1.

Domingo Vergara, Sr. vs. Hon. Jose T. Suelto

G.R. Nos. L-74766, December 21, 1987

Facts:
Vergara alleges that he is the owner of a commercial building and that the
lessees thereof defaulted in the payment of rentals. Thus he instituted an action
for unlawful detainer. Defendant-lessees answered denying having paid rents to
Vergara. They also set an affirmative defense by claiming title over the land.
Subsequently, Vergara filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court
denied this motion on the ground that the answer of defendants specifically
denied the material allegations in the complaint and that they even set up an
affirmative defense. Thus, such answer did not merely consist of a general denial
but definitely tendered a genuine issue which cannot be resolved by resort to a
summary judgment.
Issue:
WON the summary judgment is proper.

Held:
YES. The defendants’ answer appears on its face to tender issues. It purports
to deal with each of the material allegations of the complaint, and either
specifically denies, or professes lack of knowledge or information to form a belief
as to them. It also sets up affirmative defenses. But the issues thus tendered are
assumed, not genuine.
Summary judgment must not be confused with judgment on the pleadings.
The essential question in determining whether a summary judgment is proper is
not whether the answer does controvert the material allegations of the
complaint but whether that controversion is bona fides and not whether the
answer does tender valid issues as by setting forth specific denials and/or
affirmative defenses but whether the issues thus tendered are genuine, or
fictitious, sham, characterized by bad faith.
2

Sps. Eduardo B. Evangelista vs. Mercator Finance Corp., et. al.

G.R. No. 148864, August 21, 2003

Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of titles against respondents,
Mercator Finance Corporation, Lydia P. Salazar, Lamecs Realty and Development
Corporation, and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Petitioners claimed being the
registered owners of five (5) parcels of land contained in the Real Estate
Mortgage executed by them and Embassy Farms, Inc. Respondents likewise
assailed the long silence and inaction by petitioners as it was only after a lapse of
almost ten (10) years from the foreclosure of the property and the subsequent
sales that they made their claim. Mercator moved for summary judgment on the
ground that except as to the amount of damages, there is no factual issue to be
litigated. Petitioners opposed the motion for summary judgment claiming that
because their personal liability to Mercator is at issue, there is a need for a full-
blown trial. The RTC granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed
the complaint. Petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals, but again were
unsuccessful. A motion for reconsideration by petitioners was likewise denied
for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo erred and acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming trial court’s on
respondent’s motion for summary judgment.

Held:
Yes. Summary judgment "is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out
sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation." The crucial question
in a motion for summary judgment is whether the issues raised in the pleadings
are genuine or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions
accompanying the motion. A genuine issue means "an issue of fact which calls for
the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or
contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. In the case at bar, there
are no genuine issues raised by petitioners. Petitioners do not deny that they
obtained a loan from Mercator. They merely claim that they got the loan as
officers of Embassy Farms without intending to personally bind themselves or
their property. However, a simple perusal of the promissory note and the
continuing suretyship agreement shows otherwise. These documentary evidence
prove that petitioners are solidary obligors with Embassy Farms.
3.
Monterey Foods Corp, et. al. vs. Victorino E. Eserjose, et. al.
G.R. No. 153126, Sept. 11, 2003

Facts:
Petitioners alleged in the petition that for a period of twelve years,
respondent bought from petitioner Monterey Foods Corporation live cattle and
hogs which he in turn sold and distributed to his customers.
Respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioner corporation pay him for
his services under a contract. His demands went unheeded; thus, he filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City an action for sum of money and damages
against petitioner corporation and its President.The RTC rendered its judgment
in favor of herein respondent.
Petitioners filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court granted.
Respondent submitted a manifestation and motion alleging that petitioners have
admitted their liability under the contract. Petitioners opposed the manifestation
and motion. The trial court, acting on petitioners judicial admission, rendered
partial summary judgment. Respondent moved for the execution of the partial
summary judgment, which the trial court granted.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied for lack of
merit. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which
the CA dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not summary judgment is proper in the case at bar.

Held:
Yes. Rule 35, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for
summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any
material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the
motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, the SC find that the Court of
Appeals did not commit any reversible error in affirming the assailed orders of
the trial court. Hence, the instant petition must be denied.
4.
Republic of the Phils. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et. al.
G.R. Nos. L-31303-04, May 31, 1978

Facts:
Both Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar Anglo claim
ownership over the same lots located in Sagay-Escalante Cadastre, Negros
Occidental. Ocampo filed for registration of the subject property to which
petitioner-appellant opposed. The latter then filed a complaint for the recovery
of possession of the lots.

A joint trial for recovery of possession and the land registration case was
conducted, dismissing the complaint and adjudging the registration of the
subject two lots in the name of the then applicant de Ocampo. A certificate of title
was issued in his name. The petitioner-appellant received a copy of the decision
on August 13, 1965 but no appeal was taken therefrom. However, Republic later
filed with the trial court on December 28, 1965, a “Petition for Relief from
Judgment with Preliminary Injunction Pending Proceeding.

The petition alleged that the Republic’s failure to appeal was due to accident,
mistake and/or excusable negligence, specifically, stating that its docket clerk,
Cesar Salud, merely committed excusable negligence when he inadvertently
attached the copy of the decision to the file of another case; that it was only on
November 5, 1965, that Salud found the copy of the same; and that petitioner has
a substantial cause of action in Civil Case No. 264 (6154) and a good and
substantial defense in the Land Registration Case. The petition was dismissed by
the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the appeal has perfected on the part of the petitioner.

Held:
Yes, the appeal has perfected. The requested 20-day extension (which was
granted by the lower court) expired on November 3, 1967. As to the legal ground
for the dismissal on the foregoing bases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
construed Section 6, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court as mandatory and
jurisdictional in nature, non-compliance with which justifies the dismissal of the
appeal.
5.
Producers Bank of the Phils., et. al. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126620, April 17, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner filed a Complaint to recover a sum of money from Asia Trust
Development Bank (Asiatrust) and the Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP)
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Thereafter, petitioner filed an
amended complaint, impleading additional defendants. The defendants filed
their respective Answers, after which the issues were joined and trial on the
merits ensued. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of interest to prosecute.

Petitioner’s handling counsel, Atty. Ignacio filed a motion to reconsider the

Order, explaining that his late arrival at the hearing was due to the unexpected
heavy traffic at Roxas Boulevard in front of Baclaran Church. QTE received a copy
of the Order dated August 1, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration on
August 11, 1995. At that time, Atty. Ignacio was indisposed for allegedly suffering
from "fatigue and stress". It was only on August 25, 1995 that Atty. Ignacio found
out that the Order denying the motion for reconsideration was received by the
law firm on August 11, 1995. He filed a Notice of Appeal on August 25, 1995.

On November 13, 1995, Asiatrust, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with
the Court of Appeals. The CA granted the motion to dismiss petitioner’s appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing an appeal that was
filed 13 days late despite its own findings that petitioner’s counsel was grossly
negligent.

Held:
The petition is bereft of merit. The SC uphold the dismissal of the appeal by
the Court of Appeals. The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even
mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The exception to
this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable
that the client is deprived of his day in court. In which case, the remedy then is to
reopen the case and allow the party who was denied his day in court to adduce
his evidence.8 However, a thorough review of the instant case reveals that
petitioner cannot seek refuge or obtain reprieve.
6.
Spouses Shem G. Alfarero, et. al. vs. Spouses Petra and Sancho Sevilla
G.R. No. 142974, Sept 22, 2003

Facts:
Plaintiffs filed the present action to repurchase the parcel of land in the
present case. Defendants’ rejection of the offer to repurchase is based on the
defense that the plaintiffs’ action has already prescribed, that plaintiffs’ offer to
repurchase is already beyond the five (5) year limitation period. After the parties
submitted their memoranda, the court resolved the matter [in favor of the
plaintiffs] on the basis of their submitted pleadings. Dissatisfied with the adverse
ruling of the trial court, the petitioners herein appealed to the Court of Appeals
but affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners’ Motion for
New Trial.

Held:
No. The time is past for petitioners’ arguments. The scrutiny of the SC of the
records shows that the second query posed, under the circumstances of this case,
is moot and academic. Rule 37, Section 1 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
clearly provides that a motion for new trial should be made "within the period
for taking an appeal." Instead, what the record shows is that petitioners, in effect,
only asked for a new trial after the appellate court had rendered its decision on
appeal. Such a situation is definitely not permissible under the Rules. It is well
accepted that a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence may
indeed be filed after judgment, but within the period for perfecting an appeal.
7.
Antonio Navarro, et.. al vs. Metrobank, et. al.
G.R. No. 138031, May 27, 2004

Facts:
The private respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (respondent
MBTC) filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the judicial foreclosure of
the real estate mortgage executed by the petitioners in its favor. The court
hereby grants foreclosure the properties. The petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision, however it was denied. Later on, the petitioners
filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal but failed to pay the requisite docket and
other lawful fees. The respondent MBTC filed a Motion to Deny Due Course to
Notice of Appeal with Motion for Execution on the ground that the notice of
appeal was not timely filed. Acting on the motion, the RTC, while ruling in favor
of the timeliness of the petitioners' notice of appeal, nevertheless denied the
appeal for not being accompanied by the required docket fees. Upon appeal, the
CA dismissed the petitioner's appeal. The latter’s MC was also denied. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in sustaining the RTC's denial of
their notice of appeal on the ground of their failure to pay the docket and other
legal fees.

Held:
The payment of the docket fees within this period is a condition sine qua non
to the perfection of the appeal. Contrary to the petitioners' predication, the
payment of the appellate docket and other lawful fees is not a mere technicality
of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, without which the decision or
final order appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was
filed at all.
The SC have consistently ruled that litigation is not a game of technicalities
and that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure so that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved.
However, they have also ruled that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed
except only when, for persuasive and weighting reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.
8.
Madrigal Transport, Inc. vs. Lapanday Holdings Corp., et. al.
G.R. No. 156067, Aug. 11, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Madrigal Transport, Inc. ("Madrigal") filed a Petition for Voluntary
Insolvency before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Subsequently,
petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against Respondents Lapanday
Holdings Corporation ("Lapanday"), Macondray and Company, Inc.
("Macondray"), and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC of Manila.
The insolvency court herein declared petitioner insolvent. While
respondents Lapanday, Lorenzo and Macondray filed their respective Motions to
Dismiss and was granted for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was later denied.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
seeking to set aside the RTC’s order. The appellate court ruled that since the
main issue in the instant case was purely legal, the Petition could be treated as
one for review as an exception to the general rule that certiorari was not proper
when appeal was available. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the
proper remedy in the instant case.

Held:
No. Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari
will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and
certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.52 Hence,
certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own
negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.53
One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy.54 Where an appeal is available, certiorari
will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
9.
Domingo Neypes, et. al. vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et. al.
G.R. No. 141524, Sept. 14, 2005

Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land
and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the
RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed
petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998
and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing
the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it
was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule
65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the
appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of
appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to
run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of
the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well
within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA
dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have
been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12,
1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the
order was the “final order” appealable under the Rules.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

Held:
Yes. The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal
within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of
receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement
is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the
appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which we already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial
or reconsideration.
10.
Donato Sumaway, et. al. vs. Urban Bank, Inc., et. al.
G.R. No. 142534, June 27, 2006

Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for Reformation of Contract, Specific Performance,
Damages, Consignation with Injunction, with Restraining Order, with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
complaint states no cause of action; the claim is unenforceable under the Statute
of Frauds; the action has prescribed; and the pendency of another action.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners’ counsel filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Petitioners’ counsel filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course by
the trial court and ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the CA.
Respondent Urban Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that
the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period. Respondent
contended that petitioners’ notice of appeal was filed five days late, as it should
have been filed on April 28, 1997, and not May 3, 1997. The CA found merit in
respondent’s contention and granted the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA properly dismissed the appeal after it was approved
by the Trial Court and accepted it with the corresponding payment of docket fees
and filing of appellants’ brief.

Held:
No. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule
43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full
or partial) or any final order or resolution.
11.
Adalia B. Francisco, et. al.vs. Hon. Benigno M. Puno
G.R. No. L-55694, October 23, 1981

Facts:
Private respondent filed with respondent judge a complaint for
reconveyance of a parcel of land and damages alleging inter alia that
respondent’s father caused the land in question titled in his name alone as
“widower”, after her mother’s death, in spite of the property being conjugal, and
then sold it to the predecessor in interest of petitioners from whom they bought
the same. Private respondent filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration
alleging that the insufficiency of her evidence was due to the fault of her counsel
who presented the same without her being fully prepared. In other words, she
claimed, she had newly discovered evidence that could prove her cause of action.
It is relevant to note that said motion was signed and sworn to by private
respondent herself together with her counsel.

Issue:
WON the filing of a Motion for New Trial is the appropriate remedy.

Held:
Yes. When another remedy is available, as, in fact, private respondent had
filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration alleging practically the same
main ground of the petition for relief under discussion, which was denied, what
respondent should have done was to take to a higher court such denial. A party
who has filed a timely motion for new trial cannot file a petition for relief after
his motion has been denied. These two remedies are exclusive of each other. It is
only in appropriate cases where a party aggrieved by a judgment has not been
able to file a motion for new trial that a petition for relief can be filed.
12.
Corazon L. Escueta, et. al. vs. Rufina Lim
G.R. No. 137162, January 24, 2007

Facts:
Respondent herein filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title to, real
property, with preliminary injunction and issuance of a hold-departure order
from the Philippines against Ignacio E. Rubio. Respondent amended her
complaint to include specific performance and damages. Petitioners, on the other
hand, denied the material allegations of the complaint. Judgment was rendered
in favor of respondent. Petitioner (Baloloys) filed a petition for relief from
judgment, which was denied by the Trial Court. Hence, appeal to the Court of
Appeals was taken challenging the order denying the petition for relief. After
trial, the complaint [and] amended complaint are dismissed against petitioners.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s order and partial decision, but
reversed the later decision. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the CA
Decision was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying the petition for relief from judgment
filed by the Baloloys.

Held:
No. The Baloloys apparently in an attempt to cure the lapse of the aforesaid
reglementary period to file a petition for relief from judgment, included in its
petition the two Orders dated May 6, 1994 and June 29, 1994. The first Order
denied Baloloys’ motion to fix the period within which plaintiffs-appellants pay
the balance of the purchase price. The second Order refers to the grant of partial
execution, i.e. on the aspect of damages. These Orders are only consequences of
the partial decision subject of the petition for relief, and thus, cannot be
considered in the determination of the reglementary period within which to file
the said petition for relief.
13.
Anita Mangila vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.
G.R. No. 125027, August 12, 2002

Facts:
Mangila contracted the freight forwarding services of Guina for shipment of
sea food products to Guam where Mangila maintains an outlet. Mangila agreed to
pay Guina cash on delivery.
On the first shipment, Mangila requested for seven days within which to pay
Guina. However, for the next three shipments, Mangila failed to pay Guina the
shipping charges.
Despite several demands, Mangila never paid Guina. Thus, Guina filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City a case for collection of sum of money.
Mangila filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Guina’s
invoice for the freight forwarding service stipulates that if court litigation
becomes necessary to enforce collection, the agreed venue for such action is
Makati.
Guina filed an Opposition asserting that although Makati appears as the
stipulated venue, the same was merely an inadvertence by the printing press.
Moreover, Guina claimed that Mangila knew that Guina was holding office in
Pasay City and not in Makati.
The trial court, finding credence in private respondents assertion, denied the
Motion to Dismiss and allowed the case to proceed.
The trial court thereafter ruled in favor of Guina, ordering Mangila to pay her
outstanding balance.

Issue:
W/N there was improper venue.

Held:
Yes. The case should be dismissed for improper venue, but not for the reason
stated by Mangila. Under the Rules of Court, venue in personal actions is where
the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. The
exception to this rule is when the parties agree on an exclusive venue other than
the places mentioned in the rules. But, as discussed, this exception is not
applicable in this case. Hence, following the general rule, the case may be
brought in the place of residence of the plaintiff or defendant, at the election of
the plaintiff.
14.
Alejandro Ng Wee vs. Manuel Tankiansee
G.R. No. 171124, February 13, 2008

Facts:
Respondent was impleaded in a complaint as one of the defendants. On the
basis of the allegations in the complaint and the Affidavit of petitioner, RTC
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties
not exempt from execution of all the defendants subject to petitioner’s filing of a
bond. The writ was consequently issued. Arguing that the writ was improperly
issued and that the bond furnished was grossly insufficient, respondent moved
for the discharge of the attachment.
The other defendants likewise filed similar motions. RTC denied all the
motions. The defendants, including respondent filed their respective motions for
reconsideration but the trial court likewise denied the same.
Incidentally, while respondent opted not to question anymore the said
orders, his co-defendants, Virata and UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UEM-
MARA), assailed the same via certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. CA,
however, denied it and the motion for reconsideration thereon.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA was correct in lifting the writ of preliminary
attachment against respondent based on additional ground that allegedly
pertains already to the merits of the main action, i.e., lack of factual
circumstances of fraud.

Held:
YES. Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, which provides the
grounds upon which attachment may issue, states that at the commencement of
the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party
may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the
aatisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases: (d) In
an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance
thereof.
In the instant case, petitioner’s Affidavit is bereft of any factual statement
that respondent committed a fraud. The affidavit narrated only the alleged
fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata and/or Power Merge, by
which SC affirmed the writ of attachment issued against the latter.
15.
Miguel Perez Rubio vs. The Hon. Samuel Reyes, et. al.
G.R. No. L-24581, January 31, 1966

Facts:
Respondent Robert D. Phillips, in his behalf and in that of his wife and Robert
O. Phillips and Sons, Inc., entered into negotiations for the sale of their shares of
stock in Hacienda Benito, Inc. to Alfonso Yuchengco. Upon being informed of this,
the herein petitioner Perez Rubios, through their attorney-in-fact, Joaquin
Ramirez, reminded them of the unpaid balance of the shares being sold to
Yuchengco. They gave a similar notice to Yuchengco, but expressed no objection
to the sale provided the obligations in their favor were satisfied.
Instead herein petitioner filed a complaint should the full amount due to
herein respondents remained unpaid, the latter (respondents) are the ones who
filed a complaint where they obtained, ex-parte, a preliminary injunction.
Petitioner herein, then, filed a motion to dissolve the said writ of preliminary
injunction, which the respondent judge denied. They also filed their answer to
the complaint with a counterclaim of an amount representing the unpaid balance
of the sale price of their shares. Because of this the Perez Rubios were charged
with contempt. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing
preliminary injunction against the petitioner.

Held:
No. The injunction issued in this case is directed exclusively to the parties
herein and, in connection with the assets of said hacienda, they are the only ones
enjoined from performing any act which will either diminish the value of said
shares of stock or deplete the assets of said hacienda. The petition for
modification in this regard is, therefore, not well founded and is denied.
Inasmuch as the petition for the dissolution of the preliminary injunction
issued by Us in this case, upon the filing of a bond, is ex-parte, the respondents
are hereby ordered to serve a copy thereof upon petitioner, who is hereby
required to submit his comments in connection therewith, if he so desires, within
ten days from receipt thereof.
16.
Wack wack Golf and Country Club, Inc. vs. Lee E. Won, et. al.
G.R. No. L-23851, March 26, 1976

Facts:
Wack Wack Golf and Country Club filed a complaint for interpleader against Won
and Tan who both claim ownership over membership fee certificate 201. Won
claims its ownership stemming from a decision rendered in Civil Case 26044
entitled "Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee vs. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc."
Meanwhile, Tan claims ownership from the assignment made by the alleged true
owner of the same certificate. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground of res judicata by reason of the previous civil case that issued Won the
right to the certificate. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not Wack Wack is barred to file an interpleader suit.

Held:
Yes. It is a general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a
position to ask for an order of intrepleader, he must be prepared to show, among
other prerequisites, that he has not become independently liable to any of the
claimants. Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse
claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he
cannot later on have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit.
In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case to proceed to final
judgment. It was aware of the conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to
the membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the present interpleader
suit. Yet it did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation and
to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against
it and said judgment has already been executed. It is therefore too late for it to
invoke the remedy of interpleader.
17.
Hilarion M. Henares, Jr., et. al., vs. LTFRB, et. al.
G.R. No. 158290, October 23, 2006

Facts:
Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed
for a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles
(PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Petitioners
allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke,
and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from
various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health,
productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In addition, they allege
that with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and
transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions.
They cited studies showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have
resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD);
that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and that the
children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than
their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the
emissions of PUVs.

Issue:
Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility vehicles
to use compressed natural gas through a writ of mandamus.

Held:
No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable
legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus
compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. The legislature should
provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental
problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus
is taken.
18.
Ma. Lutgarda P. Calleja, et. al., vs. Jose Pierre A. Panday, et. al.
G.R. No. 168696, February 28, 2006

Facts:
Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of 14 armed men usurped the powers which
supposedly belonged to respondents (Calleja, Tabora, et al) and took away the
daily hospital collection from St. John Hospital in Naga City. Calleja, et al filed a
petition with the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages
and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order against Panday, et al.

On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the
Regional Trial Court in Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified
petition showed petitioners therein (herein respondents) to be residents of Naga
City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
action for quo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the
respondents resides. However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to
receive the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating that
improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another
administrative jurisdiction.

Issue:
WHETHER or not the RTC which HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY AND
DECIDE A CASE HAS the AUTHORITY TO REMAND THE SAME TO ANOTHER CO-
EQUAL COURT IN ORDER TO CURE THE DEFECTS ON VENUE AND
JURISDICTION.

Held:
No. Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of
jurisdiction over respondents petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations
in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The
trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the
aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never
designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with
jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC.
Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or
power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial
Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss
the petition for lack of jurisdiction.”
19.
PNB vs. Sanao Marketing Corp, et. al.
G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005

Facts:
In July 1997, Sanao Marketing Corporation, the spouses Amado A. Sanao and
Soledad F. Sanao and the spouses William (Willy) F. Sanao and Helen Sanao (all
respondents herein), as joint and solidary debtors, obtained a loan in the amount
of One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (P150,000,000.00) from PNB secured by a
real estate mortgage of several parcels of land. For failure of respondents to fully
pay the loan upon its maturity, PNB caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. Subsequently, , PNB filed with the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch
32, a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. ON the other hand,
respondents filed a complaint with the RTC alleging that the auction and
foreclosure proceedings were null and void for non-compliance of the notice of
publication of the sale.

Issue:
WHETHER or not petitioner is entitled to a writ of possession despite
questions on the regularity and validity of the sale.

Held:
Yes. The purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession
during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that
purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of
property covered by a Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the
approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the
court to issue the order for a writ of possession. Any question regarding the
regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the consequent cancellation of the
writ, is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of
Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Such question is not to be raised as a
justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession, since, under the
Act, the proceeding is ex parte. In the case at bar, PNB has sufficiently established
its right to the writ of possession.
20.
DBP vs. Spouses Wilfredo and Azucena Gatal
G.R. No. 138567, March 4, 2005

Facts:
Aggrieved, respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction. The action sought to (a) declare the sale of the property to
Torrefranca void and uphold respondents’ right of pre-emption; and (b)
maintain the status quo between the parties prior to the filing of the suit.
The RTC issued an Order granting respondents’ application for a preliminary
injunction.
On the other hand, petitioner filed with the same RTC a petition for issuance
of a writ of possession, where the court ruled in favor of petitioner.
Subsequently, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case and a motion to
quash the writ of possession on the ground that there is another case pending
involving the same parties, the same subject matter and the same legal issues.
The RTC issued an Order dismissing the case and recalling its earlier Order
granting the writ of possession on the ground of litis pendentia. Petitioner DBP
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. On appeal, the CA denied
petitioner’s a petition for certiorari. Still, Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in holding
that the trial court correctly dismissed the case on the ground of litis pendentia.

Held:
Yes. There being no litis pendentia, the Court of Appeals likewise erred in
applying the doctrine of non-interference between courts of equal rank. Under
the said doctrine, a trial court has no authority to interfere with the proceedings
of a court of equal jurisdiction. When Branch 47 issued the writ of possession, it
did not interfere with the jurisdiction of Branch 4 in the injunction case. It
merely exercised its ministerial function of issuing the writ of possession.
21.
Victorino Quinagoran vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.
G.R. No. 155179, August 24, 2007

Facts:
The heirs of Juan dela Cruz filed a complaint for recovery of a parcel of land
with damages before RTC of Cagayan against Quinagoran. Quinagoran filed a
Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under
R.A. No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC to
include all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00.
The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the action is
accion publicciana and therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of the
value of the property. The CA affirmed decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition to
the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of
possession regardless of the value of the property involved.

Held:
No. The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana
lies with the RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true.
As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the
assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and
P50,000.00, if within.
In Atuel v. Valdez (G.R. No. 139561, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 517), the Court
likewise expressly stated that: Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in
a court of general jurisdiction. Specifically, the regional trial court exercises
exclusive original jurisdiction “in all civil actions which involve x x x possession
of real property.” However, if the assessed value of the real property involved
does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro
Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover
possession of real property.
22.
Germelina Torres Racaza, et. al. vs. Ernesto Gozum
G.R. No. 148759, June 8, 2006

Fact:
The plaintiffs, Germelina Racaza and Bernaldita Torres Paras, are the
registered co-owners of a parcel of land under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
PT-92411 situated at Amang Rodriguez Avenue, Santolan, Pasig City.
On this lot is a 2-storey, 3-door apartment which was formerly owned by the
father of the plaintiffs, the late Carlos Torres.
In 1981, Ernesto Gozum occupied the back portion of the property on a
P3,500.00 monthly rental and continued to occupy the same even after the death
of Carlos Torres on December 26, 1993.
On November 24, 1995, plaintiffs commenced an ejectment case against
Gozum. The case was, however, dismissed due to technicality.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for
accion publiciana.

Held:

The petition has merit. The allegations of a complaint determine the nature
of the action as well as which court will have jurisdiction over the case. The
complaint would be deemed sufficient if, on its face, it shows that the court has
jurisdiction without resorting to parol testimony. Precisely because ejectment
proceedings are summary in nature, the complaint should contain a statement of
facts which would bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy.
23.
Cesar T. Hilario, et. al. vs. Allan T. Salvador
G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005

Facts:
Hilario filed a complaint with the RTC against Salvador alleging that they
were the co-owners of the parcel of land where Salvador constructed his house
without their knowledge and refused to vacate despite their demands. Salvador
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He
contended that the complaint did not state the assessed value of the property,
which determines the jurisdiction of the court. Hilario maintained that the RTC
had jurisdiction since their action was an accion reinvindicatoria, an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the
subject property, exclusive jurisdiction fell within the said court. Also, in their
opposition to Salvador's motion to dismiss, they mentioned the increase in the
assessed value of the land in the amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, they
maintained that their action was also one for damages exceeding P20,000.00,
over which the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Hilario.

Held:
No. The provision Regional Trial Courts’ exercise of exclusive original
jurisdiction is applicable only to "all other cases" other than an action involving
title to, or possession of real property in which the assessed value is the
controlling factor in determining the court’s jurisdiction. The said damages are
merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery
of possession of real property. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action
of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC,
are null and void.
24.
Ruben Santos vs. Spouses Tony Ayon and Mercy Ayon
G.R. No. 137013, May 6, 2005

Facts:
Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) a complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon,
respondents. Petitioner alleged that when he bought the three lots, he informed
respondents that the building occupies a portion of his land but allowed them to
continue using the building. But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot,
hence, he demanded that respondents demolish and remove the part of the
building encroaching his property and turn over to him their possession. But
they refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion and even
made improvements on the building. The dispute was then referred to the
barangay lupon, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
Respondents sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the court has
no jurisdiction over it. The RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that respondents'
occupation... of the contested portion was by mere tolerance.
Petitioner contends that it is not necessary that he has prior physical
possession of the questioned property before he could file an action for unlawful
detainer. He stresses that he tolerated respondents’ occupancy of the portion in
controversy until he needed it. After his... demand that they vacate, their
continued possession became illegal. Hence, his action for unlawful detainer
before the MTCC is proper.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in
holding that petitioner's complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the
MTCC.

Held:
It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the
defendant. This rule is not different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the
proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, which actions... shall include not only the plea for restoration
of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom. The
said courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if the defendants
therein raises the question of ownership... over the litigated property in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership.
25.
Amelia S. Roberts vs. Martin B. Papio
G.R. No. 166714, February 9, 2007

Facts:
Roberts filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC of Makati City.
She averred that despite repeated demand on Papio to pay his back rentals, the
latter refused to pay and refused to leave the premises.

Papio raised the defense that in the original contract of sale, Roberts gave him
the right to redeem the property at any time for a reasonable amount. In fact, on
1985 he remitted to Roberts’ authorized representative, Perlita Ventura, the
amount of P250,000 as repurchase price. Allegedly, Roberts only refused to
execute a deed of absolute sale because Ventura misappropriated the amount of
P39,000 from the supposed repurchase price. The MeTC ruled in favor of
petitioner. RTC affirmed in toto. And on appeal, CA reversed the decision on
ground that the Deed of Absolute Sale entered into by Papio and Roberts is
actually an equitable mortgage.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in declaringg that the MeTC and RTC were
remiss in the exercise of that jurisdiction acquired because it did not consider all
petitioner’s defense of equitable mortgage.

Held:
No. The CA ruling (which upheld the jurisdiction of the MeTC to resolve the
issue of who between petitioner or respondent is the lawful owner of the
property, and is thus entitled to the material or de facto possession thereof) is
correct. Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue
of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The
judgment rendered in an action for unlawful detainer shall be conclusive with
respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building. Such judgment would not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.
26.
Alfredo Yasay del Rosario vs. Spouses Jose E. Manuel and Concordia Manuel
G.R. No. 153652, January 16, 2004

Facts:
Respondent Spouses herein filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) a
complaint for unlawful detainer against herein petitioner. They alleged that they
are the true and lawful owners of a lot occupied by the petitioners. Respondents
repeatedly asked petitioner to vacate the lot but to no avail, prompted them to
bring the matter to the barangay. But the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement. Thus, the barangay chairman issued a Certification to File Action.
Petitioner answered the Complaint. The trial court rendered a Decision in
favor of respondents. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirms the
decision in toto of the trial court. Herein petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review, but dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the ejectment case.

Held:
Petitioner claimed that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case
considering that there is no allegation in the complaint that respondents have
prior physical possession of the lot and that they were ousted therefrom by
force, threat, strategy or stealth. Prior physical possession is not always a
condition sine qua non in an ejectment case. We must distinguish the two kinds
of ejectment, namely, forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the
plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In this light, he must allege and
prove prior physical possession. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto
under any contract, express or implied. What respondents filed is a complaint for
unlawful detainer. Prior physical possession is not required. Hence, respondents
need not allege the same in their complaint.