”.
 Petitioner enumerates the similarities between the Legarda case and its own, as follows:
First, like the petitioner in the Legarda case, petitioner herein was not negligent in
choosing a counsel. Former engaged the services of former law school dean, while that latter
engaged the service of the well and known reputable law firm. Diligence of petitioner can be
shown by the fact that it even replaced it’s first counsel Atty. Antonio Pery in favor of
Quisumbing, hoping that by hiring the services of that law firm tha case would be handled
better.
Second, just like in the case of Legarda, the previous counsel of the petitioner
committed two bundlers.
Third, in both cases the Court of appeals has found that both counsels committed Court
negligence. The only difference would be that in the case of Legarda, the Court of Appeals only
held that there was only pure and simple negligence. while in the case at bar, the Court of
 Appeals found that there was gross and inexcusable negligence on the part of Quisumbling
Torres and Evangelista Law Firm.

ISSUE:
Within petitioner should be bound by the negligence of his course.

RULING:
 Petitioner is bereft of merit. We uphold the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of appeals
general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique. Exception to his rule is when the negligence of counsel in the realm of
reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. In which case, the
remedy then is to reopen the case and allow the party who was denied his day in court to
adduce his evidence. However, a thorough review of the instant case reveals that petitioner
cannot refuge or obtain reprieve under these principles of law:
Legarda case is not applicable
 Legarda case Court declared that petitioner’s counsel, committed not just ordinary or
simple negligence, but reckless and gross negligence which deprived the client of her
property without due process of law.
 Was so gross and inexcusable that it should not bind his client. However, the decision in
said case was not yet final in 1991. It is, however, basic that as long as a party was given
an opportunity to defend her interest in due course, she cannot be said to have been
denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process.
 No denial of Due Process
 So long as a party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due
course, it cannot said that there was denial of due process. In petitioner’s case as in the Legarda
case, the chronology of events shows that the case took its regular course in the trial court.
 On December 8, 1992, petitioner presented its first witness, he was cross-examined by CBP.
 On March 1, 1993, petitioner presented its second witness
 Upon said dismissal, petitioner’s counsel filed a timely motion for reconsideration. The same
was denied. However, it must be emphasized that petitioner was not left without any relief.
Upon the denial, the situation could have been easily remedied by filling a notice of appeal
within the reglementary.
 As correctly pointed, all that is required is a singled-paged, pro-forma notice of appeal, the
accomplishment of which does not require a high degree of legal skill. Despite this, counsel
failed to file its notice of appeal on time.
 Indeed, by failing to file its appeal within the reglementary period, it could not be successfully
argued that petitioner was deprived of its day in court.
 Time and again it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and
accordance with the provisions of the law.
 Counsel for petitioner committed simple negligence
 We also find that the negligence of the law firm engaged by the petitioner to litigate its cause
was not gross but simple negligence. Petitioner capitalizes on the following “blunders” to
establish gross negligence: (1) arriving late during the hearing (2) filing notice of appeal (13) days
late. Tardiness is plain and simple negligence. Counsel’s failure to file the notice of appeal within
the reglementary period did not deprive petitioner of due process of law.
  We also do not miss the fact that petitioner were represented by a law firm which meant that
any of its member could lawfully act as their counsel during the trial. When a client employs the
services of a law firm, he does not employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to
personally handle the case. Rather, he employs the entire law firm. In the event that the ciunsel
appearing for the client resigns, the firm is bound to provide a replacement. Petitioner cannot
now complain of counsel’s errors. Litigants, represented by counsel, should not expect
especially that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.
 No justifiable reason to excempt petitioner from the general rule that clients should “suffer the
consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of the counsel whom they
themselves hired and had the full authority to fire at any time and replace with another even
without any justifiable reason.
 This is not a case where the negligence of counsel is one is that is so gross, palpable, pervasive
and reckless which is the type of negligence that deprives a party of his or her day in court.
 The Court is bound by the trial court’s judgment which had become final and executory due to
the simple negligence of the petitioner’s counsel in allowing the reglementary period to lapse
without perfecting the appeal.
 No reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals, petition DENIED.

3. Monterey Foods Corp v. Victorino E. Eserjose GR.No, 153126 Sept 11,2003

4. Republic v. CA GR.No.L-31303-04 April 17,2002
5. Spouses Shem G. Alfarero v. Spouses Petra and Sancho Sevilla GR.No.142974 Sept 22,2003
6. Antonio Navarro v. Metro bank GR No. 138031 May 27,2004

Facts:
 On November
7. Madrigal Transport, Inc v. Lapanday Holdings Corp GR.No 156067 Aug 11,2004
8. Domingo Neypes v. CA GR 141524 Sept 14,2005
9. Donato Sumaway v. Urban Bank,Inc. Gr 142534 June 27,2006
10. Adalia B. Francisco v. Hon Benigno M. Puno GR. L-55694

11. Corazon L. Escueta v Rufina Lim GR 137162 January 24,2007

Facts:
 Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title to, real property, with
preliminary injunction and issuance of a hold departure order from the Philippines against
Ignacio E. Rubio. Respondent amended her complaint to include specific performance and
damages
 In her amended complaint it stated that she bought hereditary shares from Ignacio Rubio and
the heirs of Baloloy that said vendors executed a contract of sale dated April 10,1990 in her
favor; That Ignacio and the heirs of Baloloy received a down payment in the amount of
P102,169.86 and P450,000, respectively; that it was agreed in the contract of sale that balance
of the purchase price would be paid to each heir upon presentation of their individual
certificates of title.
 That respondent was and is ready and willing to pay Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy
upon presentation of their individual certificates of title, free from whatever lien and
encumbrance
 The baloloys Failed to appear in the pre trial. Upon motion of respondent the trial court
declared Baloloys in default. They then filed a motion to life the order declaring them in default
 which was denied by the trial court. Consequently the respondent was allowed to adduce
evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a partial decision against the baloloys.
 The Baloloys filed a petition for relief from judgment. Which was denied by the trial court.
Hence, the appeal to the court of appeals was taken challenging the order denying the petition
for relief from judgment.

 On appeal the CA affirmed the trial courts order and partial decision, but reversed the latter
decision.
 Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CA decision was denied, Hence this petition

Issue:

a. W/N Baloloy was properly declared in default

b. W/N the court erred in denying the petition for relief from judgment filed by the Baloloys?

Held:
a. Yes
 Bayani Baloloy was represented by hi attorney in fact, Alejandro Baloloy. In the Baloloys answer
to the original complaint and amended complaint, the allegations relating to the personal
circumstances of the Baloloys are clearly admitted to.
 Pre-trial is mandatory. The notices of Pre-trial had been sent to both the baloloys and their
former counsel of record. Being served with notice, he is charged with the duty of notifying the
party represented by him. He must see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the
pre trial. What the Baloloys and their counsel have alleged instead of their motion to lift order of
as in default dated December 11,1991 is the belated receipt of the Bayani Baloloys special
power of attorney in favor of their former counsel. Not having raised the ground for lack of
spcial power of attorney in their motion, they are no deemed to have waived it. For lack of
representation, bayani baloloy was properly declaed in default.

b. No.
 Section 3 of rule 38 of the Rules of Court states that a petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of
the judgment or final order, or other proceeding to be set aside and not more than 6 months
after such judgment or final order was enetered, or such proceeding was taken and must be
accompanied with affidavits showing fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglkigence relied
upon and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantital cause of action or defense
as the cause may be
 The 60 day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order,
judgment or proceedings and not from the date he actually reads the same
 The evidence on record as far as this issue is concerned show that atty, arsenio Villalon, Jr., the
former counsel of record of the Baloloys received a copy if the partial decision dated June
23,1993.
 On April 5, 1994. At that time, said former counsel is still their counsel of record. The reckoning
of the 60 day period therefore is the date when the said counsel of record received a copy of the
partial decision which was on April 5,1994. The petition for relief was filed by te new counsel on
July 4, 1994 which means that 90 days have already lapsed or 30 days beyond the 60 day
period.Moreover the records further shows that the Baloloys received the partial decision on
 September 13, 1993 as evidenced by Registry return cards which bear the numbers 02597 and
02598 signed by Mr. Alejandro Baloloy
 Futhermore, no fraud, accident or mistake or excusable negligence exists in order that the
petition for relief may be granted
 There is no proof of ectrinsic fraud that prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting
all of his case to the court or an accident which ordinary prudence could not have guarded.
 There is no proof of either a mistake of law or an excusable negligence cause by failure to
receive notice of the trial that it would not be necessary for him to take an active pafrt in the
case by relying on another person to attend the case for im, when such other person was
chargeable with that duty or by other circumstances not involving fault of the moving party

12. Sps. Eduardo B. Evangelista v. Mercator Finance Corp GR 148864 August 21,2003