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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V.

Paul Le Montejo 1
TAU MU

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS (G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997) 1 ISSUE/S:
1. WON there is a justiciable controversy?
FACTS: 2. WON the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene with Sec.19,Art. 2
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS decided to sell through public and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. 12 of the Philippine Constitution?
bidding 30% to 51% of the outstanding shares of Manila Hotel. Only two (2) 3. WON the provisions of WTO Unduly impair or interfere with the exercise of
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino judicial and legislative power by the court and congress respectively?
corporation, which offered to buy 51% shares at P41.58/share, and a 4. WON there is grave abuse of discretion
Malaysian firm, at P44.00/share. Pending the declaration of the winning
bidder, petitioner matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by the RULING:
Malaysian Firm which respondent GSIS refused to accept. The petitioner 1. Yes. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that
posits that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony, petitioner it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
invoking Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution. have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The court however is limited “to
ISSUE/S: determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion
1. WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self- amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in
executing provision ratifying the WTO Agreement and shall not inquire upon the wisdom of the
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, WON Manila Hotel falls under President and Senate in ratifying the same.
the term national patrimony.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, WON 2. No. The principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
selling mere 51% shares and not the land itself can be considered part of sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, they do not embody
national patrimony. judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
4. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other
Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of Economy –
RULING: “While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
1. Yes. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is self- services, labor and enterprises, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
executing which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for isolationist policy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited
its enforcement. It is per se judicially enforceable The Constitution mandates entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not
that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.”
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi 3. No. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness
remedium. of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of
their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from
2. Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to a convention or pact.
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the cultural In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts
heritage of the Filipinos. the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
3. Yes. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the cooperation and amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of incorporation,
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law,
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. 44 One of the
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. servanda — international agreements must be performed in good faith.

4. Yes. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by the 4. No. Grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
foreign firm, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse of
petitioner the shares of MHC in accordance not only with the bidding discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
grave abuse of discretion. or to act at all in contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the part of the petitioner to
show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition.
Hence, GSIS(respondent) is ordered to accept the matching bid of
petitioner and execute the necessary clearances for the purchase of the Wherefore, Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
subject 51% MHC shares.

Reasoning: The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law Domino vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999) 3
of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
Tanada vs. Angara (G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997) 2 of Representative of the Province of Sarangani indicating in his certificate that
he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1)
FACTS: year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election. On 6 May 1998,
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
which resolved that the Senate concur, in the ratification by the President of disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of Sarangani for
the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the
The instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give ISSUE/S:
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of 1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods." list of voters declaring DOMINO a resident of the province of Sarangani and
not of Quezon City acquire the nature of res judicata.
2. WON DOMINO was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least
one year immediately preceding the election.
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A. Fundamental Principles on Constitutional Law and the Bill of Rights
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A. Fundamental Principles on Constitutional Law and the Bill of Rights
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A. Fundamental Principles on Constitutional Law and the Bill of Rights
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 2
TAU MU

3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has jurisdiction over the present As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office
petition of DOMINO. may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
4. WON, the candidate who received the next highest number of votes can be privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus
proclaimed as the winning candidate in the light of DOMINO’s Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and outlined instances wherein the
disqualification? COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy.
RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of the equal access clause is not violated.
Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained.
It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceeding, to Reasoning: There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the
declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The case of candidates for national positions because the election process
jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national
determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the
the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots.
registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification. These would entail additional costs to the government

Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.For the xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if
decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is they cannot wage a decent campaign enough to project the prospect of
essential that there must be between the first and the second action identity winning, no matter how slim. It would be then a senseless sacrifice on the
of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action. part of the State.

2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the Yrasuegui vs. PAL (G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008)5
same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct FACTS:
indicative of such intention. On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency"
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5)
be deemed lost until a new one is established. 25 To successfully effect a years," his services were considered terminated "effective immediately."11
change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of ISSUE/S:
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond 1. WON the obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under the Labor
with the purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically Code.
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. 2. WON the dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
occupational disqualification defense.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of 3. WON the petitioner can invoke the equal protection clause guaranty
obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically
vest the position in the winning candidate. 41 A candidate must be proclaimed RULING:
and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a 1. Yes. It would fall under Article 282€ of the Labor Code. A reading of the
member of the House of Representatives. Considering that DOMINO has not weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they
been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job.
the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to
Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.
which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
2. Yes. Though generally, employment in particular jobs may not be limited
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin. However, if the
not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. It employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally qualification for performing the job, the qualification is then considered valid
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority and referred to as bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).
or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative
of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their Applying the “Meiorin Test” in determining whether an employment policy is
ballots that they do not choose him. justified, the following must concur: (1) the employer must show that it
adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance
of the job;64 (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably
necessary65 to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the
Pamatong vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004) 4
employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to
accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose.
FACTS:
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance
The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. The most important activity of
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign. Petitioner seeks to
the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of
reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right
the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of
to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article
the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have
II of the 1987 Constitution.
the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to attend to
passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand
ISSUE/S:
grueling flight schedules among other reasons.
WON the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for
public office" grants a constitutional right to run for or hold public office
3. No. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of Rights is
RULING:
not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Private actions, no
No. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by
matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.91
law. Also, the "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution. The provisions under the Article are generally considered not
self-executing.

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A. Fundamental Principles on Constitutional Law and the Bill of Rights A. Fundamental Principles on Constitutional Law and the Bill of Rights
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 3
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People vs. Siton6


FACTS:
FACTS: The private respondents were involved in mauling incidents that were a result
In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, lucidly shows that of a fraternity war. On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board
there was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the reports that vagrants issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the
and prostitutes proliferate in the place where the respondents (among other supreme penalty of automatic expulsion, pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.
women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night and soliciting male
customer. Hence, respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano ISSUE/S:
were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal. 1. WON private respondents accorded due process of law?
In turn, the respondents filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that
Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad. RULING:
1. Yes. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2) is In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating
unconstitutional for being vague. school discipline, "[t]here are minimum standards which must be met before
2. WON Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the
Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
RULING: informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
1 No. The trial court in its assailed ruling relied on the underlying principles in evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered
Papachristou vs. City of Jacksonville case: by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case.
First, that the assailed ordinance fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by a statute and; In the case at bar, the Private respondents were duly informed in writing of
the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board. They
Second, it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in
discriminatory law enforcement. fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the
evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the
However, the aforementioned principles do not apply in the case at bar since: Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce
evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered
The first principle finds no application here because under our legal system, all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith and; resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
Second, the fear exhibited by the respondents, that unfettered discretion is applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
placed in the hands of the police to make an arrest or search, is assuaged by an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
the constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is one less than A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to
certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility. The requirement of due process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable
probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present
that may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. "To be heard"
found to be violating Article 202 (2). does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may
also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard
Furthermore, it may be note worthy that the Jacksonville ordinance was through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
declared unconstitutional for provisions that are not found in the questioned
Vagrancy law in the case at bar.
Romualdez vs. Comelec8
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is
legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to FACTS:
maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature however, Respondent-spouses, Carlos and Erlinda Romualdez registered as new
must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, in spite of the fact that they were
prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and and still are, registered voters of Quezon City. That being the case, they are
know what acts it is his duty to avoid. This requirement has come to be guilty of an election offense due to double registration under R.A. 8189,
known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that “a statute which otherwise known as the Voter’s Registation Act of 1996.
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to ISSUE/S:
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” 1. WON the petitioners are accorded due process of law
2. WON 45(j) of the Voter’s registration Act can be declared vague on the
2. No. Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987
does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of Constitution.
public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or
unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to RULING:
endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the 1. Yes. The petitioners are accorded due process of law.
community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by
indecently or to engage in immoral conduct. private respondent (Section 261(y)(2) and (y)(5) of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 12 of the Voter’s Registration Act) are entirely different
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally from those which they stand to be accused of before the RTC by the
offensive. It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting COMELEC(.Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of the Voter’s
themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, Registration Act). The petitioners’ contentions are untenable.
under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support
society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
of members of the community. Republic Act No. 8189;

DLSU vs. CA7

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C. Due Process in General
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C. Due Process in General C. Due Process in General
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 4
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Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not
the election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as
charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no
incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and
Placido vs. NLRC 10
the Informations filed before the RTC. Evidently, the informations directed to
be filed by the Comelec against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with
FACTS:
the RTC, were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the
Petitioners in this case aver that they were denied due process when PLDT
private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
refused to furnish them a copy of the Investigation Report and grant them a
formal hearing in which they could be represented by counsel of their choice.
2. No. Section 45(j) of R.A. No. 8189 cannot be facially invalidated as it is a
criminal statute.
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
its application. However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. “On-its-
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate as such invalidation
What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard,
would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and
hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been
controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context
afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is
having no factual concreteness.
not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements
of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.
Garcillano vs. Committees 9
In the present case, petitioners were, among other things, given several
FACTS:
written invitations to submit themselves to PLDT’s Investigation Unit to
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped
explain their side, but they failed to heed them. A hearing, which petitioners
conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-
attended along with their union MKP representatives, was conducted on June
ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. On
25, 2001 during which the principal witnesses to the incident were presented.
October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one
Petitioners were thus afforded the opportunity to confront those witnesses
of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its
and present evidence in their behalf, but they failed to do so.
hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that
Mendoza vs. Comelec11
he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not
only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
FACTS:
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended
The petitioner and the respondent vied for the position of Governor of the
legislation which underpins the investigation.
Province of Bulacan. The petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate and
assumed the office of Governor, while the respondent seasonably filed an
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit that the Senate Rules of
election protest with the COMELEC.
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
The COMELEC approved the parties’ formal offer of evidence and then
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. However, with
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The parties
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, no effort was undertaken
complied with the COMELEC’s order. The case was thereafter submitted for
for the publication of these rules.
resolution.
On March 2, 2009 the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes,
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
including those involved in the provincial election contest, to the Senate
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
Electoral Tribunal (SET).
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.
ISSUE:
Whether there were proceedings within the SET premises, entitling the
ISSUE:
petitioner to notice and participation, which were denied to him; in other
Whether or not the absence of any amendment to the rules dispenses the
words, the issue is whether the petitioner’s right to due process has been
requirement of due publication of the rules of procedure in a legislative
violated.
inquiry.

RULING:
RULING:
No. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
No. The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in
an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal
clear derogation of the constitutional requirement under Section 21, Article VI
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. These are now commonly
of the 1987 Constitution.
referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings to wit;
The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of
of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or
evidence in support thereof. xxx
its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and
with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction
to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom,
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that
of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
Furthermore, the invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence
The law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the

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C. Due Process in General
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C. Due Process in General C. Due Process in General
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 5
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is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is
affected. continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must
act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the We likewise differ from SURNECO’s stance that it was denied due process
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at when the ERC issued its questioned Orders. Administrative due process
a decision. simply requires an opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It means being given the
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can opportunity to be heard before judgment, and for this purpose, a formal trial-
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions type hearing is not even essential. It is enough that the parties are given a fair
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority and reasonable chance to demonstrate their respective positions and to
conferred upon it. present evidence in support thereof.

The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party Verily, the PPA confirmation necessitated a review of the electric
at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due cooperatives’ monthly documentary submissions to substantiate their PPA
process, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative charges. The cooperatives were duly informed of the need for other required
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a supporting documents and were allowed to submit them accordingly. In fact,
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. hearings were conducted. Moreover, the ERC conducted exit conferences
with the electric cooperatives’ representatives, SURNECO included, to
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay discuss preliminary figures and to double-check these figures for
requirements are applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker inaccuracies, if there were any. In addition, after the issuance of the ERC
decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set Orders, the electric cooperatives were allowed to file their respective motions
forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the for reconsideration. It cannot claimed, therefore, that SURNECO was denied
material and substantial components of decision-making. due process.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the
decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and
decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the Southern Hemisphere vs. Anti-Terrorism13
constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the
facts and the law upon which it is based. FACTS:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic
After consideration of the respondents’ Comments and the petitioner’s Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People
petition and Reply, we hold that the contested proceedings at the SET from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007.
("contested proceedings) are no longer part of the adversarial aspects of the
election contest that would require notice of hearing and the participation of ISSUE/S:
the parties 1. WON petitioners possess locus standi
2. WON there is an actual case or controversy
What took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the COMELEC, 3. WON RA9372 Regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its
as a quasi-judicial body, in the course of appreciating the evidence presented validity
and deciding the provincial election contest on the merits.
RULING:
To conclude, the COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party It must be noted that in constitutional limitations, the power of judicial review
of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or
provincial election contest. controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Surigao Electric vs. ERC 12
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are
FACTS: the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
On March 19, 2007, the ERC issued its assailed Order, mandating that the
discounts earned by SURNECO from its power supplier should be deducted 1. Petitioners lack locus standi
from the computation of the power cost upon ascertaining that the Purchased For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must
Power Adjustment (PPA) of SURNECO resulted to an over-recovery show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
amounting to PhP18,188,794. result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable action.
ISSUE:
WON SURNECO was deprived of the opportunity to be heard in ordering it to Petitioners in this case have not presented any personal stake in the outcome
refund alleged over-recoveries arrived at by the ERC. of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected
RULING: "communist fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas
In directing SURNECO to refund its over-recoveries based on PPA policies, individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
which only ensured that the PPA mechanism remains a purely cost-recovery doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
mechanism and not a revenue-generating scheme for the electric While jurisprudence holds that transcendental public importance dispenses
cooperatives, the ERC merely exercised its authority to regulate and approve with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of
the rates imposed by the electric cooperatives on their consumers. The ERC suffering direct and personal injury, this does not apply in cases involving the
simply performed its mandate to protect the public interest imbued in those constitutionality of penal legislation.
rates.
2. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
It is beyond cavil that the State, in the exercise of police power, can regulate By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual
the rates imposed by a public utility such as SURNECO.— case or controversy.
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the
police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and Herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA
regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do.

12 13
C. Due Process in General C. Due Process in General
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 6
TAU MU

No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and existing Lejano vs. People14
one.
FACTS:
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is; only statutes on free speech, On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused of the charges against them on the
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
facial challenge.
Complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution
is overbroad because of possible"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The due process of law; as it seriously misappreciated the facts; and decided the
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses."
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn Section 21, Article III, that:
with narrow specificity." Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. x x x
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to
prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the
Vagueness vs. Overbreadth: infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation
would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks the will to fight.
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is A motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible but only for
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due exceptional and narrow grounds such as when the court that absolved the
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers a mistrial has occurred.
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, ISSUE:
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent WON the complainant was able to specify the violations of due process or
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby committed.
invade the area of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the
vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals RULING:
will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain No. Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Court’s
from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses’
credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Court’s finding that Alfaro was not a
Facial Challenge vs. As-applied Challenge: credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence
of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only attempt to secure Webb, et al’s conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et
on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the al is final and can no longer be disturbed.
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G.
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or Vizconde’s motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.
activities.

3. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila 15
permit a facial analysis of its validity
FACTS:
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the
RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses,
act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the
predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and Petitioners herein are operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila which
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is are directly affected by the said ordinance.
actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand. Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it
violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" interference in their business.
in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some
form of expression protected by the free speech clause. ISSUE/S:
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize 1. WON the petitioners’ has legal standing
is conduct, not speech. 2. WON the petitioners have the requisite standing to plead for protection of
Hence petitions are dismissed. their patrons' equal protection rights.
3. WON the ordinance is unconstitutional

RULING:

14
C. Due Process in General
15
D. Due Process and Police Power
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 7
TAU MU

1. Yes. Petitioners in this case are owners of establishments offering "wash- Third, applying strict scrutiny- the focus is on the presence of compelling,
up" rates and their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less
Ordinance. Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to restrictive means for achieving that interest.
the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged
to support party's participation in the case. If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed
strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that
2. Yes. The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is
system derived directly from the Constitution. In this jurisdiction, the extancy the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant
of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause for a the application of the most deferential standard – the rational basis test. Yet
petitioner's standing. Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as
several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be
party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
transcendental importance. establishments in question.

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers
exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. were are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Still, the Bill
Ohio, the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet
right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively exercise any day
important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in- without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence – that
fact,’ thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people.
the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party;
and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his 3d. It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the
or her own interests."Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the curtailment of sexual behavior. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-
petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior
of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally
by the enforcement of the Ordinance. protected will be curtailed as well. We cannot discount other legitimate
activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a
patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth day. E.g. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or
doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes.
action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally
applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth 3e. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with
guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a
makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public
see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
overbreadth. It is thus recognized that the petitioners have a right to assert interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
"wash-rate" time frame. oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
3. Yes. The said ordinance is unconstitutional. private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for
3a. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. For an ordinance to be its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not
unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. Based on the foregoing facts, Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely
wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day.
Office of the Solicitor vs. City of Manila 16
3b. The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due
process. The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as FACTS:
imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and operate
process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to shopping malls in various locations in Metro Manila. The shopping malls
the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of operated or leased out by respondents have parking facilities for all kinds of
life, liberty, or property However, if due process were confined solely to its motor vehicles, they collect parking fees from the persons making use of
procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary their parking facilities, regardless of whether said persons are mall patrons or
government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive not.
due process then completes the protection envisioned by the due process
clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. Human Rights conducted a joint investigation on which the following purpose
is included: (1) to inquire into the legality of the prevalent practice of shopping
3c. The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due malls of charging parking fees. The Committees found that the collection of
process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to the National Building Code and
test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products, to is therefor [sic] illegal.
wit;
Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information enjoining respondent
First, the rational basis examination - laws or ordinances are upheld if they SM Prime and similar establishments from collecting parking fees, and to
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. impose upon said establishments penal sanctions under Presidential Decree
No. 1096.
Second, the intermediate review - governmental interest is extensively
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.

16
D. Due Process and Police Power
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 8
TAU MU

ISSUE: HELD:
Whether or not compelling the respondent to provide parking spaces in their Hacienda Palico was not automatically converted as non-agricultural land.
malls for the use of their patrons or the public in general, free of charge Under the whereas clause of PP 1520, it merely recognizes the potential
constitutes: tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone
clearly does not allocated reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of
1. A lawful exercise of police power or the zone for non-agricultural purposes.
2. It is an unlawful taking of property without just Compensation?
CARL is both an exercise of police power and eminent domain. It prescribes
RULING: retention limits for landowners and it provides for the compulsory acquisition
1. The Court finds that in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting of private agricultural lands. Objective: the expropriation b4 us affects all
parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the State private agricultural lands whenever found and for whatever kind as long as
would be acting beyond the bounds of police power. they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This
kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the
merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The land-glutted owner.
power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori,
the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power
does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a CHEVRON vs BCDA19
few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to
destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the ISSUE/S:
general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, 1. Is the royalty charged by the BOD of the CDC(Clark Development
such as opium and firearms. Dorporation) a tax imposition or a regulation –police power?
2. Is royalty fee per liter unreasonable and grossly in excess of regulation
2. Yes. Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking costs?
facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of
parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already HELD:
tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not
only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for 1. Regulation-police power. The purpose is the determining factor. If it is
use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the
to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into measure results in some form of regulation. If it is primarily to regulate,
the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the then it is deemed a regulation-police power, even though incidentally,
right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further revenue is generated. In the case, from the declaration of policy, it can
prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the be gleaned that the policy is issued, first and foremost, to ensure the
expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking safety, security and good condition of the petroleum fuel industry within
facilities. the CSEZ.

2. No. Fuel is highly combustible which, if left unchecked, poses a serious


BSP vs ANTONIO-VALENZUELA17 threat to the life and property. The reasonable relation between the fee
imposed on a per liter basis and the regulation sought to be obtained is
ISSUE/S: that the higher the volume of fuel entering the said economic zone, the
(1) Are banks entitled copies of ROE (report on examination) or audit greater the extent and the frequency of supervision and inspection
findings? required to ensure safety, security, and order within the zone.
(2) Is failure to furnished copy/copies of ROE to a bank is a violation of due
process?
ESPINA vs ZAMORA20
HELD:
ISSUE:
1. No. There is no provision in the law, nor sections in the procedures of Is RA 8762(Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2002) which allow foreign
the BSP that shows that the BSP is required to give the (audited)banks nationals from engaging in the retail trade business under 4 categories,
the copies of ROEs. unconstitutional(not a valid exercise of police power), because it runs afoul of
several provisions in the constitution(denial of Filipinos right to property and
2. No. Under the law, the sanction of closure could be imposed upon a due process)?
bank by the BSP even without notice and hearing. This “close now, and
hear later” scheme is grounded on the practical and legal considerations HELD:
to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid No. The control and regulation of the trade in the interest of the public welfare
exercise of POLICE POWER to protect the depositors, creditors, is of course an exercise of the police power of the state. RA 8762, merely
stockholders, and the general public. lessens the restriction or restraint on the foreigners’ right to property or to
engage in an ordinary lawful business.

ROXAS & CO vs DAMBA-NFSW18 Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to
which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
FACTS:
Petitioner voluntarily offered to sell its Hacienda Palico to DAR pursuant to In summary
CARL. Subsequently, it withdraw its offer believing said hacienda was already
converted as non-agricultural land, not covered by CARL, under PP1520 First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the 4
declaring the municipalities of maragondon and ternate in cavite province and categories;
the municipality of nasugbu as a TOURIST ZONE and for OTHER
PURPOSES.

17 19
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, D. Due Process POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, D. Due Process
and Police Power and Police Power
18 20
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, D. Due Process POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, D. Due Process
and Police Power and Police Power
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 9
TAU MU

Second, only nationals from, or judicial entities formed or incorporated in P3,284,400.00. The amount will be charged against Account No. 8-93-310,
countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage Continuing Appropriation, Account No. 101-8918-334.
in ratial trade business; and
Pursuant to said ordinance, Cebu City filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain
Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain before the RTC against the Spouses Ortega. RTC then declared that [Cebu
retailing activities outside their accredited stores thorugh the use of mobile or City] "has the lawful right to take the property subject of the instant case, for
rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door selling, public use or purpose described in the complaint upon payment of just
restaurants and sari2 stores and such other similar retailing activities. compensation."

Based on the recommendation of the appointed Commissioners, RTC issued


SOLGEN VS AYALA21 another order, ordering Cebu City to pay the spouses the sum of
P31,416,000.00 as just compensation for the expropriated land.
FACTS:
The respondents, Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and RTC’s decision became final and executory after Cebu City failed to perfect
operate shopping malls while SM Prime constructs and leases building an appeal on time. RTC then issued another order stating that Ordinance No.
structures. 1519 appropriating the sum of P3,284,400.00 for payment of the subject lot is
chargeable to Account No. 101-8918-334 and is now subject for execution or
The shopping malls that respondents operate have parking facilities in which garnishment for it is no longer exempted from execution.
they collect parking fees from the persons making use of their facilities.
Cebu City filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of
In May 2000, a joint investigation conducted by the Senate Committees on Judgment and Withdrawal of the Case, contending that the price set by the
Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights issued Senate RTC as just compensation to be paid to the Spouses is way beyond the reach
Committee Report No. 225 in which they find that the collection of parking of its intended beneficiaries for its socialized housing program. The motion
fees by herein respondents are contrary to the National Building Code. The was denied by the RTC. Cebu City’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
Code merely requires malls to provide parking spaces, without specifying denied.
whether it is free or not.
By virtue of the said order, a Notice of Garnishment was served to Philippine
On 4 October 2000, the OSG, herein petitioner, filed a petition to the RTC of Postal Bank.
Makati praying that the practice of respondents in charging parking fees is
violative of the National Building Code and its Implementing Rules and Cebu City then filed before the RTC a Motion to Dissolve, Quash or Recall
Regulations. the Writ of Garnishment, contending that the account mentioned in Ordinance
No. 1519 is not an existing bank account and the garnishment of Cebu City’s
The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents. Upon appeal, CA denied the bank account with Philippine Postal Bank is illegal, because government
petition and likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. funds and properties may not be seized under writ of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgement, on obvious reason of public policy.
ISSUE: RTC denied the said motion and likewise denied its Motion for
Whether or not the act of OSG is a valid exercise of the power of eminent Reconsideration.
domain.
On appeal, CA affirmed RTC’s denial of Cebu City’s Omnibus Motion to
HELD: Modify Judgement and to be allowed to withdraw from the Expropriation
No. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands Proceedings.
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
ISSUES:
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking 1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s denial of Cebu City’s
facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and to be Allowed to Withdraw from the
parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already Expropriation Proceedings.
tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not only 2. Whether the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank,
requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use appropriated for a different purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be
as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access to subject to garnishment as payment for the expropriated lot covered by City
said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the Ordinance No. 1519.
property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to
use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from HELD:
its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance 1. No. Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on Expropriation speaks of 2
and operation of the required parking facilities. stages:
a. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in facts involved in the suit.
the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the b. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the
same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition property sought to be taken.
amounts to a taking of respondents’ property without payment of just
compensation. An order of expropriation denotes the end of the first stage of expropriation.
Its end then paves the way for the second stage—the determination of just
compensation, and, ultimately, payment. An order of expropriation puts an
ORTEGA VS CITY OF CEBU22 end to any ambiguity regarding the right of the petitioner to condemn the
respondents’ properties. Because an order of expropriation merely
FACTS: determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
The spouses Ortega are the registered owners of a parcel of land. On May propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not hinge on the payment of just
23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu City enacted City compensation. After all, there would be no point in determining just
Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City Mayor to expropriate ½ compensation if, in the first place, the plaintiff’s right to expropriate the
portion of such land, and appropriating for that purpose the amount of property was not first clearly established.

Conversely, as is evident from the foregoing, an order by the trial court fixing
21
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON just compensation does not affect a prior order of expropriation. As applied to
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due Process the case at bar, Cebu City can no longer ask for modification of the judgment,
and Eminent Domain much less, withdraw its complaint, after it failed to appeal even the first stage
22
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON of the expropriation proceedings.
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due Process
and Eminent Domain
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 10
TAU MU

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the determination of just compensation


is a judicial prerogative.7 In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, we The trial court appointed the parties’ respective nominated commissioners to
declared: appraise the property.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a Commissioner Jesus S. Empleo, LBP’s nominee, appraised the property
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the based on, among other things, the applicable DAR issuances, average gross
initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in production, and prevailing selling prices of the crops planted thereon which
the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without included coconut, abaca, coffee, and rice. He arrived at a valuation
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that of P13,449,579.08.
its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can
the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed Commissioner Amando Chua of Cuervo Appraisers, Inc., respondents’
compensation. nominee, used the market data approach which relies primarily on sales and
listings of comparable lots in the neighborhood. Excluding the secondary
Likewise, in the recent cases of National Power Corporation v. dela Cruz and crops planted thereon, he valued the property at P29,925,725.
Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National Railways, we
emphasized the primacy of judicial prerogative in the ascertainment of just The trial court then found the market data approach to be more realistic and
compensation as aided by the appointed commissioners, to wit: consistent with law and jurisprudence on the full and fair equivalent of the
property. RTC then denied LBP’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Though the ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the
appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property Upon appeal, CA sustained RTC’s decision.
sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While
it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial LBP contends that its determination should be given weight since its valuation
court may substitute its own estimate of the value, it may only do so for valid of the property was based on the factors mentioned in RA 6657 and the
reasons; that is, where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to formula prescribed by DAR; and the taking of private property for agrarian
the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear reform is not a traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain as it also
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly involves the exercise of police power, hence, part of the loss is not
inadequate or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners is a compensable.
substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason
at all.” ISSUE:
Whether or not the market data approach should govern in the valuation of
2. No. The proper remedy of [the Spouses Ortega] is to file a mandamus case the property.
against Cebu City in order to compel its Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact
an appropriation ordinance for the satisfaction of the Spouses Ortega’s claim. HELD:
No. In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several
It is a settled rule that government funds and properties may not be seized factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657. These factors have been
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy judgments, based on translated into a basic formula in [DAO 6-92], as amended by [DAO 11-94],
obvious consideration of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be issued pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions purposes of R.A. 6657. While the determination of just compensation involves
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed the exercise of judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be
or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded
objects, as appropriated by law. R.A. 6657, as amended, and it’s implementing rules and regulations.

In fixing the just compensation in the present case, the trial court, adopting
LBP VS RUFINO 23 the market data approach on which Commissioner Chua relied, merely put
premium on the location of the property and the crops planted thereon which
FACTS: are not among the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. And the trial
Respondents are the registered owners in equal share of a parcel of land. court did not apply the formula provided in DAR AO 6-92, as amended. This
is a clear departure from the settled doctrine regarding the mandatory nature
By respondents’ claim, in 1989, they voluntarily offered the aforesaid property of Section 17 of RA 6657 and the DAR issuances implementing it.
to the government for CARP coverage at P120,000 per hectare. Acting
thereon, petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued a Notice of
Land Valuation and Acquisition dated October 21, 1996 declaring that out of LBP VS JOCSON24
the total area indicated in the title, 138.4018 hectares was subject to
immediate acquisition at a valuation of P8,736,270.40 based on the FACTS:
assessment of petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Respondents are the registered owners of two parcels of tenanted rice land
located at Negros Occidental. The property was placed under the coverage of
Respondents having found the valuation unacceptable, the matter was the government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to Presidential
referred by the provincial agrarian reform officer of Sorsogon to the DAR Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries by the
Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the conduct of summary administrative Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), which valued the compensation
proceedings to determine just compensation. DARAB then sustained LBP’s therefor in the total amount of P250,563.80 following the formula prescribed
valuation upon respondents’ failure to present any evidence to warrant in PD No. 27 and EO No. 228.
increase.
The valuation was later increased to P903,637.03 after computing the 6%
On February 23, 1998, respondents lodged with Sorsogon RTC a complaint annual interest increment due on the property per DAR Administrative Order
for determination of just compensation. Respondents contended that LBP’s No. 13, series of 1994.
valuation was not full and fair equivalent of the property at the time of its
taking. Finding the DAR’s offer of compensation for the property to be grossly
inadequate, respondent filed a complaint before the RTC, sitting as a Special
LBP countered that the property was acquired by the DAR for CARP Agrarian Court (SAC), praying that petitioner and DAR be ordered to compute
coverage in 1993 by compulsory acquisition and not by respondents’ the just compensation for the property in accordance with the guidelines laid
voluntary offer to sell; and that it determined the valuation thereof in down in Section 17 of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
accordance with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of Law of 1998.
1998 and pertinent DAR regulations.

23 24
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due Process POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due Process
and Eminent Domain and Eminent Domain
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 11
TAU MU

In their respective Answers, petitioner and the DAR claimed that the property HELD:
was acquired by the government under its OLT program and their valuation Citing the case of Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals, the Court
thereof constituted just compensation, having been made pursuant to the emphasized that where private property is taken by the Government for public
guidelines set by E.O. No. 228 and P.D. No. 27. use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or
negotiated sale, the owners action to recover the land or the value
The RTC, after noting the report of the Commissioners appointed, fixed the thereof does not prescribe. The Court went on to remind government
just compensation at P2,564,403.58. agencies not to exercise the power of eminent domain with wanton disregard
for property rights as Section 9, Article III of the Constitution provides that
Petitioner filed a MR of the SAC decision which was denied. private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Upon appeal, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In Forform Development Corporation vs Philippine National Railways, the
court declared that recovery of possession of the property by the landowner
ISSUE: can no longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly,
Whether or not PD No. 27 and EO No. 228, as claimed by petitioner, or RA of public policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue
No. 6657, as claimed by respondent, should govern in determining the value its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not
of the property. necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left to
the landowner is the right of compensation. It is settled that non-payment of
HELD: just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover
RA No 6657 should govern in determining the value of the property. Citing the possession of their expropriated lot. Herein respondents also failed to
case of Land Bank of the Philippines vs Chico, the Court declared in no question the taking of their property for a long period of time (from 1980 until
uncertain terms that RA No. 6657 is the relevant law in determining just the early 1990s).
compensation after noting several decided cases where the Court found it
more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the The prevailing doctrine on judicial determination of just compensation is that
property at the time of payment. set forth in Forfom. Therein, the Court ruled that even if there are no
expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the trial
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was applied to cases court is still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure provided for in
involving lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 where Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the
payment of just compensation had not been completed. When in the interim appointment of not more than three competent and disinterested
R.A. No. 6657 was passed before the full payment of just compensation, as in commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for
the case at bar, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation control. the subject property. The Court reiterated its ruling in National Power
Corporation v. Dela Cruz that trial with the aid of commissioners is a
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason
a judicial function, and the Court does not find the SAC to have acted at all. It was also emphasized therein that although ascertainment of just
capriciously or arbitrarily in setting the price at P93,657.00 per hectare as the compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners findings may only
said amount does not appear to be grossly exorbitant or otherwise unjustified. be disregarded or substituted with the trial courts own estimation of the
For the Court notes that the SAC properly took into account various factors propertys value only if the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
such as the nature of the land, when it is irrigated, the average harvests per evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
hectare (expressed as AGP based on three normal crop years) at 117.73 preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly
cavans per hectare, and the higher valuation applied by the DAR. inadequate or excessive.

With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed, it is


EUSEBIO VS LUIS 25 settled jurisprudence that where property was taken without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of
FACTS: possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation proceedings,
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land which was taken it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980 and was used as a municipal road.
In this case, the trial court should have fixed just compensation for the
On February 1, 1983, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed property at its value as of the time of taking in 1980, but there is nothing on
Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of record showing the value of the property at that time. The trial court,
land. However, the Appraisal Committee assessed the value of the land only therefore, clearly erred when it based its valuation for the subject land on the
at P150/sqm. In a letter dated June 26, 1995, respondents requested the price paid for properties in the same location, taken by the city government
Appraisal Commiitte to consider P2,000/sqm as the value of their land. only sometime in the year 1994.

Respondent’s counsel sent a letter to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the amount


of P5,000.00/sqm as just compensation for respondents property. In his reply, City of Iloilo vs. Contreras and Javellana (G.R. No. 168967)26
Mayor Eusebio said that the City of Pasig cannot pay them more than the
amount set by the Appraisal Committee. Facts:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain against private respondent
Thus, on October 8, 1996, respondents’ filed a complaint before the RTC Elpidio T. Javellana and Southern Negros Development Bank, the latter as
praying that the property be returned to them with payment of reasonable mortgagee which sought to expropriate two parcels of land registered in
rental for 16 years of use, or in the event said property can no longer be Javellana’s name to be used as a school site for Lapaz High
returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation. School. Petitioner alleged that the Subject Property was declared for tax
purposes to have a value of P60.00 per square meter, or a total value
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the decision of P43,560.00. Javellana also claimed that the true fair market value of his
of the RTC and denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. property was no less than P220.00 per square meter. Petitioner was able to
take physical possession of the properties sometime in the middle of 1985.
ISSUE: Private respondent thus demanded his just compensation as well as interest.
Whether or not property taken without the benefit of expropriation proceeding Private respondent alleged that since he had not been compensated for the
required by law in the taking of private property for public use can be Subject Property, petitioner’s possession was illegal, and he was entitled to
regained. recovery of possession of his lots. Private respondent could only demand for
the payment of just compensation.

25 26
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due Process POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due Process
and Eminent Domain and Eminent Domain
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 12
TAU MU

Issue: Republic vs. Mendoza (G.R. No. 185091)28


Whether or not just compensation should be based on the fair market value of
a property at the time of the filing of complaint. Facts:
PPS has been using 1,149 square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since
Held: 1957 for its school. However some portions of the property were registered in
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza. The Republic claimed
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa,
to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as
should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Just evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision plan. The Mendoza’s claim,
compensation is to be determined “as of the date of filing of the complaint”. on the other hand, that although PPS sought permission from them to use the
The reckoning date should be in 2004 because of the clear injustice to the property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to it.
private respondent who all these years has been deprived of the beneficial
use of his properties. City of Iloilo is held liable for damages for taking private Issue:
respondent’s property without payment of just compensation. Whether or not the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic from the
subject property that it had used for a public school.

RP vs. MANGOTARA27 Held:


The Mendozas’ remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not
FACTS: ejectment. It may be assumed that the Mendozas agreed to transfer
Dona Demetria owns two parcels of land and has titles to prove ownership. ownership of the land to the government but never got around to do so and
83 years later authenticity of said ownership was still in doubt and the the Republic itself altogether forgot about it. Consequently, the Republic
government filed a case of expropriation against occupants of the land (not should be deemed entitled to possession pending the Mendozas’ formal
really the owners, just renters). The occupants questioned the expropriation transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just compensation. Where the
case contending that expropriation cases can only be filed against owners, owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for
not mere occupants, of the land. The government also filed a case of public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal
Reversion against Dona Demetria’s heirs contending two parcels of land were expropriation proceeding covering such property. As to the time when just
fraudulently acquired. The owners of the land questioned the case for compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken
Reversion contending that, since they filed a case for Reconstitution of Titles without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action
in 1914 and they still have said titles at present, the government has no right for recovery of possession before the commencement of expropriation
to the land. proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is
controlling.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON owners of parcels of land are indispensable parties to an
expropriation proceeding? NO LBP vs. Livioco (G.R. No. 170685) 29
2. WON the government erred in filing both a case for expropriation and a
case for Reversion against the occupants and the owners of the land? Facts:
NO Livioco offered his sugarland to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for
3. WON, in filing the case for Reversion, the government is barred by res acquisition under the CARP at P30.00 per square meter, for a total of P9,
judicata and prescription? NO 189,870.00. The voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) form submitted to the DAR
indicated that the said property is adjacent to residential subdivisions and to
HELD: an international paper mill. LBP set the price at P3.21 per square meter.
1. The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of Livioco’s request for a reevaluation of the compensation on the ground that its value
the property condemned. They include all other persons, owning, had already appreciated from the time it was first offered for sale was denied by the
occupying or claiming to own the property. When property is taken by reason that there was already a perfected sale.
eminent domain, the owner is not an indispensable party to the
proceeding. Livioco finally filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation
against respondents maintaining that the location of his property has become
2. The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both predominantly residential hence he should be paid his property’s value as
expropriation/reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. Rule such.
67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows filing of expropriation even
when “the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be Issue:
the Republic, although occupied by private individuals.” Whether or not the compensation for respondent’s property was
determined in accordance with law.
3. (a prior case filed by an heir asking for a Reconstitution of titles was
granted and said titles are still with said heir up to the time of the filing of Held:
the case for Reversion. They have titles to “prove” ownership. However, In expropriation cases (including cases involving lands for agrarian reform), the
the 1914 case for Reconstitution of Title never delved into the issue of property’s character refers to its actual use at the time of taking, not its potential
“ownership”, only reconstitution of title and it turns out said two lands uses. Respondent himself admitted that his property was agricultural at the time he
were questionably acquired by Dona Demetria. Government, then, still offered it for sale to DAR in 1988. The coverage of RA 6657 only extends to
has the right to impugn ownership claimed by Demetria and her heirs) agricultural lands; respondent’s property should be conclusively treated as
an agricultural land and valued as such. LBP’s valuation is not in accordance
Elementary is the rule that prescription does not run against the State. with Section 17 of R.A. 6675. It is reminded to adhere strictly to the doctrine
The indefeasibility of a Title over land previously public is not a bar to an that just compensation must be valued at the time of taking. The “time of
investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been taking” is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of
acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine w/n fraud his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic. Valuation of
had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate property must be based on the values prevalent in 1994 for agricultural lands.
action for reversion may be filed by the government.

28
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due Process
and Eminent Domain
27 29
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due Process POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due Process
and Eminent Domain and Eminent Domain
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 13
TAU MU

APO Fruits Corp. vs. LBP (G.R. No. 164195) 30 Dumlao vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-52245)32

Facts: Issue:
AFC and HPI received separate notices of land acquisition and valuation of Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal
their properties from the DAR-PARO. HPI and AFC rejected the valuations of protection and due process rights.
DAR-PARO for being very low. DAR requested the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) to deposit P26, 409,549.86 in AFC’s bank account Held:
and P45, 481,706.76 in HPI’s bank account, which amounts the petitioners No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification
then withdrew. AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for determination of just based on reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case,
compensation with the DARAB which the latter failed to act upon thus forcing employees 65 years of age have been classified differently from younger
AFC and HPI to file separate complaints for determination of just employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter
compensation. The RTC fixed the just compensation for the petitioners’ are not.
1,338.6027 hectares of land at P1, 383,179,000.00, with interest on this
amount at the prevailing market interest rates, computed from the taking of In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that
the properties on December 9, 1996 until fully paid, minus the amounts the candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume
petitioners already received under the initial valuation. office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable
classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy
Issue: of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our
Whether or not just compensation was given to AFC and HPI. political elective echelons.

Held: The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
The 5% initial payments made by the LBP when the petitioners’ landholdings proscribed is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. There is
were taken, although promptly withdrawn by the petitioners, could not by any reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for office
means be considered a fair exchange of values at the time of taking; in fact, because there is the “need for new blood to assume relevance”. When
the LBP’s actual deposit could not be said to be substantial even from the an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable
original LBP valuation of P251,379,103.90. Deposits were not enough to for the same government work.
compensate the petitioners for the potential income the landholdings could
have earned for them if no immediate taking had taken place. Without prompt The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid.
payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" if the property is
immediately taken as the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of
both his land and its fruits or income. Petitioners were made to wait for more Quinto vs. COMELEC (G. R. No. 189698)33
than a decade after the taking of their property before they actually received
the full amount of the principal of the just compensation due them. When the Facts:
LBP took the petitioners’ landholdings without the corresponding full payment, R.A. 8676 provides that all elective officials are not deemed resigned upon
it became liable to the petitioners for the income the landholdings would have filing of their certificate of candidacy, however, appointive officials are
earned had they not immediately been taken from the petitioners. considered deemed resigned upon filing of the COC’s.

Issue:
Spouses Abad vs. Fil-Homes Realty (G.R. No. 189239) 31 Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is violative of
the equal protection clause.
Facts:
On June 30, 2004, the City of Parañaque filed expropriation proceedings Held:
covering the lots owned by respondents before the Regional Trial Court of 2009 Decision
Parañaque with the intention of establishing a socialized housing project
therein for distribution to the occupants including petitioners. No payment had Yes. Persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned upon filing
been made to respondents for the lots therefore they still maintain ownership. of CoCs, but not considering resigned all other civil servants, specifically
elective ones, the law duly discriminates against the first class (appointive
Issue: officials). Applying the four requisites of valid classification, the Court finds
Whether or not there was just compensation. that treatment of persons holding appointive officers as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of law (Requisite No. 2).
Held: There is no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be
property for public use upon payment of just compensation. A socialized germane to the purposes of law.
housing project falls within the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the
constitutional provisions on social justice. the mere issuance of a writ of 2010 Decision
possession in the expropriation proceedings did not transfer ownership of the Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is not violative of the equal
lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in protection clause.
expropriation. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that
expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is not complete There is substantial distinction. Elective officials are elected by his
until payment of just compensation. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it constituents, if they are deemed resigned, the constituents will be affected.
is necessary to pay the property owners the final just compensation. There is On the other hand, in the case of appointive officials, they do not have
even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents ordinary succession, thus, there will be vacancy during resignation.
prior to the City’s possession of the lots.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore
germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to
preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the
Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also
thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will.

30
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON 32 I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due Process POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal
and Eminent Domain Protection, 2. Political Equality
31 33
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, E. Due Process POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal
and Eminent Domain Protection, 2. Political Equality
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 14
TAU MU

rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of
Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC (GR No. 190582)34 the B IR and t he B OC into m ercenarie s and bount y hunter s"
as the y w il l do t he ir b est o nl y
Facts: i nc o n s i d e r a t i o n o f s u c h r e w a r d s . T h u s , t h e s y s t e m o f r
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds. LGBT e w a r d s a n d i n c e n t i v e s i n v i t e s corrupt io n and underm i nes
tolerates immorality, sexual immorality and will be exposing our youth to an the const it utio na ll y m andated dut y of these off icials a nd
environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. employees.

Issue: Issue:
Whether or not denying the application of Ang Ladlad is violative of the equal protection Whether or not the limitation of the scope of the system of rewards and
clause. incentives only to officials and employees of BIR and BOC is violative of the
equal protection clause.
Held:
Yes. COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not Held:
justified by the circumstances of the case. According to COMELEC, the N o . The classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
majority of Filipinos considers homosexual conduct as immoral and under R.A. 9335 does not violate the equal protection clause. The subject of
unacceptable. Such reason is sufficient to disqualify the petitioner. the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
Homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of equal protection BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically
clause. Moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state pertain to the said agencies. The law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
interest that is sufficient to satisfy the rational basis review under the equal because they have the common distinct primary function of generating
protection clause. LGBT has the same interest in participating in the party-list revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs
system. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs. duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under
the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent
Trillanes vs. Pimentel (G.R. No. 179817)35 functions - taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane
and intimately related to the purpose of the law.
Facts:
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’état in relation to the “Oakwood
Incident.” In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year Soriano v. Laguardia (G.R. No. 164785)37
term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court
that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate, Facts:
alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still The MTRCB gave a 20-day preventive suspension to Soriano’s And Dating
pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already Daan TV program for defamatory utterances against an INC minister. Soriano
conviction. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since was later imposed with a three-month suspension from his TV program
the presumption of innocence is still in his favor. Petitioner also illustrates that
Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, whereas he is Issue:
indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense." Whether or not the preventive suspension order by the MTRCB denied him
his right to the equal protection clause.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to attend the Senate sessions. Held:
Petitioner next faults MTRCB’s preventive suspension order which made him
Held: unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers. Petitioner’s
No. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that "all
pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable persons subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like
classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of imposed." It guards against undue favor and individual privilege as well as
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. hostile discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises, place
The Constitution provides: himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing
administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to that
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. If
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee.

The cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Within the class of offenses covered by the League of Cities vs. COMELEC (GR No. 176951)38
stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the
political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, it did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into
cities. Subsequently, the 12th Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
ABAKADA v. Purisima (G.R. No. 166715)36 9009), which took effect on 20 June 2001, amending Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
Facts: conversion of a municipality into a city from P20million to P100million. 16
P etit ioner s are c ha lle ng i ng t he constitutionality of R.A. 9335, a tax municipalities filed cityhood bills containing a common provision exempting all
reform legislation to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection the 16 municipalities from the P100million income requirement of R.A. 9009.
of the B IR and t he B OC . They contend that, by establishing a system of The cityhood bills were approved by the House of Representatives and the
Senate, and lapsed into law without the President’s signature. Said Cityhood
Laws directed the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold plebiscites
34
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON to determine whether the voters in each municipality approved of the
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal
Protection, 2. Political Equality
35 37
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal
Protection Protection
36 38
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION, F. Equal
Protection Protection
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 15
TAU MU

conversion. Petitioners sought to declare the 16 Cityhood Laws accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions,
unconstitutional for violation the equal protection clause. which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for
ISSUE: cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component
Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to
exist.
HELD:
2008 Ruling The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government
Cityhood laws are violative of the equal protection clause. Section 450 of the units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA
Local Government Code, as amended by R.A. 9009, does not contain any 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the
exemption to theP100 million annual income requirement. Even if the creation of cities.
exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely Chamber of Real vs. Romulo (G.R. No. 160756)39
states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. Facts:
9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. is
standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those questioning the constitutionality of Section 27 (E) of Republic Act 8424 and
that are not exempted. the revenue regulations issued by the BIR to implement said provision and
those involving creditable withholding taxes. Imposition of minimum corporate
In the 11th Congress, the exemption which is based solely on the fact that the income tax (MCIT) on corporations and creditable withholding tax (CWT) on
16 municipalities had cityhood bills that were pending when RA 9009 was sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets. CWT is being levied
enacted is not a valid classification between those entitled and those not only on real estate enterprises.
entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement. The
classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, Issue:
rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of Whether or not the revenue regulations are violative of the equal protection
the law, not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly clause.
situated. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the Held:
purpose of the income requirement. The classification criterion − mere The equal protection clause under the Constitution as applied in this case
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to means that all persons belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. It
the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities follows that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by
from converting into cities. legislation based on a reasonable classification. The taxing power has the
authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes of taxation.
2009 Ruling Inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
Petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation. The real estate
protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by industry is a class and can be validly treated differently from other business
virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCP’s claim that the IRA of enterprises.
its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion
into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit
of the constitutional guarantee. The favorable treatment accorded the sixteen Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission (G.R. No. 192935) 40
(16) municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the erstwhile PhP 20 Facts:
million income criterion instead of the stringent income requirement EO No. 1 was issued by President Aquino to investigate reported cases of
prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially different from other municipalities graft and corruption of previous administration. The petitioners assail EO No.
desirous to be cities. The exemption of respondent LGUs/municipalities from 1 is violative of the constitutional safeguard because it does not apply equally
the P100M income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the
occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009 and also to insure "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in
that fairness and justice would be accorded respondent LGUs making the partisan hostility." To be accorded with validity, the commission must also
classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The non-retroactive cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to
effect of RA 9009 is not limited in application only to conditions existing at the that of former President Arroyo.
time of its enactment because it is intended to apply for all time. The uniform
exemption clause would apply to all municipalities that had pending cityhood Issue:
bills before the passage of R.A. 9009 and were compliant with the LGC of Whether or not the Truth Commission is violative of the equal protection
1991. clause.

2010 Ruling Held:


2008 ruling is reinstated. No substantial distinction between municipalities Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not protection clause. For a classification to meet the requirements of
have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong
is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the to the class. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
purpose of the income requirement. Pendency of a cityhood bill in the investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and
11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time corruption during the previous administration” only. The previous
of passage of RA 9009therefore violating the requirement that a valid administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be
classification must not be limited to existing conditions only (pendency of the gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the
cityhood bills adverted to can no longer be repeated). Limiting the exemption assailed executive order. The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a
only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
must apply to all similarly situated. Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification.

2011 Ruling
There was valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal
protection clause. The purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely
to stop the "mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities" 39
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for
and without municipalities. Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure
viability of respondents to become component cities of their respective 40
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for
capacity and viability of the respondents to become the State’s partners in Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 16
TAU MU

In Re: Morales (A.M. No. .M. No. P-08-2519)41 conclusions of law. Statements of mere conclusions of law expose the
Facts: complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of
Atty. Morales has been alleged of consuming his working hours filing and action.
attending to personal cases, such as administrative cases against employees
in his old sala, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. A spot The allegation that the search warrant in this case was served in a malicious
investigation was conducted by DCA Dela Cruz together with four NBI manner is also not sufficient. Allegations of bad faith, malice and other related
agents, a crime photographer and a support staff in the office of Atty. words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law.
Morales. The team was able to access the personal computer of Atty.
Morales and print two documents stored in its hard drive which were The proceeding under Rule 126, a limited criminal one, does not provide for
pleadings not related to his work. Atty. Morales's computer was seized and the filing of counterclaims for damages against those who may have
taken to the custody of the OCA. improperly sought the issuance of the search warrant. Consequently, the Del
Rosarios had the right to seek damages, if the circumstances warranted, by
Issue: separate civil action for the wrong inflicted on them by an improperly obtained
Whether or not the pleadings found in Atty. Morales’ personal computer are or enforced search warrant. Unfortunately, their complaint, as worded, failed
admissible in the cases against him. to state a proper cause of action.

Held: Petitioner Arthur del Rosario claims that respondents NBI agents wrongfully
Atty. Morales argues that the pleadings were acquired from his personal included him as respondent in their application for a search warrant since he
computer without any valid search and seizure order and without his consent, neither owned the house at 51 New York Street nor resided in it. But the rules
such evidence should be considered as the fruits of a poisonous tree as it do not require respondents in search warrant proceedings to be residents of
violated his right to privacy. Consent must be voluntary in order to validate an the premises to be searched. If this were the case, criminals in possession of
otherwise illegal search. To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the illegal articles could simply use other people’s residence for storing such
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1) articles to avoid being raided and searched.
the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right. There is no showing that Atty. Morales
had an actual intention to relinquish his right. He may have agreed to the PEOPLE vs. TUAN (G.R. No. 176066, 11-AUG-2010)44
opening of his personal computer and the printing of files in the presence of
DCA Dela Cruz, his staff and some NBI agents during the spot investigation, HELD:
it is also of record that Atty. Morales immediately filed an administrative case The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following: (1) it
against said persons questioning the validity of the investigation, specifically must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. The determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;
Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
him for it violated his constitutional right. The case has been dismissed for oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
insufficiency of evidence. produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.

People vs. Nunez (G.R. No. 177148) 42 In People vs. Aruta, the Court defined probable cause as follows: “Although
probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a
Facts: reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
Laguna Police Detectives and IID Mobile Force conducted a search in the strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
house of Raul R. Nuñez based on reports of drug possession. Police officers accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to
found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a lady’s wallet containing P4,610 discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
inside appellant’s dresser. that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense
or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. It
Issue: ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man
Whether or not the search warrant was invalid for failing to state the exact weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our
address to be searched. rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies
on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in
Held: abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining
The right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, like any probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it
other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made expressly or must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact
impliedly. This right has been deemed waived by Nunez for failing to raise seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items
any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the will be found in the place to be searched. A magistrate’s determination of
evidence obtained during trial. probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference
by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining
DEL ROSARIO vs. DONATO, SR. (G.R. No. 180595, 5-MAR-2010)43 judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
HELD: the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place
A judicially ordered search warrant that fails to yield the described illicit article sought to be searched. Such substantial basis exists in this case.
does not allege that respondents NBI agents violated their right by fabricating
testimonies to convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the search warrant. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the
Their allegation that the NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended
warrant is a mere conclusion of law. While in a motion to dismiss assumes as and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or
true the fact alleged in the complaint, such admission does not extend to description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and
41
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was
Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure accused-appellant’s residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and
42
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES composed of several rooms.
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for
Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure
43 44
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for
Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 17
TAU MU

presumably that of the Chief Executive unless disapproved or reprobated by


the latter.
PEOPLE vs. MAMARIL (G.R. No. 171980, 6-OCT-2010)45
Chan v. Secretary of Justice delineated the proper remedy from the
HELD: determination of the Secretary of Justice. Therein, the Court, after
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is expounding on the policy of non-interference in the determination of the
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the existence of probable cause absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part
judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, of the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice, however, concluded,
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant citing Alcaraz v. Gonzalez and Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of
and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the Appeals, that an aggrieved party from the resolution of the Secretary of
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be Justice may directly resort to judicial review on the ground of grave abuse of
seized. discretion, thus:

On the other hand, probable cause means such facts and circumstances x x x [T]he findings of the Justice Secretary may be reviewed through a
which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on the allegation that he acted
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with with grave abuse of discretion. This remedy is available to the
the offense are in the place sought to be searched. aggrieved party.

There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable As petitioners strongly argue, even if the branded LPG cylinders were indeed
cause since the same must be decided in light of the conditions obtaining in owned by customers, such fact does not authorize Omni to refill these
given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the branded LPG cylinders without written authorization from the brand owners
findings or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. Pilipinas Shell, Petron and Total. In Yao, Sr. v. People, a case involving
criminal infringement of property rights under Sec. 155 of RA 8293, in
It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a affirming the courts a quo’s determination of the presence of probable cause,
showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of a probable cause for this Court held that from Sec. 155.1of RA 8293 can be gleaned that “mere
the issuance of a search warrant is paid with great deference by a reviewing unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered trademark in connection
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to
cause confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers/consumers can be
considered as trademark infringement.” The Court affirmed the presence of
TAN vs. SY TIONG GUE (G.R. NO. 174570, 15-DEC-2010)46 infringement involving the unauthorized sale of Gasul and Shellane LPG
cylinders and the unauthorized refilling of the same by Masagana Gas
HELD: Corporation as duly attested to and witnessed by NBI agents who conducted
Even if an information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the the surveillance and test-buys.
same incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner
cannot include the seized items as part of the evidence therein. Contrary to Similarly, in the instant case, the fact that Omni refilled various branded LPG
petitioner’s contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence in any cylinders even if owned by its customers but without authority from brand
other offense except in that in which the subject search warrants were issued. owners Petron, Pilipinas Shell and Total shows palpable violation of BP 33,
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Section 4. as amended. As aptly noted by the Court in Yao, Sr. v. People, only the duly
Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue authorized dealers and refillers ofShellane, Petron Gasul and, by
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be extension, Total may refill these branded LPG cylinders. Our laws sought to
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or deter the pernicious practices of unscrupulous businessmen.
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized The issue of ownership of the seized branded LPG cylinders is irrelevant and
which may be anywhere in the Philippines. Thus, a search warrant may be hence need no belaboring. BP 33, as amended, does not require ownership
issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific of the branded LPG cylinders as a condition sine qua non for the commission
offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant’s personal of offenses involving petroleum and petroleum products. Verily, the offense
knowledge and his or her witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the of refilling a branded LPG cylinder without the written consent of the brand
evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with owner constitutes the offense regardless of the buyer or possessor of the
the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases branded LPG cylinder.
emanated from the same incident.
The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrants is directed. Ownership,
TY vs. DE JAMIL (G.R. No. 182147, 15-DEC-2010)47 therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought
HELD: to be seized. Petitioners cannot deny that the seized LPG cylinders were in
For one, while it is the consistent principle in this jurisdiction that the the possession of Omni, found as they were inside the Omni compound.
determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice, who may direct the In fine, we also note that among those seized by the NBI are 16 LPG
filing of the corresponding information or move for the dismissal of the case; cylinders bearing the embossed brand names
such determination is subject to judicial review where it is established that of Shellane, Gasul and Totalgaz but were marked as Omnigas. Evidently,
grave abuse of discretion tainted the determination. this pernicious practice of tampering or changing the appearance of a
branded LPG cylinder to look like another brand violates the brand owners’
For another, there is no question that the Secretary of Justice is an alter ego property rights as infringement under Sec. 155.1 of RA 8293. Moreover,
of the President who may opt to exercise or not to exercise his or her power tampering of LPG cylinders is a mode of perpetrating the criminal offenses
of review over the former’s determination in criminal investigation cases. As under BP 33, as amended, and clearly enunciated under DOE Circular No.
aptly noted by Agent De Jemil, the determination of probable cause by the 2000-06-010 which provided penalties on a per cylinder basis for each
Secretary of Justice is, under the doctrine of qualified political agency, violation.

Foregoing considered, in the backdrop of the quantum of evidence required


45
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES to support a finding of probable cause, we agree with the appellate court and
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, which conducted the preliminary
Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure investigation, that there exists probable cause for the violation of Sec. 2 (a) in
46
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES relation to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended. Probable cause has been
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
47
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1. Requirements for prosecuted. After all, probable cause need not be based on clear and
Search Warrants: Rule 126 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 18
TAU MU

belief—probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the
bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution.
Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.

ANIAG vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 104961, 7-OCT-1994)48 The warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the
firearms seized during the warrantless search cannot be used as evidence in
FACTS: any proceeding.
Pursuant to the Gun Ban, the Sergeant-at-Arms wrote to petitioner,
requesting the return of the two firearms issued to him. Thereafter, petitioner
instructed his driver to pick the firearms from petitioner’s house and return EPIE vs. ULAT-MARREDO (G.R. No. 148117, 22-MAR-2007)49
them to Congress. Upon heading to the Congress, the driver was
apprehended at a checkpoint. The car was searched and the gun was found FACTS:
neatly packed in their cases. Upon receiving a call from an informant that a jeepney with Plate No. AYB
117 at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber, the PNP
ISSUE: swiftly established a checkpoint. As the jeepney was spotted, the PNP
Whether ANIAG can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return flagged it down but the jeepney did not stop. Hence, they chased the jeepney
to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two firearms loaded with vegetables, beneath it are the pine lumbers. Pine lumbers were
issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrantless also carried without any valid permit to do so.
search of his car. NO.

HELD: ISSUE:
NO. Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP Whether the police officers have a probable cause to believe that the subject
conducted the search. According to him, without warrant and without vehicle was loaded with illegal cargo and that, therefore, it can be stopped
informing the driver of his fundamental rights the policemen searched his car. and searched without warrant. YES.
The firearms were not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of
Arellano but were neatly packed in their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept HELD:
in the trunk of the car. Thus, the search of his car that yielded the evidence YES. Section 3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence obtained in
for the prosecution was clearly violative of Secs. 2 and 3, par. 2, Art. III of the violation of the above provision shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
Constitution. proceeding.

As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with
by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure constitutes derogation of
search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in a constitutional right.
cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view, as well
as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v. Sarap,
are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative we listed the exceptions where search and seizure may be conducted without
of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the
merely limited to a visual search. evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7)
The records do not show that the manner by which the package was bundled exigent and emergency circumstances. The only requirement in these
led the PNP to suspect that it contained firearms. There was no mention exceptions is the presence of probable cause. Probable cause is the
either of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable,
from Arellano when the car was stopped and searched. Given these discreet, and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
circumstances and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be
thoroughly search the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the searched. In People v. Aruta, we ruled that in warrantless searches,
constitutional injunction. probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or
belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. There is
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers no hard and fast rule or fixed formula in determining probable cause for its
conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to determination varies according to the facts of each case.
believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that
they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a confidential
of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. The existence of probable cause informer disclosed to SPO2 Ngina that a passenger jeepney with Plate No.
justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts of each AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet.
case. Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless search in situations The lumber was covered with assorted vegetables. A PNP roadblock was
where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the then placed in Acop, Tublay, Benguet to intercept the jeepney. At
accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to around 4:00 p.m. of that same day, the police spotted the vehicle. They
flee. flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it
reached Shilan, La Trinidad. A search of the vehicle disclosed several
We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could not produce the
officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were reasonably required DENR permit to cut and transport the same.
corroborated by other attendant matters.
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) In People v. Vinecarao, we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after
meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution No. noticing a checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police
2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with
so because of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that their inspection, there exists probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on
certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were the part of the law enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were
engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike officers of the law or that the vehicle contained objects which were
forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies to the present
or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the case. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that respondent
policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action

48 49
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, a.) Search of Moving Vehicles Warrantless Searches and Seizures, a.) Search of Moving Vehicles
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 19
TAU MU

of jurisdiction when she ruled that the warrantless search is valid and that the Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the
lumber seized is admissible in evidence against petitioners. informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in
the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped the car,
they saw a gun tucked in appellant’s waist. Appellant did not have any
PEOPLE vs. TUAZON (G.R. No. 175783, 3-SEPT-2007)50 document to support his possession of said firearm which all the more
strengthened the police’s suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car,
FACTS: they found on the driver’s seat plastic sachets containing white powdery
Upon receiving through phone call a confidential information that a Gemini substance. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish
car bearing plate no. PFC 411 would deliver an unspecified amount of shabu probable cause for the warrantless search of the Gemini car and the eventual
in Mariville Subd., Antipolo City, the PNP then dispatched a team of admission into evidence of the plastic packets against appellant.
policemen to the area to conduct a surveillance. Upon arriving to the place
stated, they saw the Gemini car and flagged it down, 5 sachets of shabu were In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the
then found on the driver’s seat, 2 more were also found in appellants pocket evidence against him on the ground that the same was obtained through a
when he was frisked. warrantless search. His failure amounts to a waiver of the objection on the
legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the
ISSUE: police. It was only proper for the trial court to admit said evidence.
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest. YES.

HELD: PEOPLE vs. MARIACOS (G.R. No. 188611, 16-JUN-2010)51


YES. Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance
of their official functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the FACTS:
contrary or that they were moved by ill-will. The O.K. bag that was described to have in it the marijuana as reported by a
confidential informant was found by the policeman. He then asked the other
In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, this Court had the occasion to elucidate passengers in the jeepney who owns the bag, but nobody knew. Meanwhile,
on the rationale for the exemption of searches of moving vehicles from the as the jeepney reached its destination, the bag was carried by accused-
requirement of search warrant, thus: appellant, hence, the police caught them up and introduced himself as a
policeman.
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis ISSUE:
of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, Whether or not there was probable cause to warrant the warrantless arrest.
the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the YES.
satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle HELD:
that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We YES. Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally
might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure
ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must determining the existence of probable cause.
be sought."
In People v. Bagista, the Court said:
Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
moving vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled discretion to admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the
aforementioned constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to seizure of evidence in plain view.
indiscriminate police distrust which could amount to outright harassment.
Surely, the policy consideration behind the exemption of search of moving With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of the police ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to
authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the must be sought.
warrantless search of a vehicle.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals, the term "probable cause" was explained to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
mean – cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
[A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The required to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of the probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied
case. before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. Without
probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a the person arrested.
warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
the search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to
crime, in the vehicle to be searched. believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to
the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A confidential that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or
informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.
Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a team to

50 51
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, a.) Search of Moving Vehicles Warrantless Searches and Seizures, a.) Search of Moving Vehicles
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 20
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The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual


belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is PEOPLE vs. AGULAY (G.R. No. 181747, 26-SEPT-2008)52
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the FACTS:
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion A certain informant went to the police station to report about a certain “Sing”
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the who had been selling shabu. A police entrapment team was then formed.
part of the peace officers making the arrest. Upon entrapment, the informant pointed the target pusher to poseur-buyer.
Poseur-buyer was then introduced to Sing, bought shabu, made the signal,
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily then the team rushed to the crime, Sing was then frisked, and 2 sachets of
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis shabu were found.
of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained,
the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the ISSUE:
satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the Whether accused-appellant was arrested in a legitimate “buy-bust” operation.
impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband YES.
from one place to another with impunity.
HELD:
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be YES. It is a well-established rule that an arrest made after
obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other an entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is
immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search considered a valid “warrantless arrest,” in line with the provisions of Rule 113,
is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant
must be sought. Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case
is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the offense.
search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The
searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been
time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination. accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a
buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender,
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellant’s without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. [16] If carried
arrest, the police received information that marijuana was to be transported out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust
from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to operation deserves judicial sanction.[17]
intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the
secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that There are eight (8) instances when a warrantless search and seizure is valid,
a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave to wit:
for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the
packages allegedly containing illegal drugs. (1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3)
searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration,
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5)
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6)
provides: where the prohibited articles are in “plain view;” (7) searches of
buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest — A person lawfully arrested may regulations; and (8) “stop and frisk” operations.
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used
or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. Considering that the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is beyond question,
the subsequent warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure, were
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. permissible. The search, clearly being incident to a lawful arrest, needed no
Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of warrant for its validity. Thus, contrary to accused-appellant's contention, the
Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit: contraband seized from him, having been obtained as a result of the buy-bust
operation to which the defense failed to impute any irregularity, was correctly
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a admitted in evidence.
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
On this premise, this Court has laid down the “objective” test in scrutinizing
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has buy-bust operations. In People v. Doria,[31] we said:
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense; We therefore stress that the “objective” test in buy-bust operations
b) When an offense has just been committed and he has demands that the details of the purported transaction must be
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
committed it; and purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from the drug, the payment of the “buy-bust” money, and the delivery
one confinement to another. of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police
officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or offense. x x x.
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous CHING vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 177237, 17-OCT-2008)53
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search.
Given that the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that search is 52
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
also valid. AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, b.) Search Incident to a Valid Arrest
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 21
TAU MU

had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant
ISSUE: was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable
1) Whether or not the arrest of the petitioner was illegal. NO. ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing
2) Whether or not the search conducted on the premised is illegal. NO. or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the
3) Whether or not the buy-bust operation against the petitioner was a informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would
sham. NO. have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have
been confiscated.
HELD:
1) NO. According to the records, the entrapment operation started when
Police Chief Suan received information from an informant that the latter PEOPLE vs. ARANETA (G.R. No. 191064, 20-OCT-2010)55
was arranging a drug deal with Ching. Since the transaction was to be
carried out almost immediately, Police Chief Suan no longer required the HELD:
conduct of a surveillance operation to verify the information. Police Chief The “objective test” in buy-bust operation was overcome. We therefore stress
Suan lost no time in briefing his men. He then assembled a team to that the “objective” test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of
apprehend Ching in the arranged drug deal. He designated SPO1 the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This
Cadoy to act as the poseur-buyer and gave him the marked money to be must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher,
used in the transaction. Inspector Arsenal was also tasked to lead the the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the
group in the target area. Police Chief Suan was monitoring his men consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the
nearby the area and communicated to them through a radio. Although sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not
he did not witness the actual sale, he was able to recount the incidents through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the “buy-
prior and immediately after the buy-bust operations. bust” money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant
alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
2) NO. This Court observed in many cases that drug pushers sell their insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
prohibited articles to any prospective customer, be he a stranger or not, offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time,
in private as well as in public places, even in the daytime. Indeed, drug however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into
pushers have become increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse, ignoring the accused’s predisposition to commit the crime. If there is
openly defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the time and venue overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal
of the sale, but the fact of agreement and the acts constituting sale and proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors
delivery of the prohibited drugs. to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far
as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of
3) NO. The rule is settled that an arrest made after an entrapment does not inducement.[6] [Emphasis supplied]
require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest
pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court 47 which states: Absent any convincing countervailing evidence, the presumption is that the
members of the buy-bust team performed their duties in a regular manner. It
SEC. 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a was certainly a job well done. Hence, the Court gives full faith and credit to
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust
operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of,
Having established that the buy-bust operation is factual and legitimate, and selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for
the subsequent warrantless arrest of Ching and as well as the the buy-bust team to arrest, and search, them on the spot because a buy-
warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs was permissible, thus: bust operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of
not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been
been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of proven to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided
moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered ABENES vs. CA (G.R. No. 156320, 14-FEB-2007)56
legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante HELD:
delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain
prisoners. view, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered by his shirt.

The prosecution was able to establish the abovementioned rule. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer
who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence.18 The "plain view" doctrine applies when
PEOPLE vs. RACHO (G.R. No. L-186529, 3-AUG-2010)54 the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of
the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
ISSUE: which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
Whether or not the search, which yielded the alleged contraband, was lawful view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
HELD: subject to seizure.
NO. The showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design is
required. Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of ESQUILLO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 182010, 25-AUG-2010)57
facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was
committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant

55
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
53
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, b.) Search Incident to a Valid Arrest
56
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, b.) Search Incident to a Valid Arrest II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
54
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures, c.) When things seized are within
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, b.) Search Incident to a Valid Arrest plain view of a searching party
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 22
TAU MU

jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an


HELD: illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
That law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant may inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
conduct a search is settled. The same, however, admits of arrest.
exceptions,viz :
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of guarantee, intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into
vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) their houses, papers and effects. X x x the constitutional guarantee,
searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or however, is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and
constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7) seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following
searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant – (i) warrantless
regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.20 (emphasis underscoring search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in “plain view”;
supplied) (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or circumstances.
seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into account, among Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 s clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs
other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances involved including the (a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both require
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be
the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground
searched, and the character of the articles procured. of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not
that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or fall under any of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest
contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk" practice serves is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at
a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting
under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to escaped from a penal establishment.
take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrest without
used against the police officer. warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested
officers constituted a valid "stop-and-frisk" operation. The search/seizure of is probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual
the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner's possession - later facts, that is supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
voluntarily exhibited24 to the police operative - was undertaken after she was themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin arrested.
introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her
arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to 2. Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view.
flee after the police officer had identified himself. The elements of plain view are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
PEOPLE vs. MARTINEZ (G.R. No. 1911366, 13-DEC-2010)58 inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent;
FACTS: and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
Upon the receipt of the report, police authorities and members of the SWAT further search.
team hied to Trinidad Subd., Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from the people in
the area, the house of the accused was located. As the police officers entered The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance
the gate of the house. However, nothing from outside the house could be considering that the identity and address of one of the accused were
seen what is happening inside, such as the alleged paraphernalia and plastic already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining
sachet of shabu on the table while they were outside the premises of the the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have
property of accused. Before entering, they only relied on the information that been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being
that there was an ongoing pot session inside the house of accused. illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal.
Thereafter, they immediately barged in and arrested accused. Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a
ISSUE: poisonous tree and should be excluded. The subject items seized
1. WON there was an express waiver on the part of the accused. NO. during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the
2. WON the items were seized in plain view. NO. verycorpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of
HELD: the accused.

1. The accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he


fails to raise such issue before arraignment. However, this waiver is POSADAS vs. CA (G.R. No. 89139, 2-AUG-1990)59
limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the
FACTS:
Pat. Ungab and Pat. Umpar, both members of INP of the Davao Metrodiscom
57
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES assigned with the Intelligence Task Force were conducting surveillance along
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of Magallanes St., Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, c.) When things seized are within Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a “BURI” bag and they
plain view of a searching party; d.) Stop and Frisk
58
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
59
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, c.) When things seized are within AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
plain view of a searching party, e.) Express Waiver Warrantless Searches and Seizures, d.) Stop and Frisk
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 23
TAU MU

noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached petitioner and there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a
his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
resistance. They then checked the buri bag and found a revolver, rounds of suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
live ammunition, and tear gas. Petitioner failed to show the necessary license probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and
or authority to possess the same. Thereafter, he was prosecuted for illegal it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
possession of firearms and ammunitions.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in
ISSUE: the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a
1. WON there was a lawful arrest or search and seizure. YES. search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be
2. WON the arrest is justified by stop and search. YES. useless, futile and much too late.

HELD:
PEOPLE vs. MENGOTE (G.R. No. 87059, 22-JUN-1992)60
1. An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private
person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested FACTS:
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an Shortly after a phone call received in the Western Police District, that there
offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has was a suspicious-looking persons (one of whom was holding his abdomen,
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has and both men looking from side-to-side) at the corner of Juan Luna and North
committed it. Bay Boulevard, Pat. Mercado and Alberto Juan proceeded to the said place
and approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen,
At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the
apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know other lawmen surrounded them. Suspects were searched, and one of them
that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal was found a revolver with live bullets in the chamber, the other (MENGOTE)
possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. They were then turned
was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its over to the HQ for investigation. Thereafter, they were accused of violation of
contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a PD 1866.
warrant.
ISSUE:
2. There are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected 1. WON the warrantless arrest was valid. NO
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is 2. WON the evidence obtained was inadmissible evidence. YES
the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by HELD:
this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as follows:
Warrantless search in broad daylight of a person merely looking from
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been side to side and holding his stomach is illegal.
stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning
the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time
incidents which amount to a violation of his light against unlawful search of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side
and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers
there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be their presence.
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case. The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not
necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The
looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested
unreasonable search. by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a
place not exactly forsaken?
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to A person may not be stopped and frisked in broad daylight on a busy
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective street on mere unexplained suspicion.
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the
public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them
to destabilize the government in the interest of public security. In this innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and be was holding his
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they
NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who
centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not
by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the the impending crime.
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the
accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of
by the men in uniform in the same manner that all governmental power Mengote's supposed involvement therein. As for the illegal possession of the
is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the
price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
60
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, d.) Stop and Frisk
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 24
TAU MU

only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later the search be conducted, but it should be done in the presence of Major
revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it. Macasaet. True enough, upon the search being conducted, a gun, bullets,
clothes of men and a book entitled “Islamic Revolution Future Path of the
Nation” were all found in the house. An arraignment was then set and an
MANALILI vs. CA (G.R. No. 113447, 9-OCT-1997)61 information was filed against petitioners for violation of P.D. 1866.

FACTS: ISSUE:
Due to the information that drug addicts were roaming the area of Kalookan WON there was the petitioners validly waived their right against warrantless
City; a surveillance was conducted by Pat. Espiritu and Pat. Lumabas. Upon search and seizure. NO.
reaching the city, they alighted from the official car of the Police Station.
Thereafter, they chanced upon a male (MANALILI) whose eyes were reddish HELD:
and was walking in a swaying manner. Manalili tried to avoid them; policemen Where permission to enter a residence was given to search for rebels, it
approached him and introduced their selves as police officers. Police then is illegal to search on the rooms therein and seize firearms without a
asked what Manalili was holding in his hands, but he tried to resist. Espiritu search warrant. None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The
again asked Manalili of what he was holding, then the latter showed his wallet reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly
and allowed Espiritu to examine the same. Espiritu took the wallet and being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt.
examined it, found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside; kept it. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because
he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This
Thereafter, an examination was conducted to Manalili and to the confiscated shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he
marijuana. Results are all positive. did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek
permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa
Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers.
ISSUE: Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample
WON there was a valid warrantless search and arrest. YES. time to procure a search warrant but did not.

HELD: Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum


prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of
general rule against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they
Appeals, 24 the Court held that there were many instances where a search are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having
and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were
arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle.
They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant,
along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must
a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was there isno crime.
characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had
sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on
drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's PEOPLE vs. NUEVAS (G.R. No. 170233, 22-FEB-2007)63
possession.
FACTS:
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner PO3 Fami and SPO3 Cabling conducted a stationary surveillance and
effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter St., Brgy. Pag-asa,
he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver Olongapo City. They received an information that a person would make a
of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable delievery of marijuana dried leaves; person was described for them to
search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right recognize. While stationed thereat, they saw a male (Nuevas) fit to the
to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or decription, alight from a motor vehicle; was carrying a bag. Fami and Cabiling
constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish accosted Nuevas and informed him that they were police officers; Nuevas
the right. 26Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption and Fami conversed in the Waray language. Thereafter, Nuevas informed
against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence Fami that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, and
from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, two other male persons (Inocencio and Din). Later on, Nuevas pointed to the
however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried
raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as leaves and bricks wrapped in blue cloth. Shortly, Nueva disclosed where the
distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case two other male persons would deliver the marijuana. Then, they all went to
is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by the place, Fami and Cabiling then introduced themselves as police officers;
petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on asked Din what he was carrying, replied that it was Nuevas’, Fami then took
appeal. the bag and upon inspection, founf marijuana packed in newspaper.

VEROY vs. LAYAGUE (G.R. No. 95630, 18-JUN-1992)62


ISSUE:
FACTS: 1. WON there was consent on the part of Nuevas for the warrantless
As the Veroy Spouses already lived in Quezon City; left their house in Davao search. YES.
City under the care of two houseboys and Edna Sooguilon (only the key to 2. WON there was consent on the part of Din and Inocencio for the
the kitchen was left, keys to the bedrooms were still kept by spouses); Capt. warrantless search. NONE.
Obrero contacted Luisa Veroy asking for perimission that they would search
her house because of the report they received that their was being used as HELD:
safehouse of rebel soldiers. Luisa responded and gave her permission that
The SC held that the search conducted in Nueva’s case was made with his
consent. In Din’s case, there was none.
61
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, d.) Stop and Frisk
62 63
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, e.) Express Waiver Warrantless Searches and Seizures, e.) Express Waiver
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 25
TAU MU

1. There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to
plastic bag with the incriminating contents to the police officers. It can be enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The Collector of
seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive
liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure
and even revealed his ‘associates,’ offering himself as an informant. His and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded
actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of
excuses, blame others and save oneself even at the cost of others’ lives. certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

2. The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs
his right against unreasonable searches. While it may not be contrary to Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known
human nature for one to be jolted into surrendering something as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the proper fora
incriminating to authorities, Fami’s and Cabling’s testimonies do not and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised
show that Din was in such a state of mind or condition. Fami and concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of
Cabling did not testify on Din’s composure—whether he felt surprised or Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose
frightened at the time—which fact we find necessary to provide basis for decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the surrender of the bag. There was no mention of any permission made the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.
by the police officers to get or search the bag or of any consent given by
Din for the officers to search it. It is worthy to note that in cases where Respondents cite the statement of the Court of Appeals that regular courts
the Court upheld the validity of consented search, the police authorities still retain jurisdiction "where, as in this case, for lack of probable cause, there
expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to is serious doubt as to the propriety of placing the articles under Customs
be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear jurisdiction through seizure/forfeiture proceedings."[11] They overlook the fact,
and positive proof. however, that under the law, the question of whether probable cause
exists for the seizure of the subject sacks of rice is not for the Regional
Inocencio’s supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was Trial Court to determine. The customs authorities do not have to prove
sought to be shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that to the satisfaction of the court that the articles on board a vessel were
Din was carrying.58 Taking a look at an object, more so in this case imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before they
peeping into a bag while held by another, is not the same as taking may exercise the power to effect customs’ searches, seizures, or
possession thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to arrests provided by law and continue with the administrative hearings.
Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or
even conspiracy to illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to It is noteworthy that because of the indiscriminate issuance of writs of
show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag injunction, the Supreme Court issued on June 25, 1999 Administrative
and that he conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. Inocencio Circular No. 07-99 to all judges of lower courts entitled re: exercise of
was firm and unshakeable in his testimony that he had no part in any utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in issuance of temporary
delivery of marijuana dried leaves. restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. The circular states
in part:
The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. However, it must be Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically declared
seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an in Mison v. Natividad (213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992]) that "[b]y express
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, provision of law, amply supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof
clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search or stifle or put it to naught."
was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of
all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in immediately disseminated and shall monitor implementation thereof.
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in
a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or
passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) RIETA vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 147817, 12-AUG-2004)65
the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; HELD:
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest may be
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has made even without a warrant for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through or search any land,
enclosure, warehouse, store or building that is not a dwelling house; and also to
Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or waiver of inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box
the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental or envelope or any person on board; or to stop and search and examine any
that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law
of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.
SALVADOR vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 146706, 15-JUL-2005)66

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS vs. OGARIO (G.R. No. 138081, 30-MAR-2000)64 HELD:


The Constitutional provisions (Section 2 and 3(2), Article 3 of the 1987
HELD: Constitution do not prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as
are unreasonable. Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where
In Jao v. Court of Appeals,[10] this Court, reiterating its ruling in a long line of searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search warrant.
cases, said:
65
There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, f.) Search of Warehouse in
Violation of Customs and Tariff Code or to enforce custom laws
64 66
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2. Valid Instances of
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, f.) Search of Warehouse in Warrantless Searches and Seizures, f.) Search of Warehouse in
Violation of Customs and Tariff Code or to enforce custom laws Violation of Customs and Tariff Code or to enforce custom laws
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 26
TAU MU

These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) Whether or not there has been a valid search and seizure in this case.
search in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented
searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful RULING:
arrest. Yes, given the circumstances, the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions against a warrantless search. The military operatives in this case
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed.
mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their
verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had
the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The
on petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As trial judge himself manifested that on the day when the raid was conducted,
such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a search his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a
warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law. search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

The power of the State to foul any fraudulent schemes resorted to by


importers who evade payment of customs duties clearly recognized People vs. Andre68
In Papa vs. Mago involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991
who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are
authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article, cargo FACTS:
or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that The appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, attempted to send 4
the said items have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the gift wrapped packages containing marijuana through a packing and forwarder
tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of company owned by Anita Reyes and her husband Job Reyes. The appellant
any vehicle or person suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, disguised the said packages by stacking it with books, gloves and cigars.
as in the case at bar. However before delivery of the package, as a Standard Operating Procedure,
Mr. Job Reyes opened the boxes for final inspection and found marijuana
The search of a moving vehicle is recognized on this jurisdiction as a leaves inside. He then reported the incident to the NBI and sent a sample of
valid exception to the requirement for a search warrant. We recall that at the suspected marijuana leaves for examination. The NBI Forensics was
the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused were on board able to determine that the samples were indeed marijuana leaves and so they
a moving PAL aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the search of a moving seized the package and located the appellant. The appellant was charged for
vehicle is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the violation of R.A. 6425 and was consequently convicted by the RTC, thus this
requirement for a search warrant. Such exception is easy to understand. A appeal. The appellant contends that the evidence against him is not
search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, admissible as evidence because it was obtained in violation of his
dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
warrant when the search is conducted in a mobileship, aircraft or other motor communication.
vehicle since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
where the warrant must be sought. ISSUE
Whether or not there has been a violation of the appellant’s constitutional
right thereby making the obtained evidence inadmissible.
People vs. Rolando De Gracia67
G.R.Nos.102009-10,July 6,1994 RULING
No. There has been no violation of the appellant’s Constitutional Right,
FACTS: specifically his right against unreasonable search and seizure. It must be
On the height of the coup d’etat in December 1989 headed by the elements noted that the evidence obtained was not procured by the state through its
of Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM- law enforcers or other authorized government agencies but through a private
SFP) against the Government, a team from the Intelligence Division of the individual acting in his private capacity and without the intervention and
NCR Defense Command conducted a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales office participation of State authorities. In the absence of governmental interference,
in Quezon City pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
said establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a State. Furthermore, the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the
communication command post. While conducting the said surveillance, a government and its agents, not upon private individuals.
group of 5 men approached the car of the surveillance team and started firing
at them. As a consequence, a searching team was sent to raid the Eurocar If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
Sales office (without search warrants because of the disorder during that time generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However,
and the courts are consequently closed.) where they found ammunitions, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
dynamites and “molotoy” bombs. As a result of the raid, the appellant who establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
was found to be a former Philippine Constabulary and 2 other men who were without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
janitors of the said building were arrested. search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual,
not the law enforcers, is involved.
The accused appellant herein was charged in two separate informations for
illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the
and for attempted homicide which were tried jointly by the RTC of Quezon Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
City. Appellant was convicted for the first charge, but was acquitted of the unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the
latter. He was then sentenced to serve the penalty of *reclusion perpetua, * same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense
with a recommendation that he be extended with executive clemency after charged.
serving a jail term of five (5) years of good behavior. Thus this appeal.

The appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal


Waterous Drug vs NLRC69
possession of firearms for the reason that he did not have either physical or
G.R.NO. 113271; 16 OCT 1997
constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess
the same; he is neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the
FACTS:
ammunition and explosives were found; he was merely employed asan
Antonia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug
errand boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in behalf of a certain Col.
Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received
Matillano; and he did not have actual possession of the explosives. He claims
memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R.
that intent to possess is necessary before one can be convicted under
Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the
Presidential Decree No. 1866.
latter's accounts as it was a prohibited practice and not to negotiate with
suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this
ISSUE:

68
(H) Search and Seizure by Private Persons
67 69
Valid Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures - (G) Exigency (H) Search and Seizure by Private Persons
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 27
TAU MU

would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not
authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. RULING
The Court held that Catolico was denied due process. Although Catolico was
Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was "due to given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service
negligence". In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS in the memorandum issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and
Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were
of medicines without the proper documents." On 29 January 1990, joined through said letters.
WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an
irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., wherein it The Court also held that Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. The burden is
was found that there was a discrepancy in the per bottle price of Voren on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee.
tablets between the recent and previous Purchase Orders. Upon verification, However, in the case at bar, WATEROUS failed to discharge that burden
the discrepancy showed that the cost per bottle in the recent Purchase Order which resulted in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
was overpriced.
It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed
The Accounting Department of Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. then because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for
confirmed that the refund for the jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge
was paid to Ms. Catolico. Valdez talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check since it appears that Catolico’s dismissal is based on hearsay information.
but she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the overpriced.
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its
However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, Pharmacy Clerk, she decision, that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable
confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as
Catolico. counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives
As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her "talagang
ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's
pocketed by Ms. Catolico. reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly
awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is
Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the computed at one month's salary for every year of service.
reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at
explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension. However, before the one-half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or
48-hour extension expires, she was informed she would be placed on raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as
preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. fixed by the Labor Arbiter.

Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged decision and
YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred resolution of the National Labor Relations except as to its reason for
that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, *viz*., that the evidence against
incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of
her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against
On 5 March 1990, Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a unreasonable searches and seizures which was set aside.
memorandum notifying Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico
filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 May People vs. Mendoza70
1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice 301 SCRA 66
against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because
petitioners failed to "prove what alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to FACTS
show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without On November 11, 1988, Octavio Mendoza, his wife Cecilia and their 10-year
just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension old daughter Charmaine went to the birthday party of a relative of Octavio in
illegal but disallowed reinstatement. Mcdo, Harrison Plaza. During the party, Octavio left without telling his wife
and kid, and went to KFC.
Petitioners appealed the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because
the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and Since Cecilia and Charamaine couldn’t find him in the party, they went home
that there was no just cause to terminate her services. in Las Pinas. They arrived home at 7 pm and left again to go to Cecilia’s
parents in Bacoor to bring perfume. Octavio still was not home.
The NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that
petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from They got home around 9pm and saw Octavio’s car parked in the garage of
her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the their neighbor. All the lights were opened but the front door was locked. After
check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co- a while, Octavio opened the back door and let them in. He was drunk and told
employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the Charmaine to get cold water and douse him. She followed and was instructed
check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of to go to her room. She went and got ready for bed. She heard her parents
Article III of the Constitution. arguing about them leaving the party without Octavio. Afterwards, she heard
three gunshots, ran to their room and saw her mom on the floor bleeding. She
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the also saw her dad hide a gun under the bed.
dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal
suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the Octavio then called his brother-in-law Sgt. Antonio Gabac. When Gabac
aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86. arrived, they all brought him to Perpetual Help Hospital where Cecilia was
declared dead on arrival. The policemen investigated Gabac and found a .38
Having their motion for reconsideration denied, petitioners filed special civil caliber revolver in his waist. Gabac told them that Octavio handed it over to
action for *certiorari*, which is anchored on the following grounds: him as soon as he arrived at the crime scene. Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of learned of his daughter’s death and that valuables were being taken away
facts. from her house. He and his sons decided to go there and decided to remove,
II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent. together with his sons, the remaining pieces of property therein, including
III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the accused-appellant's personal effects such as memorandum receipt and
1987 Constitution. mission order authorizing Mendoza to carry weapon.

ISSUE
Whether or not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of the
Constitution, under the Bill of Rights 70
(H) Search and Seizure by Private Persons
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 28
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At court, Charmaine testified that she saw her father hide the gun under the carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional
bed. In her second testimony, she said she saw no such act. Octavio also protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
denied that he killed his wife and that he owned that gun. He said that the
memorandum receipt and mission order were illegally procured by Eusebio in There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search
violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure. and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered
as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are
ISSUE armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in
Was Octavio’s constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any
violated when Eusebio took the memorandum receipt and mission order and governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state
brought it to court? tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and
until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection
RULING against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
The court held that Eusebio did not violate Octavio’s constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure. The constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to immunity of one’s People of the Philippines vs. Leila Johnson72
person from interference from THE GOVERNMENT and it cannot be G.R. No. 138881 Dec. 18, 2000
extended to acts committed by PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. In the case at bar,
the articles were discovered by Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio, a private FACTS
individual. Besides, other evidence proved his guilt. Test showed nitrate in his On July 26, 1998 accused 58 year-old Mrs. Leila Johnson was due to fly back
hands and the testimony of his daughter was accorded great weight. He was to the USA after visiting her family in the Philippines. While inside the Ninoy
charged of the crime parricide with the special aggravating circumstance of Aquino International Airport waiting for her departure, she was subjected to
the use of an unlicensed firearm. routine frisking by Olivia Ramirez, a lady frisker on duty. When Ramirez
frisked Mrs. Johnson, she felt something hard on the accused abdominal
area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty
People vs. Bongcarawan71 girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic
384 SCRA 525 pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, she reported the matter to her
superior which directed her to take accused to the rest room and asked
FACTS accused “to bring out the thing under her girdle.” There, accused brought out
Accused Basher Bongcarawan was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) plastic packs later found out to be methamphetamine hydrochloride
violation of Sec. 16, Article III of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). or “shabu” totaling to 580.2 grams without corresponding license or
He was found with the possession, custody and control of eight packs of prescription to possess or use said regulated drug. Thereafter, she was
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), without the corresponding license immediately arrested.
or prescription.
The Regional Trial Court, Br 110, Pasay City found accused guilty of violation
The contraband article was discovered incidentally when the vessel security of Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A.
personnel, Mark Diesmo, addressed the complaint of one Lorena Canoy that No. 7659 sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
her jewelry were missing and she suspects that her co-passenger a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Hence, this appeal.
(Bongcarawan) at cabin no. 106 was the culprit. With his consent, he was
bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. The security personnel then asked ISSUE
the accused to get his baggage and requested to open it. When the accused WON accused constitutional right against search and seizure was violated
opened his baggage it was found that there are eight small plastic packs when she was subjected to airport security procedure of frisking.
containing white crystals which the security personnel suspected that it was
shabu. The item was then turned over to the Philippine Coast Guard. RULING
No. The court held that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
On the defense of the accused, he averts that the contraband article was not searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The
his but belong to Alican “Alex” Macapudi as he was requested by the former methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at
to bring the Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan. the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
He also claimed that the security personnel forcibly opened the suitcase
when he refused to do the same, when he was asked by the security Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
personnel, as he did not know the secret combination lock. exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a
lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
ISSUE prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
WON there is a violation on the constitutional right against unreasonable security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
search and seizure. terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
RULING carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
protected by the Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this right is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced
protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained
of *People v. Marti*, “in the absence of governmental interference, liberties through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.” The the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the
a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with discovery and recovery of “shabu” in her person in flagrante delicto.
the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State
to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is Further the court held that the accused was validly arrested without warrant
imposed. pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides:
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by
the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found “shabu” inside the
suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The
search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore
72
(I) Airport Security

71
(H) Search and Seizure by Private Persons
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 29
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Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.

(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; is a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved. The rule is that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the
arrested has committed it; Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court.

The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security
paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited. procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235
reading as follows:

People of the Philippines vs. Susan Canton73 SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier
G.R.No. 148825. December 27, 2002 concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed
thereon: “Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to
FACTS search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
On February 12, 1998 at about 1:30pm accused, Susan Canton was at the refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft,” which
Ninoy Aquino International Airport, being a departing passenger bound for shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air
Saigon, Vietman. When she passed through the metal detector booth, a carrier.
beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian
employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless
(NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called her attention, saying searches and seizures.
“Excuse me ma’am, can I search you?” Upon frisking the accused, Mylene
felt something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand The Court also found the ruling in *People v. Johnson* *(see previous
under the skirt of accused, pinched the package several times and noticed case)*to be applicable to the instant case, which involves similar facts and
that the package contained what felt like rice granules. When Mylene passed issues.
her hand, she felt similar packages in front of accused genital area and
thighs. She asked Susan to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and
said: “Money, money only.” Mylene forthwith reported the matter to her People vs. Conde74
supervisor on duty. 356 SCRA 478

Her supervisor instructed to bring accused to a comfort room for a thorough FACTS
physical examination. There they discovered (3) three packages individually On appeal is the decision dated December 15, 1993, of the Regional Trial
wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which after examination Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City finding accused Oscar Conde, Allan Atis
turned out to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (totaling 998.2809 and Alejandro Perez, Jr., guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
grams), of a regulated drug, without the corresponding prescription or license. homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of *reclusion
perpetua *with the accessory penalties under the law.
The trial court rendered a decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. On May 25, 1992 at about 8:00 AM, the accused block the path of the two
6425 (Dangerous Drug Act), as amended, and sentenced her to suffer the Indian Nationals on a motorcycle. One of the men, later identified as Oscar
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1M. Accused filed a MR Conde, poked a gun at the two Indians while his three companions
and/or New Trial as well as the Motion to Inhibit the Judge. The trial court approached and stabbed the Indians. Allan Atis took the goods which were
issued an order denying the same. Hence this appeal. being sold by the two Indians on installment. After the stabbing, the four men
fled from the crime scene. Of the four assailants, only three were identified.
ISSUE
WON the warrantless search and seizure of the shabu were violative of her On May 30, 1992, the police arrested the three accused. Police recovered the
constitutional rights. weapons used in the robbery, when Felicidad Macabare, Conde's wife, went
to the police station to talk to the accused. These weapons were discovered
RULING inside her bag after a routine inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that
No. The Court do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent they did not have a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the accused.
seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest accused, were violative of Nor did they have a search warrant when they inspected Felicidad's bag and
her constitutional rights. Though Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 when they searched the house of a certain Jimmy where they found the
Constitution provides: stolen items. The three denied the accusations and presented alibis that
Alejandro Perez, Jr. went to Pulang Lupa Cemetery and visited the graves of
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, his uncle and grandfather. From the cemetery, they went home where they
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches drank some beer until late afternoon. Oscar Conde testified that he was
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be mending his fish net at Barangay Polo Street, Paranaque when the crime was
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue committed. Allan Atis stated that he was in MCU where he worked as a
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the construction worker for certain Romy Ramos when the incident occurred.
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing ISSUE
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. … WON the arrest of the appellants were illegal.

Sec. 3…. RULING


The records of the case will show that the arrests of the appellants came after
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding the lapse of 5 days from the time they were seen committing the crime. At the
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any time they were arrested, the police were not armed with any warrants for their
proceeding. arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
enumerates the instances when an arrest can be made without warrant,
However, the prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures is not namely:
absolute. There are recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence:
(1)search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches;
74
(J) Jail Safety

73
(I) Airport Security
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 30
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(a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed,


is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or search.
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government,
in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
None of the above circumstances is present in this case. Appellants were notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
merely walking along Tandang Sora Avenue and were not committing any movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
crime. Neither can it be said that the crime had just been committed. Five military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of
days had already passed from the time of the robbery with homicide. It cannot unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
also be said that the arresting officers had probable cause based on personal urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought
knowledge. PO3 Sevillano admitted that they learned about the suspects about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one
from Apollo Romero and certain unnamed informants. The third circumstance can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
is patently not present. The lapse of five days gave the police more than inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare
enough time to conduct surveillance of the appellants and apply for a warrant and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
of arrest. Clearly, appellants' rights provided in Sec. 2, Art. III of the however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
Constitution were violated. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by
the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is
Unfortunately, appellants did not assert their constitutional rights prior to their susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort
arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused is estopped from assailing and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay
Information against him before his arraignment. When the appellants entered for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
their pleas on arraignment without invoking their rights to question any
irregularity, which might have accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process. VALMONTE vs.DE VILLA76
Any objection, defect, or irregularity attending their arrests should had been G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990
made before they entered their pleas. It is much too late for appellants to
raise the question of their warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the information FACTS
upon arraignment constitute clear waivers of their rights against unlawful In the Court's decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners' petition for
restraint of liberty. prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and
their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Petitioners have filed the
instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision.
Valmonte vs. De Villa75
G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989 ISSUE

FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command RULING
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the The Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED.
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for The routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle's
and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. 1 For as long as the
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro search.
Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP)
sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less
elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that intrusive.
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the Vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine
implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable
make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender
of the Constitution. or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense.

ISSUE The Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against condone abuses committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The
unreasonable search and seizures? Court's decision was concerned with power, i.e. whether the government
employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that
RULING power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry ceases. True, power implies the
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the possibility of its abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a
people against unreasonable search and seizures. (The Court, voting 13- different "ball game" to be resolved in the constitutional arena.
2, DISMISSED the petition.)
The Court, like all other concerned members of the community, has become
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are aware of how some checkpoints have been used as points of thievery and
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by extortion practiced upon innocent civilians. Even the increased prices of
any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. foodstuffs coming from the provinces, entering the Metro Manila area and

75
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other urban centers, are largely blamed on the checkpoints, because the men professed innocence but also confirms their acquiescence to the search.
manning them have reportedly become "experts" in mulcting travelling Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and
traders. This, of course, is a national tragedy . seizure.

But the Court could not a priori regard in its now assailed decision that the
men in uniform are rascals or thieves. The Court had to assume that the men GUANZON vs. DE VILLA78
in uniform live and act by the code of honor and they are assigned to the 181 SCRA 623 (1990)
checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the citizenry. 6 The checkpoint is a
military "concoction." It behooves the military to improve the QUALITY of their FACTS
men assigned to these checkpoints. For no system or institution will succeed This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the
unless the men behind it are honest, noble and dedicated. military and police officers represented by public respondents from
conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.
In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen Petitioners allege that the saturation drives abused their human rights.
is not helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the law. And the According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives"
courts exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those who man are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the
checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their authority subversives are hiding. Raiders, without any search warrant or warrant of
and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts; 7 This arrest went destroying the doors of the houses of the petitioners rousing them
tenet should be ingrained in the soldiery in the clearest of terms by higher from their sleeps early in the morning. The public respondents stressed two
military authorities. points, First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation
drives. And second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a
deliberate disregard for human rights are total lies.
PEOPLE VS. EXALA77
221 SCRA 494 (1993) ISSUE
Whether or not the saturation drives were unconstitutional.
FACTS
On November 2, 1982, a private jeepney driven by the accused-appellant, HELD
Restituto Bocalan,was stopped at a police checkpoint for routing inspection The case did not rule on the constitutionality of the saturation drives. Instead,
regarding unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items. Along with Bocalan the case was remanded to the lower court for further reception of evidence.
were his co-accused Jaime Fernandez and Rodelio Exala. Pfc. Ricardo The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple
Galang, a member of the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the subversive movements which would bring down constituted authority and
occupants if there were firearms inside, and in which the occupants answered substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of
in the negative. Pfc. Galang then noticed a black bag inside the jeepney, as policy in the name of security of the State. However, all police actions are
he became suspicious, he asked the occupants of what the bag contained, governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. Where a violation of human
but nobody answered. Pfc. Galang then opened the bag and found a number rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of
of marijuana. Thereafter, the accused were brought to the police station for the court to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power
further investigation. The accused were all charged for violation of Section 4, of the state may not encroach upon the rights of the individual. It is the duty of
Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended. Bocalan now assails his conviction. He the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present petition
contends that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence against where the petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the police
him since it was obtained through a warrantless search. actions, where no names of any of the thousands of alleged victims are given,
and where the prayer is a general one to stop all police "saturation drives," as
ISSUE long as the Court is convinced that the event actually happened. On one
Whether or not the warrantless search was valid and legal, thus proper in hand, Under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution it is stated that “The
using the marijuana as evidence for convicting the accused (Bocalan) of the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
crime charged against him. Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” There
HELD can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the
Yes. Since the search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues that nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of
it was not incident to a lawful arrest. This issue was never raised in the the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the military and the police must
proceedings. Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such
the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. drives must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the
Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his objection on the legality of people affected by such actions. According to the court, Saturation drives and
the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course other police measures are not illegal, the problem only arises in the manner
thereof. In view of such waiver, the court is bound to admit the evidence. But on which the police action is executed.
even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, still appellant's contention
deserves scant consideration. There are indeed instances where search and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. The ABENES vs. CA79
instant case is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007
military or police checkpoint. The checkpoint in the instant case was
established in line with "Operational Bakal" the main object of which was to FACTS
search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of Three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, the
unauthorized persons passing through it. When the jeep carrying the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pagadian City, created a team composed
contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the of seven policemen with a directive to establish and man a checkpoint in
occupants were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang Barangay Danlugan, for the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which was
noticed a black leather bag the sides of which were bulging. He asked what then being implemented by the COMELEC.
the contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered. At that
moment, the demeanor of the accused changed; they became suspiciously The Team leader SPO3 Pascua coordinated with the Barangay Chairman of
quiet and nervous as if they were concealing something from Pfc. Galang. Danlugan, and the team put up a road block with the marking "COMELEC
The accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such GUN BAN". Vehicles passing through the road block were required by the
peculiar apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of the accused, which did team to stop and their occupants were then politely requested to alight in
not appear normal, provided the probable cause justifying a more extensive order to allow routine inspection and checking of their vehicles. Motorists who
search that led to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited refused the request were not forced to do so.
stuff. Significantly, there was no sign of any protest or objection to the search.
The accused remained silent even after their arrest. Their submissive stance At about 10:30 in the morning of the same day, a red Tamaraw FX trying to
after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of any pass through the check point was stopped by the team and directed to park at
protest on their part when arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their
78
3) Constitutionality of checkpoints and “areal target zonings”
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the side of the road. As the occupants within the vehicle could not be seen enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which they
through its tinted windows, SPO1 Eliezer Requejo, a member of the team, particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the
knocked on the vehicle’s window and requested the occupants to step down policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
for a routine inspection. The eight occupants, which included the accused- petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain
appellant Rodolfo Abenes who is the Barangay Chairman of Tawagan Norte, view and discovered inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the
Labangan, Zamboanga Del Sur, alighted from the vehicle. vehicle.

SPO1 Requejo and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered firearm was
tucked at the right waist of Abenes. The firearm was readily visible to the GAANAN vs.IAC80
policemen; it was not covered by the shirt worn by Abenes. Abenes was then G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
asked by SPO3 Pascua whether he had a license and authority to carry the
firearm, and whether his possession was exempted from the Gun Ban being FACTS
enforced by the COMELEC. Accused answered in the affirmative. The Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for
policemen then demanded for the pertinent documents to be shown to direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him.
support Abenes’ claim. He could not show any. Hence, SPO1 Requejo This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as
confiscated Abenes’ firearm, which was later identified as a Norinco .45 requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for
caliber pistol bearing Serial No. 906347, including its magazine containing the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment
seven live ammunitions. operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the
telephone conversation without complainant''s consent, complainant charged
Subsequently SPO3 Pascua brought Abenes to the PNP Headquarters. Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

A certification dated May 18, 1998 from the Firearms and Explosives License ISSUE
Processing Section of the PNP, Pagadian City disclosed that Abenes is not a Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in
registered nor a licensed firearm holder. Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation
would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two
ISSUE parties using a telephone line.
1. Was the check-point validly established?
2. Was the petitioner’s constitutional right against unlawful search and RULING
seizure violated? The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The petitioner was acquitted of the
crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
RULING Wiretapping Act.
The Court upheld the validity of the checkpoint.
the production of the mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic
the checkpoint was established three days before the May 11, 1998 elections; equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to
and, the circumstances under which the policemen found the gun warranted carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called
its seizure without a warrant. "crossed lines". An unwary citizen who happens to pick up his telephone and
who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of
intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such
intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’ right to "free passage without mischievous results.
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the user to
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty
as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an
routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. alien?
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced
by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA
Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or
such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car’s doors or subjecting It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of
its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be
is what the situation demands. taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain
view, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered by his shirt. Further, our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from
who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate,
and may be presented as evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly
the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain nature. An extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.
view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
STONEHILL vs DIOKNO81
All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case. The law
enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the 80
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G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967 Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against
a defective search warrant is emphasized.
FACTS
Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also,
petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by
“books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,
of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation
Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code. (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
and on the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents,
papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an
deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would
searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks
evidence against them. the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the
party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under
partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting
and papers. agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility of securing their conviction,
ISSUE is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the
Whether or not the search warrant issue is valid. illegality had been committed.

RULING
The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. PASTRANO vs. CA82
G.R. No. 104504 October 31, 1997
The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of
the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the FACTS
proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers A group of students went to see Capt. Rodolfo Mañoza, then intelligence
or board members of the corporation. operations officer of the Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Naranjo, at
Oroquieta City. They reported having seen Clyde Pastrano beaten up by his
The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and father, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano. The students were willing to testify but
seizure. It provides; expressed fear of the petitioner who, according to them, had firearms. Clyde
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by Pastrano had died and it was suspected he had been the victim of foul play.
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and Two sons of Pedrito Pastrano by his estranged wife also saw Capt. Mañoza,
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the seeking his assistance in connection with the death of their brother Clyde.
case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere The brothers reported that their father and his common-law wife were keeping
allegation that Stonehill et al committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, unlicensed firearms in their house. They executed a joint affidavit which they
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal stated that they had personal knowledge of the fact that their father Pedrito
Code.” In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said Pastrano was keeping three (3) firearms of different calibers in the bedroom
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed of his house.
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the On the basis of the affidavit of the Pastrano brothers, Capt. Mañoza applied
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against for a search warrant on the same day.
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, After examining complainant and the two brothers, Judge Teodorico M.
the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts Durias of the Municipal Trial Court of Oroquieta City (Branch I) issued a
performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest search warrant which Capt. Mañoza and his men later served at the
order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and residence of Pedrito Pastrano at Capitol Drive, Oroquieta City. Seized from
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as petitioner's dwelling was a sack containing the following:
alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or codes. One (1) Revolver Cal. 22 Magnum with Serial No. 07345. Made in Germany
ROHMGMBH SONTHEM/BRENZ;
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made One (1) round ammunition for Cal. 22 Magnum;
of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
One (1) Revolver Cal. 32 with Serial No. 233833 Colt Made in U.S.A.;
“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other Six rounds of live Ammunition for Cal. 32 revolver.
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss On the basis of the evidence thus seized, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano y
statements.” Capapas and his common-law wife, Erlinda Ventir y Sanchez, were charged
with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition as penalized under P.D.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records No. 1866, §1.
pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether
the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of ISSUE
all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever Whether or not the Search Warrant issued by Judge Teodorico Durias is
their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of invalid for failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution.
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The RULING

81
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The Court held that petitioner waived any objection based on the illegality of G.R. No. 182348, November 20, 2008
the search.
FACTS
Petitioner assails the absence of a written deposition showing that the judge In the morning of October 20, 2002, an informant tipped off the Drug
had examined the complainant and his witnesses by means of searching Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police Station that wanted drug pusher
questions in writing and under oath as required by Rule 126, §4 of the Rules Wifredo Loilo alias "Boy Bicol" was at his nipa hut hideout in San Mateo,
on Criminal Procedure. Rizal. A team was organized to arrest Boy Bicol. They saw Boy Bicol by a
table talking with accused-appellant. They shouted "Boy Bicol sumuko ka na
Rule 126, §4 indeed requires the examination of the complainant and his may warrant of arrest ka. Upon hearing this, Boy Bicol engaged them in a
witnesses to be put in writing and under oath. But although this is a ground shootout and was fatally shot. He dropped his shotgun when a police officer
for quashing a search warrant in this case, petitioner did nothing to this end. pointed his firearm at him. The team entered the nipa hut and apprehended
He did not move to quash the information before the trial court. Nor did he accused-appellant. They saw a plastic bag of suspected shabu, a digital
object to the presentation of the evidence obtained as being the product of an weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines lying on the
illegal search. table. PO1 Calanoga, Jr. put the markings "CVDC," the initials of accused-
appellant, on the bag containing the seized drug.
Petitioner thus waived any objection based on the illegality of the search. As
held in People v. Omaweng, the right to be secure against unreasonable Accused-appellant was subsequently arrested. The substance seized from
searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver the hideout was sent to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory for
may be made either expressly or impliedly. examination and tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. He was thus separately indicted for violation of RA 9165 and for
The Court find that the prosecution clearly established the elements of the illegal possession of firearm.
crime charged and that the Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly According to the defense, accused-appellant was at Boy Bicol's house having
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal been asked to do a welding job for Boy Bicol's motorcycle. While accused-
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. appellant was there, persons who identified themselves as police officers
approached the place, prompting accused-appellant to scamper away. He
lied face down when gunshots rang. The buy-bust team then helped him get
ABERCA vs. VER83 up. He saw the police officers searching the premises and finding shabu and
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988 firearms, which were on top of a table or drawer.

FACTS When he asked the reason for his apprehension, he was told that it was
Petitioners brought suit alleging that General Fabian Ver had ordered the because he was a companion of Boy Bicol. He denied under oath that the
Task Force Makabansa of the AFP to conduct "preemptive strikes against gun and drugs seized were found in his possession and testified that he was
known communist terrorists'' underground houses" in Metro Manila. The TFM only invited by Boy Bicol to get the motorcycle from his house.
raided some places using defective warrants; they seized personal
belongings of petitioners; they had been interrogated in violation of their right The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and
to silence and to counsel; they had been tortured and intimidated. Petitioners ammunition but convicted him of possession of dangerous drugs.
asked for payment of damages for violations of their constitutional rights.
ISSUE
ISSUE Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid.
Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military RULING
personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution. The Court ruled that since the accused-appellant was not in possession of the
illegal drugs in Boy Bicol's nipa hut, his subsequent arrest was also invalid.
RULING Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provides:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.--A peace officer or a private
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for person to be arrested has committed it; and
damages are explicitly recognized in PD 1755 which amended Art. 1146 of c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
the Civil Code by adding the following text: However, when the action (for penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises from or out of any temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or transferred from one confinement to another.
authority arising from martial law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of
the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one year. The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a),
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to
Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas be valid, two requisites must concur:
corpus suspends petitioners’ right of action for damages for illegal arrest and (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
injuries suffered because of respondents’ confiscation of their private (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their officer.
right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against
torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. Accused-appellant's act of pointing a firearm at the buy-bust team would have
been sufficient basis for his arrest in flagrante delicto; however, the
The question became moot and academic since the suspension of the PWHC prosecution was not able to adequately prove that accused-appellant was
had been lifted with the issuance of then Pres. Corazon Aquino of committing an offense. Although accused-appellant merely denied
Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986. possessing the firearm, the prosecution's charge was weak absent the
presentation of the alleged firearm. He was eventually acquitted by the trial
court because of this gaffe. His arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation
targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as he was not proved to be
PP vs. DELA CRUZ84
committing any offense.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 35
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PEOPLE v. AGOJO 85 Thereafter respondents filed a motion for judicial determination of probable
GR. NO. 181318 APRIL 16, 2009 cause with a prayer to suspend the issuance of warrants of arrest against
them.
FACTS
AGOJO was arrested via a buy-bust operation, wherein he was selling and Judge Globert Justalero, took over the RTC, and thereafter, reversed the
delivering (4) plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly order of the previous presiding judge. He found probable cause against
known as "shabu,", with a total weight of 206.32 grams, a regulated respondents and ordered the issuance of warrants for their arrest.
dangerous drug. AGOJO also have in his possession, custody and control Respondents filed the present petition for certiorari with the CA. CA granted
one (1) caliber .45 pistol Ithaca with defaced serial number, one (1) magazine the petition, set aside the RTC order of Judge Justalero, and annulled the
and seven (7) rounds of live ammunitions for caliber .45, without having warrants of arrest issued. The CA also dismissed the criminal cases against
secured the necessary license and/or permit from the proper authorities to the respondents.
possess the same. Subsequently, he waqs convicted by the trial court and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. On the other hand, AGOJO Issue: WON there was probable cause to issue a warrant for the arrest of
assails his arrest by giving his own version of the story, that he was in fact respondents.
framed-up by the buy-bust team.
Held: What is probable cause? Probable cause assumes the existence of
ISSUE facts that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a
Whether or not the ARREST of AGOJO is proper even though the ARREST crime has been committed and that it was likely committed by the person
was made WITHOUT A WARRANT? sought to be arrested. It requires neither absolute certainty nor clear and
convincing evidence of guilt. The test for issuing a warrant of arrest is less
RULING stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as
In this case, appellant points to the arrest not being in flagrante delicto, the the evidence shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court
existence of discrepancies in the serial numbers of the buy-bust money and a has sufficient ground to issue a warrant for his arrest.
prior attempt to frame him up as proofs of the frame-up. However, the fact
that the arrest was not in flagrante delicto is of no consequence. The arrest Here, admittedly, the evidence against respondents is merely circumstantial.
was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the The prosecution evidence shows that they had motive in that they had been
Rules of Court, which states: at odds with their father and stepmother. They had opportunity in that they
were still probably home when the crime took place. Archie took two pairs of
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a new gloves from his car late that evening. Cindy was apparently executed
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: inside Archie’s room. The separate rooms of the two accused had, quite
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, curiously, been wiped clean even of their own fingerprints. A trial, unlike
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; preliminary investigations, could yield more evidence favorable to either side
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has after the interrogations of the witnesses either on direct examination or on
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested cross-examination. What is important is that there is some rational basis for
has committed it; and, going ahead with judicial inquiry into the case. This Court does not subscribe
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped to the CA’s position that the prosecution had nothing to go on with.
from penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Ong vs. Genio G.R. No.182336 December 23, 200987

The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) Facts: Petitioner Elvira O. Ong filed a criminal complaint against respondent
cited above necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless Jose Genio for Robbery. The information states that respondent carry away
arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the kitchen and canteen equipment as well as her personal things valued at Php
person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the 700,000.00.
person to be arrested has committed it. A review of the records shows that
both requirements were met in this case. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case for Lack of Probable Cause
Pursuant to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and, in View of
Compelling Grounds for the Dismissal of the Case to Hold in Abeyance the
People vs. Tan G.R. No. 182310 December 9, 2009 86 Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest (Motion to Dismiss).
Facts: Francisco "Bobby" Tan, his wife and one of his daughters was killed at
their residence. The suspects of the brutal killing was his two illegitimate sons RTC of Makati City dismissed the case because the other elements of the
by another woman, herein respondents, Archie and Jan Michael (Jan-Jan) crime of Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to gain, and either
who are living with them. violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, were not
specifically alleged in the Information filed. The RTC held that the evidence
According to respondents, prior to the incident they climbed down the high on record failed to establish probable cause to charge respondent with the
concrete fence of the compound at about 12:45 a.m to go out. They returned crime of Robbery.
home at around 3:30 a.m. Respondent Jan-Jan entered the house ahead of
his brother. On reaching the door of his room at the end of the hallway, he Issue: WON the court erred in not finding probable cause to merit the
noticed his stepsister Katherine, lying on the floor near the master’s bedroom. issuance of the warrant of arrest and dismissal of the case.
As Jan-Jan switched on the light in his room, he beheld her lying on a pool of
blood. He quickly stepped into the master’s bedroom and there saw his Held: Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
father, Bobby, lying on the bed with his chest drenched in blood. Almost clearly provides:
simultaneously, respondent Archie who had come into the house after his
brother Jan-Jan noticed that the door of his room, which he locked earlier, SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.
was partly open. As he went in and switched on the light, he saw his
stepmother Cindy, lying in her blood near the wall below the air conditioner. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. ' Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
A few days after the incident police officers from the Regional CIDG complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
submitted their investigation report to the City Prosecutor’s Office of Iloilo the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
City, which pointed to respondents as principal suspects on the killing of their case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
parents and stepsister. Separate information’s for two (2) murders and finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
parricide were filed at RTC against respondents. order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued
by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case

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7) Requirements of Issuance of Warrants of Arrest
86 87
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 7. Requirements for AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 7. Requirements for
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest Issuance of Warrants of Arrest
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 36
TAU MU

of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private
the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing individual under any of the following circumstances:
of the complaint or information.
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private
Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, the RTC judge, upon the filing of person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
an Information, has the following options: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense;
(1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
(2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
(3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the person to be arrested has committed it; and
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice, the
issue to be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
information. penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
It bears stressing that the judge is required to personally evaluate the transferred from one confinement to another.
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause. This, the RTC judge clearly complied with in this case. Pineda-Ng vs. People G.R. No. 189533 November 15, 201089

Facts: On December 19, 2007, an Information for Qualified Theft was filed
People vs Pepino GR No. 183479 June 29, 2010 against: Richard Francisco, Branch Mgr. of private complainant Philippine
Business Bank, Mailada Marilag-Aquino; and petitioner Ma. Imelda Pineda-
Facts: On October 18, 1997 in Quezon City, Metro Manila accused/appellant Ng.
Pepino, Daisy and Pelenio (died in a shootout) kidnap Anita Ching, a
businesswoman, and brought her to a safehouse for the purpose of The prosecution found that Aquino had drawn and issued the seven (7)
demanding ransom in the amount of P500,000.00, after which it was paid the checks in favor of petitioner amounting to P8,735,000.00. Petitioner
victim was released. presented these 7 checks for payment before the bank by virtue of her Bill
Purchase Accommodation facility through Francisco, who, in excess of his
An information for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with serious illegal authority, approved the payment of these checks despite the fact that the
detention was filed against accused. same were actually drawn from Closed Accounts and/or drawn against
insufficient funds.
RTC, by Decision found Pepino and Daisy guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal and accomplice, respectively, of the crime charged. At first, Judge Reyes found probable cause to hold Francisco liable, while
ordered the dismissal of the case against Aquino and petitioner for absence
Pepino did not testify, and for that matter presented no evidence to defeat or of probable cause. Aggrieved, the bank filed its MR.
attenuate the charge or evidence brought against him. All he did in his
defense was to raise the constitutional presumption of innocence, and to Judge Reyes, acting on the bank’s MR, issued an Order reversing her earlier
present his kins (Renato, Larex, Zeny to testify that they and Pepino were ruling, this time finding probable cause against Aquino and petitioner and
illegally arrested. He challenged his warrantless arrest for kidnapping as directing the issuance of warrants of arrest to all the accused. No bail was
illegal. recommended.
Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before CA, which was denied for lack of
Issue: WON accused Pepino was illegally arrested. merit.
Hence, this Petition ascribe grave abuse of discretion to the CA for decision
Held: and resolution which are inconsistent with and not supported by the law, the
Pepino assails his conviction on, among others, the illegality of his arrest. facts, and the settled jurisprudence laid down by the SC on the matter of filing
of criminal cases against the accused where there is no evidence sufficient to
The court opines that as to the alleged illegality of Pepino’s arrest, it is settled engender a well-founded belief that an offense was committed.
that any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be timely raised
in a motion to quash the Information at any time before arraignment, failing Issue:
which he is deemed to have waived. Since Pepino did not raise such alleged WON there is probable cause in this case.
irregularity early on, he is now estopped.
Held:
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
Rebellion vs People G.R. No. 175700 July 5, 2010 88 circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of
Held: Petitioner’s claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit. We the crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion and
note that nowhere in the records did we find any objection interposed by reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need
petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. It has been not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating
consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt
of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the and requires more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence which would
information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection justify a conviction.
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters The general rule is that this Court does not review factual findings of the trial
his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.5 In this case, petitioner court, which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
was duly arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during warrant of arrest. It is only in exceptional cases where this Court sets aside
the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial court judge on the existence of
arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying probable cause, such as cases when the Court finds it necessary in order to
his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly
for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a administration of justice. The facts obtaining in this case do not warrant the
trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the application of the exception.
accused.

88 89
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 7. Requirements for AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 7. Requirements for
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest Issuance of Warrants of Arrest
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 37
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Moreover, we respect the findings of the CA when it held that Judge Reyes
did not solely rely on the findings of the City Prosecutor in reversing her Held: One of the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under
earlier Order. We observed, among others, that when Judge Reyes quoted Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when a person has committed,
our ruling in People v. CA, she underscored a portion thereof, clearly is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence
indicative of her reliance on said jurisprudence. Thus, it cannot be validly of a peace officer or private person.
argued that Judge Reyes simply and blindly adhered to the recommendation
of the City Prosecutor in rendering the assailed Order, bereft of any factual It is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable cause to arrest
and legal basis. Furthermore, we also accord respect to the factual findings of accused-appellants. Probable cause, in warrantless searches, must only be
the City Prosecutor and the CA that petitioner indeed encashed these based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been
allegedly anomalous checks. Suffice it to state that a finding of probable committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to formula for determining probable cause, for its determination varies according
procure a conviction – it is enough that there is a reasonable belief that the to the facts of each case. Probable cause was provided by information
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. gathered from the CI and from accused-appellants themselves when they
instructed PO1 Ayao to enter their vehicle and begin the transaction. The
illegal sale of shabu inside accused-appellants’ vehicle was afterwards clearly
People vs, Martinez G.R. No. 191366 Dec. 13, 2010 90 established. Thus, as we have previously held, the arresting officers were
justified in making the arrests as accused-appellants had just committed a
Held: Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. crime when Ara sold shabu to PO1 Ayao. Talib and Musa were also frisked
Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both for contraband as it may be logically inferred that they were also part of Ara’s
require probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be drug activities inside the vehicle. This inference was further strengthened by
valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of Musa’s attempt to drive the vehicle away and elude arrest.
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. Esquillo vs People G.R. No. 82010 Aug. 25, 2010 93

It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant Held:
must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable valid search warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions,
when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of viz:
committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause (1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of
of guilt of the person to be arrested. vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4)
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or
personal knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7)
committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building
probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.
arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
the accused had just committed an offense. seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into account, among
other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances involved including the
People vs. Quebral G.R. No. 185379 Nov. 27, 2009 91 purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
Held: searched, and the character of the articles procured.
The accused-appellants invoke the rule that a person may be arrested even
without a warrant only a) if he is caught in the act of committing a crime, b) if
he has just committed a crime and the arresting officer pursued him, or c) if
he escaped from a legal confinement. But in the first two instances, the officer
must have personal knowledge of the facts underlying the arrest. The target
person’s observable acts must clearly spell a crime. If no crime is evident
from those acts, no valid arrest can be made. An informant whispering to the
police officer’s ear that the person walking or standing on the street has
committed or is committing a crime will not do. The arresting officer must Lumanog vs. People G.R. No.182555 Sept. 7, 2010 94
himself perceive the manifestations of a crime.
Held:
As the lower court aptly put it in this case, the law enforcers already had an The police arrested Joel, without any warrant, on 19 June 1996 or six days
inkling of the personal circumstances of the persons they were looking for after the killing. Six days is definitely more than enough to secure an
and the criminal act they were about to commit. That these circumstances arrest warrant, and yet the police opted to arrest Joel and the other
played out in their presence supplied probable cause for the search. The accused, without any warrant, claiming that it was conducted in "hot
police acted on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief supported by pursuit." In law enforcement, "hot pursuit" can refer to an immediate pursuit
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to by the police such as a car chase. Certainly, the warrantless arrrest of Joel,
believe that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. Since made six days after the murder, does not fall within the ambit of "hot pursuit."
the seized shabu resulted from a valid search, it is admissible in evidence The question now is whether the successive warrantless arrests of the
against the accused. accused are legal. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:

People vs. Ara G.R. No. 185011 Dec. 23, 200992 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

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II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 7. Requirements for
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest
91 93
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may
be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of rule be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of rule
92 94
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may
be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of rule be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of rule
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 38
TAU MU

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is photographs thereof. Appellant was then brought to the headquarters where
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; he was booked.
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the Major Lorlie Arroyo, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory Regional
person to be arrested has committed it; and Office No. V, was presented as an expert witness to identify the subject
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a marijuana leaves. She related that after taking a representative sample from
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is the 928-gram confiscated dried leaves, the same was tested positive of
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being marijuana.
transferred from one confinement to another.
Appellant denied the accusations against him. That on his way home, they
None of the above instances is present in this case: (1) the accused were not met Boyet Obias (Obias) who requested appellant to bring a package
arrested in flagrante delicto; (2) the arrest was not based on personal wrapped in a newspaper to Jimmy Gonzales, he placed it in the basket in
knowledge of the arresting officers that there is probable cause that the front of his bicycle and Gonzales proceeded to the Tiagon town proper. On
accused were the authors of the crime which had just been committed; (3) the his way home, he was flagged down by the police and was invited to go with
accused were not prisoners who have escaped from custody serving final them to the headquarters.
judgment or temporarily confined while their case is pending. There is no
question that all the accused were apprehended several days after the crime TC ruled that there was violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
while doing ordinary and unsuspicious activities. There is also no question No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, hence, the
that the police had no personal knowledge of probable cause that the instant case is now before this Court on automatic review.
accused were responsible for the crime which had been committed. The third
situation is inapplicable since the accused are not prison escapees. In assailing his conviction, appellant submits that there is doubt that he had
Considering these facts, there is indeed no justification for the warrantless freely and consciously possessed marijuana. One of the issues raised is that,
arrests effected by the police in their so-called "hot pursuit." Such warrantless upon receipt of the information from the asset, the police officers
arrest, therefore, amounts to a violation of Section 2, Article III of the should have first investigated and tried to obtain a warrant of arrest
Constitution, which provides: against appellant, instead of arbitrarily arresting him.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and Issue: Whether or not the contention of the appellant is tenable?
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest Ruling: No.
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the The police was tipped off at around 1:00pm that appellant was transporting
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be marijuana to Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they had no time to secure an arrest
searched and the persons or things to be seized. warrant as appellant was already in transit and already committing a crime.
The police investigation work in this case, which led to the unlawful The arrest as effected after appellant as caught in flagrante delicto. He
warrantless arrest of the accused, is nothing but sloppy: (1) they chose to rely was seen riding his bicycle and carrying with him the contraband,
solely on the sworn statement of one eyewitness (Alejo); (2) they failed to hence, demonstrating that a crime was then already being committed.
obtain any description of the suspects from other eyewitnesses, including the Under the circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe that
owner of the Kia Pride which was forcefully obtained by the suspects as a appellant was committing a crime. Thus, the warrantless arrest is
get-away car; (3) they showed Alejo a picture of Joel to assist him in justified.
identifying the "suspect"; and (4) they arrested the other accused based
entirely on the illegally extracted extrajudicial confession of Joel. Article II, Section 4 of RA No. 6425, as amended by RA No 7659, states:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
People vs Araneta G.R. No. 191064 Oct. 20, 201095 ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
Held: administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search warrant transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as broker in any of such
or warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust operation and transactions. x x x.
the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of, and selling,
dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for the buy-bust Jurisprudence defines “transport” as “to carry or convey from one place to
team to arrest, and search, them on the spot because a buy-bust operation is another.” In the instant case, appellant was riding his bicycle when he was
a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a caught by the police. He admitted that he was about to convey the package,
form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose which contained marijuana, to a certain Jimmy Gonzales.
of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proven to be an Appellant, denies any knowledge that the package in his possession
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to contained marijuana. But TC rejected his contention, noting that it was
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. impossible for appellant not to be aware of the contents of the package
because “marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable aroma which
would have alarmed him.”
People v Penaflorida 551 SCRA 111 (2008)
Taking one step further, the appellate court went on to declare that being
Facts: SPO3 Vicente Competente narrated that in his capacity as chief of the mala prohibita, one commits the crime under RA No. 6425 by mere
Investigation and Operation Division of the PNP station in Tigaon, Camarines possession of a prohibited drug without legal authority. Intent, motive or
Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of marijuana was being knowledge thereof is not necessary.
transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur. Major Domingo Agravante, chief of police in Tigaon, then Finally, the lower courts correctly sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of
organized a team composed of Competente as team leader, SPO2 Callo, reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of one million pesos by virtue of the
SPO1 Portugal, PO3 Pillos and PO2 Edgar Latam. The team boarded the amendment to Section 4, RA No. 6425 by RA No. 7659.
police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon.
They overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged TC’s decision is affirmed.
appellant down and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper
together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also found in
appellant’s possession. The police officers confiscated these items and took People vs. Sembrano G.R. No.185848 Aug. 16, 2010 96

95
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
96
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
be made without warrant, a.) Strict enforcement of rule AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 39
TAU MU

Held: On the legality of the warrantless arrest, We reiterate that appellant Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
was arrested during an entrapment operation where he was caught in hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article
flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made during an entrapment III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation
operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line with the of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court allowing proceeding." Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be
warrantless arrests, to wit: sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted,
despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been
accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust PEOPLE vs. BIYOC 532 SCRA 201 98
operation, such as the one involving appellant, deserves judicial sanction.
Consequently, the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure Facts:
conducted on the person of appellant were allowed under the circumstances. At 4pm of Dec 5, 2000, private complainant AAA was in a room on the 2 nd
The search, incident to his lawful arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its floor of the family house taking care of here one year old sister. Her father,
validity. Thus, there is no doubt that the sachets of shabu recovered during herein appellant, entered the room and touched here genitals, after which he
the legitimate buy-bust operation, are admissible and were properly admitted told her to lie down on the floor.
in evidence against him.
Overcome by fear, AAA did lie down on the floor as told. Appellant at once
Appellant’s defenses of denial and frame-up are both self-serving and pulled her short pants down and touched her genitals again, after which he
uncorroborated, and must fail in light of straightforward and positive testimony went on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. Appellant was
of poseur-buyer identifying him as the seller of shabu. The twin defenses of not able to fully penetrate AAA’s vagina, however, as her elder sister BBB
denial and frame-up hold little weight vis-à-vis the strong evidence gathered went up the 2nd floor and saw appellant sitting in front of AAA who was lying
by the prosecution in proving his complicity to the offenses. To recall, PO1 down, face up. Appellant immediately warned BBB not to tell their mother
Manaol’s testimony was corroborated on material points by PO1 Bagay, who about what she saw. After BBB left appellant inserted his penis inside AAA’s
identified appellant as the one who handed the sachet of shabu to PO1 vagina.
Manaol after being handed two (2) One Hundred Peso bills. Contrary to the
defense’s claim, it is not impossible for a buy-bust operation to be conducted BBB lost no time to report that same day to her mother CCC, live-in partner of
in broad daylight, as in the case at bar. Frame-up, like denial, is viewed by appellant, what she saw, CCC thus immediately confronted AAA who did
this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted. confirm that appellant had inserted his penis inside her vagina that afternoon,
and that appellant had been doing the same act to her since she was nine
years old. Incensed, CCC accompanied AAA the following day, December 6,
People vs. Racho G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 201097 2000, DSWD to report the incident, and also to the police officers.

Held: PO1 Javier, together with AAA and CCC thereafter proceeded to the family
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be home and on their way, they met appellant. PO1 Javier at once informed him
discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of of his rights, arrested him and brought him to the police station. AAA’s and
his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless CCC’s statements were thereupon taken.
search is inadmissible in evidence against him.
TC ruled that appellant is guilty for the crime of rape. In his brief, appellant
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest raised the issue that the trial court failed to consider the fact that the
before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. accused’s arrest was legally objectionable. He claims that his arrest was
Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the illegal because a “warrantless arrest was effected even before the statement
case, we must abide with jurisprudence that appellant, having voluntarily of the private complainant was taken.”
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his
right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may Issue
have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction WON the contention of the accused-appellant is correct?
of the court over his person. Appellant’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot,
in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
Ruling
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to NO. Objections to the legality of arrests must, however, be made prior
ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband to the entry of plea at arraignment; otherwise, they are considered
was lawful. waived.

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be We have also ruled that an accused may be stopped from assailing the
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information
any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any against him before his arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects
proceeding. Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely: only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in
his arrest may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submitted to the
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; jurisdiction of the trial court as what was done by the appellants in the instant
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;" case. Not only did they enter their pleas during arraignment, but they also
3. Search of a moving vehicle; actively participated during the trial which constitutes a waiver of any
4. Consented warrantless search; irregularity in their arrest.
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and In the present case, appellant failed to question the illegality of his arrest
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. before entering his please, hence, he is deemed to waive the same.

be made without warrant, b.) Exceptions to strict enforcement, 1. Illegal


Possession of guns or drugs
97 98
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may
be made without warrant, c.) Waiver of Illegality of Arrest be made without warrant, d.) Effects of Declaration of Illegal Arrest
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 40
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Valdez v People 538 SCRA 611 (2007) 99 execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
Facts: Bautista testified that at around 8:00pm of March 17, 2003, he was in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 21 Here, petitioner’s
conducting the routing patrol along the National Highway La Union together act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was
with Aratas and Ordono when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away
from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had
approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in
chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away
Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.
Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly
contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared
marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity
petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation. enough to validate his warrantless arrest.26 If at all, the search most
permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the
Police Inspector Laya, the forensic chemist who conducted the examination case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring
of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that based on petitioner’s behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following
the specimen submitted to him for analysis, a sachet of the substance Terry v. Ohio,27 must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the person’s
weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a plastic bag, tested positive of outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the
marijuana. The charges were denied by petitioner. TC ruled in favour of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
prosecution. that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

In appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the Ruling in Issue No. 2
crime charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues,
albeit for the first time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question his arrest
him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search
his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a
maintains, the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible warrantless search which was not lawful.29 As we pronounced in People v.
in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree. Bacla-an —
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
Issue: Whether or not there was an illegal arrest? YES. What is the effect of inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The
the declaration of illegal arrest? following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence:
(1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches
Ruling: At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search)
any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a
the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot
person. Petitioner’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.30
basis of his acquittal. When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in
flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search
indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.
alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the
warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest. Evaluating the warrantless search being incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had
evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable consented to the search. We are not convinced. As we explained in Caballes
conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as v. Court of Appeals31 —
well. Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e.,
occasions on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit: the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant;
person to be arrested has committed it; and (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature
transferred from one confinement to another. of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took
xxx place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and
not one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was
arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at freely and voluntarily given.
the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an
offense.20 The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioner’s A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to
warrantless arrest. exercise the highest degree of diligence and prudence in deliberating upon
the guilt of accused persons brought before them, especially in light of the
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to
that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must give more serious consideration to certain material issues in the
determination of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in
some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to
99
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES extract information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are duty-
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may bound to be "[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be
be made without warrant, d.) Effects of Declaration of Illegal Arrest made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." 52 In the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 41
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same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers and public
officials alike to perform their mandated duties with commitment to the Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
highest degree of diligence, righteousness and respect for the law. provides that “every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbours and other persons” and punishes as
SC reversed the decision of the lower courts and acquitted the accused. actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
PEOPLE vs. SANTOS 555 SCRA 578 100 another person, and recognizes the privacy of letter and other private
communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
Facts: secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and
On March 8, 2003, the SDEU operatives of the Pasig City Police conducted a trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the
buy-bust operation in a residential area along Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, on Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual
the basis of reports that a certain alias Monching Labo was selling illegal Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
drugs in the said locality. Accompanied by a confidential informant, the police recognize the privacy of certain information.
team, proceeded to the ratget area at around 1:15 to 1:20 a.am. PO3 Carlo
Luna was to act as the poseur-buyer, whereas the other members of the Unlike the dissenters, we rescind from the premise that the right to privacy is
team were to serve as his backup. a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution; hence, it is the burden of
government to show that AO No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
The informant the pointed to 2 pesons standing along the target area, one of interest and that it is narrowly drawn. AO No. 308 is predicated on two
whom was Monching Labo, later indentified as appellant Ramon Catoc considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the
Picayo. After approaching , the informant introduced PO3 Luna as a shabu facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
customer to one of the persons, later identified as appellant Jerry Santos. providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce,
Appellant Santos then asked PO3 Luna how much worth of shabu he was if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transaction and misrepresentations by
buying and asked for the money. PO3 Luna gave appellant Santos the buy- person seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
bust money consisting of a pre-marked p100 bill. Santos handed this money compelling enough to warrant the issuance of AO No. 308. But what is not
to appellant Catoc, who took out from his pocket a sealed transparent plastic arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of AO No. 308
sachet containing a white crystalline substance, which he handed back to which if implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present
appellant Santos. When Santos gave the plastic sachet to PO3 Luna, the danger.
latter nabbed the former and introduced himself as a policeman.
AO No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in convicting the, as their guilt gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering that the prosecution purposes. That lack of proper safeguards in this regard od AO No. 308 may
failed to prove that a buy-bust operation took place and that their arrests interfere with individual’s liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to
without warrant were not legally effected. track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-
Issue incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government
WON the arrest was legally effected? authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The possibilities of abuse and misuse of PRN, biometrics and computer
Ruling technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks
YES. The claim of appellants that their warrantless arrests were illegal lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the
merit. The Court notes that nowhere in the records did we find any objection correctness of the date encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill
by appellants to the irregularity of their arrests prior to their arraignment. We of Rights seeks to prevent.
have held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in
complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources –
of the conviction of the accused. It is much too late in the day to complain governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at
about the warrantless arrest after a valid information ha been filed, the bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by
accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of issuing AO No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving
conviction rendered against him. information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of
basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
Nevertheless, our ruling in Pp vs Cabugatan provides that: indifferent fail to perceive the danger that AO No. 308 gives the government
the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is
The rule is settled that an arrest made after entrapment does not require a timely to take not of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., “the disturbing
warrant inasmuch as it Is considered as valid warrantless arrest pursuant to result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of
Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-
keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget.” Oblivious to
this counsel, the dissents still say we shout not be too quick in labelling the
right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the
Ople v Torres 293 SCRA 141 (1998) 101 right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that this Court invalidate Administrative Order
No. 308 entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Indentification In Re Sabio 504 SCRA 214 (2006)102
Reference System” on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly Facts: On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced
intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy. Philippine Senate Resolution No.455, “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation
on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Issue: Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications
Whether or not AO No. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy. Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
Ruling: Yes. respective Board of Directors.

On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,


100
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES approved by Senate President Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 8. When arrest may
be made without warrant, d.) Effects of Declaration of Illegal Arrest
101 102
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 10. Privacy & 11. AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 10. Privacy & 11.
Privacy of Communications Privacy of Communications
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 42
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PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an
Narciso Nrio to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v Mutuc, the Court, in line with
and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. Whalen v Roe, employed the rational basis relationship test when it held that
455. However, said invitation was refused by them, invoking 4 (b) of EO No. 1 there was no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the
which provides that, “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and
to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” honesty in public service, and promote morality in public administration. In
Valmonte v Belmonte, the Court remarked that as public figures, the
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to
Public Services issued an Order directing Major General Jose Balajadia closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the right of
(Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over
Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order bears the the right to privacy of financial transactions.
approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the Committees’
members. Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the
PHILCOMSAT, PHC, and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the
In GR No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling
directors and officers alleged among others that the subpoena violated reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the directors and
petitioners’ right to privacy and against self-incrimination. officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to
Issue: prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination
Whether or not the subpoena violated petitioners’ rights to privacy. regarding PCGG’s efficacy. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy
on the part of those directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate
Ruling: No. Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by
respondent Senate Committees.
One important on the Congress’ power of inquiry is that “the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” This is just
another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be “subject to the SJS vs DDB 570 SCRA 410 (2008) 103
limitations placed by the Constitution on government action.” As held in
Barenblatt v United States, “the Congress, in common with all other branches Facts: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA No.
of the Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
by the Constitution on governmental action, more particularly in the context of insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
this case, the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights.” students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public
and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in
accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord Issue1: Whether or not the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
“constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men,” but also public and private offices in violation of right to privacy.
from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his Ruling: No.
privacy” and “everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.” The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution intrudes. In this case, the office
least two guarantees that explicitly create zone of privacy. It highlights a or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
person’s “right to be let alone” or the “right to determine what, how expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
much, to whom and when information about himself shall be requirement. The employees’ privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
disclosed.” Section 2 guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in circumscribed by the company’s work policies, the collective bargaining
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.” Section the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
3 renders inviolable the “privacy of communication and workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
correspondence” and further cautions that “any evidence obtained in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any upheld.
purpose in any proceeding.”
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v Torres, is the
privacy and if so, whether that expectation has been violated by enabling law, authorzing a search “narrowly drawn” or “narrowly focused?”
unreasonable government intrusion. Applying this determination to these
cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the directors and officers of The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation; and 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain
second, did the government violate such expectation? provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would
unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senate’s experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly “on the under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The
Corporation (POTC), Philippines Communications Satellite Corporation goal is to discourage drug use by not telling advance anyone when and who
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
alleged improprieties in the operation by their respective board of directors.” prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the
Obviously, the inquiry focuses on petitioners’ acts committed in the discharge employee concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in
of their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations, particularly the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have no reasonable risk in the work place.”
expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation
where the government has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public
concern and over which the people have the right to information.
103
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 10. Privacy
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 43
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For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness
calculated to protect as much as possible the employee’s privacy and dignity. and being suspicionless are antiethical to their being made defendants in a
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime charged, they are
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged,
But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be by the bare fact of being hauled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably
conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case do not necessarily
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose
tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
“need to know” basis; that the “drug test result and the records shall be kept objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
confidentiality of the tests results.” Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the Lee vs CA G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010 104
intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by
proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, Held:
and is relatively minimal. Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad
testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral
the country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the examination concerning the Lee-Keh children’s theory that she had illicit
youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.
achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting an resolutely
pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited—unreasonable and
random drug test. To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize oppressive—are proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of
illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual’s privacy documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has
interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule
menace cuts across gender, age group, and social economic lines. And it 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:
may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal
drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor’s dream were it not for SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. — The court may quash a subpoena
the illegal and immoral components of any such activities. The drug problem duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the
has already abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of
trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose
this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the
random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use production thereof.
among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing
being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a
reasonable and enough means to lick the problem. Manila Electric Company vs. Lim G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010 105

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of Held:
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s
met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the
guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners,
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to
employees also labour under reasonable supervision and restrictions any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
imposed by the Civil Service Law and other laws on public officers, all threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring
command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to supplied)
serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial
Issue2: Whether or not the mandatory drug testing of persons charged complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information
before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses is in violation of right to of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the
privacy. truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this
Ruling: Yes. age of information technology.

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as
Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing
seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to Rules.
the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely
policy and requirement. property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before
the public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) 104
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 10. Privacy
mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of 105
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 10. Privacy
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 44
TAU MU

the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a


property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. One of the petitioners’ argument is that the officials of the ISAFP Detention
It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer Center violated the detainees’ right to privacy when ISAFP officials opened
- a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one
employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a
habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no envelopes in the
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits
the infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights unless authorized by law. The
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.
committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to
privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ Issue:
refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to Whether or not the officials of ISAFP Detention Center violated detainees’
respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best right to privacy of communication.
speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as Ruling: No.
"highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all." And
she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the The opening and reading of the detainees’ letters in the present case did not
real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture violate the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were not
unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related. in sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as
it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection
of contraband.
Zulueta v CA 253 SCRA 699 (1996) 106
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not
Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner
Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel
respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the
husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of
petitioner had filed against her husband. the detainees.

Issue: That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s
Whether or not the documents and papers seized were admissible in privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not
evidence. to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those
detainees is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations
Ruling: No. inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The expectation of privacy rights.
constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the KMU v Director 487 SCRA 623 (2006) 108
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful Facts: On 13 April 2005, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 420
order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as (REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-
prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND
obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.” HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING
FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES). Petitioners alleged that EO 420 is
any tell-tale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional provisions on the right to
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the privacy.
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. (i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the owner’s
consent.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the (ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for
spouse by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for any violation of its provisions.
or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while (iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of
the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent if EO 420.
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from
the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one Issue: Whether or not EO 420 violates the constitutional provision on the
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for right to privacy.
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing
to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. Ruling: No.

All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government
In Re Alejano 468 SCRA 188 (2005) 107 entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental
functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of
Facts: This case results from the Oakwood incident in July 2003. these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been
no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and
recording of personal identification data.
106
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 11. Privacy of
Communications
107 108
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE: A. ARRESTS, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 11. Privacy of AND SEIZURES, PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, 11. Privacy of
Communications Communications
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CASE DIGESTS (S.Y. 2012-2013) Atty. V. Paul Le Montejo 45
TAU MU

In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of
government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since
petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to complain
against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored
for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data,
and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. The data collection,
recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require less data
collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO
420.

Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind,
nature, and extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems.
Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14
specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government
entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven
less data than what Supreme Court’s ID shows.

Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities


prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of
personal identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section
5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are instituted:

a. The date to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for
purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited to
those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in
violation of a person’s right to privacy be allowed or tolerated under
this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification
system shall be instituted;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated
as strictly confidential and a personal or written authorization of the
Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced
security features and cryptographic technology;
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be
required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or under
such conditions as the participating agency issuing the
identification card shall prescribe.

On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly


limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the
existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict
safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to
the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy.
Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO
420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and
exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v Torres is not
authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that
case, the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of
safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter
required legislation. As the Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban noted in his concurring opinion in Ople v Torres, “The voting is
decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on this
ground that the petition is granted by this Court.”

EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems


and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO
420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not
already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive
issuance in Ople v Torres sought to establish a “National Computerized
Identification Reference System,” a national ID system that did not exist prior
to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system
requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card
issuance system where none existed before.

In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but
makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS,
SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable, and user-friendly
to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under
the President’s constitutional power of control over government entities in the
Executive department, as well as under the President’s constitutional duty to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.