SECTION 6.

– RIGHT TO CHOOSE ABODE &

RIGHT TO TRAVEL AT HOME & OUT OF
COUNTRY

The liberty of abode and of changing the same

within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as may provided by the
law.
1. Right to choose a person’s abode –
may be limited only upon lawful order of a
court
2. Right to travel both at home & going
out of country – may be limited by
administrative authorities as may be
provided by law in the interest of national
security, public safety, public health

Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel

 

Villiavicencio v. Lukban – Deported prostitutes

 No law authorizing the Mayor
DOCTRINE: There is always a law or statute that
enables a person of authority to displace a
person. Philippine Penal Law specifically
punishes any public officer who, not being
expressly authorized by law or regulation,
compels any person to change his residence.
 Manila Mayor Lukban ordered segregated
district for 170 women of ill repute
o Women were kept confined to their
houses
 City authorities perfected arrangements
with Bureau of Labor for sending women to
Davao as laborers
o Some women eventually married, some
continued working as prostitutes, some
 disappeared, and some found their way
back to Manila
 Relatives & friends of deportees filed
habeas corpus petition with SC
 Manila City fiscal said writ should not be
granted
o Petitioners have no standing
o Petition should have been filed in CFI of
Davao
o Also admitted that some women were
sent without their consent
 Court granted writ of habeas corpus,
ordering mayor to produce women in court
o None were presented
o Fiscal reiterated objections
o Fiscal showed affidavits that they are
already content with their lives in Davao
 Court issued another order to bring before
the court the women not in Manila and if
they wish to renounce their return, they
 must voluntarily write statements before
the CFI of Davao
o Respondents reported 81 renounced, 59
returned, 26 could not be found
 Counsel for petitioners moved that (R)
should be held in contempt of court
ISSUE: W/N acts of Manila Mayor had legal
basis? (NO)
SC: THERE IS NO LAW WHICH EMPOWERS
MAYOR OF MANILA TO ENFORCE ANY CITIZEN
OF THE PHILIPPINES TO CHANGE THEIR
DOMICILE FROM MANILA TO ANY OTHER
LOCALITY
 Liberty of abode is deeply embedded
principle in jurisprudence & considered so
elementary in nature as not even to
require a constitutional sanction
 Remedies for Official Oppression:
o (1) Civil action
 o (2) Criminal action
o (3) Habeas Corpus (speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint)
 Defense of respondents:
o Petitioners had no standing
 Court: Impossible for women to
apply for habeas corpus themselves.
Friends & relatives therefore
o CFI Davao, not SC has jurisdiction
 *eye roll*
 Petitioners & their counsel were in
Manila, where the SC is
 Not shown that Davao CFI was in
session
o That persons in question are not
restrained of their liberty since they are
free in Davao w/o any restraint
 Court: forcible taking of women
from Manila deprived them of
 freedom of locomotion as if they
were jailed
 Because they did not have any
money or personal belongings, they
can’t go wherever they want when
they were brought to Davao
 (R) have liability to bring them back
if they can deport those women
 Respondents were not cited in contempt
when they complied with the 2nd order of
the court
o But Mayor Lukban was still fined 100 as
nominal fine for not complying with 1st
order

Marcos v. Manglapus – Right to return in the

country not included
 Right to return home is not contemplated
in Sec. 6, Art. III but it is a protected right
 under ICCPR (customary international law)
(it is protected but not one of the rights
mentioned in the Bill of Rights Sec. 6)
 Was it valid that Former Pres. Aquino to
ban them? YES – there were threats of
more coups against and for Marcos family
& residual power of the President
DOCTRINE: The right to return is not
contemplated on the Bill of Rights. It may be
considered as a generally accepted principle of
law, but it is distinct and separate from the
right to travel and enjoys a different protection
under the ICCPR against “being arbitrarily
deprived of.”
 In February 1986, Mr. Marcos was ousted
from the presidency and sentenced into
exile in Hawaii. Three years later, on his
deathbed, he requested President Aquino
to allow him and his family to return to the
country.
  President Aquino barred the return of Mr.
Marcos and his family.
 The Marcoses believe that they have the
right to return, as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights.
o They further cite the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights as justifications. 
ISSUE: W/N Marcos and his family have the
right to return to the Philippines, in
accordance with the Bill of Rights.
SC: Marcoses do not have the right to return to
the Philippines as this right is not specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights which only
covers the liberty of abode and right to travel.
 Right to return is distinct & separate from
right to travel
 RIGHT TO RETURN IS NOT COVERED BY
BILL OF RIGHTS
o It is covered by territorial rules & border
laws bound by national security
o Marcos has right to travel but no right
to return to the PH
 Residual power of the president to protect
general welfare (Art. 2 Secs. 4 & 5)
o Must balance power to protect general
welfare against rights of individuals
 RETURN OF MARCOSES POSES A THREAT
TO NATIONAL SECURITY (AS EXHIBITED BY
THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY & FAILED
COUP BY MARCOS SUPPORTERS) THERE IS
SUFFICIENT REASON TO BAR THEIR
RETURN
 The right to return enjoys a different
protection under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Yap v. CA – Not disallowed, merely requiring
certification from Mayor prior to change of
residence
 CA imposed: 5.5M bail and condition that
Yap must secure a mayor’s certificate for
evert change of residence
 The condition does not violate Sec. 6
because you just only need to inform the
court and does not impair his liberty to
abode
DOCTRINE: The right to change abode and
travel within the Philippines are not absolute
rights. The order of CA releasing petitioner on
bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by Sec. 6 Art. III.
 Petitioner Yap was convicted by the RTC of
Pasig City of estafa from misappropriating
P5.5 million.
 The RTC denied his motion for provisional
liberty.
  On his appeal to the CA, he filed for a
motion to fix bail where he was granted
such but at the excessive amount of P5.5
million with conditions that he must
secure a mayor’s certificate for every
change of residence.
 The SC ruled that the bail was indeed
excessive, as bail should not equal
punishment.
o The SC reduced it to P200k. The SC held
that such bail amount is necessary
because petitioner had tried to leave
the country several times.
o As for the conditions on the bail the SC
held that such CA decision requiring
such is the exception to the rule in Sec.
6 that the liberty of abode cannot be
impaired “except upon lawful order of
the court.”
Spark v. QC – Curfew ordinances
  https://abogado.com.ph/sc-upholds-
curfew-in-qc-but-not-in-manila-navotas/
 1. Can the right to travel of minors can be
limited? – YES, security
 2. In limiting the right to travel of minors,
are they the same standard of adults? –
NO, because higher security is needed for
protection of minors
 3. How can the right to travel of minors in
this impair the right of minors? –
(requirement of Police Power of the State:
public necessity and reasonableness)
Reasonableness is questioned. You can
limit the right to travel of minors but only
QC was able to hurdle the requirements
of the constitution: if the children are
pursuing their other rights and it is
necessary for them to travel… (religion,
free speech, peaceably assemble)
 RIGHT TO TRAVEL IS AN ENABLER OF
OTHER RIGHTS
DOCTRINE:
 Amidst the Duterte administration's plan to
implement a nationwide curfew for minors,
the city governments of Manila, Q.C and
Navotas began implementing curfew
ordinances in the same vein, which earned
the ire of petitioners, contesting the
constitutionality of the ordinances on the
grounds that it tramples on constitutional
rights of minors to travel and parents to
rear their children, its provisions do nor
provide enough clarity and parameters for
its enforcement, the lack of compelling
state interest in implementing such
ordinances and that there are certain
ordinance penal provisions (Manila) that
violates RA 9344.
 The court held that the ordinances do not
trample the particular constitutional rights,
nor do they constitute ambiguity to fall
under void for vagueness.
 o However, through the strict scurtiny
test, it was found that only Q.C's
ordinance managed to prove that there
is a compelling state interest involved
and that it was narrowly drawn enough
to minimize clashes with other
constitutional rights, unlike Navotas and
Manila which was not narrowly draw
enough to minimize interference, and in
the case of Manila, contains penal
provisions that are violative of RA 9344
concerning penalties on minors.
 In the end, the petition was partly granted,
with the QC ordinances' constitutionality
affirmed and the other two ordinances
deemed unconstitutional and null
Genuino v. De Lima – WLO is not a HDO
 This case is about politicizing the rule of
law
 WLO is not a HDO!
DOCTRINE: Supreme Court struck down DOJ
Circular No. 41 as unconstitutional as it violates
one’s constitutional right to travel, and that
there is no law which authorizes the Secretary
of Justice to issue Hold Departure Orders
(HDO), Watch List Orders (WLO), or allow
departure orders (ADO).
In said ruling, the Supreme Court further
emphasized that the power to issue HDO is
“inherent to the courts”, and it “does not
require legislative conferment or
constitutional recognition”; it co-exists with
the grant of judicial power.”
 (Acting Sec. Agra) DOJ Circular No. 41 s.
2010 (Consolidated Rules and Regulations
Governing Issuance and Implementation of
HDO, WLO and ADO) was being questioned
for infringing constitutional right to travel
 After GMA ended her term as the President
and subsequent election as Pampanga rep.,
 criminal complaints were filed against her
before the DOJ
o Plunder, malversation/illegal use of
OWWA funds & public funds, graft &
corruption, violation of OEC & Code of
Ethical Standards for Public Officials,
qualified theft, etc.
o De Lima issued DOJ Watch List Order
2011-422 (pursuant to her authority
under Cir. No. 41) & included GMA in
immigration watchlist
 2 criminal complaints for Electoral
Sabotage & violation of OEC filed against
GMA and her husband Jose
o De Lima issued DOJ WLO 2011-573
against them with validity period of 60
days unless sooner terminated or
otherwise extended
 HDO No. 2011-64 issued against Genunios
et al., after criminal complaints for
Malversation
 Petitioners seek to annul & set aside
following orders
ISSUE: (1)W/N DOJ has authority to issue Cir.
No. 41 (YES); (2)W/N there is a ground to
hold DOJ Sec. guilty of contempt of Court
(Separate Proceedings)
SC: ISSUANCE OF DOJ CIRCULAR NO. 41 HAS
NO LEGAL BASIS.
 Under Sec. Art. 3 Constitution, 3
INSTANCES THAT MAY PERMIT
RESTRICTION ON RIGHT TO TRAVEL:
NATIONAL SECURITY, PUBLIC SAFETY,
PUBLIC HEALTH
 There must be an explicit provision of
statutory law or Rules of Court providing
for impairment
 NO LAW PARTICULARLY PROVIDING
AUTHORITY OF SOJ TO CURTAIL THE
EXERCISE OF RIGHT TO TRAVEL (NOR RoC)
o DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law, but a
mere administrative issuance
apparently designed to carry out the
provisions of an enabling law which the
former SOJ believed to be the
Administrative Code
o Administrative issuance must show a
valid delegation of legislative power: (a)
complete in itself, (b) fixes a standard
o DOJ cannot make rules; its authority is
confined to execution of laws
 Confined to filling the gaps &
necessary details in carrying into
effect the law
 Administrative Code simply grants DOJ the
power to investigate the commission of
 crimes and prosecute offenders, which are
basically the functions of the agency
o Does not carry with it the power to
indiscriminately devise all means it
deems proper in functions without
regard to constitutionally protected
rights.
 DOJ CIRCULAR NO. 41 DOES NOT HAVE AN
ENABLING LAW WHERE IT COULD HAVE
DERIVED ITS AUTHORITY TO INTERFERE
WITH THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO
TRAVEL, THEREFORE, SUCH IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL (ultra vires)