Dead Man’s Statute

(Rule 130, Section 23)

1. What is Dead Man’s Statute or Survivorship Disqualification Rule?

Parties or assignor of parties to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind , upon a claim
or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind. (Sec 23)

2. Rationale of the Rule

The reason for the rule on application of Dead Man’s Statute is that:

A) If the death has closed the lips of one party, the policy of the law is to close the lips of the other.
B) The temptation to falsehood and concealment in such cases is considered too great to allow the surviving
party to testify in his own behalf.

3. Is Dead Man’s Statute an absolute disqualification?

It constitutes only a partial disqualification as the witness is not completely disqualified but is only prohibited
from testifying on the matters specified, unlike marital disqualification rule which is a complete and absolute
disqualification.

4. Applicability of the rule

The survivorship disqualification or dead man’s rule is only applicable in civil case or special proceeding over
the estate of a deceased or insane person.

5. Requisites for the application of the Dead Man’s Statute

For the dead man’s statute to apply, the following requisites must concur:

A. That the witness offered for examination is the party plaintiff or assignor of party to a case or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted;
B. That the case is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or
against a person of unsound mind;
C. That the case is upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such
person of unsound mind or cannot testify;
D. That the testimony to be given is on an matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind.

6. Waiver of Dead Man’s Statute

The disqualification under the rule can be waived on the following instances:

A. Failure to object to the testimony of the witness

B. By cross-examining the party on prohibited matters
C. By calling the witness to testify on prohibited matters
 7. Instances where disqualification will not apply

The disqualification under this rule will not apply in the following instances:

A. When the party is not the real party in interest

B. The person is a mere witness
C. The person is not a party to the case, not an assignor of the party, not a person in whose behalf the case
is prosecuted
D. In case of nominal party or officers and stockholders of a corporation
E. In case of counterclaim
F. When the deceased contracted through an agent
G. When the representative is being sued in his individual or personal capacity
H. In case the administrator brought an action to recover property belonging to the estate
I. In case of heirs who substituted the deceased plaintiff
J. In case of negative testimony
K. In cadastral cases
L. In order to prove a claim less than what is established under a written contract
M. When it is intended to prove fraudulent transaction entered by the deceased.

Jurisprudence

1. Incompetency to testify affects only the person mentioned.

The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither are
they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by
whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero,
who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did
not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero. (Guerrero v. St. Claire's Realty & Co.,
124 SCRA 553 (1983)

2. Cross examination of the witness constitute a waiver of the rule.

There was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel for the administratrix extensively cross-examined the
witness on the very matters subject of the prohibition. (Wright v. Tinio, G.R. No. L-4004, May 29, 1952; see
also Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Macfarlane v. Green, 54 Phil. 551) It was for this reason that the trial
judge eventually overruled the counsel's previous general and continuing objection and admitted the
testimony of the witness. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the counsel's lengthy cross-examination
on the prohibited matter was merely for the purpose of establishing the "motive, prejudices and
predilection" of the witness.

The reason for the rule apparently is that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate as to what his
examination of a witness may bring forth. Having made his selection of one of two courses which he may
pursue, he has no right, after he discovers that the course selected is not to his advantage, and after he has
put the opposite party to the expense, and has consumed the time of the courts in a trial of the case in
accordance with the course selected, to change his position and make another and different selection. Such
course would be unfair both to the opposite party and to the court and should not be countenanced in any
court of justice. (Abraham v. Recto-Kasten, 4 SCRA 298 (1962)

3. Rationale of the rule

 The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of
equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff
when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the
temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. (Goñi v. CA, 144 SCRA
222 (1986)

4. Heirs are protected of the Dead Man’s Statute

Even if the property involved has been judicially adjudicated to the heirs, they are still protected under this
rule against such prohibited testimony as they are considered as the representatives of the deceased. (Goñi
v. CA, 144 SCRA 222 (1986)

5. The rule does not apply when the administrator brings an action to recover property belonging to the
estate.

The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" the administratrix of
the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. Moreover, a waiver was accomplished
when the adverse party undertook to cross-examine the interested person with respect to the prohibited
matters. (Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 (1927)

It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case
was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. (Razon v.
IAC, 207 SCRA 234 (1992)

6. Officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an executor or administrator of a deceased

person are disqualified from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person.

Our own statute, it will be observed, is broader than any of these. It neither disqualifies parties to a contract
nor persons in interest, but only parties to the action (Code Civil Procedure, sections 1879, 1880); and thus it
is that in City Savings Bank vs. Enos, 135 Cal., 167, 67 Pac., 52, it has been held that one who is cashier and at
the same time a stockholder of a bank was not disqualified, it being said: "to hold that the statute disqualifies
all persons from testifying who are officers or stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to materially
amending the statute by judicial interpretation." It is concluded, therefore, that our statute does not exclude
from testifying a stockholder of a corporation, whether he be but a stockholder, or whether, in addition
thereto, he be a director or officer thereof (Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 (1949)

7. An alleged declaration against an interest of a dead person in an action is tantamount to a claim against
the estate.
Sembrano's testimony on behalf of petitioners is about an alleged declaration against an interest of a person
who is dead in an action that is in effect a claim against his estate. Such a testimony if coming from a party
would be barred by the surviving parties rule, or the dead man's statute. And while Sembrano is not a party,
he is practically a surrogate of petitioners since he was the personal accountant of their predecessor-in-
interest and the corporate accountant of the corporation he controlled. (Hko Ah Pao vs. Ting, G.R. No.
153476, September 27, 2006)
JOSE GUERRERO, MARIA GUERRERO, MAGDALENA GUERRERO ESPIRITU, assisted by her husband CANDIDO ESPIRITU,
GREGORIO GUERRERO, CLARA GUERRERO, Et Al., Petitioner, v. ST. CLARE’S REALTY CO., LTD., GUILLERMO T.
GUERRERO, CECILIA GUERRERO, assisted by ANGELO CARDEÑO, PERLINDA GUERRERO, etc., Et Al., Respondents.
G.R. No. L-58164. September 2, 1983
Facts:
During their lifetime the spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute owners of the disputed property,
which is a parcel of land located at San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, with an area of 42,299 square meters, more or less.
The spouses had six children, named Andres, Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose and Cristina, and all surnamed Guerrero.
Panay Ramos predeceased Isidoro Guerrero. Before his demise, Isidoro Guerrero verbally willed and ordained that the
questioned lot be assigned and adjudicated to Andres Guerrero as his share in the inheritance, the other children having
been assigned other lots. Accordingly, upon the death of Isidoro Guerrero, Andres Guerrero physically possessed the lot
and cultivated it through his tenant Dominador Ramirez, who earned a 50% share in the net produce, the other 50%
being retained by Andres Guerrero who defrayed the cultivation expenses and real estate taxes on the property. Shortly
after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, and
allowed her to have the property cultivated and to retain the owner’s share in the harvests. The arrangement between
brother and sister was that Cristina Guerrero could continue in the cultivation of the land and enjoyment of the owner’s
share in the produce for as long as she needed the property. Dominador Ramirez continued his tenancy until shortly
before the death of Andres Guerrero. Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero died survived by his widow, Segunda
Laquindanum, and their children, who are the petitioners in this case. Cristina Guerrero continued as trustee of the
deceased Andres.
The complaints further alleged that as early as December 10, 1957, the land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for
and in the name of Andres Guerrero as Lot No. 4752, Case No. 4, Cadastre No. 229 of the Parañaque Cadastre.
Sometime during the latter part of 1971 certain people who introduced themselves as agents or buyers of the land
approached some of the plaintiffs in order to secure their consent to the sale of the property. Said plaintiffs were
informed that the land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero. Plaintiffs made inquiries and discovered
the following: that Manuel Guerrero was able to have the lot titled in his name on the basis of a ‘Deed of Sale of Land’
dated April 24, 1948 purportedly executed by Cristina Guerrero; that he caused the lot to be surveyed in his name as Lot
No. 4752 and he was issued advance Plan No. AP-10008 on February 28, 1962; that in the advance plan issued to him, it
was duly noted that Lot No. 4752 had been previously surveyed for Andres Guerrero; that in 1963, Manuel Guerrero,
assisted by Felicisimo Guerrero, father of the defendants Guerreros, filed an application for registration of land with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal; that notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs of Cristina Guerrero.
That on September 14, 1971, there was filed with the Register of Deeds of Rizal a "Deed of Absolute Sale" purportedly
executed by Manuel Guerrero in favor of the defendants Guerreros; that the Register of Deeds gave due course to the
registration of that deed, cancelled OCT No. 4591 and was issued Transfer Certificate No. 339629 in its stead; that on the
same day that the deed of sale was registered, the defendants Guerreros caused to be notarized an "Articles of
Partnership" of St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd., constituting themselves as partners; that on September 28, 1971, the
defendants Guerreros sold the disputed lot in a "Deed of Absolute Sale" to the St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd.; that by
virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 340842 in the name of said realty company.
According to the original and amended complaints, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero was fraudulent,
simulated and falsified for the reason, among others, that Cristina Guerrero was not the owner of the land at the time
she purportedly sold it; that Manuel Guerrero obtained OCT No. 4591 in fraud of the plaintiffs; that the Deeds of Sale to
the defendants Guerreros and St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd. and the transfer certificates of title in their favor are
fraudulent and simulated, and ineffective against the plaintiffs for the reason, among others, that at the time of
execution of the Deeds of Sale, the defendants Guerreros knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero; that
long after the complaint in the present case has been filed, the plaintiffs came to know that the St. Clare’s Realty
Company, Ltd. executed a "Joint Venture Agreement" with the United Housing Corporation under which the latter
bound itself to develop the property into a residential subdivision; and that the said agreement was entered into in
gross and evident bad faith.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from testifying in
the case and their testimonies excluded on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
(2) Whether or not the exclusion of plaintiffs’ evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was
correctly sustained by the respondent Court of appeals

RULING
(1) No, the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes were incorrectly disqualified from testifying.

Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated:

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a
claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such became of
unsound mind."

Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals were made in error. The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not
parties in the present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not
Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel
Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero.

Following this rule of construction, it may be said that incompetency to testify established in the provision above
quoted, affects only the persons therein mentioned, and no others, that is, only parties plaintiff or their
assignors, persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Mere witnesses who are neither parties plaintiff, nor
their assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are not included in the prohibition." (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., Vol. 5, p. 166.)

By excluding the testimonies of the two witnesses and by barring them from further testifying, upon reasoning
that unduly strained the meaning of the provisions of the Rules of Court relied upon, the trial court deprived
itself of the opportunity of knowing the truth in this case.

Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The
defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are
 being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the
estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man’s rule.

"It has been held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse
party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording, irrespective of their
spirit. The law uses the word ‘against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person.’ It should be noted that after the mention of an executor or administrator the words or other
representative follows, which means that the word ‘representative’ includes only those who, like the
executor or administrator, are sued in their representative, not personal, capacity. And that is emphasized by
the law by using the words ‘against the estate of such deceased persons’, which convey the idea of an estate
actually owned by the deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that
are to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the person representing him, not the personal rights of
such representative." (Moran, ibid, pp. 169-171.)

(2) No, the evidence and their preclusion was not properly sustained. Prior to the issuance of the court’s order of
June 14, 1974, by which the plaintiffs were "deemed to have waived their right to further present or formally
offer their evidence", the following had testified as witnesses of the plaintiffs, namely: Alfredo Zamora, Roman
Mataverde, Moises Javillonar, Dominador Ramirez, Bonifacio Sumulong, Frisco Cervantes, Laura Cervantes and
Jose Cervantes. It was error to hold that the testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or that
without such offer, such evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is effected by calling the
witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions. (Moran, Comments on
the Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 6, 1970 ed., p. 122.)

Notwithstanding rigid cross-examination conducted by the lawyers of the defendants, the witnesses discovered
the following facts: In the 1930’s Andres Guerrero physically possessed the disputed lot, paid the real estate
taxes for it, had the same cultivated through a tenant, defrayed the cultivation expenses, and exclusively
enjoyed the owner’s share in the harvests. Andres Guerrero loaned the lot to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, before
he died. Cristina Guerrero became ill prior to the year 1948. She could walk only inside her house in Parañaque,
Rizal. The money spent for her illness was borrowed from Manuel Guerrero. After the death of Cristina
Guerrero, Manuel Guerrero and Felicisimo Guerrero came to her house and the money loaned to her was
totalled in the amount of P1,900.00. On December 10, 1957, the questioned lot was cadastrally surveyed and
denominated as Lot 4752 of the Parañaque Cadastre. Andres Guerrero was the lone claimant. Until 1962, no
other person claimed the lot.
G.R. No. L-16741 January 31, 1962

FLORENCIA Q. DE ABRAHAM, ALFONSO ABRAHAM, and JESUS ABRAHAM, petitioners,

vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF JUAN C. YSMAEL, PRISCILLA RECTO-KASTEN, respondent.

FACTS:

On September 3, 1943, Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham, Sr. in the amount of P12,500.00 in
Japanese currency notes, and executed a promissory note in favor of the latter promising to pay the loan within 90 days
with interest at the rate of 10% per annum. The note was executed in the presence of Florencia Q. Abraham, the
creditor's wife, who affixed her signature at the bottom thereof as a witness thereto. Upon the maturity of the note, a
demand was made for its payment, but the debtor failed to pay.

On February 9, 1945, Alfonso Abraham, Sr. died. On the other hand, Juan C. Ysmael died intestate on April 23, 1952
leaving the note still unpaid.

On November 13, 1954, in Special Proceedings No. Q-285 for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juan Ysmael,
pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Florencia Q. Vda. de Abraham, together with her sons, Alfonso
and Jesus, all surnamed Abraham, filed a pleading entitled "Reclamation" demanding payment of the amount
represented by the note. Because no regular administrator of the estate had yet been appointed by the court, the
"Reclamation" was not acted upon. However, as soon as Priscilla Recto-Kasten was appointed administratrix, the
claimants reproduced their "Reclamation" before the lower court and the same was finally set for hearing. As agreed
upon by the parties, the reception of evidence was delegated to a commissioner. During the hearing before the
commissioner, the counsel for the administratrix interposed a general and continuing objection to the testimony of
Florencia Vda. de Abraham invoking the provisions of Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. However, after the
claimant had testified, he lengthily cross-examined her on the very matters against which he interposed a general
objection.

On October 4, 1956, the lower court issued in Order-Decree allowing the claim against the intestate estate of Juan C.
Ysmael. From the above Order-Decree, Priscilla Recto-Kasten, the administratrix, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court concluding that "the lower court erred in finding that the claimants have established a just and valid
claim, and in allowing the claim — supposing it was a claim with consideration — when the same had been barred by
prescription, estoppel and laches," reversed the Order-Decree appealed from.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not petitioners have established a just and valid claim?
(2) Whether the same is already barred by prescription and laches?
RULING:

(1) There is a just and valid claim. The record shows that petitioners have established the due execution and
genuineness of the promissory note and that respondents failed to present any evidence to destroy the same. It
is interesting to note that the promissory note executed by the deceased was produced before the Court and
marked as Exhibit B-1, and the circumstances under which the same was executed was extensively described by
Florencia Q. de Abraham during the hearing, who, strikingly is one of the witnesses to the said instrument. Much
to the surprise of the Court this description was more vividly given by the said witness not in answer to the
questions propounded by her lawyer but on cross-examination of counsel for the administratrix, who feebly
attempted to destroy the due execution and genuineness of the said document. It is indeed unfortunate that
counsel for the administratrix did not choose to present evidence to destroy the alleged genuineness of the
promissory note (Exhibit B-1) in support of his theory, despite his insinuation during the course of the trial that
he might try to secure the services of an expert to determine the genuineness of the signature of the late Juan C.
Ysmael mentioned therein. (t.s.n., p. 83), Again counsel manifested that if Exhibit B-1 is a genuine document the
same has been fully paid already, (t.s.n., p. 83), however, counsel did not present any proof to support this
contention.

It is true that Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides:.

(c) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind;

However, there was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel for the administratrix extensively cross-
examined the witness on the very matters subject of the prohibition. (Wright v. Tinio, G.R. No. L-4004, May 29,
1952; see also Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Macfarlane v. Green, 54 Phil. 551) It was for this reason that the
trial judge eventually overruled the counsel's previous general and continuing objection and admitted the
testimony of the witness. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the counsel's lengthy cross-examination on
the prohibited matter was merely for the purpose of establishing the "motive, prejudices and predilection" of
the witness.

The reason for the rule apparently is that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate as to what his examination
of a witness may bring forth. Having made his selection of one of two courses which he may pursue, he has no
right, after he discovers that the course selected is not to his advantage, and after he has put the opposite party
to the expense, and has consumed the time of the courts in a trial of the case in accordance with the course
selected, to change his position and make another and different selection. Such course would be unfair both to
the opposite party and to the court and should not be countenanced in any court of justice.

(2) Not barred by laches and prescription because a moratorium had an effect of suspending the statute of
limitations from November 18, 1944 when Executive Order No. 25 was issued, to May 18, 1953, the date of
promulgation of the decision in the case of Rutter v. Esteban (G.R. No. L-3708) holding such provisions no longer
applicable (Rio y Compania v. Sandoval, G. R. No. L-9391, November 28, 1956; Compania Maritima vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-14949, May 30, 1960). Thus, from December 3, 1943 to November 13, 1954, eleven years,
eleven months and ten days have elapsed. Deducting from this period eight years and six months, the time
during which the statute of limitations was suspended, it is clear that petitioners' claim has not yet prescribed
when it was filed on November 13, 1954.

Additional note:
 In order that the defense of laches may prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) conduct on the
part of defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of, (2) delay in asserting
complainant's right after knowledge or notice of defendant's conduct and an opportunity to sue, (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that complainant would assert the right on which he bases
suit, and (4) injury or prejudice to defendant in the event relief is accorded. (Villoria v. Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-11754, April 29, 1960)

G.R. No. L-27434 September 23, 1986

GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. vda. DE VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P. VILLANUEVA, MARINA P.
VILLANUEVA, VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P. VILLANUEVA, JR., JOSE P. VILLANUEVA, SAMUEL P. VILLANUEVA,
LOURDES P. VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P. VILLANUEVA DE ARRIETA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondents-appellees.

FACTS:

The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria situated in the Municipality of Bais,
Negros Oriental, were originally owned by the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas [TABACALERA]. Sometime in
1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, negotiated with TABACALERA for the
purchase of said haciendas. However, as he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of
TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas.
Allegedly because TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas, without a guaranty
private respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor, for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA.
Either because the amount realized from the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still fell short of the purchase
price of the three haciendas, or in consideration of the guaranty undertaken by private respondent Vicente, Villanueva
contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of
P13,807.00. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by petitioner Genaro Goni as attorney-in-fact of
Villanueva.

It is alleged by petitioners that subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to sell, Villanueva was able to raise
funds by selling a property in Ayungon, Negros Oriental. He thus went to private respondent Vicente for the purpose of
rescinding the contract/promise to sell However, as the amount of P12,460.24 had already been debited from private
respondent's account, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would merely be leased
to private respondent Vicente for a period of five (5) years starting with crop-year 1950-51 at an annual rental of 15% of
the gross income, said rent to be deducted from the money advanced by private respondent and any balance owing to
Villanueva would be delivered by Vicente together with the lots at the end of the stipulated period of lease.

On June 17, 1950, Villanueva executed a "Documento de la Venta Definitive" in favor of Joaquin Villegas, covering Lot
No. 314 of the Cadastral Survey of Bais with an area of 468,627 square meters, more or less. (Hacienda Sarria). A
supplemental instrument was later executed by Villanueva in favor of Villegas to include in the sale of June 17, 1950 the
sugar quota of the land.

On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were instituted on November 24, 1951 before the then
Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, docketed as Special Case No. 777. Among the properties included in the
inventory submitted to the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. Field no. 13 with an
area of 1 hectare, 44 ares and 95 centares was listed as Lot no. 723 of the inventory while fields nos. 3 and 4, with areas
of 3 hectares, 75 ares and 60 centares, and 1 hectare, 69 ares and 80 centares, respectively, were included in Lot no. 257
of the inventory.

On October 7, 1954, the day before the intestate proceedings were ordered closed and the estate of the late Praxedes
Villanueva delivered to his heirs, private respondent Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages
before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental against petitioner Goñi in his capacity as administrator of the
intestate estate of Praxedes Villanueva. In his complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 2990, private respondent Vicente
sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the
contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his favor on October 24, 1949.

ISSUE:

May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, which constitute a
demand or claim upon his estate?

RULING:

Yes, Mr. Gaspar Vicente may testify. Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente would be disqualified by
reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such
disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule
or Dead Man Statute, which provides as follows:

Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.-The following persons cannot testify as
to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
 unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind.

The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction
in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard
to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips
of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of
fictitious claims against the deceased.

The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been
distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the
"representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or operation of
law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have
obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim
which deceased might have been interested to establish, if living.

Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private respondent
Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the
representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime. It must further be
observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the
witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the
counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was
not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not
having been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.

Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications
with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is
still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or
communications which were had with the agent. 13 The contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by
petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding
the execution of such contract and therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent
Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130,
where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because
death has permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that petitioner
Goñi could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of
the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goñi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal
contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
Intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, represented by JOSEFA TONGCO, administratrix, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANASTACIA VIANZON, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage on July 5, 1894. The first named died on July 8, 1925,
leaving the second named as his widow. The niece of the deceased, Josefa Tongco, was named administratrix of the
estate. It appears that shortly before the death of Marcelino Tongco, he had presented claims in a cadastral case in
which he had asked for titles to certain properties in the name of the conjugal partnership consisting of himself and his
wife, and that corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership not long after
his death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the spouse is a competent witness?

RULING:

Yes, because a waiver was accomplished when the adverse party undertook to cross-examine the interested person with
respect to the prohibited matters. Counsel for the appellant, however, asserts that if the testimony of the widow be
discarded, as it should be, then the presumption of the Civil Code, fortified by the unassailable character of Torrens
titles, arises, which means that the entire fabric of appellee's case is punctured. Counsel relies on that portion of section
383 of the Code of Civil Procedure as provides that "Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons
in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person . . ., cannot testify as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person . . . ." Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing
that the object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction is question on the part of the surviving party. He has, however, neglected the equally important rule that the
law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth.

G.R. No. L-2016 August 23, 1949

Testate estate of RICHARD THOMAS FITZSIMMONS, deceased, MARCIAL P. LICHAUCO, administrator-appellee,

vs.
ATLANTIC, GULF and PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, claimant-appellant.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying appellant's claim of P63,868.67
against the estate of the deceased Richard T. Fitzsimmons, and granting appellee's counterclaim of P90,000 against the
appellant.

That appellant Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila is a foreign corporation duly registered and licensed to do
business in the Philippines, with its office and principal place of business in the City of Manila.

Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest stockholders of said company when the Pacific war
broke out on December 8, 1941. As such president he was receiving a salary of P3,000 a month. He held 1,000 shares of
stocks, of which 545 shares had not been fully paid for, but for which he had executed promissory notes in favor of the
company aggregating P245,250, at the rate P450 a share. In 1941 the sum of P64,500 had been credited in his favor on
account of the purchase price of the said 545 share of stock out of bonuses and dividends to which he was entitled from
the company. Under his agreements with the company dated April 4 and July 12, 1939, should he die without having
fully paid for the said 545 shares of stock, the company, at its option, may either reacquire the said 545 shares of stock
by returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the corresponding number of the
company's shares of stock equivalent to the amount paid thereon at P450 a share.

Soon after the Japanese army occupied Manila in January, 1942, it seized and took possession of the office and all the
properties and assets of the appellant corporation and interned all its officials, they being American citizens.

Richard T. Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944, in the Santos Tomas interment camp, and special proceeding No. 70139
was subsequently instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for he settlement of his estate.

The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila resumed business operation in March, 1945.

In due course the said company filed a claim against the estate of Richard T. Fitzsimmons which, as amended, consisted
of the following items:

A. Personal overdraft of Richard T. Fitzsimmons

with Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila in
current account
................................................................... P63,000.00
B. Charges from San Francisco agent of the
company not included in above figure A as of
November 30, 1945 (P1,002), less subsequent credit
advice from San Francisco agent (P133.33)
............................................................................. 868.67
Total
.................................................................................... P63,868.67

In the same claim the company offered to require the 545 shares sold to the deceased Fitzsimmons upon return to his
estate of the amount of P64,500 paid thereon, and asked the court to authorize the setoff of the amount of its claim of
P63,868.67 from the amount of P64,500 returnable to the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an executor or administrator of a
deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person, under Rule 123, section 26(c), of the Rules of Court?

RULING:
No, they are not disqualified to testify. Our own statute, it will be observed, is broader than any of these. It neither
disqualifies parties to a contract nor persons in interest, but only parties to the action (Code Civil Procedure, sections
1879, 1880); and thus it is that in City Savings Bank vs. Enos, 135 Cal., 167, 67 Pac., 52, it has been held that one who is
cashier and at the same time a stockholder of a bank was not disqualified, it being said: "to hold that the statute
disqualifies all persons from testifying who are officers or stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to
materially amending the statute by judicial interpretation." It is concluded, therefore, that our statute does not exclude
from testifying a stockholder of a corporation, whether he be but a stockholder, or whether, in addition thereto, he be a
director or officer thereof

The appellee admits in his brief in those states where the "dead man's statute" disqualifies only parties to an action,
officers and stockholders of the corporation, have been allowed to testify in favor of the corporation, while in those
states where "parties and persons interested in the outcome of the litigation" are disqualified under the statute, officers
and stockholders of the corporation have been held to be incompetent to testify against the estate of a deceased
person.

The weight of authority sustains appellant's first assignment of error. Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 disqualifies
only parties or assignors of parties, we are constrained to hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are
not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand
against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.

G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992

ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the
Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992

VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

E. Razon, Inc. was organized in 1962 by petitioner Enrique Razon for the purpose of participating in the bidding for the
arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators were Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose
Tuazon, Jr., Victor L. Lim, Jose F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle. The business, however, did not start operations
until 1966. According to the petitioner, some of the incorporators withdrew from the said corporation. The petitioner
then distributed the stocks previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends,
among them the late Juan T. Chuidian to whom he gave 1,500 shares of stock. The shares of stock were registered in the
name of Chuidian only as nominal stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares of stock were owned and
held by the petitioner but Chuidian was given the option to buy the same. In view of this arrangement, Chuidian in 1966
delivered to the petitioner the stock certificate covering the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. Since then, the
Petitioner had in his possession the certificate of stock until the time, he delivered it for deposit with the Philippine Bank
of Commerce under the parties' joint custody pursuant to their agreement as embodied in the trial court's order.
ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court in G.R. No. 74306?

RULING:

The dead man’s statute rule is inapplicable. In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of
the defendant (petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente
Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian
that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian
opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan
Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.

It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not
filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.

Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards
the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-
examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the
prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
G.R. No. 153476 September 27, 2006

HKO AH PAO, HENRY TENG and ANNA TENG, petitioners,

vs.
LAURENCE TING, ANTHONY TING and EDMUND TING, respondents.

FACTS:

On June 12, 1961, the spouses Aristeo Mayo and Salud Masangkay sold for P70,000 the property subject of this case
which is located at 1723 Vasquez St., Malate, Manila to Arsenio Ting. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63991 was
subsequently issued in the name of Arsenio Ting on June 14, 1961.

Arsenio Ting was the son of Teng Ching Lay by his first marriage. At the time of the sale, Arsenio was a practicing lawyer
and, being a Filipino, was qualified to acquire and own real property in the Philippines. Arsenio was likewise the
manager and controlling stockholder of Triumph Timber, Inc. in Butuan City. Teng Ching Lay, on the other hand, was a
Chinese citizen, and although his name did not appear in the corporate records of Triumph Timber, Inc., he was the one
making business decisions for the company. He became a naturalized Filipino citizen on January 18, 1966.

A colonial-style house was standing on the disputed lot when it was bought. Teng Ching Lay occupied the same, together
with his second wife, petitioner Hko Ah Pao, and their children, petitioners Henry and Anna Teng. Arsenio also stayed in
the same house.

Arsenio died in 1972, predeceasing his father, Teng Ching Lay, and leaving as compulsory heirs, the surviving spouse,
Germana, and respondents who were all minors at that time.

In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Arsenio's estate before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City, the court issued an Order on October 23, 1975 approving the project of partition which included,
among others, the property in question which was adjudicated in favor of respondents.

The controversy involves two feuding families of the same clan battling over a piece of property registered in the name
of respondents. Petitioners claim that the property was bought by their patriarch, the late Teng Ching Lay, who allegedly
entrusted the same to his son from a previous marriage, Arsenio Ting, the deceased father of herein respondents.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners establish their case by the evidence presented?
(2) Whether or not the testimony of accountant Sembrano may be accepted knowing that it is against the interest of a
dead person?

Ruling:
(1) The petitioners failed to establish their case by preponderance of evidence. In civil cases, the burden of proof to
be established by a preponderance of evidence is on the party who is asserting the affirmative of an
issue.15 Preponderance of evidence means probability of truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Petitioners primarily rely on Angel Sembrano's testimony to substantiate their claim. The latter's testimony,
however, consists mainly of hearsay, which carries no probative value. He did not have personal knowledge as
to the execution of the contract of sale between Arsenio and the Masangkay spouses nor the alleged agreement
between the former and Teng Ching Lay. He could only testify as to what the deceased had allegedly told him.
Thus, any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its evidentiary weight is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand.

Even if the alleged statement of Arsenio to Sembrano relating to the fact that his father, Teng Ching Lay, was
buying a house in Manila, can be admissible in evidence as a declaration against his pecuniary interest under
Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,19 still, the veracity as to whether the deceased actually made this
statement is subject to scrutiny.

(2) The testimony of Sembrano is barred by the dead man’s statute. Sembrano's testimony on behalf of petitioners
is about an alleged declaration against an interest of a person who is dead in an action that is in effect a claim
against his estate. Such a testimony if coming from a party would be barred by the surviving parties rule, or the
dead man's statute, in the Rules of Court:

Section 23, Rule 130. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or assignors of
parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.

And while Sembrano is not a party, he is practically a surrogate of petitioners since he was the personal
accountant of their predecessor-in-interest and the corporate accountant of the corporation he controlled.