International Journal of Educational Development 40 (2015) 237–249

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International Journal of Educational Development

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijedudev

What works, for whom, and in what circumstances? Towards a critical

realist understanding of learning in international and comparative
education
Leon Tikly *
University of Bristol, United Kingdom

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The article explores the potential for a critical realist approach to researching learning in international
Critical realism and comparative education (ICE) with a particular focus on the emerging post-2015 education and
Research methods development agenda. It provides a critique of existing empiricist and interpretivist approaches to
Post-2015 education and development researching learning. It is suggested that whilst both have strengths, they are based on an ontologically
agenda
reductionist view of learning with implications for research, policy and practice. As a ‘third’ research
International education
Comparative education
approach critical realism has the potential to build on the strengths whilst avoiding the pitfalls of both
empiricism and interpretivism. Such an approach it is argued needs to start from an ontologically
inclusive and laminated view of learning. Further, it is suggested that comparative research should focus
on the development of theories of learning that are able to explain the natural and social structures and
causal mechanisms that give rise to and inhibit learning at different scales and levels and in different
contexts. The development of theory ought to embrace epistemological pluralism drawing critically on,
cross-cultural, inter-disciplinary and mixed methods enquiry and making use of abductive and
retroductive forms of inference. In this way it is argued it becomes possible to move beyond the
dominant ‘what works’ agenda favoured by empiricists to critically consider what works, for who and
under what circumstances.
ß 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction methodological assumptions underlying much of the current

The concept of learning is at the heart of the current debates
about the post-2015 education and development agenda.1 The
World Bank (2011) has placed learning at the heart of its education
strategy, as have other governments and donors. Fierce debate
rages within the international development community about the
best way to develop and implement different metrics of learning.
Governments and donors are in the process of investing millions
of dollars in research programmes aimed at finding out ‘what
works’ in raising learning outcomes for disadvantaged learners in
low- and middle-income countries. Yet the philosophical and
* Tel.: +44 117 331 4366.
E-mail address: Leon.Tikly@Bristol.ac.uk
1
The article interprets the post-2015 education and development agenda
broadly to include not only the academic literature but also the key reports of
multilateral and donor organisations and NGOs that have been written on the
theme of learning in the run-up to the end of the timeframe that was originally
envisaged for realizing the millennium development goals in 2015.
discourse including what learning is (the ontology of learning)
and how we come to know what learning is (the epistemology of
learning) are rarely made explicit. This is despite the fact that
these assumptions have profound implications for education
policy and practice including pedagogy, the curriculum, assess-
ment, teacher training and investments in learning materials. The
article will contribute to ongoing debates about learning in the
context of the post-2015 education and development agenda. It
will do this, however, through focusing on some of the underlying
philosophical and methodological issues informing the debate.
In particular the article will provide a critique of the two broad
meta-theoretical2 approaches towards researching learning within
the field of international and comparative education (ICE) and
reflected in current debates, namely empiricism and interpretivism.
2
The term ‘meta-theoretical’ is used here to refer to over-arching theoretical
approaches (‘meta-theories’) that themselves underpin different theories of
learning and research into learning.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2014.11.008
0738-0593/ß 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
238 L. Tikly / International Journal of Educational Development 40 (2015) 237–249
It will be argued that empiricism is the most dominant and
underpins the emphasis on measuring learning and finding out
‘what works’ through using ‘gold standard’ research techniques
such as randomised control trials. Interpretivism on the other
hand, adopts a more relativist stance emphasising the role of
subjective meaning and the constitutive role of language, discourse
and ideologies in constructing versions of reality. It is more closely
associated with qualitative methodologies aimed at better
understanding classroom processes, the perspectives of different
stakeholders and the genealogy of dominant discourses and
ideologies. The current article starts from a ‘third’ meta-theoretical
approach in educational research and in the social sciences more
broadly informed by critical realism. At the heart of this approach
is the aim of steering a course between empiricism and
interpretivism in a way that draws on the advantages of both
whilst avoiding the pitfalls. Critical realism rests on the ontological
assumption of an external reality outside of what can be perceived
by the senses and amenable to empirical investigation. It thus
stands in contrast to both the ‘naive realism’ of empiricists and the
relativism of interpretivists.
Before going further, some caveats are necessary. Firstly, the
article is partial in that although it deals with philosophical issues
it is written with a focus on current debates on learning very much
in mind. Secondly, the view of critical realism is based on a specific
reading of a large literature spanning more than 30 years and so is
necessarily limited in terms of the literature on critical realism
with which it engages. The work that has particularly influenced
the development of the present article includes the ‘original’
critical realism of Bhaskar (e.g. 1978, 1979, 1986, 2008, 2010)3;
Archer’s work on structure and agency (including her early work
on education systems) (e.g. Archer, 1984, 1995, 1996, 2012; Archer
and Dawson, 2000); work on realist methodology (e.g. Danermark,
2002; Olsen, 2010), Carter and New’s writing on realist social
theory (2004) and Pawson’s work on realist evaluation (e.g. 2005,
2013). The article will seek to build on a small but growing
literature that has sought to apply critical realism to ICE (e.g.
Archer, 1984; Stockfelt, 2013; Tao, 2013). It should, therefore be
seen as a contribution to an unfolding debate concerning the
ontology of learning in ICE and specifically as it relates to the post-
2015 agenda.4
2. The critique of dominant approaches
In outlining the critical realist critique of dominant approaches
in ICE a further caveat is necessary in that every act of classification
inevitably involves some over-simplification. Thus although the
dominant existing meta-theoretical approaches in ICE, namely
empiricism and interpretivism will be presented as ‘ideal types’
3
Bhaskar’s work can be divided into roughly three periods (See Norrie, 2010),
namely, that of the development of ‘original’ critical realism in the 1970s as part of
his initial focus on the philosophy of science; his subsequent development of
dialectical critical realism most notably in Bhaskar (2008), and, what has been
described as his more recent engagement with ‘metareality’ otherwise known as his
‘spiritual turn’ – see for example Bhaskar (2012). The present article draws
principally on the first phase of Bhaskar’s work located within the philosophy of
science which is considered most relevant for an analysis of learning. The
implications of his later work for childhood studies and for education have been
considered elsewhere. See for example Anderson (2013), Sarra (2011), and Shipway
(2011).
4 5
The process of writing the article has also involved a critical reflection and re-
appraisal in the light of critical realism of some of my own earlier work. See for
example some of my earlier work applying postcolonial theory to ICE (see for
example, Tikly, 1999, 2004). Although the analyses acknowledged a ‘real’ world
outside of language and discourse the deeper meta-theoretical justification for this
position was not fully explicated. This needs to be seen in terms of an on-going
attempt at a rapprochement between postcolonialism and critical realism a
discussion of which is beyond the scope of the present article. See for example,
D’Souza (2010).
that share basic, common ontological and epistemological
assumptions, they are best viewed as broad discursive formations
that in fact encompass a range of approaches. Many researchers
within ICE would probably shy away from being identified as
belonging to either one or other ‘ideal type’. For example, many
researchers who are committed to empirical methodologies might
be committed to post-postivist notions of the fallibility of
empirical methods and/or to an understanding of the role of
subjectivity in research. In this sense it is important to distinguish
between empiricism as a meta-theoretical worldview and the use
of empirical methods which seek to systematically capture what
can be observed by the senses and may or may not be informed by a
belief in empiricism as it is portrayed in this article and elsewhere
in the literature. Similarly, many researchers who use interpre-
tivist methods in their research might (to various degrees) accept
that there is a reality ‘out there’ beyond how that reality is
constructed in words and discourse, even if their focus is on the
latter. Further, many researchers writing from a more critical
tradition within ICE including neo-Marxist, Freirian, feminist or
postcolonial positions might distance themselves from interpre-
tivism and claim to have a realist ontological position despite the
fact that at a methodological level their approach appears more
akin to interpretivism (see below). Many researchers within ICE
whether closer to an empiricist or interpretivist approach embrace
the need for a pragmatic use of mixed methods and interdisciplin-
arity to solve complex problems (in this sense ICE as a field is by its
nature inter-disciplinary). The problem here though, as will be
argued, is that the philosophical basis for using mixed methods are
often not made explicit resulting in ambiguity. Describing the
three meta-theoretical approaches in terms of broad discursive
formations or tendencies within ICE and the social sciences is
intended then as a heuristic device rather than as a means of
pigeon-holing individual researchers. Nonetheless, each has to
varying degrees had profound implications for the way that
research is conceptualised, evaluated and even funded as will be
discussed below.
3. Empiricism
Empiricism brings together a range of meta-theoretical
positions and historical movements.5 At the most general level
it is based on the assumption that positivist social research,
modelled on the natural sciences and medical research in
particular, can ‘discover’ through processes of induction and
deduction generalisable laws, replicable findings and reliable
predictions on which to base policy and practice. The strength of
the evidence for empiricism relates to the ‘robustness’ of the
methodology used. Systematic reviews used for the design of
interventions or research programmes informed by empiricism
often invoke a hierarchy of methods (Pawson, 2005) in which
randomised control trials (RCTs) along with studies based on
econometric analysis and school effectiveness studies are the ‘gold
standard’. The constructs and premises on which these methodol-
ogies are based are often assumed which limits critical appraisal of
their fallability. Conversely, evidence arising from more qualitative
and participative methodologies fall some way down the pecking
order (if they are taken seriously at all) limiting the engagement of
The understanding of empiricism brings together the empirical tradition dating
back to Locke and Hume based on the belief that knowledge equates with what can
be perceived by the senses. It also incorporates positivism as it has developed in the
social sciences dating back to the naturalism of Comte who rejected metaphysical
speculation in favour of ‘positive’ knowledge based on observation and experiment
and the search for law-like regularities. The positivist belief that science should only
be based on what is empirically experienced and verified through deduction drew
on but was also critical of the empiricist tradition in science. See for example Archer
(1998) and Danermark (2002).
 L. Tikly / International Journal of Educational Development 40 (2015) 237–249
empiricist research with issues of process and context (Pawson,
2005, 2013). Once the ‘robustness’ of methodologies has been
established, empirical data take the form of self-evident ‘facts’.
Causality is often (incorrectly) implied from patterns of statistical
correlation.6 Facts may take the form of models that are assumed
to reflect reality although researchers influenced by empiricism
often claim that their findings are ‘theory free’. Linked to this is a
view of the impartiality of good empirical research and the
possibility of objectivity on the part of the researcher.
Empiricism is highly influential with policy makers and donors
who are attracted by the prospect that the results of ‘good’ empirical
enquiry are generalisable and have predictive qualities. The
hegemonic status of empiricism is reflected in a disciplinary bias
towards more empirically based social science disciplines on the
part of multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and many
donors and governments in the study of learning including
economics and cognitive neuroscience (Klees et al., 2012; Tikly,
2004). The influence of empiricism in the post-2015 debate is also
reflected in the quest for a learning metric that can be used to
evaluate progress towards global learning goals (below) and has
influenced the ‘what works’ agenda in which the task of research is to
empirically test the effectiveness of interventions aimed at raising
learning outcomes. Whilst it is suggested below that empirical
evidence relating to the impact of biological factors on cognitive
development including the impact of malnutrition and disease as
well as evidence from econometric and school effectiveness type
research can contribute to a holistic understanding of learning,
empiricism tends to treat empirically gathered evidence determin-
istically which leads to a reductionist view of learning.
Empiricism does not ‘support’ any one specific theory of
learning. Indeed, a criticism of the most recent World Bank
strategy document Learning for All is the total absence of any
explicit theory of learning (Tikly, 2014). It has been argued,
however, that empiricism is most closely associated with an
‘objectivist’ view of learning (Brown, 2009) which raises issues
about how learning is conceived in the post-2015 agenda and
about the research process itself. Based on the ‘scientific laws’ of
stimulus-response and classical/operant conditioning, learning is
seen by behaviourists as a biologically driven response to
environmental conditions.7 The more recent uptake of evidence
from cognitive neuroscience by empiricists within ICE develops
and extends these behaviourist origins. The development of
constructivist and social constructivist theories of learning has
also been influenced by empiricism although research within these
paradigms is nowadays more likely to be interpretivist and to
involve qualitative enquiry into how children learn in social
settings (below).
Empiricism has been subject to considerable criticism by
critical realists. At the most basic level, although critical realism
shares a view with empiricism of the existence of an external
reality ‘out there’, critical realists argue that empiricism conflates
an understanding of reality with what can be empirically observed.
Critical realists describe this conflation as an epistemic fallacy in
which ontological questions about the deep structures and
mechanisms that give rise to observed events and phenomena
are displaced by epistemic questions about the most robust way of
measuring events/phenomena. Importantly, the empiricist focus
on the ‘surface actuality’ of what can be observed and measured
6
Many statisticians are cautious about making claims regarding causality based
on a ‘best fit’ model. Unfortunately this does not stop the results of statistical
analysis being used to imply causality in political and popular discourse.
7
In this view, learning can be conditioned through the use of rewards and
punishments on the part of the teacher. Although it has been subject to substantial
critique, the influence of behaviourism is evident in the continued use of teacher-
centred methodologies and in the use of rewards and sanctions including corporal
punishment in many classrooms in many parts of the world.
239
with respect to learning reproduces a reductionist view of learning
and this point is taken up below.
A second critique of empiricism focuses on the idea of fallability
which for critical realists is an inescapable characteristic of all
natural and social scientific research. This is linked to the multi-
causal nature of observed phenomena. In this respect Bhaskar
makes an important distinction between open and closed systems
within the natural and social sciences. Closed systems (i.e. systems
where it is possible to isolate the effects of individual causal
mechanisms) are rare and are usually confined to contrived
experimental conditions. The particle accelerator at CERN is an
example of such a contrived system used to isolate and examine
the behaviour and effects of sub-atomic particles. It is only in
artificially closed systems that it becomes possible to talk of
determinism, i.e. to isolate and measure the effects of a single
causal power.8 Within open systems by way of contrast, multi-
causality and varying degrees of complexity in terms of cause and
effect are the norm in both natural and social systems but
especially in social systems (Pawson, 2013). Here it is impossible to
isolate and to predict with certainty the effects of individual causal
mechanisms. Education systems are in these terms prime
examples of open systems, subject to the continuous interplay
of structure and agency (below). In this sense attempts to contrive
experimental conditions in education are extremely difficult if not
impossible. Nonetheless, empiricism treats open systems such as
education as if they were closed systems with the possibility of
producing replicable and generalisable results on which to base
predictions. Thus for critical realists although an aim of research
into learning ought to be to understand what causes (or indeed
prevents) learning from occurring, causality can never be
determined in that the range of causes at play inevitably vary in
relation to the context and to the individual learner. Assessing
causality on which to base theories of learning and/or to derive
implications for policy and practice therefore becomes a question
of rational but ultimately fallible judgement.9
Related to the above, critical realists question the empiricist
assumption that quasi-experimental and quantitative methodolo-
gies constitute a ‘gold standard’ in research. As Pawson (2005,
2013) has argued, the use of randomised control trials (RCTs) in
social research can be highly problematic. RCTs in fields such as
education suffer from some of the problems of RCTs in medicine
including the placebo effect. In open social systems characterised
by complexity and multi-causality, attributing causality to a single
intervention is difficult. Setting up a control experiment does not
necessarily help with this complexity precisely because of the
unpredictability of causality. This explains why the measured
effects of interventions in RCTs are often modest or negligible. RCTs
face further problems in fields such as education where unlike
medicine, interventions are not based on sound pre-existing
scientific evidence and are more likely instead to be based on
educated hunches and guesswork. RCTs may show at best surface
level patterns of ‘what works’ but they cannot tell researchers how
or indeed why interventions ‘work’ for different groups of learners
and under what specific conditions as these are subject to constant
flux. Thus whilst RCTs have a place in educational research they are
better seen as part of a battery of evidence that also includes other
8
Pawson (2013) has recently questioned the extent to which any system,
whether natural or social can be considered ‘closed’ given the nature of complexity
and the impossibility of ever knowing that one has indeed taken account of all
causal powers that may impact on observed outcomes.
9
Here it is relevant to note the difference between empiricism on the one hand
and rationalism on the other. Thus whilst empiricists claim that sense experience is
the ultimate source of all our concepts and knowledge, rationalists claim that there
are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge are gained
independently of sense experience, for example though the use of abductive and
retroductive forms of inference (see below).
240 L. Tikly / International Journal of Educational Development 40 (2015) 237–249
quantitative and qualitative approaches that can uncover under-
lying processes of learning in different contexts. Each of these
methodologies need to be treated in terms of their own ‘gold
standard’ (Scott, 2010).
A further critique of empiricism relates to the emphasis on
deductive and inductive means of inferring the truth from
observed phenomena. The former involves the researcher adopting
the hyothetico-deductive model in which general laws are used to
develop hypotheses which are then tried out with the possibility
that laws can be subsequently modified. Danermark (2002) has
provided an appraisal of deductivist forms of inference from a
critical realist perspective:
The strength of deductive logic is that it provides rules for what
is a logically valid conclusion based on given premises. The
limitation of deduction is that it does not tell us anything new
about reality beyond what is already in the premises. Deductive
conclusions are analytical conclusions. By this we mean that the
validity of the conclusions is dependent on our following the
logical rules for deduction, independently of what reality is like.
In analytical inference the conclusion is implicit in the
premises. This means that it does not give us any guidance
on how we, from observing particular phenomena, can gain
knowledge of the abstract structures and mechanisms that
make these phenomena possible (p. 84).
Inductive inference is considered to be the opposite of
deduction in that general laws or claims about reality are inferred
from the data. It is a common mode of inference in both
quantitative and qualitative research although it is also problem-
atic. Firstly, there is an inevitable risk that the incorrect
conclusions about the nature of reality will be inferred even
assuming that the starting premises were correct. That is to say
that it is not always easy or possible to arrive at reliable inferences
from the complexity represented by social phenomena. Secondly,
it may be that not all aspects of reality of a particular phenomenon
have been taken into account leading to unreliable inferences on
which to base policy. For critical realists, however, this does not
mean that induction has no place in research. Rather, the starting
point for critical realists is that the objects of social scientific
enquiry are not primarily empirical regularities but underlying
structures and mechanisms that give rise to that empirical reality.
That is to say that from a critical realist perspective, ‘nature’s
uniformity – to which many scientists have appealed – derives not
from the ‘‘accidental’’ regularities of sequences of contingently
related things but from the internal relations, structures and ways-
of-acting of things themselves (Sayer, 1992: 158). It is for this
reason that critical realists favour abduction and retroduction as
modes of inference (below). Given the above critique it is of course
problematic for critical realists when causality is implied on the
basis of statistical correlations alone. In reality such associations do
not say anything about causality – they merely indicate a pattern of
reasonably consistent associations (or in the language of critical
realism, ‘tendencies’ based on the identification of ‘demi-regulari-
ties’). This has implications for the claims that are made by
empiricists.
Before proceeding further, it is important to state that it is not
being suggested that research conducted within a broadly
empirical tradition has not made a significant contribution to
the study of learning. Here it is important to return to the
distinction mentioned earlier between empiricism on the one hand
and empirical research which may or not be informed by
empiricism. Many of the key theories of learning have emerged
from thinkers who may have been informed by empiricism even if
the theories themselves may on reflection be more a product of
abductive rather than deductive reasoning (Brown, 2009; Scott,
2010). Empiricists have also drawn attention to aspects of learning
that are often over looked by those working within a more
interpretative tradition. This is the case, for example, with respect
to the more biological and cognitive rather than social and cultural
dimensions of learning. In the post-2015 debate, for instance,
researchers working within more empirically oriented disciplines
have drawn attention to the potential of evidence from evolution-
ary psychology and cognitive neuroscience to shed light on the
development of the brain. In the language of critical realism this
relates to drawing attention to the ‘natural necessity’ of learning,
i.e. to appeal to causal structures and mechanisms that lie within
the biological domain. This is important, for example, in
highlighting the significance of the structure of the brain on
learning as well as of issues such as health, nutrition, sleep etc. on
children’s cognitive development.10
The problem for critical realists arises when these causal
powers are treated deterministically. Evidence from cognitive
neuroscience has proved highly influential in the post-2015
debate. Key policy texts including the World Bank (2011) Learning
for All strategy and various reports of the Learning Metrics Task
Team (see for example LMTF, 2013a,b) make reference to evidence
from cognitive neuroscience.11 The appeal for policy makers is
captured in the introduction to Abadzi’s (2006) influential book
Efficient Learning for the Poor: Insights from the Frontier of Cognitive
Neuroscience.12 The book makes the claim that evidence from
cognitive neuroscience can provide a ‘framework for policy advice
on improving poor students’ learning (Abadzi, 2006: 1). Although it
is acknowledged in passing that the field is still in its infancy and
that the evidence has limitations neuroscientific research is
nonetheless presented as the ‘key to the black box that can unlock
learning’. The deterministic nature of the book is evidenced in the
claim that ‘human brains process information in much the same
way, and similarities may be more important than individual or
cultural differences. Such unifying principles may point to
common solutions for educating disadvantaged children efficiently
and may be applicable from preschool to the university’ (Abadzi,
2006: 8). The book makes far reaching policy recommendations
based on evidence from disparate studies conducted in a variety of
countries ranging from the importance of nutrition and health, to
literacy and numeracy acquisition to improving instructional
support and providing incentives to improve teacher performance.
Abadzi’s book stands in contrast to other recent reviews of the
literature on neuroscience and education in which the provisional
and contested nature of the emerging field is more clearly
highlighted. In these texts, neuroscience is typically presented
as one source of evidence from which to develop an understanding
of learning (Goswami, 2004; Howard-Jones, 2014; RS, 2011). The
difficulties involved in deriving simple policy prescriptions from
cognitive neuroscience relate to this provisionality. They also
relate to the issue of the multi-causal and complex nature of the
biological processes involved in learning and to the plasticity of the
human brain in children and in adults.13 Thus although neurosci-
ence points towards the existence of genetic pre-dispositions to
learning, individual differences in learning at different stages of
development are considered to be the product of complex
interactions between ones genes and the external environment.
10
It is also pertinent in relation to debates about a lack of sanitary provision for
teenage girls in secondary schools or the physical and emotional effects of the
impact of attempts to control female sexuality, teenage pregnancy and of sexualised
violence on girls’ learning although a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope
of the article.
11
Cognitive neuroscience is an emerging field that brings together cognitive
psychology with neuroscience.
12
The book arose from a review of evidence carried out by the Bank’s Independent
Evaluation Group which is a semi-autonomous evaluation group attached to the
World Bank.
13
‘Plasticity’ refers to the fact that the neurological structure of human brain is
subject to change over time.
 L. Tikly / International Journal of Educational Development 40 (2015) 237–249
Further, learning is not only shaped by biological processes but by
social interactions that are culturally and linguistically mediated.
In this sense the development of the mind emerges from but is
irreducible to, biological processes and is context dependent. The
issue of emergence is important for critical realists and will be
returned to below. The implication is that we need to avoid the
epistemic fallacy of reading off policy from what can be observed
from brain scans. Further, the advice of neuroscientists who have
taken an interest in education is that rather than it being a case of
neuroscience having something to ‘tell’ educationalists there is a
need for inter-disciplinary understanding based on two-way
dialogue (Goswami, 2004; Howard-Jones, 2007).
An example of an area within the post-2015 debate where
evidence from cognitive neuroscience has been particularly
influential and controversial is that of early childhood literacy
and in particular the use of a phonics-led approach to the teaching
of reading. For example, the development of the Early Grade
Reading Assessment (EGRA) included a strong emphasis on
phonemic awareness and reading fluency (Gove and Wetterberg,
2011). In her analysis of reading, Abadzi (2006) focuses on the
importance of decoding which she argues is a pre-requisite for
comprehension. As other commentators have pointed out,
however, a sole emphasis on phonetics can be at the expense of
strategies that emphasise ‘reading for meaning’ (see Bartlett in this
special issue). The range and balance between the use of different
strategies also needs to relate to the specific orthography14 of the
language in question. Support for a more nuanced and culturally
relevant approach to the teaching of reading is provided by social
constructivist views of second language acquisition. Interestingly,
however, there is also evidence from cognitive neuroscience about
the importance of reading for meaning (Howard-Jones, 2014) and
this cautions against the direct ‘reading off’ of neuroscientific
evidence into universal policy prescriptions. A further concern
relates to the need to develop pedagogical coherence at the level of
classroom practice. For example, Courtney and Gravelle (2010)
have argued that the highly scripted approach to pedagogy that
accompanies the teaching of phonics can act as a point of tension at
the level of practice with attempts to introduce more learner-
centred approaches in countries such as Cambodia.
Another area in which empiricists have had a major influence
on an understanding of learning is through school effectiveness
studies. In contrast to the views of some interpretivists, however,
who are dismissive of school effectiveness research (see for
example Morley and Rassool, 1999), it is argued that this kind of
research can be valuable from a critical realist perspective in
identifying patterns of variance and the strength of associations
between variables that can then be explored in more depth by
qualitative means. This is particularly the case where more
sophisticated and context-sensitive methodologies including, for
example, multilevel modelling are used to explore variance at
different levels of the education system and across contexts. The
danger is when the results of school effectiveness research are
treated deterministically.
For example, much school effectiveness research has focused on
the importance or otherwise of class size as a ‘determinant’ of
educational outcomes in low-income countries. However, empiri-
cal studies conducted over many years have been inconclusive
about the relationship between class size and learner outcomes in
low-income countries (Glewwe et al., 2011). Evidence from
qualitative studies (Elliott, 2014; Westbrook et al., 2013) clearly
shows that the effects of class size are mediated by a range of
14
‘Orthography’ refers to the methodology of writing a language including the
rules of spelling, hyphenation, capitalization, word breaks, emphasis, and
punctuation etc. all of which can influence the processes and ease with which
languages are decoded by a reader.
241
factors including teacher quality and the forms of pedagogy used
and that these can vary significantly across cultural contexts. This
serves to highlight the importance of mixed methods in research-
ing learning. Another example is in relation to textbooks. Recent
meta-analysis of the results of randomised control trials into the
effectiveness of textbooks in raising test scores have proved
inconclusive (Kremer et al., 2013). This is consistent with school
effectiveness research undertaken as part of the Understanding
Education Quality in Low Income Countries (EdQual) research
programme where the strength of the effect of textbook use on
literacy scores across 14 African countries was seen to vary
depending on the context. Qualitative evidence on the use of
textbooks in schools also revealed evidence of patchy use of
textbooks by teachers with many textbooks remaining locked up in
cupboards and of the language of the textbooks being inaccessible
to many learners (Tikly and Barrett, 2013). These qualitative
findings are potentially of considerable relevance for governments
and policy makers but are not apparent from evidence based on
RCTs alone.
A key debate within the post-2015 agenda is the development
of a learning metric that can be used to measure progress towards
learning goals and that can be used to hold governments to
account. Barrett (2011) has provided a nuanced critique of the idea
of a learning goal. Part of this relates to the reductionism implicit in
equating learning with the results of standardised tests. A further
critique involves the difficulties in comparing across contexts (See
also Goldstein, 2004). For this reason Barrett makes the case for a
greater emphasis on the development of national and local
processes of assessment that are context appropriate and can
more readily be used for school improvement purposes. Such a
view is consistent with a critical realist position and is taken up
below.
A further area of critique of empiricism in ICE focuses on the
supposed ‘objectivity’ of empirical research. Empiricism is itself
based on a ‘symbol-processing’ view of cognition in which the
individual mind is assumed to objectively process and reflect
external reality (Scott, 2010). For interpretivists as for critical
realists, this objectivist view of learning is problematic in that it
affords little room for a consideration of the role of values, language,
culture or emotion within the research process thereby limiting self-
reflexivity on the part of the researcher. As Olsen (2010) has argued,
in contrast to the view of objectivity of ‘good’ social science implicit
in empiricism, social statistics can never be seen as value neutral. She
argues that there are key points in statistical enquiry including
compiling numbers into either theoretical categories or scales,
making corresponding assertions about the measurement units, and
interpreting data which involve qualitative value judgments and it is
the recognition of this along with the fallibility of statistical methods
that needs to be taken into account when considering evidence
based on quantitative research.
In this regard, empiricist accounts are often implicitly informed
by a range of normative assumptions despite claims to the
contrary. For example, although the evidence relating to the use of
incentives and performance-related pay for teachers is mixed,
research into the use of incentives to improve teachers’ perfor-
mance is encouraged partly because of the persistence of
ontological assumptions based on rational choice theory in which
it is assumed that individual economic agents will modify their
behaviour if it perceived to be in their material interests to do
(Pawson, 2005). This is despite a range of evidence that improved
teacher motivation is more likely the outcome of multiple causes
arising from a number of structural conditions within education
systems including pay and conditions, keeping teachers safe from
physical harm (e.g. in conflict situations), the status of the teaching
profession and opportunities to develop the professional capabili-
ties of teachers (Barrett and Avalos ref). At a general level as has
242 L. Tikly / International Journal of Educational Development 40 (2015) 237–249

been argued at length elsewhere (see for example Klees et al., 2012; learning; the implicit normative commitment within World Bank
Tikly and Barrett, 2011) much of the literature written within discourse despite the objectivist/empiricist rhetoric towards neo-
the economics of education is premised on the assumption liberal, market-led solutions to educational reform and to a
that learning outcomes can be improved through the use of particular view of human subjectivity and agency assumed by
neo-liberal market mechanisms including the use of monetary human capital theory; the self-referential and limited use of
incentives, greater accountability and competition between research evidence about learning beyond the Bank’s own work and
schools. This is despite the fact that the empirical evidence other material written from an empiricist perspective; the
to support these assumptions is in fact highly contested.15 rhetorical nature of attempts by the World Bank to give voice to
Neo-liberalism can also appear as an individualising discourse different stakeholders in poverty reduction strategies; and, the
at an ontological level that stands in contrast to the more problems of implementation of WB programmes because of a
collectivist orientation of many non-Western cultures (DeJaeghere failure to adequately engage with country contexts.16
and Baxter, 2013). Interpretivist approaches have also contributed historically to
the elaboration of learner centred (including constructivist and
social constructivist) theories of learning (Brown, 2009; Schweis-
4. Interpretivism
furth, 2011, 2013; Westbrook et al., 2013). At a philosophical level
there is a clear affinity between an interpretivist meta-theoretical
The understanding of interpretivism presented here is a broad
outlook and constructivism which focuses on how the mind
one and encompasses a range of meta-theoretical positions. It
constructs meaning through forms of active learning. Social
incorporates approaches that are traditionally identified as
constructivism including socio-cultural theory, emphasises the
interpretivist including social constructionism, ethnomethodolo-
situated and social nature of learning and the important mediating
gy, phenomenology and symbolic interactionism. It is also used to
role of language, pedagogy and other cultural artefacts including
encompass a range of anti-foundational perspectives including
learning materials in shaping learning. In the context of the post-
postmodernism and poststructuralism. What these perspectives
2015 debate, interpretivist accounts have focused attention on the
have in common is the view that all knowledge is produced
difficulties of implementing learner centred approaches in
through different kinds of social and/or discursive practices
different contexts and the need for more contextually relevant
involving subjective human perceptions, values and negotiated
learner centred pedagogies (Schweisfurth, 2013).
interactions. They therefore (to varying degrees) place emphasis
It will be suggested below that there is much to commend an
on the relative, context dependent and subjectivist nature of
interpretivist approach from a critical realist perspective including
reality. In relation to some of the strong intellectual currents
a shared critique of aspects of empiricism, a view of the socially
within ICE the ‘interpretivist’ category is also taken to include a
constructed nature of knowledge and an acknowledgement of the
range of critical, ‘emancipatory’ perspectives including neo-
important role of values in educational research. There are,
Marxism, Freirian pedagogy, feminism, postcolonialism and
however, also several problems with an interpretivist approach.
anti-racism. Unlike other interpretivist approaches these perspec-
Firstly, a criticism that can be levelled at many ‘traditional’ forms of
tives are often overtly informed by pre-existing ontological
interpretivism is a reluctance to privilege the ontological domain
positions (e.g. historical materialism in the case of neo-Marxism
and to acknowledge a reality ‘out there’ beyond how different
and Freirianism; a view of patriarchal, colonial, post-colonial
versions of reality are constructed in language and in discourse.
and racist structures in the case of feminism, postcolonialism and
The favouring of individual and group interpretations of reality
anti-racism respectively) and emancipatory commitments. They
over a consideration of the nature of reality itself is also considered
are often also critical of ‘mainstream’ interpretivist and anti-
reductionist from a critical realist perspective as reality for critical
foundationalist approaches for being ahistorical and eliding
realists is considered to exist beyond how it is sensed and
problems of social conflict, power and change. They are included
experienced. Like positivism, interpretivism is also guilty of an
here, however, because at an epistemological level many are
‘epistemic fallacy’, this time of reducing the realm of the real to
concerned with giving ‘voice’ to the interpretations and experi-
how reality is interpreted. Further, interpretivist methods are
ences of different oppressed groups or to forms of textual
useful for highlighting issues of process involved between cause
deconstruction and relating these to oppressive power relation-
and effect in the operation of social mechanisms in different
ships and structures. Many employ forms of ‘critical interpreti-
contexts. However, the reliance on inductive forms of reasoning,
vism’ (Lincoln and Guba, 2013) involving a dialogical relationship
(for example in the use of ‘grounded’ theory) shares similar
between the researcher and the researched and in which praxis
strengths and limitations for critical realists as the use of inductive
and social change are a goal based on a view of the perceptions and
inference in quantitative methods (i.e. in the risks involved in
interests of the participants.
assuming that the data being analysed represent all aspects of
Interpretivism has played an important role in the on-going
reality of a phenomenon and that the correct conclusions about
post-2015 debate. Firstly, it has provided a point of critique against
that reality are drawn).
dominant, empiricist views. For example, two recent volumes
Furthermore, through emphasising the social and cultural
written from what may be described as critical interpretivist
dimensions of learning interpretivists often fail to adequately
positions have critiqued the World Bank’s Learning for All agenda
account for the individual, cognitive and biological structures
(Collins and Alexander, 2012; Klees et al., 2012). Criticisms have
and mechanisms that also shape learning. There is a natural
focused on the ideological rather than objective nature of much
mistrust on the part of many interpretivists of any account of
World Bank discourse on learning in that it portrays a reductionist
reality that smacks of biological or social determinism (even if it
view of learning as a set of measurable and quantifiable outcomes
is biological causality rather than determinism that is being
and education systems as a set of objective and quantifiable
alluded to). Whilst rightly drawing attention to the fallibility of
processes; it does not take account of the role of capitalist social
socially produced knowledge whether within the natural or
and material relations of production in reproducing inequalities in
social sciences the wariness towards recognising the real ‘natural
15
necessity’ underlying learning makes the quest for any kind of
It has also been argued that the assumptions underlying human capital theory
are based on an ontologically individualistic view of human nature that is stands in
contrast to more collectivist understandings of agency that are characteristic of
16
some non-Western cultures. See for example Tikly (2004). For a critical summary of these texts see Tikly (2014).
 L. Tikly / International Journal of Educational Development 40 (2015) 237–249
biologically causal mechanisms problematic at best from an
interpretivist perspective.
There is also a contradiction implicit within the interpetivist
approach in that despite the tendency within traditional inter-
pretivism towards ontological relativism there is often an implicit
normative bias. This is demonstrated, for example, in a tacit belief
on the part of many interpretivists in learner-centredness as the
preferred pedagogical approach. In the case of critical interpretivist
positions the ex post facto (re) interpretation/rationalisation of the
perspectives of subjugated individuals and groups which often
takes place in relation to an a priori set of ontological commitments
can be a source of contradiction/tension (Anderson, 2013). Finally,
the bias towards qualitative, participative and deconstructive
methodologies (including forms of discourse analysis) within
interpretivism and the prioritisation of interpretation and critique
(in the case of critical interpretivists) over causality often means
that interpretative work within the ICE canon has more limited
traction with policy makers (although it can prove highly valuable
to practitioners in localised contexts).
5. Critical realism
Critical realism17 is often presented as a ‘middle way’ between
empiricism and interpretivism, rearticulating from the critique of
empiricism a more sophisticated realist ontology. As mentioned
above, the view of critical realism developed here is derived
principally from the work of Roy Bhaskar as well as other writers
who have drawn on and extended his ideas. There has been a
growing interest in applying Bhaskar’s ideas to educational
contexts as part of what Brown (2009) has described as the
‘ontological turn’ in the way that educational research is theorised.
To date there has been limited attention to the potential of critical
realism for international and comparative education despite the
fact that the early work of the critical realist Margaret Archer
focused on developing a comparative account of the emergence of
education systems (Archer, 1984).18 This has not prevented
Bhaskar’s work from becoming increasingly influential across a
range of social science disciplines including economics, business
management, international relations, politics, law, information
systems, nursing, childhood studies and education.19
Bhaskar describes critical realism as the ‘underlabourer’ for
research in that it seeks to provide a philosophical basis for
scientific and social scientific enquiry. At the most basic level as we
have seen, critical realists critique both empiricism and inter-
pretivism in terms of the ‘epistemic fallacy’ of emphasising issues
of epistemology over a concern with ontology and specifically a
consideration of the real causal mechanisms and structures in
nature and society that give rise to observable events/phenomena.
By reducing the question of ‘what is’ to one of ‘what we can know’
Western philosophy in Bhaskar’s view is also guilty of anthropo-
centrism – reducing the world to what we know as human beings.
17
The term ‘critical realism’ emerged as a consequence of the elision of Bhaskar’s
early ‘trancendental realist’ critique of positivism in the natural sciences elaborated
in a Realist Theory of Science and his ‘critical naturalist’ critique of interpretivism in
the social sciences elaborated in The Possibility of Naturalism.
18
There may be several possible reasons for the lack of attention to date to
Bhaskar’s work within ICE despite the obvious relevance of his ideas. One is the
difficulty of the language which can appear quite obfuscatory. Another is that some
of the key concepts including, for example, the emphasis on social ‘structures’ and
‘mechanisms’ can appear to those from a more interpretivist tradition as being
positivistic in orientation (despite Bhaskar being critical of positvism). Bhaskar’s
work is also better know in the UK and in Scandanavia and Australia with more
limited uptake and awareness of his work in the US and other parts of the world.
19
There has been a recent spate of literature on critical realism and education and
on critical realism and childhood studies that has coincided with Bhaskar’s move to
the London Institute of Education. See for example Anderson (2013) and Scott
(2010).
243
In developing his own conception of depth reality Bhaskar
distinguishes between the transitive domain by which he refers
to the natural and social structures and causal mechanisms that
although subject to change are relatively enduring; and the
intransitive domain which relates to our constructions of that
deeper reality including the theories that we develop to explain
reality. Within ICE for instance, the transitive domain would relate
to the observed characteristics of education systems including
current policy priorities relating to the curriculum, teacher
training, assessment etc. that vary between education systems
and change over time. The intransitive domain relates to the
deeper causal mechanisms and structures including the impact of
relatively enduring and intransigent inequalities in society and/or
the structure of the education system itself, including the degree of
centralization/decentralisation.
Bhaskar goes on to distinguish between three relatively
autonomous levels of depth reality. These are the levels of the
empirical (the experiences and sensed perceptions of knowing
subjects); the actual level of objects and events that occur in the
world (that may exist outside of our perceptions/knowledge of
them); and the real level, i.e. the level of deeper lying structures
and causal mechanisms that may be beyond our experience but
give rise to the other two levels. In relation to debates on learning,
the ‘empirical’ might relate to measured differences in the
performance of learners in standardised tests. The ‘actual’ would
relate to the nexus of factors that impact on learner outcomes
ranging from individual and group differences to the impact of
different policy interventions. The ‘real’ would relate to the
question of causality that would embrace theoretical explanation
of how differences between individuals and groups are impacted
by different kinds of inequality and of the mechanisms through
which different kinds of intervention impact on learning outcomes.
As we have seen, through focusing on surface appearances of
phenomena empiricists produces a ‘flat actualism’ that does not
probe underlying structures and causal mechanisms that may be
beyond perception. For Bhaskar these structures and mechanisms
have a transfactual quality in that they exist irrespective of our
ability to observe or measure them and the task of research is to
reveal the deeper level of structures and causal mechanisms.
By ‘structure’ critical realists refer to an ensemble of various
objects whose relations create a single overall object which has a
structure (Olsen, 2010). In the natural world atoms have structures
made up of composite sub-atomic particles. In the social world the
education system can be said to comprise a structure. Structures –
and in particular social structures – are also understood as
emergent from and yet irreducible to their composite parts. Thus
an education system is the result of interactions between sub-
systems relating to curricula, assessment, teacher training as well
as the variety of institutions that it services. Structures give rise to
mechanisms that have causal powers. Thus the basic structure of
the brain in interaction with the environment gives rise to mind.
Mechanisms arising from the structure of the family or of the
school including, for example, the gendered nature of social
relationships or institutional responses to gendered violence may
‘cause’ differences in achievement between girls and boys. These
differences might also be affected by mechanisms arising from
structures higher up the system such as a gender-biased
curriculum or even by policies emanating from global, legal and
policy frameworks and aid priorities. The fact that the phenome-
non of learning emerges from structures and causal mechanisms
that operate at a number of inter-related scales and levels gives rise
to a necessarily laminated view of learning which is discussed in
more detail below.
Social systems are, however, fundamentally different from
natural systems in that they need to take account of human agency.
Here the work of critical realists including Archer (e.g. 1984, 1995,
244 L. Tikly / International Journal of Educational Development 40 (2015) 237–249
2009; Archer and Dawson, 2000; Archer and Maccarini, 2013) and
Carter and New (2004) is particularly useful. Against biologically
and socially deterministic views of agency critical realists propose
an alternative view of the structure/agency relationship. It starts
from the ontological claim that social structures and human agents
each possess distinct properties and powers in their own right.
Social structures including for instance property relations,
linguistic and legal systems are pre-existing and relatively
enduring (intransigent) features of the world into which we are
born. The key powers that structures contain are the abilities to
constrain and to enable. Human agents also possess attributes
which are relevant for agency, including self-consciousness,
reflexivity, intentionality, emotionality and cognition (some of
these are also common to other biological organisms). As reflexive
beings capable of highly sophisticated symbolic communication,
human beings are able to formulate projects, develop plans, have
ambitions, pursue interests and critically for our discussion – to
learn. ‘This ontological endowment means that it is people who
make history. People are the only inhabitants of the social world
able to reflect upon, and so seek (individually and collectively) to
alter or reinforce, the fitness of the social arrangements they
encounter for the realisation of their own interests’ (Carter and
New, 2004: 70).
This power of agency to maintain or modify the world is not
only dependent on the property of self-consciousness. People
collectively also exert an influence simply by virtue of their
numbers. This view of structure/agency as essentially a dialectic
stands in contrast to deterministic views in which agency is seen as
determined by social structures, interpolated through discourse
etc. It also stands in contrast to voluntarist views of agency in
which agency is seen as unconstrained by structures. In this
ontological view structure and agency are irreducible to each
other. It helps to account for the complexity and inherent
unpredictability of open, social systems such as education. Linked
to and arising from the view of structure and agency within critical
realism is the concept of emergence. ‘Emergence’ refers to the way
in which particular combinations of things, processes and practices
in social life frequently give rise to new emergent properties. The
defining characteristic of emergent properties is their irreducibili-
ty. Both structures and agents emerge as a consequence of their
interactions with each other. For Bhaskar, emergence needs to be
seen in relation to what he describes as ‘four-planar social being’,
i.e. as arising from material transactions with nature; social
interactions between agents; interactions between agents and
social structures; and, from the ‘stratification of embodied
personalities of agents’ (in other language through processes of
self-reflexivity). These transactions take place simultaneously with
every social interaction (Bhaskar, 2008).
Emergence is an important concept in relation to learning. For
example, the human mind which is the seat of learning can be seen
to emerge as a result of causal mechanisms at both the biological/
psychological level and at a social level although it is irreducible to
either. Furthermore, as we have seen, learning is also enabled and
constrained by structures at a number of levels from the local to
the system level. Furthermore, to the extent that organisations and
societies can be considered to ‘learn’ (a notion that is assumed by
theories of ‘organisational learning’ of the ‘learning society’, for
example) learning at these levels of collective agency can be seen
to arise from but also to be irreducible to learning at an individual
level. All this leads to a necessarily laminated view of learning
systems which is presented below.
It is also in relation to the agency of the researcher that a
discussion of what is ‘critical’ in critical realism becomes relevant.
There are at least three senses in which researchers might exercise
criticality and self-reflexivity from a critical realist perspective. The
fist relates to the fallibility of different theories of learning and of
the evidence on which these are based and the need for these to be
critically interrogated. It is suggested below that the abductive
method of inference makes this testing of competing theories
possible. Secondly, as has been argued, there is a need for critical
self-reflexivity in relation to the values underpinning the research
process. This assumes a special significance in the context of cross-
cultural, comparative research. Elsewhere I have argued for the
need for a diatopical hermeneutic as the means for establishing an
ethical basis for cross-cultural research in postcolonial settings
linked to the idea of a critical planetary humanism (Tikly and Bond,
2013). In this sense the issue of values in research is grounded in
ongoing reflection on the ontology of ‘being human’ (Archer and
Dawson, 2000) and of sharing the planet with other species
(Bhaskar, 2010).
Thirdly, and related to the last point, critical realism allows
for an emancipatory moment in the research process.20 This is
significant for ICE as there have been important currents of
thought centred on emancipatory ideas including neo-Marxism
(including Freirianism), feminism, postcolonialism etc. Each
draws attention to different structures and causal mechanisms
that may facilitate or inhibit learning of different groups and
that often lead to the articulation of different emancipatory
projects around issues of class, race, gender, ability/disability
etc. Many researchers and organisations that sponsor research in
ICE make recourse to human rights as a normative framework. In
recent work (Tikly and Barrett, 2013, 2011) Angeline Barrett and
I have drawn on the ideas of Sen and Nussbaum to outline a view
of social justice in education in which learning is considered in
relation to the development of valued capabilities and function-
ings and as contributing to human well-being. Critical realism,
operating as it does at a meta-theoretical level is not in itself
prescriptive in determining an emancipatory project linked to
learning. In principle, critical realism is maximally inclusive at
an ontological level to the idea of multiple forms of inequality/
oppression and hence emancipatory projects and how they
intersect to reinforce inequalities in different contexts. (Such an
ontological position might also lead to a questioning of the
rather arbitrary focus within the post-2015 debate on inequality
in learning outcomes in the global South given that forms of
inequality are also highly evident in many so-called ‘developed’
countries of the global North).
Finally, and in contrast to some totalitarian/authoritarian
projects that have paraded under the banner of ‘emancipation’,
theories related to oppression and emancipation and the
ontological premises on which they are based are considered
fallible rather than absolute. The onus from a critical realist
perspective is on researchers to be self-reflexive about their
theoretical and value positions rather than assume a veneer of
neutrality as some empiricists do or to uncritically assume an a
priori ontological position as some interpretivists do. It is in this
spirit and with these caveats in mind that the next section seeks to
set out an ontology of learning as a basis for research that might
inform the post-2015 agenda.
6. Towards an ontology of learning for the post-2015 education
and development agenda
Diagram 1 below seeks to represent an ontology of learning. In
relation to the current emphasis on education systems on the part
20
In this respect much of Bhaskar’s more recent work has been to elaborate an
emancipatory project through a reworking of the Marxist dialectic. See for example,
Bhaskar (2008). See also the following for a sympathetic discussion of Bhaskar’s
work on dialectics Norrie (2010). For a more critical discussion of Bhaskar’s
emancipatory applications of critical realism see Pawson (2013). Brown et al.
provide a good discussion of the relationship between Bhaskar and Marx’s dialectic
in Brown et al. (2002).
 L. Tikly / International Journal of Educational Development 40 (2015) 237–249
Diagram 1. A laminated learning system.
of the World Bank and other donors such as DfID, it can be seen as an
initial attempt to illustrate the nature and scope of what may be
described as a ‘laminated learning system’ relevant for the post-
2015 debate. Bronfenbrenner’s (1979, 1993) ecological model of
human development has provided a useful starting point.21 Firstly,
through insisting on understanding learning in context it represents
a non-reductionist model. It provides a laminated model of learning
in which different sub-systems are nested within other sub-systems.
Each sub-system comprises intransitive structures and causal
mechanisms that, it is suggested, would need to be taken into
account in order to develop a holistic ontology of learning. The model
is based on the idea of interactions between sub-systems and the
role of sub-systems closer to the individual learner in mediating the
effects of more remote causal structures and mechanisms. The
double arrows represent the two-way nature of these interactions. It
is also non-deterministic. That is to say that the nature of the
contexts represented by each sub-system and their effects will vary
for learners in different geographical and cultural contexts and over
time but also the model allows for the individual and collective
agency of actors in actively shaping and altering their environment.
In this sense the model is consistent with the concept of emergence
in which learning at an individual level is seen to emerge from
interactions at a number of levels. Unlike more empiricist accounts
of education systems such as that described in the World Bank
strategy, it is less concerned with defining and measuring the
relationship between the observable parts of the system as in
representing the dynamic, dialectical nature of the relationship
between the underlying structures and mechanisms that give rise to
learning over time (Bronfenbrenner refers to changes in learning
over the life course and to the environment in which that person
lives as the ‘chronosystem’). Applying Bronfenbrenner’s basic model
to a consideration of the emerging post-2015 education and
21
Although developed as a heuristic device to understand child development
some of the basic principles and categories can be adapted for a consideration of the
ontology of learning. Bronfenbrenner’s model has itself been through significant
stages of development but the underlying principle – that learning needs to be
understood in context – has remained intact.
245
development agenda requires, however, adapting and extending
some of his original categories. For example, the content of each sub-
system has been updated to better reflect contemporary debates.
The model has been developed so as to encompass not only national
but increasingly global and regional structures and mechanisms that
impact on learning.22
At the individual level structures relating to the biological
makeup of the individual interact with the immediate environ-
ment to facilitate or inhibit learning. It is at this level that physical
and mental abilities/disabilities create pre-dispositions to learning
and where issues relating to nutrition, disease, sleep etc. impact on
the propensity of biological systems to support learning. It is also at
this level and through interaction with the various microsystems
that the structure of the mind and of the personality emerge and in
turn give rise to processes of self reflection, self actualisation and
autonomous learning that constitute the individual agency of
learners.
In Bronfenbrenner’s (1993) terms, a microsystem is a pattern of
activities, societal roles, and interpersonal relations experienced
by the learner. The structures of language and of culture mediate
the nature of social interactions and the learning process. The
physical structure of learning environments, of material artifacts
such as textbooks and of virtual spaces and the availability of food,
nutrients, light etc. shape learning. The way that pedagogy is
structured (here ‘pedagogy’ is used in an inclusive sense to refer to
‘formal pedagogies’ of the school, the church, mosque, initiation
ceremonies/rituals etc. as well as the less formalised pedagogies of
the home, the street and the playground) interacts with structures
at the individual level to facilitate or inhibit learning. In schools
pedagogy is regulated by the instantiated curriculum, rules and
regulations governing the structure of the school day, the medium
22
Further, whereas Bronfonbrenner’s work can be seen to focus on statistical
correlations between factors at different levels (i.e. the relationship between
parental occupation in the ‘exosystem’ and the ‘microsystem’ of child develop-
ment), the emphasis in the model presented here is more on the interaction of
causal structures and mechanisms at each level that in Bhaskar’s terms are more
‘intransitive’ in nature.
246 L. Tikly / International Journal of Educational Development 40 (2015) 237–249
of instruction, of feeding schemes, school discipline etc. The
structure of the family of peer, kinship and religious organisations
and networks regulate pedagogical activity. The structure of
discourses and practices relating to gender, class, ethnicity,
disability etc. also play a regulatory role at this level. The
mesolevel comprises the linkages and processes taking place
between two or more settings containing the learner. For example,
it encompasses the relationship between home, community and
school including parental and community involvement in school. It
can also encompass the way that social capital in the form of local
networks is structured and mobilised to support or hinder
learning. Mesosystems also relate to the relationship between
different microsystems that impact on the child including those
relating to health, social welfare and education.
Meso and microsystems mediate the effect of structures and
mechanisms within exosystems, which in this context comprise
the legal and policy frameworks governing the curriculum and
assessment, teacher training, school finance etc. The structure of
the educational state including the degree of centralisation and
decentralisation also impacts on microsystems. The educational
state in turn emerges from macrosystems comprised of class,
gender and ethnic interests and relations linked to property
relations and the political economy of nations. Wars and conflicts
which take place at a macro level can have a major causal impact
on microsystems and on learning. Global and regional structures
and mechanisms including legal and policy frameworks, aid
modalities and priorities, international assessments and global
discourses about education increasingly shape education systems
within a globalised world. Global influences are mediated by
structures at other levels. Thus, for example, international assess-
ments have a washback effect on pedagogy and learning but this is
mediated by the effects ofnational assessment systems. Although the
focus has been on social systems, natural systems may also impact on
learning. For example, weather systems influenced by global
warming may directly affect the physical provision of learning at a
macro level in areas affected by drought or flooding or crop failure.
7. Some implications for research
7.1. Interdisciplinarity and mixed methods
A discussion of the levels and scales at which causality for
learning needs to be considered in the context of the post-2015
agenda suggests a programmatic approach. Different kinds of
evidence and different theoretical models need to be brought
together to understand the complexity and multi-causality implied
by the ontological view of learning presented above. One methodo-
logical implication is the need for interdisciplinarity, i.e. an integration
of knowledges from different scientific and social scientific
disciplines. As Bhaskar et al. have recently argued in relation to
the need for interdiciplinarity in the study of climate change (2010)
inter-disciplinarity requires the development of transdisciplinarity in
that an understanding of learning requires deploying theories,
models and methods from different disciplines to the study of
learning. Some methodologies are particularly suited to the study of
learning as a laminated system. Multilevel modelling, for instance
can be used both in the social and natural sciences as a means of
understanding patterns of association between different kinds of
learning outcomes and a range of variables at different, nested levels.
Similarly, from anthropology, the idea of the vertical case study
developed in education by Vavrus and Bartlett seems highly
appropriate for exploring qualitatively the structures and mecha-
nisms that shape learning from the level of the individual to that of
the global (Vavrus and Bartlett, 2006). Inter- and transdicsiplinary
approaches in turn require fostering understanding at both the
substantive and methodological level as well as the institutional
conditions that will enable cross-disciplinary dialogue.23 In terms
familiar with many educationalists they involve creating ‘commu-
nities of practice’ that are sustained beyond disciplinary lines. Such a
commitment to interdisciplinarity is not only pertinent to research
teams but also to funders and users of research into learning. Within
the field of ICE a key issue is that of the nature of international, cross-
national partnerships and the cultural politics of those partnerships
given the legacy of unequal power relationships between researchers
in the global North and the global South (Barrett et al., 2011; Crossley,
2000; Tikly and Bond, 2013).
Linked to the idea of interdisciplinarity is the use of mixed
methods. The use of mixed methods in ICE has long been
advocated, for example, in the context of case study methodology
(Crossley and Vulliamy, 1984). A common rationale for the use of
mixed methods in ICE is a version of pragmatism in which
methodologies drawn from empiricist and interpretative para-
digms are brought together pragmatically to answer research
questions (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). The validity of findings
from mixed methods studies is considered from the point of view
of their ‘workability’. The problem with a pragmatist approach is
that it does not engage with the different ontological positions of
empiricist and interpretivist accounts and what tends to happen in
reality is that ‘workability’ becomes reduced to empiricist notions
of truth and reality, which tend to dominate amongst users of
research. The notion of ‘triangulation’ thus becomes one in which
qualitative findings are used to give contextual depth to pre-
existing assumptions that underpinned the quantitative enquiry.
The pragmatic idea of ‘workability’ is consistent with a critical
realist approach although the difference is that in the use of the
abductive method qualitative and quantitative findings can be
used in combination and as part of an iterative process to advance
the development of theoretical understanding throughout the
research process (below).
Critical realism is quite unique in embracing epistemological
and methodological plurality. This is related to the view of the
necessarily laminated view of social reality. Regarding quantita-
tive methods, it is important to recognise that these are rarely
able to delineate more than surface structures generated by the
causal powers at work in a particular social setting. Statistical
techniques may reveal associations between variables which are
suggestive of the tendencies resulting from the interplay of
causal powers. However, this is insufficient for producing causal
explanations. For explanations to be valid, researchers need to go
beyond such tendencies to specify the contingent conditions
under which specific mechanisms and causal powers are likely to
generate particular events (Danermark, 2002; Modell, 2009;
Olsen, 2010). Thus, the development of variables and indicators
for quantitative research in different contexts can be informed by
qualitative understanding of the specific context. For example, in
her study of the aspirations of Jamaican boys, Stockfelt used a
mixed method approach linked to her use of adductive reasoning
(Stockfelt, 2013). Aware of the potential lack of contextual
relevance of existing theories of aspiration derived from largely
Western contexts, she developed an initial theoretical under-
standing of aspirations augmented with qualitative findings
based on interviews and focus groups with Jamaican boys. This
led her to develop contextually appropriate quantitative indica-
tors that were subjected to factor analysis in order to gain a
quantitative understanding of their internal validity. These were
23
For Bhaskar these include (1) disambiguation of ontology and epistemology; (2)
a commitment to anti-reductionism; (3) a shared idea of explanation in terms of a
laminated totality; (4) what may be called the holy trinity of interdisciplinary
research: metatheoretical unity, methodological specificity and theoretical
pluralism and tolerance; and (5) the dissolution of career, administrative and
financial barriers to interdisciplinary research. See Bhaskar (2010).
 L. Tikly / International Journal of Educational Development 40 (2015) 237–249
then used to design a survey instrument which she administered
to a sample of Jamaican boys. The findings from the survey then
led to the qualitative elaboration of her theoretical framework. In
this way she was able to re-contextualise the phenomenon of
boys’ underachievement in Jamaica within an evolving theoreti-
cal framework that at the same time has contributed insights into
the nature of aspiration through drawing on the Jamaican
context.
7.2. Abductive and retroductive inference
The above leads to a more detailed consideration of abduction
and retroduction as forms of inference. In critical realism and
unlike empiricism and interpretivism, theory is considered the
primary ‘raw material’ for the productive work of researchers and
this involves abduction and retroduction. Abduction is a
formalised approach to inference. Unlike induction which moves
from an observed phenomenon to generalised laws or deduction
which moves from general laws to hypotheses and then to
observed phenomenon abduction starts from a theory and then
considers the extent to which it fits a case. Peirce (in Modell,
2009: 213) described the formal logic of abductive reasoning as
follows:
A surprising fact, C, is observed. But if A were true, C would be
a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to expect that A is
true.
In actual research practice, this involves assessing the
explanatory ability of multiple theories, postulating the existence
of causal mechanisms (A) (in the context of this article this could
include any number of theories of learning), in the process of
searching for evidence that may shed light on the contingent
conditions under which a particular event (C) will occur (in the
context of this article ‘C’ would equate with evidence that learning
has or has not taken place). In this way abduction seeks to
interpret and recontextualize individual phenomena within a
conceptual framework or a set of ideas and in a way that seeks to
elucidate underlying structures and causal mechanisms. As long
as theories are consistent with the basic pre-suppositions of
critical realism including the existence of a reality beyond our
perceptions of that reality then it is a candidate for providing an
explanation of any given phenomenon. The ‘best’ theory is the one
that provides the best explanation for the phenomena under
investigation. There is no room for ‘grand’ theories proclaiming
once and for all to exhaustively represent social phenomena
(Modell, 2009). Theory development is an iterative, on-going
and often ‘messy’ process rather than a linear one that results in
closure as more cases are encountered and new theories
emerge. A key concept in adbuction is that of abstraction.24
Developing theories to explain phenomena requires creativity
on the part of researchers whilst adjudicating between different
theoretical perspectives requires the use of judgemental
rationality.25
24
As Pawson (p. 337) has succinctly put it, ‘‘Abstraction is thus the thinking
process that allows us to understand an event as an instance of a more general class
of happenings. Quite literally, the reasoning goes – ‘here is a specific instance, which
I can explain as a ‘‘case’’ that falls into a broader explanatory schema’. The prize here
is that we have a tool that provides the basis for drawing transferable lessons.
Pawson (2013).
25
Scott has summarised a range of approaches that can be used to adjudicate
between different theories based on the principle of judgemental rationalism Scott
describes four ways of accomplishing this, namely by establishing that one theory is
superior to another because it is more coherent, comprehensive or representative;
because it contains fewer contradictions, disjunctions and aporias; because the
system of rationality underpinning one theory is superior to that underlying an
alternative theory; and, because one theory is more practically adequate in its
implications. Scott (2010).
247
Critical realists argue that the abductive approach is a far more
accurate depiction of how researchers and practitioners actually go
about solving problems. For critical realists, the empiricist view
that natural laws that govern the universe can be deduced from
experiments is a misrepresentation of how natural and social
scientific knowledge is progressed. A more accurate portrayal of
how science has developed is through processes of abstraction to
produce theoretical explanations about the structures, powers and
mechanisms that are beyond what can be immediately observed
and then using experimentation to confirm of to refute these
theories.26 A similar point is true in the world of evidence-based
practice. Thus a medical doctor or an educational psychologist, for
example, is more likely to consider the ‘fit’ of symptoms to a range
of pre-existing likely causes than to deduce the symptom from a
generalisable law or indeed to induce a law form a range of
symptoms. Retroduction is closely related to abduction but
involves going a step further in seeking to establish through
forms of argumentation what is basically characteristic and
constitutive of the structures and mechanisms. Retroduction
involves asking ‘why’ about the evidence, about the theories
and about the causes of the thing itself.27
It is suggested that abduction and retroduction are likely to be a
common (albeit implicit) features of much ICE research. To
illustrate this point, it is helpful to take up once again the earlier
example of the EdQual research programme mentioned above.
Although the discussion takes the form of ex post facto reflection in
that the design of the research programme was not explicitly
informed by critical realism it does illustrate how theoretical
understanding emerges often implicitly through processes of
abduction and retroduction. From inception the programme
sought to develop a holistic yet flexible framework that could
account for aspects of education quality and that captured what
was universal and what was specific and in a way that could
usefully inform policy and practice (see Tikly, 2011 Tikly and
Barrett, 2013 for a full discussion of the evolution of the theoretical
framework).
Our theoretical thinking developed iteratively as the pro-
gramme progressed as we sought to capture and explain the
increasing complexity represented by the data across different
country contexts. We used different methodologies to gather data
including a secondary analysis of a large cross-national data set
using multi-level modelling; cycles of participatory action research
involving research sites in two or more countries in which we
developed and evaluated interventions aimed at improving the
quality of education. Findings were arrived at through processes of
inductive reasoning and the validity of the findings from different
methods was considered using standards appropriate to each
method. Our emerging framework drew on the evidence from the
different studies that were considered to elucidate different
ontological aspects of ‘quality’ whilst seeking to explain findings
26
For example, it was the development of the theory of natural selection that
allowed Darwin to explain biological variation and the origin of species. The theory
did not arise from experiments but rather from the creative fusing of facts about
natural variation observed on his travels, the theory of domestic selection and
Malthus’ theory of population. The same is true in social science. Marx for instance
was much more likely to use an adductive method to understand the ‘fit’ of different
societies to his theory of class structure than to use a deductive method (despite the
influence of scientism at the time of his writing).
27
It refers to asking why things are being observed as they seem to be. This is a
complex question which includes up to three sub-elements: why do evidence and
data appear to follow the patterns they do? Why are theories about the world
sometimes wrong and what kinds of bodies of evidence are used to substantiate and
underpin each theory? and finally, how do we explain the phenomena that we are
currently interested in? The third of these sub-elements is the explanatory task
which most realists take up in a very direct way. They offer causal explanations
without having a deterministic approach to cause. The second of the sub-elements
is an attempt to re-examine existing theories as part of research about the final
phenomena.
248 L. Tikly / International Journal of Educational Development 40 (2015) 237–249
that appeared counter-intuitive or contradictory. The framework
built on but also challenged existing conceptual frameworks.28 It
focused on the identification and elaboration of three enabling
environments; that of the home/community; school and policy
contexts. These roughly correspond to the micro-, meso- and exo-
levels in the above ontology reflecting the research questions and
priorities of the programme. We identified structures and causal
mechanisms in relation to these structures that appeared to be
particularly significant across contexts for enabling learning29 and
allowed for a comparative discussion of how structures (e.g. the
curriculum, examinations system etc.) and mechanisms (e.g.
processes of data collection and monitoring, of public participation
and voice) varied in their effects across country and cultural
contexts. The framework developed iteratively as it sought to
explain the findings from different country contexts. Theorising
also involved retroductive reasoning in that we sought to infer
from the data and from the wider research literature the
underlying nature of the structures and mechanisms that
constituted each environment and why they behaved in the ways
that they did. Here our own analysis focused on issues of the wider
political economy including aid modalities in shaping institutional
forms. In relation to the discussion of the ontology of learning
above and the range of contexts that were covered, the framework
was necessarily partial and fallible. The idea was that it could
provide a useful point of departure for further research, policy and
practice.
8. Conclusion
The article has attempted to make a case for the relevance of
critical realism for the study of learning in the context of current
debates about the post-2015 education and development agenda
and ICE more broadly. It has been argued that in order to progress
research, policy and practice with regard to learning it is important
to be clear about our starting ontological assumptions, i.e. about
what learning is and the structures and mechanisms that facilitate
or inhibit learning in different contexts. Such explicitness is often
absent in debates about learning in the post-2015 education and
development agenda. The dominance of empiricism in the post-
2015 debate means, it has been suggested, that learning often
becomes implicitly equated with standardised test scores.
Empiricism is evident in discussions about a learning metric and
in behaviourist models of the brain and of learning reflecting the
deterministic influence of cognitive neuroscience. Constructivist
views of learning most closely associated with research conducted
within an interpretivist paradigm are also implicit in discourses
28
In particular, we were concerned that existing frameworks tended to provide
too decontextualized a view of education quality and tended to be descriptive
rather than explanatory in nature and focused more on inputs and on outcomes
than on processes of learning. They also tended towards a reductionist view of
quality linked to exam scores. Thus whilst our own research drew on multilevel
modelling models linking learner and school variables to measured outcomes our
view of quality was broadened to include qualitative understandings of a range of
affective as well as cognitive skills and to an understanding of wellbeing.
29
Within the environment of the home/community, for example, we identified
the importance of structures that facilitated health and nutrition, peer and family
support for learning and mechanisms including active support for learning in the
home and communication between home and school. In relation to the school
environment we emphasised the structure of basic physical structure of the school
and of the rules and regulations governing the curriculum, assessment etc. and the
significance of pedagogical mechanisms as well as of mechanisms to ensure
coherence (e.g. in relation to the curriculum or language of instruction) between the
school and policy environments. Causality at the level of policy was attributed to
the functionality of societal level structures and institutions relating to the
curriculum, assessment and teacher training and the provision of resources to
schools. It also related to the existence or otherwise of mechanisms relating to the
effective monitoring and use of assessment data to support school improvement
and to support voice and democratic debate so that the priorities of the education
system reflected those of society at large.
around learner centredness although these provide a source of
tension with pedagogies based on more behaviourist assumptions.
By way of contrast, a critical realist meta-theoretical approach
demands an explicit focus on the ontology of learning as a basis for
research. In contrast to the reductionist tendencies of empiricist
and interpretivist approaches critical realism provides a philo-
sophical basis for a ontologically inclusive approach to the study of
learning at a number of scales and levels. This ought to potentially
include evidence from the more empirically focused disciplines
including medicine, psychology, neuroscience, economics and
from school effectiveness research as well as more sociological and
anthropological evidence gathered using interpretive, qualitative
techniques. In contrast to empiricism, however, evidence gathered
using empirical methods is not treated deterministically. Further,
whilst recognizing the socially constructed nature of knowledge
about learning, critical realism eschews the ontological relativism
often implicit in interpretivism. Rather the strength of critical
realism, it is suggested lies in the potential it affords for bringing
together different kinds of evidence in the context of transdisci-
plinary research. This can be used to arrive at though processes of
abduction and retroduction, theories of learning that can begin to
explain what learning is and how it is inhibited or facilitated for
different individuals and groups of learners in different contexts in
terms of causal mechanisms operating at a number of inter-
dependent levels from the individual to the global. The task for
those working within a critical realist approach is to adjudicate
rationally between competing theories to find out ‘what works for
who and under what circumstances’. The re-contextualisation and
re-description of learning phenomena in terms of an evolving
ontological understanding of learning across contexts through
processes of abduction and retroduction seems particularly
relevant for ICE as a field. In contrast to the ‘neutrality’ of research
implied by empiricism, critical realism allows for a critical
engagement with the normative and emancipatory dimensions
of learning and encourages self-reflexivity on the part of the
researcher. Some examples were given in the article of how a
critical realist approach has been applied in the study of learning.
Nonetheless, much more research within a critical realist
framework is required both with respect to a study of learning
relevant for the post-2015 agenda and within ICE generally if
critical realism is to realise its potential and to challenge the
hegemony of empiricism.
Acknowledgements
I would like to extend my thanks to colleagues who have
generously reviewed and provided comments on earlier drafts of
this paper including Michael Crossley, Joan De Jaeghere, Talia
Isaacs, Lizzi Milligan and Shawanda Stockfelt. I would also like to
thank the anonymous reviewers for their extremely valuable and
critical comments which have helped me to improve the
manuscript. The author takes full responsibility for the final text.
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