Unit 1 & 2 HSE Mgt. in Petro

Health, Safety and Environment Management in Petroleum Operations
HSE MANAGEMENT IN PETROLEUM OPERATIONS

UNIT-1
⮚ Health Hazard: toxicity, physiological, asphyxiation, respiratory and skin effects:
Petroleum hydrocarbons are the principal components in a wide variety of commercial products (e.g.,
gasoline, fuel oils, lubricating oils, solvents, mineral spirits, mineral oils, and crude oil). Because of
widespread use, disposal, and spills, environmental contamination is relatively common. It is important to
understand that petroleum products are complex mixtures, typically containing hundreds of compounds.
These include various amounts of aliphatic compounds (straight-chain, branched-chain, and cyclic alkanes
and alkenes) and aromatic compounds (benzene and alkyl benzenes, naphthalenes, and PAHs). In addition,
many petroleum products contain non-hydrocarbon additives such as alcohols, ethers, metals, and other
chemicals that may affect the toxicity of the mixture. the actual petroleum hydrocarbon mixture to which a
given population is exposed varies with location, time and environmental medium. Accordingly, health
effects data for whole petroleum products that are relatively heterogeneous, such as gasoline and JP-4, are
not necessarily applicable to the fractions to which exposure actually occurs as a result of transport and
weathering. For example, acute inhalation exposure to a fresh spill of gasoline will be to the more volatile
constituents, whereas intermediate or chronic oral exposure to drinking water contaminated by a gasoline
release will be to the soluble constituents, and exposure to soil at the site of the original spill will be to the
less volatile and less soluble constituents. The criteria to be used in selection of the chemicals of concern for
various petroleum products are concentrations in the product, solubility and mobility, toxicological
properties, aesthetic characteristics (e.g., odor), and availability of sufficient information to conduct risk
assessments. For gasoline, kerosene, and jet fuels, commonly selected hydrocarbon chemicals of concern
are benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene (BTEX). Additional chemicals of concern for kerosene, jet
fuels & diesel fuel, other fuel oils are PAHs eg Benzo (a) pyrene. Some health impacts of petroleum
hydrocarbons are illustrated below.
Toxicity:
Toxicity: It is the ability of a substance to produce an unwanted effect when the chemical has reached a
sufficient concentration at a certain site in the body. The more toxic a material is, the smaller the amount of
it is necessary to be absorbed before harmful effects are caused. The lower the toxicity, the greater the
quantity of it is necessary to be absorbed.
Petroleum hydrocarbon toxicity may involve the respiratory, gastro-intestinal, cardiovascular systems or the
CNS. Since benzene is a natural component of crude oil and natural gas, it is well documented that it is
carcinogenic and has serious health toxicity for the living beings. Other potential toxic and suspected
carcinogenic agents or mixtures exist, such as mineral oil mist and vapour, asbestos fibres, formaldehyde,
tetrachloroethylene, welding/cutting fumes, acids, coatings, etc. Toxicity from hydrocarbon ingestion can
affect many different organs, but the lungs are the most commonly affected. The chemical properties of the
individual hydrocarbon determine the specific toxicity, while the dose and route of ingestion affect which
organs are exposed to the toxicity. Unlike the aromatic or aliphatic hydrocarbons, the halogenated
hydrocarbons tend to cause a wider range of toxicity. The chlorinated hydrocarbons, in particular carbon
tetrachloride, are hepatotoxic.
Physiological:
1. Noise-induced hearing loss is permanent hearing loss caused by long-term exposure to hazardous noise.
The severity of the hearing loss is affected by the intensity of the noise and the duration of exposure.
2. Benzene and benzo(a)pyrene - Carcinogenic in nature. Benzene also affects hematopoiesis, decreasing
the production of all major types of blood cells.
3. All the BTEXs (benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene) - neurological effects. The neurological
effects consist primarily of central nervous system depression. Toluene’s neurotoxicity also includes
ototoxicity. Evidence of hearing loss has been seen in both occupationally exposed humans and in animals.
These gases also effects renal, hepatic, gastro-intestinal and hematological ill-impacts.
Prof. Rahul Ganju, Dr. Jabrinder Singh Asst. Professor DIT University, Dehradun
4. Prolonged exposure to certain hydrocarbons (eg, n -hexane or methyl-n -butyl ketone [MnBK]) can result
in peripheral neuropathy, blurred vision, sensory impairment, muscle atrophy and parkinsonism.
5. Exposure to hydrocarbons can result in cardiotoxicity. Most importantly, the myocardium becomes
sensitized to the effects of catecholamines, which can predispose the patient to tachydysrhythmias, which
can result in syncope or sudden death.
Physiological Classification of Materials
This classification identifies toxic materials on the basis of biologic action.
Irritants – refers to some sort of aggravation of whatever tissue the material comes in contact with. e.g.
ammonia, nitrogen dioxide.
Asphyxiants – exert their effects through a depletion of oxygen to the tissues e.g. simple asphyxiants –
carbon dioxide, nitrogen, methane, hydrogen chemical asphyxiants – carbon monoxide, hydrogen cyanide,
hydrogen sulphide.
Narcotics or Anaesthetics – the main toxic action is the depressant effect upon the Central Nervous
System. e.g. – many organics, chloroform, xylene.
Systemic Poisons – the main toxic action includes the production of internal damage e.g. Hepatotoxic
agents – toxic effects produce liver damage. eg. carbon tetrachloride.
e.g. Nephrotoxic agents – toxic effects produce kidney damage eg. some halogenated hydrocarbons
Carcinogens – agents/compounds that will induce cancer in humans. e.g. benzene, arsenic, inorganic salts
of chromium, nickel, beryllium.
Mutagens – agents that affect the cells of the exposed people in such a way that it may cause cancer in the
exposed individual or an undesirable mutation to occur in some later generation. e.g. radiation, variety of
chemical agents that alter the genetic message.
Teratogens – Agents or compounds that a pregnant woman takes into her body that generate defects in the
fetus e.g. Thalidomide, possibly steroids
Sensitizers – Agents that may cause allergic or allergic-like responses to occur.
After an initial exposure to a substance an individual may become sensitized to that substance. Subsequent
exposures to the same substance, often at a much lower concentration than before, produces an allergic
response. This response may be a skin rash (dermatitis) or an asthmatic-like attack, depending on the route
of exposure. e.g. cutting oils, isocyanates in polyurethane foam operations and paint spraying operations,
some laboratory solvents.
Health Effects – Chronic vs Acute

Once a toxic substance has contacted the body it may have either acute (immediate) or chronic (long term)
effects.
Example: Spilling acid on your hand will cause immediate harm, i.e. a burn to the skin.
Exposure to asbestos or tobacco smoke may result in lung cancer after as much as twenty years (this is a
long term effect).
Exposure – Chronic vs Acute
Exposure can be classified as chronic or acute. In chronic exposures, the dose is delivered at some
frequency (daily or weekly usually) over a period of time. In acute exposures, the dose is delivered in a
single event and absorption is rapid. Usually, a chronic exposure occurs at low concentration and acute
exposure at high concentration.
Some materials may only cause harm if given acutely, not having any effect in the long term. Other
materials may not exhibit an effect in the short term, but may cause problems after prolonged exposure.
Asphyxiation: Means dying from lack of oxygen. Anyone who chokes to death dies from asphyxiation.
This is a medical word for a horrible thing that could happen to anyone. Asphyxiation, also known as
suffocation, means to die from lack of oxygen.
Types:
● Hanging(Suspension)
● Ligature (Strangulation.)
● Manual Strangulation.
● Smothering.
● Gagging.
● Choking.
● Drowning.
Respiratory impacts: Pulmonary (Lungs) complications, especially aspiration, are the most frequently
reported adverse effect of hydrocarbon exposure.
1. Hydrocarbon aspiration: Pneumonitis results from a direct toxic affect by the hydrocarbon on the lung
parenchyma. Hydrocarbon aspiration may cause interstitial inflammation, intra-alveolar hemorrhage and
edema, hyperemia, bronchial necrosis, and vascular necrosis.
2. Exposure to hydrocarbon gas can cause a narcotic effect while aspiration in lower concentrations. The
potential for narcotic effect increases as the molecular weight rises, which means that the risk is greater in
connection with condensate leaks as compared with gas leaks. A narcotic effect can occur very quickly -
typically after just 4-5 breaths, if the concentration is high enough.
3. H2S and CO are also asphyxiant gases emitted from oil and gas well and cause several health hazards.
Skin (Dermal) impacts:

1. BTEXs causes skin and eye irritation are well documented, but effects from systemic absorption are not
well mentioned. It is reasonable to expect that adverse hematological and immunological effects might
occur following dermal exposure to benzene.
2. The PAHs tend to be irritating to the skin. In addition, benzo(a)pyrene has been shown to cause
immunological/lympho-reticular effects evidence as contact hypersensitivity or suppression of this response
to other sensitizers. The PAHs classified as B2 carcinogens induce skin tumors.
⮚ Effect of sour gases:

Sour gas is natural gas or any other gas containing significant amounts (> 4 ppm) of hydrogen sulfide. Sour
gas reserves with high concentration of H2S are historically left undeveloped because of the technical
challenges and costs involved in their extraction and processing. Although the terms 'acid gas' and 'sour gas'
are sometimes used interchangeably, strictly speaking, a sour gas is any gas that specifically contains
hydrogen sulfide (H2S) in significant amounts, whereas an acid gas is any gas that contains significant
amounts of acidic gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2) or hydrogen sulfide. Thus, carbon dioxide by itself is
an acid gas, not a sour gas. In addition to being toxic, hydrogen sulfide in the presence of water also
damages piping and other equipment handling sour gas by sulfide stress cracking. Natural gas typically
contains several ppm of volatile sulfur compounds.
Hydrogen sulfide (H2S): H2S is: Toxic, Flammable & Corrosive hence harmful.
While many hydrocarbon reservoirs will contain native or natural H 2S (considered sour), many heavy oil
reservoirs are sweet with the majority of sulfides being bound within organosulfurspecies or metal sulfide.
While the later bituminous hydrocarbon reserves do not contain native H2S, the stimulation of flow by the
introduction of high-pressure steam causes the thermochemical production of H2S, CO2, CO, H2, CH4 and
other minor hydrocarbons. As a result, the associated sour gases produced at surface often contain up to 5%
H2S which must be removed and converted to elemental sulfur (recover) to avoid extraneous SO2 emission.
The removal of H 2S from sour gas is called “sweetening". The Claus process is the most
significant sulfur recovery process in the industry, recovering elemental sulfur from gaseous hydrogen
sulfide. the Claus process recovers elemental sulfur from an acid gas stream through partial oxidation of the
H2S to SO2 and then to Sulfur. Typically, the Claus process works along with an acid gas removal system,
which serves to remove the hydrogen sulfide from the sour gas stream. The resulting acid gas stream which
generally contains hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide and moisture can be treated through a Claus unit.
Effects on health:
Concentration in
Health Effects
Air (H2S)
Odour of rotten eggs can be clearly detected. Noticeable odour at concentrations as

< 1 ppm
low as 10 ppb.
Unpleasant odour. Possible eye irritation. American Conference of Industrial

1 ppm
Hygienists (ACGIH) recommended Threshold Limit Value Time Weighted Average
(TLV-TWA) over 8 hours
5 ppm ACGIH Threshold Limit Value Short Term Exposure Level (TLV- STEL) averaged
over 15 minutes
50 ppm Loss of sense of smell after about 15 or more minutes exposure. Exposure over one
hour may lead to headache, dizziness, and/or staggering.
Coughing, eye irritation, loss of sense of smell after 3 to 15 minutes. Altered

100 ppm
respiration, pain in eyes, and drowsiness after 15 to 20 minutes, followed by throat
irritation after one hour.
The sense of smell will be lost rapidly, and it will irritate the eyes and throat.
200 ppm
Prolonged exposure (>20 to 30 minutes) may cause irreversible pulmonary oedema,
i.e. accumulation of fluid in the lungs.
Unconsciousness after short exposure, breathing will stop if not treated quickly.
500 ppm
Dizziness, loss of sense of reasoning and balance. Victims need prompt artificial
ventilation and /or cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) techniques.
Unconscious quickly. Breathing will stop and death will result if not rescued
700 ppm
promptly. Artificial ventilation and/or cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) are
needed immediately
Effect of Carbon monoxide CO:

Virtually all sour natural gases also contain CO & CO 2 besides H2S, but the converse is not true: many
natural gas mixtures can contain CO2 without any H2S. CO2 and H2S are called “acid gases,” or collectively
“acid gas,” as both gases are slightly soluble in water and form a mildly acidic solution. Most regenerative
processes used for H2S removal from natural gas also remove CO 2. Carbon monoxide (CO)—a colorless,
odorless, tasteless, and toxic air pollutant—is produced in the incomplete combustion of carbon-containing
fuels, such as gasoline, natural gas, oil, coal, and wood. Although most of the CO converts into CO 2, when
came in contact with oxygen but CO has dangerous health impacts even in small concentration.
Some effects are:
1. CO poisoning is very hazardous. Breathing CO can cause headache, dizziness, vomiting, and nausea. CO
has a many fold affinity to combine with Hemoglobin as compared to oxygen hence causes asphyxiation.
2. If CO levels are high enough, you may become unconscious or die. Exposure to moderate and high levels
of CO over long periods of time has also been linked with increased risk of heart disease.
3. People who survive severe CO poisoning may suffer long-term health problems. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that chronic exposure to CO may produce mild neurological effects.
Effects of carbon monoxide in relation to the concentration in parts per million in the
air
Concentration Symptoms
35 ppm Headache and dizziness within six to eight hours of constant

(0.0035%) exposure
100 ppm
Slight headache in two to three hours
(0.01%)
200 ppm
Slight headache within two to three hours; loss of judgment
(0.02%)
400 ppm
Frontal headache within one to two hours
(0.04%)
800 ppm Dizziness, nausea, and convulsions within 45 min; insensible

(0.08%) within 2 hours
1,600 ppm Headache, increased heart rate, dizziness, and nausea within 20

(0.16%) min; death in less than 2 hours
3,200 ppm Headache, dizziness and nausea in five to ten minutes. Death
(0.32%) within 30 minutes.
6,400 ppm Headache and dizziness in one to two minutes. Convulsions,

(0.64%) respiratory arrest, and death in less than 20 minutes.
12,800 ppm Unconsciousness after 2–3 breaths. Death in less than three
(1.28%) minutes.
Figure: Symptoms of CO poisoning.
⮚ Effect of corrosive material and atmosphere during sand control, fracturing,

acidization operations.
During petroleum operations, corrosion can be divided into "sweet" corrosion, and "sour" corrosion.
Corrosion because of oxygen is found with surface equipment and can be found down hole with the oxygen
introduced by water flooding, pressure maintenance, gas lifting, or completion and/or work over fluids. It is
the major corrodant of offshore platforms, at and below the tide line.
“Sweet” corrosion is generally characterized first by simple metal dissolution followed by pitting. The
corrodant is H+, derived from carbonic acid (H2CO3) and the dissolution of CO2 in the produced brine. The
pitting leaves distinctive patterns (e.g., “mesa” corrosion), attributable to the metallurgical processing used
in manufacturing the tubing. “Ringworm” corrosion is caused when welding is not followed by full-length
normalizing of the tubular after processing. Corrosion inhibitors and CRAs are effective in mitigating sweet
corrosion. Naphthenic acids and simple organic acids indigenous to crude oil also contribute to corrosion.
“Sour” corrosion (H2S) results in the formation of various insoluble iron sulfides on the metal surface. Not
only is H2S an acidic corrodant, it also acts as a catalyst for both the anodic and cathodic halves of the
corrosion reaction. Galvanic corrosion (bimetallic corrosion) is caused by the coupling of a corrosive and
noncorrosive metal in the presence of a corrodant. Erosion is yet another category of corrosion. Erosion
corrosion is the acceleration of corrosion because of the abrasion of metal surfaces by particulates (e.g.,
sand). Finally, there is corrosion caused by acids—those used to stimulate wells (HCl and HF).
Oilfield corrosion can take specific forms:
a) Metal wastage b) Pitting c) Crevice corrosion
d) Intergranular corrosion e) Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) f) Blistering
g) Embrittlement h) Sulfide stress cracking (SSC) i) Corrosion fatigue
The first five (a-e) forms involve primarily carbonic acid and/or dissolved oxygen as corrodants. Further
items are induced primarily by H2S.
Corrosive failure by uniform loss of metal is only infrequently seen during the production of oil and gas. It
is, however, the first step in corrosive failure of steels by means of localized corrosion. A circumstance for
severe metal wastage is the pumping of poorly inhibited matrix stimulation acids.
Pitting is the common failure mode of sweet corrosion and corrosion because of dissolved oxygen. All
passivating/protecting films on steel contain weak spots that will preferentially dissolve and form pits. As
mentioned, these areas are generally the sulfide inclusions. Chloride ion weakens the repassivating film,
allowing continued dissolution. The decreasing pH within the pit also enhances continued corrosion. The
driver for theses processes is the large cathodic area of the metal oxide surface vs. the small anodic pit.
Pitting is particularly dangerous because penetration through a tubular can occur relatively fast. Other
corrosion mechanisms, such as SCC, frequently start at pits. Oxygen scavengers are typically used to
remove this gas in an attempt to minimize the pitting problem. However, small amounts may remain (e.g.,
20 ppb), and these can be sufficient to induce corrosion.
Carbonic acid, the driver for sweet corrosion, is a weak acid. The pH of the formation water depends on the
CO2 partial pressure, temperature, and alkalinity (controlled primarily, but not exclusively, by the presence
or absence of carbonate minerals in the formation). As a function of CO2 partial pressure, are computed pH
values for a seawater brine (containing 140 ppm alkalinity) and a seawater brine saturated in calcite at 50
and 150°C (substantially higher alkalinities). For the common case of carbonate-containing reservoirs and
moderate temperatures, produced waters should have pH values of 6 or greater. Waters exposed to greater
amounts of CO2 in noncarbonate-containing reservoirs can have pH values of 4 or less.
Such corrosion induced by CO2 is a function not only of CO 2 partial pressure and temperature but also of the
crude oil. Crude oil contains surface-active chemicals—some oils contain more than others. These
chemicals (e.g., resins and asphaltenes) can impact the corrosion process, at least for low-alloy steels. For a
fixed brine composition, WOR, temperature, and pressure, corrosion in the presence of some crudes can be
negligible, while in the presence of others, it can be extreme under identical environmental conditions.
Sweet corrosion generally results in the deposition of insoluble FeCO 3 (siderite) on the steel surface. It has
been suggested that this selectivity to oil composition relates to the physical morphology of the FeCO 3
corrosion product—a compact, tight film can protect the steel; a loose, poorly adherent film does not. The
average uniform corrosion rate for steel in Crude B was 0.6 mil/yr; the corrosion rate in Crude E was 26
mil/yr. Many corrosion inhibitors apparently act by the same mechanism (i.e., the generation of siderite
films similar, and/or more compact than those formed from Crude B).
Case study: Los Angeles drilling : health impacts

The land of sunshine, celebrities, and world-famous beaches is also home to 5,000 active oil and gas wells.
These wells are spread across 10 oil fields and 70 different sites embedded in neighborhoods, parks, and
commercial districts throughout Los Angeles City. More broadly, 1 in 3 Los Angeles County residents live
within one mile of an oil drilling site; more than half a million live within a quarter-mile. For those living in
close proximity, oil and gas production is not only disruptive with noisy equipment, truck traffic, and
unattractive rigs, but also potentially harmful with dangerous air pollution and the use of large amounts of
toxic chemicals. Though science and impacted communities have long documented these health and quality
of life threats, the City of Los Angeles has never conducted a full environmental review of the potential
risks and necessary safeguards.
The public may not only be exposed to air toxic chemicals, but also breathe harmful pollutants including
nitrous oxide, particulate matter, and organic compounds that are released during drilling, acidization,
gravel packing, and hydraulic fracturing. These compounds can cause cancer, respiratory issues, and cause
damage to kidneys, the nervous system, the liver, brain, and heart. Furthermore, the Los Angeles Basin in
general has unsafe levels of particulate matter and ozone (a byproduct of nitrous oxide reactions), so any
additional releases add to the potential harm towards immediate communities. When taking air samples at a
subset of recent rule 1148.2 activities, the Air Quality Management District found drilling, for example,
releases over 7 pounds of nitrous oxide and nearly 4 pounds of particulate matter per day while also
increasing concentrations of dangerous compounds including hydrocarbons. Acidization, gravel packing,
and hydraulic fracturing all also released multiple harmful pollutants. With particulate matter and ozone
traveling a hundred miles or more, oil and gas emissions have the potential to harm surrounding
communities.
UNIT-2
⮚ Safety analysis:
Safety assessment and efficient control of well is critical to ensure a safe drilling operation. Traditionally,
safety assessment is done using static failure probabilities of drilling components which failed to represent a
specific case. However, in this present study, a dynamic safety assessment approach for is presented. This
approach is based on Bow-tie analysis and real time barriers failure probability assessment of offshore
drilling operations involving subsurface Blowout Preventer. The Bow-tie model is used to represent the
potential accident scenarios, their causes and the associated consequences. Real time predictive models for
the failure probabilities of key barriers are developed and used in conducting dynamic risk assessment of the
drilling operations. Using real time observed data, potential accident probabilities and associated risks are
updated and used for safety assessment. This methodology can be integrated into a real time risk monitoring
device for field application during drilling operations.
Safety risks of drilling operations exist widely because of the hostile environment, ageing equipments,
more challenging wells, human errors, etc. Failure to control or eliminate the safety risks may affect the
drilling safety and lead to drilling accidents, resulting in enormous economic losses, or even casualties.
Previous drilling accidents had shown great challenges of safety risk management, such as outdated
management ideas and tools, poor awareness of safety risks, lack of effective safety risk information sharing
and incomplete risk management system.
In this chapter, the potential safety risks associated with drilling facilities, workers, and management are
figured out, and the corresponding risk management measures are formulated. Meanwhile, the guidelines for
safety risk management of drilling operations are established. In addition, the guidelines are combined with
the information technology, and the Web and mobile versions of the intelligent safety risk management
software of drilling operations are designed and developed. The safety inspector in drilling sites can use
mobile terminals to identify the drilling risks, being recorded in the form of text, pictures, video and other
documents, and choose the risk control and mitigation measures. The safety management staff in the
company can monitor the results of chosen measures in time by using the Web version, and provide
effective and timely technical support for the field’s safety risk management if necessary.
With the use of the intelligent safety risk management software of drilling operations, the two-way
communication and safety risk information sharing between drilling sites and drilling safety management
departments can be realized.
A complete drilling safety risk management system can also be gradually developed in the process of
a) risk identification, b) record maintenance c) report analysis,
d) control, mitigation and prevention.
The intelligent safety risk management software of drilling operations has been applied in some oilfields,
and reveals excellent application prospects. Being an intelligent management tool, the software system can
significantly improve the safety risk management efficiency, and finally realize the informational
management of safety risks in drilling operations.
Safety statistics
Personal safety and health has increasingly become more of a factor and focus in offshore operations over
the years. Safety statistics show that the following statistics have improved significantly over the last 10 to
15 years:
a) Lost time incident/injury (LTIs) b) Recordable incidents
c) Near-miss incidents d) Medical treatments
Whereas the LTI rate (incidents per 200,000 hours) was commonly more than 10, it is now common to be
less than 1 and often less than 0.5. Safety offshore is no longer given mere lip service. IADC publishes
statistics monthly by participating members, and the MSS gives out coveted awards in the Gulf Coast each
year. From both a humanitarian and a financial standpoint, all feel that making safety a priority is the right
thing to do.
Health & safety offshore
All operators and drilling contractors have extensive safety programs, with the DuPont STOP (Safety
Training Observation Program) program or some modification of it being the most common element. The
STOP program emphasizes “observance” by everyone on the unit of the actions of each crewperson and the
conditions of the surroundings. STOP cards can be written by anyone on board about anyone else, from the
roustabout to the OIM, and then discussed during safety meetings.
A Job Safety Analysis (JSA) is another significant program in which detailed procedures are written up for
every major job and task, discussed before the job is performed, and then implemented during the job
performance.
The requirement to have the proper Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), such as:
a) Hard hats b) Gloves c) Safety glasses with side shields
d) Proper shirts and pants e) Protective gloves
The following drills also contribute to improving safety in the workplace:
a) Man overboard b) Firefighting c) Helicopter landing and takeoff
d) Lifeboat use e) First aid f) Entry into non-ventilated tanks, etc.
Off and on the rig, training schools teach the following specialties, resulting in an enlightened
operation and better safety and performance:
⮚ Crane operation
⮚ Well control
⮚ Firefighting
⮚ Helicopter crash survival
⮚ Team building
⮚ Leadership, etc.
Before a crewman can be hired to go offshore, an extensive physical (including drug screening) is usually
given. For newcomers, there are roustabout and roughneck schools, such as those given on the Mr. Charlie
(now a museum and training platform in Morgan City, Louisiana). The following are strictly prohibited
offshore and, if discovered, usually mean instant dismissal and transport to shore for the offender:
⮚ Intoxicating beverages
⮚ Firearms
⮚ Weapons
⮚ Illegal drugs
Almost every rig has a paramedic as part of the crew, with access to doctors and medical help instantly
through satellite and/or other communication medium. Tens of millions of dollars and an extensive amount
of time and effort continue to be spent by all trying to run a safe operation offshore, and statistics show that
the industry has shown considerable improvement.
Environmental considerations
Environmental and anti pollution policies and efforts have increased steadily over the last 30 to 35 years.
The government authorities have extremely strict laws and procedures for before, during, and after leases
are put up for sale, drilled, produced, and abandoned. The fear of pollution, or the potential for a spill, is so
great that some areas, such as the east and west coasts of the U.S.A., have seen no drilling for years. Most of
Florida is off limits, even though limited drilling has shown potential for gas.
Through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), every rig has an international oil pollution plan
that details the procedure to follow in the event of a spill (even a very small one). In the United States, even
a very small fuel oil spill must be reported to the U.S. Coast Guard immediately. Fines of U.S. $10,000 or
more can be imposed for each incident. Discharge of any toxic or potentially polluting fluid or solids
overboard is strictly prohibited. Solid food waste must be ground into mulch before discharge.
Drill cuttings in some areas cannot be discharged overboard and must be transported to shore for disposal
and/or injected into an approved reservoir offshore, usually down a casing annulus.
Some areas offshore in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) do not allow mooring of vessels or discharge of cuttings
because of sensitive coral reefs (possibly thousands of feet underwater), tubeworms, and other protected
entities.
The most feared environmental event from a MODU is a blowout of crude oil. Well-control equipment
capabilities, procedures, and training have improved steadily over the years to a level where a blowout of
any significance is extremely rare. The industry spends billions of dollars on antipollution and
environmental safeguards every year, in an effort to comply with laws and the public’s desire for pollution-
free operations.
HSE&S has become as important in offshore operations as drilling the well. Drilling contractors are taken
off operator bid lists if they do not have and do not demonstrate a sound, statistically proven system for
human, equipment, well, pollution, security, and operational well-being.
Safety Hazards Associated with Oil and Gas Extraction Activities
Oil and gas well drilling and servicing activities involve many different types of equipment and materials.
Recognizing and controlling hazards is critical to preventing injuries and deaths. Several of these hazards
are highlighted below. See Standards and Enforcement for more information on evaluation and control
requirements.
⮚ Vehicle Collisions
⮚ Struck-By/ Caught-In/ Caught-Between
⮚ Explosions and Fires
⮚ Falls
⮚ Confined Spaces
⮚ Ergonomic Hazards
⮚ High Pressure Lines and Equipment
⮚ Electrical and Other Hazardous Energy
⮚ Machine Hazards
⮚ Planning and Prevention
Vehicle Collisions: Workers and equipment are required to be transported to and from well sites. Wells are
often located in remote areas, and require traveling long distances to get to the sites. Highway vehicle
crashes are the leading cause of oil and gas extraction worker fatalities. Roughly 4 of every 10 workers
killed on the job in this industry are killed as a result of a highway vehicle incident (Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries). The following OSHA and NIOSH documents provide guidance on recognizing and
controlling vehicle-related hazards.
Struck-By/ Caught-In/ Caught-Between: Three of every five on-site fatalities in the oil and gas extraction
industry are the result of struck-by/caught -in/caught-between hazards (OSHA IMIS Database). Workers
might be exposed to struck-by/caught-in/caught-between hazards from multiple sources, including moving
vehicles or equipment, falling equipment, and high-pressure lines.
Explosions and Fires: Workers in the oil and gas industries face the risk of fire and explosion due to
ignition of flammable vapors or gases. Flammable gases, such as well gases, vapors, and hydrogen sulfide,
can be released from wells, trucks, production equipment or surface equipment such as tanks and shale
shakers. Ignition sources can include static, electrical energy sources, open flames, lightning, cigarettes,
cutting and welding tools, hot surfaces, and frictional heat.
Falls: Workers might be required to access platforms and equipment located high above the ground. OSHA
requires fall protection to prevent falls from the mast, drilling platform, and other elevated equipment.
Confined Spaces: Workers are often required to enter confined spaces such as petroleum and other storage
tanks, mud pits, reserve pits and other excavated areas, sand storage containers, and other confined spaces
around a wellhead. Safety hazards associated with confined space include ignition of flammable vapors or
gases. Health hazards include asphyxiation and exposure to hazardous chemicals. Confined spaces that
contain or have the potential to contain a serious atmospheric hazard must be classified as permit-required
confined spaces, tested prior to entry, and continuously monitored.
Ergonomic Hazards: Oil and gas workers might be exposed to ergonomics-related injury risks, such as
lifting heavy items, bending, reaching overhead, pushing and pulling heavy loads, working in awkward
body postures, and performing the same or similar tasks repetitively. Risk factors and the resulting injuries
can be minimized or, in many cases, eliminated through interventions such as pre-task planning, use of the
right tools, proper placement of materials, education of workers about the risk, and early recognition and
reporting of injury signs and symptoms.
High Pressure Lines and Equipment: Workers might be exposed to hazards from compressed gases or
from high-pressure lines. Internal erosion of lines might result in leaks or line bursts, exposing workers to
high-pressure hazards from compressed gases or from high-pressure lines. If connections securing high-
pressure lines fail, struck-by hazards might be created.
High Pressure Lines and Equipment: Compressed Gas and Equipment. Prescribed standards and hazard-
control measures associated with compressed gas and equipment are followed.
Pressure Vessels. Reviews standards and hazard-control measures associated with pressurized tanks and
containers need to be followed.
Electrical and Other Hazardous Energy: Workers might be exposed to uncontrolled electrical,
mechanical, hydraulic, or other sources of hazardous energy if equipment is not designed, installed, and
maintained properly. Further, administrative controls such as operating procedures must be developed and
implemented to ensure safe operations.
Machine Hazards: Oil and gas extraction workers may be exposed to a wide variety of rotating wellhead
equipment, including top drives and Kelly drives, drawworks, pumps, compressors, catheads, hoist blocks,
belt wheels, and conveyors, and might be injured if they are struck by or caught between unguarded
machines.
Planning and Prevention: For process-specific and task-specific hazards and controls, see OSHA's Oil and
Gas Well Drilling and Servicing eTool. The eTool identifies common hazards and possible solutions to
reduce incidents that could lead to injuries or deaths. Each drilling and servicing company should have its
own safety program:
Know the hazards. Evaluate the hazards at the worksite. Many companies within the oil and gas industry
use the Job Safety Analysis Process (also referred to as a JSA, Job Hazard Analysis, or JHA) to identify
hazards and find solutions.
Establish ways to protect workers, including developing and implementing safe practices for:
a) Confined space; excavations b) Chemical handling; exposure c) Chemical storage
d) Electrical work e) Emergency response f) Equipment/machine
hazards
g) Fall protection h) Fire protection i) Hot work, welding, flame cutting
operations
j) Personal protective equipment use k) Power sources (lockout/tagout provisions, safe distance
from power lines) l) Working in the heat, long shifts
Provide personal protective equipment (PPE). When engineering controls alone cannot protect
worker overexposure to chemicals, noise, or other hazards, the employer must provide PPE.
Communicate the hazards, and train workers. Have a plan for contractor safety and training.
The biggest risk of fire is any spark potential, in my opinion. Other works can increase risk, such as naked
flame works. The risk of fire is heightened significantly if a gas release is incurred. Any gas release requires
an ignition source. There are controls and barriers put in place to prevent a release actually finding an
ignition source, such as an open electrical box or loose wires that may be live.
The new risk, in my opinion, is mobile phones offshore. With increased provision of Wi-Fi there is a higher
user rate within the offshore community keeping contact with home via a mobile device which leads to the
device finding its way outside on to the process plant. This is a large risk, as mobile phones are not
intrinsically rated and if dropped the battery can potentially cause a spark. In short, no one would fill their
car up in the petrol station while using their phone, however offshore that risk is not taken as seriously as it
should be. Designing an ultra-stable offshore accommodation vessel
Norwegian company SALT Ship Design has collaborated with ship-owner stensj on a new, ultra-stable
accommodation craft.
The installation fire pumps and the fixed deluge systems, the fire water systems and all their associated
parts. Without a doubt these [are the most important], combined with ‘blow down operations’ and the
emergency shutdown valves – these close on signal to stop any further flammable liquids returning to the
top side infrastructure and maintaining or fuelling a fire. With a number of actions being implemented
simultaneously on the installation, the intensity of any fire can be reduced by removing any part of the fire
triangle. If the fire pump is out of operation then there is no way of supplying pressurised fire water to any
part of the installation.
If the deluge systems are not working and the fire pump is healthy then we can have water but cannot
distribute it. If we fail to cool the area then the increased risk of heat and fire spreading to other adjacent
areas increases the risk.
⮚ Manual and Automatic shutdown system:
An Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system is a method to rapidly cease the operation of the process and isolate
it from incoming or going connections or flows to reduce the likelihood of an unwanted event from
occurring, continuing, or escalating. The aim of an ESD system is to protect personnel, afford protection to
the facility, and prevention of an environmental impact from a process event. Most ESD systems are
designed so that several mechanisms can initiate a facility shutdown. mechanisms are provided by both
manual and automatic means. They may include the following:
1. Manual activation from a main facility control point.
2. Manual activation from strategically located initiation stations within the facility.
3. Automatic activation from fire or gas detection systems.
4. Automatic activation from process instrumentation set points.
Emergency shutdown Action Criticality

level
1 Total Facility Shutdown Catastrophic
2 Unit or Plant Shutdown Severe
3 Equipment Shutdown Major
4 Non ESD process or Slight or Routine

control alarm
⮚ Blow down system:

Blow down: To vent gas from a well or production system. Oil Wells that have been shut in for a period
frequently develop a gas cap caused by gas percolating through the fluid column in the wellbore. It is often
desirable to remove or vent the free gas before starting well intervention work. It is desirable to remove this
gas cap by flaring the accumulated gases before starting well intervention. This flaring of gases is referred to
as casing blowdown. The term gas blowdown is referred to venting of gas accumulated in equipments,
process facilities, oil production wells etc. The gas which is to be blown down is not desired to be used for
production of a variety of possible reasons and is usually vented through a flare. The flare burns the
hydrocarbons before venting product gases to atmosphere. A valve or system of valves that, when activated,
initiates a blowdown of a pipeline, plant, process or platform; similar to an emergency shutdown valve
(ESDV) that shuts in a pipeline, the Blow Down Valve (BDV) opens a pipeline. Since blowdown valves
are simply on-off valves, they cannot restrict the gas flow. The blowdown lines are often equipped with
restriction orifices downstream of blowdown valves to restrict the gas flow being sent to the flare to a
certain limit. In the safe design of blowdown systems, an essential design step is to ensure that temperatures
resulting from auto-refrigeration during depressurisation do not lead to a risk of brittle fracture in both the
process equipment and flare system. Quantitative analysis of the rapid depressurisation (“blowdown”) of
high-pressure vessels and process piping is an essential element for the design and safety analysis of Oil &
Gas facilities and other high-pressure installations. Process blowdown usually determines the minimum
design temperature and thus the material of construction (e.g. carbon steel, low temperature carbon steel or
stainless steel) for each part of the facility and so can have a very significant impact on capital cost
expenditure. Equally, if wrongly specified, the safety of the facility is at risk.
⮚ Gas leakage:
Along with the increase in number of wells, the amount of related equipment that has the potential to leak
will increase as well. The emissions that occur from leaks are in the form of gasses or evaporated liquids
that escape to the atmosphere. Some of the potential leak emissions from these sources include methane and
VOCs. Potential sources of leak emissions from these sites include agitator seals, compressors seals,
connectors, pump diaphragms, flanges, hatches, instruments, meters, open ended lines, pressure relief
devices, pump seals, valves, and improperly controlled liquids storage. Changes in pressure, temperature
and mechanical stresses on equipment may eventually cause them to leak. There are a number of
technologies available that can be used to identify leaks and a number of approaches to repairing those
leaks. The technologies for identifying leaks and the approaches to repairing leaks are discussed in separate
sections below:
a) Leak Detection: (i) Portable Analyzers : A portable monitoring instrument is used to detect hydrocarbon
leaks from individual pieces of equipment. These instruments are intended to locate and classify leaks based
on the leak definition of the equipment as specified in a specific regulation, and arenot used as a direct
measure of mass emission rate from individual sources. The instruments provide a reading of the
concentration of the leak in either ppm, parts per billion(ppb), or percent concentration. The portable
monitoring instruments operate on a variety of detection principles, with the three most common being
ionization, IR absorption and combustion.
(ii) Optical Gas Imaging (IR Camera): Optical gas imaging (OGI) is a technology that operates much like a
consumer video camcorder and provides a real time visual image of gas emissions or leaks to the
atmosphere. The OGI camera works by using spectral wavelength filtering and an array of IR detectors to
visualize the IR absorption of hydrocarbons and other gaseous compounds.
(iii) Acoustic Leak Detector: Acoustic leak detectors are used to detect the acoustic signal that results when
pressurized gas leaks from a component. This acoustic signal occurs due to turbulent flow when pressurized
gas moves from a high pressure to a low pressure environment across a leak opening.
(iv) Ambient/Mobile Monitoring: A growing number of research and industry groups are using mobile
measurement approaches to investigate a variety of source emissions and air quality topics. For oil and
natural gas applications, a vehicle can be equipped with at minimum a methane measurement instrument
and GPS to facilitate discovery of previously unknown sources and in more advanced forms, provide
information on source emission rates. Mobile leak detection techniques sample emission plumes from
standoff (sometimes offsite) observing locations and are,Therefore, generally less accurate than direct
(onsite) source measurements. Mobile leak detection techniques can cover large survey areas and can be
particularly useful in identifying anomalous operating conditions.
b) Repair
After a leak is detected, the owner or operator of the facility must decide whether or not to fix the leak,
unless they are required to fix the leak due to regulatory or permitting obligations. It is suggested that once a
leak is found it is almost always economical to repair the leak. According to the studies reviewed, the cost
of detecting the leak is generally far larger than the cost of fixing the leak.
⮚ Fire detection and suppression systems:
A key aspect of fire protection is to identify a developing fire emergency in a timely manner, and to alert the
building's occupants and fire emergency organizations. This is the role of fire detection and alarm systems.
The control panel is the "brain" of the fire detection and alarm system. It is responsible for monitoring the
various alarm "input" devices such as manual and automatic detection components, and then activating
alarm "output" devices such as horns, bells, warning lights, emergency telephone dialers, and building
controls.
1. Fire detection: a) Manual fire detection is the oldest method of detection. In the simplest form, a person
yelling can provide fire warning. b) Thermal detectors are a type of automatic detection devices, having
origin in the mid 1800's, with several styles still in production today. The most common units are fixed
temperature devices that operate when the room reaches a predetermined temperature (usually in the 135°–
165°F/57°–74°C). The second most common type of thermal sensor is the rate-of-rise detector, which
identifies an abnormally fast temperature climb over a short time period. The third detector type is the fixed
temperature line type detector, which consists of two cables and an insulated sheathing that is designed to
breakdown when exposed to heat. C) Smoke detector, which has become widely used in extremely
sensitive applications, is the air aspirating system. This device consists of two main components: a cotrol
unit that houses the detection chamber, an aspiration fan and operation circuitry; and a network of sampling
tubes or pipes. Along the pipes are a series of ports that are designed to permit air to enter the tubes and be
transported to the detector.
2. Suppression system: There are four means used by the agents to extinguish a fire. They act on the "fire
tetrahedron":
1) Reduction or isolation of fuel. No agents currently use this as the primary means of fire suppression.
2) Reduction of heat. Representative agents: Novec 1230, pentafluoroethane (NAF S125, ECARO-25).
3) Reduction or isolation of oxygen: Representative agents: Argonite / IG-55 (ProInert), CO 2 carbon
dioxide, IG-541 Inergen, and IG-100 (NN100).
4) Inhibiting the chain reaction of the above components. Representative agents: FE-13, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3-
Heptafluoropropane, FE-25, haloalkanes, bromotrifluoromethane, trifluoroiodomethane, NAF P-IV, NAF S-
III, NAF S 125, NAF S 227, and Triodide (Trifluoroiodomethane).
Methods:
a) Fire Sprinklers Fire sprinklers utilize water by direct application onto flames and heat, which causes
cooling of the combustion process and prevents ignition of adjacent combustibles. They are most effective
during the fire's initial flame growth stage, while the fire is relatively easy to control.b) CO2 Extinguisher It
suppresses the fire by discountinuing the availability of oxygen to the fuel.
c) Condensed aerosol fire suppression is a particle-based form of fire extinction similar to gaseous fire
suppression or dry chemical fire extinction. The aerosol employs a fire extinguishing agent consisting of
very fine solid particles and gaseous matter to extinguish fires. The condensed aerosol microparticles and
effluent gases are generated by the exothermic reaction; until discharged from the device, the particles
remain in vapor state. They are cooled and "condensed" within the device and discharged as solid particles.
⮚ Hazard and failure mode analysis:
Hazard: Any chemical, biological or physical condition that has potential to cause damage to people,
property and environment.
Hazard analysis: Identification of undesired events and analysis of mechanism which led to these events
and further estimation of extent, magnitude and likelihood of harmful effects. It can be depicted by figure
below:
The process mainly involve: HAZOP and FMEA.

⮚ HAZOP: A hazard and operability study. HAZOP is a structured and systematic examination of a
complex planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may
represent risks to personnel or equipment. The intention of performing a HAZOP is to review the
design to pick up design and engineering issues that may otherwise not have been found. The
technique is based on breaking the overall complex design of the process into a number of simpler
sections called 'nodes' which are then individually reviewed. It is carried out by a suitably
experienced multi-disciplinary team (HAZOP) during a series of meetings. The HAZOP technique is
qualitative, and aims to stimulate the imagination of participants to identify potential hazards and
operability problems. Structure and direction are given to the review process by applying
standardised guide-word prompts to the review of each node. The relevant international standard
calls for team members to display 'intuition and good judgement' and for the meetings to be held in 'a
climate of positive thinking and frank discussion'.
Hazop Objectives: HAZOP studies are conducted to identify the following:
1. Any perceived deviation from intended design.
2. Causes for those deviations
3. Consequences of those perceived deviations
4. Safegaurds to prevent the causes and mitigate the consequences
5. Recommend the action and deviation in design to improve safety.
Regulating authorities are looking for new mechanisms to assure the safety of petroleum installations.
Therefore, the use of HAZOP studies to identify offshore risks may continue to increase in the
industry as a response to safety requirements. The efficient coordination of the companies involved
in the process and the companies' commitment to safety practices may reduce risks during
interventions. The subsea industry is increasing its work in deep water regions, and the challenges to
achieve production in reservoirs located in extreme conditions are also increasing. The assessment
tools, such as HAZOP, will contribute to ensuring intervention activities.
⮚ FMEA: Failure mode and effects analysis. An FMEA is often the first step of a system reliability
study. It involves reviewing as many components, assemblies, and subsystems as possible to identify
failure modes, and their causes and effects. For each component, the failure modes and their
resulting effects on the rest of the system are recorded in a specific FMEA worksheet. There are
numerous variations of such worksheets. An FMEA can be a qualitative analysis, but may be put on
a quantitative basis when mathematical failure rate models are combined with a statistical failure
mode ratio database. Sometimes FMEA is extended to FMECA (failure mode, effects, and criticality
analysis) to indicate that criticality analysis is performed too. FMEA is used to structure Mitigation
for Risk reduction based on either failure (mode) effect severity reduction or based on lowering the
probability of failure or both. A simple FMEA can be created easily with a spreadsheet program.
However, simple spreadsheets are not designed to handle a complex relation structured document
such as an FMEA. Each process has many requirements, each requirement has many potential failure
modes. On a large project the FMEA becomes increasingly complicated and so FMEA software is
useful to handle this.
⮚ Disaster and crisis management:

Once the hazards are identified, safeguards can be recommended, which can either prevent an event from
occurring or reduce the consequences, if at all the event occurs. The process of disaster and crisis
management is adopted as the next step.
A disaster is a serious disruption, occurring over a relatively short time, of the functioning of a community
or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental loss and impacts, which
exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. Example BP oil
disaster gulf of mexico.
Crisis is the situation of a complex system (Industry, Organization, Society) when the system functions
poorly, an immediate decision is necessary, but the causes of the dysfunction are not immediately identified.
⮚ Case Studies:
⮚ Piper Alpha Explosion (North Sea, 1988)
With 167 fatalities Piper Alpha is the deadliest accident in the history of the offshore oil and gas industry.
The Piper field is located about 120 miles north-east of Aberdeen and the platform initially produced crude
oil, while in late 1980, gas conversion equipment was installed allowing the facility to produce gas as well
as oil. A sub-sea pipeline, shared with the Claymore platform, connected Piper Alpha to the Flotta oil
terminal on the Orkney Islands. Piper Alpha also had gas pipelines connecting it to both the Tartan platform
and to the separate MCP-O1 gas processing platform. In total, Piper Alpha had four main transport risers: an
oil export riser, the Claymore gas riser, the Tartan gas riser and the MCP-01 gas riser.
On 06 July 1988, work began on one of two condensate-injection pumps, designated A and B, which were
used to compress gas on the platform prior to transport of the gas to Flotta. A pressure safety valve was
removed from compressor A for recalibration and re-certification and two blind flanges were fitted onto the
open pipework. The dayshift crew then finished for the day.
During the evening of 06 July, pump B tripped and the nightshift crew decided that pump A should be
brought back into service. Once the pump was operational, gas condensate leaked from the two blind
flanges and, at around 2200 hours, the gas ignited and exploded, causing fires and damage to other areas
with the further release of gas and oil. Some twenty minutes later, the Tartan gas riser failed and a second
major explosion occurred followed by widespread fire. Fifty minutes later, at around 2250 hours, the MCP-
01 gas riser failed resulting in a third major explosion. Further explosions then ensued, followed by the
eventual structural collapse of a significant proportion of the installation.
167 men died as a result of the explosions and fire on board the Piper Alpha, including two operators of a
Fast Rescue Craft. 62 men survived, mostly by jumping into the sea from the high decks of the platform.
About 100 recommendations from the Inquiry practically re-shaped offshore safety legislation and practices.
A number of factors contributed to the severity of the incident:
1. the breakdown of the chain of command and lack of any communication to the platform's crew;
2. the presence of fire walls and the lack of blast walls - the fire walls predated the installation of the gas
conversion equipment and were not upgraded to blast walls after the conversion;
3. the continued pumping of gas and oil by the Tartan and Claymore platforms, which was not shut down
due to a perceived lack of authority, even though personnel could see the Piper burning.
Macondo Blowout (Gulf of Mexico, 2010)

On 20 April 2010, the Macondo well blew out, costing the lives of 11 men, the beginning of a catastrophe
that sank the Deepwater Horizon drifting rig and spilled over 4 million barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of
Mexico. The spill disrupted an entire region’s economy, damaged fisheries and critical habitats, and brought
vividly to light the risks of deepwater drilling oil and gas.
At approximately 9:45 p.m. CDT, on April 20, 2010, methane gas from the well, under high pressure, shot
all the way up and out of the drill column, expanded onto the platform, and then ignited and exploded. Fire
then engulfed the platform. Most of the workers escaped the rig by lifeboat and were subsequently
evacuated by boat or airlifted by helicopter for medical treatment; however, eleven workers were never
found despite a three-day Coast Guard search operation, and are believed to have died in the explosion.
Efforts by multiple ships to douse the flames were unsuccessful. After burning for approximately 36 hours,
the Deepwater Horizon sank on the morning of 22 April 2010. The leak lasted for 87 days and resulted in an
unprecedented environmental disaster.
The root technical cause of the blowout was that the cement that BP and Halliburton pumped to the bottom
of the well did not seal off hydrocarbons in the formation. Factors that increased the risk of cement failure at
Macondo include: First, drilling complications forced engineers to plan a “finesse” cement job that called
for a low overall volume of cement. Second, the cement slurry itself was poorly designed and tested, while
the temporary abandonment procedures, finalized only at the last minute, called for rig personnel to severely
“underbalance” the well before installing any additional barriers to back up the cement job. The results of
the negative pressure test conducted on April 20 and clearly showing that hydrocarbons were leaking into
the well were misinterpreted by the well site leaders and Transocean personnel. Transocean and Sperry
Drilling rig personnel then missed a number of further signals that hydrocarbons had entered the well and
were rising to the surface during the final hour before the blowout actually occurred. By the time they
recognized a blowout was occurring and activated the Blowout Preventer (BOP) it was too late for that
device to prevent an explosion. Furthermore the preventer itself was inadequately designed (single blind
shear ram, unable to cut through tool joints) and operating.
The underlying cause of the accident was a bad safety culture of the operator (BP) and its contractors
(Transocean, Halliburton). The investigation reports (Commission Report to the President and Chief
Counsel’s Report) reveal a series of organisational and safety management failures that led to the accident.
Amongst them, the following can be stressed:
a. Lack of adequate hazard identification – in particular addressing risks rising from the frontier conditions
and from changes to well design and conditions
b. Inadequate level of detail in procedures
c. Lack to timely recognise and react to early warning signals
d. Lack of communication
e. Lack of clear leadership, especially lack of a culture of leadership responsibility
f. Lack of the ability to learn lessons from other accidents and recent near-misses.
g. Lack of appropriate training of personnel, especially in reacting to emergency situations.
The investigation reports contain also recommendations for regulatory reform, since the Minerals
Management Service (MMS) regulatory structure in place in April 2010 was found completely inadequate
to address the risks of deepwater drilling projects like Macondo. Amongst others the Report’s
recommendations include:
a. The need to separate leasing from safety oversight regulatory functions
b. The need for a shift towards a risk-based performance approach, similar to the “safety-case” approach
used in the North Sea
c. The need of authorisation, review and approval of the safety case, as well as performance of inspections
d. The need for improved international safety standards
e. The need for increased transparency, reporting of incidents and near-misses for the purpose of lessons
learning.
f. The need for increased capabilities and better planning for emergency response.
Table: Failures and lessons learned from landmark accidents:
Failures Lessons learned
Prevention
Failure to properly identify risks and address them Performance of adequate risk assessment:
in risk assessment - Identification of hazards under extreme
conditions, during changes of procedures
and boundary conditions and during all
phases of the life cycle of the oil & gas
exploitation activity
- Existence, application and review of high
level standards for hazard identification
Failure of cementing job in well Appropriate cementing of the well:
(primary barrier) - Existence of high level well integrity
standards and practices
- Operator follows adequate procedures
- Operator/contractor recognises early
signals and reacts promptly
- Operator maintains high safety culture level
- Appropriate oversight by regulatory
authorities; control conformity, review risk
assessment, check operator’s /contractor’s
capacity
Failure of BOP (blowout preventer) (Secondary Installation of BOP with adequate features.
barrier) Ensure performance as preventer and
integrate in prevention system:
- Existence of high level technology
standards (e.g. double shear ram, or able to
cut through joints)
- Risk assessment ensures increased
reliability of the overall protection system;
ensures that it works under all conditions
- Operator applies state-of-the-art
technology and recognised best practices

- Regulatory authority oversees risks,
reviews risk management and performs
inspections
Early warning
Failure to recognise and react to early warning Better monitoring, early detection and
signals of hydrocarbons entering the well interpretation of early warning signals:
- Existence and application of good
practices
Mitigation
Failure to adequately use the diverter; too much Installation of diverter of appropriate design
reliance on human response under pressure and with the adequate features. Ensure that
in case of accident, it is used in the
appropriate way to avoid escalation:
standards with appropriate balance between
automatic / human intervention
- Risk assessment ensures increased
reliability of the overall protection system and
appropriate protection level
- Regulatory authority oversees risks,
reviews risk management and performs
inspections
Failure to avoid ignition of released hydrocarbons Installation and functioning of gas detectors
in appropriately defined hazardous areas;
avoid ignition sources in these areas:
- Existence of good practices for the
definition of hazardous and high technology
in gas detectors
- Operator installs state-of-the-art gas
detectors in appropriate locations and
extends the hazardous areas where
necessary
- Regulatory authority checks adequacy of
protection measures and performs
inspections
Failure to protect vulnerable areas (e.g. control Use of materials and designs that withstand
room, workers’ area, vulnerable compartments) increased overpressure (high-strength steel):
from the impact of explosion - Existence of best technologies and good
practices for the protection of vulnerable
areas
- Operator installs state-of-the-art protection
measures (balance with increased cost and
other drawbacks)
- Regulatory authority checks adequacy of
protection measures
Preparedness and planning
Failure to be adequately prepared to respond to the Be prepared and foresee the capacities
accident needed to respond to the accident. Develop a
plan on how to respond:
- Existence of good practices
- Development of scenarios and
assessment of capacities necessary to
efficiently respond to these scenarios (e.g. to
rescue personnel, to stop the release, to drill
relief wells, to contain the spill)
- Operator develops emergency plan
(internal) based on commonly acceptable
scenarios and good practices. He has to
ensure that capacities are in place.
- Regulatory authority has to review and
inspect the emergency plans and to confirm
the existence of capacities. It also has to
ensure that other respond authorities (e.g.
costal guard, civil protection, maritime
pollution control) are informed
- Transboundary effects
Emergency response
Failure to adequately respond to the accident Application of highly sophisticated

emergency response technologies and
application of efficient plans, mobilising all
necessary capacities of the operator and the
Member States (Note: No progress in
response measures has been noticed
between Exxon Valdez and Deepwater
Horizon oil spills):
standards and best available technologies
for emergency response
- Existence of capacities
- Emergency plan (external) with the
involvement of various authorities from
affected Member States
Aftermath / Restoration
Failure to restore the environment to the status prior Take measures to restore the quality of
to the accident (hopefully, not in the Macondo environment:
accident) - Existence of high level technology
standards for cleanup operations
- Regulatory authority oversees and
monitors cleanup operations
Safety management
Failure to manage safety of operations adequately Put in place a Safety and Environmental
Management System, addressing
continuously and systematically the safety
challenges of the operations:
- Existence of good practices

- Operator applies recognised best practices
Operator takes actions to enhance and
promote safety culture, communication,
targeted training and safety leadership
inside his business
- Regulatory authority reviews safety
management systems and monitors the level
of safety
Lessons learning
Failure to learn from accidents and from near- Put in place an appropriately designed
misses system to investigate accidents, identify key
lessons and learn lessons from accidents,
incidents and near-misses (note: Transocean
did not learn from a similar near-miss
occurred on 23 December 2009 in the North
Sea). Communicate not only internally, but –
for the key lessons – also externally, to the
wider offshore risk management community:
- Existence of a common format for
reporting accidents, incidents and near-
misses
- Existence of agreed taxonomies of the
causes, consequences and critical issues
related to them, including lessons learned.
- Operator investigates accidents, incidents
and near-misses, identifies lessons and
disseminates them not only within the
personnel, but also shares lessons with other
operators, inspectors and risk management
community
- Regulatory authority collects data and
forwards to the Commission for further
analysis
- Commission (or other independent body)
analyses accidents and disseminates lessons

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Health, Safety and Environment Management in Petroleum Operations

HSE MANAGEMENT IN PETROLEUM OPERATIONS

Health Effects – Chronic vs Acute

Skin (Dermal) impacts:

⮚ Effect of sour gases:

Odour of rotten eggs can be clearly detected. Noticeable odour at concentrations as

Unpleasant odour. Possible eye irritation. American Conference of Industrial

Coughing, eye irritation, loss of sense of smell after 3 to 15 minutes. Altered

Effect of Carbon monoxide CO:

35 ppm Headache and dizziness within six to eight hours of constant

800 ppm Dizziness, nausea, and convulsions within 45 min; insensible

1,600 ppm Headache, increased heart rate, dizziness, and nausea within 20

6,400 ppm Headache and dizziness in one to two minutes. Convulsions,

Figure: Symptoms of CO poisoning.

⮚ Effect of corrosive material and atmosphere during sand control, fracturing,

Case study: Los Angeles drilling : health impacts

Emergency shutdown Action Criticality

1 Total Facility Shutdown Catastrophic

2 Unit or Plant Shutdown Severe

3 Equipment Shutdown Major

4 Non ESD process or Slight or Routine

⮚ Blow down system:

The process mainly involve: HAZOP and FMEA.

⮚ Disaster and crisis management:

Macondo Blowout (Gulf of Mexico, 2010)

Table: Failures and lessons learned from landmark accidents:

Failures Lessons learned

technology and recognised best practices

Failure to adequately respond to the accident Application of highly sophisticated

- Existence of good practices

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