were only aware of the aforementioned constitutional
provision and decision, he would have cut short the
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118118. August 14, 1995.]
ALFREDO GUIEB, petitioner, vs.
HON. LUIS M. FONTANILLA, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Branch 42, Dagupan City,
and MANUEL ASUNCION,
respondents.
Orlando C. de Guzman for petitioner.
Aquilino P. Bollinas for respondent Manuel Asuncion.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; BARANGAY ELECTIONS;
ELECTION CONTEST; JURISDICTION. — Under
paragraph (2), Section 2, subdivision C, Article IX of
the Constitution, it is the COMELEC, and not the
Regional Trial Courts, that has exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective barangay officials
decided by courts of limited jurisdiction, which are
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. In Flores vs.
Commission on Elections, this Court struck out as
unconstitutional that portion of Section 9 of R.A. No.
6679 vesting upon the Regional Trial Courts appellate
jurisdiction over such cases.
2.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; JUDGES; MUST KNOW
THE LIMITS OF AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION OF
HIS COURT; CASE AT BAR. — It must be noted that a
judge is presumed to know the constitutional limits of
the authority or jurisdiction of his court. He is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the laws and procedural laws; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
requires that a judge should be "studious of the
principles of the law." Thus, if the respondent judge
journey of a very simple case and put an end to the
litigation.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J :p
Revealed in this case is the parties' and the lower
court judges' unfamiliarity with or ignorance of the
constitutional provision on the appellate jurisdiction
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
election contests involving elective barangay officials
and of the decision of this Court declaring
unconstitutional a provision of law vesting upon
Regional Trial Courts appellate jurisdiction over the
said cases.
We find it unnecessary to resolve the issue raised by
the petitioner, viz., whether or not a vote for a
candidate for an office to which he did not seek to be
elected is valid. We shall, instead, deal with the
validity of the challenged decision.
The antecedents are uncomplicated and
uncontroverted.
The petitioner and the private respondent were
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, in the
barangay election of 9 May 1994. After the canvass of
votes in the said barangay, the former was
proclaimed as the winning candidate. The latter then
seasonably filed an election protest with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan.
On 27 May 1994, the MTC, per Judge Lilia C. Español,
rendered a decision confirming the proclamation of
the petitioner and dismissing the protest of the
private respondent. 1
The private respondent appealed the decision to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. The case
was assigned to Branch 42 thereof.
In its decision 2 of 31 August 1994, the RTC, per
respondent Judge Luis M. Fontanilla, reversed the
decision of the MTC, annulled the proclamation of
the petitioner, and declared the private respondent
as the winning candidate with a plurality of four votes
over the petitioner.
After the petitioner's motion for reconsiderations 3 of
the decision was denied 4 on 25 November 1994, the
private respondent immediately filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution.
In its order of 8 December 1994, 5 the RTC declared
that the motion should be properly filed with the
court of origin and that the decision of 31 August
1994 had already become final; it then ordered the
remand of the records of the case to the MTC of Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan, for proper disposition.
On 12 December 1994, the petitioner filed with this
Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition
for review on certiorari. On 29 December 1994, he
sent by registered mail his petition, which this Court
received only on 25 January 1995. It turned out,
however, that his motion for extension of time to file a
petition had already been denied on 4 January 1995
for his failure to submit an affidavit of service of that
motion. On 8 February 1995, he filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the denial.
Meanwhile, on 20 December 1994, the private
respondent filed with the MTC a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution. 6
In its order of 19 January 1995, the MTC deferred
action on the said motion and required the
petitioner's counsel to inform the court of the status
of his petition with this Court. 7 For failure of the
petitioner's counsel to comply with the said order, the
court issued an order on 7 February 1995 8 granting
the issuance of a writ of execution. On 13 February
1995, however, the court received the said counsel's
Compliance dated 9 February 1995, 9 wherein he
informed the court of the petitioner's motion to
reconsider this Court's resolution denying the motion
for extension of time to file his petition.
In the resolution of 8 February 1995, this Court
required the respondent to comment on the petition.
On 16 February 1995, the petitioner filed with the
MTC an Urgent Motion to Stay and/or Suspend
Execution. 10 This motion was, however, denied 11
on the ground that the writ, having been hand-
carried by the private respondent to the office of the
sheriff, must have already been implemented and,
therefore, the motion to stay or suspend the same
has become moot and academic.
On 20 March 1995, the sheriff returned the writ of
execution with the information that in the presence of
a barangay kagawad and barangay residents, he
enforced the writ and proclaimed the private
respondent as Punong Barangayof Barangay
Nilomot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. 12
In view of the issue involved, we resolved to give due
course to the petition.
The RTC had absolutely no jurisdiction over the
appeal interposed by the private respondent from the
decision of the MTC.
Under paragraph (2), Section 2, subdivision C, Article
IX of the Constitution, 13 it is the COMELEC, and not
the Regional Trial Courts, that has exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
barangay officials decided by courts of limited
jurisdiction, which are the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts. 14 In Flores vs. Commission on Elections, 15
this Court struck out as unconstitutional, that portion
of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679 vesting upon the
Regional Trial Courts appellate jurisdiction over such
cases.
The private respondent should have appealed the
decision of the MTC to the COMELEC; the MTC
should not have given due course to the appeal; and
the RTC should have dismissed outright the appeal
for want of jurisdiction.
In accepting the appeal and deciding the case on its
merits, the respondent judge manifested either
ignorance or palpable disregard of the aforesaid
constitutional provision and decision. It must be
noted that a judge is presumed to know the
constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of
his court. He is called upon to exhibit more than just
a cursory acquaintance with the laws and procedural
laws; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic
legal principles. 16 Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics requires that a judge should be "studious of
the principles of the law." Thus, if the respondent
judge were only aware of the aforementioned
constitutional provision and decision, he would have
cut short the journey of a very simple case and put
an end to the litigation. What this Court stated in
Aducayen vs. Flores 17 deserves reiteration:
approach to the discharge of judicial functions to
avoid the imputation that there is on the part of a
number of judges less than full and adequate
comprehension of the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
challenged decision of 31 August 1994 of Branch 42
of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City and its
order of 25 November 1994 denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE
and ANNULLED for lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the said court to entertain and decide the appeal.
The decision of 27 May 1994 of the Municipal Trial
Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, is hereby
declared final for failure of the private respondent to
appeal the same before the proper forum, and the
writ of execution to enforce the decision of the
Regional Trial Court is hereby SET ASIDE and
ANNULLED.
Costs against the private respondent.

Nor is this all that has to be said. There is need, it SO ORDERED.

does seem, to caution anew judges of inferior courts,
which according to the Constitution refer to all those ||| (Guieb v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 118118, August 14,
outside this Tribunal, to exercise greater care in the 1995)
discharge of their judicial functions. They are called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.
Moreover, while it becomes hourly difficult to keep
abreast of our ever-increasing decisions, a modicum
of effort should be exerted by them not to lag too far
behind. Nor is it too much to expect that they betray
awareness of well-settled and authoritative doctrines.
If such were the case, then resort to us would be less
frequent. That way our time could be devoted to
questions of greater significance. Not only that, there
would be on the part of party litigants less expense
and greater faith in the administration of justice if
there be a belief on their part that the occupants of
the bench cannot justly be accused of an apparent
deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. Such an
indictment unfortunately cannot just be dismissed as
a manifestation of chronic fault-finding. The situation
thus calls for a more conscientious and diligent
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123673. June 19, 1997.]
PEDRO C. CALUCAG, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Manila; THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 04,
TUGUEGARAO, CAGAYAN and
CESAR CARBONEL, respondents.
Edgar S. Orro for petitioner.
Dominador M. Narag for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; BARANGAY ELECTION; ELECTION
PROTEST; APPEAL; SEC. 9 OF R.A. NO. 6679,
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; EFFECTS
THEREOF CASE AT BAR. — The Court has
categorically pronounced in Flores vs. Commission
on Election, (G.R. No. 89604, April 20, 1990) that
Section 9 of RA No. 6679, insofar as it provides that
the decision of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial
Court in a barangay election case should be
appealed to the Regional Trial Court, is
unconstitutional. Said pronouncements is hereby
reiterated. The section is in direct contravention of
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing
that the COMELEC shall: "(e)xercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction ." Section
9 of R.A. No. 6679 was declared unconstitutional
even if it was not squarely and properly challenged
by Flores. Despite the non-compliance by Flores with
the requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional
question, the Court felt that it was fruitless to wait for
the issue to be raised anew, perhaps in the next
barangay elections, before being resolved. Technical
obstacles were disregarded so that the defect in R.A.
No. 6679 may be brought the attention of Congress
and the same be corrected. At the time Flores was
resolved, there was as yet no pronouncement on the
constitutionality of said Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679,
such that the Court held that Flores had a right to rely
on its presumed validity. He merely relied on said law
when he appealed the decision of the MTC to the
RTC. His subsequent appeal to the COMELEC was,
therefore, considered to have been made directly
from the MTC, thereby disregarding the detour to the
RTC. It follows that after the promulgation of Flores,
the same arguments propounded therein by the
petitioner may no longer be employed. Article 8 of the
Civil Code states that "(j)udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines." Said
pronouncement of the Court, having formed part of
the law of the land, ignorance thereof can no longer
be countenanced. Therefore, the COMELEC is the
proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to
hear the appeal, which appeal must be filed within
five days after the promulgation of the MTC's
decision. The erroneous filing of the appeal with the
RTC did not toll the running of the prescriptive period.
Petitioner filed his notice of appeal only on August 12,
1994, or one month and twenty six days from the
time he received a copy of the MTC's decision on
June 16, 1994. The five-day period, having expired
without the aggrieved party filing the appropriate
appeal before the COMELEC, the statutory privilege
of petitioner to appeal is deemed waived and the
appealed decision has become final and executory.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A MERE STATUTORY PRIVILEGE
WHICH MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE MANNER
PRESCRIBED BY LAW. — Petitioner's contention that
the COMELEC erred in disallowing the case based
on sheer technicalities is likewise unmeritorious. The
COMELEC dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction, based on his failure to perfect
his appeal on time. That this is NOT A TECHNICALITY
is correctly pointed out in the questioned order citing
various jurisprudence. Granting that petitioner paid
the appeal fees on time, he chose the wrong forum;
the payment, therefor, having been done after the
lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. In
support of his arguments petitioner cites the case of
Roleto Pahilan vs. Rudy Tabalba, (230 SCRA 205
[1994]) wherein the Court proceeded to rule on the
election protest brought to it which was dismissed in
the trial court due to incomplete payment of docket
fees. The Court stated that the trial court had "no
basis for the dismissal of petitioner's protest for the
simple reason that an election contest is not an
ordinary civil action. Consequently, the rules
governing ordinary civil actions are not necessarily
binding on special actions like an election contest
wherein public interest will be adversely affected. . . .
The rules which apply to ordinary civil actions may
not necessarily serve the purpose of election cases,
especially if we consider the fact that election laws
are to be accorded utmost liberality in their
interpretation and application bearing in mind always
that the will of the people must be upheld. Ordinary
civil actions would generally involve private interests
while election cases are, at all times, invested with
public interests while all election cases are, at all
times, invested with public interest which cannot be
defeated by mere procedural and technical
infirmities." The Court, however, in Rodillas vs.
COMELEC [245 SCRA 702 (1995); citing Dorego vs.
Perez, 22 SCRA 8 (1968), and Bello vs. Fernandez, 4
SCRA 135 (1962)] categorically made a
pronouncement that "the requirement of an appeal
fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or
procedure. It is an essential requirement without
which the decision to be appealed from would
become final and executory as if no appeal was filed
at all. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by, and in accordance with, the provision of the law ."
IHCE SD
DECISION
ROMERO, J : p
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court questioning the dismissal of
petitioner's appeal before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) on the ground of prescription
of time for filing an appeal.
Petitioner Pedro Calucag and private respondent
Cesar Carbonel were both candidates for Barangay
Captain in Barangay Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan during the May 9, 1994 elections. Petitioner
garnered 478 votes while private respondent
obtained 477 votes or a difference of one vote.
Private respondent filed an election protest with the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4 of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan praying for the judicial recount of the
ballots cast and the annulment of the proclamation
of petitioner. As agreed upon by the parties, a
recount/revision of the votes/ballots was made. As a
result, private respondent obtained 491 votes as
against petitioner's 489 votes. On May 31, 1994, the
MTC promulgated a decision in open court declaring
the former as the duly elected Barangay Captain of
Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao. 1 Petitioner appealed
this ruling to the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, Branch 3 which appeal was opposed by
private respondent in a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, the proper forum being
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). 2 On July
18, 1994, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the
appeal based on such ground. 3 Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal
which was also seasonably denied. 4
On appeal, the COMELEC likewise dismissed
petitioner's case for lack of appellate jurisdiction in its
order dated August 12, 1994, which provided, inter
alia:
"Guided by the pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in the case of Flores v.
COMELEC (GR No. 89604, April 20,
1990), We have disregarded the detour
of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court
and considered this appeal direct to the
Commission from the Municipal Trial
 Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
however, unlike in Flores case, this
appeal was not perfected as it is
wanting on the required payment of
appeal fees on time, hence the
appellate jurisdiction of this
Commission does not attach.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (First
Division) hereby DISMISSES the instant
appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction."
5 (Emphasis supplied)
A motion for reconsideration of said order was filed,
but this was also denied by the Commission en banc
which found the motion to be devoid of merit, not
because of non-payment of appeal fees on proper
time but because the same was filed out of time. 6
Hence, this petition.
The main issue which must be addressed herein is
whether the COMELEC has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over election contests involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
It is high time that this question be settled definitively
to obviate situations similar to the one at bar.
The Court has categorically pronounced in Flores v.
Commission on Elections that Section 9 of R.A. No.
6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the
Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court in a barangay
election case should be appealed to the Regional
Trial Court, is unconstitutional. Said pronouncement
is hereby reiterated here. The section is in direct
contravention of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall:
"(e)xercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of
all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction."
Petitioner wishes this Court to entertain his case and
rule as it did in Flores. This, however, cannot be done
anymore even if the facts of this case were on all
fours with Flores because in said case, the petitioner,
Roque Flores, was proclaimed Punong Barangay in
accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 6679 7 after
having received the highest number of votes for
Kagawad in the March 28, 1989, elections. The
private respondent, Nobelito Rapisora, filed an
election protest with the MTC of Tayum, Abra which
sustained his arguments and installed him in place of
Flores as Punong Barangay. The latter appealed to
the RTC of Abra, which affirmed in toto the
challenged decision. Thereafter, Flores went to the
COMELEC which dismissed his appeal on the
ground that it has no power to review the decision of
the RTC. Said ruling was based on Section 9 of R.A.
No. 6679 8 which states that decisions of RTC's in
electoral contests brought to it on appeal from the
MTC regarding questions of fact shall be final and
unappealable. In resolving the petition for certiorari,
the Court supported the dismissal of the appeal, not
on the basis of said provision but on Constitutional
grounds. Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679 was declared
unconstitutional even if it was not squarely and
properly challenged by Flores. Despite the non-
compliance by Flores with the requisites of a judicial
inquiry into a constitutional question, 9 the Court felt
that it was fruitless to wait for the issue to be raised
anew, perhaps in the next barangay elections, before
being resolved. Technical obstacles were
disregarded so that the defect in R.A. No. 6679 may
be brought to the attention of Congress and the
same be corrected. cda
At the time Flores was resolved, there was as yet no
pronouncement on the constitutionality of said
Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679, such that the Court held
that Flores had a right to rely on its presumed validity.
He merely relied on said law when he appealed the
decision of the MTC to the RTC. His subsequent
appeal to the COMELEC was, therefore, considered
to have been made directly from the MTC, thereby
disregarding the detour to the RTC.
It follows that after the promulgation of Flores, the
same arguments propounded therein by the
petitioner may no longer be employed. Article 8 of the
Civil Code states that "(j)udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines." Said
pronouncement of the Court, having formed part of
the law of the land, ignorance thereof can no longer
be countenanced. Therefore, the COMELEC is the
proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to
hear the appeal, which appeal must be filed within
five days after the promulgation of the MTC's
decision. 10 The erroneous filing of the appeal with
the RTC did not toll the running of the prescriptive
period. Petitioner filed his notice of appeal only on
August 12, 1994, or one month and twenty six days
from the time he received a copy of the MTC's
decision on June 16, 1994. The five-day period,
having expired without the aggrieved party filing the
appropriate appeal before the COMELEC, the
statutory privilege of petitioner to appeal is deemed
waived and the appealed decision has become final
and executory.
Petitioner's contention that the COMELEC erred in
disallowing the case based on sheer technicalities is
likewise unmeritorious. The COMELEC dismissed
petitioner's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction,
based on his failure to perfect his appeal on time.
That this is NOT A TECHNICALITY is correctly pointed
out in the questioned order citing various
jurisprudence. Granting that petitioner paid the
appeal fees on time, he chose the wrong forum; the
payment, therefor, having been done after the lapse
of the reglementary period to appeal. In support of
his arguments petitioner cites the case of Roleto
Pahilan v. Rudy Tabalba, 11 wherein the Court
proceeded to rule on the election protest brought to it
which was dismissed in the trial court due to
incomplete payment of docket fees. The Court stated
that the trial court had "no basis for the dismissal of
petitioner's protest for the simple reason that an
election contest is not an ordinary civil action.
Consequently, the rules governing ordinary civil
actions are not necessarily binding on special
actions like an election contest wherein public
interest will be adversely affected. . . . The rules which
apply to ordinary civil actions may not necessarily
serve the purpose of election cases, especially if we
consider the fact that election laws are to be
accorded utmost liberality in their interpretation and
application bearing in mind always that the will of the
people must be upheld. Ordinary civil actions would
generally involve private interests while all election
cases are, at all times, invested with public interest
which cannot be defeated by mere procedural and
technical infirmities." The Court, however, in Rodillas
v. COMELEC 12 categorically made a
pronouncement that "the requirement of an appeal
fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or
procedure. It is an essential requirement without
which the decision to be appealed from would
become final and executory as if no appeal was filed
at all. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by, and in accordance with, the provision of the law ."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order of
the Commission on Elections en banc dated
February 1, 1996, DISMISSING the instant case for
lack of appellate jurisdiction, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Calucag v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 123673, June 19,
1997)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118861. April 27, 1995.]
EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS,
petitioner, vs. ROSITA C. CUMBA
and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
Libarios & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.ELECTION LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
JURISDICTION OVER PETITION FOR CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS IN ELECTION
CASES WHERE IT HAS EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE
JURISDICTION; DOCTRINE UNDER THE
CONSOLIDATED CASES OF GARCIA v. COMELEC. —
This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court revives the issue of whether or not
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus in election cases where it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction. In the split decision of
4 March 1992 in the consolidated cases of Garcia vs.
De Jesus (G.R. No. 88158) and Uy vs. Commission on
Elections, (G.R. Nos. 97108-09) this Court ruled in the
negative because of the absence of any specific
conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the
Constitution or by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction to
issue such extraordinary writs. It held that jurisdiction,
or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or
causes of action, must exist as a matter of law,
whether the jurisdiction is original or appellate, and
since these two classes of jurisdiction are exclusive
of each other, each must be expressly conferred by
law. One does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other.
This Court proceeded to state that in the Philippine
setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which
has always been expressly conferred either by the
Constitution or by law. It is never derived by
implication. Although the Constitution grants the
COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it
any power to exercise original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
unlike in the case of this Court which is specifically
conferred with such authority in Section 5(1) of
Article VIII. It also pointed out that the doctrine laid
down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC (101 SCRA 769 [1980])
— that neither the Constitution nor any law has
conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue such
writs — still finds application under the 1987
Constitution. In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria
vs. Commission on Elections, (211 SCRA 907 [1992])
this Court reiterated the Garcia and Uy doctrine.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING REVERSED IN CASE AT
BAR, CONSIDERING SECTION 50 OF B.P. 697. — The
respondent COMELEC, points out that Section 50 of
B.P. Blg. 697 expressly, granted it jurisdiction over the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus. Indeed, it did. And the Court agrees with
the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions
in B.P. Blg. 697 whose lifetime go beyond the 14 May
1984 election or the subsequent selection of sectoral
representatives. In fact, by the very wording of the
last paragraph of its Section 50, it is quite clear that
the exercise of the power was not restricted within a
specific period of time. Taken in the context of the
conspicuous absence of such jurisdiction as ruled in
Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, (supra) it
seems quite obvious that the grant was intended as
a remedial legislation to eliminate the seeming
incongruity or irrationality resulting in a splitting of
jurisdiction pointed out in the dissenting opinion of
Justice De Castro in the said case. But did not the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P.
Blg. 697? This Court is not unaware of the equally
settled rule in statutory construction that in the
revision or codification of laws, all parts and
provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the
revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless
the statute or code provides otherwise expressly or
impliedly. By the tenor of B.P. Blg. 697 Repealing
Clause, it does not evidently appear that the
Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all prior
election statutes and to replace them with the new
Code. It made, in fact, by the second sentence, a
reservation that all prior election statutes or parts
thereof not inconsistent with any provisions of the
Code shall remain in force. This being the case, the
Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last
paragraph of Section 50 of the Omnibus Election
Code to determine if the former is inconsistent with
any of the provisions of the latter. It found none. In the
face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as
it now does, abandon the ruling in the Garcia and Uy
and Veloria cases. We now hold that the last
paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as
follows: "The Commission is hereby vested with
exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving
election cases." remains in full force and effect but
only in such cases where, under paragraph (2),
Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the
COMELEC has the authority to issue the
extraordinary writs for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
3.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION FOR
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, MUST BE FILED
BEFORE THE PERIOD FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL;
CASE AT BAR. — That the trial court acted with
palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in
granting the petitioner's motion for execution
pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is
all too obvious. Since both the petitioner and the
private respondent received copies of the decision
on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed
within five days from 1 July 1994 or on or before 6
July 1994. Any motion for execution pending appeal
must be filed before the period for the perfection of
the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of Interim Rules
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have
supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of
Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an
appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day
for any of the parties to appeal, or on 6 July 1994. On
4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of
appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the
trial court gave due course to the appeal and
ordered the elevation of the records of the case to
the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the
trial court was divested of its jurisdiction over the
case. Since the motion for execution pending appeal
was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection
of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly
act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the
motion was filed before the perfection of the appeal.
Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, then it
correctly set aside the challenged order granting the
motion for execution pending appeal and writ of
execution issued by the trial court. cdphil
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J :p
This special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court revives the issue of
whether or not the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election
cases where it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction. In the split decision of 4 March 1992
in the consolidated cases of Garcia vs. De Jesus
and Uy vs. Commission on Elections, 1 this Court
ruled in the negative because of the absence of
any specific conferment upon the COMELEC,
either by the Constitution or by legislative fiat, of
jurisdiction to issue such extraordinary writs. It
held that jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear
and determine a cause or causes of action, must
exist as a matter of law, whether the jurisdiction
is original or appellate, and since these two
classes of jurisdiction are exclusive of each other,
each must be expressly conferred by law. One
does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other. This
Court proceeded to state that in the Philippine
setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which
has always been expressly conferred either by
the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by
implication. Although the Constitution grants the
COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant
it any power to exercise original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, unlike in the case of this Court which
is specifically conferred with such authority in
Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that
the doctrine laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC
2 — that neither the Constitution nor any law has
conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue
such writs — still finds application under the 1987
Constitution. prLL
In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria
vs. Commission on Elections, 3 this Court
reiterated the Garcia and Uy doctrine.
In the challenged resolution at bench, the
respondent COMELEC adhered to the affirmative
view of the issue, citing as authority therefor its
own decision of 29 July 1993 in Dictado vs.
Cosico and the last paragraph of Section 50 of
B.P. Blg. 697, which reads:
Sec. 50.Definition. —
xxx xxx xxx
The Commission is hereby vested with
exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus involving election cases.
The petitioner herein pleads that this
resolution be set aside and nullified for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He
contends that while the COMELEC's position is
inherently compelling, it deserves scant
consideration in view of Garcia and Uy and
Veloria and the nature and purpose of B.P. Blg.
697 which was to govern solely the Batasan
Pambansa election of 14 May 1984; hence, it was
a temporary statute which self-destructed after
such election.
The antecedent facts that led to the filing
of this action are uncomplicated and undisputed.
In the synchronized elections of 11 May
1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita
Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor
in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del
Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning
candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two
votes over the former.
Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner
filed an election protest with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was
assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.
On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per
Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to
have won with a margin of six votes over the
private respondent and rendered judgment in
favor of the petitioner as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
results, the court hereby declares the
protestant as having won the mayoralty
election and as duly elected Mayor of
the Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan
del Norte in the local election held on
May 11, 1992, the protestant having
obtained six (6) votes more than that of
the protestee's votes. Cdpr
Copies of the decision were sent to and
received by the petitioner and the private
respondent on 1 July 1994.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent
appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing
her notice of appeal and paying the appellate
docket fees.
On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due
course to the appeal.
On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with
the trial court a motion for execution pending
appeal, which the private respondent opposed
on 22 July 1994.
On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted
the petitioner's motion for execution pending
appeal. The corresponding writ of execution was
forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private
respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration of
the order of execution and the sheriff held in
abeyance the implementation of the writ. This
motion was denied on 5 August 1994.
The private respondent then filed with the
respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to
annul the aforesaid order of the trial court
granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and the writ of execution. The petition
was docketed as SPR No. 1-94.
On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC
promulgated its resolution granting the petition. 4
The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVES that is [sic] has
exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus in election cases as
authorized by law, and therefore,
assumes jurisdiction of the instant
petition for certiorari which is hereby
GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo
of August 3, 1994 is hereby declared
NULL and VOID and the Writ of
Execution issued on August 4, 1994
LIFTED.
Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is
ordered restored to her position as
Municipal Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan
del Norte, pending resolution of the
appeal before this Commission in the
case of Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC
No. 108-94.
In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus cases, the
respondent COMELEC maintains that there is a
special law granting it such jurisdiction, viz.,
Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full
force as it was not expressly repealed by the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), and that it
is not exactly correct that this law self-destructed
after the May 1984 election. It further reasoned
out that in the performance of its judicial
functions, the COMELEC is the most logical body
to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases
where it has appellate jurisdiction. It ratiocinated
as follows:
It is therefore clear that if there is a law
which specifically confers jurisdiction to
issue the prerogative Writs, then the
Commission has jurisdiction. LLphil
Such a law exists. Section 50, BP Blg.
697 is that law.
BP Blg. 697, approved on March 14,
1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN
THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE
BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14,
1984 AND THE SELECTION OF
SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES
THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES." Section 50 provides:
"Section 50.Definition. — Pre-
proclamation controversy
refers to any question
pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the Board of
Canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate,
political party or coalition of
political parties before the
board or directly with the
Commission.
The Commission on Elections
shall be the sole judge and
shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over all pre-proclamation
controversies.
 The Commission is hereby
vested with exclusive authority
to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus involving election
cases." (Italics Supplied).
We have debated among ourselves
whether Section 50, BP Blg. 697, has
been repealed. We have come to the
conclusion that it has not been
repealed. The repealing provision in the
Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881,
December 3, 1985), provides:
"Sec. 282.Repealing Clause. —
Presidential Decree No. 1296
otherwise known as the The
1978 Election Code, as
amended, is hereby repealed.
All other election laws, decrees,
executive orders, rules and
regulations or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions
of this Code is hereby repealed,
except Presidential Decree No.
1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg.
20 governing the election of the
members of the Sangguniang
Pampook of Regions IX and
XII." (Italics supplied).
BP Blg. 697 has not been expressly
repealed, and Section 50 thereof is not
inconsistent with the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code. Besides, in the
cited Garcia/Uy cases, as reiterated in
the Veloria case, the Supreme Court
itself said, reiterating previous cases,
that implied repeal of statutes is
frowned upon, thus:
"Just as implied repeal of
statutes is frowned upon, so
also should the grant of original
jurisdiction by mere implication
to a quasi-judicial body be
tabooed." (Garcia/Uy/Veloria
Cases: Italics supplied). Lex Lib
xxx xxx xxx
"It is equally clear that
Executive Order No. 90 . . . did
not modify or repeal, whether
expressly or impliedly, Section
23 of P.D. No. 1752. It is
common place learning that
implied repeal ere not favored
in law and are not casually to
be assumed. The first effort of a
court must always be to
reconcile or adjust the
provisions of one statute with
those of another so as to give
sensible effect to both
provisions (Jalandoni vs.
Andaya, 55 SCRA 261 (1974);
Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA
190, 196-197 (1971); National
Power Corporation vs. ARCA, 25
SCRA 931 (1968); U.S. vs.
Palacios, 33 Phil. 208 (1916);
and Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, Inc. vs.
Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
Only when there is clear
inconsistency and conflict
between the provisions of two
(2) statutes, may a court hold
that the provisions later in point
of time have impliedly repealed
the earlier ones" (Philippine
American Management Co.,
Inc. vs. Philippine American
Management Employees
Association, 49 SCRA 194
(1973); and Villegas vs. Subido,
41 SCRA 190 (1971). (Larga vs.
Ranada, Jr., No. L-7976, August
3, 1984, 164 SCRA 25).
It was even suggested that Batas
Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed after
the Batasang Pambansa elections of
1984, because of the provisions of
Section 1 (Title and Applicability) which
provides: "This act shall be known and
cited as 'The Law on the 1984 Batasang
Pambansa Election.' It shall govern the
election for the regular Batasang
Pambansa which shall be held on May
14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral
representatives thereafter as provided
by the Constitution."
While that may be true with most of its
provisions which were applicable only
for the particular election (like election
and campaign periods, voting
constituency, etc.) most if not all of the
remaining provisions could be
applicable to future elections. It is not
lost to the Commission that BP Blg. 697
was passed also "for other purposes."
But the important consideration is that
the authority granted to the
Commission under BP Blg. 697 is not
inconsistent with our election laws. It
should be mentioned that the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6636
which governed the local elections of
January 18, 1988, as to the number of
councilors in specified cities (Sec. 3)
and the number of Sanggunian
members in different provinces and
cities (Sec. 4) are still applicable up to
this day. In fact, it became one of the
important controlling provisions which
governed the May 11, 1992 elections. If
provisions of Republic Act No. 6636
which are not inconsistent with the
present election laws did not self-
destruct, why should Section 50 of BP
Blg. 697?
Another provision which did not self-
destruct is that which provides "that any
city or municipal judge, who includes or
excludes any voter without any legal
basis in inclusion and exclusion
proceedings, shall be guilty of an
election offense," although this
provision is found in Section 10 of
Executive Order No. 134 supposedly
with limited application as the enabling
act for the elections for Members of
Congress on May 11, 1987 and for other
purposes. Lex Lib
Clearly, the intent of the law was to give
certiorari jurisdiction to the Commission
on Elections because the Pimentel case
said there was none, to fill a void in the
law, and avoid an incongruous
situation.
"A statutes's clauses and
phrases must not be taken
separately but in its relation to
the statue's totality. Each
statute must, in fact, be
construed as to 'harmonize it
with the pre-existing body of
laws.' Unless clearly repugnant,
provisions of statutes must be
reconciled. . ." (Commissioner
of Customs vs. ESSO Standard
Eastern, Inc. L-28329, August 7,
1975, 66 SCRA 113).
xxx xxx xxx
The statutory construction rule
is: "When the Legislature
enacts a provision, it is
understood that it is aware of
previous, statutes relating to
the same subject matter and
that in the absence of any
express repeal or amendment
therein, the new provision
should be deemed enacted
pursuant to the legislative
policy embodied in the prior
statutes." (Legaspi vs. Executive
Secretary, L-36153, November
28, 1975, 68 SCRA 253).
The Commission is the most logical
body whenever it performs judicial
functions to take jurisdiction of petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus because it has appellate
jurisdiction in election cases granted by
the Constitution itself. The Court of
Appeals has no more appellate
jurisdiction over such cases. And in the
case of the Supreme Court, Justice de
Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out,
in his dissenting opinion, that under the
Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in election cases
should properly be limited to decisions,
orders or rulings of the Commission on
Elections, not from lower courts.
It was of course different under the
Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388,
September 2, 1971) because the
Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals then had appellate jurisdiction
in election cases decided by the lower
courts.
In the Veloria case, it now appears that
only the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals have certiorari jurisdiction
over election cases from the lower
courts because after reiterating the
ruling in the Garcia and Uy cases, the
Supreme Court said:
"In view of this pronouncement,
an original civil action of
certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus against a regional
trial court in an election contest
may be filed only in the Court of
Appeals or in this Court, being
the only courts given such
original jurisdiction under the
Constitution and the law."
(Italics supplied).
While these two appellate Courts do
have the jurisdiction under the
Constitution and the law, it is most
logical for the Commission whenever it
performs judicial functions to have the
authority to issue these prerogative
writs. . .
xxx xxx xxx
In traversing the first issue, we are citing
our decision laid down in the case of
Antonio Dictado vs. Hon. Rodrigo N.
Cosico, and Emilio Tiongco
promulgated on July 29, 1993. In this
case, the Commission en banc had
occasion to rule on the question of
whether or not the Commission has the
authority to hear and decide petitions
for certiorari in election cases. LLp hil
The Commission En Banc, speaking
through Hon. Commissioner Regalado
E. Maambong, ruled that there is [a] law
which grants the Commission the
exclusive authority to issue special writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
in election cases, and there are also
Supreme Court decisions, recent in fact,
which declare that the Commission has
no such authority precisely because,
according to the decisions, there is no
law granting such authority, and without
any hint whatsoever of the existence of
Sec. 50 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697.
As gleaned from the case of Dictado,
respondents were arguing that Sec. 50
of BP Blg. 697 was repealed by the
Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881,
December 3, 1985). Furthermore, in their
answer, respondents cited Supreme
Court decisions where it was declared
that, indeed, the Commission has no
jurisdiction to issue special writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
It is still the position of this Commission
that Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 has not been
repealed.
As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial
power" includes the duty of the Courts
of Justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government (Sec.
1, par. 2, Art. VII).
 Since the COMELEC, in discharging its
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2
(2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice
performing judicial power and said
power includes the determination of
whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily
follows that the Comelec, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 5
It set aside, for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, the trial court's order of
execution pending appeal and the writ of
execution because.
[a]t the time the Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal was filed on July 12,
1994, the court a quo had already lost
jurisdiction over the case for as early as
July 8, 1994, it had already
acknowledged through its order issued
on that date, the perfection of the
appeal of petitioner as in fact it ordered
the elevation of the records of the case
to this Honorable Commission. 6
Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner
filed the instant special civil action.
In the resolution of 21 February 1995, the
Court required the respondents to comment on
the petition and issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the respondent COMELEC to
cease and desist from enforcing its challenged
resolution.
As naturally expected, the private
respondent, in her Comment, opposed the
petition by invoking the very arguments adduced
by the respondent COMELEC in its challenged
resolution and the dissenting opinion in the
Garcia and Uy cases.
In its comment filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, the respondent COMELEC
postulates that it issued the said resolution after it
had taken cognizance of the appeal interposed
by the private respondent from the RTC decision,
unlike in the Garcia and Uy cases, and therefore,
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, thus:
it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses
inherent powers to employ means
necessary to carry into effect the
powers conferred upon it by law (Sec. 6,
Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court)
and verily, there was no need for any
statutory grant for that purpose. Indeed,
in annulling the Order of Execution of
the Regional Trial Court, public
respondent did not exceed its
jurisdiction since its action in this regard
was necessary to preserve the subject
of the appeal and to maintain the status
quo of the parties pending the final
outcome of its review of the correctness
of the appealed decision. 7
It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the
trial courts still had jurisdiction over the cases
unlike in the instant case where the trial court
had already given due course to the appeal and
elevated the records of the case to the COMELEC
which had taken cognizance of the appeal.
LexLib
This Court resolved to give due course to
this petition and to decide it on its merits.
The contention of the respondent
COMELEC as advanced by the Office of the
Solicitor General is unacceptable. It goes against
its theory in the assailed resolution and is not
supported by the facts. The challenged resolution
involves a case which the COMELEC docketed
as a special relief case (SPR No. 1-94). Under
Rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the special relief
cases are petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, and contempt proceedings. The
ordinary appeal from the RTC decision was, as
disclosed in the challenged resolution, docketed
as EAC No. 108-94, 8 Clearly then, the COMELEC
had recognized and taken cognizance of two
cases: one, the ordinary appeal from the RTC
decision (EAC No. 108-94), and two, the special
civil action for certiorari docketed as SPR No. 1-
94. The two cases were not consolidated. The
dissimilarities between them need no further
elaboration. Since it issued the challenged
resolution under the latter case, it cannot now be
heard to state that it issued it as an incident in the
former, the ordinary appeal. This erroneous
contention of the Office of the Solicitor General
notwithstanding, the position taken by the
COMELEC in its resolution now in question paves
the way for a re-examination of this Court's
pronouncement in the Garcia and Uy cases.
As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and
later, in Veloria, 10 this Court ruled that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus because there is no specific
constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such
jurisdiction.
The respondent COMELEC, however,
points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697
expressly granted it such jurisdiction. Indeed, it
did. Nevertheless, considering that the said law
was, per Section 1 thereof, "to govern the election
for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall
be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of
sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by
the Constitution," and in view of the passage of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) by the
regular Batasang Pambansa, 11 this Court is then
confronted with the twin issues of whether said
B.P. Blg. 697 became functus officio after the 14
May 1984 election of members of the regular
Batasang Pambansa or the selection thereafter
of the sectoral representatives at the latest, and
whether it was repealed by the Omnibus Election
Code.
The Court agrees with the respondent
COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg.
697 whose lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984
election or the subsequent selection of sectoral
representatives. In fact, by the very wording of the
last paragraph of its Section 50, to wit:
Sec. 50.Definition. —
xxx xxx xxx
The Commission is hereby vested with
the exclusive authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving
election cases. (Italics supplied). LLjur
it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was
not restricted within a specific period of time.
Taken in the context of the conspicuous absence
of such jurisdiction as ruled in Pimentel vs.
Commission on Elections, 12 it seems quite
obvious that the grant was intended as a
remedial legislation to eliminate the seeming
incongruity or irrationality resulting in a splitting of
jurisdiction pointed out in the dissenting opinion
of Justice De Castro in the said case.
But did not the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697? The repealing
clause of the latter reads as follows:
Sec. 282.Repealing Clause. —
Presidential Decree No. 1296, otherwise
known as The 1987 Election Code, as
amended, is hereby repealed. All other
election laws, decrees, executive orders,
rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this
Code are hereby repealed, except
Presidential Decree No. 1618 and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the
election of the members of the
Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX
and XII.
The second sentence is in the nature of a general
repealing clause. It has been said:
An express general repealing clause to
the effect that all inconsistent
enactments are repealed, is in legal
contemplation a nullity. Repeals must
either be expressed or result by
implication. Although it has in some
instances been held to be an express
 recognition that there are acts in conflict
with the act in which it is included and
as indicative of the legislative intent to
repeal such acts, a general repealing
clause cannot be deemed as express
repeal because it fails to identify or
designate any act to be repealed. It
cannot be determinative of an implied
repeal for it does not declare any
inconsistency but conversely, merely
predicates a repeal upon the condition
that a substantial conflict is found under
application of the rules of implied
repeals. If its inclusion is more than
mere mechanical verbiage, it is more
often a detriment than an aid to the
establishment of a repeal, for such
clause is construed as an express
limitation of the repeal to inconsistent
acts. 13
This Court is not unaware of the equally
settled rule in statutory construction that in the
revision or codification of laws, all parts and
provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the
revised statute or code are deemed repealed,
unless the statute or code provides otherwise
expressly or impliedly. 14
By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing
Clause, it does not evidently appear that the
Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all
prior election statutes and to replace them with
the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second
sentence, a reservation that all prior election
statutes or parts thereof not inconsistent with any
provisions of the Code shall remain in force. That
sentence
predicates the intended repeal upon the
condition that a substantial conflict
must be found on existing and prior
acts of the same subject matter. Such
being the case, the presumption
against implied repeals and the rule on
strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore. For the
legislature is presumed to know the
existing laws so that, if repeal of
particular or specific law or laws is
intended, the proper step is to express
it. The failure to add a specific repealing
clause particularly mentioning the
statute to be repealed indicates that the
intent was not to repeal any existing law
on matter, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in
the terms of the new and the old laws.
15
This being the case, the Court painstakingly
examined the aforesaid last paragraph of Section
50 of the Omnibus Election Code to determine if
the former is inconsistent with any of the
provisions of the latter. It found none.
LibLex
In the face of the foregoing disquisitions,
the Court must, as it now does, abandon the
ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases. We
now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of
B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
The Commission is hereby vested with
exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus involving election cases.
remains in full force and effect but only in such
cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC
has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having
been settled, we now proceed to review the
substance of the challenged resolution.
That the trial court acted with palpable
and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the
petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal
and in issuing the writ of execution is all too
obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private
respondent received copies of the decision on 1
July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed
within five days 16 from 1 July 1994 or on or
before 6 July 1994. Any motion for execution
 pending appeal must be filed before the period
for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to
Section 23 of Interim Rules Implementing B.P.
Blg. 129, which is deemed to have
supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of
Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an
appeal would be deemed perfected on the last
day for any of the parties to appeal, 17 or on 6
July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent
filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee.
On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to
the appeal and ordered the elevation of the
records of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the
perfection of the appeal, the trial court was
divested of its jurisdiction over the case. 18 Since
the motion for execution pending appeal was
filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection
of the appeal, the trial court could no longer
validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise
if the motion was filed before the perfection of the
appeal. 19 Accordingly, since the respondent
COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, then it correctly set aside the
challenged order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and writ of execution
issued by the trial court. cdphil

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is

DENIED and the challenged resolution of 9
February 1995 of the Commission on Elections in
SPR No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita Cumba vs. Manuel
M. Relampagos, et al." is AFFIRMED.
The temporary restraining order issued
on 21 February 1995 is hereby LIFTED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Relampagos v. Cumba, G.R. No. 118861, April 27,

1995)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142907. November 29, 2000.]
JOSE EMMANUEL L. CARLOS,
petitioner, vs. HON. ADORACION G.
ANGELES, IN HER CAPACITY AS
THE ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
IN CALOOCAN CITY (BRANCH
125) and ANTONIO M. SERAPIO,
respondents.
Pimentel Yusingco Pimentel & Garcia Law Offices for
petitioner.
Pete Quirino-Quadra for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
On May 21, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, proclaimed petitioner Jose
Emmanuel L. Carlos as the duly elected mayor of
Valenzuela having obtained 102,688 votes, the
highest number of votes, over that of respondent
Antonio M. Serapio who obtained 77,270 votes. On
June 1, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, an election protest
challenging the election results. The RTC of
Caloocan City, Branch 125, rendered its decision and
set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its
finding of "significant badges of fraud." Despite the
plurality of valid votes in favor of protestee Carlos, the
trial court set aside his proclamation and declared
protestant Serapio as duly elected mayor of
Valenzuela City. On May 4, 2000, petitioner appealed
to the Comelec, but on May 8, 2000, petitioner filed
the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious.
Both the Supreme Court and Comelec have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus over decisions of
regional trial courts in election cases involving
elective municipal officials. The court that takes
jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over the case, which in this case is the Supreme
Court. Petitioner's appeal to the Comelec would not
bar the present action for certiorari because appeal
is not a speedy and adequate remedy. The proper
remedy is an action before the Comelec en banc to
declare a failure of election or to annul the election.
However, the case below was an election protest
case involving an elective municipal position which
falls within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
Petitioner admittedly received 17,007 valid votes
more than the respondent and, therefore, the
nullification of the election would not lie. Elections
are won on the basis of a majority or plurality of votes
cast and received by the candidates. The trial court
gravely abused its discretion in rendering the
decision proclaiming respondent Serapio the duly
elected mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on the
basis of its perception of the voice of the people of
Valenzuela, even without a majority or plurality votes
cast in his favor. Contrary to its own finding that
petitioner obtained 83,600 valid votes against 66,602
valid votes for the respondent as second placer, or a
plurality of 17,007 votes, the trial court declared the
second placer as the winner, a blatant abuse of
judicial discretion.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
SUPREME COURT AND COMELEC HAVE
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION TO ISSUE WRITS OF
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS OVER
DECISIONS OF TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL
JURISDICTION IN ELECTION CASES INVOLVING
ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS. — The Comelec
has original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This point has been
settled in the case of Relampagos vs. Cumba, where
we held: "In the face of the foregoing disquisitions,
the court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling in
the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases. We now hold
that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697
providing as follows: The Commission is vested with
exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving
election cases. remains in full force and effect but
only in such cases where, under paragraph (2),
Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the
COMELEC has the authority to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction ."
Consequently, both the Supreme Court and Comelec
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions
of trial courts of general jurisdiction (regional trial
courts) in election cases involving elective municipal
officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Ergo,
this Court has jurisdiction over the present petition of
certiorari as a special civil action expressly conferred
on it and provided for in the Constitution.
2.ID.; ID.; ELECTION; EXPLAINED; A DEFEATED
CANDIDATE CANNOT BE DEEMED ELECTED TO
THE OFFICE. — In this jurisdiction, an election means
"the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote" through the use of the ballot, and
the elected officials of which are determined through
the will of the electorate. "An election is the
embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the
sovereign power of the people." "Specifically, the
term 'election,' in the context of the Constitution, may
refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing
of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and
the casting and counting of votes." The winner is the
candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of
valid votes cast in the election. "Sound policy
dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who receive the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office. For, in all republican forms of
government the basic idea is that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality
of the legal votes cast in the election." In case of
protest, a revision or recount of the ballots cast for
the candidates decides the election protest case. The
candidate receiving the highest number or plurality
of votes shall be proclaimed the winner. Even if the
candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or
disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes or the second placer, can not be
declared elected. "The wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from the disqualified winner to the
repudiated loser because the law then as now only
authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the
person who has obtained a plurality of votes and
does not entitle a candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected." In
other words, "a defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office."
3.ID.; ID.; ELECTION; ELECTIONS ARE WON ON THE
BASIS OF THE MAJORITY OR PLURALITY OF VOTES
CAST AND RECEIVED BY THE CANDIDATES. — The
annulment of an election on the ground of fraud,
irregularities and violations of election laws may be
raised as an incident to an election contest . Such
grounds for annulment of an election may be
invoked in an election protest case. However, an
election must not be nullified and the voters
disenfranchised whenever it is possible to determine
a winner on the basis of valid votes cast, and discard
the illegally cast ballots. In this case, the petitioner
admittedly received 17,007 valid votes more than the
protestee, and therefore the nullification of the
election would not lie. The power to nullify an
election must be exercised with the greatest care
with a view not to disenfranchise the voters, and only
under circumstances that clearly call for such drastic
remedial measure. As heretofore stated, in this
jurisdiction, elections are won on the basis of a
majority or plurality of votes cast and received by the
candidates. "The right to hold an elective office is
rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived
entitlement to the office."
4.ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF ELECTIONS; INSTANCES
WHERE A FAILURE OF ELECTIONS MAY BE
DECLARED. — In a petition to annul an election
under Section 6, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, two
conditions must be averred in order to support a
sufficient cause of action. These are: (1) the illegality
must affect more than 50% of the votes cast and (2)
the good votes can be distinguished from the bad
ones. It is only when these two conditions are
established that the annulment of the election can be
justified because the remaining votes do not
constitute a valid constituency. We have held that:
"To declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions
must occur: first, no voting has taken place in the
precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or,
even if there were voting, the election nevertheless
resulted in a failure to elect; and, second, the votes
not cast would affect the result of the election."
Neither of these conditions was present in the case
at bar. More recently, we clarified that, "Under the
pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election
Code, there are only three (3) instances where a
failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the
election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the
election in any polling place had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c)
after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes."
5.ID.; ID.; PROCLAIMING A MAYORIAL CANDIDATE
WINNER IN THE ELECTION ON THE BASIS OF
PERCEPTION OF THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, EVEN
WITHOUT A MAJORITY OR PLURALITY VOTES CAST
IN HIS FAVOR IS VOID. — We find that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision
proclaiming respondent Serapio the duly elected
mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on the basis of its
perception of the voice of the people of Valenzuela,
even without a majority or plurality votes cast in his
favor. In fact, without a single vote in his favor as the
trial court discarded all the votes. Thus, the decision
is not supported by the highest number of valid votes
cast in his favor. This violated the right to due
process of law of petitioner who was not heard on
the issue of failure of election, an issue that was not
raised by the protestant. "A decision is void for lack of
due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity of being heard." The trial court can not
decide the election protest case outside the issues
raised. If it does, as in this case, the trial court is
ousted of its jurisdiction. Likewise, it is a basic
principle that a decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is void. "A void decision may be assailed or
impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by
means of a petition filed in the same case or by
means of a separate action, or by resisting such
decision in any action or proceeding where it is
invoked." Here, the trial court indulged in
speculations on its view of the voice of the people,
and decided the case disregarding the evidence, but
on its own intuition, ipse dixit. How was this voice
communicated to the trial court? Certainly not by
competent evidence adduced before the court as it
should be, but by extra-sensory perception. This is
invalid in law. Contrary to its own finding that
petitioner obtained 83,600 valid votes against 66,602
valid votes for the respondent as second placer, or a
plurality of 17,007 votes, the trial court declared the
second placer as the winner. This is a blatant abuse
of judicial discretion by any account. It is a raw
exercise of judicial function in an arbitrary or despotic
manner, amounting to evasion of the positive duty to
act in accord with law. HSCATc
6.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;
CERTIORARI; EXPLAINED. — In a special civil action
for certiorari, the burden is on petitioner to prove not
merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the public respondent Judge. "By grave abuse
of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It
must be grave abuse of discretion as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must
be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law." We must emphasize that
election to office is determined by the highest
number of votes obtained by a candidate in the
election.
DECISION
PARDO, J : p
The Case
The case before the Court is an original special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to
annul the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City, Branch 125, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the proclamation of the Protestee, Jose
Emmanuel Carlos, by the Board of
Canvassers is accordingly SET ASIDE.
EcDTIH
"The Court hereby FINDS the Protestant,
ANTONIO SERAPIO, as the DULY
ELECTED MAYOR OF VALENZUELA
CITY.
"SO ORDERED." 1
The Facts
Petitioner Jose Emmanuel L. Carlos and respondent
Antonio M. Serapio were candidates for the position
of mayor of the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila (later converted into a City) during the May 11,
1998 elections.
On May 21, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila proclaimed petitioner as
the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela having
obtained 102,688 votes, the highest number of votes
in the election returns.
On June 1, 1998, respondent Antonio M. Serapio who
obtained 77,270 votes, the second highest number of
votes, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, an election protest challenging the
results. Due to the inhibition of all judges of the
Regional Trial Court in Valenzuela, the case was
ultimately assigned to the Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City, Branch 125, presided over by
respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles.
On June 26, 1998, petitioner filed with the trial court
an answer with affirmative defenses and motion to
dismiss. The court denied the motion to dismiss by
order dated January 14, 1999. Petitioner elevated the
order to the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on
petition for certiorari and prohibition, 2 which,
however, has remained unresolved up to this
moment.
In the course of the protest, the municipal treasurer
of Valenzuela, who by law has custody of the ballot
boxes, collected the ballot boxes and delivered them
to the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City. The trial
court conducted a pre-trial conference of the parties
but it did not produce a substantial result as the
parties merely paid superficial service and only
agreed on the following:
1.Both parties admit their capacity
to sue and be sued;
2.Both parties admit that the
protestant was a candidate
during the May 11, 1998
election;
3.Both parties admit that the
protestee has been
proclaimed as the elected
mayor of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, on May 21, 1998;
 4.Both parties admit that the (a)protestant Serapio —
protestee allegedly obtained 66,602 votes.
102,688 votes while the
protestant obtained 77,270 (b)protestee Carlos —
votes per canvass of 83,609 votes, giving
election returns of the Board the latter a winning
of Canvassers. margin of
17,007votes.
The pre-trial was then concluded and the parties
agreed to the creation of seven (7) revision The Trial Court's Ruling
committees consisting of a chairman designated by
the court and two members representing the Nevertheless, in its decision, the trial court set aside
protestant and the protestee. the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of
"significant badges of fraud," namely:
Meantime, on May 12, 1999, petitioner filed a
consolidated motion that included a prayer for 1.The keys turned over by the City
authority to photocopy all the official copies of the Treasurer to the court did
revision reports in the custody of the trial court. not fit into the padlocks of
However, the trial court denied the issuance of such the ballot boxes that had to
authorization. 3 The court likewise denied a motion be forcibly opened;
for reconsideration of the denial. 4 Then petitioner
2.Seven (7) ballot boxes did not
raised the denial to the COMELEC on petition for
contain any ballot and two
certiorari and mandamus, 5 which also remains
(2) ballot boxes out of the
unresolved until this date. HEcaIC

seven (7) ballot boxes did

The Revision Results not contain any election
returns;
The revision of the ballots showed the following
results: 3.Some schools where various
precincts were located
(1)Per physical count of the ballots: experienced brownouts
during the counting of votes
(a)protestant Serapio — causing delay in the
76,246 votes. counting although there
was no undue commotion
(b)protestee Carlos — or violence that occurred;
103,551 votes.
4.Some of the assigned watchers of
(2)Per revision, the court invalidated 9,697 votes of protestant were not in their
the protestant but validated 53 stray votes in his posts during the counting of
favor. votes.

The court invalidated 19,975 votes of the protestee On the basis of the foregoing badges of fraud, the
and validated 33 stray votes in his favor. trial court declared that there was enough pattern of
fraud in the conduct of the election for mayor in
The final tally showed: Valenzuela. The court held that the fraud was
attributable to the protestee who had control over the (2)There are important reasons and
election paraphernalia and the basic services in the compelling circumstances
community such as the supply of electricity. which justify petitioner's
direct recourse to the
On April 24, 2000, the trial court rendered a judgment Supreme Court;
ruling that the perpetuation of fraud had undoubtedly
suppressed the true will of the electorate of (3)Respondent judge committed
Valenzuela and substituted it with the will of the grave abuse of discretion
protestee. Notwithstanding the plurality of valid votes when she declared
in favor of the protestee, the trial court set aside the respondent Serapio as the
proclamation of protestee Jose Emmanuel Carlos by duly elected mayor of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers and declared Valenzuela despite the fact
protestant Antonio M. Serapio as the duly elected that she found that
mayor of Valenzuela City. 6 petitioner obtained 17,007
valid votes higher than the
Hearing news that the protestant had won the valid votes of respondent
election protest, protestee secured a copy of the Serapio;
decision from the trial court on May 4, 2000. On the
other hand, notice of the decision was received by (4)The assailed decision is contrary
the protestant on May 03, 2000. CST EHI to law, based on
speculations and not
On May 4, 2000, protestant filed with the trial court a supported by the evidence
motion for execution pending appeal. 7 On May 4, as shown in the decision
2000, the trial court gave protestee five (5) days itself. 11
within which to submit his comment or opposition to
the motion. 8 The Issues

Petitioner's Appeal to Comelec The issues raised are the following:

Meantime, on May 04, 2000, petitioner filed a notice 1.Whether the Supreme Court has
of appeal from the decision of the trial court to the jurisdiction to review, by
Commission on Elections. 9 petition for certiorari as a
special civil action, the
The Petition at bar decision of the regional trial
court in an election protest
On May 8, 2000, petitioner filed the present recourse. case involving an elective
10
municipal official
considering that it has no
Petitioner raised the following legal basis:
appellate jurisdiction over
such decision.
(1)The Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction to entertain
2.Whether the trial court acted
special civil actions of
without jurisdiction or with
certiorari and prohibition;
grave abuse of discretion
when the court set aside the
proclamation of petitioner
 and declared respondent
Serapio as the duly elected
mayor of Valenzuela City
despite its finding that
petitioner garnered 83,609
valid votes while respondent
obtained 66,602 valid votes,
or a winning margin of
17,007 votes.
TRO Issued
On May 8, 2000, we issued a temporary restraining
order ordering respondent court to cease and desist
from further taking cognizance of Election Protest No.
14-V-98 more specifically from taking cognizance of
and acting on the Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal filed by respondent Serapio on May 4, 2000.
12
Respondent's Position
On May 15, 2000, respondent Serapio filed his
comment with omnibus motion to lift the temporary
restraining order and to declare petitioner in
contempt of court for violating the rule against forum
shopping. 13 He submitted that Comelec and not the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the present
petition for certiorari assailing the decision dated
April 24, 2000 of the regional trial court. Assuming
that this Court and Comelec have concurrent
jurisdiction and applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the Comelec has jurisdiction since
petitioner has perfected his appeal therewith before
the filing of the instant petition. Certiorari cannot be a
substitute for an appeal; the present petition is
violative of Revised Circular No. 28-91 on forum-
shopping; issues raised are factual, not correctable
by certiorari; and that the temporary restraining order
should be lifted, the petition dismissed, and petitioner
and counsel should be made to explain why they
should not be punished for contempt of court.
CaSHAc
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition impressed with merit. 14
I.The Supreme Court is vested with
original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus against the
decision of the regional trial
court in the election protest
case before it, regardless of
whether it has appellate
jurisdiction over such
decision.
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that:
"SECTION 5.The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers:
"(1)Exercise original jurisdiction over
cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus."
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, provides that:
"SECTION 1.Petition for certiorari. —
When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings
of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
 The petition shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46."
By Constitutional fiat, the Commission on Election
(Comelec) has appellate jurisdiction over election
protest cases involving elective municipal officials
decided by courts of general jurisdiction, as provided
for in Article IX (C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
"SECTION 2.The Commission on
Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
"(1). . . .
"(2)Exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications
of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction." DHATcE
In like manner, the Comelec has original jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
involving election cases in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. 15 This point has been settled in the case
of Relampagos vs. Cumba, 16 where we held:
"In the face of the foregoing
disquisitions, the court must, as it now
does, abandon the ruling in the Garcia
and Uy and Veloria cases. We now hold
that the last paragraph of Section 50 of
B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
The Commission is vested with
exclusive authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus
involving election cases.
remains in full force and effect but only
in such cases where, under paragraph
(2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC
has the authority to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus only in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction." (Italics
supplied).
Consequently, both the Supreme Court and Comelec
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions
of trial courts of general jurisdiction (regional trial
courts) in election cases involving elective municipal
officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case. 17
Ergo, this Court has jurisdiction over the present
petition of certiorari as a special civil action expressly
conferred on it and provided for in the Constitution.
Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with the
COMELEC, the same would not bar the present
action as an exception to the rule because under the
circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 18
The exception is sparingly allowed in situations
where the abuse of discretion is not only grave and
whimsical but also palpable and patent, and the
invalidity of the assailed act is shown on its face.
II.Certiorari lies. The trial court acted
with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Its
decision is void.
The next question that arises is whether certiorari lies
because the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in deciding the way it did Election Protest Case No.
14-V-98, declaring respondent Serapio as the duly
"elected" mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or
selection of candidates to public office by popular
vote" 19 through the use of the ballot, and the elected
officials of which are determined through the will of
the electorate. 20 "An election is the embodiment of
the popular will, the expression of the sovereign
power of the people." 21 "Specifically, the term
'election,' in the context of the Constitution, may refer
to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the
casting and counting of votes." 22 The winner is the
candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of
valid votes cast in the election. 23 "Sound policy
dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who receive the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office. For, in all republican forms of
government the basic idea is that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality
of the legal votes cast in the election." 24 In case of
protest, a revision or recount of the ballots cast for
the candidates decides the election protest case. The
candidate receiving the highest number or plurality
of votes shall be proclaimed the winner. Even if the
candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or
disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes or the second placer, can not be
declared elected. 25 "The wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from the disqualified winner to the
repudiated loser because the law then as now only
authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the
person who has obtained a plurality of votes and
does not entitle a candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected." 26
In other words, "a defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office." 27
"Election contests involve public interest, and
technicalities and procedural barriers should not be
allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the
choice of their elective officials. Laws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. In an election case, the court has an
imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the
electorate. The Supreme Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or the rules that would
hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results." 28 CDTHSI
In this case, based on the revision of ballots, the trial
court found that:
First, by canvass of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers the results were:
Carlos—102,668 votes
Serapio—77,270 votes, or a winning
margin of
25,418 votes
Ramon Ignacio—20 votes.
and consequently, the Board of Canvassers
proclaimed petitioner Carlos the duly elected
mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Second, by physical count of the ballots, the results
were:
Carlos—103,551 votes
Serapio—76,246 votes, or a winning
margin of
27,305 votes.
Third, by revision of the ballots, the trial court found in
a final tally that the "valid" votes obtained by the
candidates were as follows:
Carlos—83,609 votes
Serapio—66,602 votes, or a winning
margin
of 17,007 votes.
Consequently, the final tally clearly showed petitioner
Carlos as the overwhelming winner in the May 11,
1998 elections.
However, the trial court set aside the final tally of
votes because of what the trial court perceived to be
"significant badges of fraud" attributable to the
protestee. 29 These are:
First: The failure of the keys turned over by the City
Treasurer to the trial court to fit the padlocks on the
ballot boxes that compelled the court to forcibly open
the padlocks. The trial court concluded that the real
keys were lost or the padlocks substituted pointing to
possible tampering of the contents of the ballot
boxes.
Procedurally, the keys to the ballot boxes were
turned over by the Board of Election Inspectors from
the precinct level to the Municipal Board of
Canvassers and finally to the municipal treasurer for
safekeeping. The three-level turn-over of the keys will
not prevent the possibility of these keys being mixed
up. This is an ordinary occurrence during elections.
The mere inability of the keys to fit into the padlocks
attached to the ballot boxes does not affect the
integrity of the ballots. At any rate, the trial court
easily forced open the padlocks and found valid
votes cast therein;
Second: Seven (7) ballot boxes were found empty.
Thus, the trial court concluded that there were
"missing ballots" and "missing election returns." This
is pure speculation without factual basis. "The sea of
suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks
upon it is without rudder or compass." 30 On the
other hand, the Summary of Votes as revised does
not show any unaccounted precinct or whether there
was any precinct without any ballot or election
returns. It is a standard procedure of the Commission
on Elections (Comelec) to provide extra empty ballot
boxes for the use of the Board of Election Inspectors
or the Board of Canvassers, in case of necessity.
The empty ballot boxes found could be the empty
reserve ballot boxes that were not used by the Board
of Election Inspectors or the Board of Canvassers
since there was neither proof nor even a claim of
missing ballots or missing election returns .
Third: Some schoolhouses experienced brownout
during the counting of votes. There was nothing
extraordinary that would invite serious doubts or
suspicion that fraud was committed during the
brownout that occurred. Indeed, one witness stated
that it was the first time that he observed brownout in
Dalandanan Elementary School and another stated
that the brownout was localized in Coloong
Elementary School. Since counting of votes lasted
until midnight, the brownouts had caused only slight
delay in the canvassing of votes because the election
officials availed themselves of candles, flashlights
and emergency lights. There were no reports of
cheating or tampering of the election returns. In fact,
witnesses testified that the counting of votes
proceeded smoothly and no commotion or violence
occurred. So, the brownouts had no effect on the
integrity of the canvass.
Fourth: The absence of watchers for candidate
Serapio from their posts during the counting of votes.
This cannot be taken against candidate Carlos since
it is the candidate's own look-out to protect his
interest during the counting of votes and canvassing
of election returns. As long as notices were duly
served to the parties, the counting and canvassing of
votes may validly proceed in the absence of
watchers. Otherwise, candidates may easily delay
the counting of votes or canvassing of returns by
simply not sending their watchers. There was no
incomplete canvass of returns, contrary to what the
trial court declared. The evidence showed complete
canvass in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. 31
"We cannot allow an election protest on such flimsy
averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election
ESHcTD
process will deteriorate into an endless stream of
crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembank
from the water." 32
Assuming for the nonce that the trial court was
correct in holding that the final tally of valid votes as
per revision report may be set aside because of the
"significant badges of fraud," the same would be
tantamount to a ruling that there were no valid votes
cast at all for the candidates, and, thus, no winner
could be declared in the election protest case . In
short, there was failure of election.
In such case, the proper remedy is an action before
the Commission on Elections en banc to declare a
failure of election or to annul the election. 33
However, the case below was an election protest
case involving an elective municipal position which,
under Section 251 of the Election Code, falls within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the appropriate
regional trial court. 34
Nonetheless, the annulment of an election on the
ground of fraud, irregularities and violations of
election laws may be raised as an incident to an
election contest. Such grounds for annulment of an
election may be invoked in an election protest case.
However, an election must not be nullified and the
voters disenfranchised whenever it is possible to
determine a winner on the basis of valid votes cast,
and discard the illegally cast ballots. In this case, the
petitioner admittedly received 17,007 valid votes
more than the protestee, and therefore the
nullification of the election would not lie. The power
to nullify an election must be exercised with the
greatest care with a view not to disenfranchise the
voters, and only under circumstances that clearly call
for such drastic remedial measure. 35
As heretofore stated, in this jurisdiction, elections are
won on the basis of a majority or plurality of votes
cast and received by the candidates. "The right to
hold an elective office is rooted on electoral
mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office." 36
More importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to
declare a failure of election. 37
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that:
"SECTION 6.Failure of Election. — If, on
account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place
has not been held on the date fixed, or
had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody of
canvass thereof, such election results in
a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of
election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the
basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice
and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure
to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure
to elect but not later than thirty (30) days
after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect." (Italics
supplied)
aIcHSC
Likewise, RA 7166 provides that:
"SECTION 4.Postponement, Failure of
Election and Special Elections. — The
postponement, declaration of failure of
election and the calling of special
elections as provided in Sections 5, 6
and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code
shall be decided by the Commission
sitting en banc by a majority vote of its
members. The causes for the
declaration of a failure of election may
occur before or after the casting of
votes or on the day of the election."
(Italics supplied)
It is the Commission (Comelec) sitting en banc that is
vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure
of election. 38
"In a petition to annul an election under Section 6,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, two conditions must be
averred in order to support a sufficient cause of
action. These are: (1) the illegality must affect more
than 50% of the votes cast and (2) the good votes
can be distinguished from the bad ones . It is only
when these two conditions are established that the
annulment of the election can be justified because
the remaining votes do not constitute a valid
constituency." 39
We have held that: "To declare a failure of election,
two (2) conditions must occur: first, no voting has
taken place in the precincts concerned on the date
fixed by law or, even if there were voting, the election
nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and,
second, the votes not cast would affect the result of
the election." 40 Neither of these conditions was
present in the case at bar.
More recently, we clarified that, "Under the pertinent
codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there
are only three (3) instances where a failure of
elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed
on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in
any polling place had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and
during the preparation and transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof,
such election results in a failure to elect on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes." 41
Thus, the trial court in its decision actually
pronounced a failure of election by disregarding and
setting aside the results of the election. Nonetheless,
as herein-above stated, the trial court erred to the
extent of ousting itself of jurisdiction because the
grounds for failure of election were not significant
and even non-existent. More importantly, the
commission of fraud can not be attributed to the
protestee. There was no evidence on record that
protestee had a hand in any of the irregularities that
protestant averred. It is wrong for the trial court to
state that the protestee had control over the "election
paraphernalia" or over electric services. The
Commission on Elections has control over election
paraphernalia, through its officials and deputies. 42
The Comelec can deputize with the concurrence of
the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the government, including the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections. 43 On the other hand, electric
utility services in Metro Manila, including Valenzuela
are under the control of its franchise holder,
particularly the Manila Electric Company, a public
service company, certainly not owned or controlled
by the protestee. In fact, during election period,
Comelec has control over such utilities as electric
and even telephone service. 44 What is important,
however, is that the voters of Valenzuela were able to
cast their votes freely and fairly. And in the election
protest case, the trial court was able to recount and
determine the valid votes cast. DaEcTC
Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to
declare a failure of election, the extent of that power
is limited to the annulment of the election and the
calling of special elections. 45 The result is a failure of
election for that particular office. In such case, the
court can not declare a winner. 46 A permanent
vacancy is thus created. In such eventuality, the duly
elected vice-mayor shall succeed as provided by
law. 47
We find that the trial court committed a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rendering its decision proclaiming
respondent Serapio the duly elected mayor of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on the basis of its
perception of the voice of the people of Valenzuela,
even without a majority or plurality votes cast in his
favor. In fact, without a single vote in his favor as the
trial court discarded all the votes. Thus, the decision
is not supported by the highest number of valid votes
cast in his favor. This violated the right to due
process of law of petitioner who was not heard on
the issue of failure of election, an issue that was not
raised by the protestant. "A decision is void for lack of
due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity of being heard." 48 The trial court can not
and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." 53
We must emphasize that election to office is
determined by the highest number of votes obtained
by a candidate in the election. DIETHS

decide the election protest case outside the issues

raised. If it does, as in this case, the trial court is The Judgment
ousted of its jurisdiction. Likewise, it is a basic
principle that a decision with absolutely nothing to WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The
support it is void. 49 "A void decision may be assailed Court ANNULS and DECLARES VOID the decision
or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, dated April 24, 2000 of the trial court in Election
by means of a petition filed in the same case or by Protest Case No. V-14-98.
means of a separate action, or by resisting such
The temporary restraining order we issued on May 8,
decision in any action or proceeding where it is
2000, is made permanent.
invoked." 50 Here, the trial court indulged in
speculations on its view of the voice of the people,
Let Election Protest Case No. V-14-98 be remanded
and decided the case disregarding the evidence, but
to the trial court for decision within a non-extendible
on its own intuition, ipse dixit. 51 How was this voice
period of fifteen (15) days from notice of this decision.
communicated to the trial court? Certainly not by
The judge shall report to this Court on the decision
competent evidence adduced before the court as it
rendered within five (5) days from rendition
should be, but by extra-sensory perception. This is
submitting a copy thereof to the Office of the Clerk of
invalid in law. Contrary to its own finding that
Court en banc.
petitioner obtained 83,600 valid votes against 66,602
valid votes for the respondent as second placer, or a
This decision is immediately executory.
plurality of 17,007 votes, the trial court declared the
second placer as the winner. This is a blatant abuse No costs.
of judicial discretion by any account. It is a raw
exercise of judicial function in an arbitrary or despotic SO ORDERED.
manner, amounting to evasion of the positive duty to
act in accord with law. 52 (Carlos v. Angeles, G.R. No. 142907, November 29,
|||

2000)

In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on

petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondent Judge. "By grave abuse of discretion is
meant capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave
abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 88158. March 4, 1992.]
DANIEL GARCIA and TEODORO
O'HARA, petitioners, vs. ERNESTO
DE JESUS and CECILIA DAVID,
and THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 97108-09. March 4, 1992.]
TOMAS TOBON UY, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and JOSE C. NEYRA, respondents.
F .B. Santiago, Nalus, Magtalas, Catalan & Associates
for petitioners in 88158.
Dionisio E. Bala, Jr. and Julian de la Rosa for
petitioner in 97108-09.
Francisco V . Marallag & Fred V . Marallag for private
respondent in 97108-09.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ISSUE WRITS OF
CERTIORARI. — In the absence of any specific
conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the
Constitution or by legislative fiat, the COMELEC is
bereft of jurisdiction to issue said Writs. It is the
COMELEC alone, invoking its Constitutionally
invested appellate jurisdiction and rule-making
power, that arrogated unto itself the authority to issue
Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in Rule
28, Section 1, of its Rules of Procedure. However,
neither the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC nor
its rule-making power justifies such self-conferment
of authority.
2.REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; DEFINED AND
CLASSIFICATION. — Jurisdiction or the legal power
to hear and determine a cause or causes of action,
must exist as a matter of law. It may be classified into
original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction.
Original jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take
judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial
action for the first time under conditions provided by
law. Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court
higher in rank to re-examine the final order or
judgment of a lower Court which tried the case now
elevated for judicial review (Remedial Law
Compendium, Regalado, Florenz D., Fifth Revised
Edition, Vol. 1, p. 3). Since the two jurisdictions are
exclusive of each other, each must be expressly
conferred by law. One does not flow from, nor is
inferred from, the other.
3.ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI;
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE WRIT INVOLVES THE
EXERCISE OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION; COMELEC
ONLY WITH APPELLATE JURISDICTION. — In the
Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such authority
has always been expressly conferred, either by the
Constitution or by law. What the Constitution granted
the COMELEC was appellate jurisdiction. The
Constitution makes no mention of any power given
the COMELEC to exercise original jurisdiction over
Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
unlike in the case of the Supreme Court which was
specifically conferred such authority (Art. VIII, Sec,
5[1]). The immutable doctrine being that jurisdiction
is fixed by law, the power to issue such Writs cannot
be implied from the mere existence of appellate
jurisdiction. Just as implied repeal of statutes are
frowned upon, so also should the grant of original
jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial
body tabooed. If appellate jurisdiction has to be
statutorily granted, how much more the original
jurisdiction to issue the prerogative Writs?
4.ID.; JURISDICTION; CONFERRED BY LAW AND
NEVER DERIVED BY IMPLICATION. — As a matter of
fact, the well-settled rule is that jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law (Orosa,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76826-32, 28 January
1991; Bacalso v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26
October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by
implication. Indeed, "(w)hile the power to issue the
writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all
courts by constitutional or statutory provisions,
ordinarily, the particular courts which have such
power are expressly designated" (J. Aquino's
Concurring Opinion in Pimentel v. Comelec, G.R. Nos.
53581-83, December 19, 1980, 101 SCRA 769, citing
14 C.J.S. 202; Emphasis ours).
5.POLITICAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
ONLY WITH APPELLATE JURISDICTION ABSENT
ANY SPECIFIC CONFERMENT TO ISSUE WRITS OF
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS. —
Apparently, the COMELEC Rule on its Certiorari
jurisdiction is patterned after the previous
authorization to the Court of Appeals to issue Writs of
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. That authority, however, was
not inherent in the Court of Appeals but was
specifically conferred by Section 30 of the Judiciary
Act (Rep. Act No. 296) and Section 9(1) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). It
does not follow that just because the 1987
Constitution vests the COMELEC with appellate
jurisdiction, without more, it can issue such Writs in
aid of that appellate jurisdiction.
6.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION;
CERTIORARI; VIEW THAT WRITS ARE BUT
COMMON-LAW WRITS, NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS
JURISDICTION. — The view that the subject Writs are
but common-law Writs not owing their existence to
any constitutional provision or statutory enactment
may be true in foreign jurisdictions but not in the
Philippine judicial system where such Writs are
specifically characterized as original Special Civil
Actions (Rule 65, Rules of Court). It is original
jurisdiction, as contrasted to appellate jurisdiction,
that is exercised in the issuance of said Writs.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; WRITS INHERENT TO JUDICIAL
TRIBUNALS EXERCISING APPELLATE
JURISDICTION; DOES NOT COMPREHEND
AGENCIES EXERCISING ADMINISTRATIVE AND
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS. — Although there may be
authorities in other jurisdictions which maintain that
such Writs are inherent in the power of higher Courts
exercising appellate jurisdiction, the same refers to
judicial tribunals, which the COMELEC is not. What
this agency exercises are administrative and quasi-
judicial powers (Filipinas Engineering and Machine
Shop vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-31455, 28 February 1985,
135 SCRA 25).
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED. — As defined, Certiorari "is a
writ from a superior court to an inferior court or
tribunal commanding the latter to send up the record
of a particular case" (Pimentel v. COMELEC, supra).
The function of a Writ of Certiorari is to keep an
inferior Court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
(Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 41859, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 49).
9.POLITICAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
GRANT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION THERETO
DOES NOT NECESSARILY MAKE IT A SUPERIOR
COURT. — The grant of appellate jurisdiction to the
COMELEC does not necessarily make it a "superior
Court" vis-a-vis Regional Trial Courts. In fact, in
People v. Delgado (G.R. Nos. 93419-32,18 September
1990, 189 SCRA 715), we ruled that Regional Trial
Courts have jurisdiction to review the actions taken
by the COMELEC in criminal prosecutions for
violations of election laws. This, notwithstanding the
grant to the COMELEC of "exclusive power" to
conduct preliminary investigations of all election
offenses punishable under Section 265 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
10.ID.; ID.; POWER TO PROMULGATE ITS OWN
RULES OF PROCEDURE, CANNOT INCLUDE THE
CONFINEMENT UPON ITSELF OF JURISDICTION TO
ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI. — The power vested
in the COMELEC to promulgate its Rules of
Procedure neither confers upon itself the jurisdiction
to issue the prerogative Writs. Procedure, as
distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by
which the power or authority of a Court to hear and
decide a class of cases is put into action (Manila
Railroad Co. v. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523). Rules
of procedure are remedial in nature and not
substantive. They cover only rules on pleadings and
practice. And in respect of the COMELEC, the
authority to promulgate its rules of procedure was
specifically "in order to expedite disposition of cases"
(Section 3, Article IX-C). That limited purpose can not
be expanded to include the conferment upon itself of
jurisdiction which is substantive in nature and can
only be fixed by law.
11.ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PIMENTEL
CASE, REITERATED IN CASE AT BAR. — The doctrine
laid down in Pimentel, supra, holding that the
COMELEC has not been invested with jurisdiction to
issue the Writs in question, therefore, still finds
application under the 1987 Constitution. Said case
also involved an elective municipal official except
that it was decided under the regime of the 1973
Constitution and the 1987 Election Code (Pres.
Decree No. 1296). There is no gainsaying that, unlike
the 1987 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution did not
grant appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC over
election contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, such appellate jurisdiction was
conferred upon it by Section 196 of the 1987 Election
Code (Pres. Decree No. 1296). Section 190 referred to
in the first paragraph deals with election contests for
municipal and municipal district offices. Again, while
the 1973 Constitution did not empower the
COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedure,
Section 192 of the same 1978 Election Code granted
it such powers. It would appear, therefore, that what
were merely statutory provisions under the 1978
Election Code became constitutional grants under
the 1987 Constitution. Significantly, however, neither
the 1973 Constitution nor the 1987 Constitution
expressly confers upon the COMELEC the jurisdiction
to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus. In essence, therefore, the statutory set-
up in the present Petition and in Pimentel, insofar as
the COMELEC power to issue those Writs is
concerned, is on all fours.
12.ID.; CONGRESS; WITH POWER TO DEFINE
JURISDICTION OF VARIOUS COURTS AND QUASI-
JUDICIAL BODIES. — There is no specific grant to the
COMELEC, either in the Constitution or by legislative
fiat, of jurisdiction over said petitions. In the last
analysis, the remedy lies with the legislature and not
with this Court. It is Congress that has the power to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various Courts (Art. VIII, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution).
That should include quasi-judicial bodies.
13.ID.; DUE PROCESS; OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD,
INDISPENSABLE. — Absence of hearing per se, does
not necessarily imply denial of due process. The fact
that they were afforded reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy through their
pleadings, destroys the validity of their argument. As
long as the parties were given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment was rendered, the demands
of due process are sufficiently met (Lindo v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 95016, 11 January 1991, 194
SCRA 25).
14.ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; WITHOUT
AUTHORITY TO DEPRIVE REGIONAL COURTS OF
POWER TO ORDER EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.
— The COMELEC, however, is bereft of authority to
deprive Regional Trial Courts of the competence to
order execution pending appeal. For one, it is
essentially a judicial prerogative. For another, it is a
pronouncement of the COMELEC alone in its
procedural rules, without benefit of statute, unlike in
the past where it was specifically provided for in
Section 177 of the Revised Election Code (Rep. Act
No. 180, as amended) and Section 224 of the
Election Code of 1971 (Rep. Act No. 6388) from
whence the rule was lifted verbatim. Significantly,
however, when the Election Code of 1971 (Rep. Act
No. 6388) was superseded by the 1978 Election Code
(Pres. Decree No. 1296), said clause was deleted
therefrom. It is likewise absent in the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987 (Rep. Act No. 6646) and in the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which were
the election laws in effect during the 18 January 1988
local elections. There is no express provision of law,
therefore, disauthorizing executions pending appeal,
and the COMELEC, in its procedural rules alone,
should not be allowed to divest Regional Trial Courts
of that authority. It deprives the prevailing party of a
substantive right to move for such relief contrary to
the constitutional mandate that those Rules can not
diminish nor modify substantive rights (Section 6,
Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution).
15.ID.; REVISED ELECTION CODE; CLAUSE "AS
SOON AS THE JUDGMENT BECOMES FINAL,"
INTERPRETED AS DEFINING THE EFFECT OF A
FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE RIGHT OF A DE JURE
ELECTIVE OFFICIAL TO SERVE UP TO THE END OF
THE TERM. — At any rate, the clause "as soon as the
judgment becomes final" had already been
interpreted by this Court as a general one defining
the effect of a final judgment on the right of the
winner to assume the contested office as the de jure
elected official to serve up to the end of the term
(Gahol v. Hon. Riodique, G.R. No. L-40415, 27 June
1975, 64 SCRA 494 at p. 514). It does not disallow
Regional Trial Courts from ordering execution
pending appeal.
16.REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF
COURT, APPLIED BY ANALOGY TO ELECTION
CONTESTS. — Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, which allows Regional Trial Courts to order
executions pending appeal upon good reasons
stated in a special order, may be made to apply by
analogy or suppletorily to election contests decided
by them (Rule 43, Section 1, COMELEC Rules of
Procedure).
17.POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; COURT'S
DECISION ON PROCLAMATION CASES GIVEN
PREFERENCE OVER PROCLAMATION MADE BY THE
BOARD OF CANVASSERS. — Indeed, as much
recognition should be given to the value of the
decision of a judicial body as a basis for the right to
assume office as that given by law to the
proclamation made by the Board of Canvassers. To
construe otherwise would be to bring back the ghost
of the "grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest"
techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians
in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to
an elective office. This would, as a consequence, lay
to waste the will of the electorate (See Estrada v. Sto.
Domingo, G.R. No. L-30570, 29 July 1969; Lagumbay
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-25444, 31 January 1966, 16
SCRA 175).
CRUZ, J., concurring:
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONGRESS; WITH
POWER TO DEFINE JURISDICTION OF VARIOUS
COURTS. — It is only Congress that has the power to
"define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts," subject only to certain specified
limitations. (Article VIII, Section 2). Conformably, every
judicial tribunal must trace its power to issue writs of
certiorari to an express authorization from the
legislature and not to mere inference. I know of no
such tribunal that exercises this power on the sole
justification that it is an appellate court.
2.ID.; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO ISSUE WRITS
OF CERTIORARI, AN EXPRESS GRANT. — The
Supreme Court itself derives its power to issue writs
of certiorari not by implication only from its appellate
jurisdiction but by an express grant in Article VIII,
Section 5 of the Constitution. Furthermore, it may
exercise this power only "as the law or rules of Court
may provide" under paragraph 2 of that section,
which means that the conferment is not automatic or
self-executing. Without such implementation, this
Court is powerless to issue writs of certiorari in the
appealed cases mentioned in that provision even if it
is the highest court in the land.
3.ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; AN
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO
ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI. — We cannot be less
strict with the Commission on Elections, which is
essentially only an administrative body. If even the
Supreme Court itself can be so inhibited by no less
than the Constitution, I see no logic in allowing the
Commission on Elections a wider latitude in the
exercise of what is clearly a judicial power. And on
such a fragile ground. While I may concede that this
agency can exercise the power if expressly allowed
by the legislature, I reject the notion that it can claim
such jurisdiction by mere implication.
BIDIN, J.; dissenting:
1.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;
CERTIORARI; WRITS MAY BE ISSUED IN THE
EXERCISE OF NOT ONLY ORIGINAL BUT ALSO IN
AID OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION. — The writs of
certiorari may be issued not only in the exercise of
original jurisdiction but also in aid of appellate
jurisdiction as now conferred upon the Court of
Appeals (Sec. 9 [1], BP 129). Inasmuch as the Court
of Appeals had been issuing writs of certiorari in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 9 [1], BP
129, and before that Sec. 4, Rule 65, it cannot be said
that certiorari is limited to the exercise of original
jurisdiction only.
2.POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PIMENTEL
CASE (101 SCRA 769 [1980]) THAT COMELEC DID
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS FOR
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS,
DEEMED ABANDONED UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION. — In Pimentel, (101 SCRA 769
[1980]), this Court ruled that the COMELEC did not
have jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus in election contests
cognizable by the then Court of First Instance and
appealable to the Commission on the ground that
such jurisdiction was not conferred to it by
constitutional or statutory enactment. It must be
noted, however, that the Pimentel case was decided
under the 1973 Constitution which limited the
Commission's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to the members of the Batasang Pambansa,
elective provincial and city officials, and excluded
therefrom election contests involving municipal and
barangay officials. Such limitation no longer holds
true under the present state of the law. Neither is this
a case where the COMELEC justifies its assumption
of jurisdiction by applying, by analogy, Sec. 4, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court as it did in the case of Pimentel.
Section 2 (2), Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution now
grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal official decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction. Taken in conjunction with Sec. 3,
Art. IX-C, which empowers the Commission to
promulgate its rules of procedure, the above
constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction to the
COMELEC over election cases cognizable by the trial
courts of general or limited jurisdiction is broad
enough to cover petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE-MAKING POWER UNDER THE
1987 CONSTITUTION IMPLIES AUTHORITY TO
ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND
MANDAMUS. — It is significant to note that no similar
provision granting respondent COMELEC with rule-
making power as provided in the present
Constitution is found in the 1973 Constitution, the
fundamental law in force when the Pimentel case
was decided. Such constitutional conferment of rule-
making power in favor of the COMELEC necessarily
implies, if not in itself inherent, the authority of the
Commission to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
expressly conferred by the constitution.
4.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION;
CERTIORARI; FUNCTION OF THE WRIT. — It is
elementary that the function of the writ is to keep an
inferior court within its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction (Central Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 429 [1989]; Calagui v.
Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 564 [1990]; Brillo v.
Buklatan, 87 Phil. 519 [1950]).
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO ISSUE WRITS FLOWS
FROM THE EXISTENCE OF APPELLATE
JURISDICTION; CASE AT BAR. — The power to issue
special writs also flows from the existence of
appellate jurisdiction is a doctrinal pronouncement
and settled jurisprudence. It has been held that
"grant of jurisdiction implies that there is included in it
the power necessary to its effective exercise and to
make all orders that will preserve the subject of the
action and give effect to the final determination of the
appeal" (Kjellander v. Kjellander (132 P 1170 [1913]).
Premises considered, the COMELEC may issue writs
of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; A COMMON LAW WRIT WHICH DOES
NOT OWE ITS EXISTENCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION OR STATUTORY ENACTMENT. — The
Court must not lose sight of the fact of the origin and
historical development of the special writs as it was
understood in common law jurisdiction from where it
evolved and carried over to the Philippine court
system (i.e., from Act 190 through RA 296 to BP 129)
that "(t)he writ of certiorari does not owe its existence
to constitutional provision or statutory enactment. It is
a common law writ, of ancient origin, and one of the
most valuable and efficient remedies which came to
us with that admirable system of jurisprudence"
(Tennessee Cent. R. Co. v. Campbell, 75 SW 1012
[1903]).
7.ID.; COURTS; ONE OF THE INHERENT POWERS OF
AN APPELLATE COURT IS TO MAKE USE OF ALL
WRITS. — "(I)t is an essential doctrine that one of the
essential attributes of appellate jurisdiction, and one
of the inherent powers of the appellate court, is the
right to make use of all writs known to the common
law, and, if necessary, to invent new writs or
proceedings in order to suitably exercise the
jurisdiction conferred (Wheller v. Northern Colorado
Irrigation Co., 11 P 103 [1986]; citing Attorney General
v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 425; Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137; U.S. v. Commissioners, 1 Morris, (Iowa)
42; Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis 277).
8.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; WITH JUDICIAL POWERS TO BE JUDGE
OF ELECTION CONTESTS. — The power to be the
"judge . . . of . . . contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of any public official is
essentially judicial. As such, . . ., it belongs exclusively
to the judicial department, except only insofar as the
Constitution provides otherwise." (Lopez v. Roxas, 17
SCRA 756 [1966]; citing Matthews, American
Constitutional System; Cooley, Thomas M., A Treatise
on Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I, pp. 270-271, 1927
ed.; 23 W & P 147 [1965 Pocket Part]; State ex rel.
Tanner v. Duncan, 10 So. 2d 507, 511, 23 W & P 148,
supra). In granting the COMELEC with the powers
and functions to "exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction" (Sec. 2 [2], Art. IX-C,
Constitution), the Constitution vested upon the
COMELEC judicial powers to decide all contests
relating to elective local officials as therein provided.
9.ID.; JUDICIAL POWER, DEFINED. — As defined in
the Constitution, "(j)udicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1,
par. 2, Art, VIII).
10.ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; WITH
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI IN
AID OF ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION. — Since the
COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of
justice performing judicial power and said power
includes the determination of whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows
that the COMELEC, by constitutional mandate, is
vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
11.ID.; ID.; SHOULD NOT BE HAMPERED WITH
RESTRICTIONS IN THE DISCHARGE OF ITS DUTIES.
— The Commission on Elections is a constitutional
body. It is intended to play a distinct and important
part in our scheme of government. In the discharge
of its functions, it should not be hampered with
restriction that would be fully warranted in the case
of a less responsible organization. The Commission
may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of the
great objective for which it was created — free,
orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully
with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly
illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this
court should not interfere. Politics is a practical
matter . . . (Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288.)
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J :
p
The jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus in electoral contests involving
municipal and barangay officials is the common
question addressed in these elections cases, hence,
their consolidation.
The antecedent facts follow:
(1)G.R. No. 88158 (The Antipolo Case)
In the 18 January 1988 local elections, Petitioners
Daniel GARCIA and Teodoro O'HARA were the
winning candidates for Mayor and Vice Mayor,
respectively, of Antipolo, Rizal. They were proclaimed
as such on 22 January 1988.
On 1 February 1988, Private Respondents Ernesto DE
JESUS and Cecilia DAVID instituted an election
protest before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 72 (RTC), docketed as Election Case
No. 02-A, where the results in twenty-five (25)
precincts were put in issue.
On 25 July 1988, the RTC issued an Order directing
the delivery to it of all ballot boxes and other election
paraphernalia used in the 25 protested precincts so
that the ballots could be examined and the votes
recounted
After five (5) ballot boxes were already examined and
revised, Petitioner's newly-hired counsel moved for
the suspension of the hearing being conducted on
18 September 1988 alleging that an error was
committed in the proceedings because there was no
basis for the opening of the ballot boxes. He
contended that the irregularities alleged in the
election protest do not relate to the appreciation of
ballots and thus, the opening of those boxes would
not affect the result of the election.
On 26 September 1988, Petitioners GARCIA and
O'HARA filed before the RTC a "Motion To Dismiss
Opening Of Ballot Boxes and/or To Dismiss The
Protest" which was premised on the ground that the
allegations in the election protest were merely self-
serving.
cdll
Acting on the aforesaid Motion, the RTC issued an
Order dated 28 October 1988, amending its Order
dated 25 July 1988, limiting the opening of ballot
boxes to only nine (9) precincts out of the 25
protested ones, and limiting the examination of the
ballot boxes only to those anomalies specified in the
annexes attached to the election protest by
Respondents DE JESUS and DAVID.
The latter moved for reconsideration thereof which
was denied by the RTC, in an Order dated 27
December 1988. On 9 January 1989, Respondents
DE JESUS and DAVID filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus before the COMELEC, docketed as
SPR No. 289, which sought to nullify the RTC Order
limiting the examination of ballot boxes to only 9
precincts.
On 13 January 1989, respondent COMELEC
temporarily restrained the proceedings before the
RTC and set for hearing Respondents DAVID and DE
JESUS' application for Preliminary Injunction on 29
January 1989.
Petitioners GARCIA and O'HARA, meanwhile,
registered their objection to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the COMELEC over the Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus through their
"Manifestation With Motion To Dismiss." It was their
contention that the COMELEC was not empowered
to take cognizance of Petitions for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus.
After the parties had filed their respective pleadings,
the COMELEC issued the questioned Decision, dated
27 April 1989, which directed the RTC to open all the
ballot boxes in the 25 protested precincts.
(2)G.R. Nos. 97108-09 (The Isabela Case)
After the canvass of election returns was made in the
same local elections, Respondent Jose C. NEYRA
was proclaimed Mayor of Gama, Isabela over
Petitioner Tomas TOBON UY, with a plurality of 28
votes.
Petitioner TOBON UY filed an election protest before
the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 16
(RTC), docketed as Election Case No. 369. On 7
January 1991, the RTC declared TOBON UY the
winner "by a majority of five (5) votes" over NEYRA
(RTC Decision, p. 24).
On the same date that said RTC Decision was
promulgated, NEYRA filed a "Notice of Appeal," and
TOBON UY, a "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal,"
with the latter pleading set for hearing on 10 January
1991.
The day before, or on 9 January 1991, NEYRA filed
before the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari and/or
Prohibition, docketed as SPR No. 1-91, seeking to
enjoin the RTC from further acting on TOBON UY's
aforesaid "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal."
On 10 January 1991, the RTC, after due hearing, gave
due course to NEYRA's appeal, granted execution
pending appeal stating the special reasons therefor,
and required TOBON UY to post a bond in the
amount of P300,000.00. On the same date, the
COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the RTC from further proceeding with the
case. NEYRA's application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was likewise set for hearing by the
COMELEC on 24 January 1991.
On 15 January 1991, NEYRA filed a second Petition
for Certiorari and/or Prohibition before the
COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 2-91. This time, he
sought to set aside the RTC Order, dated 10 January
1991, which granted TOBON UY's "Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal."
The COMELEC took cognizance of both Certiorari
Petitions and, on 15 February 1991, issued the
questioned Resolution (in SPR Nos. 1-91 & 2-91),
declaring as null and void the Writ of Execution
Pending Appeal granted by the RTC, premised on
Rule 35, Section 18, of its Rules of Procedure, and
enjoining TOBON UY from "assuming the office and
performing in whatever and however manner the
duties of Mayor of Gamu, Isabela, until the final
disposition of the appeal."
Principally, Petitioners GARCIA and O'HARA in G.R.
No. 88158, and Petitioner TOBON UY in G.R. Nos.
97108-09, question the arrogation unto itself by the
COMELEC of the power to issue Writs of Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus. They invoke the previous
ruling of this Court in Pimentel v. COMELEC (G.R.
Nos. 53581-83, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 769),
which maintained that no such jurisdiction was ever
conferred on respondent Commission by the 1973
Constitution or by law. LexLib
On the other hand, all Respondents in the Antipolo
Case (G.R. No. 88158) and in the Isabela Case (G.R.
Nos. 97108-09) contend that since the 1987
Constitution now expressly empowers the COMELEC
to exercise "appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction" (Section 2[2], Article IX-
C), and to "promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it" provided they do
"not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights"
(Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C), the
COMELEC validly promulgated the rule which
empowers it to issue the special Writs.
As a subsidiary issue, Petitioners GARCIA and
O'HARA maintain that the COMELEC denied them
due process in the Antipolo Case (G.R. No. 88158)
when it rendered its questioned Decision without
benefit of hearing. For his part, TOBON UY, in the
Isabela Case (G.R. Nos. 97108-09), raises the
question of whether or not Regional Trial Courts have
the authority to order execution pending appeal in
election contests decided by it. His view is that said
Courts possess that authority. Respondent NEYRA
contends otherwise.
In the absence of any specific conferment upon the
COMELEC, either by the Constitution or by legislative
fiat, the COMELEC is bereft of jurisdiction to issue
said Writs.
It is the COMELEC alone, invoking its Constitutionally
invested appellate jurisdiction and rule-making
power, that arrogated unto itself the authority to issue
Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in Rule
28, Section 1, of its Rules of Procedure, thus:
"SECTION 1.When available. — In aid of
its appellate jurisdiction in election
cases before courts of general
jurisdiction relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of elective
municipal officials, and before courts of
limited jurisdiction in cases relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications
of elective barangay officials, the
Commission en banc may hear and
decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus."
However, neither the appellate jurisdiction of the
COMELEC nor its rule-making power justifies such
self-conferment of authority.
Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and
determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as
a matter of law. It may be classified into original
jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. Original
jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial
cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for
the first time under conditions provided by law.
Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court
higher in rank to re-examine the final order or
judgment of a lower Court which tried the case now
elevated for judicial review (Remedial Law
Compendium, Regalado, Florenz D., Fifth Revised
Edition, Vol. I, p. 3). Since the two jurisdictions are
exclusive of each other, each must be expressly
conferred by law. One does not flow from, nor is
inferred from, the other.
In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such authority
has always been expressly conferred, either by the
Constitution or by law. As a matter of fact, the well-
settled rule is that jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law (Orosa, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso v.
Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21
SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication. Indeed,
"(w)hile the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in
some instance conferred on all courts by
constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the
particular courts which have such power are
expressly designated" (J. Aquino's Concurring
Opinion in Pimentel, supra, citing 14 C.J.S. 202;
Emphasis ours).
Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs of
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus by virtue of
express constitutional grant or legislative
enactments. To enumerate: Cdpr
(1)Section 5[1], Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution conferred upon this Court
such jurisdiction;
(2)Section 9[1] of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, to the Court of Appeals (then
Intermediate Appellate Court);
(3)Section 21[1] of the said Act, to
Regional Trial Courts;
(4)Section 5[1] of Republic Act No. 6734,
or the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, to the
newly created Shari'ah Appellate Court;
and
(5)Article 143[e], Chapter I, Title I, Book
IV of Presidential Decree No. 1083, or
the Code of Muslim Personal Law, to
Shari'ah District Courts.
Significantly, what the Constitution granted the
COMELEC was appellate jurisdiction. The
Constitution makes no mention of any power given
the COMELEC to exercise original jurisdiction over
Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
unlike in the case of the Supreme Court which was
specifically conferred such authority (Art. VIII, Sec,
5[1]). The immutable doctrine being that jurisdiction
is fixed by law, the power to issue such Writs cannot
be implied from the mere existence of appellate
jurisdiction. Just as implied repeal of statutes are
frowned upon, so also should the grant of original
jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial
body tabooed. If appellate jurisdiction has to be
statutorily granted, how much more the original
jurisdiction to issue the prerogative Writs ?
Apparently, the COMELEC Rule on its Certiorari
jurisdiction is patterned after the previous
authorization to the Court of Appeals to issue Writs of
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. That authority, however, was
not inherent in the Court of Appeals but was
specifically conferred by Section 30 of the Judiciary
Act (Rep. Act No. 296) and Section 9(1) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). It
does not follow that just because the 1987
Constitution vests the COMELEC with appellate
jurisdiction, without more, it can issue such Writs in
aid of that appellate jurisdiction.
The view that the subject Writs are but common-law
Writs not owing their existence to any constitutional
provision or statutory enactment may be true in
foreign jurisdictions but not in the Philippine judicial
system where such Writs are specifically
characterized as original Special Civil Actions (Rule
65, Rules of Court). It is original jurisdiction, as
contrasted to appellate jurisdiction, that is exercised
in the issuance of said Writs. And although there may
be authorities in other jurisdictions which maintain
that such Writs are inherent in the power of higher
Courts exercising appellate jurisdiction, the same
refers to judicial tribunals, which the COMELEC is
not. What this agency exercises are administrative
and quasi-judicial powers (Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-31455, 28
February 1985, 135 SCRA 25).
As defined, Certiorari "is a writ from a superior court
to an inferior court or tribunal commanding the latter
to send up the record of a particular case" (Pimentel
v. COMELEC, supra). The function of a Writ of
Certiorari is to keep an inferior Court within the
bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction (Central Bank of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41859, 8
March 1989, 171 SCRA 49). The grant of appellate
jurisdiction to the COMELEC does not necessarily
make it a "superior Court" vis-a-vis Regional Trial
Courts. In fact, in People v. Delgado (G.R. Nos. 93419-
32,18 September 1990, 189 SCRA 715), we ruled that
Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction to review the
actions taken by the COMELEC in criminal
prosecutions for violations of election laws. This,
notwithstanding the grant to the COMELEC of
"exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigations of all election offenses punishable
under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code. cdll
The power vested in the COMELEC to promulgate its
Rules of Procedure neither confers upon itself the
jurisdiction to issue the prerogative Writs. Procedure,
as distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by
which the power or authority of a Court to hear and
decide a class of cases is put into action (Manila
Railroad Co. v. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523). Rules
of procedure are remedial in nature and not
substantive. They cover only rules on pleadings and
practice. And in respect of the COMELEC, the
authority to promulgate its rules of procedure was
specifically "in order to expedite disposition of cases"
(Section 3, Article IX-C). That limited purpose can not
be expanded to include the conferment upon itself of
jurisdiction which is substantive in nature and can
only be fixed by law.
The doctrine laid down in Pimentel, supra, holding
that the COMELEC has not been invested with
jurisdiction to issue the Writs in question, therefore,
still finds application under the 1987 Constitution.
Said case also involved an elective municipal official
except that it was decided under the regime of the
1973 Constitution and the 1978 Election Code (Pres.
Decree No. 1296).
There is no gainsaying that, unlike the 1987
Constitution, the 1973 Constitution did not grant
appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC over election
contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, such appellate jurisdiction was
conferred upon it by Section 196 of the 1978 Election
Code (Pres. Decree No. 1296), reading:
"Section 196. Appeal. — From any
decision rendered by the Court of First
Instance in the cases stated in Section
190 hereof, the aggrieved party may
appeal to the Commission within five
days after receipt of a copy of the
decision; Provided, That no motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained by
the court (Emphasis ours).
"The appeal shall proceed as in a
criminal case and shall be decided
within sixty days after the case has
been submitted for decision."
Section 190 referred to in the first paragraph deals
with election contests for municipal and municipal
district offices.
Again, while the 1973 Constitution did not empower
the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of
procedure, Section 192 of the same 1978 Election
Code granted it such powers. Thus:
"Section 192.Procedure in election
contests. — The Commission shall
prescribe the rules to govern the
procedure and other matters relating to
election contests pertaining to all
national, regional, provincial, city,
municipal and barangay offices. Such
rules shall provide a simple and
inexpensive procedure for the
expeditious disposition of election
contests" (Emphasis ours). Cdpr
It would appear, therefore, that what were merely
statutory provisions under the 1978 Election Code
became constitutional grants under the 1987
Constitution. Significantly, however, neither the 1973
Constitution nor the 1987 Constitution expressly
confers upon the COMELEC the jurisdiction to issue
Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. In
essence, therefore, the statutory set-up in the present
Petition and in Pimentel, insofar as the COMELEC
power to issue those Writs is concerned, is on all
fours.
Then, as now, there is no specific grant to the
COMELEC, either in the Constitution or by legislative
fiat, of jurisdiction over said petitions.
It may be that, as pointed out by the Solicitor General,
division of authority between the Courts and the
COMELEC could affect the expeditious settlement of
election contests. That is no justification, however, for
conferring a quasi-judicial body with original
Certiorari jurisdiction. That would place the
COMELEC in a class by itself apart from similar
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies. Neither
would there be "sharing of appellate jurisdiction"
thereby, since the issuance of the special Writs
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction.
In the last analysis, the remedy lies with the
legislature and not with this Court. It is Congress that
has the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various Courts (Art. VIII, Sec. 2, 1987
Constitution). That should include quasi-judicial
bodies.
Considering that the COMELEC does not have
jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus, it would thus be moot and
academic to still pass upon GARCIA and O'HARA's
contention that they were denied due process when
the respondent Commission issued the questioned
Decision in the Antipolo Case. Suffice it to state that
absence of hearing per se, does not necessarily
imply denial of due process. The fact that they were
afforded reasonable opportunity to explain their side
of the controversy through their pleadings, destroys
the validity of their argument. As long as the parties
were given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment was rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met (Lindo v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 95016, 11 January 1991, 194 SCRA 25).
We now come to the subsidiary issue raised by
Petitioner TOBON UY in G.R. Nos. 97108-09 of
whether or not Regional Trial Courts can order
execution pending appeal in election contests
decided by it involving elective municipal officials.
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure would also
deprive Regional Trial Courts of the prerogative to
order execution pending appeal in Rule 35, Section
18, reading:
"SEC. 18.Decision on the contest. — The
Court shall decide the election contest
within thirty (30) days from the date it is
submitted for decision, but in every
case within six (6) months after its filing
and shall declare who among the
parties has been elected, or in a proper
case, that none of them has been
legally elected. The party who in the
judgment has been declared elected
shall have the right to assume the office
as soon as the judgment becomes
final." (emphasis ours).
The COMELEC, however, is bereft of authority to
deprive Regional Trial Courts of the competence to
order execution pending appeal. For one, it is
essentially a judicial prerogative. For another, it is a
pronouncement of the COMELEC alone in its
procedural rules, without benefit of statute, unlike in
the past where it was specifically provided for in
Section 177 of the Revised Election Code (Rep. Act
No. 180, as amended) 1 and Section 224 of the
Election Code of 1971 (Rep. Act No. 6388) 2 from
whence the rule was lifted verbatim. Significantly,
however, when the Election Code of 1971 (Rep. Act
No. 6388) was superseded by the 1978 Election Code
(Pres. Decree No. 1296), said clause was deleted
therefrom. It is likewise absent in the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987 (Rep. Act No. 6646) and in the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which were
the election laws in effect during the 18 January 1988
local elections.
There is no express provision of law, therefore,
disauthorizing executions pending appeal, and the
COMELEC, in its procedural rules alone, should not
be allowed to divest Regional Trial Courts of that
authority. It deprives the prevailing party of a
substantive right to move for such relief contrary to
the constitutional mandate that those Rules can not
diminish nor modify substantive rights (Section 6,
Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution).
At any rate, the clause "as soon as the judgment
becomes final" had already been interpreted by this
Court as a general one defining the effect of a final
judgment on the right of the winner to assume the
contested office as the de jure elected official to
serve up to the end of the term (Gahol v. Hon.
Riodique, G.R. No. L-40415, 27 June 1975, 64 SCRA
494 at p. 514). It does not disallow Regional Trial
Courts from ordering execution pending appeal.
Admittedly, unlike in Section 218 of the Election Code
of 1971, applied in Gahol v. Hon. Riodique, supra,
there is no express provision in the Electoral Reforms
Law (Rep. Act No. 6646) nor in the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881) that would allow execution
pending appeal. Said Section 218 reads: prLL
"Sec. 218.Assumption of office
notwithstanding an election contest. —
Every candidate for a provincial, city,
municipal or municipal district office
duly proclaimed elected by the
corresponding board of canvassers
shall assume office, notwithstanding the
pendency in the courts of any contest
against his election, without prejudice to
the final decision thereon and
applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court regarding execution of judgment
pending appeal."
Nonetheless, Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
which allows Regional Trial Courts to order
executions pending appeal upon good reasons
stated in a special order, may be made to apply by
analogy or suppletorily to election contests decided
by them (Rule 43, Section 1, COMELEC Rules of
Procedure). Indeed, as much recognition should be
given to the value of the decision of a judicial body
as a basis for the right to assume office as that given
by law to the proclamation made by the Board of
Canvassers. In the words of Gahol v. Hon. Riodique,
supra:
". . . why should the proclamation by the
board of canvassers suffice as a basis
of the right to assume office, subject to
future contingencies attendant to a
protest, and not the decision of a court
of justice? Indeed, when it is considered
that the board of canvassers is
composed of persons who are less
technically prepared to make an
accurate appreciation of the ballots,
apart from their being more apt to yield
to external considerations, and that the
board must act summarily, practically
racing against time, while on the other
hand, the judge has the benefit of all the
evidence the parties can offer and of
admittedly better technical preparation
and background, apart from his being
allowed ample time for conscientious
study and mature deliberation before
rendering judgment, one cannot but
perceive the wisdom of allowing the
immediate execution of decisions in
election cases adverse to the
protestees, notwithstanding the
perfection and pendency of appeals
therefrom, as long as there are, in the
sound discretion of the court, good
reasons therefor."
To construe otherwise would be to bring back the
ghost of the "grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-
protest" techniques so often resorted to by devious
politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate
their hold to an elective office. This would, as a
consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate
(See Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30570, 29
July 1969; Lagumbay v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-25444,
31 January 1966, 16 SCRA 175).
In retrospect, good reasons did, in fact, exist which
justified the RTC Order, dated 10 January 1991,
granting execution pending appeal. Among others
mentioned by the RTC are the combined No costs.
considerations of the near expiration of the term of
office, public interest, the pendency of the election SO ORDERED.
contest for more than three (3) years, and that
TOBON UY had filed a bond in the amount of ||| (Garcia v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 88158, 97108-09, March
P300,000.00 (Rollo, p. 46). 04, 1992)

To recapitulate, in the absence of an express

Constitutional or legislative authorization, the
COMELEC is devoid of competence to issue special
Writs simply on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction
and its rule-making power. Neither is the COMELEC
empowered, through its procedural rules alone, to
deprive Regional Trial Courts of authority, in the
exercise of their discretion, to order execution
pending appeal upon good reasons stated in a
special order.

It must be noted that the term of office of the

contested positions is nearing expiration. There is
need, then, for this Decision to be immediately
executory.

WHEREFORE, these consolidated Petitions for

Certiorari and prohibition are hereby GRANTED. cdphil

In G.R. No. 88158, the COMELEC Decision, dated 27

April 1989, in SPR No. 2-89 is hereby SET ASIDE, and
the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 72, dated 28 October 1988 in Election
Case No. 02-A, limiting the opening of ballot boxes to
only nine (9) precincts, is hereby REINSTATED, the
case to proceed until final disposition.

In G.R. Nos. 97108-09, the COMELEC Resolution

dated 15 February 1991, in SPR Nos. 1-91 and 2-91, is
likewise SET ASIDE, and the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 16, dated 10
January 1991, in Election Case No. 369 granting
execution pending appeal, is hereby REINSTATED,
without prejudice to the disposition of respondent
Jose Neyra's appeal before the COMELEC.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 106019. December 17, 1993.]
JOSE "PEPING" NAVARRO,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSE "PEMPE"
MIRANDA, respondents.
Ramirez Law Office for petitioner.
Agustin J. Guillermo for private respondent
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF
COMELEC GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED BY
SUPREME COURT; EXCEPTION. – The Constitution
did not intend to place the COMELEC – explicitly
made independent by the Constitution itself – on a
lower level than that of statutory administrative
agencies, whose factual findings are generally not
disturbed by the courts except when there is no
substantial evidence to support such findings.
Factual matters are not proper for consideration in
proceedings brought either as an original action for
certiorari or as an appeal by certiorari. The main
issue in the former case is one of jurisdiction – lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction; while in the latter case, the
issues are limited to the consideration of questions of
law.
2. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSION REACHED BY COMELEC ON
MATTER WITHIN ITS COMPETENCE ENTITLED TO
UTMOST RESPECT; EXCEPTION. – In the absence of
jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the conclusion
reached by the COMELEC on a matter that falls
within its competence is entitled to utmost respect.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. – Petitioner, more
particularly, failed to follow the procedure laid down
in Section 244 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
provides: "Parties adversely affected by a ruling of the
board of canvassers on questions affecting the
composition or proceeding of the board may appeal
the matter to the Commission within three (3) days
from a ruling thereon. The Commission shall
summarily decide the case within five days from the
filing thereof." and Section 7 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, which provides: "Procedure before the
Board of Canvassers when composition or
proceedings of the board are contested. a) When the
composition or proceedings of the board of
canvassers are contested, the board of canvassers
shall, within 24 hours, make a ruling thereon with
notice to the contestant who, if adversely affected,
may appeal the matter to the commission within 5
days after the ruling with proper notice to the board
of canvassers." With respect to the alleged mistakes
committed by the Board of Canvassers in the
inclusion of certain returns, petitioner failed to follow
the procedure laid down in Section 245 of the
Omnibus Election Code. This provision requires that
the party contesting the inclusion or exclusion in the
canvass of any election returns should interpose his
verbal objections to the Chairman of the Board of
Canvassers at the time the questioned return is
presented for inclusion or exclusion.
DECISION
QUIASON, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary mandatory injunction, to enjoin: (a)
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from implementing its questioned Resolution dated
June 29, 1992, and (b) the proclamation of private
respondent as Mayor of Santiago, Isabela.
Petitioner Jose "Peping" Navarro and private
respondent Jose "Pempe" Miranda were mayoralty
candidates in Santiago, Isabela during the
synchronized elections held on May 11, 1992. llcd
Petitioner lost to private respondent.
On May 21, 1992, petitioner filed with the COMELEC
an appeal under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election
Code, in relation to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166, to
annul and set aside the rulings of the Board of
Canvassers of Santiago, Isabela and the order of
Manuel Agpalo, the acting Provincial Election
Supervisor in the canvassing of votes in the
mayoralty contest (SPC. No. 92-116). The petition
alleged that:
1) The respondent Board erred in not
issuing to the appellant a written notice
of the canvassing that took place on
May 12, 1992, in violation of Section 228
of the Omnibus Election Code;
2) The respondent Board erred in
continuing with the canvassing of the
election returns despite appellant's
petition to disqualify Domingo Gorospe
and Rodrigo Santos to sit in the board
of canvassers, whose integrity have
been assailed for obvious partiality
towards the candidacy of Jose Miranda;
3) The respondent Board erred in
continuing with the canvassing of
contested returns despite verbal and
written petitions to exclude, supported
by clear and convincing evidence;
4) The respondent Board erred in
continuing with the canvassing of
contested election returns despite the
filing of notices of appeal by appellant
and for failure to observe the provisions
of Section 20, R.A. 7166;
5) Respondent Agpalo erred in issuing
an order setting aside appellant's notice
of appeal, a denial of due process"
(Rollo, pp. 188-189).
In his Answer/Opposition, private respondent alleged
that:
1) Petitioner failed to make a timely
objection to the 118 returns from the
118 precincts subject matter of the
appeal (Rollo, p. 42).
2) The affidavits submitted by petitioner
in support of his written objections to
the 118 precincts do not make out a
prima facie case showing the existence
of fraud, irregularity or other
circumstances constituting the ground
for the objection (Rollo, p. 44).
In his Supplemental Answer, private respondent
further alleged: a) that like petitioner, he was not
given a written notice by the Board of Canvassers of
its initial meeting; b) that two lawyers appeared in
representation of petitioner at the meeting of the
Board of Canvassers; c) that said lawyers did not
register their objections to the regularity of the
proceedings; d) that also present at the meeting
were several supporters of petitioner; and e) that, at
any rate, such failure of the Board of Canvassers to
give notice of the initial meeting was not his fault and
a ground for a pre-proclamation controversy (Rollo,
pp. 48-49). cdll
In its Resolution dated June 29, 1992, the COMELEC
en banc dismissed the petition without prejudice to
the filing of a regular electoral protest (Rollo, pp. 37-
51).
Hence, this petition which alleges that the COMELEC
has gravely abused its discretion:
1) When it upheld the regularity of the
canvassing of the election returns
inspite of the lack of due notice thereof
and the failure of the board of
canvassers to attach the proof of
service of notice to the records;
2) When it allowed the municipal board
of canvassers to continue with the
canvassing despite the filing of the
motion to disqualify some of the
members;
 3) When it upheld the illegal following objections raised before it by
composition of the board; the Petitioner, to quote:

4) When it affirmed the anomalous 1. Misreading of ballots;

membership of a fourth member of the
board, who prepared the minutes under 2. Interchanging of results;
the Domingo board and Acierto board
and erased from said minutes 3. Tampering/falsification of
petitioner's participation during the election returns;
proceedings; and
4. Discrepancies in the Returns;
5) When it arbitrarily ruled that the
grounds raised for excluding 118 5. Election Returns prepared
returns are not grounds for pre- under duress, threats, coercion
proclamation (Rollo, pp. 151-152). or intimidation;

The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to make 6. Substitute/fraudulent returns

timely objections to the alleged illegal acts will materially affect the
standing of the aggrieved
committed by the Board of Canvassers, as well as to
candidate (Annex "I", "J" and
its composition and proceedings.
"K").
cdrep

The COMELEC stated that:

Petitioner's injection therefore of
matters related to the composition or
"In the light of these conflicting claims,
proceedings of respondent Board in the
resort to the minutes of the respondent
discussion of the instant appeal is a
board is necessary.
failed attempt to resurrect an
abandoned right. In fine,
Significantly, nothing in the said
petitioner/appellant raised, although
minutes will show any such objection
belatedly and at a time when estoppel
by petitioner or his counsels of the said
had set in, grounds which could have
respondent Board's failure to send
been proper for a pre-proclamation
notices to the candidates or political
controversy but for his failure to pursue
parties as required under Section 228 of
it in the manner and within the period
the Omnibus Election Code. Or that if
provided for by law. This is fatal. cdrep

such objections were raised, the same

was pursued to the end. Neither is there
Going over the grounds relied upon in
in the Minutes any showing that
the instant appeal, the Commission is
petitioner's objection to the composition
not persuaded to consider the same as
of respondent Board particularly
appropriate in a pre-proclamation case.
Chairman Gorospe and Vice Chairman
Likewise, the evidence submitted does
Santos was made pursuant to the
not warrant such a finding" (Rollo, pp.
procedural requirement provided for by
49-51).
Section 19, R.A. No. 7166. Failing thus,
petitioner cannot now raise and pursue
The main issue in this petition is whether or not
said objections for the first time in this
petitioner made timely oral objections as to the
appeal.
alleged illegal proceedings and composition of the
At this juncture, it needs re-stating that Board of Canvassers.
this instant appeal is on the various
rulings of respondent Board on the
The finding that petitioner failed to make timely
objections to the composition and the proceedings
of the Board of Canvassers involves a question of
fact, which is left to the determination of the
COMELEC.
The Constitution did not intend to place the
COMELEC – explicitly made independent by the
Constitution itself – on a lower level than that of
statutory administrative agencies, whose factual
findings are generally not disturbed by the courts
except when there is no substantial evidence to
support such findings. Factual matters are not proper
for consideration in proceedings brought either as an
original action for certiorari or as an appeal by
certiorari. The main issue in the former case is one of
jurisdiction – lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction; while
in the latter case, the issues are limited to the
consideration of questions of law (Padilla v.
Commission on Elections, 137 SCRA 424 [1985]).
In the absence of jurisdictional infirmity or error of
law, the conclusion reached by the COMELEC on a
matter that falls within its competence is entitled to
utmost respect (Pimping v. Commission on Elections,
140 SCRA 192 [1985]).
Petitioner, more particularly, failed to follow the
procedure laid down in Section 244 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which provides:
"Parties adversely affected by a ruling of
the board of canvassers on questions
affecting the composition or proceeding
of the board may appeal the matter to
the Commission within three (3) days
from a ruling thereon. The Commission
shall summarily decide the case within
five days from the filing thereof." prLL
and Section 7 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, which provides:
"Procedure before the Board of
Canvassers when composition or
proceedings of the board are contested.
a) When the composition or
proceedings of the board of canvassers
are contested, the board of canvassers
shall, within 24 hours, make a ruling
thereon with notice to the contestant
who, if adversely affected, may appeal
the matter to the commission within 5
days after the ruling with proper notice
to the board of canvassers."
With respect to the alleged mistakes committed by
the Board of Canvassers in the inclusion of certain
returns, petitioner failed to follow the procedure laid
down in Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code.
This provision requires that the party contesting the
inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election
returns should interpose his verbal objections to the
Chairman of the Board of Canvassers at the time the
questioned return is presented for inclusion or
exclusion.
As to Zenaida Taguba, the alleged fourth member of
the Board of Canvassers, there is nothing on record
to show that she participated in the proceedings of
the said Board. At most, she merely acted as a
secretary, whose work involved the purely
mechanical act of taking down notes of the
discussion. cdphil
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the
petition.
SO ORDERED.
(Navarro v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 106019, December
|||
17, 1993)