Process Safety For PII - Day 1 PDF

1/30/2016
Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia
Practical Process Safety Management
Presented for kursus kompetensi Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

March 2016
 Alvin Alfiyansyah
Current Job title : Senior Loss Prevention Engineer, Qatargas OPCO
 Chemical Engineering – BChe, Itenas 1995-2000
 MBA – General Management, IPMI Jakarta 2010-2012
 MSc – Safety & Risk Management, Heriot-Watt University, UK 2011-2015 (expected)
 Technical Authority in Project HES Management; Process Safety; Loss Prevention; Risk
Management; HSE Audit; Safety in Design; PSSR; Process Hazard Analysis (PHA).
 Married – 1 daughter, 1 son
 Past experiences :
 MSW Champion – Chevron Indonesia Company (3 yrs)
 Project Safety Engineer – Chevron Indonesia Company (2 yrs)
 SHEQ Advisor – AMEC for bp Indonesia (0,8 yrs)
 Acting Lead Process Safety Engineer – Technip Indonesia (4,5 yrs)
 Project Sales Engineer – PT UDM (2 yrs)
 Certification :  Membership :
- Certified Lead Auditor ISO 9001 and OHSAS 18001 (BVQI) ASSE, AICHe, ICheMe, IATMI,
- Certified Project HSE Management Expert (Qatargas and Chevron) IAFMI, KMI, IIPS, BKK-PII,
- Certified PHA Facilitator (Qatargas and Chevron) CCPS Global Network
- Certified SIS / SOA / SIL Facilitator (Chevron/TUV)
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Housekeeping & Ground Rules

 Emergency Response
 Hours Ground Rules :
 08:00 – 15:30
HP is on Silent Mode
 Min. 2 Coffee Breaks & 1 Lunch Break Mix English and Indonesian presentation
 Flexible, but on time
 Handphone Use
 Silent/Vibrate Only mode, Accept call outside class
 SMS-ing? Do appropriately
 Facilities (toilet, mushola, canteen / restaurant, etc.)
 Be punctual
 Avoid side conversations (except during exercise)
 Address issue to instructor for class discussion
Training Objectives
 Know about process safety Introduction comprises of process safety
history and its regulation across USA, UK and Indonesia.
 Understand process safety management model, anatomy of process
incidents, and catastrophes of process incidents .
 Understand basic process safety concept and layer of protection.
 Know about summary application of design solutions, prescriptive
risk management and what went wrong cases.
 Understand role of process safety engineer and summary in how to
distribute process safety competency in a company.
 Understand process safety management and their key elements
refer to OSHA PSM.
 Understand how to manage process safety management integration
with common HSEQ management system.
 Understand key performance indicator in process safety
management. .
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Reference Books
 Marshall, Vic., Ruhemann, Steve., “Fundamental of Process Safety”,
IChemE, 2001
 Crowl, D.A., Louvar, J.F., “Chemical Process Safety: Fundamental with
Applications” Prentice Hall, 2002
 CCPS, “Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures”, 1992
 CCPS, “Guidelines for Design Solution for Process Equipment Failure”
 CCPS, “Plant Guidelines for Technical Management of Chemical
Process Safety”, 1995
 CCPS, “Guidelines for Engineering Design of Process Safety”, 1993
 CCPS “Guidelines for integrating process safety management,
environmental, safety, health, and quality”, 1996
 CCPS “Process Safety leading and lagging metric”, 2011
 HSE UK, HSG254 “Developing process safety indicator”, 2006
 HSE UK COMAH and Seveso II
 API RP 754 Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and
Petrochemical Industries, 2010
 Dupont and DNV presentation materials
Other Reading
 Lees, Frank P., “Loss Prevention in the Process Industries”,
Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996.
 Kletz, Trevor A., “Learning from Accident”, Butterworth-Heinemann,
1994
 Kletz, Trevor A., “What Went Wrong? Case Histories of Process Plant
Disasters”, Gulf Publishing, 1994
 Kletz, Trevor A., “Still Going Wrong? Case Histories of Process Plant
Disasters”, Butterworth-Heinemann, 2003
 Sanders, Roy E., “Chemical Process Safety: Learning from Case
Histories”, Butterworth-Heinemann
 Kletz, Trevor A., “Process Plants: A Handbook for Inherently Safer
Design”, Taylor and Francis
 Wikipedia -> http://www.wikipedia.org
 Indonesian Regulation in HSE and Process Safety.
 KMI, IIPS, IATMI, IAFMI, BKK-PII, SPE articles, CCPS discussion
group.
 Other process safety books and articles from journals/publications.
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Training Format
 This is not a formal lecture.
 Presentations on key principles.
 No calculation, no formula.
 Refer to Crowl & Louvar for Safety Engineering calculation
 Exercises and workshop collaborate with individual
participation.
 Discussion and questions encouraged.
 Ask questions if in doubt
 Strike question while presentation is hot
Training Agenda
Chapter 1 : Process Safety Introduction
 Day 1 – Safety Moment

 History of HSE and Process Safety
 Oil and Gas Value Chain
 LNG Value Chain
 Process Safety History and its terminology
 Process Safety History and Regulation in USA, UK,
Indonesia
 Catastrophes in the Process Industries
 Process Safety Management Model
 Process Safety Management
 Anatomy of Process Incident
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Safety Moment
 Mumbai High North (Bombay High North) Incident
 Located 160 km West of Mumbai in 73 m water depth.
 Platform owned and operated by ONGC- National oil company
Why did an injured finger have a major impact on offshore platform ???
Mumbai High North Platform

 At about 14:00 hours on 27 July 2005, a crewman (chef)
on the support vessel Samudra Suraksha injured his
finger, and the decision was taken to transfer him to the
Platform for medical attention, in spite of bad weather
and high waves.
 Control of the vessel was lost and it collided with risers
on the Platform.
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Incident Result
 Damage to the risers led to serious oil leakage
and rapidly spreading fire.
 227 people on platform, 84 on board support
vessel Samudra Suraksha and 73 on Noble
Charlie Yester drilling rig, which also had to be
abandoned. Rescued in 15 hours : 362.
 22 fatalities (including 11 missing presumed
dead).
 6 divers in decompression chamber on dive
support vessel - rescued the next day.
 Platform, support vessel and the Charlie Yester
completely destroyed and 1 helicopter lost.
 The platform was lost in less than 2 hours.
 100,000 bbl/day production lost for several
weeks.
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Oil and Gas Value Chain
LNG
Facility
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LNG Value Chain
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What went wrong ?

 Design: Unprotected risers close to boat landing
 Operational: Failure to assess risk of routine
activities in abnormal conditions.
 Cultural: Investigation concluded that this was
passive, accepting, not challenging task.
“PSM vs HSE Management”, what is the difference ? ”
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Day 1 - Chapter 1
Process Safety
Introduction
History of HSE and Process Safety

March 2016
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Industrial Paradigm
Production :
“Mass” “Lean” “Flexible” “Reconfigurable”
1913 1960 1980 2000
Objective :
“Knowledge
Science”
Computerization
Production Management
“Interchangeable Parts” Approach:

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Garis Besar aplikasi strategi dalam HSE

manajemen
 Dupont (2004-2005)
- Unsafe Act/At-risk Behavior 96%
- Other causes : 4%
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Are safety performance and

safety culture related?
2012
8
Recordable
6
Total
Rate
2
*
0
40 60 80 100
Relative Culture Strength
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Learning About You – What Industry are

you associated with?
Avg Avg
NAICS Industry TRR* RCS
211 Oil and Gas Extraction 1.4 54
212 Mining (except Oil and Gas) 3.5 61
221 Utilities 3.5 52
2211 Electric Gen., Transmission, and Distribution 3.2 46
2212 Natural Gas Distribution 4.3 59
311 Food Manufacturing 6.2 35
322 Paper Manufacturing 3.7 40
324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 1.9 47
325 Chemical Manufacturing 2.7 64
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 5.9 55
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 7.2 45
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 6.0 44
8 424 Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods 4.7 55
Total Recordable Rate*
481 Air Transportation 8.7 29

2008 BLS Industry
48-49 Transportation and Warehousing 5.7 42

6 4862 Natural Gas Pipelines 2.3 57
Entire
Average
Organization * TRR based on 200,000 hours

4
2
Benchmark Best
0
40 60 80 100
Relative Culture Strength
2012
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Risk Management History – Overall
0 BC to ++1900 1939 1960-1969 1972-1980 1999 ++2000
1st Prophet / Corporate (1963), Statistical & Company &

First Human to Technological Historical Industry
Last Prophet / Rasul Risk Management Risk Expectation
(1963), Management
Insurance (1964), Approach
Project (1969) (HSE UK)
Finance
Risk Matrix
(American Finance
concept and
Association –
regulation (HSE
1939-1946)
UK)
** Taken from various sources by Alvin
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Sejarah Keselamatan Proses – Amerika
--1900++ 1920-1950 1960 1970 1984 1992 2000+
Massive Oil Standardization OSH OSHA CCPS PSM

Exploration (1860) Trend Standard
Organization
Company &
Grows :
Industry
ASME (1880)
Expectation
AICHE (1908)
API (1919) Process safety influencee to risk
management
Sources : HM Inspector
Factories (1974)
** Taken from Various sources
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Sejarah Aturan Keselamatan Proses – Contoh

evolusi aplikasi dalam dunia Industri
 1989, American Chemistry Council  4 elemen psm
 1990, American Petroleum Institute (API)  management of process hazards (11
elements)
 1992, OSHA  29 CFR part 1910 psm (14 elements)
 1992, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, through CCPS  12 elements
 1996, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Risk Management Plant (RMP) 40 CFR
PART 68
 1998, Instrumentation and Safe Automation Society (ISA)  ISA S.84
 SE No. 140/Men/PPK- KK/II/2004, Minister of Man Power Indonesia  Major Hazard
Installation
“Hal diatas adalah pendekatan manajemen
risiko secara HSE/OE dalam dunia industri”
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Common Terminology Used in America

Loss Prevention instead of Technological Risk
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) instead Hazard Identification
Layer of Protection instead of Lines of Defend
Spade/Blind instead of spectacle blind
Process Safety instead of Technical Risk
Recommended Practice driven from industry data and best practice
Mentoring is recommended to facilitator of process hazard analysis or

risk assessment new to the role or not fullfill company/organization
specification.
Process Safety Management is about:
Process, Plant and People
It is begin with Management Commitment
The purpose is to protect people, avoid

environmental impact and assets.
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Risk Analysis Methodologies

•What-IF/Checklist
Qualitative : •HAZOP
•Hazard Identification and Analysis
(JSA, JLA)
• Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index
Quantitative : • Mond Fire Explosion & Toxicity Index
• Fire Explosion and Risk Analysis
• SIL Study
• FMEA
Typical Quantitative Study used for PHA in America is using above
methodologies and also INDEX… INDEX… INDEX …
Dow’s Chemical Exposure Index
Toxic Damage Index
Fire & Explosion Damage Index
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Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index (example)

 Attachment shows steps and important notes for calculating Dow’s Fire &
Explosion Index
 The larger the value, the more

hazardous the process. More bigger
penalty factor achieved in calculating
DFEI mean our installation has
higher degree of hazards and can
causing higher assurance/insurance
premium rate for such facilities.
 Need specific DFEI training or
lecturer to understand steps for
calculating degree of hazards.
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Risk Management in Europe

• In Europe:
• Seveso Directive I –1974 *(version II – 1984) : Oil & Gas
• Nuclear safety case regulation 1974
• In UK Sector: HSE-UK Offshore Safety Case -1992
• In Norway: Use of Risk Analyses –1990
• In Functional Safety Area : IEC-61508 (2000) and IEC-61511 (2002)
• International Standard ISO/IEC 27001-2013 : Information security

management
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Sejarah Keselamatan Proses – Eropa

1833 1843 1893 1956 1959 1974 1975 1988 1999 2000+
HM Factory 1st Women Nuclear Health & COMAH /

Inspectorate Inspectors Installation Safety Seveso II
(Factory Act Appointed Act Executive
(1895 : Quarry formed
1833) Inspector for
3000 Textiles
Functional Safety
Steam Power
Mills Formed) and Risk
Flixborough
Management
(Seveso I)
- Safety Reps & Safety Committee Regulation (1977)
“HS at Work Act” - Control of Lead at Work Regulation (1980)
Mines Inspectorate - Notification of Accidents and Dangerous Occurences
Appointed (Mines Regulation (1980)
- 1st Aid Regulation (1981)
Act 1842) - CIMAH / Bhopal / PSM – 1984
Piper Alpha/Lord - Reportiing Injury, Disease, Dangerous Occurrence
Cullen Report – Regulation (1985)
Agriculture - Ionising Radiation (1985)
Safety Case - Control of Asbestos at Work (1987)
(HS Welfare Act) - Control of Substance Hazardous to Health (1988)
- Noise at Work & Electricity at Work (1989)
- Workplace Safety, PPE & Manual Handling (1992)
- Construction Regulation (1994)
- Tankfarm / Buncefield rule (2005)
** Taken from HSE UK and various sources
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Development in Oil and Gas Sector
Shell –EP 95-0352 Quantitative Risk Assessment

(1995)
BP –GP 48-50 Guidance on Practice for Major

Accident Risk Process (2005)
Total –GS-EP-SAF-041 Technological Risk

Assessment Methodology (2008)
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European approach to risk management

and PSM :
• More into
Probabilistic /
Performance
Based
Approaches
• Very Detailed
and Multi steps,
Collaboration
from many
entities
• Based on
Societal Impact
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Sejarah Aturan HSE– Indonesia
1970 1980 1980 1990

1945-1960 1970 -1980 -1990 -1990 -1999 2000++
Industry UU No. 1 Berbagai PP Diversifikasi Pengaruh

Standardization ttg K3 di industri PP ttg K3 : SNI dan
Migas, - Dokter OtDa
Tambang - Lalin
Era VR 1910 dan Gedung - Kebakaran
- Lifting, dst.
Era privatisasi
inspeksi K3 Era Transformasi
Dan terbitnya Ahli K3 (1992)
syarat PJK3 (1994)
kesehatan kerja SMK3 (1996)
** Taken from Various sources (Alvin’s library)
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Mari kita bahas satu topik : Investigasi

Kecelakaan Incident Investigation Principle
Cost of Incident (COI) = Revenue Impact + Expense Impact
+ Incremental Capital Impact
Revenue : Production Loss x Product Price Expense : Repair or Replacement Cost
Incremental Capital : Additional Cost implemented after incident
(need upgrade instead of replacement)
Incident Investigation flowchart :

 Higher impact (COI) triggers use of robust and advance incident investigation techniques
 Higher impact (COI) triggers involvement of several expert and senior root cause analysis
facilitator
 Higher impact (COI) triggers involvement of company management
 Higher impact (COI) measured against company HSE management system
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Fakta Kompetensi vs Hak Ahli K3

SYARAT ADM. SELEKSI DIKLAT EVALUASI SERTIFIKASI
No Jenis Syarat Hak Kewajiban
1 a. D3 + 4 th • Riksa/uji •Rencana kerja

Ahli K3 S1 + 2 th • Minta keterangan •Lapor dan membuat laporan
b. Permohonan Prsh • Rekomendasi
c. Biodata
d. FC ijasah
e. Sertifikat Ahli K3
f. Pasphoto (4x6)
2 a. TK  100 orang •dilantik •Membuat laporan
PJK3 b. Resiko bahaya tinggi •formal (SK) •safety meeting
c. Keanggotaan (3 + 3)
d. Ketua (decision maker)
e. Bentuk (bebas)
3 a. Badan Hukum •melakukan kegiatan •mentaati peraturan
PJK3 b. SIUP sesuai SK •mengutamakan pelayanan untk
Inspeksi c. NPWP •Mendapat imbalan syarat2 K3
d. Wajib Lapor jasa •Kontrak kerja
/ Diklat
e. Peralatan memadai •Memelihara dokumen min. 5
f. Ahli K3 spesialis thn.
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Incident Data Base – country case example

Pre-1980 (USA) Post 1980 (USA) Data Status
International and National International and National Classified
Company Internal Data Base Company Internal Data Base
Country Regulator (DoT, DoE, Country Regulator (DoT, DoE, Classified
DoD, OSHA, EPA, etc.) DoD, DoL-OSHA, EPA, etc.)
Lesson learn – not available Independent Country Board : Open to public
CSB
Independent world wide Open to public
association : IADC, IOGP/OGP, Detail - open with
etc. request
International Consultant : WS- Open to public with
Atkins, Acutech, etc. request
Lesson learn by academic Permitted with
professor or professional source declaration
INDONESIA (1970 to present) : PusLabFor PolRI dan Jamsostek/BPJS
Depnaker, DepTransportasi dan Perhubungan, DepESDM, DepLH, etc.
All Data are Classified !
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HSE Implementation : Incident Investigation

– country case
Item USA UK Indonesia
Regulation Occupational Safety Health and Safety Act UU No. 1 tentang K3

and Health Act 1970 1974
Content 26 SubPart 27 Chapter 11 Chapter
Agency DoL - OSHA HSE Executive Depnaker and affected

department
Involving Party Agency Agency Agency (Pengawas)
with role and Inspector Inspector Direktur Perusahaan
responsibility Employee Employee P2K3
statement Company Company
Penalty According to court According to court Rp. 100.000,- or criminal

result result offense as per Police report
Investigation State Agency or State Agency or Pengawas K3 atau Polisi
responsibility – authorize person authorize person
major incident selected by Agency selected by Agency
Incident Focus on Root Causes Focus on Root Causes Focus on Actor & Penalty
Investigation Selected by Agency or or Selected by Agency Method is selected by
Authorize Person Authorize Person Agency or Police
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Catastrophes in Industries

March 2016
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Catastrophes in the Industry
 Flixborough, England
 1974
 Caprolactam
manufacturing plant
 Explosion and fire
 28 deaths
 >US$160 million in
damage
37
 Seveso, Italy
 1976
 Agricultural Chemical
Plant
 Release of Dioxin
 Animals and vegetation killed
 Population exposed suffered
a higher than normal cancer
rate
38 BKK – PII
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 Mexico City
 1984
 LPG Storage Terminal
 Explosions and fires
 >300 deaths
39 BKK – PII
 Bhopal, India
 1984
 Insecticide production
plant
 Release of Methyl
Isocyanate
 >3000 deaths
 >10,000 people injured
40 BKK – PII
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 Chernobyl, Russia
 1986
 Graphite-moderated
Nuclear Power Reactor
 Release of radioactive
fission products
 31 deaths
 50,000 people evacuated
 3000 sq miles unfit for
habitation
41 BKK – PII
 Piper Alpha, North Sea

 1988
 Oil & gas production
platform
 Fire and explosion
 167 deaths
 Platform destroyed
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bp Texas - 2005 Lapindo - 2006 Crane Sudirman Palace -2007
DeepWater Horizon Drilling Petrowidada, 2004 PT Mandom, 2015

April 2010
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Kecelakaan Kerja Terbesar di Indonesia

 Pt Badak LNG, Bontang, Kaltim
 15 April 1983
 4 orang meninggal; puluhan orang cedera; kesalahan pada saat start-up
menyebabkan ledakan awan uap (VCE) Lng
 Pt Petrowidada, Gresik, Jawa Timur

 21 Januari 2004
 3 orang meninggal, 70 orang cedera, ledakan awan uap (vce) phtalic acid dan
maleic acid

 Pt Mandom, Cibitung, Jawa Barat

 10 Juli 2015
 28 orang meninggal, 31 orang cedera, ledakan aerosol di pabrik kosmetik
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Discussion
 How do you view all those catastrophes?
 Why could they happen?
 How could have they been prevented?
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The Nature of the Accident Process
 Three types of chemical plant accidents
Type of Probability of Potential for Potential for

accident occurrence fatalities economic loss
Fire High Low Intermediate
Explosion Intermediate Intermediate High
Toxic Release Low High Low

Source: Crowl & Louvar, 2002
46 BKK – PII
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 Type of loss for large hydrocarbon chemical plant
accidents
Source: Marsh Inc., 1998
47 BKK – PII

 Hardware associated with largest losses
Piping Systems
Miscellaneous
Storage tanks
Reactor piping system
Process holding tanks
Valves
Source: Marsh Inc., 1987
Heat exchangers
Process towers
Compressors
Pumps
Gauges
0 10 20 30 40 50
Number of accidents
48 BKK – PII
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Process Safety Management Model

March 2016
Something we bother
 37 process safety accidents in 2004
causing 12 fatalities and 122 injuries
 We have that knowledge, but how can we
contribute to accident prevention?
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PSM in Indonesia
 Too many process safety incidents
 No PSM regulation for PSM per se (itself)
 Partial implementation; a whole system
only in a few big companies
 Must deal with poor safety culture
 Low awareness & limited resources
 Law enforcement needs improvement
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PSM Development Cycle
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PSM model ala Indonesia (IIPS)
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CCPS PSM Element (1989)

 Accountability: Objectives and Goals
 Process Knowledge and Documentation
 Capital Project Review and Design Procedures
 Process Risk Management
 Management of Change
 Process and Equipment Integrity
 Incident Investigation
 Training and Performance
 Human Factors
 Standards, Codes, and Laws
 Audits and Corrective Actions
 Enhancement of Process Safety Knowledge
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PSM vs Risk Management Model
Safety Case 2015
COMAH 2015
OSHA PSM 2013
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Process Safety Management

Seveso II Safety Case
OSHA 1919.119 (COMAH)
Employee Participation Process Description Facility Descriptioon
Training Surrounding Environment (Offshore : Platform &
Reservoir Description)
Process Hazard Analysis Management System
Policy
Process Safety Information Policy
Mechanical Integrity Organization
Organization
Operating Procedure Processes
Processes
Hot Work Permit Risk Assessment
Risk Assessment
Management of Change Permit to Work
Permit to Work
Pre Start Up Safety MOC
MOC
Review Performance
Performance Measurement
Emergency Planning & Measurement
Response Audit & Review
Audit & Review
Incident Investigation Major Hazard Identification
Major Hazard Identification
Contractors Systematic Major Hazard
Systematic Major Hazard Risk Assessment
Compliance Audit Risk Assessment
Trade Secret Demonstration of :
Demonstration of :
Prevention, Control,
Prevention, Control, Mitigation, Evacuation
Mitigation, Emergency Rescue & Recovery, Safety
Response Plans, Safety Case
Report
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PSM vs Safety Case
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Design Safety Case workflow
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Operational Safety Case workflow
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Functional Safety
 Latest approach in
risk management and
process safety by
introducing functional
safety requirement
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What is SIL and what SIS is needed ?
 Sets of performance standards for Safety

Instrumented Systems based on risk level
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Safety Integrity Level
 SIL 4 extremely rare in process industry, NEED DESIGN REVIEW.
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PSM vs. EPA Risk Management Plans(RMP)

The principal areas in which the requirements of
the EPA differ from the OSHA Rule are:
Different chemical list and Threshold Quantities (TQ) for

some chemicals. e.g., Chlorine 1500 lbs. (PSM) v. 2500 lbs.
(RMP)
EPA requires hazard assessments that include analyses of

the “worst case” accident consequences.
EPA requires preparation of written risk management plans to

document the risk management program. The plans must be
submitted to designated agencies and will be available to the
public.
Risk Management Plans must be registered with the EPA.
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Resources for developing OSHA PSM

 European Economic Community (EEC)
 World Bank
 International Labor Office (ILO)
 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA)
 States, Industry, & Labor Organizations
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PSM
Plan
Act PSM Do
Exercise in
groups :
Identify 14
PSM
elements
Check for each
cycle
(15 minutes)
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Hierarchy of PSM element (OSHA)
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Process Safety Management Element (OSHA)

Employee Trade Secret
Participation
System
Wide
Process Hazard PSM Training
Analysis
Incident Process Safety
Investigation Information
Emergency
Response
Reaction
PSM
Accountability
Preventi
on Operating
Procedure
Mechanical CSMS
Integrity
Control
Management of PSSR & Safe

Change PSM Audit Work Practices
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Definisi Process Safety Management

 Menurut American Society of Safety Engineer
(ASSE) di tahun 1986, PSM adalah aplikasi prinsip
sistem manajemen untuk mengidentifikasi,
memahami, dan mengontrol bahaya proses yang
berdampak pada karyawan, asset fasilitas dan
lingkungan.
 Sedangkan CCPS, AIChE -1992, PSM diartikan
sebagai sebagai set komprehensif dari kebijakan-
kebijakan, prosedur-prosedur, dan praktek-praktek
yang dibuat dan dapat digunakan, tersedia, dan
efektif untuk mencegah kecelakaan besar.
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Why do we need PSM ?

 It is Industry Product
 To remember and learn from incident (we do not forget actual
incident or famous incident)
 Develop employee awareness to employee and people
 Adhere to local rule, country regulation, and international
standard
 Increase performance and profit
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Process Safety Management (PSM)

March 2016
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What is Process Safety Management (PSM)?
CCPS, AIChE: “Comprehensive sets of policies, procedures,

and practices designed to ensure that barriers to major
accidents are in place, in use and effective”
OSHA: “A systematic approach to chemical process hazards

management, when implemented, will ensure that the
means for preventing catastrophic release, fire and
explosion are understood, and that the necessary preventive
measures and lines of defence are installed and maintained”
71
Why are all interested in PSM?

 Numerous catastrophes caused by release of highly
hazardous materials over the past years
 Regulators, lawmakers, management, employees,
the media focused, etc focused on tasks being done
to manage processes involving hazardous materials
72
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Regulatory Requirements on PSM

 1970s – Seveso directives in Europe
 Mid to late 1980s – Regulations on manufacture,
handling and storage of hazardous materials in the USA
 1992 – OSHA PSM (29 CFR 1910.119)
In Indonesia
 No specific requirements on PSM
 SMK3 – PerMenaker 1996. 3.3.4 “Pengendalian resiko
kecelakaan dan penyakit akibat kerja dalam proses rekayasa
harus dimulai sejak tahap perancangan dan perencanaan”
 Surat Edaran Menakertrans #140/PPK-KK/2004 – Pemenuhan
kewajiban syarat-syarat keselamatan dan kesehatan kerja di
industri kimia dengan potensi bahaya besar
73
A Different View of PSM

 Firstly introduced by the American Chemistry Council
(was Chemical Manufacturers Association) in the middle
of 1988.
 Now, more than ten PSM models were conceptualized.
 API 750 (Now Inactive)
 EPA RMP (Risk Management Program)
 OSHA
 CCPS
 Industry: i.e. DuPont
 The most wide-range industrial implemented models is
OSHA’s PSM since it is backed up by US Federal
regulation.
74
37
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A Different View of PSM
*RMP: Risk Management Program
75
Anatomy of Process Incident

March 2016
38
1/30/2016
Anatomy of Process Incidents

Propagating
Factors
Initiating Incidents
Outcome
Hazard
Events s
Risk Reduction
Factors
*Source: CCPS, SIL selection

book, Fundamentals of process
Intermediate
safety book Events
LOSS OF
PROCESS CONTAINMENT
SAFETY
POTENTIAL
ENGINEERING
IMPACT
SAFETY
PERSONNEL /
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
77
• Hazard
An inherent physical or chemical
characteristics that has potential for
causing harm to people, property, or
the environment
– Chemical Hazards
– Physical Hazards
– Biological Hazards
– Human Factors
Source: Vic Marshall,

2001
78
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Exercise
• Hazard
Identify the following hazards which exist in the process plant
(10 minutes)
– Physical Hazards
– Ergonomic Factors
*Chevron copyright
79

Exercise
• Hazard
Identify the following hazards which exist in the process plant
• Flammable materials, Combustible materials, Unstable materials, Corrosive
materials, Asphyxiant, Shock-sensitive materials, Highly reactive materials, Toxic
materials, Inert gases, Combustible dusts, Pyrophoric materials
– Physical Hazards (Forms of energy absorbed by employees)

• Heat, Cold, Vibration, Noise, Ionizing radiation, Nonionizing radiation (visible light,
IR, UV, Laser, Microwave)
• Viruses, Bacteria, Fungi, Parasites, Insects, Plants and Animals
– Human Factors
• Physical, Physiological, Psychological
80
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• Concept of A Hazard System
– Realization
– Secondary sources in a hazard system
– Overlapping of a system
– Differing laws
– Different levels of realization
– Chronic and acute sources
– Passive and active sources
– Mobile and static receptors
– Onsite and offsite receptors
– Attenuation
– Binary nature of hazards
81

 Factors Affecting Process Hazards
 Technology advances/new innovation
 Increasing capacity
 Increasing variety of products
 Increasing intensity of production
 Increasing number of type of hazards
 Population density and industry location
 Gaps between plant development and safety
system
 Safety is not integral part of plant development
82 BKK – PII
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 Process Hazards
Significant Inventories of: Extreme Physical Condition:

 Flammable materials - High temperature
 Combustible materials - Cryogenic
temperature
 Unstable materials - High pressure
 Corrosive materials - Vacuum
 Asphyxiant - Pressure cycling
 Shock-sensitive materials - Temperature cycling
 Highly reactive materials - Liquid/water hammering
 Toxic materials - Ionizing radiation
 Inert gases - High voltage/current
 Combustible dusts - Corrosion
 Pyrophoric materials - Erosion
83 BKK – PII

 Initiating Events
Process upsets
 Process deviations
Management systems failures
 Pressure • Inadequate staffing
 Temperature • Insufficient training
 Flowrate
 Concentration • Lack of administrative controls and audits
 Phase/state change
 Impurities Human errors
 Reaction rate/heat of reaction
 Spontaneous reaction
• Design
 Polymerization • Construction
 Runaway reaction • Operations
 Internal explosion
 Decomposition • Maintenance
 Containment failures • Testing and inspection
 Pipes, tanks, vessels, gaskets/seals
 Equipment malfunctions
 Pumps, valves, instruments, sensors, interlock
External events
failures • Extreme weather conditions
 Loss of utilities
• Earthquakes
 Electricity, nitrogen, water, refrigeration, air, heat
transfer fluids, steam, ventilation • Nearby accidents' impacts
• Vandalism/sabotage
84
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 Intermediate Events
Propagating factors Risk reduction factors Risk reduction factors – cont.
 Equipment failure • Control/operator responses • Emergency plan responses
 Safety system failure • Alarms • Sirens/warnings
 Ignition sources • Control system response • Emergency procedures
 Furnaces, flares, incinerators
 Vehicles
• Manual and automatic ESD • Personnel safety equipment
 Electrical switches • Fire/gas detection system • Sheltering
 Static electricity • Safety system responses • Escape and evacuation
 Hot surfaces
 Cigarettes
• Relief valves • External events
 Management systems failure • Depressurization systems • Early detection
 Human errors • Isolation systems • Early warning
 Omission • High reliability trips • Specially designed
 Commission
• Back-up systems • structures
 Fault diagnosis
 Decision making • Mitigation system responses • Training
 Domino effects • Dikes and drainage • Other management systems
 Other containment failures • Flares
 Other material releases
• Fire protection systems
 External conditions
 Meteorology • Explosion vents
 Visibility • Toxic gas absorption
85 BKK – PII

 Incident Outcomes
Phenomena Consequences
 Discharge
• Effect analysis
 Flash and evaporation
 Toxic effects
 Dispersion
 Neutral or buoyant gas
 Thermal effects
 Dense gas  Overpressure effects
 Fires • Damage assessments
 Pool fires  Community
 Jet fires  Workforce
 Flash fires  Environment
 Explosions  Company assets
 BLEVEs  Production
 Fireballs
 Confined explosions
 Unconfined vapor cloud explosions
 Physical explosions
 Dust explosions
 Detonations
 Condensed phase detonations
 Missiles
86
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Exercise: Flixborough (20 minutes)
Propagating
Factors
Initiating
Hazard Events Outcome
Risk Reduction s
Factors
Identify all items under each element of process incident
87
Group Exercise (20’)

Identify all items under each element of process incident
for Flixborough accident
88
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Back up Slide : Flixborough Disaster

Temporary Modifications
89
Flixborough Disaster
Temporary Modifications
 Six reactors in series – each reactor slightly lower than
the one before for gravity flow
 28-inch-diameter connecting pipes for expansion
 Reactor 5 removed as a result of a crack
 20-inch by-pass temporarily installed
 The temporary by-pass pipe failed 2months later
 50 tons of hot cyclohexane released and ignited
 28 people killed and plant destroyed
90
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What Went Wrong? Flixborough

 Temporary pipe was not properly supported –
rested on scaffolding
 Bellows allowed “squirm” or free-to-rotate
 No professionally qualified engineer
 Those who designed and built it did not know
how to design large pipes required to operate at
high temperature and gauge pressure
 No knowledge on highly-stressed piping
92
46

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Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

Practical Process Safety Management

Presented for kursus kompetensi Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

Housekeeping & Ground Rules

 Day 1 – Safety Moment

Mumbai High North Platform

Oil and Gas Value Chain

LNG Value Chain

What went wrong ?

“PSM vs HSE Management”, what is the difference ? ”

Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

History of HSE and Process Safety

Presented for kursus kompetensi Persatuan Insinyur Indonesia

“Interchangeable Parts” Approach:

Garis Besar aplikasi strategi dalam HSE

Are safety performance and

Learning About You – What Industry are

481 Air Transportation 8.7 29

48-49 Transportation and Warehousing 5.7 42

Organization * TRR based on 200,000 hours

Risk Management History – Overall

0 BC to ++1900 1939 1960-1969 1972-1980 1999 ++2000

1st Prophet / Corporate (1963), Statistical & Company &

** Taken from various sources by Alvin

Sejarah Keselamatan Proses – Amerika

--1900++ 1920-1950 1960 1970 1984 1992 2000+

Massive Oil Standardization OSH OSHA CCPS PSM

** Taken from Various sources

Sejarah Aturan Keselamatan Proses – Contoh

Common Terminology Used in America

Mentoring is recommended to facilitator of process hazard analysis or

It is begin with Management Commitment

The purpose is to protect people, avoid

Risk Analysis Methodologies

Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index (example)

 The larger the value, the more

Risk Management in Europe

• In UK Sector: HSE-UK Offshore Safety Case -1992

• In Norway: Use of Risk Analyses –1990

• In Functional Safety Area : IEC-61508 (2000) and IEC-61511 (2002)

• International Standard ISO/IEC 27001-2013 : Information security

Sejarah Keselamatan Proses – Eropa

HM Factory 1st Women Nuclear Health & COMAH /

Development in Oil and Gas Sector

Shell –EP 95-0352 Quantitative Risk Assessment

BP –GP 48-50 Guidance on Practice for Major

Total –GS-EP-SAF-041 Technological Risk

European approach to risk management

Sejarah Aturan HSE– Indonesia

1970 1980 1980 1990

Industry UU No. 1 Berbagai PP Diversifikasi Pengaruh

** Taken from Various sources (Alvin’s library)

Mari kita bahas satu topik : Investigasi

Incident Investigation flowchart :

Fakta Kompetensi vs Hak Ahli K3

1 a. D3 + 4 th • Riksa/uji •Rencana kerja

Incident Data Base – country case example

HSE Implementation : Incident Investigation

Regulation Occupational Safety Health and Safety Act UU No. 1 tentang K3

Agency DoL - OSHA HSE Executive Depnaker and affected

Penalty According to court According to court Rp. 100.000,- or criminal