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Realism with a Human Face / edited by James Conant. Putnam: "live the questions now. Perhaps you will then gradually, without noticing it, live along some distant day into the answer" conant: "to' claim Qf any statement that it is true is, roughly, to claim that it is false in its place, in its conceptual scheme"
Realism with a Human Face / edited by James Conant. Putnam: "live the questions now. Perhaps you will then gradually, without noticing it, live along some distant day into the answer" conant: "to' claim Qf any statement that it is true is, roughly, to claim that it is false in its place, in its conceptual scheme"
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Realism with a Human Face / edited by James Conant. Putnam: "live the questions now. Perhaps you will then gradually, without noticing it, live along some distant day into the answer" conant: "to' claim Qf any statement that it is true is, roughly, to claim that it is false in its place, in its conceptual scheme"
Copyright:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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Als PDF, TXT herunterladen oder online auf Scribd lesen
Realism with a Human Face
Hilary Putnam
Edited by James Conant
Harvard University Pree
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Cal and aePreface
“The essays that James Conant as slated for this volume represent
«central prt of the thinking Ihave been doing since I ew my now
‘welknown (some would say "notorious" distinction between 6%0
Kinds of realism ["metaphysicl” and “internal in presidental
«addi to the American Philosophical Association ia 1976. Alubough
they do noe in any sense present giving up of the poston Lcalled|
“Satenal elim," I have chosen # emphasize a somewhat diferent
aspect ofthat postion than the one emphasized in Reston, Truth,
and History
In Reason, Truth and History was primaily concerned to present
1 conception of truth alternative to both the classical metaphysical
eal conception (truth as correspondence to "mind independent
objets”) and to relativsvpostvit views. (My eeasons fr treating
{clavism and postvism a6 two sides of a sage coin are discussed
in Why ls Philosopher," Chapter 7 ofthe presen volume) Accor
ing to my conception, to claim of ay statement that itis tue that
isha iis toe in ts plac, nits cone, conceptual scheme,
i roughly wo claim chat i could be justified were epistemic cond.
tions good enough. If we allow oureves the Bion of “ideal” epi
temic conditions (a5 one allows oneself the fiction of friiones
planes in physis, one ean expres this by saying that a tre statement
fone tht could be justified wer epistemic contions ideal. But this
has opened me toa misunderstanding which I very much ere, and
which Chapter 2 ("A Defense of Internal Realism") ties to set
straight.
(Many people have thought that my idealization was the same 3s
Peirce hat what the igre ofa “fnctionles plane” corresponds (0
{sa situation ("finished since" ia which dhe community would be
ina potion to justly every ee statement and to discon evry