MAGALLONA VS.

ERMITA
FACTS:

 Petitioners assails the constitutionality of RA 9522 adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and
classifying the baselines of nearby territories.
 RA 3046 (year 1961) demarcates the maritime baselines of the Philippines was amended by RA 9522 in
March 2009 to comply with the UNCLOS requirement. It shortened one of the baselines of the Philippine
territory.
 Petitioners allege that RA 9522 reduced Philippine maritime territory and the Phils sovereign power in
violation of Art. 1 of the 1987 Consti.

ISSUES:

 Whether the petitioners possess locus standi.

 Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

 Yes, Petitioners have locus standi.

Owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing a more
direct and specific interest to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship
standing.

 NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped RA3046. KIG and Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the
baselines drawn around the Philippine Archipelago, if included will violate international laws.
Sec. 2 of RA9522 states that the Philshas continued claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, determined
as “regime of islands”, Hence the Phils. Still have sovereign power and jurisdiction over the disputed islands.

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 2ND DIVISION

FACTS:

 PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all properties of private respondent, Benedicto. Among the
properties sequestered and taken over by PCGG were 227 shares of Negros Occidental Golf and Country
Club (NOGCC).
 PCGG did not pay monthly membership fee of the shares totaling to 2, 959, 471 and were eventually
declared delinquent and be sold at public auction.
 Republic thru PCGG and Benedicto entered into a compromise agreement and passed a resolution
directing PCGG to release and deliver to the Clerk of Court the shares which they failed to do.
 To escape liability, the Representative through PCGG invokes state immunity from suit.

ISSUE: Whether the Republic through PCGG is immune from suit.

HELD:
NO. By entering into a compromise agreement with the Private Respondent, Petitioner Republic stripped of
itself from immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the state enters into
contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to
Constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual and reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations
arise therefrom. The State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a
contract, the sovereign descends to the level of a citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of
entering to such contract, breach on its part gives right to the other party.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY v. ONATE (2007)
Facts: Onate Spouses owns the disputed lot. In 1940 Bagumbayan Elementary School was constructed on a portion
of the lot. The Dep Ed developed and built various school buildings and facilities on the lot. The grand child of the
spouses filed a case in the RTC of Legaspi for reconstitution proceedings. The Dep Ed responded that the
Municpality of Daraga donated the disputed lot.

Issue: Whether CA erred in ruling that DEPED may be sued in violation of the State’s immunity from suit
Held: The threshold issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued in Civil Case No. 8715 without its consent. A
supplementary issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued independently of the Republic of the Philippines.
We rule that petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its being privy to the Deed of
Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay over the disputed property. When it voluntarily gave its
consent to the donation, any dispute that may arise from it would necessarily bring petitioner DECS down to the
level of an ordinary citizen of the State vulnerable to a suit by an interested or affected party. It has shed off its
mantle of immunity and relinquished and forfeited its armor of non-suability of the State.
The auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the Philippines is likewise resolved in the negative. While it is
true that petitioner is an unincorporated government agency, and as such technically requires the Republic of the
Philippines to be impleaded in any suit against the former, nonetheless, considering our resolution of the main
issue below, this issue is deemed mooted. Besides, at this point, we deem it best to lift such procedural technicality
in order to finally resolve the long litigation this case has undergone. Moreover, even if we give due course to said
issue, we will arrive at the same ruling.
The Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-defendant in Civil Case No. 8715 considering that
it impliedly gave its approval to the involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a situation involving
a contract between a government department and a third party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be
impleaded as a party to a suit resulting from said contract as it is assumed that the authority granted to such
department to enter into such contract carries with it the full responsibility and authority to sue and be sued in its
name.

REPUBLIC vs. HIDALGO

FACTS:

 TarcilaLaperal Mendoza filed an actionfor the annulment or declaration of nullity of  the title and deed of
sale, reconveyanceand/or
recovery of ownership and possession aproperty against the Republic of thePhilippinesin the RTC of
Manila.It is also known as theArlegui  Residencewhich housed two Philippinepresidents and which now
holds the Office of the Press Secretary and the News InformationBureau.The case was initially dismissed
by thepresiding Judge of the Manila RTC (Branch 35)on the ground of state immunity. The case wasre-
raffled to the Manila RTC (Branch 37), withrespondent Vicente A. Hidalgo as presidingJudge.
 In an Order, Judge Hidalgo declared theRepublic
in default for failure of SolicitorGabriel Francisco Ramirez, the handlingsolicitor, to file the required
Answer within theperiod prayed for in his motion for extension.It is contended
that the respondentJudge violated the Constitution and thefundamental rule
that government funds areexempt from execution or garnishment whenhe caused the issuance of
the writ of executionagainst the Republic.

ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke immunityfrom suit.

HELD:
NO. It is settled that when the State givesits consent to be sued, it does not
therebynecessarily consent to an unrestrainedexecution against it. Tersely put, when theState waives its immunity,
all it does, in effect,is to give the other party an opportunity toprove, if it can, that the state has
a liability.The functions and public servicesrendered by the State cannot be allowed toparalyzed or disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specificobjects, as appropriated by law.
 TERESITA M. YUJUICOvs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA
G.R. No. 164282 October 12, 2005
Facts:
The City Council of Manila enacted an Ordinance authorizing the City Mayor to acquire by negotiation or
expropriation certain parcels of land for utilization as a site for the Francisco Benitez Elementary School. The
property chosen is located in the Second District of Manila and contains an approximate area of 3,979.10 square
meters. It is covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles all in the name of petitioner. The Ordinance provides that an
amount not to exceed the fair market value of the land then prevailing in the area will be allocated out of the
Special Education Fund (SEF) of the City of Manila (City) to defray the cost of the property’s acquisition.
Failing to acquire the land by negotiation, the City filed a case for eminent domain against petitioner as owner of
the property. The RTC decided the case in favor of the City. The City was ordered to pay a total amount of
P73,257,555.00 as just compensation for the whole property. Pursuant to a Writ of Execution, the branch sheriff
served a Notice ofGarnishment on the funds of the City deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines, YMCA
Branch, Manila. Invoking jurisprudence holding that public funds cannot be made subject to garnishment, the City
filed a motion to quash the Notice of Garnishment.In line with the manifestation made by the counsel for the City,
the trial court ordered the release to petitioner within 30 days, of the amount of P31,039,881.00 deposited with
the Land Bank, in partial payment of the just compensation adjudged in favor of petitioner.As there was no action
from theCity School Board (CSB), petitioner filed a petition for contempt of court against respondents. the trial
court denied the petition for contempt of court.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus against the members of the CSB, seeking to compel them to pass
a resolution appropriating the amount necessary to pay the balance of the just compensation awarded to
petitioner in the expropriation case. The RTC granted said petition.
Respondents filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment. Respondents invoked excusable negligence as a
ground for their failure to seasonably file an appeal.Finding the Order unacceptable, petitioner elevated it to this
Court by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue: whether the enactment of an ordinance to satisfy the appropriation of a final money judgment rendered
against an LGU may be compelled by mandamus?
Ruling:
The question of whether the enactment of an ordinance to satisfy the appropriation of a final money judgment
rendered against an LGU may be compelled by mandamus has already been settled in Municipality of Makati v.
Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a
municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered
against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of
the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefore.
Clearly, mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner when a money judgment is rendered in its favor and
against a municipality or city, as in this case.
Moreover, the very ordinance authorizing the expropriation of petitioner’s property categorically states that the
payment of the expropriated property will be defrayed from the SEF. To quote:
An amount not to exceed the current fair market value, prevailing in the area appraised in accordance with the
requirements of existing laws, rules and regulations, of the property to be acquired or so much thereof as may be
necessary for the purpose shall be allocated out of the Special Education Fund of the City to defray the cost of
acquisition of the above-mentioned parcels of land.
The legality of the above-quoted provision is presumed. The source of the amount necessary to acquire
petitioner’s property having in fact been specified by the City Council of Manila, the passage of the resolution for
the allocation and disbursement thereof is indeed a ministerial duty of the CSB.
Furthermore, respondents had argued in the petition for contempt filed against them by petitioner that the latter’s
failure to invoke the proper remedy of mandamus should not be a ground to penalize them with contempt. In their
haste to have the contempt petition dismissed, respondents consistently contended that what petitioner should
have filed was a case for mandamus to compel passage of the corresponding resolution of the CSB if she wanted
immediate payment.Having relied on these representations of respondents and having filed the action they
adverted to, petitioner cannot now be sent by respondents on another wild goose chase to obtain ultimate
recovery of what she is legally entitled to.
The notion of expropriation is hard enough to take for a private owner. He is compelled to give up his property for
the common weal. But to give it up and wait in vain for the just compensation decreed by the courts is too much to
bear. In cases like these, courts will not hesitate to step in to ensure that justice and fair play are served.
Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land
but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered ‘just’ for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss

China National Machinery and Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria (2012)

Facts: CNMEG and NorthRail entered into Memorandum of Understanding for the feasibility study on apossible
railway line from Manila to La Union ( NorthRail Project). CNMEG and NorthRail executed a Contract of Agreement
for the construction of the Phase 1 of Northrail. The respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and
Injunction in the RTC of Makati. CNMEG filed a motion to dismiss. CNMEG filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
the Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over its person as it was an agent of the Chinese government making it
immune from suit, and the subject matter as the Northrail was product of an executive agreement.

Issue: Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity precluding it from being sued before a local court
Held: CNMEG claims immunity on the ground that the Aug 30 MOU on the financing of the Northrail Project was
signed by the Philippine and Chinese governments, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor meant that it was
bound to perform a governmental function on behalf of China. However, the Loan Agreement, which originated
from the same Aug 30 MOU, belies this reasoning, viz:
Article 11. xxx (j) Commercial Activity The execution and delivery of this Agreement by the Borrower constitute,
and the Borrower’s performance of and compliance with its obligations under this Agreement will constitute,
private and commercial acts done and performed for commercial purposes under the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines and neither the Borrower nor any of its assets is entitled to any immunity or privilege (sovereign or
otherwise) from suit, execution or any other legal process with respect to its obligations under this Agreement,
as the case may be, in any jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Borrower does not waive any immunity
with respect of its assets which are (i) used by a diplomatic or consular mission of the Borrower and (ii) assets of a
military character and under control of a military authority or defense agency and (iii) located in the Philippines
and dedicated to public or governmental use (as distinguished from patrimonial assets or assets dedicated to
commercial use). (Emphasis supplied.)
(k) Proceedings to Enforce Agreement In any proceeding in the Republic of the Philippines to enforce this
Agreement, the choice of the laws of the People’s Republic of China as the governing law hereof will be recognized
and such law will be applied. The waiver of immunity by the Borrower, the irrevocable submissions of the
Borrower to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the People’s Republic of China and the appointment of
the Borrower’s Chinese Process Agent is legal, valid, binding and enforceable and any judgment obtained in the
People’s Republic of China will be if introduced, evidence for enforcement in any proceedings against the Borrower
and its assets in the Republic of the Philippines provided that (a) the court rendering judgment had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action in accordance with its jurisdictional rules, (b) the Republic had notice of the
proceedings, (c) the judgment of the court was not obtained through collusion or fraud, and (d) such judgment was
not based on a clear mistake of fact or law.
Further, the Loan Agreement likewise contains this express waiver of immunity:
15.5 Waiver of Immunity The Borrower irrevocably and unconditionally waives, any immunity to which it or its
property may at any time be or become entitled, whether characterized as sovereign immunity or otherwise, from
any suit, judgment, service of process upon it or any agent, execution on judgment, set-off, attachment prior to
judgment, attachment in aid of execution to which it or its assets may be entitled in any legal action or proceedings
with respect to this Agreement or any of the transactions contemplated hereby or hereunder. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the Borrower does not waive any immunity in respect of its assets which are (i) used by a diplomatic or
consular mission of the Borrower, (ii) assets of a military character and under control of a military authority or
defense agency and (iii) located in the Philippines and dedicated to a public or governmental use (as distinguished
from patrimonial assets or assets dedicated to commercial use).
Thus, despite petitioner’s claim that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to Northrail because the bank
was mandated by the Chinese government, and not because of any motivation to do business in the Philippines,it
is clear from the foregoing provisions that the Northrail Project was a purely commercial transaction.
Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government, while the
Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is silent on the
classification of the legal nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan Agreement, which is an
inextricable part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the Northrail Project
to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in character.
Thus, piecing together the content and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding
dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wang’s letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the
desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely commercial activity performed in the
ordinary course of its business.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. NEDA DIR.-GENERAL

FACTS:

 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued ExecutiveOrder No. 420 that directs a unified ID system
amonggovernment agencies and Government owned and controlledcorporations in order to have a
uniform ID for all governmentagencies.Kilusang Mayo Uno and other respondents assailed this executive
order for being a usurpation of legislative powers by the president and it infringes the citizens right to
privacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 420 is valid.

HELD:
YES, Executive Order 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the president’s constitutional power of
control over government entities in the executive department, as well as the president’s constitutional duty to
ensure that all laws are faithfully executed, thus said executive order is not a usurpation of legislative power.
Furthermore, it is not usurpation of legislative power because the act of issuing ID cards and the collection of some
necessary information to imprint in them do not require legislation. What needs legislation is the system of
appropriation to enforce the unified ID system, when unified ID system includes the citizens and when personal
data that are beyond of what is routinely needed is collected for the ID.

REPUBLIC v. GINGOYON (2005)

Facts: NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO)
was nullified. Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through expropriation
filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that  a mere deposit of the assessed value of the
property with an authorized government depository is enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court). However, respondents avers that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued, direct
payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA No. 8974 and a related
jurisprudence (2004 Resolution
Issue: Whether the RA 8974 can amend the Rules of Court
Dissenting Opinion
R.A. No. 8974 cannot
amend Rule 67
Article VIII, sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution gave the Supreme Court the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice we emphasized that the 1987 Constitution strengthened the rule making power
of this Court, thus:
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the
rule making power of this Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. But most importantly, the
1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress
Undoubtedly, Rule 67 is the rule this Court promulgated to govern the proceedings in expropriation cases filed in
court. It has been the undeviating rule for quite a length of time. Following Article VIII, section 5(5) of the 1987
Constitution and the Echegaray jurisprudence, Rule 67 cannot be repealed or amended by Congress. This
prohibition against non- repeal or non-amendment refers to any part of Rule 67 for Rule 67 is pure procedural law.
Consequently, the Court should not chop Rule 67 into pieces and hold that some can be changed by Congress but
others can be changed. The stance will dilute the rule making power of this Court which cannot be allowed for it
will weaken its institutional independence.

SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

 Petitioner, Rommel Jacinto DantesSilverio, a male transsexual, filed a petition for his change of name and
sex in his birth certificate which the lower granted.Its relevant portions read:

(a) “Petitioner filed to present petition… solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex”;
(b) “Granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
(c) Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken
against him.
(d) The court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the
petition as it would only grant the petitioner his much awaited happiness and the realization of their (his fiance’)
dreams.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.  On February 23, 2006, the
CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, thus, this petition.
ISSUE:Whether or not the change of the petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate are allowed under Articles
4007 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
HELD:
No.  It is not allowed.  A person’s name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.  No law allows the
change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment.   A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.  Statutes control petitions for change of name.  Neither may entries in the birth certificate as
to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity.  Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can
change his name or surname without judicial authority.  Article 412 provides that no entry in the civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, vs. FLORENCIO M. REYES

Facts:
A complaint for gross misconduct was filed against Rene De Guzman a clerk of court, because of delay in
transmitting records to the CA. It was alleged that De Guzman is using illegal drugs and had been manifesting
irrational and queer behavior while at work. This prompted Judge Sta. Romana to request the PNP Crime Lab to
perform a drug test on De Guzman. The result of the drug test was positive. The OCA submitted its report and
recommendation that De Guzman is guilty of gross misconduct.
Ruling:
Anent the use of illegal drugs, we have upheld in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board the validity
and constitutionality of the mandatory but random drug testing of officers and employees of both public and
private offices. As regards public officers and employees, we specifically held that:
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable
supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for
private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional demand,
are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and
efficiency.
This Court is a temple of justice. Its basic duty and responsibility is the dispensation of justice. As dispensers of
justice, all members and employees of the Judiciary are expected to adhere strictly to the laws of the land, one of
which is Republic Act No. 9165 which prohibits the use of dangerous drugs.
The Court has adhered to the policy of safeguarding the welfare, efficiency, and well-being not only of all the court
personnel, but also that of the general public whom it serves. The Court will not allow its front-line
representatives, like De Guzman, to put at risk the integrity of the whole judiciary.
In fine, we agree with the OCA that by his repeated and contumacious conduct of disrespecting the Court’s
directives, De Guzman is guilty of gross misconduct and has already forfeited his privilege of being an employee of
the Court. Likewise, we can no longer countenance his manifestations of queer behavior, bordering on absurd,
irrational and irresponsible, because it has greatly affected his job performance and efficiency. By using prohibited
drugs, and being a front-line representative of the Judiciary, De Guzman has exposed to risk the very institution
which he serves. It is only by weeding out the likes of De Guzman from the ranks that we would be able to
preserve the integrity of this institution.
The legislative policy as embodied in Republic Act No. 9165 in deterring dangerous drug use by resort to
sustainable programs of rehabilitation and treatment must be considered in light of this Court’s constitutional
power of administrative supervision over courts and court personnel. The legislative power imposing policies
through laws is not unlimited and is subject to the substantive and constitutional limitations that set parameters
both in the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.  As such, it cannot limit the
Court’s power to impose disciplinary actions against erring justices, judges and court personnel. Neither should
such policy be used to restrict the Court’s power to preserve and maintain the Judiciary’s honor, dignity and
integrity and public confidence that can only be achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards of decency and
propriety governing the conduct of justices, judges and court employees.

Southern Cross cement vs. cement manufacturers association of the Philippines

Facts:
The case centers on the interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act
(“SMA”), which was one of the laws enacted by Congress soon after the Philippines ratified the General Agreement
on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The SMA provides for the
structure and mechanics for the imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect domestic
industries and producers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict serious injury on them.

Philcemcor filed with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) a petition seeking for the imposition of safeguard
measures on Gray Portland cement, in accordance with the SMA. After the DTI issued a provisional safeguard
measure, the application was referred to the Tariff Commission for a formal investigation pursuant to Section 9 of
the SMA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, in order to determine whether or not to impose a definitive
safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement. After public hearings and conducting its own investigation,
the Tariff Commission came out with a negative finding. Notwithstanding such finding, the DTI sought the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose a definitive safeguard measure. The Secretary of Justice
opined that the DTI could not do so under the SMA, and so the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision wherein
he expressed the DTI’s disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time,
ultimately denying Philcemcor’s application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so
in light of the Tariff Commission’s negative findings.
Philcemcor filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set aside
the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commission’s Report. Philcemcor argued that the DTI Secretary, vested as he
is under the law with the power of review, is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission;
and, that the Report is void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and erroneous
methodology. The CA held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings of the Tariff Commission
since such findings are merely recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the Secretary’s discretionary
review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant the DTI Secretary the power to make a final decision on
the Tariff Commission’s recommendation.

Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the
existence or non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding
upon the DTI Secretary.

Ruling:
The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties on imported products, tariff rate
quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the importation of a product into the country. Concerning as they do the
foreign importation of products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall within the ambit of Section
28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
These impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the realm of the power of taxation, a power which is
within the sole province of the legislature under the Constitution.

Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax
levies involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the
enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of
the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and
should be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to the President, rather than the affirmation of
an inherent executive power.

This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential authority attain primordial
consideration. First, there must be a law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which
would be filled in by the law. And further, Congress is further empowered to impose limitations and restrictions on
this presidential authority. On this last power, the provision does not provide for specified conditions, such as that
the limitations and restrictions must conform to prior statutes, internationally accepted practices, accepted
jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of members of the executive branch.

The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI may be
exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the President, such as department
secretaries. Indeed, for purposes of the President’s exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section
28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. The SMA provides an
exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities as
alter egos  of the President, to impose such measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even
as alter ego of the President, to levy tariffs and imports.

Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed within the same
context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the
executive branch, subject to limitations and restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI
Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA,
in the implementation of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of
taxation. Indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing
safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and
imposts. Without legislative authorization through statute, the President has no power, authority or right to
impose such safeguard measures because taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.

SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, vs.THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

Facts:
The municipality of Andong was created by virtue of EO 107, which was justified by Pres. Macapagal citing his
powers under the Revised Administrative Code, however the said EO were declared null and void, as it failed to
meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch.
Sultan Camid filed a petition that assails a Certification by the DILG which enumerates 18 municipalities and
alleged that Andong is a full blown municipality certified as "existing," per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen
(18) municipalities are among the thirty-three (33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court
in Pelaez. Camid presented a Certification from the DENR about the total land area of Andong, and a certification
of the Statistics office of Marawi City about its population. Camid also enumerates a list of governmental agencies
and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong, and notes that other municipalities have recommended to the
Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the immediate implementation of the revival or re-establishment
of Andong.
Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying Andong as a regular existing
municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as an existing regular
municipality." He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong,
especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly annulled by reason
of Pelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003;
direct the DILG to classify Andong as a "regular existing municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full
recognition and support to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management,
to immediately release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the
DILG, to recognize the "Interim Local Officials" of Andong.
Ruling:
It bears noting that based on Camid’s own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by
executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never elected
its municipal officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of
obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving
it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality.
How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the DILG
Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez, legislation
was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.66 It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the existence of
these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities enumerated in the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through statute. Clearly then, the fact
that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient
legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen (18) other municipalities.

Sema vs COMELEC
Facts:
 The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines apportioned 2 legislative districts
for Maguindanao. The first consists of Cotabato City and 8 municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA
6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054). Cotabato City, as part of Maguindanao’s first legislative
district, is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII (having voted against its inclusion in November 1989  plebiscite).
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act
201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the 8 municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao.

Later, 2 new municipalities were carved out of the original 9, constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, resulting to total of
11. Cotabato City is not part of Maguindanao. Maguindanao voters ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in 29
October 2006 plebiscite.

On 6 February 2007, Cotabato City passed Board Resolution No. 3999, requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the
status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province”
under MMA Act 201. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo
with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.” Resolution No. 07-
0407, adopted the COMELEC’s Law Department recommendation under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007.
The COMELEC issued on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is
composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201. On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 7902 (subject of these cases), amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district
in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City).”

Meanwhile, the Shariff Kabunsuan creation plebiscite was supervised and officiated by the COMELEC pursuant

to Resolution No. 7727. Several municipalities seceded from Maguindanao and formed the new province. All of
them were from the first legislative district of Maguindanao.
Kabuntalan was chosen as the capital of the new province. The province was the first to be created under Republic
Act No. 9054 or the Expanded ARMM law. Sandra Sema questioned COMELEC Resolution 7902 which combined
Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City into a single legislative district during the Philippine general election, 2007.
Sema lost to incumbent Congress representative of the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato district, Didagen
Dilangalen.

Ruling:
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly
Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan 
 
The creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or barangay – must comply
with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code.   Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution.  Third, there
must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
 
          There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its
plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution.   In
fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays
within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.   However, under the Local Government Code,
“only an Act of Congress” can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
 
          Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM.   Congress made the delegation under its
plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative
powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. In the present case, the question arises whether
the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution. 
 
          There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the
power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is
followed.  However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter.  Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election
to at least one Member.” 
 
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same
reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the
power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a
legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a
legislative district because once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to
one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a
legislative district. 
 
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the
same time the power to create a legislative district.  The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives?  The
answer is in the negative.

          In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section
20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.    Only
Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the
creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.  The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a
legislative district.  Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the
office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly
operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.  Thus, we rule
that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is
void.  

NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION, vs.NPC

Facts:

EPIRA law was enacted and under the EPIRA Law, a new National Power Board of Directors was constituted
composed of the Secretary of Finance as Chairman, with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Budget and
Management, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Director-General of the National Economic and Development
Authority, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government,
the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, and the President of the National Power Corporation as
members.

The Secretary of the Department of Energy promulgated the IRR of the EPIRA Law, pursuant to Section 77 thereof.
Said IRR were approved by the Joint Congressional Power Commission on even date. Meanwhile, also in pursuant
to the provisions of the EPIRA Law, the DOE created the Restructuring Committee to manage the privatization and
restructuring of the NPC, the National Transmission Corporation, and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Corporation.
To serve as the overall organizational framework for the realigned functions of the NPC mandated under the EPIRA
Law, the Restructuring Committee proposed a new NPC Table of Organization which was approved by the NPB
through a Resolution. Likewise, the Restructuring Committee reviewed the proposed 2002 NPC Restructuring Plan
and assisted in the implementation of Phase I (Realignment) of said Plan, and thereafter recommended to the NPB
for approval the adoption of measures pertaining to the separation and hiring of NPC personnel. The NPB, taking
into consideration the recommendation of the Restructuring Committee, thus amended the Restructuring Plan
approved under NPB Resolution No. 2002-53.

Pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA Law and Rule 33 of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124
which provided for the Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of
Personnel in the NPC Table of Organization. Under said Resolution, all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on
31 January 2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits. On the same day, the NPB approved NPB Resolution
No. 2002-125, whereby a Transition Team was constituted to manage and implement the NPC's Separation
Program.

In a Memorandum, the NPC OIC-President and CEO Rolando S. Quilala circulated the assailed Resolutions and
directed the concerned NPC officials to disseminate and comply with said Resolutions and implement the same
within the period provided for in the timetable set in NPB Resolution No. 2002-125. As a result thereof, Mr.
Paquito F. Garcia, Manager – HRSD and Resources and Administration Coordinator of NPC, circulated a
Memorandum dated 22 November 2002 to all NPC officials and employees providing for a checklist of the
documents required for securing clearances for the processing of separation benefits of all employees who shall be
terminated under the Restructuring Plan.

Ruling:
In assailing the validity of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, petitioners maintain that said
Resolutions were not passed and issued by a majority of the members of the duly constituted Board of Directors
since only three of its members, as provided under Section 48 6 of the EPIRA Law, were present, namely: DOE
Secretary Vincent S. Perez, Jr.; Department of Budget and Management Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin; and NPC OIC-
President Rolando S. Quilala. According to petitioners, the other four members who were present at the meeting
and signed the Resolutions were not the secretaries of their respective departments but were merely
representatives or designated alternates of the officials who were named under the EPIRA Law to sit as members
of the NPB. Petitioners claim that the acts of these representatives are violative of the well-settled principle that
"delegated power cannot be further delegated." Thus, petitioners conclude that the questioned Resolutions have
been illegally issued as it were not issued by a duly constituted board since no quorum existed because only three
of the nine members, as provided under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law, were present and qualified to sit and vote.

It is petitioners' contention that the failure of the four specifically identified department heads under Section 48 of
the EPIRA Law to personally approve and sign the assailed Resolutions invalidates the adoption of said Resolutions.
Petitioners maintain that there was undue delegation of delegated power when only the representatives of certain
members of the NPB attended the board meetings and passed and signed the questioned Resolutions.

We agree with petitioners. In enumerating under Section 48 those who shall compose the National Power Board of
Directors, the legislature has vested upon these persons the power to exercise their judgment and discretion in
running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion may be defined as "the act or the liberty to decide according to the
principles of justice and one's ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances, without willfulness or
favor. Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of
acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience,
uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. It is to be presumed that in naming the respective
department heads as members of the board of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the various
executive departments on the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen which made them eligible to
occupy their present positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties
as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions, because it is their personal
judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such responsibility.

In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-
125, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive departments and not the secretaries
themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution, as shown by the fact that it is the
signatures of the respective representatives that are affixed to the questioned Resolutions. This, to our mind,
violates the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to employ their own sound
discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the NPC. Evidently, the votes cast by these mere representatives
in favor of the adoption of the said Resolutions must not be considered in determining whether or not the
necessary number of votes was garnered in order that the assailed Resolutions may be validly enacted.

RODOLFO R. MAGO, vs.JUDGE AUREA G. PEÑALOSA-FERMO,

Facts:
Mr. Mago filed a complaint for Grave Coercion against DARAB Sheriff Alex Roberto Angeles. However, instead of
summoning the accused for a Preliminary Investigation, he received a complaint charging him and his 2 sons
with Grave Threats. He stresses the complaint against him as purely fabricated. He states that the complainant in
the said case was not DARAB Sheriff Angeles. He avers that the affidavits of the witnesses in the said case could not
be found in the records of the MTC. Complainant further declares that, he received a subpoena to attend the
preliminary investigation. In compliance, he and his witnesses attended, and even without the assistance of
counsel, they were examined through a prepared set of questions handed to them by the stenographer. The
respondent judge was not present then. The complainant also states that right after the preliminary investigation,
he was immediately arrested and was imprisoned for 3 days. Thereafter, he was released after posting a bail.

Complainant filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition with Application for Preliminary Injunction and
Ex-Parte Motion for TRO questioning the order of respondent judge in denying his omnibus motion to quash the
information. He adds that despite the filing of this petition, the respondent judge continued to direct him to
appear at the pre-trial/preliminary conference. He alleges that the respondent judge had been biased when
hearing his case. 
Judge Penalosa-Fermo gave her side of the case and said that there was delay in the scheduling of the arraignment
after the arrest of the complainanant, respondent surmises that the Clerk of Court or the clerk-in-charge might
have overlooked the Return of Service of the warrant officer. Respondent states, however, that when the
arraignment was scheduled, complainant’s counsel opposed the same and filed an Omnibus Motion which resulted
in the repeated resetting of the arraignment.
The OCA found the respondent administratively liable for her unfamiliarity with the rules on preliminary
investigation. There was irregularity during the preliminary investigation when the respondent judge allowed the
stenographers to handle the latter part of the proceedings.

Ruling:
Prior to the amendment on October 3, 2005 of Rules 112 and 114 of the Rules of Court via A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC,Re:
Amendment of Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by Removing the Conduct of
Preliminary Investigation from Judges of the First Level Courts, judges of municipal trial courts were empowered to
conduct preliminary investigations in which they exercised discretion in determining whether there was probable
cause to hale the respondent into court. Such being the case, they could not delegate the discretion to another.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was
chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power
to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires on the part of the officer, the exercise of
judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to
exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to him,
he cannot delegate his duties to another.
Then, as now, a personal examination of the complainant in a criminal case and his witness/es was required. Thus,
under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court before its amendment, the "investigating fiscal" was
required to "certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined
the complainant and his witnesses . . . "
By respondent’s delegation of the examination of the sheriff-complainant in the grave threats case to the
stenographer, and worse, by allowing the witnesses to "read/study the [written] question[s]" to be propounded to
them and to "write their answers [thereto]" upon respondent’s justification that the scheme was for the
convenience of the stenographers, respondent betrayed her lack of knowledge of procedure, thereby contributing
to the erosion of public confidence in the judicial system.

MMDA, et al. vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

December 18, 2008
 FACTS:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for
the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay, and to submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan
of action for the purpose.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, which was confirmed by DENR’s Water Quality Management Chief, Renato T. Cruz that water
samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content
ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml which is beyond the standard 200 MPN/100ml or
the SB level under DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90.

          The reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants]
resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life
of Manila Bay, the RTC held petitioners liable and ordered to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and to restore
its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation. [3]

Herein petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals contending that the pertinent provisions of the
Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in
general. They also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.

The CA sustained RTC’s decision stressing that petitioners were not required to do tasks outside of their
basic functions under existing laws, hence, this appeal.

Ruling:

RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management.  It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall
protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
 
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding
petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to
future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.