1

Quasi-Delict

JOSE CANGCO vs. MANILA RAILROAD (defendant was bound by

reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers
facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to
assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the
platform was clear )
G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
FISHER, J. En Banc

Facts:
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of
clerk. in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila
where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to
ride upon the company's trains free of charge.

Upon the occasion in question,the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second
class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door,

Then the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off
also,

but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of

watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him
and he fell violently on the platform.

His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car,
where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after
the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before
it came to a full stop.

The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the
railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away,
objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern
especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.

explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff
alighted is
 2

found in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting
these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for the
shipment to the market.

Testimony showsThis row of sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of
platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that
his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped
upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness
is readily to be credited.

plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared
that the injuries which he had received were very serious. brought at once to a
certain hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his
arm was amputated.
The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to
another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was
again amputated higher up near the shoulder.

It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of
medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of
his curation.

he instituted this proceeding in CFI Manila to recover damages of the

defendant company, founding his action

upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in

placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as
to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's
trains.

Judge accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company.

Although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the
sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the
cars,

nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to

use due caution in alighting from the coach and
was therefore precluded form recovering.
 3

Issue: Whether plaintiff is entitled to damages on the ground of the negligence of

the servants and employees of the defendant placing the sacks of melons upon the
platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger
alighting from the company's trains?

Held: YES!

It can not be employees of the railroad

doubted that the

company were guilty of negligence in piling these

sacks on the platform in the manner above stated;
that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they
therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff.

In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-
wit, the

● primary responsibility of the defendant company and

●
● the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.

foundation of the legal liability of

It is important to note that the

the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the

obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the

breach of that contract by reason of the failure of

defendant to exercise due care in its performance.

That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate,

differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which
can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision.

Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising

ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the
technical form of expression,
 4

that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa

contractual.

In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely
not
upon the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is
applicable to acts of negligence which constitute
the breach of a contract.

It is not accurate to say that

proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the
servant relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts — on
the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never existed.

As Manresa saysthe liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always

based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful
intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused
damage to another.

The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that
the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was
a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and
leaving its trains,

the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his
own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a
complete stop before alighting.
 5

Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra),

if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no

liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's
negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be
apportioned.

It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of

negligence.

It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a
full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have
occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in support of the
contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train.

We are not disposed to subscribe to

this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of
the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the
experience of every-day life.

In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is
shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place
where he stepped from it.

Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year,
and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous
obstructions.

There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any

injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent
failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.

As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be
drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off
the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train
was yet slowly moving.
 6

In considering the situation thus presented , it should not be

overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction
which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed;

defendant was bound by reason of its

and as the

duty as a public carrier

to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its

trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance
to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear.

The place, as we have already stated,

● was dark, or dimly lighted,

and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of
a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede that it had
right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them
adequately so that their presence would be revealed.

The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to
the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff
was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as
the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person

Contributory Negligence

In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act — that is to

say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the

● age,
● sex, and
● physical condition of the passenger

are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be
considered.
 7

Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of
alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel
obstructs the free movement of the limbs.

Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was
his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be
no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was
required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting.

SC’s conclusion is that the

conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly
under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he
was not guilty of contributory negligence.
 8

Geo DAYWALT vs. LA CORPORACION ( stranger cannot become more

extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the
party in whose behalf he intermeddles )
G.R. No. L-13505 February 4, 1919
STREET, J. En Banc

Facts:
1902, Teodorica Endencia, an unmarried woman, resident in the Province of
Mindoro, executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey
to Geo Daywalt a land situated in San Jose Province. It was agreed that

a deed should be executed as soon as the title to the land should be

perfected by proceedings in Land Registration and a Torrens certificate
should be produced therefore in the name of Teodorica

August 1906, A decree recognizing the right of Teodorica as owner was entered in
said court but the Torrens certificate was not issued until later. The parties,
Made a new contract in the form of a deed of conveyance and bears date of
August 16, 1906.

Second contract was not immediately carried into effect Torrens certificate was not
yet obtainable and in fact said certificate was not issued until the period of
performance contemplated in the contract had expired.

Torrens certificate was in time issued. it was found by official survey that the area of
the tract inclosed in the boundaries stated in the contract was about 1.248
hectares of 452 hectares as stated in the contract.

In view of this development Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to transfer the

whole tract to the purchaser, asserting that she never intended to sell so
large an amount of land and that she had been misinformed as to
its area.
 9

La Corporacion was at this time also the owner of another estate on the same island
immediately adjacent to the land which Teodorica Endencia had sold to Geo
Daywalt.

Teodorica appears to be

● a woman of little personal force,

● easily subject to influence, and

● upon all the important matters of business was accustomed to seek, and was
given, the advice of father Sanz and other members of his order
with whom she came in contact.

Plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant corporation the sum of P500,000, as
damages, on the ground that

said corporation, for its own selfish purposes, unlawfully

induced Teodorica to refrain from the
Endencia
performance of her contract for the sale of the
land in question
and to withhold delivery to the plaintiff of the Torrens title, and further,
maliciously and without reasonable cause,

maintained her in her defense to the action of specific performance which was
finally decided in favor of the plaintiff in this court.

Trial court found that this contention was not sustained,

observing that while it was true that the circumstances pointed to an entire sympathy
on the part of the defendant corporation with the efforts of Teodorica Endencia to
defeat the plaintiff's claim to the land, the fact that its officials may have advised her
not to carry the contract into effect would not constitute actionable
interference with such contract.
 10

Issue: Whether corporation not a party to a contract for the sale of land makes
himself liable for damages to the vendee by colluding with the
vendor and maintaining him in the effort to resist an action for
specific performance. ?

Held: NO!

Malice in some form is generally supposed to be an

essential ingredient in cases of interference with contract relations.

But upon the authorities it is enough if the wrong-doer, having knowledge of

the existence of the contract relations, in bad faith sets about to
break it up. Whether his motive is to benefit himself or gratify his spite by working
mischief to the employer is immaterial. Malice in the sense of ill-will or spite is not
essential.

Upon the question as to what constitutes legal justification, a good illustration was
put in the leading case.

If a party enters into contract to go for another upon a journey t o a remote

and unhealthful climate, and a third person, with a bona fide
purpose of benefiting the one who is under contract to go, dissuades him
from the step, no action will lie.

But if the advice is not disinterested and the persuasion is used for "the
indirect purpose of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff," the
intermedler is liable if his advice is taken and the contract broken.

Whatever may be the character of the liability which a stranger to a contract may
incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to evade performance, there is one
proposition upon which all must agree. This is, that

the stranger cannot become more extensively liable in

damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the
party in whose behalf he intermeddles.
 11

To hold the stranger liable for damages in excess of those that could be recovered
against the immediate party to the contract would lead to results at once
grotesque and unjust.

In the case at bar, as Teodorica Endencia was the party directly bound by the
contract, it is obvious that the liability of the defendant corporation, even admitting
that it has made itself coparticipant in the breach of the contract,

can in no even exceed hers.

This leads us to consider at this point the extent of the liability of Teodorica Endencia
to the plaintiff by reason of her failure to surrender the certificate of title and to place
the plaintiff in possession.
12
 13

RAKES vs. RAKES Gulf ( As an answer to the argument urged in this particular
action it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is
the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for
his workmen. His obligation therefore is one "not punished by the law " and
falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence )
G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907
TRACEY, J. En Banc

Facts:
Plaintiff negro, in the employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron
rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila.
Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has
proved that there were two immediately following one another.

According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car
or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling
by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged,

the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off

and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards
amputated at about the knee.

The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the tie, which was the
immediate occasion of the accident, is not clear in the evidence, but is found by
the trial court and is admitted in the briefs and in the argument to have been the
dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the
water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon.

The superintendent of the company attributed it to the giving way of the block laid in
the sand. No effort was made to repair the injury at the time of the occurrence.

Issue: Whether respondent company is liable for damages on the ground that it is
negligent?

Held: YES!

It is contented by the defendant, as its first defense to the action, that the
necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries
through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official
criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only
subsidiarily to him.
 14

This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article
1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not
punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter 11 of Title XVI. Section
1902 of that chapter reads:

A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is

fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to

point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the
employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his
workmen.

His obligation therefore is one "not punished by the law " and falls under civil
rather than criminal jurisprudence.

Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required
that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose
prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
 15

PSBA et al vs. CA et al ( When an academic institution accepts students for

enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with Necessarily, the
school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order
within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof; Because
the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern )
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PADILLA, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista
while on the second-floor premises of PSBA prompted the parents of the
deceased to file suit in RTC Manila for damages against the said

1. PSBA and
2. its corporate officers.

At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at
the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's
academic community but were elements from outside the school.

Substantially, the plaintiffs sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely
demise due to their alleged

● negligence,
● recklessness and
● lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after
the attack on the victim.

Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit

dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence
on the subject is to the effect that

academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in
the afore-stated article.

Trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8
December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. CA affirmed Trial Court, primarily
anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code.
 16

Issue: Whether PSBA and its officials are liable for damages on the ground that
there were negligent in keeping there students safe?
 17

Held: YES! While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion
to dismiss the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should be
tried on the merits,

we do not however agree with the premises of the

appellate court's ruling.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the
rule of

in loco parentis.

This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza,
Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. In all such cases, it
had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the

by pupils or
damage should have been caused or inflicted
students of he educational institution sought to be
held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its y.

However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier
indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for
whose acts the school could be made liable.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment ,

there
is established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing
their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary
undertaking of imparting knowledge.
Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences

when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in

the air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb.
 18

Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation

between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do
not really govern
A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort,
also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.

However, this impression has not prevented this Court from

determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.

In Air France vs. Carrascoso the

private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from
a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the
Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort,
not one arising from a contract of carriage.

In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist
even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort.
 19

This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was
already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice
Fisher elucidated thus:

The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of

contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical
human relations.

These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere
fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person.

When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract
under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of
the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage. (emphasis supplied).

Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's
employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white
man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat."

In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to the passenger was

the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages
to the latter.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that

should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative
of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-
delict.
 20

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no
finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached
thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for
the trial court to determine.

And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the
negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract.

In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation
between PSBA and Bautista.
In other words, a contractual
relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's
liability.
The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
 21

AIR FRANCE vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO & CA ( The foregoing are the
considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which
the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a
first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a
stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight )
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
SANCHEZ, J. En Banc

FactS:
Air France, issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to
Rome From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he
was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a

"white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.

e plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his
seat would be taken over his dead body; they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso
and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane

CFI Manila sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso. CA affirmed

CFI. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Air France is liable for damages on the ground that it ordered
Respondent to move out of his paid first class seat?

Held: YES!

Damages

Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant

claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize
an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver:

First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering,
amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg;

Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first
class transportation at Bangkok; and
 22

Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth

"after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by
reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and
humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But,
the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances
set forth therein.

The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress
of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.

Quite apart from the foregoing is that

(a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard
on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in
Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat
to a white man; 35 and

(b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented
without objection on the part of the petitioner.

It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient

averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the
complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to
the evidence is not even required.

On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:

That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of
the plane belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was
transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his
will,
 23

The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be
essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's
manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code
says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that
upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages
are recoverable.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga
testified that the reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was
confirmed.

The court cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal
understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant
would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong.

The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are
facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent
Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok,
which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight.

We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's

statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to
petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class
seat to provoke an issue".

And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his
office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to
see the Manager".

Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he
had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
 24

NATIVIDAD Andamo vs. IAC et al ( the recitals of the complaint, the alleged
presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual
obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa
aquiliana )
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
FERNAN, C.J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
Spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our
Lady of La Salette, a religious corp.

Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances ,

including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly

● inundated and eroded petitioners' land,

● caused a young man to drown,
● damaged petitioners' crops and plants,
● washed away costly fences,
● endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy
seasons,
● and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.

1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, Criminal case 82 before RTC

Cavite against officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for
destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 RPC.

1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a
civil case, docketed as Civil Case 48 for damages with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction before the same court

Trial court granted respondent corporation's motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved. Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that

"criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil
action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action."

CA affirmed RTC and respondent’s MR denied

 25

Issue: Whether RTC erred in dismissed the civil case based on quasi-delict on the
ground that there is a pending criminal action?
Held: YES!

Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in
accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend
that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748
since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.

Petitioners have raised a valid point.

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the
facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.

The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of
prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made
in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations
and prayer for relief.

A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is
one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:

(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,

(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose
acts he must respond; and

(c) the connection of cause and effect between the

● fault or negligence of the defendant and

● the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

 26

Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by

respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.

There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of

building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such
action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.

In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied Article 1902, now Article
2176 of the Civil Code and held that

"any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping
the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river,

thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the
rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or
lake,

shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to

the injured party.

While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the
property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that
petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and
will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built
by respondent corporation.

Indeed, the recitals of the complaint,

● the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners,

● the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or

negligence, and

● the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing
contractual obligation between the parties

make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.

 27

If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,

latter can claim indemnification for the injury or
the
damage suffered.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage
caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence,

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers

1. not only acts "not punishable by law" but also

2. acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or

negligent.

Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a

criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the

offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to
recover damages on both scores,

only to the bigger award

and would be entitled in such eventuality

of the two, assuming the awards made in the

two cases vary.
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which
states:

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
 28

According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at
first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence.

The Criminal Negligence is a violation of the criminal law, while the Civil
Negligence

is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or

quasi-delict, of ancient origin,

having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence.

Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-

delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain .

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, the Court declared that in quasi-delicts,

"(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case

according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.

There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal
prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action

and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter."

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 29

MARIA Dulay et al vs. CA et al ( Binaril ng Security guard sa Alabang; It must be

noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged
with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in
Therefore, in this
Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies )
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
BIDIN, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred
at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang. As a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security
guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

Feb. 1989, petitioner Maria Dulay and in behalf of her minor children, filed before
RTC QC. an action for damages against

● Benigno Torzuela and

● herein private respondents Safeguard alleged employers of defendant
Torzuela.

Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.

SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss since the alleged act of shooting

was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 RPC.

SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence

under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners,

cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC.

In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the

complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in
a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's
subsidiary liability

March 1989 an Information charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed
before RTC Makati.
 30

Respondent Judge Regino in Civil Case issued an order granting

SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss, Respondent judge also declared that

the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under
Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those
arising from, quasi-delict.

CA affirmed RTC and dismissed petitioner’s MR. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether civil case arising from quasi-delict shall be suspended pending the
criminal action?

Held: NO! We find for petitioners.

It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal
shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives
the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.

determined by the facts

The nature of a cause of action is
alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of
action
An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the plaintiffs,
petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the
private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno
Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and
2 of the complaint.

Contrary to the theory of private respondents , there is no

justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the
Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence.
 31

Well-entrenched is the doctrine that

article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence,

but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.

As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill. The same doctrine was echoed
in the case of Andamo v. IAC

Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code
applies only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia
v. CA , and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-
delicto.

However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been

construed to include

bodily injuries causing death

not the crime of physical injuries defined in

It is
the Revised Penal Code.
It includes not only physical injuries but also

consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide

Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action may
be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, i

It must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is
charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant
Therefore, in this
in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
 32

Private respondents also contend that their liability

is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that
they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a
security guard.

It having been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners
may proceed directly against Torzuela and the
private respondents.
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused
by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer

● either in the selection of the servant or employee,

● or in supervision over him after selection or both.

The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is

direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee

Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employee.

Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are
intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to
dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of
attendant negligence attributable to private respondents
 33

Sps. CRISTINO & BRIGIDA IO et al vs. CA et al ( In the case at bar, although

there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of
abuse of right. )
G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996
REGALADO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected
thereon situated at Taguig Said property may be described to be surrounded by
other immovables pertaining to defendants herein.

When said property was purchased by Mabasa, he saw that there had been built
an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said
adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property
which is also along the first passageway.

Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in
such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. Defendant Ma. Cristina
Santos testified that she constructed said fence because

there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled
by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway.

1982, for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa
against Petitioners Cristino io et al before RTC Pasig. RTC ruled in favor of
Respondents but not awarded damages.

CA affirmed RTC with modification, hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay

plaintiffs-appellants the sum P65K as as Actual Damages, P30K as Moral
Damages,, P10K as Exemplary Damages. Petitoner’s MR denied hence the case at
bar.

Issue: Whether the award of damages is in order?

 34

Held: NO!

We agree with petitioners that th e Court of Appeals erred in awarding

damages in favor of private respondents.

The award of damages has no substantial legal basis.

A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of
damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff,

Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when

the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the
passageway.

However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not
give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the
recovery of damages, there must be both

1. a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant,

2. and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom.

Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong Danum absque Injuria, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury.

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;

Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and

Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the

damage suffered.
 35

Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the

loss or harm was not the result of a violation of

a legal duty.

These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries

of which he complains, he must establish that

such injuries resulted from a breach of duty

which the defendant owed to the plaintiff
a concurrence of

● injury to the plaintiff and

● legal responsibility by the person causing it.

The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that

an individual was injured in contemplation of

law.

breach of some duty and the

Thus, there must first be the
imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded;
it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the
plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.
 36

Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which
cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other
person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone.

The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount
to a legal injury or wrong.

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that
act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum
et injuria.
If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or
loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or
omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as
damnum absque injuria

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary
to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to
have violated the principle of abuse of right.

In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code
can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur:

(1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is

contrary to morals, good customs or public policy;

(2) The acts should be willful; and

(3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.15

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within

their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners,

hence not contrary to morals, good customs or

public policy.
 37

The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law.

It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their

property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that

"(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls,
ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon."

the lot was not subject to

At the time of the construction of the fence,
any servitudes. There was no easement of way
existing in favor of private respondents, either by
law or by contract.
The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is
confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in
their favor after payment of just compensation.

It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty
on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.

Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their
property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they
may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right.

To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private

respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by
petitioners is damnum absque injuria.
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his
pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied.
 38

As a general rule, therefore, there is

no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own
property in a lawful and proper manner,

although such acts incidentally

cause damage or an unavoidable
loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque
injuria.

When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which
the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can

because the incovenience arising

complain of having been injured,

from said use can be considered as a mere

consequence of community life.
 39

Pedro Elcano et al vs. REGINALD HILL et al ( Therefore, under the proposed

Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for
civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-
delict or 'culpa aquiliana )
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
BARREDO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Appeal from the order of CFI QC. in Civil Case 02 dismissing, upon motion to
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from
defendant Reginald Hill and his father Marvin Hill, for the killing by Reginald of the
son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted,
the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal,
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the acquittal in the criminal case constitutes res judicata on the Civil
case for recovery of Damages?

Held: NO!

in Barredo vs. Garcia penned bu Justice Bocobo,

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist.
come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action
of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been
the subject of a criminal action.

And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action

under article 1902 of the Civil Code.

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of
the child was punishable by the Penal Code.

Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a

proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil
liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code.
 40

Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito

or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized,

even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime

Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,

acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on

reasonable doubt or not,

shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not

for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-
delict or 'culpa aquiliana'
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the

offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also

criminally, to recover damages on both scores , and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.
 41

We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes

voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
It results, therefore, that the

acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not

extinguished his liability for quasi-delict,

hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant

action against him.
 42

MACARIO TAMARGO et al vs. CA et al ( In the instant case, the shooting of

Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still
lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual y
of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages )
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
FELICIANO, J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years old, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her
death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed before RTC Vigan by
petitioners against

spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc,

respondent
Adelberto's natural parents

with whom he was living at the time of the tragic

incident.
In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto Bundoc. however, was acquitted
and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without
discernment.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. petition for
adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had
shot and killed Jennifer.

In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents,

reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that

not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action

since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment
the successful petition for adoption was filed.
 43

Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually
living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been
relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
Trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents
of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.

Issue: Whether the Natural Parents are indispensible parties even if petition for
adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and
killed Jennifer?

Held: YES!

It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer

Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict
against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the

● father and,

● in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,

for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives
with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
 44

This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently

designated as

● vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed

negligence" under Anglo-American tort law,

where a person is

● not only liable for torts committed by himself,

● but also for torts committed by others with

whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible.

Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of

the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority —
which includes the

● instructing,
● controlling and
● disciplining of the child.

The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco
v. Manila Railroad Co in the following terms:

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with
them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the
Civil Code upon such parents.

The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their
legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their y and control.
 45

Parental liability is, in other words,

anchored upon parental authority

presumed parental dereliction in the

coupled with
discharge of the duties accompanying such
authority.
The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be
overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured
when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto.

natural parents who had then

It would thus follow that the
actual y of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree
of adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses,
parental authority

was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of
the petition for adoption

that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc
spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for
Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.

Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
 46

The Court is not persuaded.

As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a
minor child is the

relationship existing between the parents and the minor child

living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents
exercise supervision and control.

Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:

Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil
Code.

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines has similarly insisted upon the
been in the
requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have
actual y of the parents sought to be held liable for
the ensuing damage
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened.

Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption
where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of
the adopted child.

In the instant case, however,

to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could
not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were
at the time in the United States and had no physical y over the child
Adelberto)

would be unfair and unconscionable.

 47

Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy
basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.

Put a little differently,

no presumption of parental dereliction on the

part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto
was not in fact subject to their control at the
time the tort was committed.
 48

PHILIPPINE RABBIT vs. Philam Forwarders ( We are of the opinion that those
terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from
the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish
version) is used in the sense of "employer"; Balingit himself may be regarded
as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc )
G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975
AQUINO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Philippine Rabbit Bus and Felix appealed on pure questions of law from the order of
CFI Tarlac dismissing their complaint against Archimedes J. Balingit.
dismissal was based on the ground that

Balingit as the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., which together

with Fernando Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages

in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, is not the manager of

an establishment contemplated in article 2180 of C.C.

the complaint for damages filed by the bus company against Phil-American alleged
that Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.

The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping,

● Pangalangan suffered injuries and

● the bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days,

thus depriving the company of earnings amounting to P8K. Among the defenses
interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's
employer.

Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the
bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. As already
stated, the lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus company and
its driver appealed.

Issue: Whether terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment

or enterprise" under Art. 2180 embrace the manager of a corporation owning a
 49

truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident
from which the damage arose?

Held: NO

We are of the opinion that those terms do not

include the manager of a corporation.
It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager"
("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer".

Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual

liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned

he himself may be regarded as an

because
employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
 50

FILAMER vs. IAC et al ( Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the
act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in
behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial
duties; petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising
from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. )
G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner
Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was
assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each
school day.

Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan

Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on
his way home one late afternoon. place where Allan lives is also the house of his
father,. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while
he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.

According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them
so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard
a sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to
check.

Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan
who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular
traffic, and hit him.

private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of

the decision rendered by this Court reviewing the appellate court's conclusion

that there exists an employer-employee relationship between the

petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha.

The private respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party shall have
recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of the
incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the
interest and for the benefit of the petitioner.
 51

Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the
knowledge of the school authorities.

Issue: Whether Funtecha and Allan Masa are liable for damages for the injuries
sustained by Potenciano?

Held: YES!

Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the
petitioner-school. He further said that there was no specific time for him to be off-
duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to
go back to school and then drive home using the same vehicle.

Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president
is an act in furtherance of
where both Allan and Funtecha reside
the interest of the petitioner-school.
Allan's job demands that

he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch

students in the morning of the next school day.

It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had

knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose .

Moreover, it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of
Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to undergo driving
lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms.

In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's
house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride .
Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own"

but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by
the petitioner school.
 52

Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking
over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which
act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was
done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties.

The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of
raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act
done by an employee,
● in furtherance of the interests of the employer or

● for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage.

Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the
act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by
answering the question of

whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident

performing any act in furtherance of his master's business.

Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The
Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III
of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student
of a school and against the school itself.

There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-
contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless
imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal
fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over
(him)."

Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an

official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held
responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at
the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner.
 53

Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the
scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting
the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the
selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him.

he Court reiterates that supervision includes the

● formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its employees
and

● the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public
and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees.

In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules
and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control
over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the
Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle.
Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or
warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the
driver.

The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury

arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the
vehicle.

In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the
vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees.
 54

JOSE Amadora et al vs. CA et al ( As long as it can be shown that the student is

in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues; In sum, the
Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable )
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
CRUZ, J. En Banc

Facts:
Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises while they
were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo , ending
all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old.

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. herein petitioners, as

the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the
C.C. against the

● Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos,

● its rector the high school principal,
● the dean of boys, and
● the physics teacher,

CFI Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P290K.
On appeal before CA the decision was reversed and all the defendants were
completely absolved .

Petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then
under the y of the private respondents.

Private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school
only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no
longer in their y because the semester had already ended.

Issue: Whether school and principal are liabale for damages under Art 2180 C.C. on
the ground that victim was in the y of the school to submit project?
 55

Held: NO!!

It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the
school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he has
already registered and thus placed himself under its rules.

Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of
classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied for
completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term papers, clearances
and the like.

During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary

authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether
from observance of its rules.

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in

pursuance of

● a legitimate student objective,

● in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even
● in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student privilege,

the responsibility of the school authorities over the student

continues. During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who
must answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that the parents are
responsible for the child when he is in their y.

It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present
and in a position to prevent it.

y does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers
more to the

● influence exerted on the child and the

● discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence.

 56

Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the
parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed
within the premises of the school at any time when
its authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed
to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on
the school itself.

If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the
acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of
respondeat superior,

but then it may exculpate itself from liability by

proof that it had exercised the diligence of a
bonus paterfamilias.

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following
conclusions:

1. Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the y of the authorities of
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes
had formally ended.

It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics

experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that
he was there for a legitimate purpose.

2. Rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined.

Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body
and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in
charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its
discipline.
 57

3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no

showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that
he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or
condoned their non-observance.

4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys

who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he
had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and
returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting
the matter to higher authorities.

While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions
does not necessarily link him to the
from the school, it
shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that
he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.

5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-

Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because
only the

● teacher or

● the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice.

Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other
private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged
with the y of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his
duties in connection with such y.

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of
the principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for
the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's
death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972.

While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the
tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend
them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the
law they have invoked.
 58

Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article

2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting
positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable

for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as
they remain in their y.

Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been
directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in
Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning.

The parties herein have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article
2180 covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and
trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its y."

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that

the provision in question should apply to all

schools, academic as well as non-academic.

Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in

nature,

responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision.

This is the general rule.

In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head

thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.
 59

In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students

school is technical in nature, in which case it

except where the
is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis

● "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and

● "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."

There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and

the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned.

The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control
and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching.

These questions, though, may be asked:

If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts
why is it the head of the school
committed by his students,
only who is held liable where the injury is
caused in a school of arts and trades?
And in the case of the academic or non- technical school, why not
apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the
liability only on the teacher?
 60

The fact that historically the head of the school of arts and
trades
exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic
school.

The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans
apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft.

The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was
personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even boarded
with him and so came under his constant control, supervision and influence.

The head of the academic school was

not as involved with his students and exercised only

administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons
directly dealing with the students.

The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship
with the students.

Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the
head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be
so blamed.
 61

Coca Cola vs. CA & LYDIA GERONIMO ( The vendor could likewise be liable for
quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon
may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing
contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the
law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict,
i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict )
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J. 1st Div.

Facts:
Lydia L. Geronimo private respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner with RTC Dagupan.

She alleges in her complaint that some parents of the students complained to her
that the

Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and
other foreign substances or particles;

he then went over her stock of softdrinks and discovered the presence of
some fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke bottles
and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle;

DOH, informed her that the samples she submitted "are adulterated;" as a
consequence of the discovery of the foreign substances in the beverages, her sales
of soft drinks severely plummeted

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and prescription. trial court granted the motion to
dismiss.

It also stated that the complaint is based on a contract, and not on quasi-delict,
as there exists pre-existing contractual relation between the parties; thus, on the
basis of Article 1571, in relation to Article 1562, the complaint should have been filed
within six months from the delivery of the thing sold. MR denied

CA reversed RTC, complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not for breach of
warranty as respondent contends, the applicable prescriptive period is four years.
Coke’MR denied hence the present petition.
 62

Issue: Whether whether the subsequent action for damages should be treated
as one for quasi-delict, as held by the public respondent, which can be filed
within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code ?

Held: YES!

We find no merit in the petition.

The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action in Civil Case No. D-9629
is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil
Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations
in the complaint,
more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and
negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption."

The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against
not limited to
hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are
those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code
which provides:

The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict

under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by
the vendee.

While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a
general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict,

the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e.,

the acts which breaks the contract may also be
a quasi-delict.
 63

Thus, in Singson vs. BPI this Court stated:

We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract

between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by
the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.

Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent

case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso,

involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi first-class ticket, had

been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and
compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment,

was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the
ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between
the passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and
nature

the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.

Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of
contractual relations. 20

Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-

causing products may be based on

● negligence,
● breach of warranty,
● tort, or
● other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is

known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-
contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not
identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only
negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery,
false imprisonment and deceit.

It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the public respondent
should by no means be understood as suggesting that the private respondent's
claims for moral damages have sufficient factual and legal basis.
 64

BERNARDINO JIMENEZ vs. Manila & CA ( In the case at bar, there is no

question that the Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and
Operating Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated
Corporation remained under the control of the former; Thus the negligence of
the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered, the City is
therefore liable for the injury suffered by the petitioner. )
G.R. No. 71049 May 29, 1987
PARAS, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Petitioner Bernardino went to Sta. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at the time
when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. After purchasing the
"bagoong" he turned around to return home but he stepped on an uncovered
opening which could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater,

causing a dirty and rusty four- inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered
opening, to pierce the left leg of plaintiff-petitioner penetrating to a depth
of about one and a half inches.

He felt ill and developed fever and he had to be carried to Dr. Juanita Mascardo. He
was then rushed to the Veterans Memorial Hospital where he had to be confined for
twenty (20) days due to high fever and severe pain.

Upon his discharge from the hospital, he had to walk around with crutches for fifteen
(15) days. His injury prevented him from attending to the school buses he is
operating.

Petitioner sued for damages the

1. City of Manila and the

2. Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Ana Public
Market had been placed by virtue of a Management and Operating Contract

RTC dismissed complaint. CA held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable for
damages but absolved respondent City of Manila. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether CA erred in not ruling that respondent City of Manila should be
jointly and severally liable with Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the injuries
petitioner suffered?
 65

Held: YES!

Petition is impressed with merit.

Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be held liable for the injuries
sustained by the petitioner because under the Management and Operating Contract,
Asiatic Integrated Corporation assumed all responsibility for damages which may be
suffered by third persons for any cause attributable to it.

It has also been argued that the City of Manila cannot be held liable under Article 1,
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 as amended (Revised Charter of Manila) which
provides:

The City shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or
property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any
other City Officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter,

or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal

Board, or any other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions.

Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides
that:

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the

● death of, or

● injuries suffered by any person

by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings

and other public works under their control or
supervision.
constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities ...
liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" —
specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision."
 66

In other words, Art. 1, sec. 4, R.A. No. 409 refers to liability arising from negligence,
in general, regardless of the object, thereof,

while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due to

"defective streets, public buildings and other public works" in
particular and is therefore decisive on this specific case.

In the same suit, the Supreme Court clarified further that under Article 2189 of the
Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach, that the
defective public works belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted.

What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality

has either "control or supervision" over the public
building in question.
The contention of respondent City of Manila that

petitioner should not have ventured to go to Sta. Ana Public

Market during a stormy weather

is indeed untenable.
As observed by respondent Court of Appeals, it is an error for the trial court to
attribute the negligence to herein petitioner. More specifically stated, the findings of
appellate court are as follows:

The trial court even chastised the plaintiff for going to market on a rainy day
just to buy bagoong. A customer in a store has the right to
assume that the owner will comply with his duty to keep the
premises safe for customers.

If he ventures to the store on the basis of such assumption and is injured

because the owner did not comply with his duty, no negligence can be
imputed to the customer.
 67

As adefense against liability on the basis of a quasi-

delict, one must have exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family. (Art. 1173 of the Civil Code).
There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of Manila to exercise reasonable
care to keep the public market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for
their marketing needs.

While it may be conceded that the fulfillment of such duties is extremely difficult
during storms and floods, it must however, be admitted that ordinary precautions
could have been taken

during good weather to minimize the dangers to life and limb

under those difficult circumstances.

For instance, the drainage hole could have been placed under the stalls instead of
on the passage ways. Even more important is the fact, that the City should have
seen to it that the openings were covered. Sadly, the evidence indicates that long
before petitioner fell into the opening, it was already uncovered, and five (5) months
after the incident happened, the opening was still uncovered.

To recapitulate, it appears evident that the City of Manila is likewise liable for
damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, respondent City having retained
control and supervision over the Sta. Ana Public Market and as tort-feasor under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts

Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no openings in the middle of the
passageways and if any, that they were adequately covered. Had the opening been
covered, petitioner could not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City
of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered, the City is
therefore liable for the injury suffered by the peti- 4 petitioner.
 68

JOSE DINGCONG vs. HALIM KANAAN et al ( Jose Dingcong, on the other hand,
did not practice the diligence of a good parent to prevent these damages,
despite the fact that he knew that they could be caused by the pipes being
repaired, because, presuming that Echavarria could use the tap, he did not I
provide some container with drain, and if you just put under it a basin that,
when filled )
G.R. No. L-47033 April 25, 1941
AVANCEÑA, J. En Banc

Facts:
According to the decision of CA brothers Loreto Dingcong Owner and Jose
Dingcong Manager are co-executives of the house of Emilia Saenz where they
established the Central Hotel. The defendant Francisco Echevarria occupied, by
payment of P30/month fourth No. 10 of said hotel.

The plaintiffs were filming, in turn, the basement of this hotel where they had
established their "American Bazaar" dedicated to the purchase and sale of items and
items. Echevarria, when retiring to bed , left carelessly open the tap that
gave on an ordinary basin without drainage. As the hotel pipes at that
time were under repair,

This action was filed by Halim Kanaan, Nasri Kanaan and Michael Kanaan on
behalf of the name of the "American Bazaar" against Loreto Dingcong, Jose
Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria for damages caused to the plaintiffs.

CFI condemned Francisco Echevarria,, absolving Jose Dingcong. CA reversed CFI.

Declared Jose Dingcong responsible and ordered him to pay the plaintiffs the
amount of the damages

Issue: Whether Jose Dingcong is liable for damage suffered by respondents based
on tort?

Held: YES!

Being Jose Dingcong co-tenant and managerof the hotel, with full possession of the
house's tops, must respond for damages caused by things that were thrown or
dropped from it (article 1910 of the Civil Code).
 69

Francisco Echevarria was a guest of the hotel and he was the one who directly, by
his carelessness, when leaving the tap open, allowed the water in the pipe to drain
through the floor and seep into the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise of
the plaintiffs.

Jose Dingcong, on the other hand, did not practice the diligence of a good parent to
prevent these damages, despite the fact that he knew that they could be caused by
the pipes being repaired, because, presuming that Echavarria could use the tap, he
did not I provide some container with drain, and if you just put under it a basin that,
when filled,

The decision appealed is confirmed, with the costs to the appellant.

 70

Concept, Principles and Rules of Negligence

U.S. vs. TEODORO JUANILLO ( Negligence of the defendant in the case at bar
consisted in his failure to recognize the great injury that would accrue to the
deceased from the collision; He had no right, it seems to us, after he saw the
deceased and his companions walking in the road ahead of him to continue at
so great a speed, at the eminent hazard of colliding with the deceased )
G.R. No. L-7255 October 3, 1912
TRENT, J. En Banc

Facts:
Ponciano Leal was killed on the public highway while going from the town of Pavia
to Santa Barbara, by being struck by an automobile, of which the appellant was the
chauffeur.

The contention of the prosecution is that the death of the deceased was due to the
reckless insists that the unfortunate occurrence was purely an accident

Issue: Whether appellant Teodoro is liable for damages for the death of Leal on
basis of quasi-delict?

Held:

Negligence is

Want of care required by the circumstances.

It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its

application depends upon the situation of the parties , and the degree
of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose.

Where the danger is great a high degree of care is necessary,

and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.

The operator of an automobile is bound to exercise care in proportion to the varying

danger and risks of the highway and commensurate with the dangers naturally
incident to the use of such vehicle.

He is obliged to take notice of the conditions before him, and if it is apparent that by
any particular method of proceeding he is liable to work an injury,
 71

Negligence of the defendant in the case at bar consisted in his failure to

recognize the great injury that would accrue to the deceased from the
collision.

He had no right, it seems to us, after he saw the deceased and his companions
walking in the road ahead of him to continue at so great a speed, at the eminent
hazard of colliding with the deceased.

Great care was due from him by reason of the deadliness of the machine he was
propelling along the highway. When one comes through the highways with a
machine of such power as an automobile, it is incumbent upon the driver to use
great care not to drive against or over pedestrians.

An automobile is much more dangerous than a street car or even a railway car.
These are propelled along the fixed rails and all the traveling public has to do to be
safe is to keep off the track. But the automobile can be turned as easily as an
individual, and for this reason is far more dangerous to the traveling public than
either the street car or the railway train.

We do not feel at liberty, under the evidence, to say that this defendant was free
from reckless negligence.

In failing to so check the speed of his machine when he saw the deceased in front of
him to give him sufficient control to avert the injury or to stop it entirely, when he
knew that if he continued at the same speed at which he was going he would collide
with the deceased, not only shows negligence but reckless negligence in a marked
degree.
 72

PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD ( there still was a duty on

the part of Corliss to stop his jeep to avoid a collision and that
Teodorico Capili, who drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at the time
of the accident. For one cannot just single out circumstance and then
confidently assign to it decisive weight and significance )
G.R. No. L-21291 March 28, 1969
FERNANDO, J. En Banc

Facts:
witness of the plaintiff said that said jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing,
that it made a brief stop but that it did not stop — dead stop. Elaborating, he
declared that while it was slowing down, Corliss Jr. shifted into first gear and that
was what he meant by a brief stop.

He also testified that he could see the train coming from the direction of San
Fernando and that he heard a warning but that it was not sufficient enough to avoid
the accident."

main witness "testified that before the locomotive, which had been previously
inspected and found to be in good condition approached, the crossing, that is, about
300 meters away, he blew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the
regulations until he saw the jeep suddenly spurt and that although the
locomotive was running between 20 and 25 kilometers an hour and although he
had applied the brakes, the jeep was caught in the middle of the tracks."

Lower court when it dismissed the complaint for recovery of damages filed by
plaintiff-appellant, Preciolita Corliss whose husband, the late Ralph Corliss, died,
when the jeep he was driving collided with a locomotive of defendant-appellee
Manila Railroad Company. lower court, after summarizing the evidence, concluded
that the

deceased "in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the oncoming locomotive,

took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he
became the victim of his own miscalculation."

Negligence imputed to defendant-appellee was thus ruled out by the lower court,
fails to
satisfactory proof to that effect. An examination of the evidence of record
yield a basis for a reversal of the decision appealed
from. We affirm.
 73

Issue: Whether Manila rail road is liable for damages for the death of victim on the
ground that it was negligent in its operation of the locomotive?

Held: NO!

On this ground alone we can rest the affirmance of the judgment appealed from.

This action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is under
obligation to pay for the damage done. 9 Unless it could be satisfactorily shown,
therefore, that defendant-appellee was guilty of negligence then it could not be held
liable.

The crucial question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.

Negligence was defined by us;

The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of

another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury."

"Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a

relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably require.

Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances."

no negligence could be imputed to

To repeat, by such a test,
defendant-appellee, and the action of plaintiff-appellee must necessary
fail. The facts being what they are, compel the conclusion that the liability sought to
be fastened on defendant-appellee had not arisen.
 74

The first two assigned errors would make much of the failure of the lower court to
hold that the crossing bars not having been put down and there being no guard at
the gate-house,

there still was a duty on the part of Corliss to stop his jeep to avoid
a collision and that Teodorico Capili, who drove the engine, was not qualified to
do so at the time of the accident. For one cannot just single out circumstance and
then confidently assign to it decisive weight and significance

What Justice Cardozo announced would merely emphasize what was set forth
earlier that each and every, case on questions of negligence is to be decided in
accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be
no hard and fast rule.

There must be that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the situation demands. Thus defendant-appellee acted. It is undeniable then
that no negligence can rightfully be imputed to it.
 75

AMADOR Ong vs. METROPOLITAN WATER ( And while all these efforts were being
made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however
came late because upon examining the body he found him to be already dead. All of
the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is humanly possible under the
circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it
liable for his death )
G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J. En Banc

FActs:
Defendant owns and operates recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters, Q.C.
The main pool it between two small pools of oval shape known as the "Wading pool"
"Beginners Pool." There are diving boards in the big pools
and the
and the depths of the water at different parts are indicated by
appropriate marks on the wall.

The care and supervision of the pools and the users thereof is entrusted to a
recreational section composed of Simeon Chongco as chief, Armando Rule, a male
nurse, and six lifeguards who had taken the life-saving course given by the
Philippine Red Cross at the YMCA in Manila.

Defendant has also on display in a conspicuous place certain rules and regulations
governing the use of the pools, one of which prohibits the swimming in the pool
alone or without any attendant. Although defendant does not maintain a full-time
physician in the swimming pool compound, it has however a nurse and a sanitary
inspector ready to administer injections or operate the oxygen resuscitator if the
need should arise.

In the afternoon of July 1952, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student
and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to defendant's
swimming pools. This was not the first time that the three brothers had gone to
said natatorium for they had already been there four or five times before.

Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an
adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and
Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they
did not see the latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of coke.

In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the pool compound,
namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva.

● Abaño was from 8:00 to 12:00 in the morning and from 2:00 to 6:00

● Villanueva from 7:30 to 11:30 a.m. and from 12:30 to 4:30 p.m.
 76

Between 4:00 to 5:00 that afternoon, there were about twenty bathers inside the pool
area and Manuel Abaño was going around the pools to observe the bathers in
compliance with the instructions of his chief.

Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area informed a bather
by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that s omebody was swimming under
water for quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of
the same happening

and Abaño immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved the
apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom. body was placed at the
edge of the pool and Abaño immediately applied manual artificial respiration.

Meanwhile, Abaño continued the artificial manual respiration, and when this
failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were
exhausted. Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao arrived with another resuscitator, but
the same became of no use because he found the boy already
dead. The doctor ordered that the body be taken to the clinic.

death was due to asphyxia by submersion in water.

Plaintiffs spouses seek to recover from defendant, a GOCC damages for the death
of their son Dominador Ong in one of the swimming pools operated by defendant.

lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the
complaint. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the
negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover
damages?
 77

Held: NO!

we may quote the following authorities cited in the decision of the trial court:

"The rule is well settled that the

owners of resorts to which people generally are expressly or by

implication invited are legally bound to exercise ordinary care and prudence in
the management and maintenance of such resorts, to the end of making them
reasonably safe for visitors"

"Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron,

resulting from lack of ordinary care in providing for his safety, without the fault
of the patron,

he is not, however, in any sense deemed to be the insurer of

the safety of patrons.

And the death of a patron within his premises does not cast upon him the
burden of excusing himself from any presumption of negligence"

appellee has taken all

there is sufficient evidence to show that
necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its
patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown
that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing
line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit.

The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility.
There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and
regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who
are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued
certificates of proficiency.

These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a
way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers.
There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen
resuscitator.

And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency.
 78

The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was
retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees of appellee
did everything possible to bring him back to life.

Thus, after he was placed at the edge of the pool, lifeguard Abaño immediately gave
him manual artificial respiration. Soon thereafter, nurse Armando Rule arrived,
followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who brought with him an oxygen
resuscitator. When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector
immediately injected him with camphorated oil.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the
record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming
pool.

The only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that
he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on
nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved.

The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the

negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the

negligence of defendant

where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence. Or,

"As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident , notwithstanding
the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is
imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences of the accident."

law is that a person who has the last clear chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the of other party.
 79

Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being
apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one
of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools,

and it appearing that lifeguard Abao responded to the call for help as soon as his
attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the
disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life,

it is clear that there is no room for the

application of the doctrine now invoked by
appellants to impute liability to appellee.

The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered;
 80

HEDY Yu vs. CA & People ( Emergency Rule; Petitioner certainly could not
be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal
conditions. The danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent,
She had no opportunity for
threatening her very existence.
rational thinking but only enough time to heed the
very powerfull instinct of self-preservation )
G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988
FERNAN, C.J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the

defendant Yu swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of

the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross
the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the
parked jeepney.

The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear
of the parts truck ahead of it. The

● pedestrian was injured, the

● Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the
● jeep suffered damages on its rear and front paints, and
● the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear.

Old dead on arrival at the hospital. trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the of- offense charged. CA affirmed RTC with
modification.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Petitioner is negligent in causeing the death of victim?

 81

Held: NO!

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:

Would a prudent man in the position of the

person to whom negligence is attributed

foresee harm to the person injured as a

reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued?
If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to take precaution against
its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.

A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the

Emergency Rule. "Under that rule,

● one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger,

● and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger,

is not guilty of negligence,

if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have
been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence."

we find the petitioner not

Applying the above test to the case at bar,
guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in
Homicide.
 82

The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said:

The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going
in the opposite direction followed by another which overtook the first by
passing towards its left.

She should not only have swerved the car she was driving to the right
but should have also tried to stop or lessen her speed so that she would
not bump into the pedestrian who was crossing at the time but also the
jeepney which was then parked along the street.

The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were
it not for the fact that such suggestion did not take into account the
amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation she was
in.

For it is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient

time for appellant to analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder
on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to
herself and to others.

Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution with
respect to the relative distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the
oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove that petitioner did have
sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to swerve her
car to the light without stepping on her brakes.

The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own evidence, we cannot but
deem its veracity to have been admitted by it. Thus, under the circumstances
narrated by petitioner, we find that the appellate court is asking too much from a
mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best
judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the
driver of the overtaking vehicle.
 83

Petitioner certainly could not be expected to act with all the

coolness of a person under normal conditions. The danger confronting
petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence.

She had no opportunity for rational thinking but

only enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct
of self-preservation.
 84

AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH ( Kalesa and Car; it was his duty either to
bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons
on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the
horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran
straight on until he was almost upon the horse )
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
STREET, J. En Banc

Facts:
It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony
over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve
miles per hour.

As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn
to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had
taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to
him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.

Plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of
the bridge instead of going to the left.

He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient
time to get over to the other side.

When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting
across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the
right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing;

but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it
became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the
railing.

In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and
the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violence.
 85

From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the accident occurred
the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing of the
bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the
horse died.

Issue: Whether defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described
was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage
done?

Held: YES!!

we are of the opinion that he is so liable.

As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the
horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the
center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done;

and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross
with safety in front of the moving vehicle.

In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet
some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the
plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control
of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant;

and it was his duty either

● to bring his car to an immediate stop or,

● seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side
and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.

Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on

until he was almost upon the horse.
 86

He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet
exhibited fright.

But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the
animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get exited and jump
under the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the
horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established.
A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and
would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the
defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from
fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong
side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent;
and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible.

It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
negligence of the defendant succeeded the
since the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval.
Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
 87

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION et al vs. IAC & LEONARDO DIONISIO

we agree with the Court of First Instance
( Nonetheless,
and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and
proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful —
or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. )
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
FELICIANO, J: 1st Div.

FActs:
private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home at 1:30am. Dionisio was
driving his Volkswagen car and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street,
when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed.

He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck
looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and
registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was

● parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the
oncoming traffic.

● dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a
manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming
traffic.

● no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere
near the dump truck, front or rear.

The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando
U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer
Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning,

Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it
was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision,
Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial
scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.

Dionisio commenced an action for damages CFI Pampanga claiming that the legal
and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel
had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
 88

Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of
Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the
accident,

● while under the influence of liquor,

● without his headlights on and
● without a curfew pass.

Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and
supervision of the dump truck driver.

Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and
Carbonel. CA affirmed RTC, hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Phoenix and driver are both libale for damages on the ground that
the dump truck was not parked properly?

Held: YES!

we agree with the Court of First Instance

Nonetheless,
and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and
proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel.

Petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was

negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that
negligence was merely a "passive and static condition"

and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an

intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he
sustained.
 89

We have examined the record both before the trial court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court and we find that both parties had placed into the record sufficient
evidence on the basis of which the trial court and the appellate court could have and
should have made findings of fact relating to the alleged reckless manner in
which Dionisio drove his car that night.

No Curfew Pass
We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove
possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that
the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that
night.

The relevance of possession or non-possession of a curfew pass that night lies in

the light it tends to shed on the other related issues:

whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he had indeed

purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to
avoid detection and possibly arrest by the police in the nearby
police station for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid curfew
pass.

whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that

night
both the trial court and the appellate court were completely silent.

Patrolman Cuyno, witness, who was at the scene of the accident almost immediately
after it occurred, the police station where he was based being barely 200 meters
away.

Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident
told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its
headlights on.

Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was hearsay
and did not fag within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule
since the facts he testified to were not acquired by him through official information
and had not been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
Private respondent's objection fails to take account of the fact that the
testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records exception
 90

to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as part of the res gestae. Testimonial
evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of

● excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event

● sufficiently startling in nature

● so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the

observer and

● hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and not

the result of reflective thought.

We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a
stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to
evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers who
happened to be around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was
therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been
considered by the trial court.

Whether Dionisio purposely turned off his

headlights, or whether his headlights accidentally
malfunctioned, just moments before the accident.

It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his

headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by
the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not
far away from the intersection.

We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation

than that offered by private respondent Dionisio — i.e., that he had his headlights on
but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way
malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again
at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck.
 91

Whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the

accident.

We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that

Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute
his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence.

There simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he

had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his
judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware that "one shot or two" of hard
liquor may affect different people differently.

The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that
private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night
of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he
should have been.

Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna

and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked
askew and sticking out onto the road lane.

we agree with the Court of First Instance

Nonetheless,
and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
● legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the

wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump

truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel.
collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a
"passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and
efficient cause.
 92

The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without
any warning lights or reflector devices.

The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for
anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the
truck driver must be held responsible.

The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be
absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence

because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence
which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck
driver's own wrongful act or omission.

To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the

fundamental principle of law that

a man must respond for the forseeable

consequences of his own negligent act or omission.
Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in
society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the
petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the

part of his employer Phoenix 16 in supervising its employees properly and
adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion,
that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence.

The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to
his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning,

when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise
the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises,
is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
 93

GLAN PEOPLE'S LUMBER et al vs. IAC et al ( The evidence not only acquits
Zacarias of any negligence in the matter; there are also quite a few significant
indicators that it was rather Engineer Calibo's negligence that was the
proximate cause of the accident. )
G.R. No. 70493 May 18, 1989
NARVASA, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
Engineer Orlando Calibo et al were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan
Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from the
South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City 1:45 pm.

At about that time, the cargo track, loaded with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood,
driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, coming from the opposite
direction of Davao City and bound for Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed
said bridge.

At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the
jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died
while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt.

1979, the instant case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children
Eng. Calibo against the driver and owners of the cargo truck Glan’s Lumber before
CFI Bohol.

CFI ruled that plaintiffs failed to establish by preponderance of evidence the

negligence, and thus the liability, of the defendants." Accordingly, the Court
dismissed the complaint.

CA reversed decision ruled in favor of plaintiff, stating that Zacarias to be negligent

on the basis of the following circumstances, he "did not drive his truck back to
his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming jeep . . .;"

what is worse, "the truck driver suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew
that he was still within the lane of the jeep

Zacarias' negligence "gave rise to the presumption of negligence on

the part of his employer, and their liability is both primary and solidary.. Hence
the case at bar.
 94

Issue: Whether Zacaria is liable for damages on the ground of his negligence that he
"did not drive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming
jeep?

Held: NO!

The finding that "the truck driven by defendant Paul Zacarias occupied the
lane of the jeep when the collision occurred"

is a loose one, based on nothing more than the showing that at the
time of the accident, the truck driven by Zacarias had edged over the painted center
line of the road into the opposite lane by a width of twenty-five (25) centimeters.

It ignores the fact that by the uncontradicted evidence, the actual center line of the
road was not that indicated by the painted stripe but, according to measurements
made and testified by Patrolman Juanita one of the two officers who investigated the
accident, correctly lay thirty-six (36) centimeters farther to the left of the truck's side
of said stripe.

Thus, although it was not disputed that the truck overrode the painted stripe by
twenty-five (25) centimeters, it was still at least eleven (11) centimeters away from its
side of the true center line of the road and well inside its own lane
when the accident occurred.
Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that Paulino Zacarias had acted
negligently in applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his lane upon
qqqespying the approaching jeep. Being well within his own lane, as has
already been explained, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeep's
way as said Court would have had him do

The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any negligence in the matter; there are
also quite a few significant indicators that it was rather Engineer Calibo's negligence
that was the proximate cause of the accident.
 95

Zacarias had told Patrolman Dimaano at the scene of the collision and later
confirmed in his written statement at the police headquarters that the jeep had been
"zigzagging," which is to say that it was travelling or
being driven erratically at the time.
The other investigator, Patrolman Jose Esparcia, also testified that eyewitnesses to
the accident had remarked on the jeep's "zigzagging."

There is moreover more than a suggestion that

Calibo had been drinking shortly before the
accident.
The decision of the Trial Court adverts to further testimony of Esparcia to the effect
that three of Calibo's companions at the beach party he was driving home from
when the collision occurred, who, having left ahead of him went to the scene when
they heard about the accident, had said that there had been a drinking spree at the
party and, referring to Calibo, had remarked:

"Sabi na huag nang mag drive . . . . pumipilit,"

 96

Phil Rabbit vs. IAC & Casiano Pascua ( It cannot be said that the bus was
travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80
to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet
within the speed limit allowed in highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes
was
for not having avoided the collision proximate cause of the accident
the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune
and Carreon. Culpa Contractual )
G.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990
MEDIALDEA, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
11 am Decemeber 1966 , Catalina Pascua et al boarded the jeepney

● owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and

● driven by Tranquilino Manalo

bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas at their respective

homes.

Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the
jeepney was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. jeepney
practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western
lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north,
among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Rabbit driven by Tomas
delos Reyes

The bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of the
collision, three passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and
Adelaida Estomo) died while the other jeepney passengers sustained physical
injuries.

Complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before CFI Pangasinan.
Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and
Manalo on their contractual liability. As against Rabbit and delos
Reyes,

plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-

delict.
 97

1978, the trial court rendered its decision finding Manalo negligent,
breached contract of carriage with their passengers the plaintiffs' and/or their heirs,
and this Court renders judgment ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to
pay the plaintiffs.

CA reversed CFI finding delos Reyes negligent, ordering the Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver Tomas delos Reyes to pay the former jointly and
severally damages in amounts awarded

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether PHL Rabbit is liable for damages on the ground that its driver was
negligent in the course of his duties causing the death of victims?

Held: NO!

Misappreciation of the facts and evidence and the misapplication of the laws by the
respondent court warrant a reversal of its questioned decision and
resolution.

We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call
for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles.
It does not arise where

a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce

its contractual obligations.

On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the
cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. The above
discussion would have were it not for the
been correct
undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney
was abrupt.
The jeepney, which was then traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight,
skid mark of approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle,
making a skid mark of approximately 15 meters from the eastern shoulder to the
point of impact.
 98

delos Reyes could not have anticipated the

Hence,
sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. The respondent court did not realize
that the presumption was rebutted by this piece of evidence.

It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident
occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming
such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed
We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not
in highways.
having avoided the collision.
Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per hour at the
time of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45
meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos
Reyes would have covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little
time to react to the situation.

To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from
him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options
available to him.

After a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven evidence, We find that
was the negligence of Manalo
the proximate cause of the accident
and spouses Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise
the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.
 99

In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the

carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,

and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had
observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of
the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a
fortuitous event

The trial court was therefore right

Manalo and spouses Mangune and

in finding that
Carreon were negligent.
However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly and
severally liable with Manalo is erroneous

The driver cannot be held jointly and severally

liable with the carrier in case of breach of the
contract of carriage.

The rationale behind this is readily discernible.

Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the

passenger,

and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible

therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence
of his driver.

In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract
to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his.
 100

Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that
would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and
consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver, 5
contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181
of the New Civil Code.
 101

GEORGE MCKEE et al vs. IAC et al ( On the basis of the foregoing definition,

the test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no
negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary
prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving
the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to
take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane )
G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
DAVIDE, JR., J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred
(200) cavans of rice weighing about 10 kilos was traveling southward from Angeles
City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila.

The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San
Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern
approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side
of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and
forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back.

Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of
the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and
thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided
with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the
opposite lane, on the said bridge.

In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after the accident,
Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 kilometers) per hour.

As a consequence of the collision, (2) civil cases, were filed before CFI Pampanga.
said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a
vehicular accident which led to the deaths of

● Jose Koh,
● Kim Koh McKee and
● Loida Bondoc

and caused physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and
petitioner Araceli Koh McKee. private respondents are the owners of the cargo
truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben Galang was the driver of the
truck at the time of the accident.
 102

An Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence

Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property"
was filed with the trial court.

private respondents asserted in the Answer with counter claim that it was the Ford
Escort car which "invaded and bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven by Ruben
Galang.

Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the accused

Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal case. Judge Mario
Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2) civil cases and awarded the private
respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

CA affirmed conviction of Galang, MR denied. CA in relation to the 2 civil

cases, reversed RTC. Decision is anchored principally on the respondent
Court's findings that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence
which caused the accident.

MR of respondents was granted hence CA affirmed RTC. MR of petitioner was

denied. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Truck driver and company are liable based on quasi-delict on the
ground of their negligence which cause the death of victims?

Held: NO!!

In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact that the

● car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that

● the collision occurred in said lane

gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent.
On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately
concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate
cause of the collision.

This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the

petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because
as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two (2) boys darted across the road
from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.
 103

Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during cross examination.

Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to
avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril —

death or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can

hardly be classified as negligent.
Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Picart vs. Smith

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation?)

If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman

On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts obtaining
in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose
Koh.

Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man woul d have tried to avoid running
over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this
would mean entering the opposite lane.

Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take

particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane

● would be several meters away and

● could very well slow down,
● move to the side of the road and
● give way to the oncoming car.
 104

Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "

● one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger,

● and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger,

is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently

and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method , unless
the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence."

In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is

negligent,

itcannot be said that his negligence was the

proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause has been defined as:

that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any

efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred

Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at
all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events , it
cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and
deaths

sufficient intervening event, the

because of the occurrence of a
negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of
the tragedy.

The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the
collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow
down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane.
 105

Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far

right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the
given circumstances, the truck driver

● continued at full speed towards the car.

The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the
road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286
meters, in width

This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of
3.661 meters to spare.

The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records . He himself said that
his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the
bridge while the

maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per

hour.

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code,

a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the

mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
We cannot give credence to private respondents' claim that there was an error in the
translation by the investigating officer of the truck driver's response in Pampango as
to whether the speed cited was in kilometers per hour or miles per hour.

The law presumes that official duty has been regularly performed; unless there is
proof to the contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant case, private
respondents' claim is based on mere conjecture.
 106

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds
application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that
the

contributory negligence of the party injured will

not defeat the claim for damages
if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care
and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence
of the injured party.

person who had the last clear chance to

In such cases, the
avoid the mishap is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences thereof.

The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may
have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is
entitled to recovery.

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it was
the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid
the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision.

Liability of Employer/Owner

As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting
damages.
 107

The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee.
That presumption, however, is only juris tantum ( Rebuttable presumption
), not juris et de jure ( conclusive presumptions ).

Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage.

The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees. 60 The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases
Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove
it.

The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in
reversing the decision of the trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and
4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual
moorings.
 108

JUAN SYQUIA et al vs. CA & Manila Memorial ( There was no stipulation in

the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules and
Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would
be waterproof )
G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993
CAMPOS, JR., J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia and defendant-appellee, the former, father of
deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed defendant-appellee to
inter the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park.

The concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche
underground. plaintiffs-appellants discovered that the

concrete vault had a hole approximately three (3) inches in

diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing out the width of the vault
on one end

and that for a certain length of time (one hour, more or less), water
drained out of the hole;

because of the aforesaid discovery, plaintiffs-appellants became agitated

and upset with concern that the water which had collected inside the vault might
have risen as it in fact did rise, to the level of the coffin and flooded the same as well
as the remains of the deceased with ill effects thereto;

a. the interior walls of the concrete vault showed evidence of total flooding;

b. the coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt causing the wooden
parts to warp and separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located
directly above the head and torso of the deceased;

c. the entire lining of the coffin, the clothing of the deceased, and the exposed
parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled by the action of the
water and silt and were also coated with filth.

Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defendant-appellee of its
obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the remains of
the deceased and the coffin against the elements
 109

and in the because of defendant-appellee's gross

alternative,
negligence conformably to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code in failing to
seal the concrete vault, the complaint prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants Damages.

Trial Court dismissed complaint, held that the contract between the parties

did not guarantee that the cement vault would be

waterproof;
that there could be no quasi-delict because the

● defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence,

● and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the

Syquias and defendant Manila Memorial Park

It also noted that the father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite
knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to
keep the grass green and that water would eventually seep through the vault. The
trial court also accepted the explanation given by defendant for boring a
hole at the bottom side of the vault:

"The hole had to be bored through the concrete vault

because if it has no hole the vault will (sic) float and the grave would be filled
with water and the digging would caved (sic) in the earth, the earth would
caved (sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave."

CA affirmed RTC, MR of petitioners denied. Hence the case at bar.

At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the

act of boring a hole by private respondent on the vault

of the deceased kin of the bereaved petitioners. The latter allege that such act was
either a breach of private respondent's contractual obligation to provide a sealed
vault, or, in the alternative, a negligent act which constituted a quasi-
delict.
 110

Issue: Whether Manila Memorial was guilty of Tort?

Held: NO!

While this may be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa
aquiliana

for boring the hole on the vault?

It cannot be denied that the hole made possible the entry of more water and soil than
was natural had there been no hole.

The law defines negligence as the

"omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation

and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place."

In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to
be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good
father of a family.

The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act — boring of the
hole — negate the allegation of negligence.
The reason for the act was explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said
that:

when the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so
that water could come into the vault because it was raining heavily then
because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be filled
with water and the digging would caved (sic) in and the earth, the earth would
(sic) caved in and fill up the grave.
 111

Except for the foreman's opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a
heavy rainfall, from the above-mentioned explanation,

private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a

family

in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in
the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with earth.

Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find

no reason to award damages in favor of petitioners.

We are more inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the negative.

With respect to herein petitioners' averment that private respondent has
committed culpa aquiliana, the Court of Appeals found no negligent act on the part
of private respondent to justify an award of damages against it.

Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does

not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana,

We find no reason to disregard the respondent's

Court finding that there was no negligence.
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to
be send in the interment. Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of private respondent
provides that:

Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or
in an outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of which
shall be made by the employees of the Association.

a concrete vault was provided on July 27, 1978, the day before the interment, and
was, on the same day, installed by private respondent's employees in the grave
which was dug earlier. After the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid.
 112

Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private respondent was not
sealed, that is, not waterproof. Consequently, water seeped through the cement
enclosure and damaged everything inside it.

We do not agree.

There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual

Care and in the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
that the vault would be waterproof.
Private respondent's witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the term
"sealed" meant "closed."

Moreover, it is also quite clear that "sealed" cannot be equated

with "waterproof". Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the
contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties,
then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.

Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be
interpreted beyond their obvious intendment. 12 As ruled by the respondent Court:

We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation
to the Syquias.
 113

Espiritu vs. Philippine Power ( In the ordinary course of events, electric wires do
not part suddenly in fair weather and injure people, unless they are subjected
to unusual strain and stress or there are defects in their installation,
maintenance and supervision )
CA-G.R. No. 3-R, September 20, 1949
Justice J.B.L. Reyes

Facts:
While the plaintiff-appellee and other companions were loading grass between the
municipalities Laguna, with clear weather and without any wind blowing, an electric
transmission wire, installed and maintained by the defendant Philippine Power
alongside the road,

● suddenly parted, and

● one of the broken ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was about to board
the truck

As a result, plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400 volts carried by the wire and was
knocked unconscious to the ground. wounds that were not completely healed when
the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over one year after the mishap.

Defendant therein disclaimed liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
show any specific act of negligence, but the appellate court overruled the defense
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Issue: Whether defendant is liable for damages under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur?

Held: YES!

While it is the rule, as contended by the appellant, that

in case of noncontractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof

is on the plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of his injury was the
negligence of the defendant,
 114

it is also a recognized principal that

● "where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person,

● is under the exclusive control of the defendant and

● the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he
having such control use proper care,

it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury
arose from defendant's want of care."

And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed
due care and diligence.

This rule is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself),
and is peculiarly applicable to the case at bar, where it is unquestioned that the
plaintiff had every right to be on the highway, and the electric wire was under the
sole control of defendant company.

In the ordinary course of events, electric wires do not part suddenly in fair weather
and injure people, unless they are subjected to unusual strain and stress or there are
defects in their installation, maintenance and supervision;

just as barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure
passersby, unless some one was negligent.

Consequently, in the absence of contributory negligence (which is admittedly not

present), the

fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of

negligence in its installation, care and maintenance.

Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock, "if there are any facts inconsistent
with negligence, it is for the defendant to prove."
 115

Juan Nakpil & Sons et al vs. CA et al ( defects in the construction and in the
plans and specifications were the proximate causes that rendered the PBA
building unable to withstand the earthquake )
G.R. No. L-47851 October 3, 1986
PARAS, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Philippine Bar Association decided to construct an office building on its 840 square
meters lot located at Intramuros Manila. The construction was undertaken by the
United Construction, Inc. on an "administration" basis, on the suggestion of Juan J.
Carlos, the president and general manager of said corporation.

Proposal was approved by plaintiff’s board of directors and signed by its president
Roman Ozaeta, a third-party defendant in this case. The plans and specifications for
the building

were prepared by the other third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons.

Building was completed in June, 1966.

1968 2 years after, an unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and its environs and
the building in question sustained major damage.

● Front columns of the building buckled,

causing the building to tilt forward dangerously.

The tenants vacated the building in view of its precarious condition. As a temporary
remedial measure, the building was shored up by United Construction, Inc. at the
cost of P13K.

Plaintiff commenced this action for the recovery of damages arising from the partial
collapse of the building against United Construction and its President Juan Carlos.
Plaintiff alleges that the

A. collapse of the building was accused by defects in the construction,

B. the failure of the contractors to follow plans and specifications and
C. violations by the defendants of the terms of the contract.

Defendants in turn filed a third-party complaint against the architects who prepared
the plans and specifications, alleging in essence that the collapse of the building was
 116

due to the defects in the said plans and specifications. building was authorized to be
demolished at the expense of the plaintiff,

Commissioner found that while the damage sustained by the PBA building was
caused directly by the August 2, 1968 earthquake whose magnitude was estimated
at 7.3 they were also caused by the defects in the plans and specifications prepared
by the third-party defendants' architects,

● deviations from said plans and specifications by the defendant contractors

and

● failure of the latter to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction of

the building and

● Failure of the contractors, architects and even the owners to exercise the
requisite degree of supervision in the construction of subject building.

Trial court agreed with the findings of the Commissioner except as to the holding that
the owner is charged with full nine supervision of the construction. CA affirmed RTC.

Hence the case at bar.

Nakpils claimed that it was an act of God that caused the failure of the building which
should exempt them from responsibility and not the defective construction,

Issue: Whether Nakpils & Sons, third-party architec, liable for the defects in the plans
on the ground that the building collapsed after the earthquake?
 117

Held: YES!

no dispute that the earthquake of August 2, 1968 is a fortuitous event or an act of

God. An act of God has been defined as

an accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human

intervention,

which by no amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been

expected, could have been prevented.

To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach
of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur:

(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of
the debtor;

(b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable;

(c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and

(d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the
injury to the creditor.

The negligence of the defendant and the third-party defendants petitioners was
established beyond dispute both in the lower court and in the Intermediate Appellate
Court.

Defendant United Construction Co., Inc. was found to have made substantial
deviations from the plans and specifications. and to have failed to observe the
requisite workmanship in the construction as well as to exercise the requisite degree
of supervision;

while the third-party defendants were found to have inadequacies or defects in the
plans and specifications prepared by them.
 118

As correctly assessed by both courts, the defects in the construction and in the plans
and specifications were the proximate causes that rendered the PBA building unable
to withstand the earthquake of August 2, 1968.

For this reason the defendant and third-party defendants cannot claim exemption
from liability.

In any event, the relevant and logical observations of the trial court as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals that "while it is not possible to state with certainty that the
building would not have collapsed were those defects not present, the

fact remains that several buildings in the same area withstood the earthquake
to which the building of the plaintiff was similarly subjected," cannot be
ignored.

applicable law governing the rights and liabilities of the parties herein is Article 1723
of the New Civil Code,
 119

VICTORIAS PLANTERS et al vs. Victorias Milling ( Fortuitous Event WAR; does

not mean that the happening of any of those events stops the running of the
period agreed upon; It only relieves the parties from the fulfillment of their
respective obligations during that time )
G.R. No. L-6648 July 25, 1955
PADILLA, J. En Banc

Facts:
the sugar cane planters pertaining to the districts of Manapla and Cadiz, Negros
Occidental, executed identical milling contracts, setting forth the terms and
conditions under which the sugar central "North Negros Sugar Co. Inc." would mill
the sugar produced by the sugar cane planters of the Manapla and Cadiz districts;

Subsequent moliendas or millings took place every successive crop year thereafter,
except the 6-year period, comprising

● 4 years of the last World War II and

● 2 years of post-war reconstruction of respondent's central at Victorias, Negros

Occidental.

That after the liberation, the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. did not reconstruct its
destroyed central at Manapla, Negros Occidental, and in 1946,

it advised the North Negros Planters Association, Inc. that it had made arrangements
with the respondent Victorias Milling Co., Inc. for said respondent corporation to mill
the sugar cane produced by the planters of Manapla and Cadiz holding milling
contracts with it.

Beginning with the year 1948, and in the following years, when the planters-
members of the North Negros Planters Association, Inc. considered that the
stipulated 30-year period of their milling contracts executed in the year 1918 had
already expired

Respondent has refused and still refuses to accede to execute a new milling contract
for the 6 years of stoppage of milling contending that under the provisions of the
mining contract (Annex "A".)

"It is the view of the majority of the stockholder-investors, that our contracts with the
planters call for 30 years of milling — not 30 years in time" and

that "as there was no milling during 4 years of the recent war and two years of
reconstruction, when these six years are added on to the earliest of our contracts in
Manapla.
 120

RTC ruled in favor of respondent, contract expired and terminated upon the lapse of
the therein stipulated 30-year period,

and that respondent corporation is not entitled to claim any extension of or addition
to the said 30-year term or period of said milling contracts

by virtue of an equivalent to 6 years of the last war and reconstruction of its

central, during which there was no planting and/or milling.

The reason the planters failed to deliver the sugar cane was the war or a fortuitious
event. The appellant ceased to run its mill due to the same cause.

Issue: Whether the contract shall be extended for 6 years on the ground that the 30
year milling contract had not elapsed due to a fortuitous event?

Held:

Fortuitious event relieves the obligor from fulfilling a contractual obligation. The fact
that the contracts make reference to "first milling" does not make the period of thirty
years one of thirty milling years.

The term "first milling" used in the contracts under consideration was for the purpose
of reckoning the thirty-year period stipulated therein. Even if the thirty-year period
provided for in the contracts be construed as milling years, the deduction or
extension of six years would not be justified.

At most on the last year of the thirty-year period stipulated in the contracts the
delivery of sugar cane could be extended up to a time when all the amount of sugar
cane raised and harvested should have been delivered to the appellant's mill as
agreed upon.
 121

The seventh paragraph of Annex "C", not found in the earlier contracts (Annexes "A",
"B", and "B-1"), quoted by the appellant in its brief, where the parties stipulated that
in the

● event of flood,
● typhoon,
● earthquake, or
● other force majeure,
● war,
● insurrection,
● civil commotion,
● organized strike, etc.,

the contract shall be deemed suspended during said period,

does not mean that the happening of any of those events stops the running of
the period agreed upon.

It only relieves the parties from the fulfillment of their respective obligations during
that time — the

● planters from delivering sugar cane and

● the central from milling it.

In order that the central, the herein appellant, may be entitled to demand from the
other parties the fulfillment of their part in the contracts, the latter must

● have been able to perform it but failed or

● refused to do so

and not when they were prevented by force majeure such as war.
 122

To require the planters to deliver the sugar cane which they

1. failed to deliver during the four years of the Japanese occupation and

2. the two years after liberation when the mill was being rebuilt

is to demand from the obligors the fulfillment of an obligation which was impossible
of performance at the time it became due. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia no one is
bound to perform impossibility.

The obligee not being entitled to demand from the obligors the performance of the
latters' part of the contracts under those circumstances cannot later on demand its
fulfillment. The performance of what the law has written off cannot be demanded and
required.

prayer that the plaintiffs be compelled to deliver sugar cane to the appellant for six
more years to make up for what they failed to deliver during those trying years, the
fulfillment of which was impossible, if granted, would in effect be an extension of the
term of the contracts entered into by and between the parties.
 123

In accord with the rule laid down in the case of Lacson vs. Diaz, 47 where

despite the fact that the lease contract stipulated seven sugar crops and not
seven crop years as the term thereof,

we held that such stipulation contemplated seven consecutive agricultural

years

and affirmed the judgment which declared that the leasee was not entitled to
an extension of the term of the lease for the number of years the country was
occupied by the Japanese Army

during which no sugar cane was planted we are of the opinion and so hold
that the thirty-year period stipulated in the contracts expired on the thirtieth
agricultural year.

The period of six years — four during the Japanese occupation when the appellant
did not operate its mill and the last two during which the appellant reconstructed its
mill — cannot be deducted from the thirty-year period stipulated in the contracts.
 124

SALUD Bataclan vs. MARIANO MEDINA ( In the present case under the
circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the
proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when
the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking
of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected )
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
MONTEMAYOR, J. En Banc

Facts:
Shortly after midnight bus 30 of the Medina Transportation, owner defendant
Mariano Medina left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driver
Conrado Saylon. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan,

while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite,

A. one of the front tires burst and the

B. vehicle began to zig-zag

C. until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and

D. turned turtle.

three passengers seated beside the driver, named

1. Bataclan,
2. Lara and the
3. Visayan and
4. the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva,

could not get out of the overturned bus.

Nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from the
wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or
extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or
shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood.
 125

came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a
wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach
the overturned bus, and almost immediately,

a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it.

It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from
the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the
body of the bus and the ground under and around it,

and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help
set it on fire.

Four passengers died. Bataclan’s widow, Salud Villanueva, brought the present suit
to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees in the total amount of P87K before CFI Cavite and ruled in favor of
widow

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the owner of the bus company is liable for damages for the death of
the passengers caused by the fire?

Held: YES! no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable.
The only question is to what degree.

We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of
transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry
Bataclan safely to his destination Pasay City.
 126

We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the
defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at
the time of the blow out, the

bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers,

and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including
that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal
where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150
meters.

The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the
bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its
momentum carried it over a distance of 150m before it fell into the canal and turned
turtle.

There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable.
The only question is to what degree.

The trial court was of the opinion that the

proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus,

but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-
passengers who were unable to leave it;

that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical
injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his
death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.
 127

We disagree.

Proximate cause -

● natural and continuous sequence,

● unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,

● produces the injury,

○ and without which the result would not have occurred.'

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a
passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected
and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say,

by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire,

and the passenger is burned to death,

one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and
not the overturning of the vehicle.

But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus,

this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on
its back,

● the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was natural or expected;

that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves,

and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available;

and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.

In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help.
 128

What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence
of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor.

According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking
back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus,

this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be
smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet

neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to
the evidence, one of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her,
was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano
Medina, and in the course of his visit,

she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said
inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were
already old,

and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said
tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions.

If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken
the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers.
 129

Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had
been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have already stated, the
blow out would not have occurred.

All in all, there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle
negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to
others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods,
 130

ILIGAN CEMENT vs. CA & Manila Electric ( It was petitioner itself which made a
study of its electrical system and on the basis of such study decided on the
specifications of the capacitor. Likewise, it was petitioner itself that designed
the equipment it ordered from private respondent. The blame cannot be laid at
the door of private respondent, if petitioner's study did not take into
consideration the deficiency of its electrical system. )
G.R. No. 103437 November 25, 1994
QUIASON, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
Iligan Cement Corp. started undertaking its "Plant Rehabilitation" program of power
requirements which had to be implemented on a phase-to-phase basis. Phase I of
this program consisted in the

installation of power factor correction equipment

Of the four would-be suppliers the ICC considered the quotation of the BETA Electric
Corporation (Beta) as the most reasonable. The quotation was for either

● a six-step power factor corrective equipment or

● for a three-step corrective power equipment.

ICC, through the recommendation of Engr. Munasque and Engr. Pachler, a Swiss
consultant, decided on the purchase of a three-step power factor correction
equipment.

equipment was delivered to Iligan at plaintiff's cement plant there. This equipment
upon the approval of the plaintiff, was installed. In the presence and with the
approval, of ICC engineering staff, the equipment was switched on. Thereafter, a
chattering sound was heard, and fire ensued.

both parties decided to form a technical committee to study the technical causes of
the fire. Its findings showed that the fire was

"caused by arcing faults and restrikes arising from overvoltage produced by

switching the 600 KVAR capacitors into the 4160-volt system

which is susceptible to arcing faults and whose equipment are not well
protected against overvoltage.

The fire and the damages it caused was due to the fact that oil circuit breakers were
used indoors". parties were unable to pinpoint which should shoulder what cost.
 131

Comment made by the committee stating that the fire could have been avoided "had
a technical audit been made before the capacitors were considered."

ICC filed a complaint for damages against Beta. It was plaintiff's theory that part of
the defendant's duty as the entity commissioned by the ICC to manufacture, install,
commission and test the equipment was the making of a prior technical audit.

defendant asserted that

"plaintiff itself made a study of its electrical system and on the basis of such
study,

decided on a power factor corrective equipment which (it) itself designed."

Thus, it cannot be faulted if plaintiffs own study did not reveal the weakness and
deficiency of its electrical system.

trial court decided for the defendant It held:

To the mind of the court, BEC has not at all breached its capacitor contract
with ICC, let alone could such alleged breach of the contract be considered as
the proximate cause of the November 2, 1985 fire that damaged ICC's major
substation and other power utilization equipment at its Iligan cement plant.

It must be noted that BEC's contract with ICC caused only the

● supply,
● installation,
● commissioning and
● testing

with the 63 step (sic) power factor capacitor at ICC's Iligan plant.

transaction itself came into being as a brainchild of ICC's own safety and
consultant professional electrical engineer, Fernando Munasque who (in
coordination with ICC's projects group composed of foreign and local
engineers) studied, designed and recommended the acquisition of the
capacitor in 1981 admittedly for cost saving purposes.

CA affirmed RTC. ordering the plaintiff (herein petitioner) to pay the defendant

Issue: Whether proximate cause of the fire was the negligence of private respondent
BETA in switching on the capacitor into the electrical system of petitioner without first
determining whether said connection could be done safely?
 132

Held: NO!

The relations of the parties is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines on contracts for a piece of work. Article 1713 of said Code provides:

By the contract for a piece of work the contractor binds himself to execute a
piece of work for the employer, in consideration of a certain price or
compensation.

The contractor may either employ only his labor or skill, or also furnish the
material.

A contractor is responsible for the damages caused by the defects in the work or by
the use of materials of inferior quality or due to any violation of the terms of the
contract (cf. Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1723; Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines 291 [1992]).

Petitioner failed to present evidence that there was a defect in the capacitor it
ordered from private respondent; that the latter used materials of inferior quality; or
that it had violated the terms of the contract for the supply of said equipment.

The CA was categorical that private respondent "did not at all break its contractual
obligation with plaintiff-appellant

Another point to consider is that after the fire, the capacitor was still in good
condition, which could only mean that private respondent had complied with the
design made by the engineers of petitioner.

Based on the findings of the Technical Committee, the trial court concluded that

the overvoltage, caused by the weak and inadequate electrical system of the
cement plant, generated the sparks which ICC's circuit breakers failed to
isolate or neutralize.

Hence, the sparks spread to other bigger-sized circuit breakers of the cement plant's
electrical system, heated the poorly insulated electrical wiring and ignited the oil in
the circuit breakers and transformer equipment.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the overvoltage was caused by
the weak and deficient electrical system, including the lack of protective relays, of the
cement plant itself
 133

The installation of the equipment prior to its switching on into the electric system of
the cement plant was made under the supervision of the engineers of petitioner. The
wiring lay-out plans were also approved by petitioner.

Petitioner has its own engineering staff and foreign consultants, who were
knowledgeable about the capacity and requirements of the electrical system of the
cement plant.

It was petitioner itself which made a study of its electrical system and on the basis of
such study decided on the specifications of the capacitor. Likewise, it was petitioner
itself that designed the equipment it ordered from private respondent.

The blame cannot be laid at the door of private respondent, if petitioner's study did
not take into consideration the deficiency of its electrical system.
 134

According to the Technical Committee, "had a technical audit been made before the
capacitors were considered, the system would have revealed its weakness" (Rollo,
p. 89).

It was petitioner's duty to conduct a periodic technical audit of the cement plant. In
this particular case, petitioner was remiss in its duty

Petitioner contends that there was no more need to switch-on the capacitor prior to
the accident because its power factor had already been raised to 93.3%, which was
more than the desired 85% level.

It was petitioner which ordered the capacitor. It was in a better position to ascertain
whether or not it still needed the equipment. It was its duty to inform private
respondent that it had already achieved the desired power factor rating.
 135

ABDULIA RODRIGUEZ et al vs. CA et al ( fire was not caused by an

instrumentality within the exclusive control of defendants," which is one of the
requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the law of
negligence )
G.R. No. 121964 June 17, 1997
DAVIDE, JR. J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
a fire broke out which razed two apartment buildings, owned by plaintiffs-appellants
Abdulia Rodriguez et al and partially destroying a commercial building. Plaintiffs-
appellants, filed a case for damages against defendants-appellees

complaint alleged that by reason of the gross negligence and want of care of the
construction workers and employees of the defendants-appellees, the

bunkhouse or workers' quarters in the construction site caught fire spreading

rapidly, burning the adjacent buildings owned by plaintiffs-appellants.

Defendant-appellee John Young, the building contractor, in his answer, contended

that he can not be held responsible even if there was negligence on the part of the
employees for he had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his workers.

Court a quo resolved that the fire was not caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendants-appellants. CA affirmed RTC.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether John Young, the building contractor responsible for the negligence of
his employees which was the source of the fire?

Held: NO!

Court of Appeals ruled here that the reporting officer who prepared the Fire
Investigation Report "had no personal knowledge of what actually took place;"

besides, the information he received did not qualify as "official information" since
those who gave the statements to the reporting officer had no personal knowledge of
the facts stated and no duty to give such statements for the record.

Some confusion surrounds the issue of admissibility of the Fire Investigation Report

The record discloses that the officer who signed the report, Fire Major Eduardo P.
Enriquez, was subpoenaed at the request of and testified in open court for
 136

petitioners. He identified the Report, which petitioners offered in their Offer of

Exhibits 25 as:

What appears to us to be the underlying purpose of petitioners in soliciting

affirmance of their thesis that the Report of Major Enriquez should be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule, is to shift the burden of evidence to private
respondents under the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in negligence cases.

They claim, as stated in their offer of Exhibits, that "the fire started at the
generator. . . within the construction site."

This quotation is based on the penultimate paragraph of page 4 of the Report of

Major Enriquez and is obviously misleading as there is nothing in said paragraph that
unequivocally asserts that the generator was located within the construction site. The
paragraph reads:

After analyzing the evidences [sic] and the circumstances underlying the
situation, one can easily came [sic] to the conclusion that the fire started at
the generator and extended to the bunkhouse and spread among the
combustible stored materials within the construction site.

Among the combustible materials were the plastic (PVC) pipes and plywoods
[sic].

Clearly, the phrase within the construction site could only refer to the immediately
preceding term "combustible stored materials."
 137

The trial court itself concluded that the fire could not have started at the generator
and that the bunkhouse was not burned, thus:

All the defendants's witness testified that the generator never caught fire, and
no one at all had heard any explosion anywhere before the fire was
discerned. Exhibit 1 (a photograph of the fire while it was raging reveals that
the bunkhouse was intact.

It then declared that "the fire was not caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of defendants,"

which is one of the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in the law of negligence.

It may further be emphasized that this doctrine is not intended to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged.
It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and
facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.

The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
involved, direct evidence is absent or not readily available.
 138

Medical Malpractice

LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA vs. WILFRED PASCASIO et al ( Indeed here, a causal

connection is discernible from the occurrence of the victim's death after the
negligent act of the anaesthesiologist in administering the anesthesia, a fact
which, if confirmed, should warrant the filing of the appropriate criminal case )
G.R. No. 118141 September 5, 1997
ROMERO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila underwent surgical operation at
the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by

● Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while

● Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the anaesthesiologist.

Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died of complications of "unknown
cause," according to officials of the UST Hospital. NBI ruled that Florencio's death
was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia.

NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be
charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the City
Prosecutor.

Prosecutors in charge in conduction preliminary investigation faild to conclude that

there is probable cause to file an information for Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence against the doctors for unexplained reasons.

Thus Petitioner filed before the ombudsman a complaint against the proescutors fro
violation of RA 3019. However ombudsman dismissed complaint for lack of evience.

Issue: Whether there was probable cause in filing criminal case agiant the doctors?
 139

Held: YES!

NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy that there was indeed negligence on
the part of the attending physicians in administering the anaesthesia.

The fact of want of competence or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of

which can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial for it is virtually impossible to
ascertain the merits of a medical negligence case without extensive investigation,

Clearly, the City Prosecutors are not in a competent position to pass judgment on
such a technical matter, especially when there are conflicting evidence and findings.
The bases of a party's accusation and defenses are better ventilated at the trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation.

medical malpractice or negligence cases.

type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed
by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm.

In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care
provider, in most cases a physician,

1. either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider

would have done,

or

2. that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not
have done;

and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient. 12

 140

Hence, there are four elements involved in medical negligence cases:

1. breach,
2. Injury
3. proximate causation.
4. duty,

Evidently, when the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes, a
physician-patient relationship was created.

In accepting the case, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes in effect represented that, having
the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the
same field, they will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of their
patients.

They have a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. The
breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their improper performance,
by a physician surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body or in health,

constitutes actionable malpractice.

Consequently, in the event that any injury results to the patient from want of due care
or skill during the operation, the surgeons may be held answerable in damages for
negligence.

Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of

anaesthesia,

the necessity of expert testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa
loquitur to the plaintiff;

have been applied in actions against anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant liable
for the death or injury of a patient under excessive or improper anaesthesia.
 141

Essentially, it requires two-pronged evidence:

1. evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical community in the

particular kind of case, and

2. a showing that the physician in question negligently departed from this

standard in his treatment. 17

Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which is divided into two
inquiries:

● whether the doctor's actions in fact caused the harm to the patient and

● whether these were the proximate cause of the patient's injury.

Indeed here, a causal connection is discernible from the occurrence of the victim's
death after the negligent act of the anaesthesiologist in administering the anesthesia,
a fact which, if confirmed, should warrant the filing of the appropriate criminal case.

To be sure, the allegation of negligence is not entirely baseless. Moreover, the NBI
deduced that the attending surgeons did not conduct the necessary interview of the
patient prior to the operation.

It appears that the cause of the death of the victim could have been averted

had the proper drug been applied to cope with the symptoms of malignant
hyperthermia.

Also, we cannot ignore the fact that an antidote was readily available to counteract
whatever deleterious effect the anaesthesia might produce. Why these precautionary
measures were disregarded must be sufficiently explained.
 142

ROGELIO RAMOS et al vs. CA & et al ( Considering that a sound and unaffected

member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is
unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians,
we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res
ipsa loquitur )
G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999
KAPUNAN, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos, because the discomforts, somehow interfered with her
normal ways, she sought professional advice. She was advised to undergo an
operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent a series of
examinations which included blood and urine tests (Exhs. "A" and "C") which
indicated she was fit for surgery.

She and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino Hozaka, one of the
defendants. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a "cholecystectomy"
operation. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured Rogelio that he will get a good
anesthesiologist. she was admitted at one of the rooms of the DLSMC,

At the time of Operation Dr. Hosaka, was late. Herminda Cruz, saw Dr. Gutierrez
intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, "ang hirap
ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan"

Because of the remarks of Dra. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr.
Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of
the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her.

She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another
anesthesiologist

The patient's nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg
position — a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than
her feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the patient's
brain

That fateful day, she saw the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Victim
suffered a comatose.

Petitioners filed a civil case befre RTC QC alleging negligence in the management
and care of Erlinda Ramos. RTC ruled in favor of Ramos. CA reversed RTC.

In the case at bar, the Court is called upon to rule whether a

 143

● surgeon,
● an anesthesiologist
● and a hospital

should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled
for cholecystectomy.

Issue: Whether surgeon, anesthesiologist and a hospital liable for the unfortunate
comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy?

Held: YES

We disagree with the findings of the Court of Appeals.

We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of

negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate
cause of her piteous condition.

At any rate, without doubt, petitioner's witness Herminda, an experienced clinical

nurse whose long experience and scholarship led to her appointment as Dean of the
Capitol Medical Center School at Nursing, was fully capable of determining whether
or not the intubation was a success. She had extensive clinical experience starting
as a staff nurse in Chicago, Illinois; staff nurse and clinical instructor in a teaching
hospital, the FEU-NRMF.

The appellate court, however, disbelieved Dean Cruz's testimony

In other words, what the Court of Appeals is trying to impress is that being a nurse,
and considered a layman in the process of intubation, witness Cruz is not competent
to testify on whether or not the intubation was a success.

We do not agree with the above reasoning of the appellate court.

 144

Although witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well testify upon
matters on which she is capable of observing such as,

● the statements and acts of the physician and surgeon,

● external appearances,
● and manifest conditions which are observable by any one.

This is precisely allowed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where the testimony
of expert witnesses is not required

It is the accepted rule that expert testimony is not necessary for the proof of
negligence in non-technical matters or those of which an ordinary person may be
expected to have knowledge, or where the lack of skill or want of care is so obvious
as to render expert testimony unnecessary.

We take judicial notice of the fact that anesthesia procedures have become so
common, that even an ordinary person can tell if it was administered properly. As
such, it would not be too difficult to tell if the tube was properly inserted. This kind of
observation, we believe, does not require a medical degree to be acceptable.

We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As will
hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a
scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa
loquitur.

Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means

"the thing or the transaction speaks for itself."

 145

The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the rule that the

fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances,

may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence

or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation.

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be

1. under the management of the defendant or his servants and the

2. accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have its management or control use proper care,

it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that

the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that,

as a matter of common knowledge and experience,

the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence
on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the
absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence.

Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common
knowledge.

However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law
and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of
liability.

Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. It

is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural of convenience since it
furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific
proof of negligence.

In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense
with the requirement of proof of negligence.
 146

Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be
satisfactorily shown:

1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence;

2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant

or defendants; and

3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff

responsible is eliminated.

In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the "control of instrumentality"

which caused the damage.

Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant.
In order to have the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or
damage, must show a situation where it is applicable, and must establish that the
essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident.

Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res
ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are
themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause
of that harm.

Although generally,

expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a

physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard
medical procedure,

When the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because

the injury itself provides the proof of negligence.

 147

The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only
to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and

not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may
be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.

Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to
testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable
degree of skill and care.

However, testimony as to the

● statements and acts of physicians and surgeons,

● external appearances, and
● manifest conditions which are observable by any one

may be given by non-expert witnesses.

Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to
find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of
expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine
the proper standard of care.

Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not
have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised,

an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily
required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred.
 148

Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following
situations:

● leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation,

● injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the
area, of treatment,

● removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was intended,

● knocking out a tooth while a patient's jaw was under anesthetic for the
removal of his tonsils, and

● loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic,
during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been
measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical
negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that
he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence.

A distinction must be made between the

● failure to secure results,

and

● the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the
service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in
that particular practice.

It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a
suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment.

The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce
the desired result. 39 Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if
the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not
accomplished.
 149

We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar.

As will hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior
to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa
loquitur.

Indeed, the principles enunciated in the aforequoted case apply with equal force
here. In the present case,

● Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general

surgery to be performed on her gall bladder.

On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, y and control of
private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control over her.

● At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a
few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body.

However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance

of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain.

Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already
decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda
sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder
operation.

In fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of someone in
the administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube.

Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence
because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her
unconscious.

Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or
destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive
control of the physicians, we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates
the application of res ipsa loquitur.

Upon these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say, as
a matter of common knowledge and observation, if negligence attended the
management and care of the patient.
 150

Human Relations

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES vs. CA & EUGENIO Baltao ( A person who has not
been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the
debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the
issuer of the check pay the amount thereof; In the absence of a wrongful act or
omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that
the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and
subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant
to impose a penalty on the right to Litigate )
G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993
BIDIN, J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
Petitioner Albenson delivered to Guaranteed Industries located at Manila the mild
steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was
given check P2K and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks. check was
dishonored for the reason "Account Closed."

Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid
mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao. , Albenson made an extrajudicial
demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to
replace and/or make good the dishonored check.

Respondent Baltao, denied that he issued the check , or that the

signature appearing thereon is his. He further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct
entity and hence, could not have transacted business with Albenson.

Albenson filed complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22 before City Fiscal of
Rizal. It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake,

his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business establishment,

E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the Baltao Building, Manila

City Fiscal filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of BP 22.
Provincial Fiscal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated
respondent Baltao. Provincial Fiscal Castro then castigated City Fiscal
Sumaway for failing to exercise care and prudence in the performance of his
duties

Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him respondent Baltao
filed before RTC Q.C. a complaint for damages against herein petitioners
 151

Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its
employee.

In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account
of "E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be
President.

Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation
since 1975. . . . .

The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III,
a son of plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao Building located
on V. Mapa Street, that the defendants may have been dealing with.

RTC ruled in favor of Eugenio Baltao ordering Albenson to ordering. CA affirmed

RTC with modification

Issue: Whether Egenio is entitled to damages due to the unjust filing of a criminal
case against him?

Held:

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following:

(1) There is a legal right or duty;

(2) which is exercised in bad faith;

(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other

provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own
sanction.Thus,

● anyone who, whether willfully or negligently,

● in the exercise of his legal right or duty,

● causes damage to another,

● shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby.

 152

Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following
elements:

1) There is an act which is legal;

2) but which is contrary to

● morals,
● good custom,
● public order, or
● public policy;

3) and it is done with intent to injure.

Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to
another may be made the basis for an award

There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and

that is, the

act must be intentional.

However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either
"willfully", or "negligently".

Thetrial court as well as the respondent appellate

court mistakenly lumped these three (3) articles
together, and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages in the civil
complaint filed against petitioners, thus:
 153

Assuming arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not
independently of each one, could be validly made the bases for an award of
damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under the circumstances,

We see no cogent reason for such an award of

damages to be made in favor of private respondent.

Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have

violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right.
What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of
P2K due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by
private respondent.

Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded the
following results:

from the records of SEC it was discovered that the President of Guaranteed
(the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eugenio S. Baltao"

In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private
respondent demanding that he make good the amount of the check. Counsel for
private respondent wrote back and denied, among others, that private respondent
ever transacted business with Albenson

It is pivotal to note at this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed private
respondent wanted to clear himself from the baseless accusation made against his
person, he should have made mention of the fact that there are three (3) persons
with the same name, i.e.:

1. Eugenio Baltao, Sr.,

2. Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private respondent), and
3. Eugenio Baltao III
 154

A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him

will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to

pay him.
It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the
amount thereof;

In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or

of fraud or bad faith,
moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not
per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages,
for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to Litigate

In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates were
ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building and as part payment
thereof, the bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private
respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos conducting
business in the same building — he and his son Eugenio Baltao III.

Considering that Guaranteed, which received the goods in payment of which the
petitioner acted in
bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent,
good faith and probable cause in filing the
complaint before the provincial fiscal.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does
not make one liable for malicious prosecution.
 155

ALFREDO Velayo vs. Shell Co. et al ( taking advantage of his knowledge that
insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by CALI, Defendant Shell
schemed and effected the transfer of its sister
corporation in the United States, where CALI’s plane C-54 was
by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said
insolvent’s property depriving the latter hence liable for damages )
G.R. No. L-7817. October 31, 1956
FELIX, J. En Banc

Facts:
Mr. Alexander Sycip, Secretary of the Board of Directors of the CALI, informed the
creditors present that this corporation was insolvent and had to stop operations.

taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be

instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the
manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among them,

and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such understanding as it
was really the case —

Defendant schemed and effected the transfer of its

sister corporation in the United States, where CALI’s plane
C-54 was

by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said

insolvent’s property depriving the latter

Issue: Whether defendant is liable for damage under Art 19 C.C.

Held: YES!

The writer of this decision does not entertain any doubt that the
Defendant —

taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings

were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an
understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among
them,
 156

and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such
understanding as it was really the case —

schemed and effected the transfer of its sister

corporation in the United States, where CALI’s plane C-54 was
by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said
insolvent’s property depriving the latter and the Assignee that was latter
appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane.

In addition to the aforementioned Section 37, Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE

of the Civil Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides the following:

Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith”.

It maybe said that this article only contains a mere declarations of principles and
while such statement may be is essentially correct, yet We find that such declaration
is implemented by Article 21 and sequence of the same Chapter which prescribe the
following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”.

Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which compels the

return of a thing acquired ‘without just or legal grounds’.

This provision embodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another, which has been one of the mainstays of
every legal system for centuries.

It is most needful that this ancient principles be clearly and specifically consecrated
in the proposed Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no
one may unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of another.

We conclude, therefore, reaffirming the doctrine laid down in the case of Lilius (59 J.
F. 800) in the sense that indemnity lies for moral and patrimonial damages which
include physical and pain sufferings.

With this (doctrine), We effect in this jurisdiction a real symbiosis 1 of the Spanish
and American Laws and, at the same time, We act in consonance with the spirit and
progressive march of time” (translation)
 157

We hold
In accordance with these quoted provisions of the Civil Code,
Defendant liable to pay to the Plaintiff, for the
benefit of the insolvent CALI and its creditors, as compensatory
damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at the time aforementioned and
another equal sum as exemplary damages.
 158

David LLORENTE vs. Sandigan & People ( The Court is convinced that the
he had no
petitioner had unjustly discriminated against Mr. Curio;
valid reason to "go legal" all of a sudden with
respect to Mr. Curio, since he had cleared three employees who, as
the Sandiganbayan found, "were all similarly circumstanced in that they all
had pending obligations when, their clearances were filed for
consideration, warranting similar official action.)
G.R. No. 85464 October 3, 1991
SAMIENTO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Atty. Llorente was employed in the PCA as Deputy Administrator for Administrative
Services, Finance Services, Legal Affairs Departments. As a result of a massive
reorganization in 1981, hundreds of PCA employees resigned.

After the clearance was signed by the PCA officers concerned, it was to be
approved, first, by Atty. Llorente, in the case of a rank-and-file employee.

The clearance of Mr. Curio likewise favorably passed all officers concerned,
including Mrs. Sotto, the latter signing despite the notation handwritten on
December 8, 1981, that Mr. Curio had pending accountabilities,

However, when the clearance was submitted to Atty. Llorente for approval,
he refused to approve it. For this reason, the clearance was held up in his
office and did not reach Atty. Rodriguez. Atty. Llorente invoked Condition (a) of the
clearance (Exhs. D and I-B), which, he said, was "very stringent" and could not be
interpreted in any other way ...

An Information for violation of Section 3(c) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act was filed against the petitioner on the ground that Petitioner refuse to accept
clearance.

Sandiganbayan acquitted the petitioner in the absence of any evidence that he

acted in bad faith. But petitioner is civilly liable, and ordered him to pay
"compensatory damages" in the sum of P90K . According to
Sandiganbayan, the

petitioner was guilty nonetheless of abuse of right under

Article 19 of the Civil Code
 159

and as a public officer, he was liable for damages suffered by the aggrieved
party (under Article 27).

Issue: Whether petitioner, although acquitted, is liable for damages under Art. 19?

Held: YES!

We also agree with the Sandiganbaya (although the Sandiganbayan did not say it)
that although the petitioner did not act with evident bad faith,

he acted with bad faith nevertheless, for which

he should respond for damages.

The records show that the office practice indeed in the Philippine Coconut Authority
was to clear the employee (retiree) and deduct his accountabilities
from his gratuity benefits.

As we said, the acts of the petitioner were legal (that is, pursuant to
procedures), as he insists in this petition,

yet it does not follow, as we said, that his acts were done in good
faith.

For emphasis, he
had no valid reason to "go legal" all of a
sudden with respect to Mr. Curio, since he had cleared three
employees who, as the Sandiganbayan found,

"were all similarly circumstanced in that they all had pending

obligations when, their clearances were filed for
consideration, warranting similar official action."

The Court is convinced that the petitioner had unjustly discriminated against Mr.
Curio.

It is no defense that the petitioner was motivated by no ill-will (a

grudge, according to the Sandiganbayan), since the facts speak for themselves.
 160

It is no defense either that he was, after all, complying merely with legal procedures
since, as we indicated, he was not as strict with respect to the three retiring other
employees.

There can be no other logical conclusion that he was acting

unfairly, no more, no less, to Mr. Curio.

It is the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code, under which the petitioner was made
to pay damages, together with Article 27, that the performance of duty be done with
justice and good faith.

In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. we held the

defendant liable under Article 19 for disposing of its propertv — a perfectly

legal act — in order to escape the reach of a creditor.

In two fairly more recent cases, Sevilla vs. CA and Valenzuela vs. Court of
Appeals, 15 we held that

a principal is liable under Article 19 in terminating the agency — again, a legal

act — when terminating the agency would deprive the agent of his
legitimate business.

We believe that the petitioner is liable under Article 19.

 161

CHARMINA Banal vs. Jdg. TOMAS Tadeo & Claudia ( In the case at bar, Civil
liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the
check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless
check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense )
G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
(15) separate informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against respondent
Claudio before RTC Q.C. Respondent court issued an order rejecting the
appearance of Atty. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that the

charge is for the violation of BP. 22 which does not provide for any civil
liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against property but public
order."

MR denied hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether BP. 22 does provide for civil liability?

Held: YES!

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of
our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100,
The Revised Penal Code).

Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a
crime he offends two entities namely

(1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose
law he had violated; and

(2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity
or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same
punishable act or omission.
 162

Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil
liability is really the

obligation and the moral duty of everyone

● to repair or
● make whole

the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or

omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be
punishable by law.

In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious
act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate
cause thereof.

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to

another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so

provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the
damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of
another.

The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the
penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime.

In the case at bar, Civil liability to the offended

private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the check is
entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued.
Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty- handed
by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in
many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit.

To do so, may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the
check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the
 163

payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to
naught.

The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to 40913 is

justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of the
speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the Constitution.

A separate civil action for the purpose would only prove to be

costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further
delay the final disposition of the case.

This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioner's rights may be fulIy
adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort t o a separate action to
recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.
 164

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE & Hendry vs. CA & Tobias ( Next tortious act
committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in
October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY
due to dishonesty; Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment
with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed )
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
CORTES, J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions
for which it lost several thousands of pesos. According to private respondent it was
he who actually discovered the anomalies.

petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect.
Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report clearing private
respondent of participation in the anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator,
finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further
investigation was still to be conducted.

Metro Manila Police Chief submitted a second laboratory crime report

reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials
appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions
were not those of Tobias. lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded
negative results.

Criminal complaints of estafa were dismissed by fiscal. Tobias has been terminated.
Thus Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company

(RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO,
wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on

alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. RTC ruled in
favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay damages.

CA affirmed RTC in toto. Petitioner’s MR denied.

 165

Issue: Whether petitioner is liable for damages n alleged unlawful, malicious,

oppressive, and abusive acts

Held: YES

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of

abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed
● not only in the exercise of one's rights

● but also in the performance of one's duties

These standards are the following:

1. to act with justice;

2. to give everyone his due; and to

3. observe honesty and good faith.

The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed.

A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as

such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.

But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation.
 166

Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article

21 would be proper.

In the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law
since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent.

This does not, however, leave private respondent

with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code
provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.

And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain
significant circumstances,

finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the

right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which
the latter must now be indemnified.

An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty

might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation
and directing the employee to go on a leave.

Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such
But the high-handed treatment accorded
employer.
Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for.

But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias . Several other
tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the
latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the
filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias,
 167

The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the

writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that
Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.

Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a
result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time.

For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable
for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 168

ESTERIA Garciano vs. CA et al ( The Court of Appeals was correct in finding

that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. While the
respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated, they actually did
nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post, as ordered by the
school's Board of Directors )
G.R. No. 96126 August 10, 1992
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
Petitioner was hired to teach in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of
Camotes. Before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of
absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter was
employed and was approved by President of School

Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June, 1982, she received the letter
informing her that her services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had
been terminated.

She made inquiries from the school about the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the
members of the

Board of Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz,
signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your
usual duties as Classroom Teacher

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the RTC, Branch XI,

against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo, and some members of the faculty of the school
for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal.

Lower court ruled in favor of petitioner ordering the defendants jointly and severally
to pay damages. CA reversed RTC, MR of petitioner denied.

Issue: Whether Fr. Wiertz et al is liable for damages?

Held: NO! the Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.

The board of directors of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which alone

possesses the authority to hire and fire teachers and other employees of the school,
did not dismiss the petitioner.
 169

It in fact directed her to report for work. While the private respondents sent
her a letter of termination through her husband, they admittedly had no
authority to do so.

Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from
unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or
public policy.

The CA was correct in finding that

petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was

her own choice.
While the respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated, they actually
did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post, as ordered by
the school's Board of Directors.

That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain
even if
her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse,
true, did not make them liable to her for damages.
They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to
dissent from the Board's decision.

Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. They
did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her
prevailed.

She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982,

but she did not comply with that order.
Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings
was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.
 170

With respect to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the right to recover them under
Article 21 is based on equity, and

he who comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean

hands.

Article 21 should be construed as granting the right to recover damages to injured

persons who are not themselves at fault

Moral damages are recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 in relation to
Article 21. In the case at bar, petitioners is not without fault.

Firstly, she went on an indefinite leave of absence and failed to report back in time
for the regular opening of classes.

Secondly, for reasons known to herself alone, she refused to sign a written contract
of employment. Lastly, she ignored the Board of Directors' order for her to report for
duty on July 5, 1982.
 171

CECILIO PE vs. ALFONSO PE ( The circumstances under which defendant tried

to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was
he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent
of making her fall in love with him )
G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: En Banc

Facts:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man
and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory.

Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative

of Lolita's father. defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a
member of their family.

two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only
in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school.

rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in
1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from
further seeing Lolita. affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.

1957 Lolita disappeared from said house in QC.

Plaintiffs brought this action before CFI Manila to recover moral, compensatory,
exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94K.

no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that

defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with

Lolita Pe

thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs

and public policy.

Lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one
Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared
that defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages

it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his
marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection.
 172

Issue: Whether defendant, being a married man,is liable for Damages on the
ground that he carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy?

Held: YES!

We disagree with RTC’s view.

The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead,
that it was he who, thru an
to any other conclusion than
ingenious scheme or trickery,
seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him.

This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext
he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
that
rosary.
Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free
access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her
family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita
used to teach in a barrio school.

When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents,
defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita.
Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese
national.

Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared
from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of
events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her.
 173

The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering
the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby

sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
 174

GASHEM BAKSH vs. CA & MARILOU Gonzales ( proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy )
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
Private respondent , filed with trial court a complaint for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. Petitioner
courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that
they would get married;

they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was
in October of that year. she was a virgin before she began
living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of
such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; d

uring a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day

before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages

RTC applying Article 21 C.C. ruled in favor of respondent petitioner was thus
ordered to pay the latter damages. Trial court's findings and conclusions that

(a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers,

(b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue

who readily submits to sexual advances,

(c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised

to marry private respondent,

d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to

be deflowered by him,
 175

(e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents —
in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987
by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting
sponsors,

(f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and

(g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs,
culture and traditions.

The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter
alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose
her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.

CA affirmed RTC in toto.

Issue: Whether a breach of promise to marry respondet under the circumstances is

actionable for damages under Art 21?

Held: YES!

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both

the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which
could alter the result of the case.

The existing rule is that a

breach of promise to marry per se is not an

actionable wrong.

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21,

which is

designed to expand the concept of torts or

quasi-delict in this jurisdiction
 176

by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of

moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that

where a man's promise to marry is in fact the

proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman

and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the

proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual

congress,

proof that

● he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her

and

● that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive

device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain
her consent to the sexual act,

could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article

21 not because of such promise to marry
 177

fraud and deceit behind it and the willful

but because of the
injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

petitioner's
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage."

In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession
of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to.
 178

BEATRIZ Wassmer vs. FRANCISCO Velez ( Surely this is not a case of mere
breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid )
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BENGZON, J.P., J. En Banc

Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September
2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:

Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the

Convair today

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON

APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages. judgment was rendered ordering

defendant to pay damages.

Issue: Whether respondent is liable for damges for breach of promise to mary under
Art 21?

Held: YES!

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a
license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their

● wedding was set for September 4, 1954.

● Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances

● The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important
occasion were purchased

● Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared.
 179

● A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought.

● Bridal showers were given and gifts received

And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years
old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My
mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao,

and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed
But he never returned and was
rest assured returning soon."
never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry . As stated,

mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.

But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-

described preparation and

publicity, only to walk out of it when the

matrimony is about to be solemnized,
is quite different.

This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which

defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.
 180

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. CA et al ( we find ourselves unable to say that

petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately
ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36)
years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a
life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first
instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of
their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy. )
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
CONCEPCION, J. En BAnc

Facts:
Soledad Cagiga filed complaint for moral damages for alleged breach of promise.
Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the
but denied having ever promised to marry the
latter,
complainant.
Trial court ordered petitioner to pay damages. CA affimred trial court hence the case
at bar.

Issue: Whether petitioner is liable for damages for breach of promise to marry?

Held: NO!

Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and
petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around
together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise
of marriage prior thereto.

one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual
intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then
attached as apprentice pilot. Soledad advised petitioner that she was in
the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her.

However, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action.
 181

We find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of

seduction,

not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age,

and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be —

when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to
petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
 182

PASTOR Tanchavez vs. VICENTA Escano et al ( her refusal to perform her wifely
duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband
constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is
entitled to the corresponding indemnity )
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
REYES, J.B.L., J.

Facts:
Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino
of Spanish ancestry exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez,
32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock,

without the knowledge of her parents,

before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in
the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly
registered with the local civil register. Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her,
before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.

A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta
returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao.

Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they
reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To
facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of
Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in

her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she
was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The
application was approved, and she left for the US.

She married a american man and obtained a divorce decree for her previous
marriage from petitione was granted?

Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in CFI

against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, whom he charged with having dissuaded
and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband and asked for Damages.

Trail court denied claim of Damages. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the
complaint?
 183

Held: YES!

It follows, likewise, that

● her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and

● her denial of consortium and

● her desertion of her husband

constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault,

for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176).
Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging
immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law,

and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our

law, on the basis of adultery"

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto
Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their
daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported
by credible evidence
 184

NATIVIDAD Sycip et al vs. CA et al ( All the documents declared null and void or
inexistent by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals were found to
have been falsified in Civil Case No. 969; without consideration and more
importantly without approval by any of the following officials: the Provincial
Governor of Cotabato, Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu, or the Chairman
of the Commission on National Integration and therefore nun and void)
G.R. No. 76487 November 9, 1990
PARAS, J. 2nd Div.

FactS:
plaintiffs-spouses are native muslims. Prior to 1952, Talinanap Matualaga bought a
parcel of land with an area of 54 Hectares. The land was, however, surveyed in the
name of Bangon Yu (father of plaintiff Melencio Yu. Lot was subdivided into 5
lots

● Lot No. 1 for Bengon Yu;

● Lot No. 2 for Melencio Yu;
● Lot No. 3 for Dominga Pinagawang;
● Lot No. 4 for Talinanap Matualaga and
● Lot No. 5 for Ison Yu (the brother of plaintiff Melencio Yu).

Melencio Yu, together with his wife, Talinanap Matualaga filed respective Free
Patent Application for both Lot Nos. 4 and 2. The owner's copy of said title,
however, was not received by the patentee Melencio Yu because the same was
given to defendant John Z. Sycip

Alfonso Non deceived Melencio in signing a document it turned out that the deeds
involved the sale of the whole parcel of land consisting of more than 54 hectares in
favor of John Sycip for a consideration of P9,500.00.

private respondents filed a complaint against John Z. Sycip for the Declaration of
Nullity of Document and Recovery of Possession of Real Property with a prayer for a
writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages.

trial court upheld the right of the private respondents. CA affirmed in toto CFI. Lot
No. 2 however was not revocered.

ISsue: Whether the sale of lot No. 2 is null and void?

Held: YES!

It is not disputed that the private respondents are Muslims who belong to the
cultural minority or non-Christian Filipinos as members of the Maguindanao
Tribe.
 185

Any transaction, involving real property with them is governed by the provisions of
Sections 145 and 146 of the Revised Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu,
Section 120 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141),

as amended, and Republic Act No. 3872, further amending the Public Land Act.

All the documents declared null and void or inexistent by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals were found to have been falsified in Civil
Case No. 969;

without consideration and more importantly without approval by any of the following
officials: the Provincial Governor of Cotabato, Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu,
or the Chairman of the Commission on National Integration and therefore null and
void.
 186

employee was
ST. LOUIS REALTY vs. CA & Aramil ( St. Louis Realty's
grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and
Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday
Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation
of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification)
G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984
AQUINO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio but without
permission of Doctor Arami an advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE
HEART IS"

The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969.
Doctor Aramil a neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon
Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake.

On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty the following letter of protest:

my house at the above-mentioned address and implying that it belonged to

another person.

The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge
of advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor
Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology was
published.

Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary
damages of P110K. Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if
Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in the Manila Times

Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new
advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house. But it did
not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error.

Aramil filed his complaint for damages. trial court awarded Aramil damages. CA
affirmed RTC.

Issue: Whether Realty is laible for damages on the ground of negligent in mixing up
the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely?
Held: YES!
 187

The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and
2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions
mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and
omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.

employee was grossly negligent in

St. Louis Realty's
mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely
circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made
any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a
cavalier "rectification ".

Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted,
lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio
had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily
exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.
 188

JOSE Ledesma vs. CA et al ( We find no reason why the findings of the trial and
appellate courts should be reversed; It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo
went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's
neglect of duty and callousness )
G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the
West Visayas College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as treasurer.

Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students
of the school.

"the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans was against school rules
and regulations.

Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing
her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that

she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from

the school.

MR denied, Delmo, thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of
Public Schools. Dir. directs that appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, be not deprived
of any award, citation or honor from the school, if they are otherwise entitled
thereto

On the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another telegram from the
Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was
impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the program as one
of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain student

instead of being awarded the Latin honor of

Magna Cum Laude.

Delmo filed action for damages against the petitioner. During the pendency of the
action, however, Delmo passed away. RTC ruled in favor of Delmo. CA affirmed
RTC.

Hence the case at bar.

 189

Issue: Whether petitioner is libale for damages in not awarding delmo with honors as
order by the Dir?

Held; YES!

We find no reason why the findings of the trial and

appellate courts should be reversed.
It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was
brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness.

Thus, moral damages are but proper.

The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate

omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the
petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision.

Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the

petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could
have done so considering that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even
though he sent it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole
of it which consisted of only three pages.

Moreover, the petitioner should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the
girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision.
 190

ROGELIO ABERCA, et al vs. Ge. Fer et al ( We find merit in petitioners'

contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal
arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. )
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
YAP, J. En Banc

Facts:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of
the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of AFP Task Force
Makabansa rdered by Gen. Ver

"to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)

underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila

plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some
period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers;

Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-
General Estelito Mendoza, alleging that

(1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended;

(2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are
immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties;
and

(3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants.

RTC granted Motion to Dismiss. Hence the case at bar

Issue: Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a
civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel
and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution?
 191

Held: YES!

We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.

At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to

provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and

freedoms enshrined in the Constitution.

Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity.
In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is
strongest to yield — borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee —

to the law of force rather than the force of law,

it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are
immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious
demands of the ruling power.

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents

postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle
of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or
function In support of said contention.

We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity

from suit totally misplaced.
 192

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of

the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim,
"to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in
accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of
martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-
emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses.

But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving

commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard
or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and
protected by the Constitution.

The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or
low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.

We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of

action is barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

suspension of the
.We find merit in petitioners' contention that the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights.

The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention.
What is suspended is

merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through
the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

May a superior
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition.
officer under the notion of respondent superior be
answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates,
to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?

Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the
language of Article 32.
 193

The law speaks of an

officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for

the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.

Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for
the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of
cause of action the complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba.

The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted
hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all
of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
 194

MERARDO Zapanta vs. Agustin Montesa et al ( Should the question for

annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's
consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is
obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction
for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment
of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of
the crime of bigamy )
G.R. No. L-14534 February 28, 1962 Superseded by new cases
DIZON, J. En Banc

Facts:
Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpi Yco an information for Bigamy was filed
by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in CFI Bulacan alleging that

the latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin, and without said
marriage having been dissolved,

contracted a second marriage with said complainant.

Petitioner filed in CFI Pampanga against respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the
annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation.
petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case to suspend proceedings
therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case.

Judge denied motion and MR. petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No.
3405 to suspend proceedings therein, on the ground that the determination of the
issue involved in Civil Case

Issue: Whether there is a prejudicial question which calls for the suspension of the
criminal case?

Held: YES

We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which

● arises in a case,
● the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and
● the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal

The prejudicial question — we further said —

 195

● must be determinative of the case before the court,

● and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court

These requisites are present in the case at bar.

Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence,
petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation,

it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of
his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan.

issue involved in the action for the annulment

Thus, the
of the second marriage is determinative of
petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of
bigamy.

On the other hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's
marriage with respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said court.

In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the

defendant in a case for bigamy claims that the

first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in
another court, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before
the action for bigamy can proceed.

There is no reason not to apply the same rule when the contention of
the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he entered
into it because of duress, force and intimidation.
 196

Juliana Yap vs. Martin Paras & Jdg. Barcelon ( On the basis of the issues raised
in both the criminal and civil cases against petitioner and in the light of the
foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a
prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro
Ras' defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of
the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Piche )
GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992
CRUZ, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent Martin Paras.
1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate estate for P300.
Nineteen years later, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for
P5,000. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.

When Yap learned of the second sale , she filed a complaint for
estafa against Paras and Saya-ang before Provincial prosecutor. On the same
date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the
said sale before RTC Gen San.
Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with MCTC South
Cotobato. before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu proprio issued an
order dismissing the criminal case on the ground of
prejudicial question to a civil action. MR denied.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether a prejudicial question warrants the dismissa of the criminal case

Held: NO! Suspension Lang!

The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the respondent judge
did indeed commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio
issuing the order of dismissal.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by this
Court on July 7, 1988, provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.

 197

We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as
to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil
action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused". 6

It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal
action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.