Running head: Artifact #6 Religion and Public Schools 1

Artifact #6

Religion and Public Schools

Mariana Gallardo

College of Southern Nevada

May 4, 2020
Artifact #6 Religion and Public Schools 2

Bill Ward is a kindergarten school principal who recommended the dismissal of a teacher

named Karen White in regard to her lack of meeting her students’ needs. Karen White acquired a

new affiliation with Jehovah’s Witnesses, which lead her to refuse to engage in activities that

were religious in nature. So, she communicated to her students and their parents that she could

no longer participate in certain activities within the school. She told them that such activities

included decorating the classroom for holydays, planning gift exchanges in Christmas season,

singing “Happy Birthday,” or reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. This caused parents to protest,

and principal Bill Ward suggested Karen’s dismissal. The question here is if there is a justifiable

basis for Karen’s dismissal.

Bishop v. Aronov (1991) will be the first case presented to justify Karen’s dismissal. This

case consisted of Dr. Bishop who was an assistant professor at the University of Alabama and

taught exercise physiology. He occasionally referred to his religious beliefs during instruction.

Bishop suggested to his students one time that his religious beliefs were more important than

academic production when they asked him about academic research, publishing, tenure, or

promotion. Bishop also organized an after-class meeting for those interested on a lecture where

he discussed “Evidences of God in Human Physiology,” a discussion that he concluded saying

that man was created by God and not by evolution. Then Westerfield prepared a memorandum to

him, regarding as “Religious Activities in a Public Instruction,” suggesting that some of his

actions at the University needed to cease. The University believed that Bishop’s preferences or

beliefs were not necessary to class discussions. Bishop then filed a suit in federal district court

for violation of his free speech right and academic freedom. Even though the district found in

favor of Bishop, the University appealed. So, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that

“teachers can be directed to refrain from expressing religious viewpoints in the classroom or to
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students during school day” (Underwood & Webb, 2006). Bishop v. Aronov (1991) relates to

Karen’s situation as she does not want to do certain activities in the classroom due to her

religious beliefs. However, she is not considering the needs of her students. The activities that

she does not want to participate in are indispensable activities for students. Therefore, as ruled in

Bishop v. Aronov (1991), she can be directed to refrain from expressing her religious viewpoints

in the classroom. She is showing her religious viewpoints by refusing to do activities that affect

her students. So, Bishop v. Aronov (1991) can be a justifiable basis for Karen’s dismissal.

Palmer v. Board of Education (1979) will be the second case that helps to justify Karen’s

dismissal based on her inability to participate in certain activities of the school curriculum. In

this case, a kindergarten teacher who is Jehovah’s Witness approached to the principal of the

school, Florence Paskind, to inform her that due to her religious beliefs she would not teach

“anything having to do with love of country, the flag, and other patriotic matters.” The teacher

refused to instruct students in the Pledge of Allegiance, to lead them in patriotic songs and to

conduct instruction and certain activities concerning some national holidays. For example, she

refused to lead holidays like Columbus Day, Halloween, Thanksgiving, and Christmas. Parents

complained about her behavior, arguing that their children were not receiving the same

instruction other classes did, and that they would hesitate to enroll their children there. For this

reason, the school board proposed her discharge. The U.S. court of appeals decided that the

school has the right to fire a teacher who refuses to follow the curriculum for religious reasons,

that “the school interest in delivering the curriculum to students outweighed any interference

with teacher’s constitutional right” (Underwood & Webb, 2006). Palmer v. Board of Education

(1979) is very similar to Karen’s situation. Karen is also a teacher who is Jehovah’s Witness

refusing to participate in certain activities of the school curriculum because of her beliefs. She
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does not want to engage in activities about holidays either. Under Palmer v. Board of Education

(1979), the school can dismiss Karen from her duties as a teacher as she is ineffectively meeting

the needs of her students by not following the curriculum. A teacher cannot force students “to

forego a portion of their education they would otherwise be entitled to enjoy” (Underwood &

Webb, 2006). Palmer v. Board of Education (1979) helps to justify Karen’s dismissal.

The first case presented to support Karen and against the school is West Virginia State

Board of Education v. Barnette (1943). This case consisted of West Virginia State Board of

Education requiring public schools to include salute to the flag by teachers and students as a

mandatory part of the school activities, and that refusal to do so could result as an act of

insubordination. So, children in a Jehovah’s Witness family refused to say the Pledge Allegiance

to the United States flag and were sent home for non-compliance. Barnette, a Jehovah’s Witness,

brought the case to the U.S. district court. Then the school board appealed to the U.S. Supreme

Court, which ruled that “compelling children in public schools to salute the U.S. flag was an

unconstitutional violation of their freedom of speech and religion.” This case should be applied

to teachers as well. In regard to Karen’s position, she is refusing to do certain activities in the

school due to her religious beliefs. Among those activities, she is refusing to recite the Pledge of

Allegiance. This is similar to the case West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943).

This case focuses in her freedom of speech and religion. The Free Speech Clause of the First

Amendment protects Karen from being forced to say the Pledge of Allegiance as well as her

freedom of religion from doing those activities contrary to her religious beliefs. Under West

Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), there is not a justifiable basis for Karen’s

dismissal.
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Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) will be the second case presented to argue that there is not a

justifiable basis for Karen’s dismissal. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), Jonas Yoder and Wallace

Miller, both members of the Old Amish Religion and Conservative Amish Mennonite Church,

were convicted of violating Wisconsin’s school attendance law. This law required a child’s

school attendance until age 16, and Jonas and Wallace parents refused to send them to public or

private school after they graduated from the eighth grade. Their parents were arguing that school

attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs. According to their religion, “they would

endanger their own salvation and that of their children by complying with the law.” The U.S.

Supreme Court that the school attendance law to them violated their rights under the Free

Exercise Clause of the First Amendment in their free exercise of religious rights. For this reason,

“the Supreme Court said that the state could not interfere with the free exercise of religion unless

it could show a compelling state interest in doing so” (Underwood & Webb, 2006). By focusing

on Karen dismissal, it would be unjust to fire her since she is just exercising her freedom of

religion. Karen just does not want to participate in certain activities, and she is in her right to do

so. By choosing to not decorate the classroom for holidays, or refusing to recite the Pledge of

Allegiance, she is not interfering with the state interest. So, under Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972),

there is not a justifiable basis for Karen’s dismissal. Dismissing Karen violates her right under

the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

My decision in this case is against Karen’s behavior. I agree with principal Bill Ward that

she should be dismissed as she is ineffectively meeting the needs of her students. Karen is

refusing to do certain activities in the classroom because of her religious beliefs. However, these

activities are within the school curriculum. Under Bishop v. Aronov (1991) and Palmer v. Board

of Education (1979), Karen’s dismissal is justifiable. In Bishop v. Aronov (1991), it was ruled
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that teachers can be refrain from expressing their religious viewpoints in the classroom as well as

to students during the school day. Karen is expressing her religious viewpoints by refusing to

participate in activities that are important to students. Furthermore, Palmer v. Board of

Education (1979) is very similar to Karen’s case. In Palmer v. Board of Education (1979), it was

ruled that schools have the right to fire teachers that refuse to follow the curriculum for religious

reasons. Karen is not following the school curriculum because of her religious beliefs. Therefore,

under these two cases Karen’s dismissal is justifiable.

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References

Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991). Retrieved from

https://casetext.com/case/bishop-v-aronov

Palmer v. Board of Education. 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979). Retrieved from

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/466/600/2361432/

Underwood, J., & Webb, L. (2006). Teachers’ Rights. School Law for Teachers Concepts and

Applications. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). Retrieved from

https://www.britannica.com/event/West-Virginia-State-Board-of-Education-v-Barnette

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Retrieved from

https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/406/205