II.
Ownership The following undisputed findings of facts, as found by the trial court, are stated in the
opinion of the CA:
C. Kinds of Ownership
Full ownership vs. Naked ownership;
Legal Title vs. Beneficial Title
G.R. No. 183589. June 25, 2014.
CHARLIE LIM (represented by his heirs) and LILIA SALANGUIT,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES DANILO LIGON and GENEROSA VITUG-LIGON, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Requisites for Judgment to Constitute
Res Judicata.—For a judgment to constitute res judicata, the following requisites must concur: x x x (a)
the former judgment was final; (b) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (c) the judgment was based on the merits; and (d) between the first and the second actions,
there was an identity of parties, subject matters, and causes of action. Res judicata embraces two
concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. Bar by prior judgment exists
“when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought
to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.” On the other hand, the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment finds application “when a fact or question has been squarely put
in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.” This
principle only needs identity of parties and issues to apply.
Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; An ejectment suit is brought before the proper court to recover
physical possession or possession de facto and not possession de jure.—An ejectment suit is brought
before the proper court to recover physical possession or possession de facto and not possession de
jure. The use of summary procedure in ejectment cases is intended to provide an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or right to possession of the property and not to determine the actual title
to an estate. If at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the
defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue of possession. Its determination on the ownership
issue is, however, not conclusive.
Civil Law; Property; Free Patents; A free patent obtained through fraud or misrepresentation is
void.—We do not agree with the ruling of the appellate court that a certificate of title issued pursuant to
a public land patent becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the
date of issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. A free patent obtained through fraud or
misrepresentation is void. Hence, the one-year prescriptive period provided in the Public Land Act does
not bar the State from asking for the reversion of property acquired through such means.  and an analogous Original Certificate of Title No. OP-1808 (Exh. B) dated 16 December
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 84284 dated December 28, 2007 and July 3, 2008,
respectively, affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Nasugbu, Batangas. The case arose from an action for Quieting of Title, Recovery of
Possession and Damages with Prayer for a Temporary Restrain- ing Order and Preliminary
Injunction, filed by herein respondents before the court a quo involving the subject land
located at Sitio Kuala, Barangay Wawa, Nasugbu, Batangas, with an area of 9,478 square
meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. TP-1792.
As synthesized from the admissions made by the parties in their respective
pleadings, the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced during the proceedings[,]
it appears that sometime in 1970, one Tomas Fernandez filed a Free Patent Application
over a parcel of land situated in Sitio Kuala, Barangay Wawa, Nasugbu, Batangas with
an area 9,[478] sq. meters. After the death of Tomas Fernandez, his son Felicisimo
pursued the application and on 25 April 1984, the survey plan under Psu No. 04-008565
was approved by the Bureau of Lands.
In 1985, the spouses Isaac and Concepcion Ronulo asked the assistance of the
Office of the President and requested investigation of their claim that a parcel of land
containing 1,000 square meters which they have been occupying since the 1950s was
included in the approved survey plan PSU-04-008565 in the name of Tomas Fernandez.
The Office of the President referred the matter to the Bureau of Lands which in turn
referred the same to the DENR-Region IVB for appropriate action.
On October 9, 1995, Regional Director Antonio Prinsipe of DENR Provisional
Region IV-A issued an Order in DENR Case No. IV-5516, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the protest of Spouses
Isaac and Concepcion Ronulo to be meritorious, the plan PSU-04-008565
approved in the name of
Tomas Fernandez is hereby, as it is, ordered CANCELLED and whatever
amount paid on account thereof forfeited in favor of the Government.
Consequently, the aforementioned spouses Ronulo are hereby advised to cause
the survey and to file the appropriate public land application over the land
actually possessed and occupied by them. (Exh. A-2).”
The above order was appealed by Felicisimo Fernandez to the Office of the DENR
Secretary and was docketed therein as DENR Case No. 5101.
On 20 October 1995, the already widowed Concepcion Ronulo executed an
Affidavit of Waiver of Rights over the parcel of land subject of DENR Case No. IV-5516
in favor of herein defendant Lim who will “file the appropriate public land application
(Exh. A-3).” On the same date, the children of Concepcion Ronulo executed an affidavit
of conformity to the waiver, conveyance and transfer of the property subject of DENR
Case No. IV-5516 in favor of Charlie Lim (Exh. A-4).
In the meantime, herein plaintiffs Spouses Danilo Ligon and Generosa Vitug-Ligon
purchased the subject property from Felicisimo Fernandez and introduced
improvements thereon, including a beach house. On 31 October 1995, TCT No. TP-
1792 (Exh. A-1) of the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas was issued in the name
of the spouses Ligon based on Free Patent No. (IV03A) issued on 11 December 1986
1993, both in the name of Felicisimo Fernandez.
On 09 September 1996, defendant Lim filed a complaint for forcible entry against
the petitioners with the Municipal Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas involving the subject
property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1275. On May 26, 1997, the trial
court rendered judgment (Exh. A-5) in favor of private respondent and ordered
petitioners to vacate the subject land. The trial court based its decision on the alleged
finality of the Order dated 09 October 1995 issued by Regional Director Prinsipe in
DENR Case No. IV-5516.
Plaintiffs appealed the adverse decision to the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu,
Batangas but the same was affirmed in a decision dated 12 January 1998 (Exh. A-6).
On 20 July 1998, plaintiffs appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals by
way of a petition for review. In a decision (Exh. A-7) dated 20 January 1999, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition for review.
On 28 May 1999, the DENR Secretary rendered a decision (Exh. A-8) in DENR
Case No. 5102 reversing the order of Regional Director Prinsipe in DENR Case No. IV-
 5516 dated 09 October 1995, dismissing the protest of the Ronulos, and ordering that
TCT No. TP-1792 in the name of plaintiffs “shall remain undisturbed.”
On 14 July 1999, the Ronulos filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
decision. In an order (Exh. A-9) dated 21 December 1999, the DENR Secretary denied
the motion for reconsideration.
On 16 January 2000, the Ronulos filed a second motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the DENR Secretary in DENR Case No. 5102.
Meanwhile, as a result of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case, plaintiffs
were evicted from the subject property. On 01 March 2000, they filed the instant suit
before this Court, a complaint against defendant Lim and his representative, Lilia
Salanguit, for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages with prayer for a
TRO and Preliminary Injunction, to restore them to their possession of the subject
property and to enjoin herein defendant Lim from demolishing their beach house.
On 10 April 2000, this Court denied plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief as a
result of which plaintiffs’ beach house was demolished by the Branch Sheriff on the
motion of defendants.
On 16 April 2000, plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint for additional damages
as a result of the demolition of their beach house worth about P7 million. Defendants did
not answer the supplemental complaint despite being ordered to do so.
During the pre-trial on 08 August 2000, the parties agreed to hold hearings on 25
September, 06 October and 20 October 2000. However, the first two hearing dates were
cancelled at the instance of the defendants. During the scheduled hearing on 20
October 2000, defendant and counsel did not appear. Instead, Judge Antonio de Sagun,
then the Honorable Presiding Judge informed plaintiffs that herein defendant Lim filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground that the denial of the second motion for
reconsideration in DENR Case No. 5102 was appealed to the Office of the President. In
his motion, defendant alleged that trial should be suspended pending “final adjudication
of the case (DENR Case No. 5102) before the Office of the President where the issue of
validity of plaintiff’s title is squarely involved.
In an Order dated 13 November 2000, this Court granted the motion to suspend
proceedings. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by
then Presiding Judge Antonio de Sagun in an order dated 10 January 2001.
On February 19, 2001, plaintiffs filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 63441, assailing the suspension of proceedings ordered
by this Honorable Court which, after due proceedings, was granted and the Order dated
November 13, 2000 issued by this Court suspending the proceedings of this case
reversed and set aside in a Decision of the said appellate court dated March 6, 2002.
No motion for reconsideration or any appellate recourse to the Supreme Court
having been interposed by defendants, plaintiffs on June 7, 2002, moved to set this
case for further proceedings. This Court granted the motion and this case was set for
trial on August 30, 2002 at 8:30 a.m.229
On August 30, 2002, in view of the absence of the defendants and their counsel
despite due notice, evidence for plaintiffs was presented ex parte with plaintiff Danilo
Ligon taking the witness stand. After plaintiff’s direct examination, this Court ordered a
resetting of the case for cross-examination by defendants on November 18, 2002 at
8:30 a.m. Counsel and his witness plaintiff Danilo Ligon were present during the
November 18, 2002 scheduled trial in which defendants were properly notified.
Defendants and counsel were absent prompting this Honorable Court, upon plaintiff’s
motion to consider the cross-examination of plaintiff Danilo Ligon by defendants as
waived; the continued absence of the defendants as indicative of lack of interest to
further defend this case; Grant plaintiff’s motion for ten (10) days within which to file
Formal Offer of Evidence and thirty (30) days from November 18, 2002, within which to
file their Memorandum. After which, this case will be deemed submitted for decision.
In its decision dated February 3, 2004, the RTC ruled, viz.:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is rendered for the plaintiffs as
follows:
1. Confirming the ownership of the plaintiffs and right of possession over the
property;
2. Ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiffs the sum of P6,000,000.00 for
indecent haste in causing the demolition of plaintiffs’ house;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 a month as
monthly rental for the duration of the period they are deprived thereof commencing the
month of November 1999;
4. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages; and
5. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P500,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision with the CA alleging that the lower court erred in
deciding the case based on the ex parteevidence presented by respondents, in ruling that
Felicisimo was the original owner of the questioned property, in ruling that the Order of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Executive Director
was a collateral attack against TCT No. TP-1792 of the Spouses Ligon, in ruling that the
Spouses acquired the subject property in good faith, in not giving weight and credit to the
Resolution of the Office of the President (OP) dated March 24, 2004, in ordering Lim and
Salanguit to pay a monthly rental of P50,000.00 for the duration of the period that the
Spouses Ligon have been deprived of their property, and in ordering Lim and Salanguit to
pay the Spouses Ligon’s attorney’s fees.
In its assailed Decision dated December 28, 2007, the appellate court dismissed the
appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSEDfor utter lack
of merit. The challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas,
Branch 14 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the awards of P6,000,000.00 as
indemnity and P50,000.00 representing the monthly rental for the subject property to the
plaintiffs-appellees are DELETED for lack of factual basis. Costs against the
defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
 
Petitioners moved for reconsideration while respondents filed their Opposition To Motion
For Reconsideration in compliance with the directive of the appellate court. In a Resolution
dated July 3, 2008, the CA denied reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal
raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE IN LINE WITH [THE] PRINCIPLE OF RES
JUDICATA OF A DECISION OF A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY SUCH AS THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT?
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
RENDERED AN UNJUST JUDGMENT IN DEPRIVING THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR
OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BASED ON TECHNICALITY?
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINALITY OF THE JUDGMENT IN THE EJECTMENT CASE
SERVED AS RES JUDICATA WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF PRIOR
POSSESSION OF THE SPOUSES RONULOS (THE PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST
OF THE PETITIONERS)?
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
OWNERSHIP OF THE RESPONDENTS AND THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AS
WELL AS ATTORNEYS FEES?

We deny the petition.
On the first issue, petitioner Lim contends that when the OP reinstated the October 9,
1995 Order of DENR Regional Director Antonio G. Principe in its Resolution dated March
24, 2004, such disposition served to put an end to the administrative proceedings. The
petition thus states:
In a nutshell, the proceedings in the administrative case which went on to become a
judicial case is the proper forum to determine the issue of ownership over the parcel of
land subject matter of this case. Basically, this case lodged before the DENR Provincial
Region IV-A is an initiatory move by the government for the reversion/cancellation of the
title of the respondents herein, which title was derived from the fraudulent and irregular
survey of the lot in question and the grant of the land patent application of Felicisimo
Fernandez. In other words, if this case before the Court of Appeals where this issue was
raised affirms with finality the Resolution of the Office of the President (Annex “C”), this
will have the effect of cancelling the title of the respondents and shall pave the way to
the institution of the application by the Ronulos (or the herein petitioners as their
successors-in-interest) of a public land patent in their favor.
 
Petitioner Lim further argues that the subject Resolution of the OP should have
operated as a bar to the furtherance of these proceedings as to “the issue” judicially
determined by the OP. According to petitioner Lim, had the CA taken into account the
administrative proceedings before the DENR and the Resolution of the OP, it would have
come up with a determination that fraud was perpetrated by the respondents. The findings
of the DENR Regional Executive Director, as affirmed in the subject resolution of the OP,
should operate as res judicata that will have the effect of cancelling the title of respondents.
We do not agree.
For a judgment to constitute res judicata, the following requisites must concur:
x x x (a) the former judgment was final; (b) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the judgment was based on the merits; and
(d) between the first and the second actions, there was an identity of parties, subject
matters, and causes of action.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment.
Bar by prior judgment exists “when, as between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action.”
On the other hand, the concept of conclusiveness of judgment finds application
“when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and
adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.” This principle only needs
identity of parties and issues to apply.
Neither bar by prior judgment nor conclusiveness of judgment applies to the case at bar.
While there is identity of parties and subject matter between the instant case and the matter
before the DENR and later the OP, the causes of action are not the same. The present case
arose from a case for quieting of title where the plaintiff must show or prove legal or
equitable title to or interest in the property which is the subject-matter of the action. Legal
title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. Without
proof of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or
removed. The administrative proceedings before the DENR and now the OP, on the other
hand, were instituted on behalf of the Director of Lands, in order to investigate any
allegation of irregularity in securing a patent and the corresponding title to a public land
under Section 91 of the Public Land Act, viz.:
SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as
essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of
such application, and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing,
or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any
subsequent modification, alteration or change of the material facts set forth in the
application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit
granted. It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he
may deem it advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true, or whether
they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the
purposes of such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to
issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory
process from the courts. In every investigation made in accordance with this section, the
existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of
essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or
fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director of
Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and
specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order
of cancellation may issue without further proceedings.
Given the lack of identity of the issue involved in the instant case vis-à-vis the issue in
the administrative proceedings before the DENR and the OP, there can also be no bar by
conclusiveness of judgment.
To be sure, even if there was an identity of the issues involved, there still would have
been no bar by prior judgment or conclusiveness of judgment since the March 24, 2004
Resolution of the OP has not reached finality — it being the subject of an appeal by
respondents Spouses Ligon under C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 85011. Furthermore, in terms of
subject matter, the property involved in the administrative proceedings is a 1,000-square
meter tract of land over which petitioners’ alleged right of possession could ripen into
ownership. On the other hand, the instant case involves the issue of the ownership or the
validity of the title of respondents over the entire 9,478-square meter tract of land where
petitioners claim to have enjoyed open, continuous exclusive and notorious possession for
more than thirty years over a 1,000-square meter portion thereof.
On the second issue that the lower court and the CA rendered an unjust judgment
depriving petitioners of their ownership over the subject property on the basis of technicality,
we cannot as well agree.
Petitioner Lim proffers the following excuses for his failure to comply with the resolutions
and other directives of the court a quo: that his counsel withdrew his appearance while the
case was pending before the RTC; that his representative, Salanguit, had a sudden death,
causing him to lose track and control of the proceedings; that he was not aware of the ex
parte presentation of evidence by respondent Danilo Ligon; and, that the court a quo waived
for him his right to present evidence due to lack of interest. It is central to petitioner Lim’s
argument that he was deprived of his right to due process and lost his right to property
without being fully afforded an opportunity to interpose his defense — part of which is the
March 24, 2004 Resolution of the OP which would have been highly persuasive in
determining the issues of ownership and possession in this case. Petitioner Lim therefore
pleads that this Court afford him the amplest opportunity to present evidence and disregard
technicalities in the broader interest of justice.
We hold that the RTC did not err when it ruled and based its decision on the ex
parte evidence of respondents spouses.236Petitioners were absent, despite due notice,
during the ex partepresentation of evidence of respondents. Petitioners were likewise
absent during cross-examination despite proper notice. When respondents filed their
Formal Offer of Evidence and Memorandum, petitioners did not file any opposition or
comment despite receipt of the documents.
To be sure, petitioner Lim cannot attribute all blame on the gross negligence of his
previous counsels. He cannot bank on such negligence, including the sudden death of his
representative Salanguit who used to coordinate with his counsels, with impunity. Petitioner
Lim’s own equally gross and contributory negligence in this case is glaring and inexcusable
that it constrains us from reopening the case. This was aptly described by the RTC in its
Resolution dated December 10, 2003 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration to the
Order considering the case submitted for decision, viz.:
The reasons advanced by the defendants are flimsy and bereft of merit. x x x.
x x x defendants’ counsel was duly notified beforehand of the scheduled hearing on
August 30, 2002, but for unknown reasons, defendants and counsel failed to appear.
Suffice it to say that this Court even became lenient to them when it set another hearing
on November 18, 2002, for them to exercise their so-called right to cross-examine
plaintiffs’ witness. But then again, records will show that despite receipt of Order dated
August 30, 2002, wherein the Court directed plaintiff Ligon to be present on November
18, 2002 for cross-examination, both defendants and counsel did not show up without
giving any reason for their absence.
x x x x
Defendants cannot rightfully claim of losing track and control of the proceedings
had in this case since they can easily verify the records regarding the status of the case,
especially that they admitted that they have differences with their counsel. They should
have taken account of the length of time that already elapsed since the August 30, 2002
hearing. They could have done so with facility. The fact that they did not is clear that
they slept unreasonably on their right.
Stress should be made that plaintiff even furnished them with a copy of the Formal
Offer of Evidence and Memorandum filed to this Court as early as November 26, 2002
and December 18, 2002, respectively, yet not even a comment or opposition evinced
reply from the defendants. This matter is too important to be completely disregarded.
x x x x
If the defendants were, using their own terms, not allowed to cross-examine would
be denied due process, then, they have nobody but themselves to blame. They failed to
comply with the basic rudiments of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants cannot
take advantage of their own faux pas and invoke the principle of liberality. If they come
to Court for leniency, they must do so with clean hands. Since they sought relief with
“dirty hands,” their plea must be denied. x x x.
Likewise, the CA properly concluded that:
x x x there is no truth to the defendants-appellants’ claim that they were denied due
process when the trial court allowed the plaintiffs-appellees to present their evidence ex
parte. The trial court gave them all the opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff-
appellee Danilo Ligon but they failed to appear on the scheduled hearing. Hence, they
have nobody to blame but themselves.
As to the third issue, petitioner Lim argues that the finality of the judgment in the
ejectment case serves as res judicata with respect to the issue of prior possession of the
Spouses Ronulos — the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. In the ejectment
case filed by petitioner Lim against the same respondents in the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas in Civil Case No. 1275, the MTC ruled on May 26, 1997 that
prior possession was established in favor of the Ronulo spouses. When the respondents
Ligon Spouses appealed, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. The CA also
dismissed the appeal of respondent spouses. On appeal to this Court docketed as G.R. No.
139856, a Resolution dated October 13, 1999 was issued denying the appeal with finality.
Hence, petitioner Lim now contends that the finality of the ejectment case “determining the
issues of possession and prior possession serves as [res judicata] between the parties x x x
inasmuch as the case herein involves the same parties, same issues and same property
therein.”
An ejectment suit is brought before the proper court to recover physical possession
or possession de facto and not possession de jure. The use of summary procedure in
ejectment cases is intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or right to possession of the property and not to determine the actual title to an
estate. If at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by
the defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue of possession. Its determination on the
ownership issue is, however, not conclusive.
The following discussion in the case of Spouses Diu v. Ibajan is instructive:
Detainer, being a mere quieting process, questions raised on real property are
incidentally discussed. (Peñalosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303.) In fact, any evidence of
ownership is expressly banned by Sec. 4 of Rule 70 (Sec. 4, Rule 70 provides:
“Evidence of title, when admissible.—Evidence of title to the land or building may be
received solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession
and damages for detention.”) except to resolve the question of possession. (Tiu v. Court
of Appeals, 37 SCRA 99; Calupitan v. Aglahi, 65 Phil. 575; Pitargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil.
5.) Thus, all that the court may do, is to make an initial determination of who is the
owner of the property so that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other
evidence to resolve the latter. But such determination of ownership is not clothed
with finality. Neither will it affect ownership of the property nor constitute a
binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits with respect to the issue of
ownership. x x x.
 
Thus, under Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules on Civil Procedure:
SEC. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions
involving title or ownership.—The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar
an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.
x x x x
The legal limitation, despite the finality of the ruling in the ejectment case, however, is
that the concept of possession or prior possession which was established in favor of
petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest in the ejectment case pertained merely to possession
de facto, and not possession de jure. The favorable judgment in favor of petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest cannot therefore bar an action between the same parties with
respect to who has title to the land in question. The final judgment shall not also be held
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different
cause of action not involving possession.  As what took place in the case at bar, the final
judgment was not bar to this subsequent action to quiet respondents’ title in order to settle
ownership over the 9,478-square meter property.

Finally, on the fourth assignment of error, petitioner Lim raises the issue as to whether
the CA erred in affirming the ownership of the respondents. This part of the petition,
however, discusses no other additional ground for assailing the validity of the decision of
the CA in affirming respondents’ title to the property. Failing to adduce evidence to overturn
the ruling of both the court a quo and the appellate court, we affirm the indefeasibility of
respondents’ title over the 9,478-square meter property.

We do not agree, however, with the ruling of the appellate court that a certificate of title
issued pursuant to a public land patent becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent.
A free patent obtained through fraud or misrepresentation is void. Hence, the one-year
prescriptive period provided in the Public Land Act does not bar the State from asking for
the reversion of property acquired through such means.

On the issue of moral damages, we agree with petitioner Lim that there is no basis for
the award of moral damages of P1,000,000.00. Lim caused the demolition of the beach
house of respondents pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the MTC of Nasugbu,
Batangas in the ejectment case — the same judgment which was affirmed by the RTC, the
CA and this Court. As Lim states in this petition, it will become an absurdity if he will be
penalized and required to pay moral damages over a property the rightful possession of
which has been awarded to them in the ejectment case.

Lastly, we sustain the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00 which the
appellate court found to be reasonable considering the factual circumstances surrounding
the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 84284 dated December 28, 2007 and July 3, 2008,
respectively, are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of P1,000,000.00 as
moral damages is deleted for lack of factual basis. However, the award by the Court of
Appeals of the amount of P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees in favor of the herein
respondents is hereby REITERATED and UPHELD.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—If the land covered by free patent was a private land, the Director of Lands has no
jurisdiction over it; Such free patent and the subsequent certificate of title issued pursuant thereto are a
nullity. (Heirs of Margarito Pabaus vs. Heirs of Amanda Yutiamco, 654 SCRA 521 [2011])

Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would
necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary. (Estel vs. Heirs of Recaredo P.
Diego, Sr., 663 SCRA 17 [2012])

——o0o——
 II. Ownership
D. Attributes of Ownership
d.1 Right to enjoy
- right to posses
 
G.R. No. 165952. July 28, 2008.
ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LANDEX
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Appeals; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Procedural rules are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice—their strict and rigid application should be relaxed when they hinder
rather than promote substantial justice.—It is true that appeals are mere statutory privileges which
should be exercised only in the manner required by law. Procedural rules serve a vital function in our
judicial system. They promote the orderly resolution of cases. Without procedure, there will be chaos. It
thus behooves upon a litigant to follow basic procedural rules. Dire consequences may flow from
procedural lapses. Nonetheless, it is also true that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application should be relaxed when they hinder rather
than promote substantial justice. Public policy dictates that court cases should, as much as possible, be
resolved on the merits not on mere technicalities. Substantive justice trumps procedural rules.
Same; Same; There are no vested rights to technicalities—it is within the court’s sound
discretion to relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the merits of a case.—We find that the
RTC and the CA soundly exercised their discretion in opting for a liberal rather than a strict application
of the rules on notice of hearing. It must be stressed that there are no vested rights to technicalities. It
is within the court’s sound discretion to relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the merits of a
case. This Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent grave abuse or palpable
error. Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure even mandates a liberal construction of
the rules to promote their objectives of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.
Same; Same; Due Process; Notice of Hearing; The requirement of a notice of hearing in every
contested motion is part of due process of law, but what the rule forbids is not the mere absence of a
notice of hearing in a contested motion, but the unfair surprise caused by the lack of notice.—The
requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is part of due process of law. The notice
alerts the opposing party of a pending motion in court and gives him an opportunity to oppose it. What
the rule forbids is not the mere absence of a notice of hearing in a contested motion but the unfair
surprise caused by the lack of notice. It is the dire consequences which flow from the procedural error
which is proscribed. If the opposing party is given a sufficient opportunity to oppose a defective motion,
the procedural lapse is deemed cured and the intent of the rule is substantially complied. In E & L
Mercantile, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 142 SCRA 385 (1986), this Court held: Procedural
due184process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application of a rule such that any
deviation is inexorably fatal. Rules of procedure, and this includes the three (3) days notice
requirement, are liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding (Section 2, Rule
1, Rules of Court). In Case and Nantz v. Jugo (77 Phil. 517), this Court made it clear that lapses in the
literal observance of a rule of procedure may be overlooked when they have not prejudiced the adverse
party and have not deprived the court of its authority.
Property; Ownership; Every owner has the right to enclose or fence his land or tenement by
means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means—the right to fence flows from the right of
ownership.—Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or
tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows from the
right of ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the limitations
and restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal and enforceable right, as here, We will not
interfere with the exercise of an essential attribute of ownership.
Appeals; Well-settled is the rule that factual findings and conclusions of law of the trial court
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are accorded great weight and respect.—Well-settled is the rule
that factual findings and conclusions of law of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are accorded
great weight and respect. Here, We find no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings and
conclusion of law of the trial court and the appellate court. We have meticulously reviewed the records
and agree that Aneco failed to prove any clear legal right to prevent, much less restrain, Landex from
fencing its own property.
REYES, R.T., J.:
THIS is a simple case of a neighbor seeking to restrain the landowner from fencing his
own property. The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. Absent a clear legal and
enforceable right, We will not unduly restrain the landowner from exercising an inherent
proprietary right.
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissing the complaint for
injunction filed by petitioner Aneco Realty and Development Corporation (Aneco) against
respondent Landex Development Corporation (Landex).
Facts
Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land in
San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine (39) lots. It
later sold twenty-two (22) lots to petitioner Aneco and the remaining seventeen (17) lots to
respondent Landex.
The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its
lots. To restrain construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC
in Quezon City. Aneco later filed two (2) supplemental complaints seeking to demolish the
newly-built wall and to hold Landex liable for two million pesos in damages.
Landex filed its Answer alleging, among others, that Aneco was not deprived access to
its lots due to the construction of the concrete wall. Landex claimed that Aneco has its own
entrance to its property along Miller Street, Resthaven Street, and San Francisco del Monte
Street. The Resthaven access, however, was rendered inaccessible when Aneco
constructed a building on said street. Landex also claimed that FHDI sold ordinary lots, not
subdivision lots, to Aneco based on the express stipulation in the deed of sale that FHDI
was not interested in pursuing its own subdivision project.
RTC Disposition
On June 19, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision granting the complaint for injunction,
disposing as follows:
“Wherefore, premises considered, and in the light aforecited decision of the
Supreme Court judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant is
hereby ordered:
1. To stop the completion of the concrete wall and excavation of the road lot in
question and if the same is already completed, to remove the same and to return the lot
to its original situation;
 2. To pay actual and compensatory damage to the plaintiff in the total amount of
P50,000.00;
3. To pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00;
4. To pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.”
Landex moved for reconsideration.  Records reveal that Landex failed to include a
notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration as required under Section 5, Rule 15 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Realizing the defect, Landex later filed a motion setting a
hearing for its motion for reconsideration. Aneco countered with a motion for execution
claiming that the RTC decision is already final and executory.
Acting on the motion of Landex, the RTC set a hearing on the motion for
reconsideration on August 28, 1996. Aneco failed to attend the slated hearing. The RTC
gave Aneco additional time to file a comment on the motion for reconsideration.
On March 13, 1997, the RTC issued an order14 denying the motion for execution of
Aneco.
On March 31, 1997, the RTC issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration of
Landex and dismissing the complaint of Aneco. In granting reconsideration, the RTC stated:
“In previously ruling for the plaintiff, this Court anchored its decision on the ruling of
the Supreme Court in the case of “White Plains Association vs. Legaspi, 193 SCRA
765,” wherein the issue involved was the ownership of a road lot, in an existing, fully
developed and authorized subdivision, which after a second look, is apparently
inapplicable to the instant case at bar, simply because the property in question never
did exist as a subdivision. Since, the property in question never did exist as a
subdivision, the limitations imposed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 440, that no
portion of a subdivision road lot shall be closed without the approval of the Court is
clearly inappropriate to the case at bar.
The records show that the plaintiff’s property has access to a public road as it has
its own ingress and egress along Miller St.; That plaintiff’s property is not isolated as it is
bounded by Miller St. and Resthaven St. in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City; that
plaintiff could easily make an access to a public road within the bounds and limits of its
own property; and that the defendant has not yet been indemnified whatsoever for the
use of his property, as mandated by the Bill of rights. The foregoing circumstances,
negates the alleged plaintiffs right of way.”
Aneco appealed to the CA.
CA Disposition
On March 31, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC order, disposing as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the instant appeal is
perforce dismissed. Accordingly, the order dated 31 March 1996 is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.”
In affirming the RTC dismissal of the complaint for injunction, the CA held that Aneco
knew at the time of the sale that the lots sold by FHDI were not subdivision units based on
the express stipulation in the deed of sale that FHDI, the seller, was no longer interested in
pursuing its subdivision project, thus:
“The subject property ceased to be a road lot when its former owner (Fernandez
Hermanos, Inc.) sold it to appellant Aneco not as subdivision lots and without the
intention of pursuing the subdivision project. The law in point is Article 624 of the New
Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two
estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered,
should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may
continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two
estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of
either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of
the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned
in common by two or more persons.
Viewed from the aforesaid law, there is no question that the law allows the
continued use of an apparent easement should the owner alienate the property to
different persons. It is noteworthy to emphasize that the lot in question was provided by
the previous owner (Fernandez Hermanos, Inc.) as a road lot because of its intention to
convert it into a subdivision project. The previous owner even applied for a development
permit over the subject property. However, when the twenty-two (22) lots were sold to
appellant Aneco, it was very clear from the seller’s deed of sale that the lots
sold ceased to be subdivision lots. The seller even warranted that it shall undertake to
extend all the necessary assistance for the consolidation of the subdivided lots,
including the execution of the requisite manifestation before the appropriate government
agencies that the seller is no longer interested in pursuing the subdivision project. In
fine, appellant Aneco knew from the very start that at the time of the sale, the 22 lots
sold to it were not intended as subdivision units, although the titles to the different lots
have yet to be consolidated. Consequently, the easement that used to exist on the
subject lot ceased when appellant Aneco and the former owner agreed that the lots
would be consolidated and would no longer be intended as a subdivision project.
Appellant Aneco insists that it has the intention of continuing the subdivision project
earlier commenced by the former owner. It also holds on to the previous development
permit granted to Fernandez Hermanos, Inc. The insistence is futile. Appellant Aneco
did not acquire any right from the said previous owner since the latter itself expressly
stated in their agreement that it has no more intention of continuing the subdivision
project. If appellant desires to convert its property into a subdivision project, it has to
apply in its own name, and must have its own provisions for a road lot.”
Anent the issue of compulsory easement of right of way, the CA held that Aneco failed
to prove the essential requisites to avail of such right, thus:
“An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property of the servient
owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate (Cristobal v.
CA, 291 SCRA 122). The essential requisites to be entitled to a compulsory easement
of way are: 1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; 2) that proper indemnity has been paid; 3) that the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; 4) that the right of
way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 122).
An in depth examination of the evidence adduced and offered by appellant Aneco,
showed that it had failed to prove the existence of the aforementioned requisites, as the
burden thereof lies upon the appellant Aneco.”
Aneco moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. Hence, the present petition
or appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues
Petitioner Aneco assigns quadruple errors to the CA in the following tenor:
A.
 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S
APPEAL AND SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER DATED 31 MARCH 1997
GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH IS
FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF NOTICE OF HEARING.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S ORDER WHICH GAVE FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT TO THE MISLEADING
AND ERRONEOUS CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY GILDA E. ESTILO WHICH SHE
LATER EXPRESSLY AND CATEGORICALLY RECANTED BY WAY OF
HER AFFIDAVIT.
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE LIBERAL
CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL
COURT’S ORDER DATED 31 MARCH 1997.
D.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S ORDER THAT MADE NO PRONOUNCEMENTS AS TO COSTS, AND IN
DISREGARDING THE MERIT OF THE PETITIONER’S CAUSE OF ACTION.
Our Ruling
The petition is without merit.
Essentially, two (2) issues are raised in this petition. The first is the procedural issue of
whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in liberally applying the rule on notice of hearing
under Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The second is the
substantive issue of whether or not Aneco may enjoin Landex from constructing a concrete
wall on its own property.
We shall discuss the twin issues sequentially.
Strict vs. Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules; Defective motion was
cured  when Aneco was given an opportunity to comment on the motion for
reconsideration.
Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure  requires a notice of hearing for
a contested motion filed in court. Records disclose that the motion for reconsideration filed
by Landex of the RTC decision did not contain a notice of hearing. There is no dispute that
the motion for reconsideration is defective. The RTC and the CA ignored the procedural
defect and ruled on the substantive issues raised by Landex in its motion for
reconsideration. The issue before Us is whether or not the RTC and the CA correctly
exercised its discretion in ignoring the procedural defect. Simply put, the issue is whether or
not the requirement of notice of hearing should be strictly or liberally applied under the
circumstances.
Aneco bats for strict construction. It cites a litany of cases which held that notice of
hearing is mandatory. A motion without the required notice of hearing is a mere scrap of
paper. It does not toll the running of the period to file an appeal or a motion for
reconsideration. It is argued that the original RTC decision is already final and executory
because of the defective motion.
Landex counters for liberal construction. It similarly cites a catena of cases which held
that procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. Landex asserts
that the procedural defect was cured when it filed a motion setting a hearing for its motion
for reconsideration. It is claimed that Aneco was properly informed of the pending motion for
reconsideration and it was not deprived of an opportunity to be heard.
It is true that appeals are mere statutory privileges which should be exercised only in
the manner required by law. Procedural rules serve a vital function in our judicial system.
They promote the orderly resolution of cases. Without procedure, there will be chaos. It thus
behooves upon a litigant to follow basic procedural rules. Dire consequences may flow from
procedural lapses.
Nonetheless, it is also true that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application should be relaxed when they hinder
rather than promote substantial justice. Public policy dictates that court cases should, as
much as possible, be resolved on the merits not on mere technicalities. Substantive justice
trumps procedural rules. In Barnes v. Padilla, this Court held:
“Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to
alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules
must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.”
Here, We find that the RTC and the CA soundly exercised their discretion in opting for a
liberal rather than a strict application of the rules on notice of hearing. It must be stressed
that there are no vested right to technicalities. It is within the court’s sound discretion to
relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the merits of a case. This Court will not
interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent grave abuse or palpable error. Section 6,
Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure even mandates a liberal construction of the
rules to promote their objectives of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.
To be sure, the requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is part of
due process of law. The notice alerts the opposing party of a pending motion in court and
gives him an opportunity to oppose it. What the rule forbids is not the mere absence of a
notice of hearing in a contested motion but the unfair surprise caused by the lack of notice.
It is the dire consequences which flow from the procedural error which is proscribed. If the
opposing party is given a sufficient opportunity to oppose a defective motion, the procedural
lapse is deemed cured and the intent of the rule is substantially complied. In E & L
Mercantile, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held:
“Procedural due process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application
of a rule such that any deviation is inexorably fatal. Rules of procedure, and this
includes the three (3) days notice requirement, are liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court).
In Case and Nantz v. Jugo(77 Phil. 517), this Court made it clear that lapses in the
literal observance of a rule of procedure may be overlooked when they have not
prejudiced the adverse party and have not deprived the court of its authority.
 A party cannot ignore a more than sufficient opportunity to exercise its right to be detriment of the new owner Landex. The RTC and the CA correctly dismissed the complaint
heard and once the court performs its duty and the outcome happens to be against that for injunction of Aneco for lack of merit.
negligent party, suddenly interpose a procedural violation already cured, insisting that
everybody should again go back to square one. Dilatory tactics cannot be the guiding
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED.
principle.
The rule in De Borja v. Tan (93 Phil. 167), that “what the law prohibits is not the SO ORDERED.
absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to
be heard,” is the applicable doctrine. (See also Aguilar v. Tan, 31 SCRA 205; Omico v. ——o0o——
Vallejos, 63 SCRA 285; Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 488.) x x x”

We also find that the procedural lapse committed by Landex was

sufficiently cured when it filed another motion setting a hearing for its defective motion for
reconsideration. Records reveal that the RTC set a hearing for the motion for
reconsideration but Aneco’s counsel failed to appear. The RTC then gave Aneco additional
time to file comment on the motion for reconsideration.

Aneco was afforded procedural due process when it was given an opportunity to
oppose the motion for reconsideration. It cannot argue unfair surprise because it was
afforded ample time to file a comment, as it did comment, on the motion for reconsideration.
There being no substantial injury or unfair prejudice, the RTC and the CA correctly ignored
the procedural defect.

The RTC and the CA did not err in dismissing the complaint for injunction; factual
findings and conclusions of law of the RTC and the CA are afforded great weight and
respect.

Anent the substantive issue, We agree with the RTC and the CA that the complaint for
injunction against Landex should be dismissed for lack of merit. What is involved here is an
undue interference on the property rights of a landowner to build a concrete wall on his own
property. It is a simple case of a neighbor, petitioner Aneco, seeking to restrain a
landowner, respondent Landex, from fencing his own land.

Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or
tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows
from the right of ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject
only to the limitations and restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal and enforceable
right, as here, We will not interfere with the exercise of an essential attribute of ownership.

Well-settled is the rule that factual findings and conclusions of law of the trial court when
affirmed by the CA are accorded great weight and respect. Here, We find no cogent reason
to deviate from the factual findings and conclusion of law of the trial court and the appellate
court. We have meticulously reviewed the records and agree that Aneco failed to prove any
clear legal right to prevent, much less restrain, Landex from fencing its own property.

Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because it
knew at the time of the sale that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, from FHDI.
This is clear from the deed of sale between FHDI and Aneco where FHDI manifested that it
was no longer interested in pursuing its own subdivision project. If Aneco wants to transform
its own lots into a subdivision project, it must make its own provision for road lots. It
certainly cannot piggy back on the road lot of the defunct subdivision project of FHDI to the
 II. Ownership
D. Attributes of Ownership
d.3 Right to recover
d.3.b Recovery of personal property – Replevin, Rule
60 Rules of Court
G.R. No. 205998. April 24, 2017.*
WILLIAM ANGHIAN SIY, petitioner, vs. ALVIN TOMLIN, respondent.
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Replevin; In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must
convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought
to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains
the same.—In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner
or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who
is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.” “Rule 60 x x x allows a plaintiff, in
an action for the recovery of possession of personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be
shown that he is ‘the owner of the property claimed . . . or is entitled to the possession thereof.’ The
plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the possession of the
property and his legal basis therefor.
Civil Law; Agency; In many cases as well, busy vehicle owners selling their vehicles actually
leave them, together with all the documents of title, spare keys, and deeds of sale signed in blank, with
secondhand car traders they know and trust, in order for the latter to display these vehicles for actual
viewing and inspection by prospective buyers at their lots, warehouses, garages, or showrooms, and to
enable the traders to facilitate sales on-the-spot, as-is-where-is, without having to inconvenience the
owners with random viewings and inspections of their vehicles. For this kind of arrangement, an
agency relationship is created between the vehicle owners, as principals, and the car traders, as
agents.—In many cases as well, busy vehicle owners selling their vehicles actually leave them,
together with all the documents of title, spare keys, and deeds of sale signed in blank, with secondhand
car traders they know and trust, in order for the latter to display these vehicles for actual viewing and
inspection by prospective buyers at their lots, warehouses, garages, or showrooms, and to enable the
traders to facilitate sales on-the-spot, as-is-where-is, without having to inconvenience the owners with
random viewings and inspections of their vehicles. For this kind of arrangement, an agency relationship
is created between the vehicle owners, as principals, and the car traders, as agents. The situation is
akin to an owner of jewelry who sells the same through an agent, who receives the jewelry in trust and
offers it for sale to his/her regular clients; if a sale is made, the agent takes payment under the
obligation to remit the same to the jewelry owner, minus the agreed commission or other compensation.
Same; Same; Implied Agency; The basis of agency is representation and the same may be
constituted expressly or impliedly. In an implied agency, the principal can be bound by the acts of the
implied agent. The same is true with an oral agency.—The basis of agency is representation and the
same may be constituted expressly or impliedly. In an implied agency, the principal can be bound by
the acts of the implied agent. The same is true with an oral agency. Acting for and in petitioner’s behalf
by virtue of the implied or oral agency, Ong was thus able to sell the vehicle to Chua, but he failed to
remit the proceeds thereof to petitioner; his guarantee checks bounced as well. This entitled petitioner
to sue for estafa through abuse of confidence. This is exactly what petitioner did: on May 18, 2011, he
filed a complaint for estafa and carnapping against Ong before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.
Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, petitioner thus ceased to be the owner thereof.
Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his ownership, petitioner lost his right
of possession over the vehicle. His argument that respondent is a buyer in bad faith, when the latter
nonetheless proceeded with the purchase and registration of the vehicle on March 7, 2011, despite
having been apprised of petitioner’s earlier November, 2010 “Failed to Return Vehicle” report filed with
the PNP-HPG, is unavailing. Petitioner had no right to file said report, as he was no longer the owner of
the vehicle at the time; indeed, his right of action is only against Ong, for collection of the proceeds of
the sale.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the October 9, 2012 Decision and February
19, 2013 Resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA) which respectively granted the
respondent’s Petition for Certiorari and denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 124967.
Factual Antecedents
 
In July 2011, petitioner William Anghian Siy filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (RTC) a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Prayer for
Replevin5 against Frankie Domanog Ong (Ong), Chris Centeno (Centeno), John Co Chua
(Chua), and herein respondent Alvin Tomlin. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
11-69644 and assigned to RTC Branch 224.
In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that he is the owner of a 2007 model Range Rover
with Plate Number ZMG 272 which he purchased from Alberto Lopez III (Lopez) on July 22,
2009; that in 2010, he entrusted the said vehicle to Ong, a businessman who owned a
secondhand car sales showroom (“Motortrend” in Katipunan, Quezon City), after the latter
claimed that he had a prospective buyer therefor; that Ong failed to remit the proceeds of
the purported sale nor return the vehicle; that petitioner later found out that the vehicle had
been transferred to Chua; that in December 2010, petitioner filed a complaint before the
Quezon City Police District’s Anti-Carnapping Section; that Ong, upon learning of the
complaint, met with petitioner to arrange the return of the vehicle; that Ong still failed to
surrender the vehicle; that petitioner learned that the vehicle was being transferred to
respondent; and that the vehicle was later impounded and taken into custody by the PNP-
Highway Patrol Group (HPG) at Camp Crame, Quezon City after respondent attempted to
process a PNP clearance of the vehicle with a view to transferring ownership thereof.
Petitioner thus prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the return of the vehicle to him,
and that the defendants be ordered to pay him P100,000.00 attorney’s fees and the costs of
suit.
After hearing the application, the trial court issued a July 29, 2011 Order decreeing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and with the ADMISSION of the plaintiff’s
Documentary Exhibits in support of this Application, issue a Writ of Replevin in favor of
the plaintiff subject to the posting of the bond in the amount of EIGHT MILLION PESOS
(Php8,000,000.00) to be executed in favor of the defendants for the return of the said
property if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse parties of such
sum as they may recover from the applicant in this action.
SO ORDERED.
 
Petitioner posted the required P8 million bond which was approved by the trial court. A
Writ of Replevin was then issued.
 The subject vehicle was seized by the court-appointed special sheriff who then filed the
corresponding Sheriffs Return.
On August 17, 2011, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to quash the Writ of
Replevin, dismiss the Complaint, and turn over or return the vehicle to him. Respondent
claimed that he is the lawful and registered owner of the subject vehicle, having bought the
same and caused registration thereof in his name on March 7, 2011; that the Complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 should be dismissed for failure to pay the correct amount of
docket fees; that the Complaint is defective for failing to allege the correct and material facts
as to ownership, possession/detention by defendant, warranty against distraint/levy/seizure,
and actual value of the vehicle; and that the implementation of the writ was attended by
procedural irregularities.
Particularly, respondent argued that petitioner could not prove his ownership of the
vehicle as the only pieces of evidence he presented in this regard were a manager’s check
and cash voucher as proof of payment, and the affidavit of Lopez attesting to the sale
between him and petitioner which are insufficient; that in fact, he is the registered owner of
the vehicle, as shown by the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration dated March 7,
2011 issued in his name by the Land Transportation Office (LTO); that it has not been
shown that he wrongfully detained the vehicle, as petitioner was never in possession
thereof, since the same was already detained and seized by the HPG at the time; that
petitioner failed to allege, as required under Section 2 of Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure14(1997 Rules), that the vehicle has not been distrained or taken for a tax
assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from
such seizure or custody; and that petitioner failed to allege the actual market value (P4
million) of the vehicle, and instead, he intentionally understated its value at only P2 million in
order to avoid paying the correct docket fees.
As for the alleged procedural defects, respondent claimed that the sheriff implemented
the writ against the HPG, which is not a party to the case; that the Complaint must be
dismissed for failure to pay the correct docket fees based on the actual value of the vehicle;
and that the trial court acted with undue haste in granting the writ of replevin.
Finally, respondent argued that he is the true owner of the subject vehicle as he was
able to register the transfer in his favor and obtain a certificate of registration in his name;
and that as between petitioner’s documentary evidence and his official registration
documents, the latter should prevail.
Petitioner filed his Opposition/Comment to the omnibus motion.
 
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 21, 2011, the trial court issued an Order denying respondent’s Omnibus
Motion for lack of merit. It held that respondent’s remedy is not to move to quash the writ of
replevin, but to post a counterbond within the reglementary period allowed under the 1997
Rules; that for failure to post said counterbond, respondent’s prayer for the return of the
vehicle to him is premature; that the issues of ownership and insufficiency of the allegations
in the complaint are best determined during trial; and that an allegation of undervaluation of
the vehicle cannot divest the court of jurisdiction.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but he was rebuffed just the same.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 
Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
124967 claiming as he did in his Omnibus Motion that the trial court should have dismissed
Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 on account of failure to pay the correct docket fees, defective
complaint, procedural irregularities in the service of the writ of replevin, the fact that he is
the registered owner of the subject vehicle, and for the reason that the trial court irregularly
took cognizance of the case during the period for inventory of its cases. Respondent sought
injunctive relief as well.
On October 9, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision granting the Petition. It held
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the instant case for failure of petitioner to
pay the correct docket fees, since petitioner misdeclared the value of the subject vehicle at
only P2 million in his Complaint, when the market value thereof was around P4.5 million to
P5 million; that this misdeclaration was undertaken with the clear intention to defraud the
government; and that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements under Section 2,
Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules, in that he gave a grossly inadequate value for the subject
vehicle in the Complaint and failed to allege therein that the vehicle has not been distrained
or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution
or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis.
The CA added that it was improper for the sheriff to serve a copy of the writ of replevin
upon the respondent on the day following the seizure of the subject vehicle, and not prior to
the taking thereof; that the trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction when it seized and detained the vehicle on the basis of an improperly served
writ; and that respondent was correct in moving to quash the writ, as the proper remedy in
case of an improperly served writ of replevin is to file a motion to quash the same or a
motion to vacate the order of seizure, and not to file a counterbond as the trial court
declared.
The CA thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorariis hereby
GRANTED with the following effects:
1) [T]he Order dated 21 November 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 224 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
2) [T]he Order dated 13 March 2012 similarly rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 224 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
3) Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 224 is hereby DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction;
4) The subject Range Rover with plate number ZMG 272 should be RETURNED to the
Philippine National Police-Highway Patrol Group for its proper disposition and
finally;
5) Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction is DENIED for being moot and academic.
 SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in its assailed February 19, 2013 Resolution, the CA
remained unconvinced. Hence, the present Petition.
 In a November 10, 2014 Resolution,  this Court resolved to give due course to the
Petition.
Issues
 
Petitioner pleads the following assignment of errors:
I court in misdeclaring the value of the subject vehicle; that while they need not be
WHETHER X X X THE TRIAL COURT HAS ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION WITH
PRAYER FOR REPLEVIN.
II.
WHETHER X X X THE PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE ALL THE MATERIAL
FACTS IN THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AND AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT UNDER
SECTIONS 2 & 4, RULE 60 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
III.
WHETHER X X X THE SHERIFF PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED THE WRIT OF
REPLEVIN BY SERVING THE SAME TO ANY PERSON WHO IS IN POSSESSION OF
THE PROPERTY SUBJECT THEREOF.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be reversed and set aside and that, instead,
Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 be reinstated, petitioner argues that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the replevin case considering the payment of docket fees based on a
valuation of the subject vehicle arrived at in good faith by petitioner, who in estimating the
vehicle’s value took into consideration various factors such as depreciation, actual
condition, year model, and other circumstances; that the payment of an inadequate docket
fee is not a ground for dismissal of a case, and the trial court may simply allow the plaintiff
to complete the payment of the correct docket fees within a reasonable time; and that his
eventual submission to the trial court’s valuation of P4 million and his willingness to pay the
bond and corresponding docket fee proves his good faith and sincerity.
On the issue relating to his supposed defective complaint on account of insufficient
allegations made therein, petitioner contends that there is nothing in the 1997 Rules which
requires him to copy the requirements in Section 2 of Rule 60 and incorporate them to the
letter in his complaint, as the rule merely requires an applicant in replevin to show the
circumstances in his complaint or affidavit of merit, which he claims he did.
Finally, petitioner insists that the writ of replevin was properly served upon respondent.
He did not address the issue relating to the sheriff’s service of summons, the writ of
replevin, and the corresponding order of the trial court on the day following the seizure and
detention of the subject vehicle, arguing rather sweepingly that it is sufficient for the sheriff
to have served respondent with a copy of the writ of replevin, together with the complaint,
affidavit, and bond. He conceded that respondent was in constructive possession of the
vehicle, as he was the registered owner thereof.
In his Reply, petitioner retorts that the Petition is grounded on questions of law; that
even though respondent was able to register the vehicle in his name, he is nonetheless a
buyer and possessor in bad faith, and thus, the transfer of ownership over the subject
vehicle in his favor is illegal; that a criminal case for estafa relative to the vehicle is pending
against Ong, Chua, and Centeno; that Lopez’s purported sale to Chua was anomalous; and
that respondent should have filed a counterbond.
 
Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment, respondent essentially counters that the Petition should be dismissed
as it raises issues of fact; that a liberal application of the rule requiring the payment of
correct docket fees cannot apply to petitioner’s case since he intentionally defrauded the
stated verbatim, the enumeration of required allegations under Section 2 of Rule 60 must
still be specifically included in a complaint for replevin or in the accompanying affidavit of
merit; that petitioner failed to show that he is the owner of the vehicle or that he is entitled to
its possession, and that the vehicle is wrongfully detained by him, and that it has not been
distrained, seized or placed under custodia legis; and that he is a buyer in good faith and for
value.
 
Our Ruling
 
The Petition must be denied.
“In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the
owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the
defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.”  “Rule
60 x x x allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of possession of personal property, to
apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is ‘the owner of the property
claimed . . . or is entitled to the possession thereof.’ The plaintiff need not be the owner so
long as he is able to specify his right to the possession of the property and his legal basis
therefor.”
In Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court likewise held that —
x x x It is not only the owner who can institute a replevin suit. A person “entitled to the
possession” of the property also can, as provided in the same paragraph cited by the
trial court, which reads:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.—Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must
show . . .
(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it,
or is entitled to the possession thereof; x x x
 
As correctly cited by respondent in his Comment:
x x x [A] party praying for the recovery of possession of personal property must
show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts
that he is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof. It must be borne in mind that replevin is a possessory action the gist
of which focuses on the right of possession that, in turn, is dependent on a legal basis
that, not infrequently, looks to the ownership of the object sought to be replevied.
Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin
must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the
writ should not be issued.
 
Petitioner admits and claims in his pleadings that on July 22, 2009, he purchased the
subject vehicle from Lopez, who executed and signed in blank a deed of sale and
surrendered all documents of title to him; that he did not register the sale in his favor, such
that the vehicle remained in the name of Lopez; that in September 2010, he delivered the
subject vehicle, together with all its documents of title and the blank deed of sale, to Ong,
with the express intention of selling the vehicle through the latter as broker/secondhand car
dealer; that Ong appears to have issued in his favor two guarantee checks amounting to
P4.95 million; and that these checks bounced.  Thereafter, Ong was able to sell the vehicle
using the deed of sale executed and signed in blank by Lopez to Chua, who secured a
certificate of registration in his name. Chua then sold the vehicle, via a Deed of Sale of
Motor Vehicle dated December 7, 2010, to respondent, who caused registration of the
vehicle in his name on March 7, 2011. Apparently, Ong did not remit Chua’s payment to
petitioner, prompting the latter to file formal complaints/charges for 1) estafa and
carnapping on May 18, 2011 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
and 2) carnapping on June 15, 2011 before the PNP-HPG in Camp Crame, Quezon City
against Ong and Centeno. It appears as well that prior to the filing of these formal
complaints, or sometime in November 2010, petitioner appeared before the Quezon City
Anti-Carnapping Unit based in Camp Karingal, Quezon City and, claiming that the subject
vehicle was carnapped, filed a “Failed to Return Vehicle” report; that on February 23, 2011,
petitioner, respondent, Ong, and Chua appeared at Camp Karingal to shed light on the
claimed carnapping; that the parties were requested to voluntarily surrender the subject
vehicle, but the request proved futile; and that petitioner was instead advised to file
appropriate charges and file a complaint with the PNP-HPG in order to include the subject
vehicle in the “hold order list.”
This Court is not unaware of the practice by many vehicle buyers and secondhand car
traders of not transferring registration and ownership over vehicles purchased from their
original owners, and rather instructing the latter to execute and sign in blank deeds of sale
covering these vehicles, so that these buyers and dealers may freely and readily trade or
resell the vehicles in the secondhand car market without difficulty. This way, multiple
transfers, sales, or trades of the vehicle using these undated deeds signed in blank become
possible, until the latest purchaser decides to actually transfer the certificate of registration
in his name. For many car owners-sellers, this is an easy concession; so long as they
actually receive the sale price, they will sign sale deeds in blank and surrender them to the
buyers or dealers; and for the latter, this is convenient since they can “flip” or resell the
vehicles to the public many times over with ease, using these blank deeds of sale.
In many cases as well, busy vehicle owners selling their vehicles actually leave them,
together with all the documents of title, spare keys, and deeds of sale signed in blank, with
secondhand car traders they know and trust, in order for the latter to display these vehicles
for actual viewing and inspection by prospective buyers at their lots, warehouses, garages,
or showrooms, and to enable the traders to facilitate sales on-the-spot, as-is-where-is,
without having to inconvenience the owners with random viewings and inspections of their
vehicles. For this kind of arrangement, an agency relationship is created between the
vehicle owners, as principals, and the car traders, as agents. The situation is akin to an
owner of jewelry who sells the same through an agent, who receives the jewelry in trust and
offers it for sale to his/her regular clients; if a sale is made, the agent takes payment under
the obligation to remit the same to the jewelry owner, minus the agreed commission or other
compensation.
From petitioner’s own account, he constituted and appointed Ong as his agent to sell
the vehicle, surrendering to the latter the vehicle, all documents of title pertaining thereto,
and a deed of sale signed in blank, with full understanding that Ong would offer and sell the
same to his clients or to the public. In return, Ong accepted the agency by his receipt of the
vehicle, the blank deed of sale, and documents of title, and when he gave bond in the form
of two guarantee checks worth P4.95 million. All these gave Ong the authority to act for and
in behalf of petitioner. Under the Civil Code on agency,
Art. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal,
from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that
another person is acting on his behalf without authority.
Agency may be oral, unless the law requires a specific form.
 Art. 1870. Acceptance by the agent may also be express, or implied from
his acts which carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the
circumstances. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
“The basis of agency is representation and the same may be constituted expressly or
impliedly. In an implied agency the principal can be bound by the acts of the implied agent.”
The same is true with an oral agency.
Acting for and in petitioner’s behalf by virtue of the implied or oral agency, Ong was thus
able to sell the vehicle to Chua, but he failed to remit the proceeds thereof to petitioner; his
guarantee checks bounced as well. This entitled petitioner to sue for estafathrough abuse of
confidence. This is exactly what petitioner did: on May 18, 2011, he filed a complaint
for estafa and carnapping against Ong before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.
Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, petitioner thus ceased to be the
owner thereof. Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his
ownership, petitioner lost his right of possession over the vehicle. His argument that
respondent is a buyer in bad faith, when the latter nonetheless proceeded with the purchase
and registration of the vehicle on March 7, 2011, despite having been apprised of
petitioner’s earlier November, 2010 “Failed to Return Vehicle” report filed with the PNP-
HPG, is unavailing. Petitioner had no right to file said report, as he was no longer the owner
of the vehicle at the time; indeed, his right of action is only against Ong, for collection of the
proceeds of the sale.
Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject vehicle
at the time he filed Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 in July 2011, petitioner may not seek a return
of the same through replevin. Quite the contrary, respondent, who obtained the vehicle from
Chua and registered the transfer with the Land Transportation Office, is the rightful owner
thereof, and as such, he is entitled to its possession. For this reason, the CA was correct in
decreeing the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-11-69644, although it erred in ordering the
return of the vehicle to the PNP-HPG, which had no further right to hold the vehicle in its
custody. As the registered and rightful owner of the subject vehicle, the trial court must
return the same to respondent.
Petitioner cannot be allowed to cut his losses by ostensibly securing the recovery of the
subject vehicle in lieu of its price, which Ong failed and continues to fail to remit. On the
other hand, Ong’s declarations contained in his Affidavit,  to the effect that petitioner
remains the owner of the vehicle, and that Chua came into illegal possession and
ownership of the same by unlawfully appropriating the same for himself without paying for it,
are unavailing. Faced with a possible criminal charge for estafa initiated by petitioner for
failing or refusing to remit the price for the subject vehicle, Ong’s declarations are
considered self-serving, that is, calculated to free himself from the criminal charge. The
premise is that by helping petitioner to actually recover his vehicle by insisting that the same
was unlawfully taken from him, instead of remitting its price to petitioner, Ong expects that
he and petitioner may redeem themselves from their bad judgment; for the petitioner, the
mistake of bestowing his full faith and confidence upon Ong, and blindly surrendering the
vehicle, its documents of title, and a deed of sale executed and signed in blank, to the latter;
and for Ong, his failure to remit the proceeds of the sale to petitioner; and petitioner might
then opt to desist from pursuing the estafa and other criminal charges against him.

Having disposed of the case in the foregoing manner, there is no need to discuss the
other issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The October 9, 2012 Decision and February 19,
2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 124967 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, in that the subject Land Rover Range Rover, with Plate Number ZMG 272
and particularly described in and made subject of these proceedings, is ORDERED
RETURNED to respondent Alvin Tomlin as its registered owner.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—Agency can be express or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of
action, or his failure to repudiate the agency knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without
authority. (Oliver vs. Philippine Savings Bank, 788 SCRA 189 [2016])

Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels
may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who
wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. (Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Alibudbud, 791
SCRA 134 [2016])
 
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