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Civil procedure

Alcantra vs republic (820 scra 390)

Butuan development corporation vs twenty first division of the hon. CA

Regalado vs dela rama vda. Dela pena

Palao vs vs florentino iii international corp . V V

Malvar vs baleros

Carson realty and management corp. vs red robin security agency V

Municipality of tangkal, province of lano del Norte vs balindong V

2. Butuan Development Corporation vs Twenty First Division of the Hon. CA


While BDC was still in the process of incorporation, a certain Max Arriola armed with a notarized
Resolution of BDC board of directors, mortgaged a property owned and bought for BDC to De Oro
Resources Inc. (DORI) After incorporation, BDC filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the
real estate mortgage (REM) against Arriola and DORI alleging that the Arriola’s misrepresented
themselves as the owners and directors of the BDC. DORI claims that the case should be dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action, because at the time the REM was constituted, BDC had not yet
existed as a corporation. The RTC ruled in favour of BDC but was reversed by the CA.


Whether or not BDC has a cause of action.


The elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) act or omission on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate

Based on the foregoing allegations, BDC's complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of the REM. Basically, BDC alleged in its complaint that it is the owner of the
subject property as evidenced by TCT No. RT-4724, which was issued in its name after it purchased
the subject property, through Satorre, from the Spouses Sering on March 31, 1966. It bears
stressing that a certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. BDC further alleged that the
subject property was mortgaged to DORI and Libarios without their knowledge or consent and that
the Arriolas were not in any way connected with BDC.

The respondents' affirmative defense that BDC, at the time of the execution of the REM, had no right
to hold the subject property in its name being merely an unincorporated association, if at all,
amounts to an allegation that BDC has no cause of action against the respondents. However, failure
to state a cause of action is different from lack of cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action
refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not
prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. The remedy in the first is to move for the dismissal
of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence.
3. G.R. No. 202448, December 13, 2017


ANTONIO DE LA PENA, Respondents.


Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime Antonio (Jaime) all surnamed de la Pena
(respondents), are the registered owners of two parcels of land with a total area of 44 hectares located
in Murcia, Negros Occidental. These properties are referred to as Lot Nos. l38-D and 138-S, and are
respectively covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-103187 and T-103189 5 (subject properties).

G.R. No. 186967

January 18, 2017


On July 30, 2008, Florentino appealed to the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property
Office. This appeal's Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by Atty. John
Labsky P. Maximo (Atty. Maximo) of the firm Balgos and Perez. However, Florentino failed to attach to
its appeal a secretary's certificate or board resolution authorizing Balgos and Perez to sign the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Thus, on August 14, 2008, the Office of the
Director General issued the Order requiring Florentino to submit proof that Atty. Maximo or Balgos and
Perez was authorized to sign the Verification and Certification ofNon-Forum Shopping.

In his Order dated September 22, 2008, Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian S. Cristobal,
Jr. (Director General Cristobal) dismissed Florentino's appeal He noted that the Secretary's Certificate
pertained to an August 14, 2008 Resolution issued by Florentino' s Board of Directors, and reasoned that
the same Certificate failed to establish the authority of Florentino's counsel to sign the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping as of the date of the filing of Florentino's appeal (i.e., on July 30,

Florentino then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. In its assailed January 8, 2009 Decision,22 the Court of Appeals faulted Director
General Cristobal for an overly strict application of procedural rules. Thus, it reversed Director General
Cristobal's September 22, 2008 Order and reinstated Florentino' s appeal.

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the September 22, 2008 Order of Intellectual
Property Office Director General Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr., and in reinstating respondent Florentino III
International, Inc.'s appeal.


The need for a certification of non-forum shopping to be attached to respondent's appeal before the
Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office is established. Section 3 of the
Intellectual Property Office's Uniform Rules on Appeal specifies the form through which appeals may be
taken to the Director General.

These requirements notwithstanding, the Intellectual Property Office's own Regulations on Inter Partes
Proceedings (which governs petitions for cancellations of a mark, patent, utility model, industrial design,
opposition to registration of a mark and compulsory licensing, and which were in effect when
respondent filed its appeal) specify that the Intellectual Property Office "shall not be bound by the strict
technical rules of procedure and evidence.

Given these premises, it was an error for the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office to have
been so rigid in applying a procedural rule and dismissing respondent's appeal. It is reasonable,
therefore-consistent with the precept of liberally applying procedural rules in administrative
proceedings, and with the room allowed by jurisprudence for substantial compliance with respect to the
rule on certifications of non-forum shopping-to construe the error committed by respondent as a venial
lapse that should not be fatal to its cause.
6. Carson Realty and Management Corporation Vs. Red Robin Security Agency and Monina C. Santos

G.R. No. 225035

February 8, 2017


On October 2, 2008 at around 12:51 in the afternoon, when a copy of Alias Summons dated September
9, 2008 issued in the entitled case together with a copy of the complaint and annexes attached thereto
was brought for service to the President/General Manager of CARSON REALTY & MANAGEMENT CORP.,
in the person of Marcial M. Samson and/or Nieva A. Cabrera at its office address at Unit 601 Prestige
Tower Condominium, Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, 1605 Pasig City, undersigned was informed by
the secretary of the company in the person of Ms. Vina Azonza that the above mentioned persons were
not around and there was no one in the company authorized to receive the aforesaid summons. That
the undersigned went back to the said office on October 16, 2008 at around 3:08 in the afternoon and
was entered by Ms. Lorie Fernandez, also an employee of the company who is authorized to receive the
said process.

On October 27, 2008, at around 2:23 in the afternoon, undersigned tried again to serve the same
process to the President/General Manager of Carson Realty & Management Corp. but with the same
result. Finally, on October 28, 2008 at around 1:03 in the afternoon, the undersigned went back to the
said company to personally serve the Alias Summons together with the other pertinent documents, just
the same, the President/General Manager of the company was not around, hence, substituted service of
summons was resorted to by leaving the copy of the Alias Summons at the company's office through its
employee, Ms. Lorie Fernandez, however, she refused to acknowledge receipt of the process.

(1) Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Carson.

(2) Whether or not Carson was properly declared in default.


The petition is bereft of merit. In actions in personam, such as the present case, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons.
However, because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service and personal
service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to
substituted service of summons. Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties must:
(a) indicate the impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the
efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of
sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular
place of business of the defendant.

BALINDONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari’a District Court, 4th Judicial District, Marawi City,

G.R. No.  193340

January 11, 2017


The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint with the Shari'a District
Court of Marawi City (Shari'a District Court) against the petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for recovery
of possession and ownership of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 25 hectares located at
Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, Lanao del Norte. They alleged that Macalabo was the owner of the land,
and that in 1962, he entered into an agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to
"borrow" the land to pave the way for the construction of the municipal hall and a health center
building. The agreement allegedly imposed a condition upon the Municipality of Tangkal to pay the
value of the land within 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise, ownership of the land would revert to
Macalabo. Private respondents claimed that the Municipality of Tangkal neither paid the value of the
land within the agreed period nor returned the land to its owner. Thus, they prayed that the land be
returned to them as successors-in-interest of Macalabo.

The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and lack
of jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic
tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the
complaint for recovery of land is a real action, it should have been filed in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte.
In its Order dated March 9, 2010, the Shari'a District Court denied the Municipality of Tangkal's motion
to dismiss. It held that since the mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a Muslim, the case "is an
action involving Muslims, hence, the court has original jurisdiction concurrently with that of regular/civil
courts." It added that venue was properly laid because the Shari'a District Court has territorial
jurisdiction over the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, in addition to the cities of Marawi
and Iligan. Moreover, the filing of a motion to dismiss is a disallowed pleading under the Special Rules of
Procedure in Shari'a Courts.

The Municipality of Tangkal moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Shari'a District Court.
The Shari'a District Court also ordered the Municipality of Tangkal to file its answer within 10 days. The
Municipality of Tangkal timely filed its answer and raised as an affirmative defense the court's lack of

Within the 60-day reglementary period, the Municipality of Tangkal elevated the case to us via petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO). It
reiterated its arguments in its earlier motion to dismiss and answer that the Shari'a District Court has no
jurisdiction since one party is a municipality which has no religious affiliation.


Whether or not the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for recovery of
possession filed by Muslim individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a Muslim.


The matters over which Shari'a district courts have Jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, specifically in Article 143. Consistent with the purpose of the law to provide for an
effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims, it has a catchall
provision granting Shari'a district courts original jurisdiction over personal and real actions except those
for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. cralawred The Shari'a district courts' jurisdiction over these
matters is concurrent with regular civil courts, i.e., municipal trial courts and regional trial courts. There
is, however, a limit to the general jurisdiction of Shari'a district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable
by regular courts: such jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a
Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular courts.

The complaint below, which is a real action involving title to and possession of the land situated at
Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, was filed by private respondents before the Shari'a District Court pursuant
to the general jurisdiction conferred by Article 143(2)(b). In determining whether the Shari'a District
Court has jurisdiction over the case, the threshold question is whether both parties are Muslims. There
is no disagreement that private respondents, as plaintiffs below, are Muslims. The only dispute is
whether the requirement is satisfied because the mayor of the defendant municipality is also a Muslim.

When Article 143(2)(b) qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to actions "wherein the parties involved
are Muslims," the word "parties" necessarily refers to the real parties in interest. Section 2 of Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court defines real parties in interest as those who stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or are entitled to the avails of the suit. In this case, the parties who will be directly
benefited or injured are the private respondents, as real party plaintiffs, and the Municipality of Tangkal,
as the real party defendant. In their complaint, private respondents claim that their predecessor-in-
interest, Macalabo, entered into an agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal for the use of the land.
Their cause of action is based on the Municipality of Tangkal's alleged failure and refusal to return the
land or pay for its reasonable value in accordance with the agreement. Accordingly, they pray for the
return of the land or the payment of reasonable rentals thereon. Thus, a judgment in favor of private
respondents, either allowing them to recover possession or entitling them to rentals, would
undoubtedly be beneficial to them; correlatively, it would be prejudicial to the Municipality of Tangkal
which would either be deprived possession of the land on which its municipal hall currently stands or be
required to allocate funds for payment of rent. Conversely, a judgment in favor of the Municipality of
Tangkal would effectively quiet its title over the land and defeat the claims of private respondents.

It is clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was impleaded only in
a representative capacity, as chief executive of the local government of Tangkal. When an action is
defended by a representative, that representative is not-and neither does he become-a real party in
interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in interest; the representative remains to be a
third party to the action. That Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of
complying with the jurisdictional requirement under Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To
satisfy the requirement, it is the real party defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a
Muslim. Such a proposition, however, is a legal impossibility.

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a "Muslim" as "a person who testifies to the oneness of God
and the Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam."31 Although the definition does not explicitly
distinguish between natural and juridical persons, it nonetheless connotes the exercise of religion, which
is a fundamental personal right. The ability to testify to the "oneness of God and the Prophethood of
Muhammad" and to profess Islam is, by its nature, restricted to natural persons. In contrast, juridical
persons are artificial beings with "no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires."33
They are considered persons only by virtue of legal fiction. The Municipality of Tangkal falls under this
category. Under the Local Government Code, a municipality is a body politic and corporate that
exercises powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory.


WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City in
Civil Case No. 201-09 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 201-09 is DISMISSED.