EVIDENCE DIGESTS FIRST BATCH

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 — Atienza v. Board of Medicine

1 — Atienza v. Board of Medicine 1 Keywords: ​Admissibility and probative weight, best evidence
rule, hearsay evidence, kidney operation
2 — Dela Llana v. Biong 2
Principles: ​Rules on evidence are not strictly applied in
3 — State of Missouri v. Ball 3
proceedings before administrative bodies such as BOM.
4 — Lopez v. Heesen 4 Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of WON the
circumstance or evidence is to be considered at all. Probative
5 — People v. Marti 5 value of evidence refers to the question of WON it proves an
issue.
6 — Waterous Drug v. NLRC 6

7 — People v. Guillermo 7 The facts sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s

exhibits, that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
8— Villaflor v. Summers 9 locations at the time of her operation need not be proved as it
is covered by mandatory judicial notice.
9 — Pascual v. Medical Board of Examiners 9

10 — Cabal v. Kapunan 10 FACTS:

11 — Beltran v. Samson 11 Private Respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center
12 — US v. Tan Teng 12 (RMC) for check-up due to her lumbar pains. She was referred
to Dr. Pedro Lim III who ordered for several diagnostic tests.
13 — People v. Salanguit 13 It was found out that although her right kidney was normal,
her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Hence,
14 — People v. Damaso 14 she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
15 — Padilla v. CA 14
Her husband, Romeo Sioson then filed a complaint for gross
16 — People v. Amminudin 17 negligence and/or incompetence before the BOM against the
doctors who participated in the kidney operation, namely: Dr.
17 — People v. Quebral 18
Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio
18 — Rosete v. Lim 19 Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza. During the said
operation, what was removed was the fully functional right
19 — People v. Bokingo 20 kidney of Editha Sioson, instead of her left kidney is
non-functioning and non-visualizing.
20 — De la Cruz v. People Taken from previous digest
21
The complaint was heard by the BOM. Editha Sioson filed her
21 — De Castro v. People 22 formal offer of documentary evidence, photocopies of the
X-ray Request forms on separate occasions, for the purpose of
22 — Homar v. People 23 proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
23 — PDIC v. Casimiro Taken from previous digest 24 locations at the time she was operated. While Rico Atienza
filed his comments and objections to the formal offer of
24 — People v. Guting 26 exhibits as the same were inadmissible because they were
merely photocopies, they violate the best evidence rule, not
25 — People v. Lauga 27
properly identified and authenticated and intended to establish
26 — Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment matters which are hearsay. Also, the exhibits are incompetent
Court 28 to prove the purpose for which they are offered.

27 — Gaanan v. IAC Taken from previous digest 29 BOM​: The formal offer of the documentary exhibits by Editha
28 — Salcedo v. CA 29 Sioson was admitted for whatever purpose they may serve in
the resolution of the case. A hearing was set on July 4, 2004.
29 — Ramirez v. CA 31
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. BOM
30 — Navarro v. CA 31 concluded that it should first admit the evidence being offered
31 — People v. Yatco 32 so it can determine its probative value when it decides the
case. It can only determine whether the evidence is relevant or
32 — People v. Andan 33 not if it will take a look at it through the process of admission.

33 — People v. Abriol 34
Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was
35 — US v. Hong Siu Hong 36 dismissed by the latter. Hence, the present case.

ISSUE:​ WON the exhibits are inadmissible evidence

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HELD:
NO​. Firstly, rules on evidence are not strictly applied in
proceedings before administrative bodies such as BOM. From
there, distinction between admissibility of evidence and the
probative weight must be emphasized. Admissibility of
evidence refers to the question of WON the circumstance or
evidence is to be considered at all. Probative value of evidence
refers to the question of WON it proves an issue.
Secondly, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the
substantive rights of petitioner (upon petitioner’s reliance on
Sec. 20, Art. I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules
of Procedure) because the fact sought to be proved, that the
two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations
at the time she was operated on is presumed under Sec. 3,
Rule 131, ROC. These exhibits were actually attached as
annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III’s counter affidavit filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City which was
investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by
Editha against the doctors of RMC who handled her surgical
procedure.
The facts sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s
exhibits, that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
locations at the time of her operation need not be proved as it
is covered by mandatory judicial notice. Laws of nature
involving physical science, specifically biology include the
structural make-up and composition of living things such as
human beings. As such, we may take judicial notice that
Editha’s kidneys before and at the time of the operation as
with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical
locations.
Thirdly, best evidence rule is inapplicable. The proper
anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her
operation may be established not only through the exhibits
offered in evidence.
Finally, the exhibits are not hearsay evidence of the anatomical
location of Editha’s kidney. The anatomical location of her
kidneys may still be established through belated ultrasound or
x-ray of her abdominal area. In fact, such secondary evidence
is allowed as the originals cannot be produced since they were
transferred to the new building as testified by Dr. Nancy
Aquino.
WHEREFORE, petition is denied.
2 — Dela Llana v. Biong
FACTS:
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was
driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon
City. ​His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front
passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat.
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital
when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car
halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly
rammed the car's rear end, violently pushing the car forward.
Due to the impact, the car's rear end collapsed and its rear
windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra.
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dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana
did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical
injuries.
The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified
the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that Joel was
recklessly imprudent in driving the truck. Joel later revealed
that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing
business under the name and style of "Pongkay Trading" and
was engaged in a gravel and sand business.
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel
mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and
shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by.
Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the
extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9,
2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation
medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her
that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by
the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and
hand.
Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca
compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.
Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC).
She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of
the vehicular accident
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no
cause of action against her as no reasonable relation existed
between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana's injury.
She pointed out that Dra. dela Llana's illness became manifest
one month and one week from the date of the vehicular
accident.
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary
witness and Joel as a hostile witness. Dra. dela Llana
reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the
vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she identified and
authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000
issued by Dr. Milla.
ISSUE:
whether Joel's reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra.
dela Llana's whiplash injury.
RULING:
No.
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish
her case by preponderance of evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act
or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision,
the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1)
damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission of
the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant
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must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and
effect between such negligence and the damages
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish
by preponderance of evidence the three elements of
quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca's liability as Joel's
employer.
She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel's
negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash
injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have
occurred.
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three
pieces of evidence: (1) the pictures of her damaged car, (2)
the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and (3) her
testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of
evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular
accident and the whiplash injury. In other words, Dra. Dela
Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the
evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the
ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below:
A. The pictures of the
damaged car only
demonstrate the impact of
the collision
Her insistence that these pictures show the causation grossly
belies common logic. These pictures indeed demonstrate the
impact of the collision. However, it is a farfetched assumption
that the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these
pictures.
B. The medical certificate
cannot be considered
because it was not admitted
in evidence
The medical certificate, marked as Exhibit "H" during trial,
should not be considered in resolving this case for the reason
that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC in an order
dated September 23, 2004.
However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the
disposition of this case, the medical certificate has no
probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on
the witness stand.
Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the
contents of the medical certificate. However, she was not
presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify
and affirm the contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore,
Rebecca was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Dr.
Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings.
We also point out in this respect that the medical certificate
nonetheless did not explain the chain of causation in fact
between Joel's reckless driving and Dra. dela Llana's whiplash
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injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash injury
was a result of the vehicular accident.
C. Dra. dela Llana's opinion
that Joel's negligence
caused her whiplash injury
has no probative value
The present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela Llana,
as the plaintiff in this quasi-delict case, was the lone
physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified
as an ordinary witness before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana
essentially claimed in her testimony that Joel's reckless driving
caused her whiplash injury.
Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even
assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot give
weight to her opinion that Joel's reckless driving caused her
whiplash injury without violating the rules on evidence.
Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference
between an ordinary witness and an expert witness. The
opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence
regarding: (a) the identity of a person about whom he has
adequate knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has
sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person with
whom he is sufficiently acquainted. On the other hand, the
opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he shown to possess.
Dra. dela Llana's medical opinion cannot be given probative
value for the reason that she was not presented as an expert
witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to
testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash
injury.
The Supreme Court cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries
Dra. dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary
evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the
vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana's injury.
We point out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial
notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. This
proposition is not public knowledge, or is capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.
3 — State of Missouri v. Ball
Keywords:​ Robbery, relevant evidence
Principle: ​To be relevant, there must be a logical connection
bet. the fact in issue and the crime charged; when it has a
tendency to prove or disprove a fact in issue.
One afternoon in October of 1958, two men entered the
Krekeler & Sons Jewelry Company. The taller man selected and
bought a cigarette lighter, while also looking at watches and
rings. The shorter man looked in the cases and was moving
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about. In preparation to closing the store later in the day, as
Krekeler (owner/personnel) was placing the store goods in a
safe, two men entered. Krekeler recognized the tall man as the
same man who had bought from the store earlier by his hat,
jacket, shirt, and scar on his face. He intercepted the shorter
man who was walking behind the counter, but the latter drew
a .38 pistol and “stuck it in Krekeler’s face”. Krekeler was led
to the restroom at the store’s rear and was told to face the
wall. He only heard the dumping of the jewelry in a bag and
the jingle of the cash register. When the men left, he called
the police.
Krekeler was able to identify the taller man (W.A. Ball) after
his capture in the hospital. Ball was arrested for 1​st degree
robbery.
A motion for new trial was filed by the appellant on the ff.
grounds:
1. There was no direct evidence of an injury or any
evidence to show that Krekeler was put “in fear of
some immediate injury to his person,” (an essential
element of 1​st​ deg. robbery).
2. The evidence is not material or relevant, too remote
from the date of the incident to indicate a
consciousness of guilt.
3. The introduction of Ball’s hat, jacket, shirt, shoes,
ring, watch, wallet, pen knife and the dollar bills and
coins taken from his person as exhibits are
IMMATERIAL and IRRELEVANT as they neither tend
to prove nor disprove any of the issues involved in
the case; and that the money was not identified by
Krekeler as the money allegedly stolen.
​ISSUE:​ Are the claims tenable?
1. NO. The element of fear, being a reasonable
inference from the evidence, the facts and
circumstances support and warrant the finding of
robbery in the 1​st​ degree.
Although Krekeler did not testify that he was
in fear, he could apprehend injury if he did
not heed their requests.
2. NO. Unexplained flight and resisting arrest even 30
days after the commission of a crime is a RELEVANT
circumstance. The remoteness of the flight goes to
the WEIGHT of the evidence, not its admissibility.
Evidence​: ​3 weeks after the incident, police
officers in a squad car saw Ball walking
along Easton Avenue. They stopped him and
told him he was under arrest. Officer Powell
searched him while Officer Ballard attempted
to cuff him but Ball was able to escape.
Powell yelled for him to stop and fired one
shot in the air yet Ball continued to run;
Powell fired 4 more shots – 2 at his legs, one
at his buttocks, one at his back – Ball fell.
3. YES. "The mere possession of a quantity of money is
in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker
of money charged as taken.”
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In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the
record that the money in Ball's possession at the time
of his arrest came from or had some connection with
the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of
his impecuniousness before the robbery and his
sudden affluence, the evidence was NOT RELEVANT
and in the circumstances, was obviously prejudicial
for if it did not tend to prove the offense for which
the appellant was on trial, the jury may have inferred
that he was guilty of another robbery. The admission
of the evidence infringed his right to a fair trial.
It was adduced that the amount of $140
cash and $4,455 worth of jewelry was taken
from the store. There was no proof as to the
denomination of money in the cash register,
only that $140 was lost. Further, 19 days
had elapsed and there was no proof that Ball
had suddenly come into the possession of
the $258.02 found in his person. Although
he had just been out of the penitentiary and
had no means of livelihood or support, he
asserted that he had earned the money
working for a custodian of an apartment
house and had won the money. Further,
Krekeler was unable to identify the money or
any of the items in Ball’s person as having
come from the jewelry store.
4 — Lopez v. Heesen
FACTS: Jesse Lopez (appellant) originally filed a suit against
Robert Heesen (appellee) alleging that the latter assaulted and
shot the appellant with a shotgun, thereby inflicting dangerous
and painful wounds and injuries to appellant causing him
great bodily and mental pain and anguish. In this case,
appellee, Sears, Roebuck and Company (Sears) was joined a
party-defendant. It was alleged that Sears sold to Heesen the
Higgins Model 51 hunting rifles which was negligently designed
or manufactured in that the safety mechanism moved readily
and in a dangerous manner from a “safe” to a “fire” position.
The facts are substantially as follows: Heesen, an Air Force
officer, purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51, 30.06 rifle from
Sears. The safety mechanism of the rifle is what known as a
“class 1” safety, meaning that it interrupts the firing pin
directly. To release the safety, you push the safety lever to the
left and down to a horizontal position and the gun is then
ready to fire. Heesen went for a deer hunting. Shortly before
the shooting, Heesen had been sitting on a knoll for about
twenty minutes checking the wind and watching for deer. He
also checked and observed the safety lever on the rifle several
times and it was on safety position. When he saw a deer,
Heesen wanted to cross the log to see the deer better and as
he stepped across the log his left foot caught in the limb
sticking out and caused him to stumble. This brought the gun
down and the gun discharged, the bullet striking the appellant.
The appellant introduced evidence tending to prove that the
safety device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is easy to knock off
safety, making the rifle dangerous. Frank Doyle, his witness,
said that the safety device, without telescopic sight, is not a
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safe piece, in that the projection is too long and it is too prone
to be knocked from “safe” to “fire” position.
The witness of the appellee, La Violette, on the other hand,
testified that safety device on the Higgins Model 51 is supplied
to High Standard Manufacturing Company by Fabrique
Nationale of Belgium. He also testified extensively as to the
advantages of the safety device of the Higgins Model 51 rifle.
The witness, Thomas Raymond Robison, Jr., testified that the
Higgins Model 51 is good and practical in the filed for a
prudent hunter and is suitable for hunting. Ira L. Kessler, an
expert witness called by defendant testified that the Marlin
Firearms Company has a fair reputation, and that the Colt
Firearms Company has an excellent reputation.
Now, the appellant contends that: 1) the trial court committed
error in permitting testimony as to the general reputation of
other firearms companies who use the same modified leaf
safety device as the Higgins Model 51 in which the witness for
appellee, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., that such companies had an
excellent reputation in the small arms field. Objection was
made to this testimony on the ground that it was wholly
immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case; 2) trial court
erred in permitting evidence to be introduced as to the
poundage pressure required to move the safety levers of
various rifles from “safe” to “fire” position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of other firearms
companies who use the same device are admissible as
evidence in court.
RULING: 1) Under Rule 21-1-1(43) (a) the rule which favors
the reception of the evidence governs, the basis being that any
evidence which throws light on the question in issue should be
admitted, leaving it to the trial court to hold the hearing within
reasonable bounds. We hold that the testimony as to the
reputation of Fabrique Nationale, who manufacture the safety
device on the Higgins Model 51 and the reputation of Marlin
Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms
Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles
which have the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins
Model 51, was relevant to the issue whether the safety device
on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
2) Under this circumstances, it was proper for the appellee to
show that poundage pressure required to move the safety
lever on Higgins Model 51 from “safe” to “fire” measured
two-and-one-half pounds, and also to show the poundage
pressure required in rifles with identical safety devices because
the Doyle’s testimony was introduced under appellant’s
contention that the Higgins Model 51 rifle was unsafe and thus
the issue arose as to the pressure required to move the safety
lever from “safe” to “fire” position.
5 — People v. Marti
FACTS​: The appellant and his common-law wife went to
Manila Packing and Export Forwarders carrying with them four
(4) gift wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland.
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Appellant refused when asked by Reyes to inspect the
packages, assuring her that the packages simply contained
books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend.
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs
and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of
the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves
inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane
wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took
several grams of the contents thereof.
Job Reyes prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI.
Later, he was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section.
Therefore, Job Reyes and NBI agents went to the Reyes'
office.
Job Reyes, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the
packages. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
contained inside the cellophane wrappers.
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for
violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
ISSUE​: Whether or not the objects searched and seized from
the four parcels were admissible in evidence
RULING​: FIRST, the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting
in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities.
We hold that in the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State. The contraband having come into possession
of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's
rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted
against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
SECOND, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert
the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless
search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search
THIRD, Appellant would like us to believe that he was not the
owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but
rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant
met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their
30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the
packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment
since the German national was about to leave the country the
next day.
As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply
entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the
marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00
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to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the
other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take
custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete
stranger on his mere say-so"
As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed
to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight
than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances
6 — Waterous Drug v. NLRC
Facts:
ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO (Catolico) was hired as a
pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter
WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988.
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez
informed Emma Co (Co) that he noticed an irregularity
involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(hereafter YSP), which he described as follows:
. . . A case in point is medicine purchased under our
Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales Invoice No.
266 representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren
tablets at P384.00 per unit. Previews P.O.s issued to YSP,
Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O.
No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00
per bottle (or total of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of
P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated December
15, 1988. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine
the discrepancy and it was found that the ​cost per bottle
was indeed overpriced​. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department
(Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the ​difference
represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of
Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their
check voucher no. 629552 (shown to the
undersigned)​, which was paid to Ms. Catolico through
China Bank check no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989 . .
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the
check but she denied having received it and that she is
unaware of the overprice​. However, upon conversation
with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she
confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually
received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even
asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the
check but Ms. Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan,
bukas." It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had
been pocketed by Ms. Catolico.
Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 37 January 1990, Co
asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of
the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to
give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension
from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she
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was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990,
she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the
interests of the company.
In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her
counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP was a
Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also
averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it
sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's
secretary, Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro,
issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her termination
On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor
Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
and illegal suspension.
In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio
Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against
petitioners. ​Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico
because petitioners failed to "prove what [they]
alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that
any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was
without just cause and due process.
In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the
findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that p​etitioners
were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's
dismissal​ from her employment.
Issue:
I. Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in its findings of facts.
II. Whether or not due process was duly accorded to private
respondent.
III. Whether or not public respondent gravely erred in applying
Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
A thorough review of the record leads us to no other
conclusion than that, except as to the third ground, the
instant petition must fail.
Concededly, Catolico was denied due process.
In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity
to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in the
memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after
receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was
ever conducted after the issues were joined through said
letters. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences
[​sic​] in [WATEROUS] possession," which were not, however,
submitted. What the "evidences" [​sic​] other than the sales
invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the
burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for
dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that
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burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is
unjustified.​ ​ Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.
Unfortunately for petitioners, ​their evidence does not
establish that there was an overcharge​. Control Clerk
Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have discovered Catolico's
inappropriate transaction, stated in his affidavit:
4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July
31, 1989, Ms. Catolico in violation of the [company]
procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to
supply WDRC needed medicines like Voren tablets at a
jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg. which has a
previous price of only P320.00;
5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the
discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle was
indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils.
through Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there was
really an overprice and she said that the difference
was refunded through their check voucher no.
629552 which was shown to me and the payee is
Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank Check No.
892068 dated November 9, 1989​.
It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal ​was based on
hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never testified nor
executed an affidavit relative to this case​; thus, we have
to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay
evidence carries no probative value.
Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren
tablets. While Valdez informed Co, through the former's
memorandum of 29 January 1990, that WATEROUS paid YSP
P3,840.00 "thru MBTC Check No. 222832," t​he said check
was never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt
from YSP offered by petitioners.
Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on
mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
employee's dismissal​. Suspicion is not among the valid
causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of
employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of
trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not
on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.
Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee,
to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is
restricted.
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC
anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine
laid down in P ​ eople vs​. M
​ arti that the ​Bill of Rights does not
protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals​. It is not true,
as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no
recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said
counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal
and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that
Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of
the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico.
Dispositive Portion:
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WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2
December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93
are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor
Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private
respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in
violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
communication and against unreasonable searches and
seizures which is hereby set aside.
7 — People v. Guillermo
Keywords: murder, admissibility of one’s confession
FACTS:
On March 22, 1998, prosecution witness Romualdo Campos, at
around 8:00 am, a security guard, Romoualdo Campos who
was assigned to Greatmore Corp. (a manufacturer of faucets
sharing the same building with Keyser Plastics), saw Eric
Guillermo, an employee of Keyser entered the premises. An
hour later, he saw Victor F. Keyser arrived.
Later, at round 10am, Campos heard some loud noises coming
from the Keyser area but ignored it thinking that such noise
was coming from the machines used to make plastics. At
around noontime, Guillermo looked through the holes in the
dividing wall and calmly told Campos that he killed Keyser. Eric
asked for his assistance to help him carry the corpse to the
garbage dump so he could burn it. Campos then called the
police to report the incident. 10 minutes later, a team from the
PNP arrived. They convinced Eric, who was still inside the
buiilding, to give them the keys to the Keyser Plastics gate.
When the police entered the premises, Eric told them that he’ll
surrender.
SPO1 Reyes asked him where the body of the victim was and
Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening the
boxes, the police found the dismembered limbs and chopped
torso of Victor F. Keyser. The victims head was found stuffed
inside a cement bag. When the police asked how he did it,
according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he
bashed the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after
Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a carpenters saw.
He then mopped up the blood on the floor with a plastic foam.
Guillermo then turned over to the police a bloodstained,
two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenters saw.
Photographs were taken of the suspect, the dismembered
corpse, and the implements used in committing the crime.
When asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied
that Keyser had been maltreating him and his coemployees.
He expressed no regret whatsoever about his actions.
The police then brought Guillermo to the PNP Station for
further investigation. SPO1 Carlos conducted the investigation,
without apprising the appellant about his constitutional rights
and without providing him with the services of counsel.
Appellant’s contention:
At the trial, the defense consisted of outright denial. He
alleged that he was a victim of a police frame-up. He said he
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was then brought to the police station where he was advised
to admit having killed his employer. Appellant contends that
his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He points
out that he was not informed of his constitutional rights nor
was he made to understand the same by the police
investigators. He says he was only made to read said rights
printed form posed on the wall at the police precinct. He was
not provided with the services of counsel during the custodial
investigation, as admitted by SPO1 Reyes.
State’s contention:
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
counters that the evidence clearly shows that the appellant
admitted committing the crime in several instances, not just
during the custodial investigation:
First, he admitted having killed his employer to the security
guard, Campos, and even sought Campos help in disposing of
Keysers body. This admission may be
treated as part of the res gestae and does not partake of
uncounselled extrajudicial confession, according to the OSG.
Second, the appellants statements before members of the
media are likewise admissible in evidence, according to the
OSG, as these statements were made in response to questions
by news reporters, not by police or other investigating officer.
The OSG stresses that appellant was interviewed by media on
two separate occasions, and each time he made free and
voluntary statements admitting his guilt before the news
reporters. He even supplied the details on how he committed
the crime.
Third, the OSG points out that appellant voluntarily confessed
to the killing even before the police could enter the premises
and even before any question could be posed to him.
Furthermore, after the police investigators had entered the
factory, the appellant pointed to the place where Keysers
corpse was found. The OSG submits that at these points in
time, appellant was not yet under custodial investigation.
Rather his statements to the police at the crime scene were
spontaneous and voluntary, not elicited through questioning,
and hence must be treated as part of the res gestae and thus,
says the OSG, admissible in evidence.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Court a quo gravely err in finding that the guilt of
the accused-appellant for the crime of murder has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt?
2. Whether the appellant’s offense murder for which appellant
should suffer the death penalty, or only homicide for which a
lesser penalty is appropriate?
HELD:
1. The trial court erred in finding that the guilt of the
accused-appellant for the crime of murder has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt but only when it admits the alleged
confession of Guillermo to the police. However, the
prosecution has amply proven the appellants guilt in killing
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Keyser with the following: a) spontaneous and out-of-court
admissions he made to Campos and the two media reports,
Abelgas and David and b) the positive evidence, including the
instruments of the crime, together with the medical evidence
and testimonies of credible prosecution witness.
The OSG contends that not every statement made to the
police by a suspect in a crime falls within the ambit of
constitutional protection. Hence, if not made under custodial
investigation or under investigation for the commission of an
offense, the statement is not protected by the Bill of Rights.
In the Court’s view, however, the confession Eric made while
he was under investigation by SPO1 Reyes falls short of the
protective standards as laid down by the Constitution. Under
Article III of the Constitution, a confession to be admissible
must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession must
be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the
confession must be express; and (d) the confession must be in
writing. In the instant case, the testimony of SPO1 Reyes on
cross-examination clearly shows the cavalier treatment by the
police of said constitutional guarantees.
Appellant’s alleged confession at the police station lacks the
safeguards required by the Bill of Rights. The investigating
officer made no serious effort to make appellant aware of his
basic rights under custodial investigation. While the
investigating officer was aware of the appellant’s right to be
represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide
him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday.
Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said
investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that
appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in
the presence of counsel. As well said in People v. Dano, even if
the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it
was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible
in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it
had been voluntarily given.
Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the
appellants confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP
Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal.
For constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation
(known, also as the Miranda principles) do not apply to
spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through
questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to
having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the
Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the
slightest use of the States coercive power as would lead an
accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth
outside the sphere of such power.
The facts in this case clearly show that Eric admitted the
commission of the crime not just to the police but also to
private individuals. According to the testimony of the security
guard, Romualdo Campos that Eric asked for his assistance to
dispose the body of the victim which was not rebutted by the
defense. As the Solicitor General points out, appellants
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statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res
gestae.
Under the Rules of Court, a declaration is deemed part of the
res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur:
(1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had time
to contrive or devise; and
(3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.
All these requisites are present in the instant case. Appellant
had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence,
the death of his employer. His admission to Campos was made
while he was still under the influence of said startling
occurrence and before he had an opportunity to concoct or
contrive a story. His declaration to Campos concerned the
circumstances surrounding the killing of Keyser. Appellants
spontaneous statements made to a private security guard, not
an agent of the State or a law enforcer, are not covered by the
Miranda principles and, as res gestate, admissible in evidence
against him.
Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the
media, appellant not only agreed to be interviewed by the
news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his guilt to
them. The TV news reporters testimonies on record show that
they were acting as media professionals when they interviewed
appellant. They were not under the direction and control of the
police. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV
cameras. The record also shows that the interviews took place
on several occasions, not just once. Each time, the appellant
did not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he
repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied
details of Keysers killing. As held in Andan, statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a
televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence.
8— Villaflor v. Summers
Keyword/s: Adultery; Body examination; Pregnant;
Self-Incrimination.
Principle: ​The constitutional protection is limited only against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. On a proper showing
and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of
the body of the accused is permissible.
FACTS
Villaflor and Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery.
The Judge of the First Instance of Manila ordered Villaflor to
submit her body to the examination of one or two competent
doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not.
Villaflor refused to obey the order arguing that such
examination and bodily exhibition was a violation of the
constitutional provision. She was cited in contempt and was
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committed to Bilibid Prison until she complies with the court’s
order.
She prayed for a writ of Habeas Corpus. The trial judge held
that there was no infringement of the constitutional provision.
ISSUE
Whether or not compelling a woman to permit her body to be
examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant,
violates the constitutional provision that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
(self-incrimination lol)
RULING
NO.
The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself is a prohibition of the ​use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from him,
not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may
be materia​l.
In short the protection is limited only against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination​; the extraction of an
admission of guilt from the defendant’s lips against his own
will.
On a proper showing and under an order of the trial
court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused
is permissible. ​Torture or force should be avioded.
There is a presumption that examination made by
reputable and disinterested physicians will not be
taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the
patient​. In the present case, no objection to the physical
examination was made by the family doctor of the accused or
by the doctor of the same sex.
Note:
*The case cited People vs. McCoy where a woman charged
with infanticide was directed for an examination of her private
parts, however the evidence obtained was inadmissible as it
was a violation against the constitution, as the ​woman was
being threated with force so the examination was
conducted against her will.
9 — Pascual v. Medical Board of Examiners
Keywords: ​Medical malpractice, right against
self-incrimination in administrative proceedings
Principle: ​A respondent may not be compelled to take the
witness stand even in an administrative proceeding, if such has
a criminal or penal nature.
FACTS
Pascual Jr. was a respondent in an administrative case filed
before the Board of Medical Examiners, for alleged medical
malpractice.
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The complainants wanted to present Pascual as their first
witness. Pascual objected relying on his right against self
incrimination. However, the Board noted that he will be called
upon to testify as a witness in the next hearing.
Pascual filed an action for prohibition with preliminary
injunction in order to restrain the Board to compel him to take
the witness stand, alleging it to have gravely abused its
discretion. Meanwhile, the Board stressed its belief that it could
compel Pascual to be a witness, for the right against
self-incrimination may only be invoked when there is a
question calling for an incriminating answer.
The lower court decided to prohibit the Board from compelling
Pascual to be a witness against himself. The case was
appealed.
ISSUE
Whether or not a respondent in an administrative proceeding
be compelled to take the witness stand and be a witness
against himself, when such proceeding has a penal aspect.
RULING:
NO​. The ​respondent in an administrative proceeding
may invoke his right against self-incrimination by
refusing to take the witness stand if such proceeding has
ap​ enal aspect.
Even if the case was before an administrative body, the case
had a penal aspect, insofar as Pascual may suffer from the
revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. Therefore,
the right against self-incrimination may also be invoked by
refusing to take the witness stand, and not only by objecting
to incriminating questions.
In line with that right, the respondent also has the right to
remain silent and his silence cannot be presumed as a result of
guilt.
Therefore, ruling of lower court is affirmed. Board is restrained
from compelling Pascual to take the witness stand without his
consent.
NOTE: ​The case of Cabal v Kapunan was mentioned in this
case in relation to right against self-incrimination in admin
proceedings.
10 — Cabal v. Kapunan
Principle:
Informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment
of fine or imprisonment against any person are deemed to be
civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in
nature to the extent that where the person using the res
illegally is the owner or rightful possessor of it, the
forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment.
FACTS:
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Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the
Secretary of Nation Defense a letter-complaint charging
petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices,
unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and
gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his
as sets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible
acts". The following month, the President of the Philippines
created a committee of five (5) members to investigate the
charge of unexplained wealth contained in said
letter-complaint and submit its report and recommendations as
soon as possible. During trial, petitioner (Cabal) refused to
take the witness stand invoking his right to self-incrimination.
Hence, a charge for contempt was issued.
Petitioner (Cabal) then filed with respondent Judge a motion to
quash the charge and/or order to show cause, upon the
ground:
(1) that the City Fiscal has neither authority nor personality to
file said char and the same is null and void, for, if criminal, the
charge has been filed without a preliminary investigation, and,
civil, the City Fiscal may not file it, his authority in respect of
civil cases being limited to representing the City of Manila; (2)
that the facts charged constitute no offense for section 580 of
the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the charge is
based, violates due process, in that it is vague and uncertain
as regards the offense therein defined and the fine imposable
therefor and that it fail to specify whether said offense shall be
treated also contempt of an inferior court or of a superior court
(3) that more than one offense is charged, for the contempt
imputed to petitioner is sought to be punished as contempt of
an inferior court, as contempt of a superior court an as
contempt under section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules Court; (4)
that the Committee had no power to order an require
petitioner to take the witness stand and be sworn to, upon the
request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch as
said order violates petitioner's constitutional right against
self-incrimination.
Motion to quash denied. Petitioner began present action for
the purpose adverted to above. In their answer, respondents
herein allege, inter alia, that the investigation being conducted
by the Committee above referred to is administrative, not
criminal, in nature; that the legal provision relied upon by
petitioner in relation to preliminary investigations is
inapplicable to contempt proceedings.
ISSUE:
WON the proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is
civil or criminal in character such that if it is criminal, then the
right to self-incrimination is applicable.
RULING:
It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may
refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also,
to take the witness stand. In this connection, it should be
noted that, although said Committee was created to
investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth,
there seems to be no question that Col. Maristela does not
seek the removal of petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the
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Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a matter of fact he no
longer holds such office. It seems, likewise conceded that the
purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to
the State of property of a public officer or employee which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer
or employee and his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property. Such for forfeiture has been
held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a
consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are
deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of
defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses
against themselves are applicable thereto.
Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods
that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any
person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such
proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where the
person using the res illegally is the owner or rightful possessor
of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a
punishment.
It has frequently been held upon constitutional grounds under
the various State Constitution, that a witness or party called as
witness cannot be made to testify against himself as to
matters which would subject his property to forfeiture
Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil
and in the nature of proceedings in rem. In some aspects,
however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are of
quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal
proceedings for all the purposes of ... that portion of the Fifth
Amendment which declares, that no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The rule
protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence
which would incriminate him exists not only when he is liable
criminally to prosecution and punishment, but also when his
answer would tend to expose him to a ... forfeiture ....
The privilege applies where the penalty or forfeiture
recoverable, or is imposed in vindication of the public justice
the state as a statutory fine or penalty, or a fine or penalty for
violation of a municipal ordinance, even though the action or
proceeding for its enforcement is not brought in a criminal
court but is prosecuted through the modes of procedure
applicable to ordinary civil remedy.
Thus, in Boyd vs. U.S. it was held that the information, in a
proceeding to declaration a forfeiture of certain property
because of the evasion of a certain revenue law, "though
technically a civil proceeding is in substance and effect a
criminal one", and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are
within the reason criminal proceedings for the purposes of that
portion the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S.
which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself.
Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of an officer was held,
in Thurston vs. Clark to be in substance criminal, for said
portion of the Fifth Amendment applies "to all cases in which
the action prosecution is not to establish, recover or redress
private and civil rights, but to try and punish persons charged
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with the commission of public offenses" and "a criminal case is
a action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction the
criminal laws, and, with this object in view, it matters not in
what form a statute may clothe it; it is still criminal case ...".
11 — Beltran v. Samson
Quick Note: Handwriting Case/ ​Magsulat ka, utos ni judge
Facts: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein
petitioner, a municipal treasurer, complains that respondent
judge ordered him to appear to provincial fiscal for the
dictation of his own personal writing. The purpose is for
comparing his handwriting and determining whether or not it is
he who wrote certain supposed falsified documents. No
question of facts alleged in this case. But respondent judge
contends that petitioner is not entitled to remedy he applied,
or seeks protection thereto which is constitutional privilege,
because fiscal under S​ec. 1687 of Admin Code and competent
judge may compel the witness to be presented at the
investigation of any crime or misdemeanor.But this power
must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights
of persons cited to appear
Petitioner refuged which is constitutional provision is contained
in the Jones Law and incorporated in General orders No.58
found in par.3, sec.3 of the Jones law states: “​ Ni se le
obligara a declarer en contra suya en ningun proceso
criminal.” ​translated as “Nor shall he be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” ​This is
also incorporated in our criminal procedure.
Issue: WON the constitutional provision invoked by the
petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute what is enjoined
upon him by the order which the proceeding was taken.
Held: Respondent judge and those under their ​orders desist
and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the
petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the
purpose of comparison.
The Jones Law “Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.” ​Accordingly, this
provision is not restricted to not compelling to testify, but
EXTENDS TO NOT COMPELLING HIM TO BE A WITNESS. This
privileged is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to
all giving of furnishing of evidence. Hence, there is the well
established doctrine that the ​constitutional inhibition is
directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but
embraced as well the furnishing of evidence by other
means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short,
of any fact which the accused has a right to hold
secret. This constitutional prohibition embraces the
compulsory preparation and creation by a witness of
self-incriminatory evidence by means of a testimonial act. And
whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and
meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.
(​TN: The court cited case but not applicable because those
cases ang person itself made a VOLUNTARY WITNESS which is
not the case ani nga kaso. Kay if you voluntary witness you
waived your personal privileges. Such voluntary witness
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includes testifying in his own behalf denies certain allegation in
writing in this case you can be cross examine. And if voluntary
asked by the judge then ni complied ka.)
In the case before us, writing is something more than moving
the body, or hand, or fingers; writing is not purely mechanical
act; it requires the application of intelligence and attention;
writing means for the petitioner here to furnish, through a
testimonial act, evidence against himself. It cannot be
contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a
specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the
crime would go unpunished. The petitioner is a municipal
treasurer, and it should not be difficult for the fiscal to obtain a
genuine specimen of his handwriting by some other means.
But even supposing that it is impossible to secure such
specimen without resorting to the means herein complained of
by the petitioner, that is no reason for trampling upon a
personal right guaranteed by the constitution.
Distinction between the case of villaflor-summers
(assigned case #8)
The difference between this case and that of Villaflor vs.
Summers, the object was to have the petitioner's body
examined by physicians, ​without being compelled to
perform a positive act​, but only an omission, that is, not to
prevent the examination, which could be, and was, interpreted
by this court as being no compulsion of the petitioner to
furnish evidence by means of a testimonial act; all of which is
entirely different from the case at bar, where it is sought to
make the petitioner perform a ​positive testimonial act​,
silent, indeed, but effective, namely, to write and give a
sample of his handwriting for comparison.
12 — US v. Tan Teng
Principle: Substance taken from the defendant, which indicates
that he has gonorrhea, can be used as evidence against him
and is violative of the constitutional injunction against
self-incrimination.
FACTS:
Tan Teng was charged with the crime of rape. The complaint
alleged that the defendant did willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, and employing force, lie and have carnal intercourse
with a certain Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age.
Chinaman Tan Teng had been of visiting the house of the
sister of the offended party. On September 15, 1910, Olivia,
after she took a bath, Tan Teng followed her into her room
and asked her for some face powder, which she gave him; that
after using some of the face powder upon his private parts he
threw her upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers,
and remained in that position for some little time.
Severl days later, the sister of Oliva discovered that the latter
was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It
was at the time of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister
what happened upon the morning of the 15th of September.
The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the
Chinaman and a number of Chinamen were collected together.
Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her.
The defendant was not present at first. later he arrived and
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Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to
violate her.
Upon this information Tan Teng was arrested and taken to the
police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The
policeman who examined the defendant swore from the
venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a
portion of the substance emitting from the body of the
defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the
purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The
result of the examination showed that the defendant was
suffering from gonorrhea.
During the trial the defendant objected strongly to the
admissibility of the testimony of Oliva, on the ground that
because of her tender years her testimony should not be given
credit. The lower court, after carefully examining her with
reference to her ability to understand the nature of an oath,
held that she had sufficient intelligence and discernment to
justify the court in accepting her testimony with full faith and
credit.
As to the scientific examination made by the Bureau, the
defendant contended that the result of the scientific
examination made by the Bureau of Science of the substance
taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested,
was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was
suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to
compel the defendant to testify against himself.
 
ISSUE:
W/N the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that
he has gonorrhea, cannot be used as evidence against Tan
Teng on the ground that it is violative of the constitutional
injunction against self-incrimination.
HELD:
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that
a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract
from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of
his guilt.
The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to
prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial.
or upon trial, for the purpose of extortin unwilling confessions
or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime.
(People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)
The accused was not compelled to make any admission or
answer any questions, and the mere fact that an object found
upon his body was examined seems no more to infringe the
rule invoked than would the introduction of stolen property
taken from the person of a thief.
13 — People v. Salanguit
FACTS
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Accused-appellant Salanguit (Salanguit) was charged for
violations of R.A. No. 6425 “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972”.
The criminal cases filed were, first (Section 16), is for willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly possessing and/or using 11.14 grams
of s​ habu, second (Section 8), is for willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly having in his possession and custody and control
1.254 grams of marijuana. These two are contrary to law.
As to the ​prosecution,​ the facts presented are the following:
Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant with the RTC to search
the residence of Salanguit. The former presented his witness,
SPO1 Badua, who testified that he was able to buy 2.12 grams
of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place at Salanguit’s
room, hence, Badua saw that the shabu was taken by
Salanguit from his cabinet inside his room.
Moreover, around 10:30 pm, December 26, 1995, a group of
10 policemen enforced the warrant. They knocked on
Salanguit’s door, but nobody opened. They however heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. They then
forced the door open and entered the house. After showing
the search warrant, they started searching the house and
found the following:
1) 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing white crystalline substance;
2) A paper clip box containing a white crystalline
substance; and,
3) 2 bricks of dried leaves weighed 1.225 grams.
On the other hand, the ​defense also has their version of the
facts:
Salanguit, himself, testified that on the night of December 26,
1995, as they are about to leave their house, they heard a
commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. About
20 armed men in civilian attire climbed over their gate and
descended through an opening in the roof. When Salanguit
demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper
inside a folder was waived in front of him and that he was not
able to read it. This testimony was corroborated by Salanguit’s
mother-in-law.
The RTC rendered the decision that Salanguit is guilty for
both violations of Sections 16 & 8 of R.A. No. 6425.
ISSUES
1) Whether or not, the Court a Quo erred in
declaring the search warrant valid?
2) Whether or not the Court a Quo erred in
admitting in evidence two (2) bricks of marijuana
pursuant to “plain-view” doctrine?
RULING
First Issue. No. Salanguit assailed the validity of the search
warrant on three grounds: ​1) no probable cause to search
drug paraphernalia; 2) issued for more than one specific
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offense; and 3) place to be searched was not described with
sufficient particularity.
The Court said that the warrant authorized the seizure of ​“an
undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia” as
stated in the search warrant. Evidence was presented showing
probable cause of the existence of shabu.
SPO1 Badua, who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in
the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on
anything about drug paraphernalia. Nevertheless, the fact that
there was no probable cause to support the application for the
seizure of drug paraphernalia, it does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be
material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the
police. The search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized
the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of shabu as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence.
In the case at bar, with respect to the seizure of shabu from
Salanguit's residence, the search warrant was properly issued
because it was founded on the probable cause personally
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the
deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
Second Issue​. Yes. The search warrant authorized the
seizure of shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the
latter drug could be justified on the ground that the drug was
seized within the "plain view" of the searching party.
Under the ​"plain view doctrine," ​unlawful objects within the
"plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented in evidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must
be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the
evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence
before the police.
In the case at bar, the police failed to allege the time when the
marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or
whether it was recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area
within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had
been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1
Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Hence, the SC ruled that
Salanguit is guilty only for violation of Section 16 of R.A. No.
6425.
14 — People v. Damaso
[G.R. No. 93516. August 12, 1992.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BASILIO DAMASO @ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA
DADO, accused- appellant.
KEYWORDS: Subversion , Hearsay evidence
FACTS:
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The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged
in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of subversion, together 6 other persons. Such information was
later amended to exclude all other persons except the
accused-appellant Basilio Damaso from the criminal charge.
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine
Constabulary officer and some companions were sent to verify
the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang,
Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group
apprehended 4 persons. When interrogated, the persons
apprehended revealed that there was an underground
safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. They
found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45
firearm and other items.
After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City,
and put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie
Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier
arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of
Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie
Mendoza aka Basilio Damaso, herein appellant. She guided the
group to the house rented by appellant. When they reached
the house, the group found that it had already been vacated
by the occupants. The Barangay Captain of the place was
requested to point out the new house rented by appellant. The
group again required Morados to go with them. When they
reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside.
They told her that they already knew that she was a member
of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she
saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house.
Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay
Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled 'Ang Bayan', xerox
copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who
were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa,
Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and
Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the persons in the
house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco
opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive
orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood
radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales,
Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other items. They confiscated the
articles and brought them to their headquarters for final
inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the
house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons
revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house and owned
the items confiscated therefrom.
Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal possession of
firearms. The prosecution presented as witnesses Lt. Quijardo
and M/Sgt Gomez to attest to this fact. The trial court found
him guilty.
Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence is admissible or not on grounds of its
being hearsay, immaterial, or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a
search warrant
HELD:
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NO, the evidence is inadmissible.
1. There is no substantial and credible evidence to
establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same
person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and
other subversive items were found or the owner of the said
items. The testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses
testified on matters not on their own personal knowledge.
While It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay
testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But, one
should not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies
are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given
credence.
2. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the
appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against him still
will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed
to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure
proceedings. Although, there are instances when a warrantless
search and seizure becomes valid [(1) search incidental to an
arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle, and (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view] but none of the exceptions is present in
this case.
3. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived
by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one
who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. In the
case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his
house at that time. There is no evidence that would establish
the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper, or
if it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had
given her authority to open his house in his absence. As a
consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was
illegal. It would have been different if the situation here
demanded urgency which could have
Wherefore, the court is left with no option, but to acquit the
accused on reasonable doubt. The decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and the appellant is acquitted.
15 — Padilla v. CA
Trigger word: R
​ obin Padilla “Action Star”
TOPIC: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS, SEARCH, and SEIZURE
1. One evening, while stopping over in a nearby
restaurant because of heavy rain, ​Enrique
Manarang and Danny Cruz saw a Mitsubishi Pajero
cruising through the highway recklessly. Then
suddenly, Manarang and Cruz heard a sound due to
the sudden and hard braking of the vehicle followed
by another sound of it hitting something.
2. Manarang and Cruz went to the location of the
accident and found out that the vehicle had hit
somebody. Manarang being a member of both
Spectrum (a civic group) and the Barangay Disaster
Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to
the PNP of Angeles City. He took out his radio and
called the ​Viper​, the radio controller of the Angeles
City PNP.
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3. After Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had
started to leave the place of the accident taking the
general direction to the north.
4. Manarang instructed Cruz to stay with the victim and
proceeded to chase the vehicle with his motorcycle,
and was able to verify the plate number of the vehicle
as PMA 777. He called the Viper again to report the
plate number. The Viper upon receipt of the second
radio call delivered the message to all units of PNP
Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle.
5. One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by
the alarm were ​SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda​,
who immediately boarded a mobile patrol vehicle and
positioned themselves near the south approach of
Abacan Bridge since it was the only passable way
going to the north. Other units also responded to the
alarm and attempted to find and intercept the vehicle.
6. Meanwhile, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle
until they reached the Abacan Bridge wherein SPO2
Borja and SPO2 Miranda were waiting. Upon seeing
the subject vehicle, the two police officers boarded
their mobile patrol vehicle and cut into the path of the
vehicle forcing it to stop. They then alighted from
their car and went to the vehicle and instructed its
driver to alight. The driver rolled down the window
and put his head out while raising both his hands.
They recognized the driver as ​Robin C. Padilla
(“Robin”).
7. Robin, the action star that he was, was wearing a
short leather jacket such that when he alighted with
both his hands raised, a gun tucked on the left side of
his waist was revealed, it’s butt protruding. SPO2
Borja made the move to confiscate the gun and
disarmed him. SPO2 Borja then told him about the hit
and run incident which Robin profusely denied. By
that time, a crowd had formed at the place. SPO2
Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and find six (6)
live bullets inside.
8. While SPO2 Borja and Robin were arguing, Mobile No.
7 with SPO Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2
Odejar on board arrived. As the most senior police
officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the
matter and informed him that he was being arrested
for the hit and run incident. ​He pointed out to
Robin the fact that the plate number of his
vehicle was dangling and the railing and the
hood were dented​. Robin, however, arrogantly
denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the
crowd by holding their hands with one hand and
pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying
“Iyan, kinuha ang baril ko.”
9. Because Robin's jacket was short, his gesture
exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in
Robin's back right pocket. SPO2 Mercado saw this and
so when Robin turned around as he was talking and
proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the
magazine from him.
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10. Suspecting that Robin could also be carrying a rifle
inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO
Mercado prevented Robin from going back to his
vehicle and proceeded to open by himself the door of
Robin's vehicle. He saw a ​baby armalite rifle lying
horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. He asked
Robin for the papers covering the rifle and Robin
answered angrily that they were at his home. SPO
Mercado modified the arrest of Robin by including as
its ground illegal possession of firearms and read to
him his constitutional rights.
11. The police officers brought Robin to the Traffic
Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard where Robin
voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a ​pietro
berreta pistol​. Robin also voluntarily surrendered a
black bag containing two additional long magazines
and one short magazine.
12. After Robin had been interrogated by the Chief of the
Traffic Division, he was transferred to the Police
Investigation Division. During the investigation, Robin
admitted possession of the firearms stating that he
used them for shooting. He was also not able to
produce any ​permit to carry or memorandum
receipt​ to cover the three firearms.
MAIN ISSUE:
WON the arrest was illegal and consequently, the
firearms and ammunition taken in the course thereof
are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary
rule.
RULING:
The arrest was ​legal​, hence, the firearms and ammunition are
admissible​ in evidence.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.”
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
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The case at bar falls under paragraph (a) I​ n flagrante
delicto​ which requires that the person be arrested:
i. after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting
to commit an offense,
ii. in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person.
Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that
petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run - an offense
committed i​ n the "presence" of Manarang​, a private
person, who then sought to arrest petitioner.
It must be stressed at this point that "presence" is not
limited to when an arresting person sees the offense,
but also when he "hears the disturbance created
thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." As testified
to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a
thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the
incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the vehicle
using his motorcycle. After having sent a radio report to the
PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge
where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2
Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the
actual arrest of petitioner.
Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of
an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, petitioner's warrantless
arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another
offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and
this time in the presence of a peace officer.
HOT PURSUIT
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could
likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just
committed an offense. T ​ here was no supervening event or
a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run
and the actual apprehension​. Moreover, after having
stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to
Manarang's report, t​ he policemen saw for themselves the
fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate
number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the
dented hood and railings thereof. T ​ hese formed part of
the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle
involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting
police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not
on unreliable hearsay information.
Also, there exists the exigent circumstances of hot pursuit - a
fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and raining
at nighttime - which all created a situation in which speed is
essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges
police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more
than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the
occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any
objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be
made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner's belated
challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the
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information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his
evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his
arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived
such irregularities and defects.
However, the failure to object to the illegality of the arrest
does not necessarily mean a bar to a subsequent objection to
the inadmissibility of evidence obtained from it. The two are
separate issues, thus, the Court discussed them separately.
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search
and seizure of property is valid, are as follows:
i. ​Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence
ii. Seizure of evidence in plain view or the
“Plain View Doctrine​”, the elements of
which are:
a. a p​ rior valid intrusion b​ ased on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties;
b. the evidence was i​ nadvertently
discovered ​by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
c. the evidence must be ​immediately
apparent, ​and;
d. “plain view” justified ​mere seizure of
evidence without further search​.
iii. ​Search of a moving vehicle
iv. C
​ onsented warrantless search​; and
v. ​Customs search
Plain view doctrine
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed
appears that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's
firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active
search which, as it is commonly understood, is prying into
hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the
Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for
they came within "plain view" of the policemen who
inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in
petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised
his hands after alighting from his Pajero.
The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16
armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the
policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw
said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. Objects
whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in
plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant.
Consented warrantless search
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With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing
assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to
the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver
of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his
failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing
any purported defect.
Search incidental to a lawful/valid arrest
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were
products of an active search done by the authorities on the
person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search
warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search
incidental to a lawful (warrantless) arrest. Once the lawful
arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective
search of the passenger compartment and containers in the
vehicle which are within petitioner's grabbing distance
regardless of the nature of the offense.
This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the
item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody
or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest.
Moving vehicle
Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle. Being
highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity.
In connection therewith, a warrantless search is
constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a
law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and
run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some
criminal offense.
16 — People v. Amminudin
Keywords: In flagrante delicto, warrantless searches and
seizures, fruit of the poisonous tree
Facts:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984,
shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about
8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in
fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag
and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to
their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to
the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified
as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. He was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. The accused appellant was eventually
convicted.
Prosecution’s claim:
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The PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of
their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a
vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He
was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him
in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed
to him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was
carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner,
who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding,
the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
Amminudin’s defense:
He averred that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He
alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately
handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant.
At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to
admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting
him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he
did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his
business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. He
also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been
carrying was not properly identified and could have been any
of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
headquarters.
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own
examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to
Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the
time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending
P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses.
Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret
pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered
when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor
were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. He also
said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away
the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his
cousin, to a friend whose full name he said did not even know.
The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment,
observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries
sustained by him.
Issue:
Was Amminudin’s warrantless arrest and search
illegal thus, making the marijuana found on him inadmissible
as evidence?
Ruling:
Yes. Amminudin was not caught in flagrante delicto
which in effect, makes the marijuana inadmissible as evidence
as it is the fruit of the poisonous tree.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC
offcers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no
warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he
was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had
earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who
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reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat
with marijuana.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or
search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination
by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not
caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or
had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest
allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the
warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, for example. Here it
was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless
searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because
these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From
the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was
coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known.
The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain.
And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the
head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
authority that "search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the
warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it
has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as
result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the
narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at
the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling
the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at
the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown
that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What
he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon
9 and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was
only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable
cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that
authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately
arrest him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly
seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall.
That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have
been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that
the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the
poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The
search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there
was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not
come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
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Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the
evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
17 — People v. Quebral
Keywords: s​ habu, informer’s report, search preceding arrest
Principles:
- Evidence obtained through valid search preceding
arrest is admissible against accused.
- The lone declaration of an eyewitness is sufficient to
convict if the court finds the same credible.
- Forensic report enjoys presumption of regularity in its
preparation and is not invalidated if the forensic
chemist did not testify in court.
- Trivial inconsistencies in testimony enhance its
truthfulness.
- Failure to comply strictly with requirements on
handling evidence wll not render the seizure of the
prohibited drugs invalid for so long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the confiscated items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
FACTS: ​On September 7, 2002, at 7pm, the Chief of the Drug
Enforcement Unit called PO3 Cecilio Galvez and other officers
to a briefing regarding a police informer’s report that two men
and a woman on board an owner type jeep with a specific
plate number would deliver s​ habu the following day at a
Petron gas station in Balagtas, Bulacan to Michael Salvador, a
drug pusher in the police watch list.
Since no exact time for the delivery was given, PO3 Galvez and
six other police officers staked out from around 7:45am until
late afternoon the North Luzon Expressway Balagtas Exit at
Burol 2nd. At around 4pm, such jeep bearing the reported
plate number and with two men and a woman came out of
Balagtas Exit. They were later identified as accused Eusebio
Quebral (driver), Fernando Lopez and Zenaida Quebral. The
police trailed the jeep as it made its way to the Petrol gas
station. A Tamaraw FX arrived from which accused Michael
Salvador alighted. Zenaida Quebral handed to him a white
envelope. PO3 Galvez, watching from about 15 meters in a
tinted car, signaled his backup team to move. Police officers
surrounded the jeep. Galvez took the envelope from Salvador,
opened it and saw five plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance which he believed to be shabu and was
later confirmed by the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory to
be such.
Appellants denied having committed the crime and claimed
they were framed by PO3 Galvez and his fellow officers.
RTC found all four guilty of the crime charged (violation of Sec.
5, Art. II of RA 9165).
CA affirmed the RTC decision but dismissed the case against
Eusebio Quebral since he died during the pendency of the
appeal.
ISSUE: W/n CA erred in not excluding the evidence of the
seized s​ habu on the ground that, having illegally arrested the
accused, the police officers’ subsequent search of their persons
incident to their arrest was also illegal.
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HELD: ​No.
Evidence obtained through valid warrantless search is
admissible against the accused
The SC held that this was not a case of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest but more of a search preceding an arrest. The
police officers had information that two men and a woman on
board an owner type jeep would arrive in Balagtas and hand
over a consignment of s​ habu at a gas station in town to a
known drug dealer whose name was on the police watch list.
When these things unfolded before their eyes as they watched
from a distance, the police came down on those persons and
search them, resulting in the discovery and seizure of a
quantity of ​shabu in their possession. In such a case, the
search is a valid search justifying the arrest that came with it.
In other words, that the circumstances played out in the
presence of the police officers supplied probable cause for the
search. Consequently, the evidence obtained from a valid
search is admissible against the accused.
In People v. Bagista, NARCOM officers had probable cause to
stop and search vehicles on a certain route based on
confidential information from a regular informant that a
woman fitting the description was carrying marijuana. They
likewise had probably cause to search her belongings. The
warrantless search was valid and the evidence obtained
admissible.
It would have been impractical for the police officeres to apply
with the appropriate court for a search warrant accused would
have already gone away during such time. The drugs could be
easily transported and with impunity. People v. Aminnudin
finds no application because in that case the police had ample
time to apply for a search warrant against a named person.
Credibility of a person is not affected by number of
witnesses
Accused-appellants are incorrect in contending that the
testimony of PO3 Galvez cannot support their conviction since
it does not bear the corroboration of the other officers
involved. The SC held that the failure of the other officers did
not weaken prosecution evidence. The lone declaration of an
eyewitness is sufficient to convict if the court finds the same
credible.
Forensic report conclusive absent evidence to the
contrary
Accused-appellants are incorrect in contending that
prosecution was unable to establish ​corpus delicti because the
chemist who examined the seized substance did not testify in
court. The SC held that non-presentation of the forensic
chemist in illegal drug cases is insufficient cause for acquittal.
The c​ orpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the
dangerous drug itself. This means that proof beyond doubt of
the identity of the prohibited drug is essential. Report of an
official forensic chemist regarding a recovered prohibited drug
enjoys presumption of regularity in its preparation.
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Moreover, accused-appellants raised their objections only on
appeal when such should have been made when the
prosecution offered the report in evidence. They are
considered to have waived such objection.
Trivial inconsistencies enhance truthfulness of
testimony
The fact that PO3 Galvez testified that the operation was
conducted on September 2, 2002, the date given by the
informant, and the following day was September 8, 2002 does
not invalidate his testimony. Besides, PO3 Galvez later
corrected himself in cross-examination.
Failure to strictly comply with requirements on
handling evidence does not render the seizure invalid
Failure to comply strictly with requirements on handling
evidence will not render the seizure of the prohibited drugs
invalid for so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers. Moreover, accused-appellants did not raise it before
the trial court, hence, they cannot raise it for the first time on
appeal.
18 — Rosete v. Lim
Keywords​: 1st case filed- civil case for annulment of
contracts; 2nd case filed- crim cases of estafa and BP22
Principle​: The right against self-incrimination can be invoke in
any kind of proceedings. But for civil actions, this right can be
invoked only if and when incriminating questions are asked as
the suit becomes criminal in nature.
FACTS:
Respondents Lim filed a Complaint for Annulment, Specfic
Performance with Damages against AFP Retirement and
Separation Benets System (AFP-RSBS), Espreme Realty and
Development Corporation (Espreme Realty), Alfredo P. Rosete,
Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito P. Rosete, Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI), and Register of Deeds of the Province of
Mindoro Occidental.
It asked, among other things, that the Deed of Sale executed
by AFP-RSBS covering certain parcels of lands in favor of
Espreme Realty and the titles thereof under the name of the
latter be annulled and to restore ownership and title of said
lands to respondents.
Petitioners contend that since there are two criminal cases
pending before the City Prosecutors of Mandaluyong City and
Pasig City involving the same set of facts, to permit the taking
of the deposition would be violative of their right against
self-incrimination because by means of the oral deposition,
respondents would seek to establish the allegations of fact in
the complaint which are also the allegations of fact in the
complaint-affidavits in the said criminal cases.
In short, petitioners Mapalo and Chito Rosete refuse to have
their depositions taken in the civil case because they allegedly
would be incriminating themselves in the criminal cases
because the testimony that would be elicited from them may
be used in the criminal cases.
ISSUE: WON, to allow their depositions to be taken would
violate their consti right against self-incrimination.
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RULING:
NO.
A person's right against self-incrimination is enshrined in
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself."
The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person
in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding. However,
the right can be claimed only when the speFcic question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness.
An ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be
compelled to testify by
subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a
particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him.
But, the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify
altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn,
and answer any question.
It is clear, therefore, that only an accused in a criminal case
can refuse to take the witness stand. The right to refuse to
take the stand does not generally apply to parties in
administrative cases or proceedings. The parties thereto can
only refuse to answer if incriminating questions are
propounded.
19 — People v. Bokingo
FACTS: ​Noli and Elsa Pasion were owners of a pawnshop and
a two-row apartment in Angeles City, Pampanga.
In the midnight of February 29, 2000, Dante Vitaliano saw
Michael Bokingco hitting something on the floor. He headed on
his apartment unit and there he discovered that it was Noli
Pasion, his brother-in-law, that was hit by Bokingco. Upon
seeing him, Bokingco ran towards him and attacked him with a
hammer. Vitaliano managed to push him away and proceeded
to Pasion’s house to inform Elsa, Noli’s wife, that his husband
was already dead.
Meanwhile, Elsa also heard the commotion while she was in
the master’s bedroom. She immediately went down to check
what was happening but before reaching the kitchen, she was
blocked by co-accused Reynante Col. She asked Col why he
was in their house but he refused to answer, instead, he
sprayed tear gas on Elsa’s eyes. Col instructed her to open the
vault of their pawnshop but she told him that she doesn’t know
the combination lock. He then proceeded to drag her in the
back door. Before they reached the door, Bokingco opened the
screen door and shouted “tara na, patay na s’ya!” Col
immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco.
Later, Vitaliano and Elsa discovered Noli lying on the floor,
bathing with his own blood. Necropsy reported that Noli
suffered 29 injuries, and that the injuries sustained by Noli on
his skull was the cause of his death.
Bokingco was arrested in Mindanao on 11 June 2000. He was
brought to the prosecutor’s office where he was subjected to
preliminary investigation wherein he admitted that he
conspired with Col to kill Pasion. However, during the trial, he
changed his story. He testified that on the night of the
incident, he was sleeping and was awakened by Pasion who
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appeared to be intoxicated. Pasion wanted to know why he did
not show up for work on the 28​th and then suddenly hit
Bokingco in the head. This prompted Bokingco to take a
hammer and hit Pasion.
Prosecution filed a case against Bokingco and Col. RTC found
them guilty of murder and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of death. CA affirmed the decision but reduced the
sentence to life imprisonment without parole.
Appellant sought reversal to the decision contending that Col is
not guilty of conspiring with Bokingco.
ISSUE: ​In seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals'
Amended Decision, two issues were raised: 1) whether the
qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to convict
appellant Bokingco of murder and 2) whether appellant Col is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.
RULING: ​There is no question that Bokingco attacked and
killed Pasion. Bokingco made two (2) separate and dissimilar
admissions: first, in his extrajudicial confession taken during
the preliminary investigation where he admitted that he and
Col planned the killing of Pasion; and second, when he testified
in open court that he was only provoked in hitting Pasion back
when the latter hit him in the head.
It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco
mentioned his and Col's plan to kill Pasion. Bokingco's
confession was admittedly taken without the assistance of
counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 12. (1)Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him
In People v. Sunga, we held that "the right to counsel applies
in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed 'critical
stages' in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation
can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the
police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary
investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's
processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing
those who might be liable for criminal prosecution."
In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel
during the time his confession was taken before a judge.
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As to the Second Issue, ​in as much as Bokingco's
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is
likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he
implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible
against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay
against them.
However, an exception to the Res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator. But, as we have previously
discussed, we did not find any sucient evidence to establish
the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial
confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in
evidence against Col.
Bokingco's judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco
admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in
the head.
All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sucient
evidence was adduced to implicate him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. Appellant Reynante Col
is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Appellant
Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide.
20 — De la Cruz v. People ​Taken from previous
digest
FACTS:
Petitioner Jaime D. Dela Cruz was charged in an Information
for violation of Section 15, Article II of RA 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) for the positive
use of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
Evidence for the prosecution reveals that agents of the NBI
received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido
claiming that Ariel Escobido (live-in partner of Corazon and son
of Charito) was picked up by several unknown persons
believed to be police officers for Ariel’s alleged sell of illegal
drugs.
Corazon and Charito were instructed to go to Gorordo Police
Office where they met “James” who demanded ₱100,000.00,
later lowered to ₱40,000.00, for the release of Ariel. After said
meeting, complainants proceeded to the NBI to file a complaint
and narrate the circumstances. Thereafter, a team was formed
for the entrapment operation. NBI was able to nab petitioner
by using pre-marked ₱500.00 bill dusted with fluorescent
powder, which was part of the amount demanded by “James.”
Petitioner was then brought at the NBI’s forensic laboratory.
There, he was required to submit his urine for drug testing,
which yielded positive result.
For his defense, petitioner denied the charges and was
allegedly arrested for extortion. When he was brought to the
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NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug
examination, but he refused the same.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The records however do not reveal whether he was likewise
charged for extortion.
The Regional Trial Court found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of RA 9165.
Petitioner appealed assailing that the RTC’svalidation of the
result of the urine test despite its dubiousness having been
admitted in spite of lack of legal basis for its admission.
The Court of Appeals found the appeal devoid of merit and
affirmed the RTC. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the drug test conducted upon petitioner is legal.
HELD:
NO, the drug test conducted is not grounded upon any existing
law or jurisprudence.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons
apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for
unlawful acts listed under Article II of RA 9165 (Note: He
supposedly committed extortion). A person arrested cannot
literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any
crime, but instead, Section 15 comprehends persons arrested
or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of RA
9165. Otherwise, to make the Section 15 applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for all other crimes is
tantamount to mandatory drug testing for any crime. To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug
testing in this case would violate a person's right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse
still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial
compulsion.
Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed
reveal that the evidence were material to the principal cause of
the arrest. Here, a urine sample is not material to the charge
of extortion. Thus, the RTC and CA erred when they held that
extraction of urine sample for purposes of drug testing was
merely a mechanical act falling outside the concept of custodial
investigation. Note that petitioner was arrested for extortion;
he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine
sample was the only available evidence used as basis for his
conviction for use of illegal drugs.
The drug test was in violation of petitioner’s right to privacy
and right against self-incrimination. Petitioner was compelled
to submit his urine for drug testing despite his resistance. The
constitutional guarantee to the right to privacy and against
self-incrimination were violated. The drug testing of all
arrested persons regardless of the crime of offense for which
the arrest is being made cannot be condoned.
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In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court acquitted Jaime
D. Dela Cruz
21 — De Castro v. People
Keywords: ​Unauthorized ( bank) withdrawal
Principle: The rights against self-incrimination and to counsel
guaranteed under the Constitution applies only during the
custodial interrogation of a suspect and not in an
administrative investigation.
Facts:
The petitioner in this case is a bank teller of the BPI Family
Savings Bank (Malibay, Pasay Branch) who appeals the
affirmance of her conviction for 4 counts of ESTAFA through
FALSIFICATION of a commercial document by forging in the
withdrawal slips the signatures of bank depositors, Matuguina
and Cornejo. She was able to withdraw a total of 65k and 2k
from the respective savings accounts of Matuguina and
Cornejo.
Matuguina and Cornejo left their savings account passbooks
with the accused within the space of a week in October –
November 1993 when they went to the bank’s branch to
transact on their accounts. Matuguina, in particular, withdrew
the sum of P500 on October 29 and left her passbook with the
accused upon the latter’s instruction. She had to return two
more times before the branch manager Cynthia Zialcita sensed
that something wrong was going on. Learning of Matuguina’s
problem, Zialcita told the accused to return the passbook to
her on November 8. On this day, the accused came up with
the convenient excuse that she had already returned the
passbook. Skeptical, Zialcita reviewed Matuguina’s account and
found three withdrawal slips dated October 19, 29 and
November 4, 1993 containing signatures radically different
from the specimen signatures of the depositor and covering a
total of P65,000. It was apparent that the accused had
intervened in the posting and verification of the slips because
her initials were affixed thereto. Zialcita instructed her
assistant manager Benjamin Misa to pay a visit to Matuguina, a
move that led to the immediate exposure of the accused.
Matuguina was aghast to see the signatures in the slips and
denied that the accused returned the passbook to her. When
she went back to the bank worried about the unauthorized
withdrawals from her account, she met with the accused in the
presence of the bank manager. She insisted that the
signatures in the slips were not her, forcing the accused to
admit that the passbook was still with her and kept in her
house.
Zialcita also summoned Juanita Ebora, the teller who posted
and released the November 4 withdrawal. When she was
asked why she processed the transaction, Ebora readily
pointed to the accused as the person who gave to her the slip.
Since she saw the accused’s initials on it attesting to having
verified the signature of the depositor, she presumed that the
withdrawal was genuine. She posted and released the money
to the accused.
On the same day, November 8, Zialcita instructed Misa to visit
another depositor, Milagrosa Cornejo, whom they feared was
also victimized by the accused. Their worst expectations were
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confirmed. According to Cornejo, on November 3, she went to
the bank to deposit a check and because there were many
people there at the time, she left her passbook with the
accused. She returned days later to get it back, but the
accused told her that she left it at home. Misa now showed to
her a withdrawal slip dated November 4, 1993 in which a
signature purporting to be hers appeared. Cornejo denied that
it was her signature. As with the slips affecting Matuguina, the
initials of the accused were unquestionably affixed to the
paper.
Zialcita reported her findings posthaste to her superiors. The
accused initially denied the claims against her but when she
was asked to write her statement down, she confessed to her
guilt. She started crying and locked herself inside the
bathroom. She came out only when another superior Fed
Cortez arrived to ask her some questions. Since then, she
executed three more statements in response to the
investigation conducted by the bank’s internal auditors. She
also gave a list of the depositors’ accounts from which she
drew cash and which were listed methodically in her diary.
The employment of the accused was ultimately terminated.
The bank paid Matuguina P65,000, while Cornejo got her
refund directly from the accused. In the course of her
testimony on the witness stand, the accused made these
further admissions:
(a) She signed the withdrawal slips Exhibits B, C, D and
H which contained the fake signatures of Matuguina
and Cornejo
(b) She wrote and signed the confession letter Exhibit K
(c) She wrote the answers to the questions of the branch
cluster head Fred Cortez Exhibit L, and to the
auditors’ questions in Exhibit M, N and O
(d) Despite demand, she did not pay the bank.
Issues:
WON her conviction was invalid because her constitutional
rights against self-incrimination, to due process and to counsel
were denied.
Ruling:
The petitioner has accepted the findings of fact about
the transactions that gave rise to the accusations in
court against her for four counts of ​estafa t​ hrough
falsification of a commercial document. She raised no
challenges against such findings of fact here and in the CA,
being content with limiting herself to the supposed denial of
her rights to due process and to counsel, and to the
inadmissibility of the evidence presented against her. In the
CA, her main objection focused on the denial of her right
against self-incrimination and to counsel, which denial
resulted, according to her, in the invalidation of the evidence
of her guilt.
Debunking the petitioner’s challenges, the CA stressed that
the rights against self-incrimination and to counsel
guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during
the custodial interrogation of a suspect. ​In her case, she
was not subjected to any investigation by the police or other
law enforcement agents. Instead, s ​ he underwent an
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administrative investigation as an employee of the BPI
Family Savings Bank, the investigation being
conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced to
give evidence against herself, or to admit to any crime,
but she simply broke down bank when depositors
Matuguina and Cornejo confronted her about her
crimes​.
The accused in the case before us may not be said to be under
custodial investigation. She was not even being investigated by
any police or law enforcement officer. She was under
administrative investigation by her superiors in a private firm
and in purely voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her
freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go. There was
no evidence that she was forced or pressured to say anything.
It was an act of conscience that compelled her to
speak, a true mental and moral catharsis that religion
and psychology recognize to have salutary effects on
the soul. In this setting, the invocation of the right to
remain silent or to counsel is simply irrelevant​.
The accused makes a final argument against her conviction by
contending that ​she did not get effective legal
representation from her former counsel​who was already
old and feeble when the case was being heard. In fact, the
records show, her counsel died during the pendency of the
case, an octogenarian at that. One can truly make a case from
one’s lack of a competent and independent counsel, but we
are not prepared to say that the accused was so poorly
represented that it affected her fundamental right to due
process. Except for the several postponements incurred by her
counsel, there is really no showing that he committed any
serious blunder during the trial. We have read the transcripts
of the trial and failed to get this impression. The evidence
against the accused was simply too overwhelming. We may
take note that once, the trial court admonished the accused to
replace her counsel due to his absences, but she did not. She
must live by that.
The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of
estafa​through falsification of a commercial document
was established beyond reasonable doubt​. As a bank
teller, she took advantage of the bank depositors who had
trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks with her upon
her instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she filled
out withdrawal slips that she signed, and misrepresented to
her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been
verified in due course. Her misrepresentation to her
co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the
withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two crimes, namely:
estafa​, by defrauding BPI Family Savings​, her employer,
in the various sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of
Matuguina and Cornejo; and ​falsification of a commercial
document​, by forging the signatures of Matuguina and
Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the
depositor concerned had signed the respective slips in order to
enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were
considered as a ​complex crime​, because the e ​ stafa ​would
not have been consummated without the falsification of the
withdrawal slips.
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22 — Homar v. People
Keyword:​ No Jaywalking
Doctrines:
1) The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the
warrantless arrest from which the corpus delicti of the crime
-shabu- was obtained. For, without a valid warrantless arrest,
the
alleged confiscation of the shabu resulting from a warrantless
search on the petitioner’s body is surely a violation of his
constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. As a
consequence, the alleged shabu shall be inadmissible as
evidence against him.
2) The filing of a criminal charge is not a condition precedent
to prove a valid warrantless arrest.
3) A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with
it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest.
FACTS:
Petitioner was accosted; not arrested, by a police officer and a
civilian agent when the latter saw petitioner crossing a “No
jaywalking” portion of Roxas Boulevard and was told to cross
at the designated area by pointing to him the right place for
crossing. After petitioner was accosted, petitioner picked up
something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy (civilian
agent) to frisk him resulting in the recovery of a knife.
Thereafter, Tancoy conducted a thorough
search on petitioner’s body and found a sachet containing
what is suspected to be shabu.
The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense. He
testified that on August 20, 2002, he was going home at
around 6:30 p.m. after selling imitation sunglasses and other
accessories at the BERMA Shopping Center.
After crossing the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped
and frisked him despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him,
accused him of being a holdupper, and forced him to go with
them. They also confiscated the kitchen knife, which he carried
to cut cords. He was likewise investigated for alleged
possession of shabu and detained for one day. He was
criminally charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Parañaque City, Branch 77 for the possession of the kitchen
knife but he was eventually acquitted.
ISSUE:
1) WON there is a lawful warrantless arrest
2) WON the waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest also means
a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest
RULING:
First Issue: No. The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful
warrantless arrest preceded the search conducted on the
petitioner’s body.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must
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concur:
1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and
2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view
of the arresting officer
The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of
the warrantless arrest from which the corpus delicti of
the crime -shabu- was obtained​. For, without a valid
warrantless arrest, the alleged confiscation of the shabu
resulting from a warrantless search on the petitioner’s body is
surely a violation of his constitutional right against unlawful
search and seizure. As a consequence, the alleged shabu shall
be inadmissible as evidence against him.
The prosecution did not proffer any other proof to establish
that the requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest
were complied with. ​Particularly, the prosecution failed to
prove that the petitioner was committing a crime.
The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where
the petitioner allegedly crossed. Thus, Tan merely stated that
the petitioner "crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard, in a
place not designated for crossing." Aside from this conclusion,
the respondent failed to prove that the portion of Roxas
Boulevard where the petitioner crossed was indeed a "no
jaywalking" area. The petitioner was also not charged of
jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence that could have
supported the conclusion that indeed the petitioner was
committing a crime of jaywalking and therefore, the
subsequent arrest and search on his person was valid.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to prove this in the
present case.
We clarify, however, that ​the filing of a criminal charge is
not a condition precedent to prove a valid warrantless
arrest. Even if there is a criminal charge against an accused,
the prosecution is not relieved from its burden to prove that
there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest preceding the
warrantless search that produced the corpus delicti of the
crime.
Presumption of Regularity
Presumption of Regularity in the performance of official duty
cannot save the prosecution’s lack of evidence to prove the
warrantless arrest and search. This presumption cannot
overcome the presumption of innocence or constitute proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Among the constitutional rights
enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often
disregarded is the presumption of innocence.
Accost vs Arrest; Intent to Arrest
The police testified that they “accosted” Homar when he
jaywalked. However, this is different from an actual arrest as
contemplated by the Rules on warrantless arrests. Clearly, no
arrest preceded the search on the person of the petitioner.
When Tan and Tangcoy allegedly saw the petitioner
jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted him and
pointed to him the right place for crossing. In fact, according
to the RTC, Tan and Tangcoy "immediately accosted him and
told him to cross [at] the designated area.
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Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under
custody or to restrain his liberty. This lack of intent to arrest
him was bolstered by the fact that there was no criminal
charge that was filed against the petitioner for crossing a "no
jaywalking" area. The Court held in Luz vs People of the
Philippines that the shabu confiscated from the accused in that
case was inadmissible as evidence when the police officer who
flagged him for traffic violation had no intent to arrest him.
According to the Court, due to the lack of intent to arrest, the
subsequent search was unlawful. This is notwithstanding the
fact that the accused, being caught in
flagrante delicto for violating an ordinance, could have been
therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending
officers.
In the light of the discussion above, the respondent’s
argument that there was a lawful search incident to a lawful
warrantless arrest for jaywalking appears to be an afterthought
in order to justify a warrantless search conducted on the
person of the petitioner. In fact, ​the illegality of the search
for the shabu is further highlighted when it was not
recovered immediately after the alleged lawful arrest​, if
there was any, but only after the initial search resulted in the
recovery of the knife. Thereafter, according to Tan, Tangcoy
conducted another search on the person of the petitioner
resulting in the alleged confiscation of the shabu. ​Clearly, the
petitioner's right to be secure in his person was
callously brushed aside twice by the arresting police
officers.
Second Issue: No, the waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not
timely object to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment as required by the Rules. In addition, he actively
participated in the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
However, this w​aiver to question an illegal arrest only
affects the jurisdiction of the court over his person ​. It
is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless
arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.
Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its
inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction and justifies
the acquittal of the petitioner.
23 — PDIC v. Casimiro T
​ aken from previous digest
FACTS:
Petitioner PDIC, through its duly-authorized agents, filed a
Joint-Affidavit charging private respondents Cu (as the 85.99%
owner of Bicol Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI), Zate (as
Chairman/President of BDBI), and Apelo (as a former
employee of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) who acted as
Bank Officer-In-Charge that examined BDBI’s books and
records, of the crimes of Direct Bribery and Corruption of
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Public Officials, as well as violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
It averred that after the BSP Monetary Board ordered BDBI's
closure, PDIC started to perform its functions as statutory
receiver, which includes, among others, the control,
management, and administration of BDBI as well as
investigating the causes of BDBI's closure. In the course of the
receivership, Gomez — a former Cashier, Service Officer, and
Treasurer of BDBI — came forward and through her affidavit,
reported the purported scheme perpetrated by private
respondents that fraudulently concealed BDBI's true condition
as a banking entity.
Gomez's affidavit outlines such scheme as follows: (a) Apelo
would provide Cu an "advance warning" of any impending
surprise bank examinations on BDBI by BSP; (b) upon receipt
of the "advance warning," Cu would then make the necessary
steps to misrepresent BDBI's status, such as instructing BDBI
employees on how to cover the possible findings/exceptions of
the BSP examiner on the books of BDBI, as well as infusing
cash into BDBI's vault in order to make it appear that the cash
listed in the books reflect the actual cash in vault, and
thereafter returning such cash to the source; (c) in exchange
for such "advance warnings," Cu and/or Zate gave Apelo as
"professional fees" the aggregate amount of P140,000.00 by
depositing the same to the latter's bank account; and (d) to
cover up such amounts given to Apelo, Cu and/or Zate,
instructed Gomez to initially cover the unofficial and unbooked
cash disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts
in BDBI's books as "OtherCash I tems," and thereafter,
regularize and remove from BDBI 's books such disbursements
by including them in the other accounts of BDBI until they
were completely covered. To support such statements, Gomez
provided copies of deposit slips showing that such amount was
indeed deposited to Apelo's bank account. She likewise
asserted that in the course of her employment at BDBI, she
does not know of any official or legitimate transactions that
BDBI had with Apelo that would warrant the disbursement of
the aforesaid amount in the latter's favor.
Cu denied having ordered or instructed Gomez to make such
deposits to Apelo's bank account. He pointed to the lack of
evidence to prove that Apelo was aware or made aware of any
alleged bank deposits made to her bank account, thus,
negating the charge of Direct Bribery against her and
Corruption of Public Officials against him. For her part, Zate
likewise denied the allegations hurled against her, countering
that Gomez's statements should not be relied upon for being
unfounded. Apelo did not file any counter-affidavit despite the
Ombudsman's orders.
The Ombudsman’s Ruling
The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of
probable cause, finding that while it may be said that certain
amounts were indeed deposited to Apelo's bank account, there
is no proof that Apelo subsequently withdrew the same.
PDIC moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The
Ombudsman found Gomez's affidavit showing Apelo as the
source of the "advance warnings" received by Cu in connection
with the BSP examinations to be inadmissible in evidence for
being hearsay.
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ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its
discretion in finding no probable cause to indict private
respondents of the crimes charged.
2. Whether the Ombudsman was correct in discrediting
Gomez’s affidavit as inadmissible in evidence for being
hearsay.
HELD:
1. Yes. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. It
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.
Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode
of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based
on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction. The presence or absence of the elements
of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense
that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
Hence, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or
accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimoniesand
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.”
In view of the grave accusations against them, Cu and Zate
resorted to mere denials, while Apelo ignored the complaint by
not filing a counter- affidavit despite due notice, thus,
miserably failing to debunk the charges hurled against them.
Indubitably, the foregoing establishes probable cause to
believe that private respondents may have indeed committed
such acts constituting the crimes charged against them. As
such, they must defend themselves in a full-blown trial on the
merits.
2. NO. Owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be
applied in the course of its proceedings. In the recent case of
Estrada v. Ombudsman, the Court declared that hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in
preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties. Further, the determination of probable
cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay evidence,
as long as the person making the hearsay statement is
credible.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
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EVIDENCE DIGESTS
In this case, assuming arguendo that Gomez's statements, as
written in her affidavit are indeed hearsay, there is
nevertheless substantial basis to credit the same, considering
that she was a former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer
of BDBI — a high-ranking officer that may be privy to delicate
transactions such as the purported "under-the-table" deal
involving private respondents. In this regard, it must be
emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime
charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause,
only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the
respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable
cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on
more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would
justify a conviction. To reiterate, the validity of the merits of a
party's defense or accusations as well as the admissibility of
testimonies and evidences are better ventilated during the trial
stage than in the preliminary stage.
24 — People v. Guting
Keywords: Parricide, confession before the custodial
investigation, res gestae
Principle: The constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime.
FACTS:
On or about 4:50 in the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006 at
Plaridel St., Poblacion B. Camiling, Tarlac, the said accused,
Adrian Guting, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
evident premeditation killed his own father Jose Guting, 67
years old, married, while inside their residential house, and
armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and unexpectedly
stabbed several times the victim, employing means, manner
and form in the execution thereof, the result of which attack
was that said victim received multiple stab wounds on his body
which directly caused his instantaneous death.
When arraigned on September 19, 2006, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Below is a summary of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.
Police Officer (PO) 1 Fidel Torre (Torre) testified that on the
rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006, at around 5:00 o'clock, he
and PO1 Alexis Macusi (Macusi) were standing in front of the
Camiling Police Station when accused-appellant, all wet from
the rain and with a bladed weapon in his hand, suddenly
approached them and told them that he had stabbed his
father. Hearing accused-appellant's statement, PO1 Torre
immediately got the bladed weapon from accused-appellant
and turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition.
PO1 Macusi corroborated PO1 Torre's testimony.
Accused-appellant proclaimed that his father was already dead.
Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi asked who killed
accused-appellant's father. Accused-appellant answered,
"Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Torre
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then got the knife from accused-appellant and gave it to PO1
Macusi. PO1 Macusi placed the knife in the custodian cabinet in
the Police Station.
Thereafter, PO1 Macusi, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Eliseo
Hermosado (Hermosado), and SPO2 Noli Felipe (Felipe) went
to the residence of Jose Guting (Jose), accused-appellant's
father, to verify the reported crime, while other police officers
informed Flora Guting (Flora), Jose's wife (also
accused-appellant's mother), who was still in the market with
Emerlito Guting (Emerlito), Jose and Flora's other son
(accused-appellant's brother), who was then driving a tricycle
for hire. While waiting for Flora and Emerlito, PO1 Macusi,
SPO2 Hermosado, and SPO2 Felipe inquired from the
neighbors if anybody had witnessed the crime, but no one did.
When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the house and
saw Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his
wounds. Immediately, Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to the
hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Subsequently, Flora and Emerlito executed their respective
Sinumpaang Salaysay and filed a case for Parricide against
accused-appellant.
On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the
knife was given to him by PO1 Torre for safekeeping, he did
not ask accused-appellant if it was the knife he used to kill his
father. Neither did accused-appellant mention to PO1 Macusi
that it was the knife he used in stabbing Jose. All that
accused-appellant said was, " Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko!
Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Macusi also admitted that he did not
request for the examination of the knife because it was clean;
any trace or stain of blood on it would have been washed
away by the rains at that time.
PO1 Macusi was further questioned as to why he did not put
into writing accused-appellant's admission that he killed his
father, and PO1 Macusi explained that it escaped his mind as
he was still new at the job then and he was carried away by
the fast flow of events
Accused-appellant opted not to present any evidence in his
defense. The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010
finding accused-appellant guilty of Parricide based on his
verbal admission that he killed his father, Jose. Even assuming
that accused-appellant's admission was inadmissible in
evidence, the RTC adjudged that the prosecution was still able
to establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which, taken
collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of
the brutal killing of his father.
Hence, accused-appellant comes before us via the instant
appeal.
Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre
and PO1 Macusi, without the assistance of counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence for having been made in blatant
violation of his constitutional right under Article III, Section 12
of the 1987 Constitution.
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
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EVIDENCE DIGESTS FIRST BATCH

person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be a startling and gruesome occurrence, that is, his father's
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in death. Accused-appellant made the confession to PO1 Torre
writing and in the presence of counsel. and PO1 Macusi only a few minutes after and while he was still
under the influence of said startling occurrence, before he had
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In fact,
convicting the accused-appellant on the basis of his accused-appellant seemed to still be in shock when he walked
extrajudicial admission? to the Police Station completely unmindful of the rain and the
knife in his hand, and headed directly to PO1 Torre and PO1
HELD: Macusi, who were standing in front of the Police Station, to
confess to stabbing his father to death. The police officers who
We find no merit in accused-appellant's appeal. immediately went to the house of Jose, accused-appellant's
father, found Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from
The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of his stab wounds. As res gestae, accused-appellant's
the 1987 Constitution pertains to "custodial investigation." spontaneous statement is admissible in evidence against him.
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a
crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask 25 — People v. Lauga
questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend Keyword/s: ​Father raped daughter (shame); Bantay Bayan
to elicit an admission. As we expounded in People v. Marra:
Principle: ​Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by
nature of watch groups, as in the case of the Bantay Bayan,
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
are recognized by the local government unit to perform
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the
significant way . It is only after the investigation ceases to be a
barangay level.
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on
a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the
FACTS:
police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to
Antonio Lauga was accused of the crime qualified rape against
operate.
his own daughter, 13 years old. Testimonies revealed that the
victim was left alone at home while his father was having a
Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not
drinking spree at the neighbor’s place. Victim’s mother decided
under custodial investigation when he admitted, without
to leave because appellant has the habit of mauling her every
assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he
time he gets drunk. While the victim’s brother went out in the
stabbed his father to death. Accused-appellant's verbal
company of some neighbor.
confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily given and
was not elicited through questioning by the police authorities.
The family sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting, a
It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-appellant who
Bantay Bayan in the barangay, about the incident. He then
killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so in response to
invited appellant to the police station, to which appellant
accused-appellant's initial declaration that his father was
obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he
already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who
raped AAA because he was unable to control himself.
actually committed the crime and did not consider
accused-appellant as the suspect in his father's killing.
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He
Accused-appellant was also merely standing before PO1 Torre
believed that the charge against him was ill-motivated because
and PO1 Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and was
he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their
not yet in police custody.
children after engaging in a heated argument, and beats the
children as a disciplinary measure.
Moreover, accused-appellant's verbal confession that he
stabbed his father to death made to PO1 Torre and PO1
Moreover, the appellant assails the inconsistencies in the
Macusi, established through the testimonies of said police
testimonies of the victim and her brother. On one hand, the
officers, falls under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court,
victim testified that her brother accompanied her to the house
which provides that "[t]he act, declaration or omission of a
of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
relatives, proceeded to look for a "bantay bayan." On
him." This rule is based upon the notion that no man would
the other hand, her brother testified that he brought her sister
make any declaration against himself, unless it is true. 18
to the house of their "bantay bayan" after he learned of the
Accused-appellant's declaration is admissible for being part of
incident.
the res gestae . A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae
and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
RTC found the appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship
when these three requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the
and minority. CA affirmed with modifications.
res gestae , is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
ISSUE:
(3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its
1. WON the extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy
immediately attending circumstances. 19 All the requisites are
Banting, without the assistance of a counsel,
present in this case. Accused-appellant had just been through
admissible in evidence.

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2. WON there there were inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the victim and her brother
RULING:
1. NO. In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, the Court
had the occasion to mention the nature of a "bantay
bayan," that is, ​"a group of male residents living
in [the] area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community[,which is] an
accredited auxiliary of the . . . PNP." ​Also,
pursuant to Section 1 (g) of Executive Order No. 309,
as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each
barangay shall be organized "to serve as
implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and
Order Council at the Barangay level."
Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions
taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope
of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay
bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a
custodial investigation, ​any inquiry he makes has
the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to
his constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as
the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
The SC, therefore, finds the extrajudicial confession of
appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence. Be that as it may, the SC
agrees with the Court of Appeals that the conviction
of the appellant was not deduced solely from the
assailed extrajudicial confession but from the
confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. NO. Citing B​ artocillo v. Court of Appeals​, appellant
argues that "where the testimonies of two key
witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable
conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie,
and their story a mere concoction." The principle,
however, is not applicable in the case at bar.
Here, the testimony of the victim does not run
contrary to that of her brother. ​Both testified that
they sought the help of a "bantay bayan." Their
respective testimonies differ only as to when the help
was sought for, which this Court could well attribute
to the nature of the testimony of the brother, a
shortcut version of the victim’s testimony that
dispensed with a detailed account of the incident. At
any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding
that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect
the veracity of the testimonies. In fact,
inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or
inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that
such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.
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26 — Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate
Impeachment Court
Keyword/s: ​Former CJ Corona's foreign currency deposits;
Bank Secrecy
Principle: ​When it comes to foreign currency deposits, it is
considered to be absolutely confidential in nature except when
the depositor himself waives his right to privacy in relation to
such deposit by the execution of a written consent.
FACTS:
Petitoners PSBANK and Pascual Garcia III (petitioners) filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullify and set
aside the resolution of the Senate Impeachment Court
(respondent) which granted the prosecution’s request for
subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to PSBANK requiring
them to testify and produce documents relative to the foreign
currency accounts that were alleged to belong to the then SC
Chief Justice Corona.
ISSUE:
WoN the Impeachment Court acted arbitrarily in issuing the
subpoena to obtain information about the alleged foreign
currency deposits of SC CJ Corona.
RULING:
Yes.
As provided in Section 8 of RA 6426 or the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act of the Philippines, foreign currency deposits are
considered as ​absolutely confidential in nature​. Sec. 8 of
RA 6246 provides:
Section 8. Secrecy of foreign currency deposits. — All foreign
currency deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by
PD No. 1035​, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized
under ​PD No. 1034​, are hereby declared as and considered of
an ​absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the
written permission of the depositor​, in no instance shall
foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into
by any person, government official, bureau or office whether
judicial or administrative or legislative, or any other entity
whether public or private; Provided, however, That said foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever.
There is only one exception for the confidential nature of
foreign currency deposits and that is only upon the written
permission of the depositor himself. Such written consent
constitutes a waiver of the depositor’s right to privacy in
relation to such deposit.
In Intengan v. CA, the court ruled that where the accounts in
question are in US dollar deposits, the applicable law is not RA
1405 but RA 6246. RA 1405 and RA 6246 are in no way
conflicting laws. The former was enacted to encourage the
public to deposit their money in banking institutions and
discourage private hoarding. It covers all bank deposits in the
PH and no distinction was made between domestic and foreign
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deposits. RA 6246 on the other hand deals specifically with
foreign deposits in the PH. RA 1405 is regarded to be general
law while RA 6246 is a specific law and a general law does not
nullify a special law.
In the instant case, neither the prosecution nor the
Impeachment Court has presented any written consent by CJ
Corona. While impeachment maybe an exception to the
secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it is not an exemption
to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits
under RA 6246.
27 — Gaanan v. IAC ​Taken from previous digest
Facts:
Atty. Pintor and Montebon, his client, discussed their
withdrawal of direct assault complaint against Laconico. Pintor
called Atty. Laconico. Laconico then consulted Atty. Gaanan
about the settlement. Laconico phoned Pintor where Gaanan
secretly listened to their conversation. Pintor gave his
conditions for the withdrawal of case against Laconico. Mostly,
the conditions involved money settlements. Laconico agreed
and he was instructed to deliver it to Pintor’s wife. Laconico
then alarmed the police of the said transaction.
Laconico filed a case of robbery/extortion. On the other hand,
Pintor filed a case against Laconico and Gaanan being in
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
Issue/s:
1. WON the telephone conversation was private in nature
2. WON Gaanan had authority to listen
3. WON an extension telephone is among the prohibited
devices of the Anti- Wiretapping Act and to use it to overhear a
private conversation would be unlawful interception of
communications between two parties
4. WON the Act is ambiguous and therefore be construed in
favour of Gaanan
Ruling:
1. Yes.
The words uttered were made between one person to the
other compared to one that is made between a speacker to the
public.
2. No.
Although Laconico authorized Gaanan to listen through the
extension line, it was obvious from the surrounding
circumstances that Atty. Pintor would not have talked about
the withdrawal of the direct assault case if he knew that
another person was listening of the conversation.
3. No.
The law refers to a “tap” of wire or cable or the use of “device
or management” for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
achieve the aforementioned purposes.
An extension telephone is not one of those devices above and
not of same category as Dictaphone, dictagraph, or other
devices enumerated in the Act. The telephone was installed for
legitimate purpose (i.e. office use). To determine the true
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intent of the legislature, the clauses of the statute should not
be taken as isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
must be considered in fixing the meaning.
The phrase “device and management”, although not exclusive
to the enumeration, should be construed to be instruments of
the same nature; those instruments used in tapping the main
telephone. They are not of common usage and precisely meant
for tapping.
An extension telephone is not.
It can also be presumed that one has an extension telephone
and runs the risk of being overheard by another person.
4. Yes.
Penal statutes must be construed in favour of the accused.
Thus, in doubt if an extension telephone is one of those meant
by the Act, it must be construed that such does not include the
extension telephone.
It can also be observed in the deliberations of the legislature
that overhearing a conversation using means other than those
specifically prohibited by the Act is not prohibited as tis may be
used for gathering legitimate evidence to prove offenses.
28 — Salcedo v. CA
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding
Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon city and
RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents. [G.R. No. 110662.
August 4, 1994.]|
DOCTRINAL PRONOUNCEMENT/S:
Tape recordings of telephone conversations of an person with
unidentified persons which were obtained illegally or in
violation of RA No. 4200 (An Act To Prohibit And Penalize
Wire-Tapping And Other Related Violations Of The Privacy Of
Communication, And Other Purposes) are inadmissible as
evidence. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same,
the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under the
said law.
FACTS:
2 May 1990​—private respondent R ​ afael S. Ortanez f​ iled
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner
Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage
license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and
raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by
respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.
Rafael orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits “A” to “M”
after presenting his evidence, this includes three (3) cassette
tapes of alleged telephone conversations between Teresita and
unidentified persons.
9 June 1992​—Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to
the oral offer of evidence but the TC admitted all of Rafael’s
offered evidence.
23 June 1992​—Teresita’s MR was denied
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A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner Teresita in However, as an exception, where the assailed interlocutory
the CA assailing the admission in evidence of the order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would
aforementioned cassette tapes. not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the court may allow
certiorari as a mode of redress.
10 June 1993​—CA rendered judgement, which in part reads:
2. No. In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any order admitting all of the evidence offered by private
other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain respondent, including tape recordings of telephone
purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These
and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth tape recordings were made and obtained when private
and fairness and the even handed administration of justice. respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire-tap his
home telephone
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to
rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize
trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be Communication, and for other purposes" ​expressly makes
questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence​. The
not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than
an error of law, properly correctable by appeal and not by "Section 1. It shall be unlawful for
certiorari. Otherwise, we will have the sorry spectacle of a case any person, not being authorized
being subject of a counterproductive 'ping-pong' to and from by all the parties to any private
the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have communication or spoken word,
made an error in any of its rulings with respect to evidentiary to tap any wire or cable, or by
matters in the course of trial. This we cannot sanction. using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, overhear, intercept, or record
is hereby DISMISSED. such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly
From this, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 known as a Dictaphone or
asserting that: dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape- recorder, or
1. The decision of the CA has no basis in law nor previous however otherwise described. . .
decisions of the SC as well as not in accord with law and with ."
applicable decisions of the SC; that In affirming the questioned
"Section 4. Any communication or
order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has decided a
spoken word, or the existence,
question of substance not therefore determined by the
contents, substance, purport, or
Supreme Court as the question of admissibility in evidence of
meaning of the same or any part
tape recordings has not, thus far, been addressed and decided
thereof, or any information therein
squarely by the Supreme Court.
contained, obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the
2. That although the questioned order is interlocutory in
preceding sections of this Act shall
nature, the same can still. Be the subject of a petition for
not be admissible in evidence in
certiorari.
any judicial, quasi-judicial,
ISSUE: legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation."
1. Case: whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to
of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner
consider the afore- quoted provisions of the law in admitting in
in the Court of Appeals.
evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear
2. Relevant Issue: Whether or not an evidence obtained showing that both parties to the telephone conversations
illegally as its acquisition was in violation of an existing statute allowed to recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the
may be admitted as evidence in a judicial proceeding. subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

RULING: Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned

1. Yes, as a general rule. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is
generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a
trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary
appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal
the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
Republic Act in Section 2 thereof imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6)
years for violation of said Act.
We need not address the other arguments raised by the
parties, involving the applicability of American jurisprudence,

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having arrived at the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes
are inadmissible in evidence under Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 28545 is hereby SET ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes
are declared inadmissible in evidence.
29 — Ramirez v. CA
Keyword/s: Wire tapping; private communication vs. private
conversation
Principle​: RA 4200 is clear that it is illegal for any
unauthorized person to secretly record by means of a tape
recorder any private communication. The substance of the
conversation need not be alleged in the information because
such is immaterial to the violation. What the law penalizes are
the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording
private communications by means of the devices enumerated
in the law.
Facts​: Ramirez filed a civil case for damages against Garcia
alleging that the latter vexed, insulted, and humiliated her in a
hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to her
dignity and personality contraty to morals, good customs, and
public policy. In support of her claim, Ramirez produced a
verbatim transcript of the event, which she culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation.
Garcia filed a criminal case against Ramirez alleging that the
act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal in violation
of RA 4200, entitled “An act to prohibit and penalize wire
tapping and other related violations of private communication,
and other purposes.”
Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash, which was granted by the
trial court on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense and the violation punished by RA 4200
refers to the taping of a communication by a person ​other than
a participant to the communication.
Garcia filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. CA ruled that
the trial court’s order is null and void. Ramirez filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was denied by CA. Hence, this
petition.
Issues​:
1. Does RA 4200 apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation?
2. Is it needed that the substance or content of the
conversation be alleged in the information?
3. Is “private communication” different from “private
conversation” which places the latter outside the ambit of
RA 4200?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The clear and unambiguous language of the law
makes it illegal for a
​ ny person​, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly record
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such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private
communication. Further, a perusal of the Senate
Congressional Records supports this conclusion that the
law makes no distinction.
2. No, because the nature of the conversation is immaterial
to the violation. What RA 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated in
the law. Moreover, nowhere in the law it is required that
before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third
person shall be professed.
3. No. The word “communicate” comes from the latin word
communicare​, meaning, “to share or to impart.” It
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a
conversation​, or signifies the process by which meanings
or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols.
WHEREFORE, ​because the law, as applied to the case at
bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby ​DENIED.
30 — Navarro v. CA
Keywords:​ Wiretapping at a police station
Principle: R.A. No. 4200 only prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private communications. If it
occurred in a public place, its recording is not prohibited.
FACTS:
At around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley
Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of a
radio station in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan,
went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was
showing the nude dancers. After the three had seated
themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer
appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she
removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and
took a picture.
At that point, the floor manager with a security guard
approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a
picture. Jalbuena replied that it was part of his job. The
security guard pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he
warned the latter that he would kill him. When Jalbuena saw
that said security guard was about to pull out his gun, he ran
out of the joint followed by his companions.
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to
report the matter. Three of the policeman on duty, including
petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police
station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join
them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt.
Añonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, the floor manager
and security guard arrived on a motorcycle.
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They were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in
a corner for around fifteen minutes. Afterwards, petitioner
Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, and
said that they messed with the wrong people.
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro
that he was there to mediate. Petitoner Navarro then turned to
Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of
Jalbuena and Lingan. This angered Lingan and the two had a
heated exchange. As a rsult, Navarro assaulted Lingan inside
the Lucena police headquarters, by boxing Lingan in the head
with the butt of a gun and thereafter, when the said victim fell,
by banging his head against the concrete pavement. As a
consequence, of which, said Lingan suffered cerebral
concussion and shock, which directly caused his death.
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner
Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the
Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy,
Casañada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to
the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his
injuries.
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record
on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased. In
the trial, Jalbuena presented in evidence the voice recording.
This was challenged as inadmissible for violating the
Anti-Wiretapping Act.
TRIAL COURT: Found that the evidence for the prosecution is
the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral
certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is
criminally responsible.
The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial could
not under the circumstance overturn the strength of the
prosecution's evidence.
The postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms
the detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan
sustained head injuries.
Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of
Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that the
head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latter's
falling down on the concrete pavement head first.
CA: Affirmed. Found the trial court's factual conclusions to
have better and stronger evidentiary support.
ISSUE: Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in
evidence.
RULING:
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice
recording had made. It may be asked whether the tape is
admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. T
​ he answer is in the affirmative.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of
private communications. Since the exchange between
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petitioner Navarro and Lingan was ​not private, its tape
recording is not prohibited. (​NOTE: It should be noted
that the exchange between Navarro and Lingan occurred in a
police station, with other people present. Such place is
considered a public place. As such, its recording is not
prohibited.)
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A
voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness
(1) that he personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the
tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and (3) that
the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are
claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that
he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played
in the court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers
on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient
foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape
presented by the prosecution.
The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that
there was a ​heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and
Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against
him and Jalbuena; and (2) that ​some form of violence occurred
involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan​, with the latter getting
the worst of it.
31 — People v. Yatco
Keywords​: Conspiracy, exclusion of confessions, extrajudicial
confession
Principles: T
​ he admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of
an accused freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against
him.
Right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may
waive. If the ground for objection is known and not reasonably
made, the objection is deemed waived and the court has no
power, on its own motion to disregard the evidence.
FACTS​:
In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of
Quezon City, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and other
whose identity is still unknown were charged with having
conspired together in the murder of Jose Ramos. During the
trial, while the prosecution was questioning witness Atty.
Arturo Xavier of the NBI, in the making of a certain
extra-judicial confession made before him by defendant
Consunji, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban
interposed a general objection to any evidence on such
confession on the ground that it was a hearsay and
incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The
lower court (CFI) ordered the exclusion of the evidence
objected to, but for a different ground: that the prosecution
could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of
defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove
conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such
conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and
circumstances.
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The prosecution moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari brought by
the Solicitor General.
ISSUE​: WON the lower court committed GAOD in ordering the
complete exclusion of the prosecution’s evidence on the
alleged confessions of the accused Consunji
HELD​:
YES. Sec. 14, Rule 123, ROC stipulates the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of an accused freely and voluntarily
made, as evidence against him. Also, under the rule of multiple
admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji’s confession may not
be competent as against co-accused Panganiban, being
hearsay or to prove conspiracy between them without the
conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession
of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible and should have
been admitted as such.
Sec. 12, Rule 123, ROC, the ruled cited by the lower court as
basis for its exclusion refers to statements made by one
conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises
and in furtherance of its object and not to a confession made,
as ITCAB, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an
end.
Moreover, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions
to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence
against both of them. The alleged confessions (both in writing
and tape recordings) had not yet even been identified.
Assuming that Sec. 12 applies, it was premature for the lower
court to exclude them on the ground that there was no prior
proof of conspiracy.
Noteworthy is the exclusion made motu proprio by the lower
court. By so doing, the court overlooked that the right to
object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive. If the
ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the
objection is deemed waived and the court has no power, on its
own motion to disregard the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of exclusion of the confessions of the
accused is annulled and set aside.
32 — People v. Andan
FACTS:
Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of age and a second-year
student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her
school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant
invited her inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood
pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne
agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her
distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the
house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought
her to the kitchen and raped her.
The following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne
was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her
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brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was
found a panty with a sanitary napkin.
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and
prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack
team of police officers to look for the criminal. The police tried
to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00
P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in
his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and
brought him to the police headquarters where he was
interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of
Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him
with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the
bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and said
that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed
Marianne and that he was merely a lookout.
Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation
room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and
whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led
appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there,
appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I
will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The
mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and
media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first
asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was
available, he ordered the proceedings photographed and
videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police,
representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son,
appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed
Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he
hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon
whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of
ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his
mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he
read almost every day.
The next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper,
radio and television reporters came. Appellant was again
interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and
reenacted the crime
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not
guilty.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admissions to the policemen, mayor, and
news reporters are admissible.
RULING:
Yes. It is admissible as to the mayor and news reporters and
inadmissible as to the policemen.
An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular
person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in
connection with an alleged offense.
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When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer
engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne.
Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the
police found him at his parents' house.
he admitted that he was the culprit. Appellant was already
under custodial investigation when he confessed to the ​police.
It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his
constitutional rights ​when he was investigated and
interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in
evidence.
However, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. Appellant's
confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question
appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to
the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely
and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The
mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his
guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession to him did not violate his
constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the
constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.
What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. Hence, we hold that
appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by
the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly
admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions
by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating
officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by
a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were
given free from any undue influence from the police
authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when
they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the
direction and control of the police. They were there to check
appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force
appellant to grant them an interview and re-enact the
commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission
before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate
days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he
repeatedly confessed his guilt to them.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen
are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It
governs the relationship between the individual and the State.
The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State
and its agents.
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33 — People v. Abriol
Facts:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1993, at about 11:50
P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, accused, armed with
handguns, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, did
then and there shot one Alejandro Flores alias Alex with the
said handguns, hitting him on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries:
CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO SHOCK AND
HEMORRHAGE SECONDARY TO MULTIPLE GUNSHOT
WOUNDS TO THE TRUNK AND THE HEAD as a consequence of
which the said Alejandro Flores alias Alex died later.
Appellant Astellero was a former prisoner at BBRC, who had
served time for grave threats. The warden then, Chief
Inspector Navales, employed him as his personal driver and
general factotum.
Abriol and Dosdos enjoyed special privileges at BBRC as the
warden's errand boys or "trustees."
Alejandro Flores alias "Alex," was a former policeman. He was
dismissed from the PNP in August 1992 after testing positive
for prohibited drugs.
While the patrol cars were chasing the "Jiffy," another police
team proceeded to the crime scene in response to the alarm.
This team from Police Station No. 3 in San Nicolas, Cebu City
rushed the victim to the Cebu City Medical Center, where he
was pronounced dead on... arrival. Meanwhile, PO3 Celso
Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police Station No. 3
found four .45 caliber shells some 4 feet away from the
victim's body, and two deformed slugs where the victim had
lain, and submitted them to the Region 7 PNP Crime
Laboratory for ballistics testing appellants underwent a paraffin
test. The hands of appellants were found positive for
gunpowder residues. A chemistry test on the firearms showed
that the three handguns were also positive.
The widow and relatives of the victim testified on the possible
motive behind the killing. They claimed the victim, a
confessed drug user, may have been "rubbed out" on the
orders of Navales for failure to remit P31,000 as proceeds from
pushing prohibited drugs. After failing to deliver the drug
money to Navales, for whom he was repeatedly pushing drugs,
the victim went into hiding, but later returned to Cebu City
because he missed his family.
The defense also presented Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-legal
officer of the Cebu City PNP Command, to testify on the caliber
of the firearms which might have caused the gunshot wounds
of the victim.
Dr. Cerna testified that it was impossible to determine the
caliber of the firearm used.
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EVIDENCE DIGESTS
Issues: whether the prosecution's evidence, which is mainly
circumstantial, suffices to convict appellants for murder and
violation of PD No. 1866, beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
First, eyewitness Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., did not personally
identify them as the culprits. At no point in his testimony did
eyewitness Sta. Cruz, Jr., positively identify any of the
appellants or appellant Abriol as the gunman.
Since the sole eyewitness could not identify the gunman and
his companions, the prosecution relied on circumstantial
evidence from which the trial court could draw its findings and
conclusion of culpability. Circumstantial evidence may be relied
upon, as in this case, when to insist on direct testimony would
result in setting felons free.
Second, appellants assert that the paraffin tests are judicially
recognized as unreliable and inconclusive. A paraffin test
could establish the presence or absence of nitrates on the
hand. However, it cannot establish that the source of the
nitrates was the... discharge of firearms. Nitrates are also
found in substances other than gunpowder. A person who
tests positive may have handled one or more substances with
the same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives,
fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco and leguminous
plants. Hence, the presence of nitrates should only be taken
as an indication of a possibility that a person has fired a gun.
However, it must be borne in mind that appellants were not
convicted on the sole basis of the paraffin test.
Since no firearm smaller than a .38 caliber pistol was seized
from appellants, they claim the observation of Dr. Cerna only
shows that they could not have shot the victim.
The Office of the Solicitor General points out that Dr. Diola's
testimony is supported by Dr. Pedro P. Solis, a medical expert.
Such expert opinions disprove appellants' theory that the .45
caliber handguns confiscated from them could not have been
used in killing the victim.
Appellants allege that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel
Caser, the prosecution's ballistics expert, clearly shows that:
(1) He is ignorant about such ballistics instruments such as the
micrometer, goniometer, and pressure barrel. (2) He is not
conversant with "the required references concerning ballistics,"
particularly books on the subject by foreign authorities.[36] (3)
He could not "scientifically determine the caliber of a bullet."
P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a
licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command and
Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of
Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness
in at least twenty-seven (27) murder and homicide cases all
over the country.
Fifth, appellants aver that the prosecution failed to show any
plausible motive for appellants to kill the victim. The
prosecution tried to prove that their co-accused Navales
instigated them to kill the victim because Navales had a
grudge against him.
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FIRST BATCH
PO3 Rustela immediately ran to the scene of the crime and
met the red jiffy with three persons on board, that speedily
passed by him proceeding towards Leon Kilat Street. Car 208
readily picked up the trail and pursued the red jiffy from Leon
Kilat, then making abrupt turns on downtown streets until
other patrol cars joined the chase and captured them in Lahug,
near the BBRC. The identity of the red jiffy was never
interrupted.
Instead of stopping, Abriol ordered Astellero to accelerate their
speed. Their obvious purpose was to elude the patrol cars.
Flight is indicative of guilt.
These unbroken chain of events prove not only appellants'
identities but also their participation and collective
responsibility in the murder of Alejandro Flores. They reveal a
unity of purpose and concerted action evidencing their
conspiracy to kill him. Against this matrix of facts and
circumstances, appellants' bare denials cannot stand. Their
story of chasing a red "Jiffy" is merely a disingenuous diversion
of no evidentiary value for the defense.
In this case, the warrantless search and seizure of the subject
handguns and ammunition is valid for two reasons. It was a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. It was made after a fatal
shooting, and pursuit of a fast-moving vehicle seeking to elude
pursuing police officers, and a more than reasonable belief on
the part of the police officers that the fleeing suspects aboard
said vehicle had just engaged in criminal activity.
34 — People v. Musa
Facts: ​On December 13, 1989, surveillance was conducted on
Mari Musa, who was a resident of Zamboanga City. A test buy
was conducted, where Sgt. Amado Ani, guided by an informer,
proceeded to the house of Musa and was able to buy one
newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was conducted. Sgt. Amado Ani was
the poseur-buyer. Arriving at the house of Musa, Sgt. Ani
proceeded to the house while the rest of the team positioned
themselves at strategic places. T/Sgt. Belarga could observe
what went on between Ani and Musa from his position. Ani
gave Musa the marked money of P20.00. After receiving the
money, Musa went back to his house, came back and gave Ani
two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani then
gave the signal and the rest of the team proceeded to the
house of Musa.
The team frisked Musa but could not find the marked money.
Musa told them that he had given it to his wife, who had
slipped away. Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag in the
kitchen containing dried marijuana.
Musa discounted the police’s version of the story. He claimed
that he was merely having a manicure at the time the
NARCOM agents came into the house. The agents did not ask
permission to enter but simply announced they were NARCOM
agents. They also did not say that they had a search warrant.
The agents found a red plastic bag in the kitchen but Musa did
not know if it belonged to his brother or his father. Musa then
claimed that he was brought at the NARCOM office. He was
asked to sign a document stating the marijuana belonged to
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him but he refused. He also asked for assistance of counsel appellate court will, in the exercise of its discretion, impose the
but was denied. He was then tortured by placing bullets in minimum penalty provided by law upon a person convicted for
between his fingers and being boxed. Musa denies the charges the first time of having a small quantity of opium in his
levied against him. possession.

Issues: FACTS: Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional

1. WON the testimony of Sgt. Ani is credible considering that
Sgt. Ani did not personally know the appellant and that
there was no witness regarding the alleged giving of the
two wrappers of marijuana.
2. WON the plastic bag containing marijuana is admissible
evidence
Held:
1. The testimony of Sgt. Ani is credible. The court finds his
testimony to be direct, lucid and without contradictions.
What matters is not an existing familiarity between the
buyer and seller but their agreement and acts constituting
sale and delivery of the marijuana. The place of the
commission of the crime is also not crucial, nor will the
presence of other people prevent the consummation of
the illegal sale. T/Sgt. Belarga is likewise considered as
credible. The appellant invokes P​ eople v. Ale, w
​ here the
court held that policemen cannot distinguish between
ordinary cigarettes and marijuana cigarettes. T/Sgt.
Belarga however did not positively claim that he saw
marijuana being handed over. He merely said there was
an exchange of articles between Musa and Sgt. Ani. His
testimony corroborates with the direct evidence.
question that the accused was compelled to be a witness
against himself. The contention is that this was the result of
forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth.
RULING: No case exactly in point can be found. But, by
analogy, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands in U. S. v. Tan Teng ([1912] 23 Phil., 145), following
leading authorities, and the persuasive decisions of other
courts of last resort, are conclusive. To force a prohibited drug
from the person of an accused is along the same line as
requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in
evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an
accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a
substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving
his guilt.
It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the
Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article,
substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime
could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this
constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by
oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from
prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime.
(Harris v. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., 415.)

2. The plastic bag is not admissible evidence. It does not fall

under the plain view doctrine. The agents found the
plastic bag inside the kitchen, and upon asking about the
contents of the bag, the accused did not answer, making
the agents open the bag and find marijuana leaves. The
NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the
house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. They
also had no clue as to its contents. The incriminating
nature of the contents was immediately apparent from the
‘plain view’ of the object.

35 — US v. Hong Siu Hong

Note: Extremely short case. Below is the syllabus and
practically the full text

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF. —

The main purpose of the constitutional provision against
compelling a person in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral
examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from
prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime.

2. OPIUM LAW; WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF. — Forcing an

accused to discharge morphine from his mouth is not
compelling him to be a witness against himself.

3. ID.; PENALTY. — The court address to the doctrine

announced in U. S. v. Lim Sing ([1912]) 23 Phil., 424); U. S. v.
Sy Liongco ([1915] 33 Phil., 53) ’and other cases that the

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