LABOR RELATIONS

REMEDIES REVIEWER

From the Lectures of Father Agustin L. Nazareno

Ateneo De Davao University - College of Law
13th Placer, 1983

Compiled by:
JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
A.Y. 2015-2016

Success consists of going from failure to failure without loss of enthusiasm.

Winston Churchill
#LABREL

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REMEDIES
Based from the Lectures of Father Agustin Nazareno of
Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
EDITOR’S TIP: For easier understanding, have with you the graph of
the labor justice system while reading this. Happy Studying! 
For the application of remedies, it assumes that the employee is not a
government employee. Otherwise, the remedy maybe before either of
the following:
 Civil Service Commission
 Regular Courts – Independent Contracting
 Department of Agrarian Reforms – Tenancy
How many fora are there in our Labor Justice System?
1) Labor Arbiter
2) Regional Director / Secretary of Labor
3) POEA
4) Bureau of Labor Relations
5) Med-Arbiter
6) Grievance Machinery
GRIEVANCE MACHINERY
272. GRIEVANCE MACHINERY AND VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION.
The parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein
provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and
conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment
and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies.
XXX
This presupposes that the workplace is an ORGANIZED
ESTABLISHMENT – it has an Exclusive Bargaining Agent (EBA) or an
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
 It is possible to have an EBA but there is no CBA yet such
as when EBA and management are still negotiating and has
not yet concluded any CBA.
 When the CBA expires, there is automatic holdover. It
continues until a new CBA is agreed upon by the parties.
Further, it will be administered by the incumbent EBA until it
is declared to have lost the election.
IS THERE A GRIEVANCE IF THE UNION DOES NOT SUPPORT OR
BRING UP THE CASE OF AN EE? YES
Any employee or group of employees may file a grievance if it is a
case with managerial action and managerial resolution of the complaint
is not agreeable for the parties.
WHAT CASES ARE COVERED BY THE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY?
Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of
collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall
be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided
in said agreements. (As amended by Section 9, Republic Act No.
6715, March 21, 1989)
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1) Interpretation or implementation of the CBA (Mandatory)
When an employer insists on an interpretation of an economic
provision of the CBA that is lower than the benefit that the union’s
interpretation of the same provision fetches, it is still within the purview
of the Grievance Machinery.
2) Interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
(Mandatory)
3) All Other Matters defined as Grievance in the CBA (Optional
or Permissive)
4) Disputes arising from wage distortions - Mandatory
With respect to the aforementioned cases, Labor Arbiter has
jurisdiction BUT only to refer it to the Grievance Machinery.
ALL OTHER MATTERS DEFINED AS GRIEVANCE IN THE CBA –
refers to agreements which are not terms and conditions of work. If
these things are included in the CBA, such inclusion is not converted
into a CBA. It is EXTRANEOUS to the CBA.
Examples: Right of first option to buy
When the Labor Arbiter is presented with a controversy arising from
other matters defined as a grievance (Option to buy), it does not
belong to the two (2) preceding classes of cases that are within the
mandatory jurisdiction of Grievance Machinery. His power is to give it
back to the parties. Their remedy is before the Regular Court as it calls
for the application of the Civil Code.
272. All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery which
are not settled WITHIN SEVEN (7) CALENDAR DAYS from the date
of its submission shall AUTOMATICALLY be referred to voluntary
arbitration prescribed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
If it remains unresolved, it must be settled through VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATION.
WAGE DISTORTIONS
This is caused by a WAGE ORDER which is EXTRANEOUS to the
CBA. If it enters the CBA, it changes the terms and conditions of work.
1 24. STANDARDS/CRITERIA FOR MINIMUM WAGE FIXING
Where the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a
law or wage order issued by any Regional Board results in distortions
of the wage structure within an establishment, the employer and the
union shall negotiate to correct the distortions. Any dispute arising
from wage distortions shall be resolved through the grievance
procedure under their collective bargaining agreement and, if it
remains unresolved, through voluntary arbitration. Unless
otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, such dispute shall be
decided by the voluntary arbitrators within ten (10) calendar days
from the time said dispute was referred to voluntary arbitration.
Disputes arising from wage distortions shall be resolved through the
GRIEVANCE MACHINERY UNDER THE CBA.
A Labor Arbiter, even if it has jurisdiction over money
claims, has no jurisdiction over a money claim arising from
wage distortion. (EXCEPT: If there is no CBA)
Also, a Regional Director of Labor, even if has jurisdiction
over money claims where the employer-employee
relationship has not yet been severed and the individual
aggregate claims does not exceed P5,000.00, he has no
jurisdiction over a money claim arising from wage distortion.
If it remains unresolved, it must be settled through VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATION.

VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
In one of the exams, the statement was ―A voluntary arbitrator has no
power to order an ocular inspection of the workplace and, in the course
of the same, compel any of the workers and management officials
present at the workplace to testify under oath under pain of contempt.‖
The answer is FALSE.
In PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES IN THE CONDUCT OF
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS, it provides:
RULE V
Powers and Authority of Voluntary Arbitrator and Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators
SECTION 2. Compulsory Powers. — The voluntary arbitration or
panel of voluntary arbitrators shall have the power to require any
person to attend hearing/s as a witness. They shall have the power to
subpoena witnesses and documents when the relevancy of the
testimony and the materiality thereof have been demonstrated to the
arbitrators.
RULE VI
Proceedings before Voluntary Arbitrator
Section 6(4) The arbitrator may take an ocular inspection of any matter
or premises which are in dispute, but such inspection shall be made
only in the presence of all parties to the arbitration, unless any party
who shall have received notice thereof fails to appear, in which event
such inspection shall be made in the absence of such party.
OTHER POWERS OF VA (275)
 Hold hearings
 Receive evidences
 Take whatever action is necessary to resolve the issues
subject to the dispute, including efforts to effect voluntary
settlement between the parties
 Issue writ of execution
NOTE: The Supreme Court, upon joint motion of the parties can refrain
from deciding a labor case before it on appeal and endorse the same
to a voluntary arbitrator pre-agreed by the parties.
CBA / COMPANY PERSONNEL POLICIES / OTHER MATTERS
275. PROCEDURES. XXX Unless the parties agree otherwise, it
shall be MANDATORY for the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators to render an award or decision WITHIN
TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS from the date of submission of
the dispute to voluntary arbitration.
PERIOD TO DECIDE: Such dispute shall be decided by the
VA WITHIN 20 CALENDAR DAYS from the time dispute
was referred to VA
EXCEPT: Parties otherwise agreed IN WRITING
WAGE DISTORTIONS
Art. 124. Standards/Criteria for minimum wage fixing. X X X Any
dispute arising from wage distortions shall be resolved through
the grievance procedure under their collective bargaining
agreement and, if it remains unresolved, through voluntary
arbitration. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing,
such dispute shall be decided by the voluntary arbitrators within
ten (10) calendar days from the time said dispute was referred to
voluntary arbitration.
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PERIOD TO DECIDE: Such dispute shall be decided by the
VA WITHIN 10 CALENDAR DAYS from the time dispute
was referred to VA
EXCEPT: Parties otherwise agreed IN WRITING
APPEAL
Aggrieved party has 15 DAYS TO FILE AN APPEAL (RULE 43) BUT
THE DECISION OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BECOMES
FINAL AND EXECUTORY 10 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF A COPY
THEREOF. If you want to appeal, you must serve notice to the
voluntary arbitrator, so that he will not issue an order of entry of
judgment of his award.
NOTE: Not all grievances, however, necessarily end with voluntary
arbitration. If it ends up with dismissal, normally, the union will not elect
voluntary arbitration because voluntary arbitration requires payment.
Also, terminations are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter [See 224(217)]. So, once termination has occurred,
they will file for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter.
CAN THE DECISION OF THE VA BE APPEALED? Unlike in US, the
decisions of the Voluntary Arbitrator in the Philippines may be
appealed to the COURT OF APPEALS. Perhaps, this is a recognition
that the VA may be corrupt or might be subject to the collusion of the
parties.
Grievance Voluntary
Machinery Arbitrator
Court of Supreme
Appeals Court
G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES
and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR, respondents.
A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of
Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-
judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.
This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original
purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the
appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities not
expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either
the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the
legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable
directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the
adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded from
the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is
deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the
contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court
for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing
business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A
party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an
award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order
confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the
award is vacated, modified or corrected. 19 MED ARBITER
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator 1) LOCAL UNION INTRA UNION DISPUTES FOR
with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition VIOLATION OF
for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be
deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a a. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS
matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of b. RIGHTS AND CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition. UNDER 249 (241)

RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF COURT. Section 1. Scope. — This Each one of the rights and conditions of
Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court membership in a labor organization may give rise,
of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions if violated, to an INTRA-UNION CONTROVERSY,
of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its which can be subject to a complaint under the
quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the … and jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter.
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
Complaints arising from Article 249 (241) of the
Labor Code on Rights and Conditions of Union
Section 2. Cases not covered. — This Rule shall not apply to
membership need not be first submitted for
judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the
conciliation and mediation with the NCMB before
Philippines. (n)
the same can be filed with the Med-Arbiter.

G.R. No. 149050 March 25, 2009 An example of local union INTRA-UNION DISPUTE is when a
member of a union is charged with DISLOYALTY for campaigning for
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT - NUWHRAIN- another union before the 60 day freedom period.
APL, Petitioner,
vs. Other Examples of Intra-Union Disputes: Violation of the rights and
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR FROILAN M. BACUNGAN and HYATT conditions of membership in a Labor Organization, Election protests
REGENCY MANILA, Respondents.
This presupposes that internal remedies of the union itself found in
The question on the proper recourse to assail a decision of a voluntary the CBL (which may be the same at that of the federation, if union is a
arbitrator has already been settled inLuzon Development Bank v. local) have already been exhausted.
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, where the Court
held that the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of WHERE FILED: It is FILED WITH THE MED ARBITER who is
arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in attached to the Regional Office of DOLE. It is NOT FILED WITH THE
line with the procedure outlines in Revised Administrative Circular No. REGIONAL DIRECTOR.
1-95 (now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure),
just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions The Med-Arbiter has NO POWER TO AWARD DAMAGES IN AN
enumerated therein, and consistent with the original purpose to provide INTRA-UNION DISPUTE.
a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all
quasi-judicial entities. If the Med-Arbiter decides against the union member, he can appeal to
the Secretary of DOLE.
Subsequently, in Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, and Nippon Paint
Employees Union v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the NOTE:
aforequoted ruling. In Alcantara, the Court held that notwithstanding
Section 2 of Rule 43, the ruling in Luzon Development Bank still
 If it is in METRO MANILA, the Director does not review the
stands. The Court explained, thus:
decision of the Med-Arbiter; it is the secretary of labor.
The provisions may be new to the Rules of Court but it is far from
being a new law. Section 2, Rules 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Med DOLE Court of Supreme
Procedure, as presently worded, is nothing more but a reiteration of Arbiter Secretary Appeals Court
the exception to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, as provided for in Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7902:  If it comes from the PROVINCES OTHER THAN THE NCR,
it can happen that the decision of the med arbiter is reviewed
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, by the Director of the BLR.
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including o From the decision of the director of BLR, you go
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees’ now to the Court of Appeals. You do not pass
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except through the Secretary. The Secretary has no
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in power to review the decision of the director of the
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines BLR.
under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this
Act and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph
(4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Med Court of Supreme
BLR
Arbiter Appeals Court

2) ELECTION OF OFFICERS

Rules with respect to election of officers were not followed.

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Example: A. PROVISIONAL PERSONALITY – The mere issuance by the
federation of a charter certificate to a local is for the purpose
 Election was not made thru secret ballot. One of filing a petition for certification election.
nominated a roster of officers, another seconded
and moved to close the nomination. No voting took B. FULL PERSONALITY - After submitting the additional
place since there was only one set of officers that supporting documents, apart from filing a petition for
was nominated. certification election, you can now file a complaint for and in
behalf of the members.
3) CBA REGISTRATION
NOTE: A breakaway faction of a labor federation can, after notice and
Registration of the CBA is one of the POST NEGOTIATION hearing, be granted by the Med-Arbiter a separate federation license.
MANDATORY ACTIVITIES.
As to revocation, there are now only three (3) grounds provided in
This requires: Article 239, as amended:

 Affidavit by the President Art. 239. Grounds for cancellation of union registration. The
 Attested by the Secretary following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:
 That the CBA was posted in 2 conspicuous places in the
workplace (1) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the
 That is has been ratified by the majority of all the members adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments
in the bargaining unit thereto, the minutes of ratification and the list of members who took
 Payment of P1000 part in the ratification;

When there are issues as to the posting of the CBA or proper (2) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the
ratification, it shall be brought before the Labor Arbiter. election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters;

4) INDEPENDENT LOCAL OR CHAPTER REGISTRATION, (3) Voluntary dissolution by the members

REVOCATION, AND CANCELLATIONS CASES
The requirements for Independent Registration and Local Registration
are found in Articles 234 and 234-A respectively.
Not all kinds of irregularities in a union meeting or voting will warrant
the cancellation of a union registration. If the irregularity is minor (i.e.
name is written twice/thrice which means that they voted twice/thrice),
Supreme Court said that it is negligible.

INDEPENDENT REGISTRATION LOCAL REGISTRATION Just like in the Law on Obligations and Contracts, there has to be a
substantial breach.

 P50 Registration Fee For a local to be entitled to other Thus, you must point out an irregularity that is substantial in nature.
 Names of officers, rights and privileges of a
Addresses, Principal Legitimate Labor Organization
address of the Labor (LLO) (for purposes other than 5) VISITORIAL POWER UNDER ARTICLE 274 (INQUIRE
Organization, Minutes filing a petition for certification INTO UNION FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES)
of Organizational election), it shall submit the
Meetings, List of following documents:
Workers who Art. 274. Visitorial power. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or
participated in such  Names of chapter’s his duly authorized representative is hereby empowered to inquire into
meetings officers, addresses and the financial activities of legitimate labor organizations upon the filing of
 Names of all its principal office of a complaint under oath and duly supported by the written consent of at
members comprising at charter least twenty percent (20%) of the total membership of the labor
least 20% of all the  Chapter’s CBL; If the organization concerned and to examine their books of accounts and
employees in the same as that of the other records to determine compliance or non-compliance with the law
bargaining unit where it federation or national and to prosecute any violations of the law and the union constitution
seeks to operate union, it shall be and by-laws: Provided, That such inquiry or examination shall not be
 If in existence for 1 or indicated accordingly conducted during the sixty (60)-day freedom period nor within the thirty
more years, copies of (30) days immediately preceding the date of election of union
its annual financial The additional supporting officials. (As amended by Section 31, Republic Act No. 6715, March
reports documents SHALL be: 21, 1989)
 4 copies of CBL of the
applicant union,  Certified under oath by WHO HAS VISITORIAL POWERS? Secretary of Labor and
minutes of its adoption the Secretary or Employment or his duly authorized representative
or ratification and list of Treasurer of the
members who chapter and PURPOSE:
participated in it  Attested by the
President.  To inquire into the financial activities of legitimate labor
organizations
 To examine their books of accounts and other records to
HOMEWORKERS can file a petition for registration of a legitimate determine compliance or non-compliance with the law and to
prosecute any violations of the law and the union constitution
labor organization with the Med-Arbiter. HOUSEHELPERS
and by-laws
(Kasambahay) cannot.
REQUIREMENTS:
WHERE FILED: If it is outside of Metro Manila, you normally file these
petitions with the Regional Office of the DOLE.
 Filing of a complaint under oath
REVIEW: Chartering a local is of two kinds:

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  Duly supported by the written consent of at least twenty
percent (20%) of the total membership of the labor
organization concerned
WHEN IT IS NOT ALLOWED?
 During the sixty (60)-day freedom period
 Within the thirty (30) days immediately preceding the
date of election of union officials
IS IT THE SECRETARY ALONE THAT HAS THE POWERS TO
INSPECT THE PAPERS, PREMISES AND OFFICES? NO
G.R. No. 96821 December 9, 1994
LA TONDEÑA WORKERS UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
and HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director,
Bureau of Labor Relations, respondents.
Rule 1, sec. 1(ff) provides: "Union Accounts Examiners" are officials of
the Bureau or the Industrial Relations Division in the Regional Office
empowered to audit books of accounts of the union.
The "union accounts examiners of the Bureau" mentioned in Rule 1,
sec. 1(ff) of the implementing rules as having the power to audit the
books of accounts of unions are actually officials of the BLR because
the word "Bureau" is defined in Rule 1, sec. 1(b) of the same rules as
the Bureau of Labor Relations.
Also, BLR is granted visitorial powers under the Revised
Administrative Code.
Chapter 4
BUREAUS
Sec. 16. Bureau of Labor Relations. - The Bureau of Labor Relations
shall set policies, standards, and procedures on the registration and
supervision of legitimate labor union activities including denial,
cancellation and revocation of labor union permits. It shall also set
policies, standards, and procedure relating to collective bargaining
agreements, and the examination of financial records of accounts of
labor organizations to determine compliance with relevant laws.
DOES THIS INCLUDE EES ORGANIZATION IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR? YES because the employees organization in the public
sector are also registered with the BLR. If they have intra union
disputes, that is also covered by the BLR.
6) ACTIONS ARISING FROM 241 (ARISING FROM
ADMINISTRATION AND ACCOUNTING OF UNION
FUNDS AND OTHER VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS OF
MEMBERS)
See Article 241 on Rights and Conditions of Membership in Labor
Organizations
NOTE: Violation of keeping records of funds, issuing receipts for
expenditures are no longer grounds for cancellation of union
registration but are now GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION of
the officers charged with such duty.
WHEN IS THE TREASURER REQUIRED TO RENDER AN
ACCOUNTING?
 At least once a year WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER
THE CLOSE OF ITS FISCAL YEAR;
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 At such other times as may be required by a resolution of the
majority of the members of the organization; and
 Upon vacating his office
During the 60 day freedom period, you can no longer ask for an
accounting because that is considered as persecution.
Hence, the Med-Arbiter cannot entertain a complaint-petition for the
issuance of an order directing the treasurer of a union, the exclusive
bargaining agent at the workplace, if the same is filed during the 60-
day freedom period, even if the complaint-petition is signed by at least
30% of the union membership.
If the treasurer fails to render an accounting, he must first be given the
chance to answer by filing a complaint with the President of the Union.
If the reason for the failure is the President of the Union himself, it
would be useless to complain against the President. You can file a
case immediately with the Med-Arbiter. This is one of the exceptions to
the exhaustion of internal remedies.
NOTE: The Med-Arbiter cannot rule on the division of real properties
and funds between a Federation and its splinter group, and issue order
for the Federation to convey certain properties to the splinter group
constituted as a new federation.
7) PETITIONS FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION
Art. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. In
organized establishments, when a verified petition questioning
the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed
before the Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-
day period before the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election
by secret ballot when the verified petition is supported by the
written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid
election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have
cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid
votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the
workers in the unit. When an election which provides for three or more
choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast,
a run-off election shall be conducted between the labor unions
receiving the two highest number of votes: Provided, that the total
number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%)
of the number of votes cast.
At the expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to
recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where
no petition for certification election is filed. (As amended by Section 23,
Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any
establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a
certification election shall automatically be conducted by the
Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization. (As amended by Section 24, Republic Act No. 6715,
March 21, 1989)
Art. 258. When an employer may file petition. When requested to
bargain collectively, an employer may petition the Bureau for an
election. If there is no existing certified collective bargaining
agreement in the unit, the Bureau shall, after hearing, order a
certification election.
All certification cases shall be decided WITHIN TWENTY (20)
WORKING DAYS.
The Bureau shall conduct a certification election within twenty (20)
days in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Labor.
PETITIONS FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS:
1. In organized establishments;
2. In unorganized establishments;
3. Filed by the employer, when requested to bargain
collectively and there has been no certification election
4. During the 60 day freedom period, 25% of the bargaining
unit (not the union) can file a petition for decertification
election.
NOTE: These are NOT COMPLAINTS. These are petitions.
Certification elections are NOT ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS.
They are fact-finding in nature.
WHERE TO FILE: You cannot file these petitions anywhere. File it
before the Med-Arbiter, attached to the Regional Office of DOLE.
Employees of GOCCs WITH ORIGINAL CHARTER can file petitions
for certification election with the Med-Arbiter.
Med-Arbiter has the power to rule upon certification contests IN THE
GOVERNMENT SECTOR.
Med-Arbiter must direct the petitioning union to furnish the employer of
a copy of their petition for certification.
Med-Arbiter should dismiss the Motion to Intervene filed by the
employer in a petition for certification election.
Med-Arbiter’s decision to hold a certification election is appealable to
the DOLE Secretary.
Art. 259. Appeal from certification election orders. Any party to an
election may appeal the order or results of the election as determined
by the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
on the ground that the rules and regulations or parts thereof
established by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the conduct
of the election have been violated. Such appeal shall be decided
WITHIN FIFTEEN (15) CALENDAR DAYS.
Med DOLE Court of Supreme
Arbiter Secretary Appeals Court
His order to hold a certification election is not stayed by the pendency
of proceedings to cancel union registration of petitioner union.
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BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS (BLR)
Art. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. The Bureau of Labor Relations
and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the
Department of Labor, shall have ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE
authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or
both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all
disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-
management relations in all workplaces, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the
subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have FIFTEEN (15) WORKING DAYS TO ACT ON
LABOR CASES BEFORE IT, subject to extension by agreement of
the parties. (As amended by Section 14, Republic Act No. 6715, March
21, 1989).
BLR has ORIGINAL JURISDICTION from special issues arising from:
 INTRA-UNION DISPUTES
 INTER-UNION DISPUTES with respect to splitting of unions
1) FEDERATION OR NATIONAL TRADE UNION CENTERS
 REGISTRATION CASES
REVIEW: Federation has to have at least 10 locals that are EBA.
WHAT HAPPENS IF THE FEDERATION NO LONGER HAS A
LOCAL? It is an empty federation.
When there is a split and the federation has less than 10 locals
that are EBA, issues may arise such as:
o Will they be given enough time to help their locals
obtain independent registration
o Will that be a ground for revocation of registration
Technically speaking, there will be no cancellation of registration
because that is not one of the grounds for the cancellation of
registration.
 REVOCATION AND CANCELLATION CASES
Union once registered, its registration or separate and distinct
personality cannot be attacked collaterally. To attack the personality
of the union you must file a separate and distinct case.
 INTRA UNION DISPUTES
2) INTER UNION CONFLICTS
INTER-UNION DISPUTES with respect to splitting of unions
(when federation splits)
a. Example: Two factions within a federation holding
separate conventions
INTER-UNION DISPUTES born out within a LABOR CENTER
Labor Center is also registered with the DOLE. It is an
aggrupation of labor federations such as the ALU-TUCP.
OTHER POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE BLR
 BLR may ISSUE SUBPOENAS to require the appearance of
any person or the production of any paper, document or
matter relevant to a labor dispute under its jurisdiction, either
at the request of any interested party or at its own initiative.
  BLR shall KEEP A REGISTRY OF LEGITIMATE LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS. DOLE
 Maintain file of CBAs, records of settlement disputes, and BLR CA SC
Secretary
copies of orders and decisions of voluntary arbitrators

MAY THE BLR AWARD DAMAGES? NO

The conflict between who are the rightful set of officers to cover a
union must belong to the jurisdiction of the BLR but not as to the issue
of damages. It is because the Labor Code does not grant the BLR the
jurisdiction to award damages. Unlike in 217, Labor Arbiter has the
power to grant damages arising from employer-employee
relationship

Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission.

Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty
(30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes,
the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:

Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages

arising from the employer-employee relations;
[[

G.R. No. 132400 January 31, 2005

EDUARDO J. MARIÑO, JR., MA. MELVYN P. ALAMIS and

UST FACULTY UNION, petitioners,
vs.
GIL GAMILLA, DUPONT ASERON and JUSTINO
CARDENAS, respondents.

Thus, unlike the NLRC which is explicitly vested with the jurisdiction
over claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages,54 the BLR is not specifically empowered to adjudicate
claims of such nature arising from intra-union or inter-union
disputes. In fact, Art. 241 of the Labor Code ordains the separate
institution before the regular courts of criminal and civil liabilities
arising from violations of the rights and conditions of union
membership. The Court has consistently held that where no
employer-employee exists between the parties and no issue is
involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code,
other labor statutes, or any collective bargaining agreement, it is
the regional trial court that has jurisdiction.

XXX In their complaint in the civil case, petitioners do not seek any
relief under the Labor Code but the payment of a sum of money as
damages on account of respondents’ alleged tortuous conduct. The
action is within the realm of civil law and, hence, jurisdiction over the
case belongs to the regular courts.

APPEAL

BLR/ OR
MED
DOLE CA SC
ARBITER
Secretary

If it is the Med-Arbiter who hears the case, the decision of the Med-
Arbiter is appealed to the Director of the BLR. But sometimes, if it is in
the NCR, it is appealed to the DOLE Secretary. The decision of the
Med-Arbiter reviewed by the BLR can no longer be reviewed by the
DOLE Secretary. It must go to the CA.

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PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT AUTHORITY
(POEA)
POEA has jurisdiction for:
1. Registration
2. Cancellation
3. Suspension of license or permit to recruit
1) CANCELLATION OR SUSPENSION OF LICENSE OF
AUTHORITY TO RECRUIT OF RECRUIMENT AGENCIES
Registration for recruitment agencies are filed before the POEA.
WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OR
SUSPENSION OF LICENSE OR AUTHORITY TO RECRUIT?
 Violation of Capital Requirements
 Violation of Citizenship Requirements – Recruitment
agencies cannot be less than 70% Filipino ownership. It
higher by 10% compared to definition of Filipino Corporation
in the Philippine Constitution.
 Violation of License – Example is when you operate in
places other than what is allowed in your license.
It is the POEA, NOT THE SECRETARY OF LABOR that can cancel a
license to recruit after proper investigation and hearing.
2) POEA also has VISITORIAL POWERS at any time of the
day or night if the office of the licensee or recruiter is open.
They can check the contracts between the placement agency and the
principal. They can be asked to produce the list of tariffs, placement
fees, and other payables or fees that an OCW pays them.
3) DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS
Examples:
 There is a deployment ban of Filipinos in Iraq. They go
to Bahrain then they later move to Iraq.
Deployment ban has already been upheld by the SC. It
is not a violation of freedom to travel. Even if you
execute a waiver of responsibility by the state, you can
still be denied the right to travel.
 Minor being employed to work in other countries
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended by RA 10022, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR
DAYS after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damage. Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to
update and keep abreast with the developments in the global services
industry.
ADJUDICATORY OR QUASI-JUDICIAL JURISDICTION of the POEA
has been abolished by RA 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act.
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WHAT JURISDICTION IS LEFT WITH THE POEA?
It is left with its REGULATORY POWERS. Complaints for illegal
recruitment may still be filed with POEA but only for purposes of
suspension or cancellation of permit to recruit. It also has power to
issue permit or authority to recruit.
OCWs now go to the LABOR ARBITER for breach of contract, money
claims, damages etc.
DOES IT RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEATH CLAIMS? NO. It is
now with Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA).
OWWA’s fund is a single trust fund pooled from the US$25.00
membership contributions of foreign employers, land-based and sea-
based workers, investment and interest income, and income from other
sources.
WHAT IS THE MONEY USED FOR?
Death Benefit - An active member is covered for the duration of his
employment contract. The coverage includes PhP 100,000.00 for
death due to natural cause and PhP 200,000.00 for death due to
accident
Disability and Dismemberment Benefit - A member is entitled to
disability/dismemberment benefits of PhP 50,000.00 for partial
disability and Php 100,000.00 in case of total permanent
disability.
Burial Benefit - On top of death benefit, a rider of PhP 20,000.00 will
be received by legal heirs for the funeral expenses.
It also has educational, repatriation and reintegration programs.
Source: www.owwa.gov.ph
ON PERMANENT DISABILITY
G.R. No. 192034 January 13, 2014
ALPHA SHIP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION/JUNEL M CHAN
and/or CHUO-KAIUN COMPANY, LIMITED, Petitioners,
vs.
ELEOSIS V. CALO, Respondent.
An employee s disability becomes permanent and total when so
declared by the company-designated physician, or, in case of absence
of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability,
upon the lapse of the 120-or 240-day treatment period, while the
employee s disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful
employment during such period, and the company-designated
physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employee s
fitness or disability.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on
money claims inclusive of damages under this section shall be paid
WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS from approval of the settlement by the
appropriate authority.
Under RA 10022, the law amending RA 8042, when the overseas
worker and the recruitment agency enters into a compromise, payment
must be made within 30 days from the approval of the settlement by
the appropriate agency.
NOTE: RA 8042 provides that it shall be paid within 4
months. Now, it shall be paid within 30 days.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid
or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, or any
unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker’s salary, the
worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if his placement
fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%)
per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract xxx.
G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner,
vs.
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION
CO., INC., Respondents.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving
the existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the
perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject
clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject
clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary
liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will
have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of
government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but
imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the
favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement
agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs
whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea
that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a
compelling state interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the
solidary liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals,
there are mechanisms already in place that can be employed to
achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of
OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4,
2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign
employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant
workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures
range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The
POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar
administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less
restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the
solidary liability of their foreign principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal
protection.1avvphi1
XXX
Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the
subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for
it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any
existing valid governmental purpose.136
The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the
subject clause of limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their three-month
salary in case of illegal dismissal, is to give them a better chance of
getting hired by foreign employers. This is plain speculation. As earlier
discussed, there is nothing in the text of the law or the records of the
deliberations leading to its enactment or the pleadings of respondent
that would indicate that there is an existing governmental purpose for
the subject clause, or even just a pretext of one.
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The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not
just petitioner's right to equal protection, but also her right to
substantive due process under Section 1,137 Article III of the
Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his
salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of
his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
WHAT IS THE LEGAL RATE OF INTEREST THAT MAY BE
ORDERED BY LABOR TRIBUNALS AS APPLICABLE TO
BACKWAGES AND OTHER MONETARY AWARDS?
G.R. No. 189871 August 13, 2013
DARIO NACAR, PETITIONER,
vs.
GALLERY FRAMES AND/OR FELIPE BORDEY, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.
In the landmark case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, the Court laid down the guidelines regarding the manner of
computing legal interest, to wit:
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of
actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the
accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a
sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due
should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore,
the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest
shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial
or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article
1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money,
is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages except when or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but
when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time
the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date
the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be
on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes
final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls
under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum
from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed
to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
 G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and forbearance of money,
goods, or credits, and in judgments when there is no stipulation on the
applicable interest rate. Further, it is only applicable if the judgment did
not become final and executory before July 1, 2013.
We add that Circular No. 799 is not applicable when there is a law
that states otherwise. While the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has
the power to set or limit interest rates, these interest rates do not
apply when the law provides that a different interest rate shall be
applied. "[A] Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law
can repeal another law."
For example, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that
unlawfully terminated overseas workers are entitled to the
reimbursement of his or her placement fee with an interest of 12%
per annum. Since Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars
cannotrepeal Republic Act No. 8042, the issuance of Circular No.
799 does not have the effect of changing the interest on awards
for reimbursement of placement fees from 12% to 6%. This is
despite Section 1 of Circular No. 799, which provides that the 6%
interest rate applies even to judgments.
Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated in contracts. "The contracting
parties need not repeat them. They do not even have to be referred to.
Every contract, thus, contains not only what has been explicitly
stipulated, but the statutory provisions that have any bearing on the
matter." There is, therefore, an implied stipulation in contracts between
the placement agency and the overseas worker that in case the
overseas worker is adjudged as entitled to reimbursement of his or her
placement fees, the amount shall be subject to a 12% interest per
annum. This implied stipulation has the effect of removing awards for
reimbursement of placement fees from Circular No. 799’s coverage.
The same cannot be said for awards of salary for the unexpired
portion of the employment contract under Republic Act No. 8042.
These awards are covered by Circular No. 799 because the law
does not provide for a specific interest rate that should apply.
In sum, if judgment did not become final and executory before July 1,
2013 and there was no stipulation in the contract providing for a
different interest rate, other money claims under Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 shall be subject to the 6% interest per annum in
accordance with Circular No. 799.
This means that respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per
annum on her money claims from the finality of this judgment.
There are also periods for mandatory resolution of cases.
G.R. No. 70615 October 28, 1986
VIRGILIO CALLANTA, petitioner,
vs.
CARNATION PHILIPPINES, INC., and NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION [NLRC], respondents.
The case of Valencia vs. Cebu Portland Cement, et al., 106 Phil. 732,
a 1959 case cited by petitioner, is applicable in the instant case insofar
as it concerns the issue of prescription of actions. In said case, this
Court had occasion to hold that an action for damages involving a
plaintiff seperated from his employment for alleged unjustifiable
causes is one for " injury to the rights of the plaintiff, and must be
brought within four [4] years.
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In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 448 [1980], this Court, thru
then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, sustained the sand of the
Solicitor General that the period of prescription mentioned under Article
281, now Article 292, of the Labor Code, refers to and "is limited to
money claims, an other cases of injury to rights of a workingman being
governed by the Civil Code." Accordingly, this Court ruled that
petitioner Marciana Santos, who sought reinstatement, had four [4]
years within which to file her complaint for the injury to her rights as
provided under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
Indeed there is, merit in the contention of petitioner that the four [4]-
year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code,
applies by way of supplement, in the instant case, to wit:
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years.
[1] Upon an injury to the lights of the plaintiff.
XXX
In the instant case, the action for illegal dismissal was filed by
petitioners on July 5, 1982, or three [3] years, one [1] month and five
[5] days after the alleged effectivity date of his dismissal on June 1,
1979 which is well within the four [4]-year prescriptive period under
Article 1146 of the New Civil Code.
However, in case of OCWs, the case of illegal recruitment shall
prescribe in 5 years. If the illegal recruitment involves economic
sabotage – there is conspiracy by 3 or more people or illegal
recruitment of 3 or more people, it will prescribe in 20 years.
SEC. 12. PRESCRIPTIVE PERIODS. - Illegal recruitment cases under
this Act shall prescribe in five (5) years: Provided, however, That illegal
recruitment cases involving economic sabotage as defined herein shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years.
 ORDINARY ILLEGAL RECRUIMENT – 5 YEARS
 INVOLVES ECONOMIC SABOTAGE – 20 YEARS
RA 8042 also qualifies people who will witness for the prosecution to
avail of the privilege under the Witness Protection Program under RA
6951.
SEC. 13. FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE, PREFERENTIAL
ENTITLEMENT UNDER THE WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM.
XXX
The provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 to the contrary,
notwithstanding, any person who is a victim of illegal recruitment shall
be entitled to the Witness Protection Program provided thereunder.
Criminal aspect of illegal recruitment does not fall within the jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter or the POEA. It falls under the jurisdiction of the
criminal courts.
SEC. 9. VENUE. - A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as
defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
province or city where the offense was committed or where the
offended party actually resides at the same time of the commission of
the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first
filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. Provided,
however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those
criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of the
effectivity of this Act.
WHERE TO FILE THE CRIMINAL CASE? Regional Trial Court of:
 Province or city where the offense was committed]
 Where the offended party actually resides at the same time
of the commission of the offense
NOTE: Sec 9 of RA 8042 is given retroactive application. It applies not
only to cases committed at the time of the effectivity of the act but even REGIONAL DIRECTOR
to those already in court at the time of its effectivity.
HISTORY: When the Labor Code first came out in 1974. There are two
POEA has NO JURISDICTION over claims of an airline for an unpaid kinds of inspection:
plane tickets bought by a licensed placement agency on credit and
agreed by the latter to be chargeable against its bond filed with the 1. Inspections that originate from the Regional Office of the
POEA. Director of Labor
2. Inspections triggered by a complainant

However, the requirement that the complaint be under oath and

verified has already been eliminated.

1) ARTICLE 128 [VISITORIAL AND ENFORCEMENT

POWER] DISSECTED

The visitorial powers is not figure-sensitive.

WHO MAY EXERCISE SUCH POWER:

 The Secretary of Labor and Employment

 Duly authorized representatives [Regional Director]
 Including labor regulation officers

WHAT CAN THEY DO?

1. Access to employer’s records and premises at any time

of the day or night whenever work is being undertaken
therein

There is no need for a warrant as long as work is being undertaken. It

is the same rule with fire and health inspectors.

Records include:

 Payrolls, Voucher, Receipts

 List of workers
 Copy of SSS Forms
 Employer-employee contracts
 Logbook for work related incidents or accidents
 Report of Pregnancies as required by SSS to
prove that pregnancy is not simulated

2. Right to copy therefrom

3. Question any employee and investigate any fact,
condition or matter which may be necessary to determine
violations or which may aid in the enforcement of this Code
and of any labor law, wage order or rules and regulations
issued pursuant thereto.

Interview can be done even without the presence of the employer.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of

this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists

G.R. No. 179652 March 6, 2012

PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS.,

INC.), Petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII,
and JANDELEON JUEZAN, Respondents.

NOTE: Ruling in May 28, 2009 case has been modified. Previous
discussion of Father Gus on the determination by the DOLE Secretary
of employer-employee relationship being merely preliminary and as the
possibility of conflict between Regional Director and NLRC is no longer
true.

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ISSUE: May the DOLE make a determination of whether or not an WHERE TO APPEAL?
employer-employee relationship exists, and if so, to what extent?
 An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment (Regional Director)
No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to
under this Article may be appealed to the latter.
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. No
procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a
 In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by
preliminary finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC.
the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
The law did not say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRC’s
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and
or that should the existence of the employer-employee relationship be
Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award
disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE
in the order appealed from.
must have the power to determine whether or not an employer-
employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or not
to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the Labor
Code, as amended by RA 7730.

Regional DOLE Court of Supreme

ISSUE: WOULDN’T IT RESULT TO CONFLICT? Director Secretary Appeals Court

The Court, in limiting the power of the DOLE, gave the rationale that
such limitation would eliminate the prospect of competing conclusions
between the DOLE and the NLRC. The prospect of competing
conclusions could just as well have been eliminated by according
respect to the DOLE findings, to the exclusion of the NLRC, and this
We believe is the more prudent course of action to take.
This is not to say that the determination by the DOLE is beyond
question or review. Suffice it to say, there are judicial remedies such as
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 that may be availed of, should a
party wish to dispute the findings of the DOLE.
RULE OF THUMB: [PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING v SECRETARY]
6. Order stoppage of work or suspension of operations of
any unit or department of an establishment when non-
compliance with the law or implementing rules and
regulations poses grave and imminent danger to the health
and safety of workers in the workplace.
NOTE: An employer whose factory operations has been ordered
closed by the Regional Director of Labor on Health and Occupational
Safety grounds but without the benefit of a hearing cannot
successfully countermand the suspension order on certiorari with the
CA for violation of due process.

 If a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to
the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or other
labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that
there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the
DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC.
Within twenty-four hours, a hearing shall be conducted to
determine whether an order for the stoppage of work or
suspension of operations shall be lifted or not.

 If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee

relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. Work may be suspended ex
parte on the ground of grave
HEARING within 24 hours from
 If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied and imminent danger to the
the issuance of the order
by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with health and safety of workers in
the workplace
the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which
provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay,
hours of work, and other terms and conditions of
employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement.
Suspension may be lifted if
 If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an
employer admits his failure and
existing employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is Determine whether or not
signs an undertaking that he will
properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, suspending operation should be
make the necessary
may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari under lifted
adjustments and improvements
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. in the workplace
4. Issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards
provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on
the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or
industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. In case the violation is attributable to the fault of the employer, he shall
pay the employees concerned their salaries or wages during the period
5. Issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the of such stoppage of work or suspension of operation.
enforcement of their orders
If the violation is not attributable to the fault of the employer, the ―NO
o EXCEPT: Employer contests the findings of the WORK, NO PAY‖ rule is followed.
labor employment and enforcement officer and
raises issues supported by documentary proofs WHAT CANNOT BE DONE BY INFERIOR COURT OR ENTITY?
which were not considered in the course of
inspection  Issue temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order
 Assume jurisdiction over any case involving the enforcement
This is issued when the employer fails to comply with the compliance orders issued in accordance with this Article
order.

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WHAT IF ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE IS FOUND GUILTY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
VIOLATION OF, OR ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, UNDER THIS
ARTICLE? He shall, after appropriate administrative investigation, be There is no jurisdictional amount.
subject to summary dismissal from the service.

7. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, by

appropriate regulations, require employers to keep and Inspection of the Submission of
maintain such employment records as may be necessary workplace Inspection Finding
in aid of his visitorial and enforcement powers under this
Code.

It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to obstruct, impede,

delay or otherwise render ineffective the orders of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives Regional Director to
Regional Director
issued pursuant to the authority granted under this Article act on the findings
issues a Compliance
and
Order
LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT recommendations

It is not grave abuse of discretion for the Regional Director of Labor to

dispatch Labor Standard inspectors to workplaces chosen at random
and from which no complaints have yet been filed with the DOLE
Regional Office. Employer may
contest the
This includes minimum wage which is not in the Labor Code. Even if compliance order
there is no employer-employee relationship, you are obliged to pay
minimum wage.
The compliance order may be controverted by documentary
If there is no employer-employee relationship, you cannot file an evidence not otherwise considered in the court of inspection.
administrative case before the Labor Arbiter. Before the Labor arbiter, (This does not include payroll records and employees file history as
non-existence of employer-employee relationship is a valid defense this should have been made available during the inspection)
against non-payment of minimum wage. If the case is dismissed on the
ground of absence of employer-employee relationship, the dismissal is
NOTE: There is a new rule. There are now 5 kinds of voluntary
without prejudice to the filing of criminal action with the prosecutor’s
compliance and certification. If you get 1, for 3 years, you are free of
office.
any visitorial inspection.
REMEDY IF NOT PAID MINIMUM WAGE: Remedy is with the CITY
1. Compliance of labor standards
OR PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR because non-payment of minimum
2. Compliance of health and safety
wage is a criminal offense.
3. Compliance of employment of minors
4. Compliance with gender sensitivity laws
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6727 5. [Father said 5 but he only mentioned 4 ]

Section 10. Penal Provisions. — Any person, corporation, trust, firm, 2) ARTICLE 129 (ADJUDICATORY) DISSECTED
partnership, association or entity which refuses or fails to pay any of
the prescribed increases or adjustments in the wage rates, made in Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits
accordance with the Act shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
P25,000 and/or imprisonment of not less than one year nor more WHO?
than two years: Provided, that any person convicted under the Act
shall not be entitled to the benefits provided for under the
 Regional Director of DOLE
Probation Law.
 Any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the DOLE
If the violation is committed by a corporation, trust or firm, partnership,
HOW INITIATED? Upon complaint of any interested party (Not motu
association or any other entity, the penalty of imprisonment shall be
proprio)
imposed upon the entity's responsible officers, including, but not limited
to, the president, vice-president, chief executive officer, general
manager, managing director or partner. CONDITIONS:

 Complaint must not include a claim for

reinstatement – There must be no severance of
employment

 Aggregate money claims of EACH employee or

househelper does not exceed Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00)

G.R. No. 85840 April 26, 1990

SERVANDO'S INCORPORATED, petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGION VI, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, respondents.

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The sole issue raised in this case is whether or not the Regional
Director has the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits of workers
and employees.
The power then of the Regional Director (under the present state
of the law) to adjudicate employees' money claims is subject to
the concurrence of all the requisites provided under Sec. 2 of RA
6715, to wit: (1) the claim is presented by an employee or person
employed in domestic or household service, or househelper; (2)
the claim arises from employer-employee relations; (3) the
claimant does not seek reinstatement; and (4) the aggregate
money claim of each employee or househelper does not exceed
P5,000.00.
Going over the records of this case, we note that the aggregate claims
of each of the fifty four (54) employees of herein petitioner are over
and above the amount of P5,000.00. Under the circumstances, the
power to adjudicate such claims belongs to the Labor Arbiter who has
the exclusive jurisdiction over employees' claims where the aggregate
amount of the claim for each employee exceeds P5,000.00.
If out of the 5 complainants-employees, one of them has claims
exceeding P5000, it becomes MANDATORY for the Regional Director
to endorse the entire case to the LABOR ARBITER, to avoid split of
jurisdiction and conflict in decisions.
This is by virtue of the unpublished cases of
 Bulldog Security Agency v. Undersecretary of Labor, G.R.
No. 93794, July 17, 1991, (Minute Resolution);
 Heva v. de la Serna, G.R. No. 90741, September 11, 1991,
(Minute Resolution)
In the aforementioned cases, the SC ruled:
Article 129 of the Labor Code expressly provides that "upon complaint
of any interested party," the Regional Director (and, consequently, the
Secretary of Labor to whom appeals form the Regional Director are
taken) is empowered to hear and decide simple money claims, i. e.
those that do not exceed P5,000.00 for each employee, employing for
this purpose a summary procedure. If Article 128(b) of the Labor Code
were to be construed as empowering the Secretary of Labor, under his
visitorial power, to hear and decide all types of employee's
claims, including those exceeding P5,000.00 for each employee,
employing for this purpose a summary procedure, then, Article 129
(limiting the Regional Director's jurisdiction to a claim not exceeding
P5,000.00) becomes a useless surplusage in the Labor Code.
WHAT IS REGIONAL DIRECTOR EMPOWERED TO DO?
After summary proceeding and after due notice, Hear and decide any
matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and
benefits, including legal interest, owing to:
 Employee or
 Person employed in domestic or household service or
 Househelper
Arising from employer-employee relations
Example: Where an employee, is upon agreement by his union but
without his written consent, deducted from his salary by the employer
an amount equivalent ½ day’s pay for insurance premium payments
while he is on training outside the company’s premises
When the Regional Director of Labor hears and decides money claims
which are NOT ACCOMPANIED by a prayer for reinstatement, he is
exercising QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS.
NOTE: The Regional Director CANNOT AWARD ATTORNEY’S FEES
in the exercise of his or her adjudicatory powers.
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REGIONAL LABOR
DIRECTOR ARBITER
Does not Exceeds
exceed P5000 P5000
PERIOD TO DECIDE: Within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of
the filing of the same
If there is already a judgment as to the sum, the REGIONAL
DIRECTOR CAN ISSUE A WRIT OF EXECUTION.
WHAT HAPPENS TO SUM RECOVERED ON BEHALF OF ANY
EMPLOYEE OR HOUSEHELPER?
 It shall be held in a SPECIAL DEPOSIT ACCOUNT
 It shall be paid on order of, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Regional Director directly to the
employee or househelper concerned.
HOW ABOUT THE SUMS NOT PAID TO THE EMPLOYEE OR
HOUSEHELPER BECAUSE HE CANNOT BE LOCATED AFTER
DILIGENT AND REASONABLE EFFORT TO LOCATE HIM WITHIN
A PERIOD OF THREE (3) YEARS?
It shall be held as a special fund of the Department of Labor and
Employment to be used exclusively for the amelioration and
benefit of workers.
CAN THE DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR OR HEARING OFFICER BE APPEALED? YES
GROUNDS: Same grounds provided in Article 223 of this Code
Art. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are
final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both
parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions,
awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:
1) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of
the Labor Arbiter;
2) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or
coercion, including graft and corruption;
3) If made purely on questions of law; and
4) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would
cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.
WHEN: WITHIN FIVE (5) CALENDAR DAYS from receipt of a copy of
said decision or resolution, NOT 10 DAYS
WHERE: To the National Labor Relations Commission
Decisions of RD on pure money claims in the exercise of quasi-judicial
powers may be reviewed by the NLRC, NOT THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR.
PERIOD TO DECIDE: Within ten (10) calendar days from the
submission of the last pleading required or allowed under its rules
The law does not require that a bond be posted for the appeal to be
perfected.
 LABOR ARBITER (LA)
Regional Court of Supreme
NLRC
Director Appeals Court This is where most of the cases are lodged.

Art. 224 (217). Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the

The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representative may supervise the payment of
unpaid wages and other monetary claims and benefits,
including legal interest, found owing to any employee or
househelper under this Code.
Unlike the Regional Director, the Labor Arbiter is not empowered to
order the payment of unpaid wages, other monetary claims and
benefits including interests.
The legal interest is 6% annually because it does not arise from
forbearance of money.
Commission.
1) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by
the parties for decision WITHOUT EXTENSION, even in the absence
of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;

DIFFERENCE OF APPEAL FROM RD TO NLRC 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that
APPEAL FROM LA TO NLRC workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other
terms and conditions of employment;

NLRC NLRC 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code,

WITHIN 5 WITHIN 10 including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and

DAYS DAYS 6. EXCEPT claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security,

Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic
REGIONAL LABOR or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
DIRECTOR ARBITER reinstatement.

2) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all

The Secretary of Labor and Employment may suspend the effects
of the termination pending resolution of the dispute in the event
of a prima facie finding by the appropriate official of the
Department of Labor and Employment before whom such dispute
is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute
or is in implementation of a mass lay-off.
cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
3) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. (As
amended by Section 9, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

Regional Director of Labor can also ISSUE A RESTRAINING ORDER
TO STOP THE EFFECTS OF DISMISSALS OR RETRENCHMENTS
OR TERMINATIONS DUE TO REDUNDANCY. Before you can
terminate workers on the ground of redundancy, retrenchment, labor
saving devices, or financial loss, the employer must serve notice to the
employee and DOLE one month before the date of effecting the
termination. The Labor Code says, if the Regional Director foresees
that this is in implementation of a mass layoff or will give rise to a
serious labor dispute, then the Regional Director of Labor can suspend
the termination.
NOTE: 217 does not contain all the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
Also, these six categories of cases listed can, by agreement of the
parties, be presented to and decided with finality by a voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
One unifying element runs through all the cases and disputes
enumerated in Article 224. That element is employment connection.
VENUE: Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) having jurisdiction over the
workplace of the complainant/petitioner.

EXCEPT: Cases involving Overseas Filipino workers – RAB

where the complainant resides or where the principal officer
of the respondents/employers are situated, at the option of
the complainant

1) UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE

NOTE: See Codal Provisions on what constitutes ULP for employers

and unions 

REVIEW: By virtue of RA 6715, Unfair Labor Practices can no longer

include violation of the CBA. Exception is if the violation of the CBA
constitutes a gross violation of its economic provisions.

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Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly,
violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, EXCEPT those
which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair
labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article,
gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean
flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions of such agreement.
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD: WITHIN 1 YEAR from the time the right of
action accrues.
If you failed to file within the 1 year period, you can still file it
as an ordinary illegal dismissal case WITHIN 4 YEARS.
REMEDIES IN CASE OF ULP:
 Cease and Desist Order
 Reinstatement (if there is dismissal)
 Backwages
 Damages
NOTE: Househelpers cannot file a ULP complaint with the Labor
Arbiter
A complaint that a union is a ―company union‖ is filed with the Labor
Arbiter.
Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for
an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
XXX
To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization, including the giving of
financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters;
2) TERMINATION CASE
General Rule: Termination disputes are within the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter. This includes retaliatory dismissals and ULP
dismissals.
Art. 118. Retaliatory measures. It shall be unlawful for an employer to
refuse to pay or reduce the wages and benefits, discharge or in any
manner discriminate against any employee who has filed any
complaint or instituted any proceeding under this Title or has testified
or is about to testify in such proceedings.
Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for
an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an
employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this
Code;
Exception: Parties defined it as a grievance under the CBA
If the parties agree to submit a ULP case to Voluntary Arbitration, the
Labor Arbiter can be deprived of its jurisdiction over ULP.
Exception to the Exception: Both union and management agreed as
to the termination (Sanyo v Canizares)
TERMINATION CASES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF LA
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G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999
PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fourth
Division), CEBU CITY, CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION
CORPORATION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS, ELDER
HECTOR V. GAYARES, PASTORS REUBEN MORALDE, OSCAR L.
ALOLOR, WILLIAM U. DONATO, JOEL WALES, ELY SACAY,
GIDEON BUHAT, ISACHAR GARSULA, ELISEO DOBLE, PORFIRIO
BALACY, DAVID RODRIGO, LORETO MAYPA, MR. RUFO
GASAPO, MR. EUFRONIO IBESATE, MRS. TESSIE BALACY, MR.
ZOSIMO KARA-AN, and MR. ELEUTERIO
LOBITANA, respondents.
Private respondents contend that by virtue of the doctrine of separation
of church and state, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by petitioner. Since the
matter at bar allegedly involves the discipline of a religious minister, it
is to be considered a purely ecclesiastical affair to which the State has
no right to interfere.
The contention of private respondents deserves scant consideration.
The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in
this case.
As pointed out by the OSG in its memorandum, the grounds invoked
for petitioner's dismissal, namely: misappropriation of denominational
funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual
neglect of duties and commission of an offense against the person of
his employer's duly authorized representative, are all based on Article
282 of the Labor Code which enumerates the just causes for
termination of employment.22 By this alone, it is palpable that the
reason for petitioner's dismissal from the service is not religious in
nature. Coupled with this is the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with
a copy of petitioner's letter of termination. As aptly stated by the OSG,
this again is an eloquent admission by private respondents that NLRC
has jurisdiction over the case. Aside from these, SDA admitted in a
certification23 issued by its officer, Mr. Ibesate, that petitioner has
been its employee for twenty-eight (28) years. SDA even registered
petitioner with the Social Security System (SSS) as its employee. As a
matter of fact, the worker's records of petitioner have been submitted
by private respondents as part of their exhibits. From all of these it is
clear that when the SDA terminated the services of petitioner, it was
merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an employee
which it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the State, through the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the
case and to determine whether the SDA, as employer, rightfully
exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an employee. This is
in consonance with the mandate of the Constitution to afford full
protection to labor.
Under the Labor Code, the provision which governs the dismissal of
employees, is comprehensive enough to include religious corporations,
such as the SDA, in its coverage. Article 278 of the Labor Code on
post-employment states that "the provisions of this Title shall apply to
all establishments or undertakings, whether for profit or not."
Obviously, the cited article does not make any exception in favor of a
religious corporation.
G.R. No. 101619 July 8, 1992
SANYO PHILIPPINES WORKERS UNION-PSSLU LOCAL
CHAPTER NO. 109 AND/OR ANTONIO DIAZ, PSSLU NATIONAL
PRESIDENT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. POTENCIANO S. CANIZARES, in his capacity as Labor
Arbiter, BERNARDO YAP, RENATO BAYBON, SALVADOR
SOLIBEL, ALLAN MISTERIO, EDGARDO TANGKAY, LEONARDO
DIONISIO, ARNEL SALVO, REYNALDO RICOHERMOSO, BENITO
VALENCIA, GERARDO LASALA AND ALEXANDER
ATANASIO, respondents.
In the instant case, however, We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not
the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to
hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. While it
appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon
the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause
provided in the CBA, We are of the opinion that these facts do not
come within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of (their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery
or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitrator states that "(t)he parties to a Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual
observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a
machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from
the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies." It is further provided in said article that
the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective
representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not
settled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to voluntary
arbitrators (or panel of voluntary arbitrators) designated in advance by
the parties. It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the
union and the company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and
the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary
arbitrators.
In the instant case, both the union and the company are united or have
come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of private respondents.
No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a
grievance machinery. The problem or dispute in the present case is
between the union and the company on the one hand and some union
and non-union members who were dismissed, on the other hand. The
dispute has to be settled before an impartial body. The grievance
machinery with members designated by the union and the company
cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees.
Due process demands that the dismissed workers grievances be
ventilated before an impartial body. Since there has already been an
actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.
If a complainant files an illegal dismissal case with money claims, the
principal cause of action of action is illegal dismissal. The money
claims is just an incidental issue.
G.R. No. L-58877 March 15, 1982
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, COSME DE ABOITIZ, and
ALBERTO M. DACUYCUY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his official capacity, and
ABRAHAM TUMALA, JR., respondents
Respondent Tumala maintains that his action for delivery of the house
and lot, his prize as top salesman of the company for 1979, is a civil
controversy triable exclusively by the court of the general jurisdiction.
We do not share this view. The claim for said prize unquestionably
arose from an employer-employee relation and, therefore, falls within
the coverage of par. 5 of P.D. 1691, which speaks of "all claims arising
from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this
Code." Indeed, Tumala would not have qualitfied for the content, much
less won the prize, if he was not an employee of the company at the
time of the holding of the contest. Besides, the cause advanced by
petitioners to justify their refusal to deliver the prize—the alleged
fraudulent manipulations committed by Tumala in connection with his
duties as salesman of the company—involves an inquiry into his
actuations as an employee.
Besides, to hold that Tumala's claim for the prize should be passed
upon by the regular court of justice, independently and separately from
his claim for back salaries, retirement benefits and damages, would be
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to sanction split juridiction and multiplicity of suits which are prejudicial
to the orderly administration of justice.
[
The Pepsi case should be differentiated from the SMC case. In the
former, when the salesman filed his case, it included back salaries,
retirement benefits and damages. It is the Labor Arbiter which has
jurisdiction because the house and lot is merely incidental to the other
causes of action.
In SMC case, the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over controversies
arising from an employer’s innovation program granting cash awards to
employees who submitted ideas and suggestion beneficial to the
corporation because it did not arise from employer-employee relations.
Further, the law that will be used is the Civil Code, particularly the laws
on innominate contracts.
G.R. No. 80774 May 31, 1988
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RUSTICO
VEGA, respondents
The important principle that runs through these three (3) cases is that
where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by
reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a
collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the
jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and
not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of
the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor
in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but
rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims
fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to
Labor Arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction
over such claims to these agencies disappears.
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the Court notes that the
SMC Innovation Program was essentially an invitation from petitioner
Corporation to its employees to submit innovation proposals, and that
petitioner Corporation undertook to grant cash awards to employees
who accept such invitation and whose innovation suggestions, in the
judgment of the Corporation's officials, satisfied the standards and
requirements of the Innovation Program 10 and which, therefore, could
be translated into some substantial benefit to the Corporation. Such
undertaking, though unilateral in origin, could nonetheless ripen into an
enforceable contractual (facio ut des) 11 obligation on the part of
petitioner Corporation under certain circumstances. Thus, whether or
not an enforceable contract, albeit implied arid innominate, had arisen
between petitioner Corporation and private respondent Vega in the
circumstances of this case, and if so, whether or not it had been
breached, are preeminently legal questions, questions not to be
resolved by referring to labor legislation and having nothing to do with
wages or other terms and conditions of employment, but rather having
recourse to our law on contracts.
In PSBA VS. LEAÑO (127 SCRA 778), this Court, confronted with a
similar controversy, ruled that the SEC, not the NLRC, has jurisdiction:
This is not a case of dismissal. The situation is that of a corporate
office having been declared vacant, and of Tan's not having been
elected thereafter. The matter of whom to elect is a prerogative that
belongs to the Board, and involves the exercise of deliberate choice
and the faculty of discriminative selection. Generally speaking, the
relationship of a person to a corporation, whether as officer or as agent
or employee is not determined by the nature of the services performed,
but by the incidents of the relationship as they actually exist.
TERMINATION CASES NOT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF LA
  The termination of a purely managerial employee by the
non-voting of the Board of Directors to retain him in the
board-appointed position cannot fall within the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter.
 Dismissal of a university professor on the sole issue of
academic freedom (CHED)
 Complaint against the bishop by a parish priest for his
dismissal from his position by excommunication
G.R. No. 79762 January 24, 1991
FORTUNE CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division) and
ANTONIO M. LAGDAMEO, respondents.
Lagdameo claims that his dismissal was wrongful, illegal, and arbitrary,
because the "irregularities" charged against him were not investigated
(p. 85, Rollo); that the case of PSBA vs. Leaño (supra) cited by the
Labor Arbiter finds no application to his case because it is not a matter
of corporate office having been declared vacant but one where a
corporate officer was dismissed without legal and factual basis and
without due process; that the power of dismissal should not be
confused with the manner of exercising the same; that even a
corporate officer enjoys security of tenure regardless of his rank (p.
97, Rollo); and that the SEC is without power to grant the reliefs
prayed for in his complaint (p. 106, Rollo).
The issue of the SEC's power or jurisdiction is decisive and renders
unnecessary a consideration of the other questions raised by
Lagdameo. Thus did this Court rule in the case of Dy vs. National
Labor Relations Commission (145 SCRA 211) which involved a similar
situation:
It is of no moment that Vailoces, in his amended complaint, seeks
other reliefs which would seemingly fall under the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter, because a closer look at these — underpayment of
salary and non-payment of living allowance — shows that they are
actually part of the perquisites of his elective position, hence, intimately
linked with his relations with the corporation.1âwphi1 The question of
remuneration, involving as it does, a person who is not a mere
employee but a stockholder and officer, an integral part, it might be
said, of the corporation, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that
comes within the area of corporate affairs and management, and is in
fact a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.
(Emphasis ours.)
EXCEPTIONS
G.R. No. 75583 November 8, 1988
GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. TEODORO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
FACTS: The antecedental employment record of private respondent in
GAUF is not in dispute. Private respondent started as a clerk in the
Registrar's Office of petitioner GAUF on September 15, 1954. In the
course of his continuous employment, he was promoted to Assistant
Cashier, Cashier, Treasurer, Finance Director and, ultimately on
election by the Board of Trustees, as Vice President and concurrently
Treasurer, effective March 5, 1981.
As of March 23, 1983, private respondent was holding his position on
an "Ad Interim Extension of Appointment/Tenure" issued by the
University President up to March 31, 1983 pending appropriate action
of the Board of Trustees at its next meeting. His services were
thereafter re-extended to April 30, 1983, with his signed conformity,
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LAST UPDATED: 11/4/15
and finally up to May 31, 1983 after which he was no longer elected by
the Board as Vice-President and/or Treasurer.
HELD: In in its Reply of June 24, 1987, raised for the first time in this
Court the issue of jurisdiction of the NLRC, a threshold objection which
should have been involved at the earliest stages of the proceedings.
Relying onPhilippine School of Business Administration, et al. vs.
Leaño, et al" and Dy, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
et. al., petitioner theorizes that since private respondent was a
corporate officer, the present controversy is within the jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to P.D. 902-A, and
not in the public respondent.
Without the need of applying the rule on estoppel by laches against
petitioner, its contention must fail on the ground of misplaced reliance.
As explained in Dy, and the same is true with Philippine School of
Business Administration, the controversies therein were intracorporate
in nature and squarely within the purview of Section 5(c), P.D. 902-A
since the real question was the invalidity of the board of directors'
meetings wherein the corporate officers involved were not re-elected,
resulting in the termination of their services. Thus:
There is no dispute that the position from which private respondent
Vailoces claims to have been illegally dismissed is an elective
corporate office. He himself acquired that position through election by
the bank's Board of Directors at the organizational meeting of
November 17, 1979. He lost that position because the Board that was
elected in the special stockholders' meeting of June 4, 1983 did not
reelect him. And when Vailoces, in his position paper submitted to the
Labor Arbiter, impugned said stockholders' meeting as illegally
convoked and the Board of Directors thereby elected as illegally
constituted, he made it clear that the heart of the matter was the
validity of the Directors' meeting of June 4, 1983 which, by not re-
electing him to the position of manager, in effect caused termination of
his services.
Those considerations do not obtain in the case at bar. No
intracorporate controversy exists and the jurisdiction of the
public respondent herein should be sustained.
There has been a history of regular employment and he was raised to
a position by the appointment of the Board of Directors.
G.R. No. 121791 December 23, 1998
ENRIQUE SALAFRANCA, petitioner,
vs.
PHILAMLIFE (PAMPLONA) VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., BONIFACIO DAZO and THE SECOND
DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(NLRC), respondents.
The issues were whether:
(1) The NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that the
employment of the Petitioner is not purely based on considerations of
Employer-Employee relationship
(2) Petitioner was illegally dismissed by private respondents.
HELD:
(1) We agree with the Solicitor General's observation that an employer-
employee relationship exists between the petitioner and the private
respondent.
(2) Relative to the second assigned error of the petitioner, both the
Solicitor General and the private respondent take the stance that
petitioner was not illegally dismissed. 10 On this aspect, we disagree
with their contentions.
On the outset, there is no dispute that petitioner had already attained
the status of a regular employee, as evidenced by his eleven years of
service with the private respondent. Accordingly, petitioner enjoys the
right to security of tenure 11 and his services may be terminated only
for causes provided by law.
Prescinding from these premises, private respondent's insistence that
it can legally dismiss petitioner on the ground that his tenure has
expired is untenable. To reiterate, petitioner, being a regular employee,
is entitled to security of tenure, hence, his services may only be
terminated for causes provided by law. 27 A contrary interpretation
would not find justification in the laws or the Constitution. If we were to
rule otherwise, it would enable an employer to remove any employee
from his employment by the simple expediency of amending its by-
laws and providing that his/her position shall cease to exist upon the
occurrence of a specified event.
Termination is illegal if there is no just and authorized cause.
If the procedure has not been followed, whether it is for authorized or
just case, the termination does not become illegal. It becomes
INOPERATIVE.
G.R. No. 117040 January 27, 2000
RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN
DEPARTMENT STORE, respondents.
Lack of Notice Only Makes Termination Ineffectual
Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process. Some are
simply part of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to a
party can be exercised. Others are simply an application of the
Justinian precept, embodied in the Civil Code, to act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith toward one's
fellowmen. Such is the notice requirement in Arts. 282-283. The
consequence of the failure either of the employer or the employee
to live up to this precept is to make him liable in damages, not to
render his act (dismissal or resignation, as the case may be) void.
The measure of damages is the amount of wages the employee should
have received were it not for the termination of his employment without
prior notice. If warranted, nominal and moral damages may also be
awarded.
If the termination is for an AUTHORIZED cause, the procedure is in
Article 283 of the Labor Code.
Payment of
One Month
Notice Termination
Waiting Period
Benefits
The notice one month before the termination is MANDATORY. You
cannot do away from such requirement by paying an extra month
salary.
The purpose of the one month period is to give the employee time to
look for another job and possibly, to question the ground for
termination.
G.R. No. 117040 January 27, 2000
RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN
DEPARTMENT STORE, respondents.
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Art. 283 also provides that to terminate the employment of an
employee for any of the authorized causes the employer must serve "a
written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof."
In the case at bar, petitioner was given a notice of termination on
October 11, 1991. On the same day, his services were terminated. He
was thus denied his right to be given written notice before the
termination of his employment, and the question is the appropriate
sanction for the violation of petitioner's right. X X X
The fines imposed for violations of the notice requirement have varied
from P1,000.00 to P2,000.00 to P5,000.00 to P10,000.00.
G.R. No. 112100 May 27, 1994
EDWARD R. RETA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ARPAPHIL
SHIPPING CORPORATION, TARPON SHIPPING CO. and LUZON
SURETY CO., INC. respondents.
As to the consequence of the failure to observe the requirement of due
process in the dismissal of an employee, we ruled in Aurelio v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 221 SCRA 432 (1993):
In cases where there was a valid ground to dismiss an employee but
there was non-observance of due process, this Court held that only a
sanction must be imposed upon the employer for failure to give formal
notice and to conduct an investigation required by law before
dismissing the employee in consonance with the ruling in Wenphil v.
NLRC, 170 SCRA 69 (1989); Shoemart, Inc. v. NLRC, supra; and
in Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Zenaida Alonzo, 199 SCRA 617 [1991]). . . . In
the Pacific Mills, Inc. and Wenphil cases, this Court merely
awarded P1,000.00 as penalty for non-observance of due process
(Emphasis supplied).
Considering that petitioner was given his walking papers and was
forced to leave his ship in a foreign port, the penalty to be
imposed on his employer for the non-observance of the
requirements of due process in dismissing him is higher than that
imposed in the cited cases.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that private
respondents should pay petitioner P10,000.00 as penalty for
failure to comply with the due process requirement.
If it is mere dismissal, the procedure is in Article 277-B.
Art. 277, par. (b), of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by
Sec. 33, R.A. 6715, provides —
Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and
their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and
authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice
under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford
the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with
company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set
by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by
the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with
the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The
burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause shall rest on the employer. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment may suspend the effects of the termination pending
resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding by
the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and
Employment before whom such dispute is pending that the
termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in
implementation of a mass lay-off.
Written Notice Hearing
Contest Validity
Decision of Dismissal
before NLRC
BURDEN OF PROOF: When an employee files a case for illegal
dismissal, he has no obligation to prove that his dismissal is illegal. He
only has to prove that he was an employee and subsequently, he is no
longer an employee. It is the employer who has to prove that the
termination or dismissal was regular.
APPEAL
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement
aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even
pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to
work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely
reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall
not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
EXECUTION: When the Labor Arbiter makes a finding that there was
illegal dismissal, pending appeal, there can be execution of the
reinstatement which may be:
1. Actual Reinstatement
2. Payroll Reinstatement
The employee need not file a motion for execution of the reinstatement
pending appeal.
In PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP. V. NLRC, ET. AL., decided in
1997, the Court clarified once and for all this self-executory nature of a
reinstatement order. After tracing back the various Court rulings
interpreting the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 6715 on
the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under Article 223 of the
Labor Code, the Court concluded that to otherwise "require the
application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for
the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run
counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate
execution of a reinstatement order."
In short, therefore, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the
law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its
immediate and automatic execution even pending appeal. The
employer is duty-bound to reinstate the employee, failing which, the
employer is liable instead to pay the dismissed employee’s salary. The
Court’s consistent and prevailing treatment and interpretation of the
reinstatement order as immediately enforceable, in fact, merely
underscores the right to security of tenure of employees that the
Constitution protects.
As we amply discussed above, an employer is obliged to
immediately reinstate the employee upon the LA’s finding of
illegal dismissal; if the employer fails, it is liable to pay the salary
of the dismissed employee. Of course, it is not always the case that
the LA’s finding of illegal dismissal is, on appeal by the employer,
upheld by the appellate court. After the LA’s decision is reversed by
a higher tribunal, the employer’s duty to reinstate the dismissed
employee is effectively terminated. This means that an employer
is no longer obliged to keep the employee in the actual service or
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in the payroll. The employee, in turn, is not required to return the
wages that he had received prior to the reversal of the LA’s
decision.
The reversal by a higher tribunal of the LA’s finding (of illegal
dismissal), notwithstanding, an employer, who, despite the LA’s
order of reinstatement, did not reinstate the employee during the
pendency of the appeal up to the reversal by a higher tribunal
may still be held liable for the accrued wages of the employee,
i.e., the unpaid salary accruing up to the time the higher tribunal
reverses the decision. The rule, therefore, is that an employee
may still recover the accrued wages up to and despite the
reversal by the higher tribunal. This entitlement of the employee
to the accrued wages proceeds from the immediate and self-
executory nature of the reinstatement aspect of the LA’s decision.
By way of exception to the above rule, an employee may be
barred from collecting the accrued wages if shown that the delay
in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault
on the part of the employer. To determine whether an employee is
thus barred, two tests must be satisfied: (1) actual delay or the fact that
the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its
reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employer’s
unjustified act or omission. Note that under the second test, the delay
must be without the employer’s fault. If the delay is due to the
employer’s unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay
the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LA’s decision.
G.R. No. 164856 January 20, 2009
JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Respondent.
NOTE: This case abandoned the Genuino v CA decision
The opposite view is articulated in Genuino which states:
If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the
finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has
the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll
reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case
was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued
benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from
his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement
provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was
reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the
employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services
rendered without need of refund.
Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on
payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then
she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of
the fallo of the September 3, 1994 NLRC Decision.14 (Emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied)
Genuino ruling not only disregards the social justice principles behind
the rule, but also institutes a scheme unduly favorable to management.
Under such scheme, the salaries dispensed pendente lite merely serve
as a bond posted in installment by the employer. For in the event of a
reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision ordering reinstatement, the
employer gets back the same amount without having to spend
ordinarily for bond premiums. This circumvents, if not directly
contradicts, the proscription that the "posting of a bond [even a cash
bond] by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement."
XXX
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is
obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the
wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal
until reversal by the higher court.21 It settles the view that the
Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is immediately executory
and the employer has to either re-admit them to work under the
same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or
to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the
options in the alternative, employer must pay the employee’s
salaries.
NOTE: Garcia case is also applicable in ULP cases
WITHIN 10 DAYS from receipt of the decision, the employer should
submit to the arbiter a report of compliance; otherwise, he may be cited
for contempt. (Section 18, Rule V and Section 9, Rule XI, NLRC
Rules, 2011)
WHEN DISMISSED EMPLOYEE NOT ENTITLED TO FULL
BACKWAGES
 Illegally dismissed employee dies
 Reaches Retirement Age (65 years old) during the pendency
of the case
 Employer closes down during the pendency of the case
 Position was abolished and there is no other equivalent
position where he can be transferred to
WHAT IS COVERED BY FULL BACKWAGES
G.R. No. L-21120 February 28, 1967
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
As a consequence, the employees involved in the case at bar are
entitled to the Christmas bonus that PAL had given to all of its
employees during said period, for said bonus, having been paid
regularly, has become part of the compensation of the
employees.1 Said employees are, likewise, entitled to transportation
allowance and the corresponding sick leave privileges. These sick
leave privileges are subject, however, to the following qualifications,
namely: (1) that the accumulated sick leave cannot exceed 140 days,
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the PAL and
the PALEA, effective in 1959; and (2) that, pursuant to the same
agreement, which denies sick leave privileges to retired employees,
Onofre Griño and Bernardino Abarrientos, who have retired, are not
entitled to said privileges.
The PAL's appeal as regards the free trip passes is, however, well
taken, for the employees had no absolute right thereto, even if they
had actually rendered services during the lay-off period. The free trip
passes were given, neither automatically, nor indiscriminately. The
employees had to apply therefore and their applications were subject
PAL's approval.
 It includes the semestral wages for teachers as it is paid,
even if they are not teaching during the semestral break.
 It includes the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) as it goes
with the salary.
NOTE: In decisions where illegal dismissal is found to have been
committed, the LA has no jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees or
damages.
He cannot also award financial assistance in the name of
compassionate justice to those retrenched or rendered redundant
over and above what separation benefits under the law they have
received from their employers.
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If the LA awards financial assistance to those who have been
dismissed for serious misconduct, he commits grave abuse of
discretion.
3) ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR STANDARDS WITH CLAIM
EXCEEDING P5,000 PER INDIVIDUAL, WHETHER OR
NOT ACCOMPANIED WITH CLAIM FOR
REINSTATEMENT
4) ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR STANDARDS WITH CLAIM
NOT EXCEEDING P5,000 PER INDIVIDUAL, IF
ACCOMPANIED WITH CLAIM FOR REINSTATEMENT
This is because the main cause now becomes termination.
5) DAMAGES ARISING FROM EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP
IN WHAT INSTANCES MAY THERE BE AWARD OF DAMAGES?
Moral damages would be recoverable where the dismissal of the
employee was not only effected without authorized cause or due
process but also:
1. Attended by bad faith or fraud
2. Constituted an act oppressive to labor
3. Done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy
G.R. No. 72644 December 14, 1987
ALFREDO F. PRIMERO, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DM
TRANSIT, respondents.
Thus, an employee who has been illegally dismissed (i.e.,
discharged without just cause or being accorded due process), in
such a manner as to cause him to suffer moral damages (as
determined by the Civil Code), has a cause of action for
reinstatement and recovery of back wages and damages. When
he institutes proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, he should
make a claim for all said reliefs. He cannot, to be sure, be
permitted to prosecute his claims piecemeal. He cannot institute
proceedings separately and contemporaneously in a court of justice
upon the same cause of action or a part thereof. He cannot and
should not be allowed to sue in two forums: one, before the Labor
Arbiter for reinstatement and recovery of back wages, or for
separation pay, upon the theory that his dismissal was illegal;
and two, before a court of justice for recovery of moral and other
damages, upon the theory that the manner of his dismissal was
unduly injurious, or tortious. This is what in procedural law is
known as splitting causes of action, engendering multiplicity of
actions. It is against such mischiefs that the Labor Code amendments
just discussed are evidently directed, and it is such duplicity which the
Rules of Court regard as ground for abatement or dismissal of actions,
constituting either litis pendentia (auter action pendant) or res
adjudicata, as the case may be. But this was precisely what Primero's
counsel did. He split Primero's cause of action; and he made one of
the split parts the subject of a cause of action before a court of justice.
Consequently, the judgment of the Labor Arbiter granting Primero
separation pay operated as a bar to his subsequent action for the
recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance under the
doctrine of res judicata, The rule is that the prior "judgment or order
is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for
the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.
CASES FOR DAMAGES NOT WITHIN LABOR ARBITER’S
JURISDICTION:
G.R. No. 89621 September 24, 1991
PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
represented by its Plant General Manager ANTHONY B. SIAN,
ELEAZAR LIMBAB, IRENEO BALTAZAR & JORGE
HERAYA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LOLITA O. GAL-LANG, SALVADOR NOVILLA, ALEJANDRO
OLIVA, WILFREDO CABAÑAS & FULGENCIO LEGO, respondents.
The case now before the Court involves a complaint for damages for
malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Leyte by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear
that there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the complaint
and the relations of the parties as employer and employees. The
complaint did not arise from such relations and in fact could have
arisen independently of an employment relationship between the
parties. No such relationship or any unfair labor practice is asserted.
What the employees are alleging is that the petitioners acted with bad
faith when they filed the criminal complaint which the Municipal Trial
Court said was intended "to harass the poor employees" and the
dismissal of which was affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor "for lack
of evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all the
respondents herein have committed the crime imputed against them."
This is a matter which the labor arbiter has no competence to resolve
as the applicable law is not the Labor Code but the Revised Penal
Code.
In SINGAPORE AIRLINES LTD. V. PAÑO, 4 where the plaintiff was
suing for damages for alleged violation by the defendant of an
"Agreement for a Course of Conversion Training at the Expense of
Singapore Airlines Limited," the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal over the case was questioned. The Court, citing the
earlier case of Quisaba v. Sta. Ines Melale Veneer and Plywood,
Inc., 5 declared through Justice Herrera:
Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and
claims no benefits under the Labor Code. The primary relief sought is
for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other
items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers
generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such as payment of
wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items claimed
are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation,
intrinsically a civil dispute.
G.R. No. 80933 October 31, 1990
PHIL-DUMEZ CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA A.
LATONIO respondents.
Under the first issue of jurisdiction, it is true that the evidence tends to
show that the private respondent was not a mere medical retainer but
was practically a part of the management of the petitioner, wherein her
employees are under the control and supervision of the management
and had to work within the hours set by the petitioner. She had to
absorb the radiologist and dentist in her medical clinic whether she
liked it or not. She was also given instructions on how medical
examinations should be performed. Her personnel were required to
observe the usual working hours set for its employees. Petitioner's
employees were treated by her and her staff, her nurses and
technologists. She was also made to participate in the computerization
of petitioner's medical records. Her nurses and technologists were
asked to clear up the mess from among said records. Memoranda
were sent to her concerning petitioner's operations in Saudi Arabia.
The name of her own medical clinic, "Spectrum Laboratory" was
adopted by petitioner as its own. All these show that she was under the
petitioner's control which indicates the existence of the employer-
employee relationship. 9
However, it appears from the records that private respondent is
suing petitioner for damages caused by its tortious act of
terminating private respondent's services for no reason at all.
This suit falls under the jurisdiction of the regular courts whereby
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LAST UPDATED: 11/4/15
private respondent claims that petitioner had oppressively and
illegally dismissed her. Her claim does not involve her hours of
work, the terms and conditions of employment, non-payment or
underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay,
and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement.
Hence, it is the regular court that has jurisdiction over the case
and not the Department of Labor and Employment or National
Labor Relations Commission.
G.R. No. L-56566 April 15, 1985
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, BROTHER DANIEL ORTIZ, FSC and
DEAN PATRICIO CEBALLOS, petitioners,
vs.
LOLITA U. LAO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
We hold that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction
over the case. It was properly brought before the courts. The issue
was the existence of employer-employee relations between Lao and
the university. Under Article 265(f), later article 217(5), the existence of
employer-employee relations is assumed, not disputed.
In this case, it is necessary to determine whether Lao became a
permanent employee after she was hired as a probationary
employee. The determination of that question could be more
competently handled by the court after a full-dress trial and not
by the Labor Arbiter by means of the position-paper procedure
followed by him.
The other contention of the appellants in their ninth and tenth
assignments of error is that Lao never became a permanent employee.
We find that the contract for permanent employment was not
completed because it was not signed by the university president, it was
legally withdrawn before it became effective and it was never delivered
to Lao.
Lao was a probationary employee. Her probationary employment
was the one legally terminated by the university. There can be no
doubt as to the university's prerogative to terminate her
probationary employment and not to give her a permanent
employment. Lao has no cause of action for damages. It must be
conceded that she filed the case in good faith.
G.R. No. L-59825 September 11, 1982
ERNESTO MEDINA and JOSE G. ONG, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance Cf Rizal, Branch
XV, Makati, Metro Manila, COSME DE ABOITIZ and PEPSI-COLA
BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
The pivotal question to Our mind is whether or not the Labor Code has
any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs. For if the Labor
Code has no relevance, any discussion concerning the statutes
amending it and whether or not they have retroactive effect is
unnecessary.
It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged
any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages
for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such
being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the
Labor Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a
wrong premise.
6) ALL OTHER CLAIMS ARISING FROM EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
RULE OF THUMB: Just because you are an employee when the
incident happened does not mean that it arises out of employer-
employee relations. If the law that is going to be used is the Labor
Code, then it arises out of employer-employee relationship.

Barangay Lupon Clearance is not required before filing a money
claims complaint with the Labor Arbiter, if the respondent employer is
not a juridical person and both complainant and respondent live in the
same barangay.
G.R. No. 111870 June 30, 1994
AIR MATERIAL WING SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et
al., respondents.
The petitioner contends that the public respondents are not
empowered to adjudicate claims for notarial fees. On the other hand,
the Solicitor General believes that the NLRC acted correctly when it
took cognizance of the claim because it arose out of Salas'
employment contract with the petitioner which assigned him the duty to
notarize loan agreements and other legal documents. Moreover,
Section 9 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court does not restrict or prevent
the labor arbiter and the NLRC from determining claims for notarial
fees.
Labor arbiters have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money
claims of workers when such claims have some reasonable connection
with the employer-employee relationship. The money claims of workers
referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 of the Labor Code are those
arising out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship
or some aspect or incident of such relationship.
Salas' claim for notarial fees is based on his employment as a
notarial officer of the petitioner and thus comes under the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.
G.R. No. 82135 August 20, 1990
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK (Represented
by its liquidator, MS. CARLOTA P. VALENZUELA), petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Labor Arbiter
EVANGELINE LUBATON and FORTUNATO DIZON,
JR., respondents.
We are of the opinion that it is the NLRC which has jurisdiction over
Dizon's money claims. Section 29 of the Central Bank Act (Republic
Act No. 265) before its amendment by Executive Order No. 289
(September, 1987,) reads, to wit:
Sec. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. — ... If the Monetary Board
shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is
insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires,
order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve
a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file
a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which
have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the
same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasibanking function and
enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders. and do all that is
necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. ... The liquidator
shall with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking
institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to
creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such
institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions
as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover
accounts and assets of such institution. [Emphasis supplied]
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There is nothing in Section 29 which suggests that the
jurisdiction of the liquidation court to adjudicate claims against
the insolvent bank is exclusive. On the other hand, Article 217 of
the Labor Code explicitly provides that labor arbiters have
original and exclusive jurisdiction, over money claims of an
employee against his employer, thus:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Commission. (a)
The Labor Arbiter shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide ... the following cases involving all workers,...:
xxx xxx xxx
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment
or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay
and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except
claims for employee's compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits. [Emphasis supplied]
We do not think that this jurisdiction would be lost simply
because a former employer had been placed under liquidation.
The legislature deemed it wise to confer jurisdiction over labor disputes
to a body exclusively of others and We are not prepared to divest such
authority from the labor arbiter and the NLRC absent any clear
provision of law to that effect.
CLAIMS NOT ARISING FROM EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP
 Claim of a salesman of his prize of a house and lot for
garnering the highest sales in a contest launched by his
employer
 General Manager’s failure to pay, before he resigned, his
bank accounts consisting of repairs done to his personal car
while still manager
 Abandonment of a pilot for another high paying job with a
rival airline in violation of a written contract of employment
which provides for liquidated damages scaled according to
the number of years he serves after his training and which
written contract is secured by a subsidiary contract of surety
G.R. No. L-65377 May 28, 1984
MOLAVE MOTOR SALES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRISPIN C. LARON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Pangasinan, Branch XLIV and PEDRO
GEMENIANO, respondents.
In the case below, PLAINTIFF had sued for monies loaned to
DEFENDANT, the cost of repair jobs made on his personal cars, and
for the purchase price of vehicles and parts sold to him. Those
accounts have no relevance to the Labor Code. The cause of action
was one under the civil laws, and it does not breach any provision
of the Labor Code or the contract of employment of DEFENDANT.
Hence, the civil courts, not the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC,
should have jurisdiction.
In the case of CAGAYAN DE ORO COLISEUM, INC. VS. OFFICE OF
THE MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ETC., ET AL., we
ruled that "(a)lthough the reliefs sought by Chavez appear to fall under
the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter as they are claims for unpaid
salaries and other remunerations for services rendered, a close
scrutiny thereof shows that said claims are actually part of the
perquisites of his position in, and therefore interlinked with, his
relations with the corporation.
If the controversy concerns the election or appointment of directors,
trustees, officers or managers of corporations, partnerships or
associations, it is the Securities and Exchange Commission, not the
labor arbiters, which has jurisdiction.
 The SEC jurisdiction over corporation disputes however has
been transferred to regular courts by the Securities
Regulations Code.
This ruling holds true even though the complainant is claiming for
backwages, employment benefits and damages (Espino, January 5,
1995)
In DY, ET AL., VS. NLRC, et al., the Court said: "(t)he question of
remuneration involving as it does, a person who is not a mere
employee but a stockholder and officer, an integral part, it might be
said, of the corporation, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that
comes within the area of corporate affairs and management and is in
fact a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.
[[
G.R. No. 66541. November 20, 1990.
GUARDEX ENTERPRISES and/or MARCELINA A.
ESCANDOR, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and JUMBEE ORBETA, Respondents.
A claim for alleged unpaid commissions of an agent is what is
basically involved in the action at bar. Somehow, it twice escaped
outright rejection for lack of jurisdiction in the Department of Labor
where the case was resolved at the first instance and on appeal. Both
the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission
appeared unaware of the utter lack of labor-related issues in the
parties’ conflicting contentions as to the existence of agency
relations between them, and proceeded to decide the case.
Neither of them of course had competence to do so.
G.R. No. 148132 January 28, 2008
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
REGINA M. ASTORGA, respondent.
RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within
its discretion in denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss. SMART’s
demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the
alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil,
dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather
than employee-employer relations. As such, the dispute falls
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
G.R. No. 80039 April 18, 1989
ERNESTO M. APODACA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JOSE M. MIRASOL
and INTRANS PHILS., INC., respondents.
Does the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) have
jurisdiction to resolve a claim for non-payment of stock
subscriptions to a corporation? Assuming that it has, can an
obligation arising therefrom be offset against a money claim of an
employee against the employer?
Firstly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction to determine such intra-
corporate dispute between the stockholder and the corporation
as in the matter of unpaid subscriptions. This controversy is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Secondly, assuming arguendo that the NLRC may exercise jurisdiction
over the said subject matter under the circumstances of this case, the
unpaid subscriptions are not due and payable until a call is made by
the corporation for payment. 2 Private respondents have not presented
a resolution of the board of directors of respondent corporation calling
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for the payment of the unpaid subscriptions. It does not even appear
that a notice of such call has been sent to petitioner by the respondent
corporation.
G.R. No. 107277 August 9, 1996
APOLINARIO R. DACANAY, BENJAMIN F. TAMAYO, JOSE C.
DADIZON, EDIZER J. CORNISTA, PABLITO E. URI, ALBERTO
DETABLAN, NARCISO ARZAIS, and ROGELIO SANTOS, in their
personal capacity and in representation of 495 members of WAKE
ISLAND FILIPINO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(WIFEA),petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RUBEN RESUS,
NARCISO TERRADO, AND ATTY. ARTURO L. TIU, respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution, dated September
25, 1992, of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR
CA No. 5-600-73 modifying its original decision dated March 10, 1992,
holding private respondents jointly and severally liable with Facilities
Management Corp. and Automation Industries, Inc. for the payment of
the money claims of petitioners by absolving them from such liability on
the ground that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the claims against
them being based on contract, jurisdiction over which belongs to the
regular courts.
The sole issue in this case is whether the NLRC has jurisdiction to hold
private respondents jointly and severally liable with Facilities
Management Corp. and Automation Industries, Inc. for the claims of
petitioners.
We hold that it does not have jurisdiction and that the NLRC
correctly absolved private respondents from such liability. They
may be held liable in damages for breach of trust, but the action
to enforce such liability must be brought in the regular courts.
The NLRC has no jurisdiction over such case.
G.R. No. 104389 May 27, 1994
ZAMBOANGA CITY WATER DISTRICT, petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDING COMMISSIONER MUSIB M. BUAT, COMMISSIONERS
LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., and OSCAR N. ABELLA, and PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS LUIS C. MARIANO, FELIX G. LAQUIO,
FRANCISCO C. OLIVEROS, MARITTA S. DELOS REYES,
FRANCISBELLO D. CRUZ, EXEQUIEL M. DAYOT, JR., ERIC A.
DELGADO, RICARDO M. FERRER, JOVITO DUHAYLUNGSOD,
ANTONIO F. ALCANTARA, RICARDO M. CORTEZ, TEOBALDO M.
FLORES, ZOILO J. CAPUY, BERNARDINO T. ALDINETE, ANGIEL
M. ESPINA, WINIFRIDO P. CASIMIRO, ENRIQUE M. MANUEL, JR.,
JOSE P. ATILANO, ANTONIO F. DELOS REYES, JR., ELEUTERIO
S. TARROZA, ANTONIO B. DESPALO, ROLANDO B. GARCIA,
CESAR P. REYES, GENEROSO L. CODINO, MARIO E.
FERNANDO, BERNARDO B. GEROLAGA, ANTONIO F. VESAGAS,
ANTONIO L. TUBIG, SAILILLA A. ABDULLA, NOEL A. FERNANDO,
SEVERIANO CASIMIRO, RODOLFO DESCALZO, ARTEMIO DE
LEON, and SANTIAGO FERRER, respondents
Petitioner contends that the NLRC had no jurisdiction to issue the
resolutions in question because jurisdiction over labor disputes is
vested in the Civil Service Commission. It also argues that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when it ordered the payment of the salaries of private
respondent during the effectivity of the restraining order of this Court in
G.R. Nos. 95219-20.
There is no dispute that petitioner, a water district with an original
charter, is a government-owned and controlled corporation. The
established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of
government-owned and controlled corporations are governed by
the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules
and Regulations (Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton, 172 SCRA 253
[1989]; Hagonoy Water District v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 165 SCRA 272 [1988]; National Housing Corporation v.
Juco, 134 SCRA 172 [1985]; Baguio Water District v. Trajano, 127
SCRA 730 [1984]. Jurisdiction over the strike and the dismissal of
private respondents is therefore lodged not with the NLRC but
with the Civil Service Commission.
Nevertheless, petitioner never raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
before the Executive Labor Arbiter, the NLRC or even this Court in
G.R. Nos. 95219-20. In fact, petitioner itself filed the complaint before
the Executive Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. RAB-IX-03-0090-87,
sought affirmative relief therefrom and even participated actively in the
proceedings below. It is only now in this case before us, after the
NLRC ordered payment of back wages, that petitioner raises the issue
of lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, it is not fair for a party who has
voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a tribunal in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief therefrom, to afterwards repudiate and deny
that very same jurisdiction to escape a penalty (Ocheda v. Court of
Appeals, 214 SCRA 629 [1992]; Royales v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 127 SCRA 470 [1984]; Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29
[1968]).
Petitioner is thus estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the NLRC
and is bound to respect all the proceedings below.
NOTE: Casual employees of GSIS (Government) cannot file money
claims complaints with the Labor Arbiter.
G.R. Nos. 81852-53 March 5, 1993
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER
MANUEL P. ASUNCION, ABUNDIO IBASCO, ANTONIO
MAGSIPOC, CARLOS VILLARANTE and BIENVENIDO
RAMIREZ, respondents.
A perusal of the complaint (Annex I, Petition, p. 59, Rollo) clearly
shows that the subject-matter concerns: (a) the assessment and
deduction of 10% from private respondents' CBA differential pay which
were denounced by private respondents as illegal and exorbitant and
made against their will, and (b) private respondents' expulsion from the
union. The assessment and deduction of 10% from each employee's
differential pay were imposed by petitioner through Resolusyon Blg.
265 and the expulsion was adopted by petitioner through Resolusyon
Blg. 15, dated January 6, 1987, both of which were denounced by
private respondents as illegal and violative of their rights as union
members. Clearly this is an intra-union dispute — a dispute between a
labor union and its members. "Internal Union Dispute" includes all
disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement
over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, including
any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership
provided for in the Code (Book V, Rule I, Section l(a), Omnibus Rules
Implementing The Labor Code).
Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines vests on the Bureau of
Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions jurisdiction to act on
all inter-union or intra-union conflicts.
7) VIOLATION OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS
Art. 227. Compromise agreements. Any compromise settlement,
including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon
by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of
the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties.
The National Labor Relations Commission or any court, shall not
assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein EXCEPT in case
of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that
the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or
coercion.
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FATHER: It is my submission that in case of violation of a compromise
agreement, the Civil Code may be invoked. In which case, the
complainant can choose from the following remedies:
1. To enforce the original claim
2. To move for execution of the compromise agreement
8) EXECUTION OF AWARD OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
A labor arbitrator can act as voluntary arbitrator.
9) OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (MONEY CLAIMS
ARISING FROM SUCH)
It is the LABOR ARBITER, NOT THE POEA that has ORIGINAL AND
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION over money claims arising from overseas
contracts of employment, land-based or sea-based.
This includes employees compensation and social security claims.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended by RA 10022, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR
DAYS after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damage. Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to
update and keep abreast with the developments in the global services
industry.
Even if the OCW has not yet gone overseas but he has already
signed the overseas employment contract, the Labor Arbiter has
jurisdiction over his claim for actual and moral damages for breach of
that contract, having not been deployed.
BURDEN OF PROOF: A complainant does not have to prove that
he/she was illegally dismissed , only that he/she was an employee and
has cease employment.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause, the Labor Arbiter can also award interest only on
the placement fee at 12% per annum. Employee is entitled to the
FULL REIMBURSEMENT of the PLACEMENT FEE WITH INTEREST
AT 12% PER ANNUM.
10) WAGE DISTORTION CASES (WHERE THERE IS NO CBA
AND NCMB FAILED TO RESOLVE DISPUTE AFTER 10
CALENDAR DAYS OF CONCILIATION
In organized establishments, wage distortion complaints must be
processed through the Grievance Machinery.
Art. 124. Standards/Criteria for minimum wage fixing.
In cases where there are no collective agreements or recognized labor
unions, the employers and workers shall endeavor to correct such
distortions. Any dispute arising therefrom shall be settled through the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it remains
unresolved AFTER TEN (10) CALENDAR DAYS of conciliation,
shall be referred to the appropriate branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). It shall be mandatory for the NLRC
to conduct continuous hearings and decide the dispute WITHIN
TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS from the time said dispute is
submitted for compulsory arbitration.

Wage Distortions in
workplaces where
NCMB
there is no CBA or
recognized labor union
10 days to resolve Remains Unresolved
Refer to Regional Office
20 days to decide
of Labor Arbiter
This is a case where the Labor Arbiter exercises APPELLATE
JURISDICTION. From the NCMB, the case is brought to the Labor
Arbiter.
11) STRIKE OR LOCKOUT COMPLAINTS AND CASES OF
VIOLATIONS OF 264 (PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES FOR
STRIKES OR LOCKOUTS)
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.
No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout
without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of
this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the
preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first
having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction
by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of
the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement
with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates
in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a
worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired
by the employer during such lawful strike.
No person shall obstruct, impede, or interfere with, by force, violence,
coercion, threats or intimidation, any peaceful picketing by employees
during any labor controversy or in the exercise of the right to self-
organization or collective bargaining, or shall aid or abet such
obstruction or interference.
No employer shall use or employ any strike-breaker, nor shall any
person be employed as a strike-breaker.
No public official or employee, including officers and personnel of the
New Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Integrated National Police,
or armed person, shall bring in, introduce or escort in any manner, any
individual who seeks to replace strikers in entering or leaving the
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premises of a strike area, or work in place of the strikers. The police
force shall keep out of the picket lines unless actual violence or other
criminal acts occur therein: Provided, That nothing herein shall be
interpreted to prevent any public officer from taking any measure
necessary to maintain peace and order, protect life and property,
and/or enforce the law and legal order. (As amended by Executive
Order No. 111, December 24, 1986)
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence,
coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from
the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public
thoroughfares. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 227, June 1,
1982)
The LA cannot issue a TRO to stop the commission of prohibited
practices under Article 264 of the Labor Code.
The criminal aspect is found in 272.
Art. 272. Penalties.
Any person violating any of the provisions of Article 264 of this Code
shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) nor more than ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and/or
imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than three (3)
years, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the
court. Prosecution under this provision shall preclude prosecution for
the same act under the Revised Penal Code, and vice versa.
Upon the recommendation of the Minister of Labor and Employment
and the Minister of National Defense, foreigners who violate the
provisions of this Title shall be subject to immediate and summary
deportation by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation and
shall be permanently barred from re-entering the country without the
special permission of the President of the Philippines. (As amended by
Section 16, Batas Pambansa Bilang 130 and Section 7, Batas
Pambansa Bilang 227)
There is no prohibition as to the filing of the criminal and
administrative case SIMULTANEOUSLY.
However, since most of the prohibited practices will also take on the
character of ULP, then you cannot file a criminal complaint which is
also ULP, unless the administrative case is terminated.
WHO HAS JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE LEGALITY OF
STRIKE AND LOCKOUT?
In general, the Labor Arbiter in the appropriate Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission has the power to determine
questions involving the legality or illegality of a strike or lockout upon
the filing of a proper complaint and after due hearing.
Where the matter of legality or illegality of strike is raised in the dispute
over which the Secretary assumed jurisdiction or in disputes certified
by the Secretary to the Commission for compulsory arbitration, the
same may be resolved by the Secretary or the Commission,
respectively. (International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Labor and Associated Labor Union, GR. No. 92981-83, January 9,
1992.)
SOURCE: http://co.ncmb.ph/conciliation-mediation/
Also, under 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure
RULE V
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LABOR ARBITERS
SECTION 1. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS. - Labor Arbiters
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:
e) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of the Labor Code, as
amended, including questions involving the legality of strikes and
lockouts;
This is likewise the opinion of Azucena.
BUT, in one of the exams, ―The NLRC, not the Labor Arbiter, can
declare a strike legal or illegal‖, the answer is FALSE. 
 The LA can still correctly rule that no illegal strike was
committed even if no ULP was in fact committed in a
purportedly ULP-called strike.
 The decision of the LA that ULP has been committed may be
executed by means of CEASE & DESIST ORDER.
 The LA CANNOT award damages to a third party (passer-
by, pedestrian) who sustains bodily injury as a result of
violence committed during a strike.
12) OTHER CASES THAT ARE WITHIN THE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITER
Art. 135. Discrimination prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any
employer to discriminate against any woman employee with respect to
terms and conditions of employment solely on account of her sex.
The following are acts of discrimination:
Payment of a lesser compensation, including wage, salary or other
form of remuneration and fringe benefits, to a female employees as
against a male employee, for work of equal value; and
Favoring a male employee over a female employee with respect to
promotion, training opportunities, study and scholarship grants solely
on account of their sexes.
Criminal liability for the willful commission of any unlawful act as
provided in this Article or any violation of the rules and regulations
issued pursuant to Section 2 hereof shall be penalized as provided in
Articles 288 and 289 of this Code: Provided, That the institution of
any criminal action under this provision shall not bar the
aggrieved employee from filing an entirely separate and distinct
action for money claims, which may include claims for damages
and other affirmative reliefs. The actions hereby authorized shall
proceed independently of each other. (As amended by Republic Act
No. 6725, May 12, 1989)
The criminal complaint may be filed simultaneously with the
administrative complaint. The action for money claims is within the
ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION of the labor arbiter.
Art. 137. Prohibited acts.
It shall be unlawful for any employer:
To deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter
or to discharge any woman employed by him for the purpose of
preventing her from enjoying any of the benefits provided under this
Code.
To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, or while on
leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy;
To discharge or refuse the admission of such woman upon returning to
her work for fear that she may again be pregnant.
Actions for 137 will take the form of a COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY
DAMAGES which may be actual and/or moral damages. Actual
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damages is for actual loss of employment. Moral damages is to
recompense the complaint for the discriminatory way in which she was
terminated.
Only women can file under Article 137.
PROCEDURAL RULES
Also applicable to NLRC
NLRC and LA are not bound by strict rules of evidence and of
procedures. But there are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings. (Ang
Tibay, February 1940)
BASIS FOR LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process. Its requirements are satisfied when parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their sides of
the controversy.
G.R. No. 123810 January 20, 1999
CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK (Cagayan Valley), INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA
SANCHEZ, respondents.
It is entirely within the bounds of the Labor Arbiter's authority to
decide a case based on mere position papers and supporting
documents without a formal trial or hearing as is sanctioned by the
New Rules Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission. 9 Thus we have consistently held that the requirements
of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity
to submit position papers 10 wherein they are supposed to attach all
the documents that would prove their claim in case it be decided that
no hearing should be conducted or was necessary. 11 Secondly, we
note that petitioner and private respondent themselves agreed during
the hearing of 3 March 1994 to forego with a formal trial and opted
instead to file only their respective replies to each other's position
paper. 12 Given these circumstances, petitioner certainly cannot now
be heard to have been deprived of due process.
Hence, LAs are not in grave abuse of discretion when they resolve
complaints for illegal dismissal solely on the basis of position papers.
It is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice
must be tilted in favor of the latter. (Nicario, September 17, 1998)
G.R. No. 107721 January 10, 1994
CHRISTOPHER MAÑEBO, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TRITRAN
and/or MICHAEL TRINIDAD, respondents.
The petitioner alleges that the respondent NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it affirmed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter which was principally based on the
Supplemental Position Paper and Memorandum submitted by the
private respondents after the case had already been deemed
submitted for resolution. He states that no copy of the Supplemental
Position Paper and Memorandum was furnished to him or his counsel,
thereby depriving him of due process. He avers that the Labor Arbiter
erred in holding him liable for misconduct and in affirming the 2 June
1990 decision of the respondent corporation dismissing him from the
service for alleged misconduct committed on the operations manager
when such dismissal had already been lifted by virtue of the resolution
of the Grievance Committee wherein he was even made to report for
work on 19 June 1990. He contends that his employer denied him due
process and that the decision to terminate him was a grave and patent
abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, the parties have filed their position papers and
have even agreed to consider the case submitted for decision
after the submission of their respective memoranda. Clearly then,
the Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in disregarding
the rule governing position papers by admitting the Supplemental
Position Paper and Memorandum, which was not even
accompanied by proof of service to the petitioner or his counsel,
and by taking into consideration, as basis for his decision, the
alleged facts adduced therein and the documents attached
thereto.
[
Revised Rules of Procedure governing arbitration proceedings
before the Labor Arbiters and the Commission
SECTION 5. PROHIBITED PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS. – The
following pleadings and motions shall not be allowed and acted upon
nor elevated to the Commission:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, improper venue, res
judicata, prescription and forum shopping;
Even if the employer’s motion to dismiss was filed out of time, the labor
arbiter may dismiss the complaint because of prescription. (Pepsi Cola
Bottling Company, April 19, 1998)
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(f) Motion for reconsideration of any decision or any order of the
Labor Arbiter;
(g) Appeal from any interlocutory order of the Labor Arbiter, such
as but not limited to, an order:
(1) denying a motion to dismiss;
(2) denying a motion to inhibit;
(3) denying a motion for issuance of writ of execution; or
(4) denying a motion to quash writ of execution;
(h) Appeal from the issuance of a certificate of finality of decision by
the Labor Arbiter; (i) Appeal from orders issued by the Labor Arbiter in
the course of execution proceedings; and
(j) Such other pleadings, motions and petitions of similar nature
intended to circumvent above provisions. (5a, RIII)
NOTE: Labor Arbiter CANNOT ISSUE A WRIT OF REPLEVIN.
APPEAL
Art. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are
final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both
parties WITHIN TEN (10) CALENDAR DAYS from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on
any of the following grounds:
1) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the
part of the Labor Arbiter;
2) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or
coercion, including graft and corruption;
3) If made purely on questions of law; and
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4) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would
cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.
Labor
10 DAYS NLRC
Arbiter
HOW IS APPEAL PERFECTED
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in
the judgment appealed from.
The payment of the appeal fee is not a mere technicality but is an
essential requirement in the perfection of an appeal. However, where
the fee had been paid belatedly, the broader interest of justice and the
desired objective in deciding the case on the merits demand that the
appeal be given due course. (C.W. Tan Mfg. February 10, 1989)
GSIS is EXEMPT from the payment of an appeal bond required by
Article 223 of the Labor Code.
A MOTION TO REDUCE THE BOND may be filed together on
meritorious grounds but, meantime, a bond in reasonable amount in
relation to the monetary award should be posted with the appeal,
otherwise, the motion does not stop the running of the period to perfect
an appeal (Stolt Nielsen, December 13, 2005)
EFFECT OF APPEAL FROM ARBITER TO NLRC
Once the appeal is filed, the Labor Arbiter loses jurisdiction over the
case. All motions/pleadings shall thereafter be addressed to and filed
with the NLRC.
ART. 224. EXECUTION OF DECISIONS, ORDERS OR AWARDS.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the
Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or Med-Arbiter or Voluntary
Arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party,
issue a writ of execution on a judgment WITHIN FIVE (5) YEARS
FROM THE DATE IT BECOMES FINAL AND EXECUTORY, requiring
a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce final
decisions, orders or awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
or regional director, the Commission, the Labor Arbiter or med-arbiter,
or voluntary arbitrators. In any case, it shall be the duty of the
responsible officer to separately furnish immediately the counsels of
record and the parties with copies of said decisions, orders or awards.
Failure to comply with the duty prescribed herein shall subject such
responsible officer to appropriate administrative sanctions.
2011 NLRC RULES OF PROCEDURE
RULE XI EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS
SECTION 2. EXECUTION BY MOTION OR BY INDEPENDENT
ACTION. – Pursuant to Art. 224 of the Labor Code, a decision or order
may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date it
becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such period, the
judgment shall become dormant, and may only be enforced by an
independent action before the Regional Arbitration Branch of
origin and WITHIN A PERIOD OF TEN (10) YEARS FROM DATE OF
ITS FINALITY. (8a)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC)
Unlike the National Wages and Productivity Commission and all
Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, NLRC is not
directly under the Secretary of DOLE.
NLRC is attached to DOLE only for purposes of policy
coordination.
COMPOSITION [213]:
 Chairman
o Presiding Commissioner of the 1st Division
 23 members
o 8 from workers organization
o 8 from employers organization
o 7 from the public sector, preferably to be chosen
from incumbent labor arbiters
 Presiding Commissioner of the 7 other
divisions
The members must divest themselves of any affiliation or interest in
the federation or association to which they belong.
HOW NLRC TRANSACTS ITS BUSINESS:
 En Banc
o To promulgate rules and regulations governing the
hearing and disposition of cases before any of its
divisions and regional branches and;
o To formulate policies affecting its administration
and operations
o To allow cases within the jurisdiction of any
division to be heard and decided by another
division
o To recommend appointment of a Labor Arbiter
 In 8 Divisions, each composed of 3 members
o An individual commissioner has no adjudicatory
power
o Concurrence of two commissioner shall be
necessary for the pronouncement of judgment or
resolution
o Each division has EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE
jurisdiction over cases appealed from the labor
arbiters within their respective territorial
jurisdictions
If the case is in Davao and the DOLE Secretary certifies the labor
dispute to the NLRC, they will just designate an Executive Arbiter.
There will be hearings. The Executive Arbiter will make his findings of
fact and recommendations. DOLE Secretary will then come up with the
order.
WHEN IS APPEAL TO THE NLRC PERFECTED?
It is perfected upon the filing of cash or surety bond in the amount
equivalent to the monetary award of the judgment appealed from.
G.R. No. 101641 May 31, 1993
VENANCIO DIOLA, AMADO SAMOY, REMIGIO CANDARI, DELFIN
SINUTO, JOSE MADDALORA, REYNALDO FANG, JOVITO
CABALLERO, DIOSDADO MULACRUZ, IGMANILBER NALUPANO
and IRENEO JAMIN,petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), ESA
PROTECTIVE AND SECURITY AGENCY and MRS. MALOU
ALVIAR, respondents.
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ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent NLRC acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction when it entertained private respondents'
appeal although the surety bond required under Sec. 223 of the Labor
Code was filed 13 days after the ten-day appeal period had expired;
The petition must fail.
The New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission, which among others implemented the provisions of R.A.
6715, were adopted and promulgated only on August 31, 1990 in Cebu
City, Philippines.
The effectivity clause of the New Rules provide that "These New Rules
shall take effect fifteen (15) days after their publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation." (Emphasis supplied.) The New
Rules were published in the Manila Bulletin on September 24, 1990.
Thus, the New Rules of Procedure became effective only on October
9, 1990.
When respondents-appellants' appeal memorandum became due
in April, 1990, the New Rules of Procedurewere not yet in effect.
Prior to the effectivity of those Rules, the filing of the surety bond
was not required for the perfection of an appeal to the NLRC. The
NLRC correctly refrained from dismissing the respondents'
appeal on that score.
WHEN IS LATE FILING OF APPEAL BOND ALLOWED OR
EXCUSED?
G.R. No. 98111. April 7, 1993.
UNION OF FILIPINO WORKERS, (UFW), petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND
DIVISION) AND MAKATI SPORTS CLUB, INC., respondents.
Note that the decision appealed from by private respondent did
not state the exact amount of monetary award. Rather, the labor
arbiter ordered the NLRC's "Corporation Auditing Examiner" to
immediately make the computation of the award. As pointed out by
private respondent in its memorandum, "(u)p to this late date, no
computations of any kind ha(ve) been submitted by the 'Corporation
Auditing Examiner' in this case . . . It was the Commission's own
appeal section, which finally (evaluated and) came up with a tentative
computation which served as a basis for the respondent club to file the
bond. As We ruled in NAFLU v. Ladrido: "Private respondent cannot
be expected to post such appeal bond equivalent to the amount
of the monetary award when the amount thereof was not included
in the decision of the labor arbiter." Moreover, there is no
showing that private respondent abused the leniency of the
NLRC, which would merit the dismissal of its appeal as in the
case of Italian Village v. NLRC. Private respondent immediately
filed the bond upon the determination of the amount of the award.
We hold that giving due course to the appeal would better serve the
ends of justice and the desired objective of resolving controversies on
the merits.
G.R. No. 105083 August 20, 1993
VIRGILIO CALLANTA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DISTILLERIA
LIMTUACO CO., INC. and/or JULIUS T. LIMPE., as President and
General Manager, respondents.
In the motion for writ of execution filed by petitioner, he contended that
the appeal of private respondent company was not perfected since
there was no bond filed along with appeal (Rollo, p. 22).
Petitioner erroneously based his argument on premise that the
amended provisions of Article 223 of the Labor Code are
applicable to his case. But as previously emphasized, R.A. No.
6715 was not yet in force at the time the appeal was filed. Neither
can R.A. No. 6715 be deemed to have retroactive effect,
prospective application of the law being the rule rather than the
exception (Article 4, New Civil Code). More so in the present case
where the law (R.A. No. 6715) itself did not provide for retroactive
application (Inciong vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
185 SCRA 651 [1990]).
Thus, applying the old rules, where perfection of the appeal
involved only "the payment of the appeal fee and the filing of the
position paper containing among others, the assignment of
error/s, the argument/s in support thereof, and the reliefs sought
within the prescribed period" (Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code Book V, Rule I Section 1(s), there is no doubt that
private respondent company's appeal was duly perfected.
Other exception:
 Employer appeals only the award for damages but not the
monetary claims
ISSUES ON APPEAL
NLRC shall, in cases of perfected appeals, limit itself to reviewing
those issues which are raised on appeal. Those which are not raised
shall be final and executory.
NLRC also exercises EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption
or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption
or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return-to-work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of
law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as
well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
When the DOLE Secretary certifies a labor dispute to the NLRC, NLRC
acquires jurisdiction in the first instance.
According to Azucena, NLRC also exercises original
jurisdiction in petitions for injunction (225).
EFFECTS IF THERE IS ASSUMPTION/CERTIFICATION:
1. There must be immediate enjoinment of all strike, whether
actual or threatening;
2. Return to Work
3. Employer is made to accept workers
When the DOLE Secretary assumes jurisdiction, his decision may
be appealed to the COURT OF APPEALS, NOT TO THE SUPREME
COURT.
On the effect that the Employer is made to accept workers
G.R. No. 151379 January 14, 2005
UNIVERSITY of IMMACULATE, CONCEPCION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE UIC TEACHING
and NON-TEACHING PERSONNEL AND EMPLOYEES UNION,
LELIAN CONCON, MARY ANN DE RAMOS, JOVITA MAMBURAM,
ANGELINA ABADILLA, MELANIE DE LA ROSA, ZENAIDA CANOY,
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ALMA VILLACARLOS, JOSIE BOSTON, PAULINA PALMA GIL,
GEMMA GALOPE, LEAH CRUZA, DELFA DIAPUEZ, respondent.
With respect to the Secretary’s Order allowing payroll
reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for the individual
respondents herein, an amendment to the previous Orders issued
by her office, the same is usually not allowed. Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately
return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
phrase "under the same terms and conditions" makes it clear that
the norm is actual reinstatement. This is consistent with the idea that
any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be
detrimental to the national interest.
XXX
As an exception to the rule, payroll reinstatement must rest on
special circumstances that render actual reinstatement
impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the
purposes of the law.
The "superseding circumstances" mentioned by the Acting
Secretary of Labor no doubt refer to the final decision of the panel
of arbitrators as to the confidential nature of the positions of the
twelve private respondents, thereby rendering their actual and
physical reinstatement impracticable and more likely to
exacerbate the situation. The payroll reinstatement in lieu of
actual reinstatement ordered in these cases, therefore, appears
justified as an exception to the rule until the validity of their
termination is finally resolved. This Court sees no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Acting Secretary of Labor in ordering the
same. Furthermore, the issue has not been raised by any party in this
case.
The Commission may sit en banc or in five (5) divisions, each
composed of three (3) members. Subject to the penultimate
sentence of this paragraph, the Commission shall sit en banc only for
purposes of promulgating rules and regulations governing the hearing
and disposition of cases before any of its divisions and regional
branches, and formulating policies affecting its administration and
operations.
G.R. No. L-58184 October 30, 1981
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and THE
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, respondents.
By way of summary, this Court holds that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130
insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction
over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts
adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or
certify the same the National Labor Relations Commission is not
on its face unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of
non-delegation of legislative power. To repeat, there is no ruling on
the question of whether or not it has been unconstitutionally applied in
this case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization and
free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by private
respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determination. It must be
stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory arbitration,
while allowable under the Constitution and quite understandable in
labor disputes affected with a national interest, to be free from the taint
of unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance with the
constitutional mandate of protection to labor. The arbiter then is called
upon to take due care that in the decision to be reached, there is no
violation of "the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
work. 48 It is of course manifest that there is such unconstitutional
application if a law "fair on its face and impartial in appearance (is)
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand. 49 It does not even have to go that far. An instance of
unconstitutional application would be discernible if what is ordained by
the fundamental law, the protection of labor, is ignored or disregarded.
Ateneo de Davao University is not indispensable national interest. With
all the more reason, St. Scholastic should be deemed indispensable to
national interest. Why did the DOLE Secretary assume jurisdiction over
the dispute?
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and SAMAHANG NG
MANGGAGAWANG PANG-EDUKASYON SA STA. ESKOLASTIKA-
NAFTEU, respondents.
FACTS: UNION declared a strike which paralyzed the operations of
the COLLEGE. Affecting as it did the interest of the students, public
respondent SECRETARY immediately assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute and issued on the same day, 5 November 1990, a return-
to-work order.
HELD: In the instant petition, the COLLEGE in its Manifestation, dated
16 November 1990, asked the "Secretary of Labor to take the
appropriate steps under the said circumstances." It likewise prayed in
its position paper that respondent SECRETARY uphold its termination
of the striking employees. Upon the other hand, the UNION questioned
the termination of its officers and members before respondent
SECRETARY by moving for the enforcement of the return-to-work
orders. There is no dispute then that the issue on the legality of the
termination of striking employees was properly submitted to
respondent SECRETARY for resolution.
Such an interpretation will be in consonance with the intention of our
labor authorities to provide workers immediate access to their rights
and benefits without being inconvenienced by the arbitration and
litigation process that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but
financially burdensome in the long run. Social justice legislation, to be
truly meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not be hampered
in its application by long-winded arbitration and litigation. Rights must
be asserted and benefits received with the least inconvenience. For,
labor laws are meant to promote, not defeat, social justice (Maternity
Children's Hospital v. Hon. Secretary of Labor ). 8 After all, Art. 4 of the
Labor Code does state that all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.
Father cites Chief Justice Fernando’s reason. However, the St.
Scholastica case was decided by Justice Bellosillo. It is the Free
Telephone Workers Union case that was decided by Chief Justice
Fernando. In the said case, CJ Fernando reasoned (not in verbatim):
The judiciary can intervene only when the executive commits a
grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 76219 May 27, 1991
GTE DIRECTORIES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ and GTE DIRECTORIES
CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents.
GTE Directories Corporation (hereafter, simply GTE) is a foreign
corporation engaged in the Philippines in the business of publishing
the PLDT (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company) telephone
directories for Metro Manila and several provinces.
Even that assumption of jurisdiction is open to question.
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The production and publication of telephone directories, which is
the principal activity of GTE, can scarcely be described as an
industry affecting the national interest. GTE is a publishing firm
chiefly dependent on the marketing and sale of advertising space for
its not inconsiderable revenues. Its services, while of value, cannot be
deemed to be in the same category of such essential activities as "the
generation or distribution of energy" or those undertaken by "banks,
hospitals, and export-oriented industries." It cannot be regarded as
playing as vital a role in communication as other mass media. The
small number of employees involved in the dispute, the employer's
payment of "P10 million in income tax alone to the Philippine
government," and the fact that the "top officers of the union were
dismissed during the conciliation process," obviously do not suffice to
make the dispute in the case at bar one "adversely affecting the
national interest."
According to Father, SC by way of obiter dictum said that the industry
is not indispensable to the national interest. It did not however stop the
DOLE Secretary from assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
G.R. No. 120751 March 17, 1999
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ACTING SECRETARY OF LABOR JOSE
BRILLANTES and PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR
ASSOCIATION, respondents.
FACTS: On March 9, 1995, the private respondent, Phimco Industries
Labor Association (PILA), duly certified collective bargaining
representative of the daily paid workers of the petitioner, Phimco
Industries Inc. (PHIMCO), filed a notice of strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board, NCR, against PHIMCO, a
corporation engaged in the production of matches, after a deadlock in
the collective bargaining and negotiation. On April 21, 1995, when the
several conciliation conferences called by the contending parties failed
to resolve their differences PILA, composed of 352 2 members, staged
a strike.
On July 7, 1995, the then Acting Secretary of Labor Jose Brillantes
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued his Order ruling.
The pivotal issue here is: whether or not the public respondent acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in assuming jurisdiction over subject labor dispute.
HELD: In this case at bar, however, the very admission by the public
respondent draws the labor dispute in question out of the ambit of the
Secretary's prerogative, to wit.
While the case at bar appears on its face not to fall within the strict
categorization of cases imbued with "national interest", this office
believes that the obtaining circumstances warrant the exercise of the
powers under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended. 12
The private respondent did not even make any effort to touch on
the indispensability of the match factory to the national interest. It
must have been aware that a match factory, though of value, can
scarcely be considered as an industry "indispensable to the
national interest" as it cannot be in the same category as
"generation and distribution of energy, or those undertaken by
banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries." 13 Yet, the public
respondent assumed jurisdiction thereover, ratiocinating as follows:
For one, the prolonged work disruption has adversely affected not only
the protagonists, i.e., the workers and the Company, but also those
directly and indirectly dependent upon the unhampered and continued
operations of the Company for their means of livelihood and existence.
In addition, the entire community where the plant is situated has also
been placed in jeopardy. If the dispute at the Company remains
unabated, possible loss of employment, not to mention consequent
social problems, might result thereby compounding the unemployment
problem of the country.
Thus we cannot be unmindful of the possible dire consequences that
might ensue if the present dispute is allowed to remain unresolved,
particularly when alternative dispute resolution mechanism obtains to
dispose of the differences between the parties herein. 14
It is thus evident from the foregoing that the Secretary's assumption
of jurisdiction grounded on the alleged "obtaining
circumstances" and not on a determination that the industry
involved in the labor dispute is one indispensable to the "national
interest", the standard set by the legislature, constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.
To uphold the action of the public respondent under the premises
would be stretching too far the power of the Secretary of Labor as
every case of a strike or lockout where there are inconveniences in the
community, or work disruptions in an industry though not indispensable
to the national interest, would then come within the Secretary's power.
It would be practically allowing the Secretary of Labor to intervene in
any Labor dispute at his pleasure. This is precisely why the law sets
and defines the standard: even in the exercise of his power of
compulsory arbitration under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the
Secretary must follow the law. For "when an overzealous official by-
passes the law on the pretext of retaining a laudable objective, the
intendment or purpose of the law will lose its meaning as the law itself
is disregarded" 15
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the public respondent gravely
abused his discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute
sued upon in the case.
However, for Father, he personally believes that matches are vital and
indispensable to national interest.
DOLE Sec in his order made an admission in his order that his powers
(assumption) is not called for. For that, he is actually forcing the SC to
shoot him down because he is admitting that he has no right to
exercise that power.
G.R. No. 180962 February 26, 2014
PIDLTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by its
Vice-President for Administration, M/GEN. NEMESIO M. SIGAYA,
Petitioner,
vs.
PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (PWU-AGLO), represented by JOSE
JESSIE OLIVAR, Respondent.
It cannot be said that in taking cognizance of NCMB-NCR CASE No.
NS-02-028-07, the Secretary of Labor did so in a limited capacity, i.e.,
as a voluntary arbitrator. The fact is undeniable that by referring the
case to the Secretary of Labor, Conciliator-Mediator Aglibut conceded
that the case fell within the coverage of Article 263 of the Labor Code;
the impending strike in Philtranco, a public transportation company
whose business is imbued with public interest, required that the
Secretary of Labor assume jurisdiction over the case, which he in fact
did. By assuming jurisdiction over the case, the provisions of Article
263 became applicable, any representation to the contrary or that he is
deciding the case in his capacity as a voluntary arbitrator
notwithstanding.
It has long been settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a
decision or resolution of the Secretary of Labor is to timely file a motion
for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent
remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.23 There is no
distinction: when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a
labor case in an industry indispensable to national interest, "he
exercises great breadth of discretion" in finding a solution to the
parties’ dispute.24 "[T]he authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and
extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. The
power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively
and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute."25 This wide latitude of
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discretion given to the Secretary of Labor may not be the subject of
appeal.
Art. 218. Powers of the Commission.
XXX
To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all
prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular
act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith,
may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render
ineffectual any decision in favor of such party: x x x
Provided, further, That the reception of evidence for the application of
a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its
Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he
may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses and
shall submit thereafter his recommendation to the Commission. (As
amended by Section 10, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
NLRC has the EXCLUSIVE AND ORIGINAL jurisdiction to ISSUE A
TRO OR AN INJUNCTION stopping any of the prohibited practices
under Article 264 of the Labor Code.
NLRC can delegate the reception of evidence to the Labor Arbiter but
the Labor Arbiter cannot issue a TRO or a writ of injunction.
The issuance of a writ of injunction, temporary (only A and B) or
permanent, must meet the following requirements:
1. Notice and Hearing
2. Only after a finding of fact by the Commission, to the effect:
a. That prohibited or unlawful acts have been
threatened and will be committed and will be
continued unless restrained, but no injunction or
temporary restraining order shall be issued on
account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act,
except against the person or persons, association
or organization making the threat or committing
the prohibited or unlawful act or actually
authorizing or ratifying the same after actual
knowledge thereof;
b. That substantial and irreparable injury to
complainant’s property will follow;
c. That as to each item of relief to be granted,
greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by
the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon
defendants by the granting of relief;
d. That complainant has no adequate remedy at law;
and
e. That the public officers charged with the duty to
protect complainant’s property are unable or
unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
LIMITATIONS ON THE ISSUANCE OF A TRO:
1. No injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued
on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act,
EXCEPT against the person or persons, association or
organization making the threat or committing the
prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or
ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;
2. Temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer
than twenty (20) days and shall become void at the
expiration of said twenty (20) days.
 3. No such temporary restraining order or temporary injunction
shall be issued except on condition that complainant shall
first file an undertaking with adequate security in an
amount to be fixed by the Commission sufficient to
recompense those enjoined for any loss, expense or
damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance of
such order or injunction, including all reasonable costs,
together with a reasonable attorney’s fee, and expense of
defense against the order or against the granting of any
injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and
subsequently denied by the Commission.
G.R. No. 85197 March 18, 1991
NESTLÉ PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, EUGENIA C.
NUNEZ, LIZA T. VILLANUEVA, EMMANUEL S. VILLENA,
RUDOLPH C. ARMAS, RODOLFO M. KUA and RODOLFO A.
SOLIDUM, respondents.
Petitioner Nestlé Philippines, Inc., correctly pointed out that:
The twin directives contained in petitioner's letters to the private
respondents to either (1) settle the remaining balance on the value of
their assigned cars under the company car plan or return the cars to
the company for proper disposition; or (2) to pay all outstanding
accountabilities to the company — are matters related to the
enforcement of a civil obligation founded on contract. It is not
dependent on or related to any labor aspect under which a labor
injunction can be issued. Whether or not the private respondents
remain as employees of the petitioner, there is no escape from their
obligation to pay their outstanding accountabilities to the petitioner; and
if they cannot afford it, to return the cars assigned to them.
As noted, the options given to the private respondents are civil in
nature arising from contractual obligations. There is no labor aspect
involved in the enforcement of those obligations. (p. 7, Rollo.)
XXX
The NLRC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction
by issuing the writ of injunction to stop the company from enforcing the
civil obligation of the private respondents under the car loan
agreements and from protecting its interest in the cars which, by the
terms of those agreements, belong to it (the company) until their
purchase price shall have been fully paid by the employee. The terms
of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The
rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may be
enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the
NLRC.
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST NLRC FROM REGULAR COURT
GR: No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant an injunctive relief
EXCEPTION: When a third-party or a stranger to the action, asserts a
claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may vindicate his
claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which may stop
the execution of the judgment on property not belonging to the
judgment debtor (Yupangco Cotton Mills, January 16, 2002)
Under Rule XI of the NLRC Rules of 2011, a third party claim
should be filed within 5 days of posting or publication of the
notice sale; otherwise, the claim is forever barred.
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Third party claimant may be required to post a bond equal to
the amount of his claim; the party seeking execution may file
a counterbond.
The third party claim shall be resolved WITHIN 10 WORKING DAYS
following the submission of the claim for resolution.
NOTE: An employee-salesperson cannot stop his employer, by taking
refuge behind an NLRC restraining order, and prevent the same
employer from securing from the courts a writ of replevin to recover
from him possession of the car given for his use according to a car
plan that is secured by a chattel mortgage.
OTHER POWERS OF THE NLRC [225 and 226]
1. Power to make rules and regulations pertaining to its
functions
2. Power to administer oaths and issue subpoenas and
summons
3. Power to investigate, hear and decide disputes within its
jurisdiction
4. Power to hold persons in contempt
5. Power to issue restraining orders and injunctions
6. Power to conduct ocular inspection
7. Power to decide appealed cases
NLRC DECISION
The decision of the NLRC shall be final and executory after 10
calendar days from receipt by the parties.
The losing party is allowed to file a MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION of any order, resolution or decision of the NLRC
based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under
oath and file within 10 days from receipt of the same. (Pure Foods,
March 21, 1989)
A party may file only one motion for reconsideration (Section 15, Rule
VII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure). The NLRC Rules do not
allow a second motion for reconsideration. If NLRC entertains such a
motion, it violates its own rules and therefore, commits grave abuse of
discretion. (Jardin, February 23, 2000)
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS
If the MR fails and there are merits in pursuing the case, the party may
also seasonably avail itself of the special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Both the SC and CA have the power to review NLRC decisions.
However, the petition for writ of certiorari should initially be filed with
the CA, in line with the principle of hierarchy of courts. (St. Martin,
September 16, 1998)
A petition for certiorari filed with CA or SC shall not stay or suspend the
execution of the assailed decision of the NLRC UNLESS a restraining
order is issued by the CA or SC. (Sec. 4, Rule XI, NLRC Rules of
2011)

NATIONAL CONCILIATION AND
MEDIATION BOARD (NCMB)
WHO CAN AVAIL OF CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION SERVICES
OF THE NCMB?
Any party to a labor dispute, either the union or management, may
seek the assistance of NCMB or any of its Regional Branches by
means of formal request for conciliation and preventive mediation.
Depending on the nature of the problem, a request may be filed in the
form of consultation, notice of preventive mediation or notice of
strike/lockout.
SOURCE: http://co.ncmb.ph/conciliation-mediation/
NCMB may:
 Motu proprio conciliate and mediate
 May do the same during cooling-off period of strike notices
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE NCMB IN CASE A NOTICE OF
STRIKE OR LOCKOUT IS FILED?
Upon receipt of a valid notice of strike or lockout, the NCMB, through
its Conciliator-Mediators, shall call the parties to a conference the
soonest possible time in order to actively assist them to explore all
possibilities for amicable settlement. To this end, the Conciliator-
Mediator may suggest/offer proposals as an alternative avenue for the
resolution of their disagreement/conflict which may not necessarily
bind the parties. In the event of failure in conciliation/mediation the
parties shall be encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary
arbitration.
SOURCE: http://co.ncmb.ph/conciliation-mediation/
 Continue to conduct mediation sessions between labor and
management during strike
 Conduct meditation sessions between labor and
management during a strike when requested by one or both
of the parties
IS CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION SERVICE STILL POSSIBLE
DURING ACTUAL STRIKE OR ACTUAL LOCKOUT?
Definitely, it is possible to subject an actual strike or actual lockout to
continuing conciliation and mediation services. In fact, it is at this
critical stage that such conciliation and mediation services by fully
given a chance to work out possible solution to the labor dispute. With
the ability of the Conciliator-Mediator to put the parties at ease and
place them at a cooperative mood, the final solutions of all the issues
involved may yet be effected and settled.
WHEN THE DISPUTE HAS ALREADY BEEN ASSUMED OR
CERTIFIED TO THE NLRC, IS IT ALSO POSSIBLE TO REMAND
THE SAME TO CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION SERVICES?
Yes, the parties are not precluded from availing the services of an
NCMB Conciliator-Mediator as the duty to bargain collectively subsists
until the final resolution of all issues involved in the dispute.
Conciliation is so pervasive in application that, prior to a compulsory
arbitration award, the parties are encouraged to continue to exhaust all
possible avenues of mutually resolving their dispute, especially through
conciliation and mediation services.
SOURCE: http://co.ncmb.ph/conciliation-mediation/
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When it believes that there is a non-strikeable issue, it categorizes
the strike notice as good for preventive mediation.
WHEN A DISPUTE SUBJECT OF A NOTICE OF STRIKE IS
FORTHWITH TREATED AS A PREVENTIVE MEDIATION CASE,
MAY THE UNION LATER ON STAGE A STRIKE ON ACCOUNT OF
THE SAME DISPUTE?
No. Once the dispute has been converted into a preventive mediation
case, the notice of strike is deemed dropped from the dockets as if no
notice of strike has been filed. Since there is no more notice of strike to
speak about, any strike subsequently staged by the Union is deemed
not to have complied with the requirements of a valid strike. The same
rule applies in the case of lockout by an employer, (PAL vs. Sec. of
Labor).
WHO HAS THE DUTY TO DECLARE THAT THE NOTICE OF
STRIKE/LOCKOUT HAS BEEN CONVERTED INTO A PREVENTIVE
MEDIATION CASE?
Upon the recommendation of the Conciliator/Mediator handling the
labor dispute, the Director of the Regional Branch of the NCMB which
has jurisdiction over the labor dispute has the duty to declare and
inform the parties that the issues raised or the actual issues involved
are not proper subjects of a Notice of Strike or Lockout and that the
Notice of Strike or Lockout has been converted into a Preventive
Mediation Case without prejudice to further conciliation or upon the
request of either or both parties.
SOURCE: http://co.ncmb.ph/conciliation-mediation/
When NCMB mediates and conciliates, it DOES NOT RENDER A
DECISION. Rather, it convinces the parties to arrive at a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
 The compromise agreement becomes the law between the
parties and in case of violation; it falls within the jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter.
ARE THE PARTIES BOUND BY THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO
BY THEM?
Certainly, the parties are bound to honor any agreement entered into
by them. It must be pointed out that such an agreement came into
existence as a result of painstaking efforts among the union,
management, and the Conciliator-Mediator. Therefore, it is only logical
to assume that the Conciliator assigned to the case has to follow up
and monitor the implementation of the agreement.
SOURCE: http://co.ncmb.ph/conciliation-mediation/
 If parties fail to come up with a compromise agreement,
NCMB recommends that the parties submit themselves to
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION.
MAY A LABOR DISPUTE, SUBJECT OF A NOTICE OF STRIKE OR
LOCKOUT, MATURE INTO A VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION CASE?
Yes. By mutual agreement, the parties may decide to bring the matter
for resolution before an accredited voluntary arbitrator of their own
choice, in which case the Notice is deemed automatically withdrawn
and dropped from the dockets.
Art. 124. Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing.
In cases where there are no collective agreements or recognized
labor unions, the employers and workers shall endeavor to correct
such distortions. Any dispute arising therefrom shall be settled
through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it
remains unresolved after ten (10) calendar days of conciliation, shall
be referred to the appropriate branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct
continuous hearings and decide the dispute within twenty (20) calendar
days from the time said dispute is submitted for compulsory arbitration.

That the NCMB has no jurisdiction and no role at all to play in wage
distortion cases where the workers are already represented by a union
with a valid subsisting CBA with their employer is FALSE.

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 SUPREME COURT

COURT OF APPEALS

Voluntary Arbitration
NLRC Strikes & Lockouts
certified (NCMB has initial assumed Office of the
jurisdiction for BLR (Appellate)
conciliation)
Secretary of Labor Disputes submitted
to Voluntary
Arbitrator

LABOR ARBITER (217) REGIONAL DIRECTOR POEA BUREAU OF LABOR (Med Regional Grievance Machinery
RELATIONS (original Arbiter) office (260)
jurisdiction) Petitions for
CE

1. ULP 129 128 1. Cancellation/Suspen 1. Federation/national trade 1. Local union intra union 1. Disputes concerning
2. Termination Cases (Adjudicatory (visitorial & sion of License of union centers disputes for violation of interpretation/implemen
3. Enforcement of Labor Standards with ) Enforcement Authority to recruit of - Registration/revocation a. Constitution and by-laws tation of CBA
claim exceeding P5,000 per individual, powers) Recruitment and cancellation cases b. Rights and conditions of 2. Disputes concerning
whether or not accompanied with claim Money Agencies (until - Intra union disputes membership under 241 interpretation/implemen
for reinstatement claims 1. Labor phase out within 5 2. Election of officers tation of company
4. Enforcement of Labor standards with arising from standards years as provided in 2. Inter Union Conflicts 3. CBA registration personnel policies
claim NOT exceeding P5,000 per Labor enforcement RA 8042) 4. Independent local/chapter 3. All others defined as
individual, if accompanied with claim Standards 2. Occupation 2. Disciplinary action v. Registration Revocation ―grievance‖ by CBA
for reinstatement Violations al Safety and OCW’s and cancellation cases 4. Wage Distortion cases
5. Damages arising from ER-EE relations NOT Health 5. Visitorial powers under (where there is CBA)
6. All other claims arising from ER-EE exceeding Violations Art. 274 (inquire into
relation P5,000 per union financial activities)
7. Violation of compromise agreements individual 6. Actions arising from 241
8. Execution of award of Voluntary AND without (arising from
Arbitrator claims for administration and
9. Overseas Employment Disputes i.e. reinstatemen accounting of union funds
money claims arising from such t and other violations of
10. Wage distortion cases (where there is rights of members)
no CBA and NCMB failed to resolve
dispute after 10 calendar days of
conciliation
11. Illegal strike/lockout complaints, and
cases on violations of 264 (prohibited
activities for strikes/lockouts)

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