Allied Political Law Review of Class 2015

CONSTITU
TIONAL
LAW
Notes and Cases from Judge Estela Alma A.
USERS’ GUIDE
Singco
 Most likely to come out in the exams:
TN – Take note, BAR – Bar Question,
***** - Memorize.
 From beginning to Legislative, it was arranged
according to the syllabus, but thereafter, it’s not.
 Blue fonts mean, the subheadings were created by us.
 The italicized portions came from the cases cited.
 The Times New Roman Bold fontface are from
provisions of the law.
 Not all cases have been placed with syllabus or cited

Subject Head:

Luigine Chan

Members:

Johnbee Biton, Abegail Borres, Richard Caminade, Kaitlin Cañada, Riza Duran, Bryce Fookson,
Rajane Gallego, Ruby Gan, Clyde Gregorio, Rhea Judilla, Fiona Lao, Jinky Lesigues, Albert Lulu,
Miguel Lumapas, Daphne Ortezuela, Angeli Otero, Athena Salas, Shane Tampus, RalphSanchez,
Camille Ubod, Judito Tapia Jr., Rose Paglinawan, Prince Robles, Joahnna Tan-Yu, Brendale Bayalas,
Riza Torres, Nico Peña, Jovelle Rejuso
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
I. The Philippine Constitution
A. Constitution: definition, nature and concepts
We start with the Constitution’s definition, concept. You have
mastered that: what a Constitution is; the different kinds of
Constitution according to its origin, according to its form,
according to the manner of changing it and according to the
form of government that is established.
So for example, let’s have the definition of a Constitution as a
general concept. It is the highest fundamental law of the land
upon which all activities of the government are based on. And
so therefore in case of a conflict between a statute and the
Constitution – always the Constitution prevailing over the
statute, as a general rule because sometimes it would depend
on the system of the government. Where there is the
supremacy of the parliament, in case of a conflict between a
statute and the Constitution, the statute is not necessarily
declared unconstitutional. Nonetheless the parliament act may
still be existing without being declared as unconstitutional. That
goes to show an implication of the principle that the
Constitution always prevails over any other law that may be
passed by the government – it could be the parliament or it
could be an administrative body in so far as rules and
regulations or even the president in some cases as regards to
his presidential decrees, proclamations or executive orders.
Kinds of Constitution According to Origin
1. Conventional or Enacted Constitution -deliberately
made at a definite period of time
2. Cumulative or Evolutionary Constitution - When it
is a result of an evolution of history of the activities the
people of the country and of the government in
particular
3. Fiat or Granted Constitution - it is a Constitution
made by one country for another usually it’s by way of
a treaty of peace, after one territory/country is
defeated by another. So a sovereign country would
prepare a Constitution for a defeated territory
Now, the more important part there is being able to distinguish
what kind of constitution that you have according to that form
or kind of constitution. Yours is definitely a Conventional or
Enacted Constitution – has been as such since we had the
1935 Constitution, 1973 and the 1987 Constitution. So it was
deliberately made, for example, in so far as the 1935
Constitution by the 1934 Con-Con ratified by the people on 14
May 1935. And then you have the 1973 Constitution that was
made by the 1971 Con-Con and it was declared to have been
validly ratified on 17 January 1973 by Proclamation 1102 by
Mr. Marcos. And then you have the freedom Constitution of
course, it was made by virtue of Proclamation No. 3 by Cory
Aquino. And then finally you have the 1987 Constitution that
was made by the 1986 Constitutional Commission, ratified and
took effect on 2 February 1987. Case in point, you have the de
Leon v. Esguerra case.
Kinds of Constitution According to Source
1. Written Constitution - a constitution whose sources
are found in one single instrument.
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2. Unwritten Constitution - not necessarily not reduced
in writing – the sources could still be written, however
the sources are scattered.
The kind of Constitution that you have is a Written Constitution
where all provisions are found in one single instrument such as
the 1987 Constitution.
Kinds of Constitution According to the Manner of Changing
1. Rigid - is when you follow a specific procedure on
how to change the Constitution, amend or revise it.
2. Flexible - is when you don’t follow any procedure and
you can effect a change to the Constitution.
So then you have master what kind of constitution you have.
Definitely yours is a Rigid Constitution; so you master how you
propose amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
B. Parts
Then we go to the different parts of the Constitution. First, you
have the Constitution of Government, the Constitution of
Liberties and then you have the Constitution of Sovereignty.
On the Constitution of government, that pertains to the
provisions that relate to the structure, functions and operations
of the government.
Q: The 1987 Constitution consists only of how many articles?
A: Eighteen (18) articles.
1. Constitution of Government - as reflected in the
Constitution, you have Articles VI, VII, and VIII – the
legislative, executive and judicial departments. Of
course you have other Constitutional Bodies, such as
the Constitutional Commissions. And then you have
the principles – the underlying principles in the
operation of the government. So you have general
principles like Article II, you have the economic
provisions, the general and transitory provisions and
all.
2. Constitution of Rights - such as the Bill of Rights,
you have Article III. that is your charter of liberty.
3. Constitution of Sovereignty - that is giving the
power to the people on how to make amendments to
the Constitution.
TN: Preamble does not form part of the Constitution, it is not
an essential part. You can have a Constitution without a
preamble.
C. Amendments and revisions
This has come out in the BAR exams several kinds. Especially
in the MCQ.
Q: (BAR) What is first the difference between amendment and
revision?
A: Amendment is when you only propose certain changes to
certain provisions or portions or parts of the Constitution – you
do not overhaul it. Even if you only change a certain portion
however it changes the philosophy or the foundation of the
Constitution then it is not just an amendment but a revision.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Let’s have an example. If you change the term of office of the
president, it’s just an amendment, but if you change the system
of the government from presidential to parliamentary definitely
it is a revision because you practically change the foundation
of the government – the system of the government.
Q: Why is it important to know the difference between an
amendment and a revision?
A: Because the matter of proposal also differ. (TN) In so far as
proposal to amend or revise a Constitution, there are only
certain individuals who are authorized to do the proposal.
Outline of Steps in Amendments
1. Proposal
Q: Who can propose an amendment to the Constitution?
A: First of all, you have Congress. And then you have a
Constitutional convention. And of course you have people
through Initiative.
Q: In revision, can people propose?
A: No, only Congress and the Constitutional convention can
make the proposal if it is a revision.
See the difference here? Let’s go to the details.
In so far as an amendment proposal or revision, Congress can
do so.
Q: What is the procedure? How many votes are needed?
A: You need ¾ votes of both houses, voting separately.
Although the Constitution says ¾ of all members of Congress,
it didn’t say voting separately. But there is an interpretation
although there is no jurisprudence that it should be interpreted
as voting separately because according to some
Constitutionalists it may be an oversight on the part of the
members of the Con-Comm just copying the 1973 Constitution
because then there was no problem because the legislature
was unicameral. It is a problem now because yours is
bicameral. So it should be understood as voting separately. So
that, even you get ¾ votes from the House of Representatives,
however you don’t get the same number of votes in the same
number of votes in Senate, there cannot be any proposal for
amendments to the Constitution coming from congress.
Another manner of changing it, you have a Constitutional
Convention – both also an amendment or revision.
Q: Who can initiate? Who will decide whether to call a Con-
Con? Or it would be Congress to act as constituent assembly?
A: That is the discretion of Congress. (BAR) TN of the voting,
the requisite vote. Directly, if Congress will act as Constituent
Assembly – ¾. The calling of a Con-con, you need only 2/3.
And if Congress is undecided and will prefer for the people to
decide on it, they would then submit the issue to the people in
a referendum.
Q: And that will require how many votes?
A: Majority.
Q: How about the people?
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A: They can only propose amendments but not revision. And it
is through the process of initiative only – initiative on the
Constitution not referendum, but initiative.
Q: How do people initiate amendments to the Constitution?
A: Take note of the following cases that are relevant:
Santiago v. COMELEC
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative   on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.   Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and cannot be cured by “empowering” the
COMELEC “to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act
Lambino v. COMELEC
…This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign
an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the
present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the
verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because
the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the
proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3
million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed
changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the
regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
Q: First of all, you should gather how many signatures of
registered voters?
A: 12% of the total registered voters of which, each legislative
district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters.
Don’t just simply say 12%. It should be 12% and 3%. They
must concur.
(TN) Additional requirements are discussed in the Lambino
case.
Q: That it should be the petition that is signed by the registered
voters, why?
A: Because after all, they are supposed to be the authors of
the petition to propose an amendment to the Constitution, and
therefore they should sign the petition itself. That is the
requirement. So, you would have copies according to as many
petitioners, if they are to be the authors of a petition to propose
amendments or changes to the Constitution.
Q: And what’s the reason?
A: In both cases, an initiative failed. In the Santiago’s case, the
SC was saying that RA 6735 (the law providing for the manner
of initiative, the implementing rule regarding on people initiating
amendments to the Constitution), is insufficient to provide a
procedure because if you read the law, it does not provide for
details – it does not even authorize the COMELEC to
promulgate the rules, unlike in initiative on statute and on local
legislation, which are very specific. Initiative on amendments to
the Constitution however was declared by the SC to be
insufficient.
Nonetheless, in the Lambino case, which was the subsequent
case, the SC was saying if people indeed would want to
propose changes, we cannot stop them. It is a political
discretion in their sovereign capacity, should they decide. But
the initiative that was initiated by Lambino group on amending
the Constitution during the Arroyo administration still failed
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
because they failed to prove to the SC the number of
petitioners signing because the copies would not reflect to the
number of registered voters supposedly initiating the
amendments to the Constitution. You need 12% and they were
saying that is equivalent to a number of voters, like 11 million
for example however the copies of the petition was much
lesser than the number of registered voters. And so the SC
was saying, it has not proven that it has obtained the requisite
number of percentage of registered voters signing the petition
as it is required by the law that would initiate amendments to
the Constitution.
2. Submission to the people for study
Q: After the proposal, what happens next?
A: You’ll have the submission of the proposal to the people for
further study and investigation. The only principle that you
must remember under this particular stage of the change of the
Constitution is that there cannot be a piecemeal submission of
a proposed amendments to the Constitution.
Piecemeal submission is prohibited. It should be the whole
thing so that the people can fully understand the proposed
changes or amendments.
3. Ratification
Q: After the submission of the proposal to the people, what will
be the next step to follow?
A: There is now the ratification.
Q: In the ratification, you will have a plebiscite. For the
amendments to be effective, how many votes are needed?
A: It’s plurality only. Majority of the votes cast during the
plebiscite.
Q: And when does the Constitution take effect, under section
22 of article XVIII?
A: As it was declared by the SC in the Esguerra case, the
Constitution, any amendments thereto or revision shall take
effect only upon ratification by the majority votes, not upon the
declaration by the president that the Constitution was validly
ratified.
That is in so far as the kind of Constitution that you have which
is rigid.
D. Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions
Q: What are the general principles on the interpretation of the
Constitution.
A: The general rule is that it is mandatory, you have to follow
them. It is not just directory, unless the law itself provides
otherwise that it is merely directory or by a Supreme Court
interpretation. And then, it is self-executing. You dont need
legislation inorder to implement them. It can be executed right
away without need of implementing rules as a general rule. As
exception to that is ARTICLE II which is not self-executing. You
need legislation inorder to implement. TN of the case of
Tañada vs Angara. Suffice to say that as a general rule it is
self- executing. Later you would learn from the decisions of the
Supreme Court where it emphasized the fact that there is no
need of a law or legislation inorder to implement the provisions
if the Constitution. You could go to court and seek judicial
relief. If it is not self executing that cannot then be the
provisions of the Constitution especially Art. II cannot be used
as judicial basis for judicial action. Meaning, you cannot
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question the validity a particular act of the government if there
is no law prohibiting it on the basis only of Art. II because is not
self executing. And our economic provisions as well. Most of
them are not self executing. In a recent decision of the
Supreme Court, it made emphasis on some provisions there
that are self executing and therefore need not require any
legislation. But generally, it is self executing.
Finally, you don’t apply the provisions of the Constitution
retroactively, they only have prospective application unless it
does not conflict with the previous Constitutions then it may be
applied retroactively. General rule is, prospective application.
E. General provisions
PREAMBLE (MEMORIZE)
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty
God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony,
and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime
of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain
and promulgate this Constitution.||| (1987 Constitution [1987])
The question is more on technicalities side of the preamble. As
i have said earlier, it is not an intergral part. It is not even
important and necessary because it cannot be a source of
rights and obligations. The utility of a preamble may be limited
to guiding our government, particulary Congress, in making
laws that if they have to make laws it must be in accordance of
the purpose forwhich the Constitution was adopted. Similarly to
the President in the implementation of the laws if he doesn’t
understand how to implement or of the purpose of Congress
then he may always refer to the preamble. As well as the
Supreme Court in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution
and laws passed by Congress. In applying it to actual cases, it
may be guided of the purposes enumerated in the preamble. If
you read the preamble, it states there “WE, THE SOVEREIGN
FILIPINO PEOPLE” indicating therefore the source of
sovereignty and authors of the Constitution, the sovereign
filipino people. “IMPLORING THE AID OF ALMIGHTY GOD”
and this has been questioned saying that we are suppose to
be a counrty with a separation of the church and the state
where it follow non establishment of a religion.
Q: would there be a violation of the statement to the
Consitution?
A: No. The preamble is more of a description of the kind of
people that we are. Rather than imposing the belief in God in
our establishing of a government or in our implementing the
provisions of the Constitution. So it just a mere declaration that
we implore the aid of the Almighty God. We are not obliged to
believe in God. If you are an atheist you cannot use that to
question the validity of the Consitution.
And then you have the enumeration of the purposes. Just go
over with the purposes. You can say that there is redundancy
because these principles are already implied in the subseqeunt
provisions of the Consitution.
II. General Considerations
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A. National territory
ARTICLE I- NATIONAL TERRITORY. (TN, ***)
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with
all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the
insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the
internal waters of the Philippines.||| (1987 Constitution [1987])
Master it because of the recent issues. In Scarborough shoal ,
what we are concerned of are the living and non-living forces in
the premises as part of our Exclusive Economic Zone. It is not
part of out territory but part of EEZ. This is explained in our
definition of National Territory. You should TN of this that the
definiton of National Territory is not binding in the international
sphere. It is not binding upon other countries because it is only
a municipal law. This is important for the purposes of
implementing our laws. Identifying our boundaries or territorial
boundaries, that is the most important part because how would
we know if our laws are applicable.
We have to include in the definition of our national territory for
some reaons. In the 1935 Constiution, we had the definition
because we were too afraid that the american government
might just retain some portions of our territory. Our definition of
national territory in 1935 Constitution was based on the Treaty
of Paris. It enumerates all and specified the delineation and
boundaries of our territory including Marianas Islands in Guam.
Then there was a different reason why we adopted a definition
in the 1973 Constitution. This is because if we will rely merely
on the Treaty of Paris as our title of what comprises as the
Philippine National Territory it would exclude the Batanes
Islands. Because the Batanes Island were not included in the
definition in the Treaty of Paris. So to inlcude it, we have to
define our national territory and also another reason for that is
to protect our natural resources that are found in the
archipelagic waters. TN that our territory is an archipelago and
therfore if you follow the ordinary principle of international law
in determining territorial seas then you will be creating pockets
of international waters within our territory.
1. Archipelagic doctrine
We cannot afford to have that situation so we adopted another
doctrine which is the Archipelagic Doctrine.
It means waters around, between and connecting the islands
regardless of breadth and dimensions are considered as inland
waters, internal waters treated like canals, rivers or swamps.
There is no controversy there on territorial sea to the extent of
jurisdiction beacuse they are treated as internal waters. In the
1987 constitution we adopted the defintion of national territory
with some changes in some phrases. Our conflict with
Malaysia over Sabbah, inorder to erase that thought of
annoyance or irritation, we erased the phrase “belonging to the
Philippines by historic/legal title” instead we have “in all other
territories in which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction”. So whatever the reason is of the definiton of the
national territory that will bind us and not necassarily the
neighboring countries.
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The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,
with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil,
the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form
part of the internal waters of the Philippines
Q: What is an archipelago?
A: A group of islands surrounded by the sea waters or it could
be a body of water studed with islands. The general concept of
archipelago is the latter defintion,body of sea water studed with
several islands. A territory may consist of several
archipelagoes or just one archipelago. Ours is just one
consisting of 7,106 when low tide and 7,100 when high tide.
TN of the definiton of an archipelago in the UNCLOS,
ART. 46. USE OF TERMS
(a) "archipelagic State" means a State constituted wholly by one
or more archipelagos and may include other islands;
(b) "archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts of
islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which
are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other
natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and
We have big islands Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Then we
have Palawan, the West Philipinnes Sea and you can also find
the islands being the subject of the controversy, Kalayaan
group of Island and the Scarborough shoal.
Q: How did we acquire these islands, not particluarly the main
archipelago?
A: We acquired the islands by virtue of transfer except for
Batanes Islands. Batanes islands were acquired by long
occupation. The rest by Treaty of Paris. And then there were
other islands that were added
Q: What are other islands added to the Philippines by
virtue of Treaty of Washington and US-British Treaty?
A: Maxi islands, Turtle islands, Cagayan de Sulu, Sibuto
islands
TN: If you are to determine the archipelago, it looks like a
triangle, until we have the two islands added – the
Scarborough shoal and the KGI. KGI to some extent is
habitable, but Scarborough shoal is not. At any rate, it is not fit
for human habitation or occupation. This information is
significant taking into consideration the present controversy
with China.
Q: What is the status of these islands today in relation to
RA 9522 (March 10, 2009)?
A: They used to be part of the archipelago until we were
pressured into redefining, redrawing our archipelago so that
they will be more or less consistent with the provisions of the
UNCLOS. By virtue of this law, these two other territories that
we are claiming as part of our archipelago, such as the
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Scarborough shoal and the KGI were EXCLUDED from the
main archipelago and are ONLY TREATED AS REGIME OF
ISLANDS. So in the WATERS SEPARATING these two from
the main archipelago WILL NOT BE ANYMORE INCLUDED IN
THE INTERNAL WATERS DEFINITION OR ARCHIPELAGIC
WATERS. The water around it, to determine its claim over the
seawaters, is based on Normal Base Line, not Exclusive
Economic Zone.
The significance there, the waters separating these
islands from the main archipelago will no longer be considered
internal waters. That is the implication. And we’ve lost
therefore a number of nautical miles of seawaters because of
the exclusion. It used to be rectangular, now it is only triangle.
TN: Anything pertaining to maritime jurisdiction or domain,
it is governed by the UNCLOS. Always remember that. Read it
and you will top the bar. That’s not only applicable in political
law but as well as in public international law.
Q: These islands are mostly rocks. Why are we
interested in them?
A: We’re interested over the seawaters surrounding
these islands, as bases for our claim over the maritime
domain. They are very rich in resources. They are part of the
Malampaya.
Q: What is the basis of China in asserting claim over these
islands?
A: Their basis is Exclusive Economic Zone. China claims
that there is overlapping of Exclusive Economic Zone, and
based from their EEZ, that is still covered from Hainan island.
TN: Insofar as our claim over the seawater which used to
be just internal waters, now we have to determine the
seawaters and the bases of EITHER they’re part of the EEZ or
its territorial seas.
Q: What is the purpose of RA 9522?
A: In gist RA 9522 defines the general configuration of
the archipelago including the extended continental shelf and
the EEZ to make it more compliant to UNCLOS.
Q: What is TERRITORIAL SEA?
A: Under ordinary circumstances, if you have this
continent, it’s only 12 nautical miles from the normal base line.
You draw it from the normal base line of the coastline of a
territory.
Q: BUT SOMETIMES, there are continents that are
submerged, and there may be an extension of the inland which
is submerged that goes beyond the 12 NM. Is that part of the
territory?
A: Answer is NO, only up to 12 NM. BUT, we have
sovereign rights over the water beyond that 12 NM up to
another 12 NM from the end of the 12 NM of territorial seas –
so 24 NM from the normal base line. That’s what we call
EXTENDED CONTINENTAL SHELF PRINCIPLE.
Q: What is the purpose of Extended Continental Self
Principle?
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A: For implementing our laws pertaining to sanitary,
customs, fiscals that would go beyond 24 NM from the normal
base line or 12 nm from the end of territorial seas.
Q: What is EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE? Where is it
reckoned from?
A: It is reckoned from normal base line of adjacent
territory, 200 NM. It means that beyond 12 NM onwards to 200
NM, it’s not part of our territory BUT we have EXCLUSIVE
RIGHTS over the seawaters including the living and non-living
resources found therein to Exploit, Develop and Utilize (EDU).
Q: Is it provided in the Constitution? Is it merely
directory? Or self-executing?
A: The Constitution is very clear on this and this is self-
executing according to the Supreme Court, that because it is
exclusive, it cannot be shared with anyone, not even
overlapping. That is your EXCLUSIVE right.
Q: There is another principle on overlapping. What is the
basis for this principle?
A: It is based on equality, equity, solution in the
determination of extent of jurisdiction proportionate on how big
your island is, adjacent to the EEZ It is not totally equal but
based on equity.
TN: But for as long as there is no overlapping, there
cannot be sharing in the exploration. What China wants, the
least, is to share the exploration of the national resources
including Malampaya.
Q: Is the Philippines allowed to share the exploration of
our islands?
A: That is contrary to the Constitution if we agree to that.
Why? Read again the constitution, it says: exclusive rights of
Filipino citizen on marine wealth. We may only hire them as
contractors to provide us financial and technical assistance just
like Shell, but there cannot be any sharing.
Q: In the case of (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167,
August 16, 2011), RA 9522 was challenged on the ground that
by adopting this law, in effect, we are deprived of our rights to
explore the resources over the waters separating these islands
such as KGI and the Scarborough shoal from the main
archipelago. How was this resolved by the Supreme Court?
A: The Supreme Court ruled that “Had Congress in RA
9522 enclosed the KGI and Scarborough Shoal as part of the
archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The
Philippines will have committed breach of the two provisions of
UNCLOS. First, Article 47(3) thereof requires that the drawing
of such baseline shall not depart from any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago. Article 47 of
the same provision provides that the length of the base line
shall not exceed 100 NM same for 3% of the total number of
baselines which can be up to 125 NM. “Although the
Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the
KIG   and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these
outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the
nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,  such that any
straight baseline loped around them from the nearest
basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
the general configuration of the archipelago."||| (Magallona v.
Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011).
TN: That’s’ why if you extend it, the configuration
becomes rectangular instead of triangular which is the original
configuration of the archipelago under the Treaty of Paris.
Q: What is our basis of our claim over Scarborough
Shoal?
A: Primarily on discovery.
TN: But China claims that they have discovered it as early
as 18th century. Remember that we only started claiming after
the WWII.
IMPORTANT: At any rate, the more important basis for our
claim is our EEZ. Part of our 200 EEZ. Read Carpio’s paper.
Q: What are our rights over our Internal Waters, and
Extended Continental Shelf?
A: Our claim over the seawaters separating the islands,
there is no doubt that if we follow the archipelagic doctrine that
they’re part of our INTERNAL WATERS, PART OF OUR
TERRITORY. Our jurisdiction is only up to the 12 NM which
means within 12 NM as part of our territory which we described
as territorial seas, we can limit foreign vessel navigation and
over-flight.
A: Insofar as the extended continental shelf, we have up
to 24 NM from the normal baseline. Beyond the 12 NM,
although still within the continental shelf, it is allowed as part of
the right of way, the same with Exclusive Economic Zone.
Q: From where should the EEZ be based or drawn?
A: In the drawing of the EEZ as part of the territory,
always remember that it has to be drawn from the normal
baseline along the coastline of an island or continental shelf.
NORMAL BASELINE of an island that is HABITABLE,
Q: What do you mean by HABITABLE?
A: That that can be inhabited, or can sustain on its own
economic growth.
Q: In relation to China’s claims, will the EEZ apply?
A: That EEZ of 200 NM cannot apply if your basis is a
reef or rocks. China cannot make a claim because their bases
are the Nine-dash lines and Paracels that cannot be occupied.
If you live there, you need to depend on the food that is being
brought there. But on their own, they cannot sustain
economically. So if that is the basis of the EEZ. That is not
allowed.
TN: Our archipelago is sustainable economically; we can
survive on our own. It is obviously habitable. If we follow that,
we have better right for EEZ where you can find the
Scarborough Shoal.
TN: Another point that we should take note is that this is
now being subjected to arbitration under the UNCLOS. China
however refused to submit and opted out from that arbitration
saying that being a sovereign state it is discretionary on their
part whether or not to submit itself to arbitration.
7
Q: Is it correct for China to refuse?
A: Answer is NO, because they are signatory to the
UNCLOS. When they signed in the UNCLOS, they consented
to follow the provisions of the UNCLOS.
In which case, they have given their consent impliedly and if
they have given their consent, they are subjected to the
jurisdiction of UNCLOS Arbitration.
TN: The jurisdiction of the UNCLOS. Its jurisdiction is limited
only to disputes involving sea waters of the continental shelf
and the Exclusive Economic Zone NOT Territorial Seas.
Kung mu ingon kag territorial imung dispute involving the
territorial seas or the maritime domain, adto na siya, ang
application kay General Principles of International Law. ICJ
has jurisdiction over that.
But when we say maritime dispute involving claims over sea
waters relating to the continental shelf, extended continental
shelf or exclusive economic zone this is under the jurisdiction
of the UNCLOS. I’m just discussing this in relation to the claims
of China over the Regime of Islands.
Aside from the Regime of Islands, you also have other
territories over which the Philippines have jurisdiction or
sovereignty. Jurisdiction we mean that we enforce our own
laws, having a government and implement our own laws.
Q: Sovereignty, is it necessary that there should be a
government in the territory, Philippine government in order for
it to be considered as part of the Philippine National Territory?
A: No. for as long as there are sovereign rights based on
historic right or legal title. That would be sufficient to claim it as
part of the national territory. Therefore, our rephrasing of the
provisions of the Constitution relating on this score, remember
the original provision saying: “and all other territories
belonging” does not actually change the scenario or our right to
claim territories later in the future if we become a superpower
as part of the national territory as long as it based on historic
right or legal title.
We are referring to Sabah. Actually we are not dropping our
claim over Sabah because you cannot deny the fact that this
Sultan of Sulu has proprietary rights over Sabah or North
Borneo.
You must be able to distinguish between Sovereign Rights and
Proprietary Rights. Kung proprietary rights referring to property
rights of a particular individual or entity. Kung mu ingon ka ug
sovereign rights it pertains to governance and you are making
it as part of the Philippine territory.
As it is now, hand offs ang government over making it as part
of the Philippine territory. We are not asserting sovereign rights
but we are not also disclaiming the proprietary rights of the
Sultan of Sulu over Sabah.
Kung ikaw tag-iya ug isla sa Sabah, what you can claim is only
your proprietary rights and as such, part of your rights over the
property is to possess it. Obviously. Regardless under whose
government or who would it be.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
But when we talk about sovereign rights, it now pertains to
governance where you implement your law and you establish a
government there and making it as part of the Philippine
government, that’s a different story.
As of now, we are avoiding the issue of sovereign rights over
Sabah but we are also not denying the rights of the Sultan of
Sulu, the proprietary rights over the island because it was
established that indeed once upon a time that Sabah was
owned by the Sultan of Sulu before the definition of anybody’s
territory. In fact, it was rented out to the British East India
Company because Malaysia was under UK. And when it was
granted independence, it was turned over to the Malaysian
government instead to the Sultan of Sulu. Understandably,
because most of the residents are Malaysians. And that was
the start of the claim of Malaysia over the same. Anyhow, we
have exerted our efforts to claim it both based on legal and
extralegal methods. Legally, because of the refusal of Malaysia
to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. The least that they did
was to hold a referendum, asking people if they want to
become part of the Philippine territory which obviously was
refused blatantly and so this prompted probably the
government to create a terrorist group in order to infiltrate the
territory. However it was discovered and all of these terrorists
were massacred. That was the Jabidah Massacre that led to
our dropping of our claim over Sabah. Otherwise, Malaysia
was ready to declare war against us. That was the controversy
involving Sabah.
As I have said, the provisions of the Constitution does not bar
us from claiming it in the future when we become so powerful
because we are so rich and maybe we can just buy Malaysia
or just invade Malaysia and Sabah and establish a government
there and sent all our prisoners to Sabah.
Marianas Islands and Guam, our claim is based on the Treaty
of Paris. It is not so potent, our basis of our claim. So what
happened, it just fizzled out. There was a referendum there
and they refused to become part of our territory and they rather
be under the trusteeship of US.
Let’s talk about Bangsamoro.
Q: How does it affect our territory?
A: It does not at all affect our territory’s definition. It’s just
delineating, defining what is considered to be the region to be
governed by Muslims in accordance with their culture, their
customs and their traditions. As long as if they are not a sub-
State, there can be no violation of the definition of the national
territory neither can there be of the provision of the Constitution
regarding having one government because still they will be
under the national government but the control of the national
government over them is lesser as compared to local
governments. It is some kind of federal system of government
wherein they are considered supreme in their own sphere and
their laws and management of affairs is based on their
customs and traditions.
Will see until we read the Organic Law creating it and until the
Supreme Court will resolve the matter because definitely there
will be a challenge because I think it will be based on the same
objections that were raised in the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
before during the Arroyo administration. That case involving
the North Cotabato. It might be raised again and until the
8
Supreme Court decides on the issue it is not yet controversial
that you are to worry about it for the bar exams. We will wait
and see.
But the general principle is that there should be no sub-state.
At least it is just an autonomous government but definitely not
a sub-state because that would be contrary to the Constitution,
more particularly on having one republican state and the
definition of the national territory.
Now, let’s talk about territorial seas referring to the sea waters
along its coastline up to 12 NM. The airspace above, no limits.
Up to the universe. But the international waters is for
everybody’s use. The subsoil you can go as if as you can if you
have the capacity.
You have other sovereign areas: the insular shelves, the
trench and etc just go over with that. The more important there
is the extended continental shelf.
On internal waters:
Q: what do you use as basis or method in determining
archipelagic waters? [BAR]
A: You used the straight-line method. Remember the straight-
baseline method wherein you connect the outermost islands
and all the waters inside are considered as internal waters.
Outside, considered as part of the territorial seas up to 12 NM
subject to archipelagic plates, in other words, right of way.
Read the concept of Regime of Islands
“Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines' claim over the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress' decision to classify
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "'Regime[s] of Islands'
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article
121"  of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State's
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda  obligation
under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
"naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies
under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.”|||(Magallona v.
Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011)
Q: What are regime of islands?
A: They consist of islands or naturally formed areas of lands
surrounded by water that remains above water during high
tide.
Bahala na ug tumoy ra like the Scarborough Shoal.
The principal forces, claimant states over certain territory to
maintain peace in the area because no country can claim,
exclusive ownership of any of these islands.
So extended continental shelf may also refer to the contiguous
zone.
B. State immunity
Let’s go to Article II.
Q: What are the elements of the State?
A: People, Territory, Government, Sovereignty
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
People- what is significant is the provisions on citizenship.
Territory- we have explained it already.
Government- the discussion will involve all about government.
Let’s talk about sovereignty.
Because the state is sovereign then there can be no authority
higher or equal to that. Therefore, not subjected to the
authority of the courts. The principle why the state is sovereign,
first of all because there can be no legal right against the
authority that makes the law on which that right depends.
(case inaudible) Also for practical reason, if you subject the
state to suits, the government will just be busy entertaining
suits rather than doing its job.
And besides, under the Principle of Royal Dishonesty, how
can one who is sovereign like the king commit a wrong against
anyone? They only think the best of the government for the
best interests of the people. It can never commit or do wrong to
anyone. This is the principle of royal dishonesty on the part of
the state because even if you have claims against it, the state
is not liable because it cannot do any wrong against anyone.
Thus, as a general rule: You cannot sue the State.
Q: Now who is the state that you are referring to that can be
subject to a suit?
A: You have the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated
agencies of the government exercising governmental
functions, the government officials and employees performing
governmental functions.
You cannot file a complaint if the defendant is the Republic of
the Philippines. That’s the general rule. But sometimes there
are cases filed against the Republic and yet the action
prospers. Why? Because other than those enumerated entities
that could be the subject to a suit that is not allowed, there is a
requirement that only those suit against those 3 entities that
would require the government to do an affirmative act such as
involving appropriation of public funds or loss of government
property that is not allowed to be filed against the state.
You may sue the state for as long as it will not entail
appropriation of funds or loss of government property.
Example:
Q: In an application for registration of title, who will be the
respondent in that case if you were the applicant?
A: It will be the Republic of the Philippines, the Bureau of
Lands or the DENR.
Why? Because if there is no claim over the land, the
presumption of the law is that it belongs to the state. But if you
can establish that it does not belong to the state, that it is an
alienable land of the state that can be disposed of and
acquired, and then if it is awarded to you then it does not
involve any loss of government property because it has never
been part of the public estate because you owned it. You are
the owner of the property. You are only confirming your
ownership by asking the court that the property be registered in
your name.
9
And that’s precisely even if the Republic of the Philippines is
made party defendant, that action will prosper.
Q: If you claim damages against the government and you
named the Republic of the Philippines as defendant, this is a
personal claim for damages, will your action prosper?
A: Even if the claim is valid, under the principle of royal
prerogative of dishonesty, the case is dismissed because the
state is immune from suit.
Q: How about if you claim for just compensation against the
Republic because you were not paid when the government
took your property for the widening of the road, can you sue
the government through the DPWH?
A: Yes. It will not entail appropriation of public funds. Before
expropriation, there is already appropriation of public funds. If
there was no appropriation in the first place, then the taking is
illegal. Second reason for that, according to the SC in many
decisions, expropriation must not be used as a tool to oppress
property owners whose property was taken for the use of the
public.
You remember that Ministerio case vs CFI
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve
as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had
the government followed the procedure indicated by the
governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed
by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the
judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment
of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon
the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public
use defined in the judgment." 14 If there were an observance
of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad
plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely
because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires,
the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if
not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of
officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too
much to say that when the government takes any property for
public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest
that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought
then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be
appropriately invoked.
At any rate, that’s the bottomline, the common denominator. If
it’s the Republic of the Philippines, again as I have said, only
when it entails appropriation of public funds or loss of
government property.
In so far as agencies of the government, only those agencies
being sued that are considered as unincorporated. They are
considered unincorporated because they do not have a
personality independent that of the Republic of the Philippines.
They are part of the government of the Republic of the
Philippines. If you sue an unincorporated agency, it is likened
to suing the government itself. Example of unincorporated
agencies: the different departments of government, the
administrative bodies of the government. If you sue, for
example, the Bureau of Fire because it didn’t stop the
conflagration that is tantamount to a suit against the state, and
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
therefore the case should be dismissed because the state is
immune from suit. Unincorporated.
There are other agencies of the government, although part of
the Philippine government, but which are considered as
incorporated. They have their own charters creating them
allowing that institution of the government in the first place to
sue and be sued; like for example those engaged in proprietary
functions like GSIS, PhilHealth, SSS. These are incorporated
agencies, like state universities. The charters creating them
allow them to sue, to acquire property, and be sued in relation
to the acquisition of the property - in which case they are
suable; unless they are performing a purely governmental
function, then the application of immunity from suit would still
apply.
Then of course you have Local Government Units. The LGU’s
are hybrids; mixed. It has dual function: both governmental and
proprietary.
Q: Are LGU’s suable?
A: Yes.
Q: Even if performing governmental function?
A: Yes, because under the Local Government Code, it has
consented to be sued.
Q: Are they liable?
A: No if it involves the exercise of a governmental function, and
therefore it will entail disbursement of public funds and you will
need another consent from the local government and that is
the passage of a supplemental budget, an ordinance,
authorizing the disbursement. But it is suable. But exercising a
proprietary function because it is also engaged in business,
definitely it can be held liable. Suable and it can be held liable
likewise.
In so far as government employees and officials are
concerned, they are also immune from suit for as long as they
are performing governmental functions, except special agents.
Special agents under Art. 2180 (Civil Code) – the state has
given its consent to be sued. The special agent is one who
discharges a function foreign from his regular functions. The
government has taken risk there and it would not be fair that he
would be out there causing injury without any responsibility.
Thus, even if this particular employee or official is performing a
governmental function, but he is designated as special agent,
the state has consented to be sued, to prove the claim against
the state, via this special agent. Second, even if a government
official is performing a function however without authority, or if
he has authority, he acted with gross negligence or with grave
abuse of that authority amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the state cannot protect him under the immunity
from suit. He can be sued in his personal capacity.
Q: PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE Inc. vs JOSEFINA
TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO G.R. No. 142362 May 3, 2006
Lichauco was sued in her personal capacity because of the
denial of a franchise. She then invoked immunity from suit so
that the case will be dismissed outright. Should the court
dismiss the case outright?
10
A: No, because it still has to be established that she did not act
in excess of her authority or with gross negligence or with
grave abuse of her authority amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Because if that is established then she will be held
liable personally, the case cannot be dismissed automatically.
Although if it is in the performance of a governmental function
likewise where ultimately it will be for the State to answer for
the liability, the case will not prosper.
The present action was denominated against Lichauco and the
unknown awardee, Lichauco was identified in the complaint as
"acting Secretary of the [DOTC]."  The hornbook rule is that a
suit for acts done in the performance of official functions
against an officer of the government by a private citizen which
would result in a charge against or financial liability to the
government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself,
although it has not been formally impleaded. However,
government immunity from suit will not shield the public official
being sued if the government no longer has an interest to
protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is
personal because it arises from a tortious act in the
performance of his/her duties|||  (Philippine Agila Satellite Inc.
v. Trinidad-Lichauco, G.R. No. 142362, May 03, 2006)
(TN) Take note of those general principles. Those are general
principles. There are exceptions however.
WHEN THE STATE MAY BE SUED
You cannot sue the state unless the state gives its consent.
When the state gives its consent, you can now sue it.
Q: How does the state give its consent?
A: Only through legislation, if it is express consent. It would be
by a general law or a special law. Or it would be impliedly
given by the state under certain circumstances.
I repeat: the giving of consent can be express or implied.
EXPRESS CONSENT
Let’s talk about express giving of consent. General laws. It
should be a law, ha, for express consent; not by contract, not
even by a declaration of the President. Remember that case of
Caylao vs Republic of the Philippines GR No. 84645 March 29,
1993 where she made a public declaration that the military
made a mistake, they should be investigated for liability in
relation to the massacre of the farmers of Hacienda Luisita at
the Mendiola bridge during her administration. They used the
declaration of the President to sue the military, the AFP, for
liability caused by the death and injuries of the farmers. What
happened? The action was dismissed because the state case
was immune from suit. It was the AFP, government officials,
who were sued in their official capacity. The action definitely
will not prosper. But if they were sued in their personal
capacity, then of course it will prosper because the negligence
of an official is not an act of the state. As I said earlier, the
state cannot do wrong. It only does the right thing. If you do the
wrong thing, that’s not the act of the state but your own act as
an employee or official. The state will not get involved in it. You
pay; not the state.
As I was saying, it has to be by legislation, by a statute passed
by Congress.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
“While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate
liability does not pertain to the government. Although the
military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were
discharging their official functions when the incident occurred,
their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded
their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there was
lack of justification by the government forces in the use of
firearms. 17 Moreover, the members of the police and military
crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P.
Blg. 880 18 as there was unnecessary firing by them in
dispersing the marchers.
While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general
rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot
be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it
cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them
from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand
indemnification from the government. The principle of state
immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the
relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official
action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of
any obligation which belongs to the State in its political
capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made
defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the
state and as its agents and servants. 22 This Court has made
it quite clear that even a "high position in the government does
not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another.”
(Caylao case)
Q: One time there was a contract entered into by a government
agency with a private individual. The contract itself provides
that in case of breach violation, the office is suable. It can be
sued. Now, would that be a valid waiver of immunity?
A: No, because if waiver of immunity is express, it must only be
by legislation of Congress.
As I have said earlier, there are general laws and special laws.
The general laws: like the provisions of the Civil Code (Article
2180, 2186); you have the Local Government Code. These are
general laws passed by Congress where the government is
allowed to sue. Usually this is a consequence of the
government’s right to acquire property and as such, in relation
to the acquisition of property, has the right to sue and be sued
in relation to its right to acquire or to possess that property.
These are general provisions of laws: 2180 refers to special
agent. I think 2186 would refer to Local Government units who
do not properly maintain their roads and drainage niya
mahulog ka sa manhole. In the law on torts, the state has
given its consent to be sued for this negligence that may have
been caused by improper maintenance or no maintenance at
all of government buildings and infrastructures. By that, the
state has waived immunity from suit.
Special laws are laws specifically passed by Congress
authorizing a particular individual to sue the state, where the
state has waived its immunity from suit in a special law
allowing an individual to prove his claim against the state. A
good example is the case of Merritt vs. the Government of the
Philippine Islands where it was Congress who passed a law
allowing the victim there to sue, to prove his claim against the
Veteran’s Hospital owned by the government.
It’s actually very easy when there is an express law. Ang
problema ang implied giving of consent.
11
IMPLIED CONSENT
Let’s talk about implied giving of consent. You have 3
instances or rather 4 or 5.
First instance is when the government enters into a
commercial contract. It’s not just any government contract. It
has to be proprietary or commercial contract. It has no relation
to the principal function of that office. For example, COMELEC
enters into a contract with a printing company for ballots.
That’s governmental contract. DPWH enters into a contract
with a contractor to build bridges and roads. That’s
governmental contract. That’s not commercial. If the contract is
purely commercial where the government enters into a contract
with an entity to provide a canteen in the office, now that’s
proprietary or commercial. In which case, if proprietary or
commercial, the state is considered to have waived its
immunity. It would be treated like an ordinary individual.
(TN) But if commercial contracts, take note, as part of the
giving of consent expressed under PD 447, General
Accounting Laws: if you have claims against the state, based
on a contract for example, contractual obligations of the state,
you cannot sue the state directly. What you must do in order to
sue the state there are certain requirements. You have to
make a claim with COA; until it is denied by COA, you can
always go to the Supreme Court on certiorari where you can
now sue the state. So it is only after your claim is denied by
COA, that you can sue the state for your monetary claims
based on a contractual obligation. The state has expressly
given its consent there. Even if your money claims is based on
a governmental contract, you can still sue not in the implied but
in the express giving of consent. But in the express giving of
consent, there is a requirement that you must first make a
claim with COA before you can sue COA and the government
agency that you are claiming against with the Supreme Court.
Again, if it is a contract, the implied giving of consent is limited
to purely proprietary or commercial contracts. Here, you can
sue the state directly.
Second instance of implied giving of consent: when
government engages in purely business transactions,
commercial transactions - business, negosyo. It has to be
primarily commercial. Because the sometimes the government
may also engage in governmental function and then part of the
governmental function, to enhance it, they may also be
engaged in proprietary function.
Q: For example, the Bureau of Customs, their function is to
assess taxes; that’s governmental. But they’re also engaged in
arrastre business – to carry the items that are heavy for
purposes of assessment. Arrastre is proprietary. It has nothing
to do with the governmental function because theirs is to
collect taxes, but it enhances the collection of taxes if they can
see the item itself where it will be brought before the office;
might as well engage also in arrastre business. If damage is
caused by the arrastre business, can you now sue the Bureau
of Customs?
A: No, because the arrastre business is not the pure business
that the Bureau of Customs is engaged in. It is merely
incidental to the performance of a governmental function, and
therefore it remains immune from suit.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
And then you have when the state initiates the filing of a suit
against an individual for affirmative relief. Initiate, meaning it is
the government who filed the complaint first against an
individual and the purpose is to seek affirmative relief.
Q: Why is this so important, the “seeking of affirmative relief”?
A: Because if the purpose of the suit is to repel, to resist a
claim against the state, the state is not considered to having
waived its community.
Q: Case of PCGG v. Benedicto G.R. No. 129406 March 6,
2006, this is a landmark case. The PCGG initiated an action
against the Benedictos to claim certain shares of stock of a
company. They are saying Benedicto was only used as
dummy, the real owners being the Marcoses therefore the
shares are ill-gotten wealth from the state. Now the SC
declared that the shares of stock belonged to the Benedictos
and not the Marcoses. The Benedictos then sued PCGG in
their counterclaim; and now the PCGG invoked their immunity
from suit. Is PCGG correct?
A: SC said no. The counterclaim will prosper because in the
first PCGG initiated the filing of the complaint against the
Benedictos for affirmative relief.
“But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the
PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state
immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the
suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State
itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit
cannot be effectively invoked”
On the contrary you have Fernando Froilan vs Pan Oriental
Shipping G.R. No. L-6060  September 30, 1954 There was
this transaction between the bank and a private individual. This
private individual failed to pay its obligation and so the ship that
was used as collateral was foreclosed by the bank, the
government intervened to stop the foreclosure because the
government claims that the ship used as collateral belongs to
the state. Later, it was declared by the SC that it belonged to
the individual who owed money. The bank has already filed a
case against the government to stop the foreclosure causing
damage to the bank.
Q: Will the action prosper?
A: No, because what the government did in this case was
merely to repel or resist a claim against it which claims that the
ship was their property and trying to protect their rights over
the property.
“The other ground for dismissing the defendant's counterclaim
is that the State is immune from suit. This is untenable,
because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government
in effect waived its right of nonsuability.
The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive
it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts.
The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different
forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by
taking the initiative in an action against a private
party, the state surrenders its privileged position and
comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
12
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right
to set up whatever claims and other defenses he
might have against the state. The United States
Supreme Court thus explains:
"No direct suit can be maintained against the
United States. But when an action is brought
by the United States to recover money in the
hands of a party who has a legal claim
against them, it would be a very rigid
principle to deny to him the right of setting
up such claim in a court of justice, and turn
him around to an application to Congress."
(Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth Ed.,
pp. 36-37, citing U. S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet.
150, 8 L. ed. 899.)
It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there was at
all any waiver, it was in favor of the plaintiff against whom the
complaint in intervention was directed. This contention is
untenable. As already stated, the complaint in intervention was
in a sense in derogation of the defendant's claim over the
possession of the vessel in question”
Finally, as an exception, in expropriation cases, were the
property owner is not paid just compensation, he has the right
to sue the state or any government entity for the payment of
just compensation. There is no violation there in the immunity
from suit. The reason being that, according to the SC, the
immunity of the state from suit should not be a tool to oppress
its citizens.
This principle of immunity from suit also applies to foreign
governments and other international personalities given legal
personality including their representatives.
Case: Archbishop of Manila relating of the acquisition of a
property that was sold to Vatican and then there was a suit
made by Vatican (a state within a state).
The Holy See vs Rosario G.R. No. 101949 December 1,
1994
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state
with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act
can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is
whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the
regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or
transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in
pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is
an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for
gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in
the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said
transaction can be categorized as an act  jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and
subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission
or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The
right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or
personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22).
This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and
entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is
granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction
of the receiving state over any real action relating to private
immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving
state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for
the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a
diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be
recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case
is the Holy See.
Q: Can it be sued?
A: if purely commercial, yes but if it is something to do with the
official function of Vatican, not suable.
That case involved the performance of an official function
therefore like any sovereign state it is immune.
Article II Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Political
Creed of the Government)
It is the enumeration of the obligations of the government,
underlying principles in the operations of government.
TN: Article II is not self-executing. It cannot be the source of
rights and obligations. If violated, you cannot go to court and
seek judicial relief unless there is a law that was violated based
on Article II.
Similar to the Apostles Creed, there is no sanction there that
you will be less catholic if you violated. Not obliged to observe.
No binding effect if there is no law implementing such.
Legislation is needed to implement it
Tañada v Angara G.R. No. 118295.   May 2, 1997
It is true that in the recent case of  Manila Prince Hotel vs.
Government Service Insurance System, et al.,[31] this Court
held that “Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.   From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.   It is per se judicially enforceable.”   However, as
the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in
regard to “the grants of rights, privileges and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony” and not to every
aspect of trade and commerce.   It refers to exceptions rather
than the rule.   The issue here is not whether this paragraph of
Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not.   Rather, the issue is
whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in
the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement.   And we hold that there
are.
Remember the World Trade Agreement (WTA) where it
stipulates that Congress is prohibited from passing a law
contrary to the provisions of the WTA. That was questioned by
13
Tanada and others, in effect, in our making of foreign policies,
we are now controlled by foreign policies. Where is now
sovereignty or independence of the Philippine state in the
formulation of its foreign policy? IOW, it will now violate the
provisions relating to independent foreign policy and the states
being sovereign.
SC dismissed the case outright saying that you cannot use the
provision of Article II as basis to question the validity of that
contract. Legislation is needed to implement the provisions in
Article. SC further discussed that no man is an island and we
cannot live by ourselves, we need to relate with foreign
policies. As long as there is reciprocity and mutuality in the
benefit, it cannot be a violation.
In Oposa v Factoran, except on the provision of the right to a
balanced ecology, SC held that it is the only provision that is
self-executing. All the rest needs legislation.
Oposa v Factoran G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated
in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As
a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear
of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come — generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
C. General principles and state policies
(Only the important ones will be discussed, the rest is up to
you)
Sec. 1. REPUBLICANISM
Sec. 1 The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
Republican – representation and renovation kind of
government. Elect representatives in representation. In
renovation, when there are changes everytime a term of office
of a public official expires, you have new administration that
would introduce changes to the government.
Because it is republican, it is understood that sovereignty
resides in the people. Whatever authority exercised by officials,
they must not forget that the power comes from the people.
Q: How do you know that the system is republican?
A: You go into the manifestations of republicanism.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
1. First, the existence of the Bill of Rights.
2. Observance of separation of powers
3. Non-delegation of legislative powers
4. Government of laws and not of men
5. Popular election
6. Accountability of public officials
7. Rule of majority
Etc etc.
TN: Among the powers that you need to remember are the
principles that are manifest in a republican system.
- Separation of powers, checks and balances and
delegation of powers (these are mentioned in the
syllabus for bar exams
The most recent decision on the principle of separation of
powers is the case involving PDAF, Belgica et al v Executive
Sec Ochoa, etc.
Belgica vs Ochoa G.R. No. 208566               November 19,
2013
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have
been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as
Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of
budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release
of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The
fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada,
cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any
of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority
is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat,
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its
ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator
identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the
same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have
nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory
import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the
statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments
– have admitted that the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be
tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution
process
One of the issues raised is the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system, WON it violates the separation of powers.
Explanation: there are three branches of the government
supposedly independent from each other because they do not
owe each other powers assigned by the constitution. It would
be express, implied or incidental powers. For as long as the
powers are assigned to that branch, we call it the “full
14
discretionary power.” As such, it cannot be checked, intruded
into, interfered, or usurped. It shall be exclusive. If usurped,
violation occurs to the separation of powers.
Example: in relation to the PDAF, based on funds allotted to
certain members of Congress for projects that they
recommend.
TN: Budget preparation is exclusive to the president under the
constitution. It shall be submitted to congress within 30 days
from the opening of the regular session.
President enumerates the expenses of government with
corresponding amounts and source of the appropriation.
Special appropriation, state the source of revenue. If general
appropriation, it is sufficient that you have the expense and the
amount.
Q: why is it submitted to congress?
A: because it is congress that will pass the law under the
principle that there cannot be any disbursement of public funds
without appropriation or authority.
When congress appropriates the amount, it specifies the
nature of the expense, purpose and amount available in the
General Appropriation Act (GAA).
That power is exclusive to congress and cannot be usurped by
the president. That’s the issue in Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP) because there is no identification of projects.
They were supposed to take it from savings and in effect
mentioned in the cases, Congress was denied to identify the
project and appropriate the amount.
PDAF is similarly situated. There was an appropriation for
PDAF. No question about that in the budget. But remember
that the function of congress is simply to appropriate, not to
implement the national budget.
Q: who implements the law?
A: It is the president
Based on the GAA, the president disburses the money.
What happened in PDAF.. History: Remember sometime in the
1990s, it was challenged as to its constitutionality in the case
of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez where the issue was WON it was
constitutional for Congress to identify the projects to which
those appropriated funds. It should not be constitutional since
in effect they are already implementing the budget. But the
decision of the SC was rather vague. SC held that it is not a
violation of the constitution since what the members did was
merely to recommend the project. Recommendatory only and
ultimately the discretion was left to the president. BUT
apparently, in the recent decision of the SC, it interferes into
the exclusive power of the executive to implement and enforce
the national budget. Because the matter of identifying the
project, they decide and determine the project and who is
going to be the beneficiary. In effect, it is identified and found
not just to be recommendatory. SC held that it violates the
separation of powers as it interferes the implementation of that
national budget which is exclusive to the president.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19,
1994
The authority given to the members of Congress is only to
propose and identify projects to be implemented by the
President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President
must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by
the members of Congress fall within the specific items of
expenditures for which the Fund was set up, and if qualified,
he next determines whether they are in line with other projects
planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects
qualify for funding under the Funds, it is the President who
shall implement them. In short, the proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are merely
recommendatory.
Sec. 2 THE INCORPORATION CLAUSE
Art. 2 is not self executing. These are only
guidelines in so far as the congress concerned in
the making of laws, as to the president in the
execution of the laws, and as to the SC is
concerned in the interpretation of the laws applied
in actual cases. Except: the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology because this is a
public right.
TN: the case of Tañada vs. Angara with respect to
the WTO.
Sec. 1 is about republicanism.
TN/(BAR): the principles of republicanism particularly on the
principles of Separation of powers, check and balances of the
powers and the blending of the powers, non-delegation of
powers, the power of judicial review on the SC to implement on
the separation and the non-delegation of the powers,
accountability of public officials, rule of majority, so on and so
forth.
Art II sec. 2, this is also important. This has been asked
several times because of public international law, which is still
part of Political Law.
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations.
Principle of international law is generally accepted, it will be
applied by our courts as though it were local or municipal
statutes. So there is no need for legislation to accept a
generally accepted principle in international law (GAPIL) in
order to implement it in our jurisdiction or apply it in actual
cases in our courts. So let’s enumerate the sources of the
generally accepted principles of international law that are
automatically adapted as part of the legal system.
Treaties.
15
You have the ratified treaties entered into by our country with
other countries. By ratified, it means that it must have been
concurred by at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate in
order to bind us. There is no need of legislation in order to
apply these agreements.
For example, the World Trade Agreement (WTA) was
concurred in by the Senate, in which case, it was applied as
though it were an ordinary statute. Do you remember the
controversy regarding on the importation of rice? Because in
the WTA, there should have been free trade on all items or
goods, including rice. There shouldn’t be any limitation on
importation from different countries. But a reservation was
made in the agreement itself, to protect our own local farmers,
because actually, the agreement will compete with our local
rice production. But that reservation is only good for a certain
period of time which was 10 years after the execution of the
WTA.
Q: Why did it become a controversy?
A: Because if applied, there is this agreement that they should
only pay for the importation of the rice, and they no longer
need to get the permit from NFA to make sure that they are still
within the limits and that the number of kilograms they import is
still within the prescribed limits. And so they just order as many
sacks of rice without the requisite NFA permit. When the court
had to resolve this issue, it had to apply the WTA agreement
as though it were an ordinary law because it was part of the
domestic legal system already.
On the other hand, let’s talk about the Rome Statute, which
created the International Court of Justice. It’s noteworthy to
mention that this was never ratified by the Senate, because
they never had the chance to, because Arroyo did not submit
the Statute of Rome to the Senate for concurrence.
Nonetheless, the ICJ was established.
Q: Are we bound by the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the event that
one of us or our officials is found to have committed human
rights abuses covered by the jurisdiction of the ICJ?
A: The general rules is, since we did not concur, that
agreement did not bind us, so we’re not subject to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ. Although there’s also a principle that we
cannot also violate it simply because we did not sign it. That’s
the general rule. To be part of the legal system automatically,
that treaty must be concurred, duly ratified, because it must be
concurrence, not just the signature of the President. Although
technically when we say ratification, it’s the President that
signs it, and it is generally discretionary on the part of the
President.
Customary norms
Another source for GAPIL are norms of general or customary
laws. So there are customs or acts or practices that have been
adapted by the international community. For as long as it has
been practices for so many years, and provided that it also has
an obligatory factor that obliges the international community to
comply, then it becomes a source of public international law
and under the incorporation clause, it’s automatically adapted
as part of the legal system.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
TN of the case of Mijares et al vs Javier GR No. 139325 April
12, 2005. In the Mijares case, this was about the recognition of
foreign judgment by our courts. The question there is: whether
you can enforce a foreign judgment even when there is no
agreement between our country and another country as
regards the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
You recall that case involving the violation of human rights
(TN) tried in the US, in Hawaii specifically, which awarded
damages to the victims of the human rights victims during the
Marcos administration. The problem there is that they cannot
satisfy the judgment because the Marcoses did not have
enough properties in America, since their properties are in the
Philippines. So the human rights victims wanted to enforce
this, but first of all, our courts need to recognize that judgment
coming from a foreign court. Remember that we are sovereign
states, and so we cannot be bound by the judgment of any
court from a foreign state.
The second problem there is, there is no agreement between
the US and the Philippines that both will recognize the court
judgments of the other state. But it has been the practice in the
international community that foreign judgments are recognized
for as long as you follow certain rules for its authentication, that
indeed it exists, that it’s in accordance with the rules, etc. then
we can recognize the same and even enforce it. So the SC
said in the case of Mijares that there is no obligatory rule
derived from treaties or convention that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments or allow the
procedure for the recognition thereof, however, GAPIL, and by
virtue of the incorporation clause, commands us to recognize
these practices even if they do not emanate from treaty
obligations.
“Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable theory
behind the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
or a universal treaty rendering it obligatory force, there is
consensus that the viability of such recognition and
enforcement is essential.
Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of
worldwide renown, points out:
Whatever be the theory as to the basis for
recognizing foreign judgments, there can be
little dispute that the end is to protect the
reasonable expectations and demands of
the parties. Where the parties have
submitted a matter for adjudication in the
court of one state, and proceedings there
are not tainted with irregularity, they may
fairly be expected to submit, within the state
or elsewhere, to the enforcement of the
judgment issued by the court.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions
that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or
allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations.”
So the customary practices are a combination of two
elements
TN:
16
1. Established, widespread and consistent practices on
the part of the states;
2. There is an opinion as to law or necessity.
So if these two elements are established, then it becomes
customary international law and it also becomes a GAPIL, and
so under the incorporation clause, it becomes part of the legal
system.
Let’s have a concrete example and let’s talk about the
immunity from suit of heads of state. So for example, if the
head of state commits rape in the Philippines publicly and even
if everyone witnessed the act. There is no criminal prosecution
because it is GAPIL that a representative of a sovereign state
cannot be subjected to the authority of another state’s court.
For as long as the court knows that he is a head of state,
automatically the court will desist from proceeding with the
case for lack of jurisdiction because of the principle of immunity
from suit.
Treaties that have become customary norms.
This is another source of GAPIL.
Example: Do you remember the Geneva Conventions where
we were not signatories to these treaties? These treaties, this
was after WW2, allowed for the establishment of military
commissions which had jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals.
TN of the case of Kuroda vs Jalandoni G.R. No. L-2662  March
26, 1949. One of the captured Japanese generals questioned
the jurisdiction of the Philippine military commission, saying
that it had no jurisdiction since its creation was invalid because
the Philippines was not a signatory to the Geneva Convention.
Q: What did the SC say about this?
A: It said that we might not be a signatory to it, but it has to be
noted that that Convention or Treaty has become a customary
law, and as such, it has also become GAPIL, and is
automatically adapted as part of the legal system of the land,
because again of the incorporation clause.
That principle was also applied in the case of the Statute of
Rome, because while we were not a signatory to it, but the
Statute of Rome was accepted by the international community
and through time it became a customary international law.
Meaning, even if there was no concurrence or ratification, but
by virtue of it being a customary law, we are subject to it under
the incorporation clause because it has become a GAPIL.
TN also of the case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines vs Duque G.R. No. 173034
October 9, 2007. I’ve mentioned this before that this pertains to
the requirement that if you’re a manufacturer of milk, you’re
supposed to put in the can or carton that breast milk is still the
best milk in the universe. At that time, the bill was still pending
in Congress, and so the manufacturers questioned the
requirement of Duque.
Q: Now, what was invoked by Duque who was then the
Secretary of Health?
A: That Convention where we’re a signatory that has become a
customary law that requires that it should be stated in all milk
products that breast milk is still the best. Again, by virtue of the
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
incorporation clause, this was automatically adapted in our
local laws. You don’t need local jurisdiction to implement it.
Q: But what happens when there is a conflict between a GAPIL
and a statute?
A: TN here guys of the case of Ichong vs Hernandez G.R. No.
L-7995  May 31, 1957, where the SC said that as much as
possible, both have to be reconciled because it is not the
intention of Congress or the President to pass a law or enter
into a treaty with the purpose of intentionally violating existing
laws or Congress violating what has been agreed upon by the
President in a treaty. That’s always the principle: you
harmonize it. If it cannot be harmonized, which of these two will
prevail? You follow Ichong vs Hernandez, that it should always
be the municipal law, because after all, the court that decides
whether or not the international law or the municipal law which
should be sustained is an organ of law, of Congress, in which
case, it must always sustain our own laws. But if the
international law conflicts with our Constitution, the Constitution
always prevails.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines
and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to
be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty
guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals
"upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country."
But the nationals of China are not discriminating against
because nationals of all other countries, except those of the
United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail
trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said
treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or
amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258,
Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the
scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs.
Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
xxx
(A)nd that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict
with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been
entered into on the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
But TN that in the international community, both statute and
law are considered as equal and no source is more superior
compared to the other.
So, the manner of construing the conflict is this:
It depends on which came first or later.
If for example, the law was passed prior to the treaty, then
always, the treaty prevails and it should be treated as an
amendment to an existing law. If the law was passed after the
treaty was signed, then it should be construed as a law
amending the treaty. So you follow statutory construction and
that’s how we construe laws conflicts between a treaty and a
statute.
Regarding the renunciation of war. It’s only aggressive war.
But I tell you class that in the BAR, the question is always
about the incorporation clause.
Sec. 3. CIVILIAN SUPREMACY
17
First of all, you have the President as the Commander-in-Chief
of the AFP, the highest authority who is a civilian and not a
member of the AFP.
As one of the instruments of maintaining the supremacy of the
civilian authority, you have the creation of court martial that
discipline the behavior of the AFP members, the decision of
which are subject to the review of the President, in his capacity
as the Commander-in-Chief in order to maintain civilian
supremacy over the military.
You also have some cases like IBP vs. Zamora, GR 141289,
Aug. 15, 2000 24. Gudani vs. Senga, GR 170165, April 15,
2006
In the IBP case, this is about the deployment of the marines in
the malls. The SC said that there’s no violation of the civilian
supremacy over the military because the marines were still
under the leadership of the local chief police force, who is in
charge in the maintenance of peace and order.
In the Gudani case, this is when Gudani, notwithstanding the
directions of his Chief of Staff not to appear in a legislative
inquiry, defied the order and appeared and testified. So he was
‘court martial-ed’. He questioned the jurisdiction of the court
martial by saying that all that he did was to heed the order of
Congress exercising its power to conduct legislative inquiry.
But the Supreme Court said that no, your accountability is
direct to the Chief of Staff or to the President as the
Commander in Chief. You follow the chain of command in
order to maintain the supremacy of the civilian authority over
the military. The Chief of Staff, as directed by the Commander
in Chief (the President) told you not to appear, in which case,
you should follow that first, because it would be too dangerous
if a person can just defy an order from the Commander in
Chief. If there is a sanction and Gudani cannot appear in a
legislative inquiry, that’s already Congress’ problem and not
Gudani’s problem, because his primary concern is his
accountability to the Commander in Chief and not to Congress.
SECTION 5: RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN ORDER TO
PROTECT LIFE, LIBERTY, PROEPRTY
Section 5 came out in the BAR exam, and this is with regard to
the maintenance of peace and order if we are to enjoy the
blessings of democracy. There should be protection of life,
liberty and property and you need to do this by bearing arms.
In such a case, you are armed with a gun or any weapon in
order to protect your property or your life or your liberty. So the
question is this: is carrying a firearm a right or a privilege that is
merely granted by the state?
TN: Remember the case of Chavez vs Romulo G.R. No.
157036, June 9, 2004, because in America, this is considered
as a property right, so therefore the permit cannot just be
revoked by the state without hearing. In the case of Chavez, he
questioned the order of the General Chief of the PNP revoking
all the permits of all those who had firearms without hearing, or
the revocation was effected by that mere pronouncement.
So, Chavez was saying that that can’t be done because that’s
an intrusion to the right of the person to protect his life, liberty
and property without due process. But according to the SC, the
right to carry firearms is not a property right and so it is not
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
covered under the due process clause. It is a privilege granted
to a person subject to revocation to be exercised by the state
under its police power.
SECTION 6: SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
What is important under the separation of church and the state
are the exceptions.
Exemptions of the principle of separation of Church and
State:
1. Tax exemptions for those actually, directly and
exclusively used for religious purposes. Number one
as an exception recognizing the contribution of the
church to the state is tax exemptions to properties that
are actually, directly and exclusively used for religious
purpose, however limited only to property tax, regardless
of ownership. Purpose has to be looked into, not mere
ownership.
2. Teaching of religion in public elementary and high
schools. You also have the teaching of religion in
public elementary and high schools. Remember that
for as long as there is consent from the parents or
guardians in writing and that it is not within school
hours and without an additional cost to the
government to be conducted by an accredited
religious teacher. That is allowed in public schools.
3. Religious people in the military and in
orphanages. Another exception is on the
appropriation of public funds. That is prohibited if it is
used for the support of any church or any priest and
minister, except when the priest or minister is working
for the AFP or for orphanages or government
leprosarium, they can receive support from public
funds from the government. That is an exception.
4. Ownership of educational institutions. Finally, on
ownership of educational institutions. The rule is only
a Filipino citizen or a private Filipino corporation can
establish an educational institution, except when that
educational institution is established by a religious
group or mission board. Even if they are all
foreigners, they may do so by way of exception as
accommodation to the church as an exception to the
separation of church and state.
Practical application of this concept? TN of that RH Law, the
case of Spouses Imbong et al vs the Executive Secretary
GR No. 204819 April 8, 2014 and many other cases. That was
decided only sometime in April 2014. One of the things that
was stressed there.
“Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is
based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle
in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith
18
and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church
cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country. 
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion
should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the
above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic
sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an  iglesia, or any
other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a
religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to
provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit
of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the
following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI,
Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution. xxxx
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom
provides two guarantees: the  Establishment Clause  and
the  Free Exercise Clause.
The  establishment clause "principally prohibits the State
from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against
other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups."  Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of
a state religion and the use of public resources for the support
or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the  free exercise clause  is
the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 
Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is
prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.”
||| (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, April 08, 2014)
D. Separation of powers
The recent decisions applying of the separation of powers is
that case of Belgica, et al vs. Executive Secretary Ochoa
and SJS et al vs. Drilon et al and the cases relating to PDAF.
Q: One of the reasons why PDAF was declared as
unconstitutional was because it was violative of separation of
powers. How?
A: Considering the 2 other cases that were rendered by the SC
prior to this case, these are the cases of Philconsa vs.
Enriquez and LAMP et. al vs. Sec. of Budget and Mgt. and
Orders. In the case of Philconsa, the SC was saying that there
was no violation of the separation of powers because in the
PDAF, what the congressmen and senators do, they simply
recommend the projects to which the funds will be allotted to.
It’s recommendatory, it’s not for them to actually determine the
project to be supported or set for, in so far as the PDAF is
concerned, there is no intrusion of the power in the executive
branch to execute the general appropriation act. In the case of
LAMP (April 2012), the SC did not make any clear
pronouncement whether there was clear separation. It simply
ruled that it was not substantiated by LAMP that indeed there
was a violation of separation powers because it was not
supported by evidence that indeed the congressmen or
senators interfered in the execution on the appropriation law,
as regards to the disbursement of funds relating to projects
that were identified by the members of congress. In other
words, there is no clear ruling on the principle of separation of
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
powers relating to PDAF because there was no evidence to
show that the principle was violated.
Finally, this case of Belgica, the SC was already clear on the
pronouncement that there was a case and up to that case, with
regard to the PDAF expended, there exists a violation of the
separation of powers.
One of the things that was stressed there, while according to
the SC the state respects religion and the church, or anyone’s
belief, like if you believe that contraceptive should not be used
as a form of preventing pregnancy or family planning purposes
and all, the State respects respect. But your belief or other
people’s belief should not be imposed upon the state because
there is separation of the church and the state.
There may be some accommodation because after all the state
has recognized the contributions of the church. The bottom line
there is that for as long as there is no clear and imminent
danger of any substantive ill to happen that the state has the
obligation to prevent, by all means, the state should allow any
person to enjoy his religious belief or non-belief of anything.
In the case of Estrada vs Escritor A.M. No. P-02-
1651.  August 4, 2003, you have another term, as long as
there is no compelling state interest, or national security or for
public order, public convenience or public health, by all means
you should be allowed to freely exercise religion or whatever
beliefs you have under the Principle of Benevolent
Neutrality- Accommodation.
“Given that a free exercise claim could lead to three
different results, the question now remains as to how the Court
should determine which action to take. In this regard, it is
the  strict scrutiny-compelling state interest  test which is
most in line with the benevolent neutrality-
accommodation approach.
Under the benevolent-neutrality theory, the principle
underlying the First Amendment is that freedom to carry out
one’s duties to a Supreme Being is an inalienable right, not
one dependent on the grace of legislature.   Religious freedom
is seen as a substantive right and not merely a privilege
against discriminatory legislation. With religion looked upon
with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.  long as the ovum has not been fertilized yet, there is no
Considering that laws nowadays are rarely enacted
specifically to disable religious belief or practice, free exercise
disputes arise commonly when a law that is religiously neutral
and generally applicable on its face is argued to prevent or
burden what someone’s religious faith requires, or
alternatively, requires someone to undertake an act that faith
would preclude. In essence, then, free exercise arguments
contemplate religious exemptions from otherwise general laws.
Strict scrutiny is appropriate for free exercise
challenges because “[t]he compelling interest test reflects the
First Amendment’s mandate of preserving religious liberty to
the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society. Underlying
the compelling state interest test is the notion that free
exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it
should be subject to strict scrutiny.”
Sec. 7 Independent Foreign Policy
In the case of Tanada vs. Angara (id), while be believe in
Independence, Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Defense
etc. you must also understand that no man is island, should
19
there be any exchange or trade or whatever, this arrangement
should be based on Equality and Reciprocity. TN
Sec. 8 Prohibition against the stocking of Nuclear Arms.
One of the issues raised in that amendment to the VFA now
with the controversy of China. They are going to question the
validity of the Executive Agreement signed by the President
recently to the U.S. allowing the U.S. troops even to stay
specifically on previous bases that they have abandoned like
Subic or Olongapo. There may not be a problem in the entry;
the problem is on the possibility of using nuclear firearms. It is
not revoked and that is prohibited under the Constitution.
TN: As a general rule, the entry of foreign military troops is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Except here it was only by way of an exception rather than as
a general rule, specifically because of the possibility of nuclear
weapons being brought here into country. That is prohibited.
But suppose in the future, (alangan man primi canyon nalang
cge atong gamiton, unya tanan nuclear weapons), it depends
on national interest, and it is Congress who will determine that.
Sec. 12 Sanctity of the Family
This is the bases on questioning the constitutionality of RH
Law, otherwise known as RA 10354.
TN: That it may violate or threat the life of an unborn. To the
controversy or issue on when does life start, because of the
use of contraceptives. They are saying in effect it promotes
abortion, (unsaon man nimo pag abort kung wala paman gani)
it prevents fertilization, because they are saying precisely that
should start from the contact. It cannot be understood.
What must be emphasized is that there is no violation of the
rights of the unborn according to the SC because what is being
protected is the fertilized ovum from being expelled. It does not
allow abortion. They are trying to give access to the poor
women to protect their reproductive health in having so many
children as a kind of means of leisure so that they can enjoy
without paying for it. Since they have access to contraceptives,
they will have more children, and more mouths to feed. For as
violation. What is being prevented is the expulsion of the
fertilized ovum, in fact the law is against abortion.
The provisions that were declared unconstitutional are Art. 7,
17 and 23.
Take for instance, I’ll give you an example. One of the
provisions in RA 10354, if for example you are an employee of
POPCOM (population commission) or in a health care, your
duty is supposed to be to introduce contraceptives as a means
of family planning. And since it is against your religion, what is
your tendency? You will not introduce that to the public
especially to the poor because you would feel guilty about
introducing it because as far as the church is concerned that is
a sin, there can be only family planning but the natural way.
So many women are deprived because they can’t afford. But
for you it is a sin. So you do not introduce. But do you know
under the law you can be penalized? So the SC said that is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Now you would be a violation of the
freedom of religion. It is true that you cannot impose your
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
beliefs but you should not also be punished for what you
believe in.
Penalties for Health Service providers that require parental
consent from minor patients who are not in an emergency or
serious situation. So even for a minor who wants an abortion, it
is allowed under the law and it is prohibited and was declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Allowing married women, not in an
emergency situation or life threatening case, to undergo
reproductive procedure without the consent of the spouse. If
you were the spouse, how would you feel? Your wife was
already ligated and you were not informed. Before that was
allowed under the law and is now declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Those were the provisions that were declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Sec. 16 Balanced and Healthful Ecology
Case in point: Oposa vs. Factoran (id). All the rest of the cases
were decided taking into consideration this case. This is a
landmark case. The point that was emphasized in the Oposa
case, which was reiterated in succeeding environmental cases,
that this is Self-Executing. You don’t need legislation in order
to enforce it. The SC also emphasized the fact that this is a
public right of the people. This is as important as the
guaranteed protection under Art. III.
Sec. 17 Priority to Education
This is with reference to giving priority to education. This is
always invoked by the students against tuition fees hike, that
the government should give priority to education by
subsidizing, especially the government universities and
colleges. This is merely directory.
General Rule: The provisions in the constitution
mandatory.
Q: What are the exceptions? What are the provisions in the
Constitution that is not mandatory?
A: Sec. 17. It is merely directory in the sense that even if its
not followed, there canot be no violation of the Constitution.
According to the SC, as it was emphasized in the Carague vs.
Guingona (id) case, the government is never precluded or
deprived from attending to other imperatives of the
government. There are other needs of government that needs
attention, not just education. But there is that direction or
instruction to give priority. And so with that priority, we have
free education, in elementary and even secondary like night
school. But in college, you cannot college education because
this is not mandatory. The government can only provide for
State Colleges and Universities with low cost tuition fees or
otherwise grant scholarship to deserving students in college.
This is on the indispensible role of the private sector. This is
part of the Non Governmental Organizations and to implement
this you have like, allowing them the chance to participate in
governance, such as the establishment of the party-list system.
Wherein they can have the chance or opportunity to become
members of the government.
Sec. 22 Indigenous Cultural Communities
20
On the promotion of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national development, this was always invoked in
the case of Bangsamoro. Political Entity, and the concepts of
Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands, this will be discussed
when we go to the topic on Regalian Doctrine.
Sec. 25 Autonomy of Local Gov’ts.
To ensure local autonomy. There will be a separate discussion
on this on Art. X. Suffice to say what is now relevant is the
Bangsamoro in relation to the framework agreement. I suppose
once it is passed there will be a question later in the future
regarding its validity. What is emphasized is Local Autonomy.
Local Devolution of Services rather than Decentralization of
powers.
Q: What do you mean when you say Decentralization of
Powers?
A: It is the transfer of powers from the National government to
the Local Government
There is no such thing. Our local governments are not
independent from the National Government. They are still
under the control and supervision of the National Government.
Q: Who has the control of Local Governments?
A: It is Congress
Q: Who has the supervision?
A: It is the President
Sec. 26 Equal Access to Opportunities for Public Office/
Prohibition of Political Dynasties
BAR Q: Is Political Dynasty Unconstitutional?
are
A: Until there is a code that punishes political dynasty for
penalties and activities defined as such, there is political
dynasty to speak of as of today.
The thing is you are given equal access and opportunity to
participate in governmental affairs. So just because you have
that right, you can demand.
Like you have the case of Pamatong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
161872 April 13, 2004 who wanted to become the President of
the Republic, however he was declared to be a Nuisance
Candidate. He invoked Sec. 26 saying that I have the right to
equal opportunity and access to public service, why are you
denying me of this right.
SC said that this is not self-executing. There are laws providing
for limitations and qualifications. He was running against
Estrada. Nobody knows him, he does not have the money to
campaign, so Nuisance candidate, you are disqualified.
“The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II
of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing,2 and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to the "equal
access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in
Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline
for legislative or executive action.3  The disregard of the
provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the
courts.”
Sec. 28 Honesty and Integrity in Public Service
This is with regards to the mandate of the government to
maintain honesty and integrity.
You have now the requirements of SALN – Statement of
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth, they are also abusing this.
What happened? Because of this, it took no less than the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court being impeached because of his
failure to state correctly his statement of assets and liabilities.
Why is that that after that, almost all the members of Congress
corrected their SALN. Why did they not give him the chance to
correct it? Because under the law it provides for reservation
that if it is incorrect, you are given a period of time within which
to make the necessary corrections to state the actual assets
and liabilities that you have.
Q: As part of accountability should it be disclosed to the
public?
A: There is already a recent decision of the Supreme Court on
this matter. There is this order of the SC prohibiting the
disclosure of the assets and liabilities. The Justices and
Judges were saying, “Ah we can be kidnapped for ransom
because the public knows our assets and liabilities.” But
recently in 2013, the SC was saying that these are public
records, and should be disclosed to the public as part of public
accountability subject to rules that may be prescribed in the
disclosure. [2013 case involving the SALN of lieutenant
focuses more on AMLC freeze order, this 2012 case is more
appropriate]
RE:  REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF
ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND
PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF
THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY. A.M.
No. 09-8-6-SC June 13, 2012
The Court notes the valid concerns of the other magistrates
regarding the possible illicit motives of some individuals in their
requests for access to such personal information and their
publication.   However, custodians of public documents must
not  concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects
of the persons seeking access to the records.   The moral or
material injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the
requestor’s responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made
subject to the consequences of the law. While public officers in
the custody or control of public records have the discretion to
regulate the manner in which records may be inspected,
examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion
does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access,
inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After
all,  public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
E. Checks and balances
Q: How was this violated?
21
In the exercise of the powers incumbent, we have three
branches - executive, legislative and judicial – the powers are
granted by the constitution. For as long as the express grant of
powers by the constitution, these are considered as full
discretionary power of the each branch and therefore as a rule
they cannot interfere with the two other branches in the
government but the confusion will usually be resolved because
corollary to the separation of powers to balance the power
where there is a checking and sometimes the powers are
shared and that’s what we called principle of blending of the
powers.
On the checking for example, in the making of the laws, we
have the president power to veto although it is within the full
discretionary power of congress to make laws, that power can
still be checked by the president through its veto power
likewise, the same power can be checked ultimately by the SC
in the exercise of judicial review. That’s checking.
In the blending of the power or the sharing of the power, take
for instance the preparation of the budget, the budget primarily
under the constitution is prepared by the executive department
– the president – that is so provided in the constitution but the
constitution also had it shared with congress by requiring the
president to submit the budget to congress for appropriation.
So we have the stages in the preparation of the budget and
finally in the enforcement. The budget will be submitted within
30 days from the opening of the regular session of congress to
congress for appropriation the bill however should originate or
should start or initiated by the House of Representative. Your
appropriation law is passed and then it will be submitted to the
president, the president under his veto power can veto it not
necessarily the whole thing this is the exemption. He can make
itemized veto as to the amount or as to particular project
because it goes to show that the president has the discretion to
identify projects to which the money should be extended. So,
the one who propose is first the congress and the one who
spends the money from the purse it is the president under the
principle of separation of powers or discretionary powers they
cannot be intervened with.
Q: Assuming that the general appropriation act was passed
and approved by the president, what would be the next step?
A: It would be enforced.
Q: Who is going to enforce the budget?
A: Under the constitution, it is the president’s power to
enforce.
Then finally, oversight function of congress to determine if
indeed the funds of which that were appropriated for certain
projects as identified in the general appropriation act had
actually been implemented and they would pass laws or
determine or review whether they were effective or not. That’s
oversight function of congress. That’s the process of budget
preparation.
Q: With respect to PDAF applying these steps, how does the
separation of powers violated?
A: So you have the president submitting the budget, they
appropriate funds. In accordance with the budget that were
submitted by the president, that may include the PDAF allotted
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
for members of congress but it does not say exactly particular
projects for which this PDAF are being allotted for because that
function is the function of the president. It is for him to spend
the money and identify the projects. Now then, under the law of
PDAF it authorized the members of congress to identify the
project for which the funds are appropriated for.
Q: In effect, interfering into what?
A: The execution of the general appropriation act. Thus, a
violation of separation of powers. Also, it violates the
delegation of powers because that power to identify the project
under the constitution or expenditures of the funds is assigned
to the president and instead the president refer it to the
senators to identify what projects are they going to support
their PDAF for.
Basically, that were the reasons that were advanced by the SC
in saying that there was a violation of the separation of powers
and, even more on the provisions of the constitutions were
violated because of PDAF.
We have many old cases where they is always a discussion on
the separation of powers. If there is any case that would reach
to the SC involving the president and congress, it’s always on
the question of usurpation/interference in the exercise of these
powers and thus violative of the separation of powers and
ultimately it is the SC that decides on it, through the exercise of
judicial review.
F. Delegation of powers
In connection of the separation of power is the non-delegation
of powers. The rule is in as much as the constitution assigned
each branch its powers, then it is establish for that branch to
exercise. It cannot just simply delegate it to someone else
simply because they are afraid to exercise their power or they
don’t like to exercise the power.
Q: So, in as much as the delegated power, why delegated?
Who delegated the power?
A: the people through the constitution. The constitution
assigned the powers and the people elect the representatives
to exercise to rule the power to each particular branch. So
what has been delegated, is now the principle, cannot be
delegated to another delegate. That’s the general rule.
Q: But what happened in reality because of the growing
complexities of the needs of the people in the society?
A: There’s more on to the delegation on the power rather than
confining it to a branch on what could be the branch to
exercise. And thus, we have the exception called permissible
delegation of powers.
Q: What would be on the delegation of legislative power?
A: This power is primarily assigned to congress. The
constitution says this power may also be delegated to another
entities or individuals in the government.
So let’s have the exceptions.
The exceptions are:
1. delegation to the president (sec 23 and 28 of art. 6);
22
2. delegation of the power to the administrative bodies
under the executive department under the principle of
subordinate legislation;
3. delegation of powers to local government units under
RA7160;
4. delegation of the power to the people under art. 6 sec
32 & RA 6735.
With regard to sec. 23 this is the emergency power that may
be delegated to the president.
Q: So if you’re ask in the MCQ, where does this power
originate?
A: It originates from the congress then delegated to a law in
order for the president to exercise the power.
So, in as much as this is a delegated power, it is a limited
power. No less than the constitution sec 23 enumerates the
limitations on the exercise of the power. 1) There should be a
law or statute authorizing the delegation in cases of a war or a
national emergency.
TN: because this has become controversial when president
arroyo issued Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency. If you are to compare this to a declaration the
existence of the state of war, under the constitution it is clear
that it is for congress to do so because the purpose of which is
to determine whether the emergency power should be
delegated to the president in case of war, under sec. 23.
Q: So the question on the issue whether or not can declare a
state of national emergency? Should it be congress to do that,
as a prelude to or a condition to a delegation of emergency
power? It is not then a usurpation of legislative function to
declare a state of national emergency, so that congress will
have a reason to delegate the exercise of emergency power to
the president? What was the decision of the SC on this matter?
A: The SC in the case of David et al vs. Drilon and Exec.
Secretary GR 171396 May 3, 2006, SC was saying that there
was no violation at all of the separation of power neither the
non-delegation of powers in this case because the president
being the chief executive is in the best position to know the
state of peace and order in the country as the PNP is directly
under the supervision of the president. As to whether there is
any threat to national security the president is in better position
compared to congress, as the national defense and the AFP
are directly under her control and supervision. In other words,
the president, as the commander in chief of the armed forces,
all that she did was to call upon the armed forces to assist her
in the performance of her function which is so provided under
the constitution. Therefore, there cannot be a violation of
separation of powers. But in the declaration of the existence of
the state of war, it is not for the president to do so because the
constitution expressly provides that it is the congress by 2/3
votes. (BAR)
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers.
This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.
Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not
be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise
its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.
xxx
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can
declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional
circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses
affected with public interest that should be taken over. In
short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all
the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
Q: (BAR) what if there is no declaration of the existence of the
state of war? Can she not declare war then being the
commander in chief?
A: She was never precluded from declaring war even if there is
no declaration of a state of war or she can exercise the
emergency power such as disbursing funds in the prosecution
of the war because there cannot be a delegation without the
congress declaring the existence of the state of war. So you
make a comparison, in the case of a declaration of national
emergency or state of rebellion.
While it is true that the president can declare a state of national
emergency without a law being passed authorizing her to do
so, she cannot however, exercise emergency power in relation
to it because sec. 20 is clear that there has to be a statutory
law giving the exercise of the power to the president; this is
part of the reason why partly the Proclamation 1017 was
declared unconstitutional.
Unlike in a declaration of state of war, the president can still
declare war even without a declaration of the existence of a
state of war provided that she does not exercise emergency
powers. It is only temporary, the purpose of which is only to
carry out the proper and necessary defense policy of congress.
A declaration of state of war is not the same with a declaration
of a state of national emergency. A declaration of a state of
national emergency can be a prelude to a declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
It is still within the power of the president to declare being, not
only as the president, but also as the commander in chief of
the armed forces. In the matter of declaration of state of war,
the constitution has expressly provided that only congress can
make such a declaration. While the president as the
commander in chief may declare war without a declaration of
the existence of a state of war, he cannot exercise emergency
powers nonetheless.
23
The exercise of emergency power is only temporary, meaning
as long as the war exists, he will continue to exercise the
power provided that it will not last until the next adjournment of
congress; automatically the exercise of the power will be
withdrawn.
TN in an MCQ: There is no need of a statute or a law to
withdraw the power from the president by congress, by a mere
resolution it can be withdrawn (a resolution does not require
the signature of the president) so that the president will not
have a chance to veto the withdrawal of emergency powers
from him.
Aside from sec. 23 you have sec. 28 on tariff powers of the
president wherein the president also has the power to tax
such as: tariff rates, import/export quota, wharfage dues, and
other tax impost and assessment.
TN: this has to be expressly delegated to the president, the
standard should be within the framework of the national
development of the economy of the country.
Also, TN: the case of Abakada Guro Party List v Purisima
GR No.166715 August 14, 2008 recall the increase of VAT
from 10% to 12% where there was an accusation that the
president usurped legislative function by declaring an increase
of the VAT, but it was clarified by the SC that while the
president has the power to tax, that does not include domestic
taxation because such power is vested in congress. In this
case, there was no usurpation of legislative function because
all that the president did here was to ascertain the facts
whether the requirements for an increase of the VAT as
provided in the law were present because these offices that
provide for the information are under her, and when she
learned that all requirements under the law have been
complied with, she had no choice but to implement the
increase. She just ascertained the facts, and when found to be
existing, she just implemented the law, she did not make the
law—that function is exclusive to congress in so far as
taxation is concerned.
Then you have the exercise of the legislative power by the
administrative bodies. So you have the departments, agencies
and bureaus of the government authorized to promulgate rules
and regulations in order to implement existing laws. First of all
it presupposes the existence of a law passed by congress,
and as much as the law cannot cover everything, as they’re
not experts in all fields. You have the experts coming from the
different administrative bodies providing for details,
parameters or boundaries within which you implement the law
for effective implementation for the promotion of the general
welfare by way of promulgating rules and regulations.
Q: Why is this considered as a delegation of legislative
power?
A: Because these rules and regulations have the force and
effect of laws, which means that if you violate the rule, it is
tantamount to violating the law itself, which is only being
enforced by the rules and regulations. That’s why we call it
implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
It is what we consider as subordinate legislation, providing for
details in the contingent provisions that will at least anticipate
how the law might be enforced effectively, not just at the
present time, but also the future needs of the people in
relation to the law. However, there are certain requirements
you have to follow, certain standards, like it has to be
complete: you have to pass the completeness test and
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
sufficiency of standard. In other words, there is nothing that is
left to the administrative body with what the law is, all they do
is to simply apply the law by promulgating rules and
regulations. It is more of rule execution rather than law
making, rule executing or rule making to implement the law.
TN in relation to the completeness test: read the case of
Defensor-Santiago v Ramos (id) the resolution of the
Comelec implementing RA 6735 on the initiative on the
amendments to the constitution, was declared unconstitutional
because in the first place, RA 6735 did not provide for
procedure on how to propose amendments to the Constitution
through charter change by the people directly, there is nothing
in the law. So how can the Comelec then promulgate rules
that are absent of any authority by any law because the law is
insufficient or not complete.
Then you also have to pass the sufficiency of standard: there
has to be a sufficient standard on the promulgation of the rules
and regulation.
TN: The most recent decision regarding that is the case of
Gerochi v Department of Energy GR No. 159796 July 17,
2007, relating to the EPIRA law that imposes universal charge
on electricity distribution. There was an accusation against the
department of energy (DoE) that it was usurping legislative
function because in effect it imposes taxes on the distribution
of electricity. The Supreme Court held that this was not
taxation power that was exercised by DoE because it has no
power to do so, that power is vested in congress. What they
did was to promote the general welfare. “Promotion of general
welfare” that was the sufficient standard, universal or national
electrification, distribution of electricity all over the country for
the promotion of the general welfare. When the DoE imposed
an amount in the general fund for universal charge for the
purpose of adding funds to be used in the distribution of
electricity all throughout the country.
“As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as
sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and
order;"[51] "adequate and efficient instruction;"[52] "public
interest;"[53] "justice and equity;"[54] "public convenience and
welfare;"[55] "simplicity, economy and efficiency;"[56]
"standardization and regulation of medical education;"[57] and
"fair and equitable employment practices."[58] Provisions of
the EPIRA such as, among others, “to ensure the total
electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security
and affordability of the supply of electric power”[59] and
“watershed rehabilitation and management”[60] meet the
requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the
limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These
are sufficient standards.”
Finally, we have this requirement on, the rules and regulation
promulgated should be with the imprimatur of the head of the
department it is not just by the chief of the bureau. Case in
point, you have People v. Echegaray GR No.117472
February 7, 1997 on the manual relating to the implementation
and execution of the lethal injection. There was a law which
imposes death penalty using the lethal injection.
Q: Who is in the best position to promulgate the rules on how
to do it?
A: The experts from the Bureau of Corrections and Jail
Management. However in this case, the promulgated rules
were only signed by the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
24
it was never approved by the Secretary of the Department of
Justice. SC emphasized that while a bureau may promulgate
rules and regulations as an administrative body, it should be
however, with the imprimatur of the superior of the department
under which the bureau belongs.
Then we have the delegation of the power to the LGUs. This is
important!
Q: Among the government units, what are the political
subdivisions?
A: autonomous regions—ARMM (which will soon be replaced
by the Bangsamoro Political Entity (BPE) as soon as the
framework agreement is passed into law), provinces, cities,
municipalities, barangays.
Our system of government is unitary, although we are trying to
establish local autonomy.
Q: What is the extent of local autonomy?
A: There is no decentralization of powers rather only
decentralization of administration. There cannot be a state
within a state. If you consider the Bangsamoro as a sub-state
or a juridical entity, then it will be contrary to the provision of
the constitution relating to the system of government that we
have under the 1987 Constitution. It can only be considered
as an autonomous political subdivision.
Q: With respect to the delegation of legislative powers, can it
(BPE) form its own laws?
A: Yes it can, the same with other political subdivisions.
However, BPE may be special to a certain extent because
they’re given more independence as compared to other
political subdivisions. These are embodied in the framework
agreement. Anyway, the general concept here is that they will
have their own laws that will be in conformity to the culture of
the people of the different provinces composing the
Bangsamoro.
TN in so far as the province and the others: can they pass
laws?
Yes.
Q: This is delegated by what law?
A: RA 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code
under the general welfare clause.
TN: the delegation of the power involves passing laws that are
not contrary to the constitution. Likewise, it should not be in
violation of any existing laws passed by congress because
LGUs cannot rise above the source of their authority.
Therefore, they cannot pass a law in the guise of promoting the
general welfare while prohibiting an activity that is allowed
under existing laws. They may only regulate the activity, but
never prohibit it. Similarly, they cannot in the guise of
promoting the general welfare, allow an activity that is
prohibited under existing laws. Neither can they pass laws that
will amend the national laws. TN: Cruz v Paras G.R. No. L-
42571-72 July 25, 1983
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
One of the issues raised with PDAF is that it is a violation of
local autonomy because the people did not have the chance to
determine what projects they need because it is determined by
the congress (which supposedly is none of their business as
far as LGUs are concerned).
Suffice to say with respect to delegation of powers, the LGUs
have the power however limited.
Then there is the exercise of the legislative power by the
people.
Q: Why the need for a delegation when sovereignty resides in
them?
A: Because we need a particular mechanism or procedure on
how the people can do that. Sec. 32 of Art VI mandates that
Congress should pass a law that would provide for the
procedure, and thus RA 6735 was passed. Under this law, the
people can propose amendments to the constitution.
TN: Amendments only!
The people can also propose statutes through the process of
initiative and referendum. Likewise, the local people can
propose local legislative acts or resolutions, or ordinances
through the process of initiative and referendum.
TN the difference between initiative and referendum: In
initiative, people directly propose, go through the process.
Whereas in referendum, it will be for the legislative body, may
it be national or local, to propose; and the people to approve or
reject them in a referendum.
That principle was raised as an issue in the PDAF controversy:
that there may be a violation of the delegation of the power to
congress in so far as identifying the projects to which to spend
the public funds for because the manner of spending as
regards to how much is to be expended, it is the president’s
power for as long as it is included in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Apparently, in the GAA what is only
mentioned are those funds for projects for country
development, but as to the identification of specific projects,
they are not stated in the GAA. That supposedly, it is within the
power of the president to identify and implement, and not for
congress. By giving that power to congress in effect, there is a
violation of the non-delegation of powers. In this particular
case, executive power.
According to SC in the case of Philconsa v Enriquez, what
has been done by the congress is only to recommend (but in
reality they are actually the ones who determine the projects).
So this was questioned again in 2012 in the Lamp case (Lamp
v Secretary of Budget and Management), but the SC said,
case dismissed, there is no evidence to show that the power is
violated. Until finally the Belgica case (Belgica v Ochoa)
wherein the SC said that indeed there was a violation because
in reality it is the congressmen who determine the projects and
determine the beneficiaries (in fact they use to get 20% until
finally it becomes 100% because the beneficiary does not exist
at all).
When you take the bar this will still be a hot issue, so compare
the cases I mentioned: Guingona v. Carague G.R. No. 94571
25
April 22, 1991 , Philconsa, LAMP, Belgica so you would have
a better understanding of the issues. Not only was there a
discussion on the separation and non- delegation of powers,
there was also a discussion on judicial review, i.e., the
elements of judicial review on the procedural aspect (especially
in the Belgica case regarding the concept of transcendental
importance)]
Those are the important principles you should remember for
bar examination purposes with respect to republicanism.
G. Forms of government
Let us now go to the purpose of a government. One of the
elements of a state is the existence of a government.
There are important forms of government which are important
for purposes of the Bar examination.
According to the number of rulers
a) Monarchy
b) Aristocracy
c) Democracy –
The most important form is democracy because we
have Section 1 of Article of the 1987 Constitution
which states that, “the Philippines is a Democratic and
Republican State”.
According to how the powers are distributed:
a) Presidential System – the powers are separated
from each other because the three branches of
the government are coequal and independent
from each other, although they coordinate with
each other.
b) Parliamentary System – is that form of
government where there is fusion of powers of
the executive and legislative.
The thing that you should TN is, between the two, the
most adversarial form of government is the
Presidential System because of the principle of
checks and balances. Here, the three branches of the
government do not trust each other. Hence, there is
the checking of each others’ powers to make sure that
they are balanced in order to maintain the equality
among the three branches.
Another feature that you must also remember is that
in the presidential system of government, there is the
enjoyment of fixed term of office of the President. The
term of office of the president is six (6) years without
re-election. Whether or not the term should be fully
served in order to be disqualified for another re-
election, is an issue that has to be resolved by the
Supreme Court. You should remember the case of
Pormento vs. Estrada et. Al, G.R. No. 191988
August 31, 2010 where there was a question of the
qualifications of Estrada when he ran for the second
time for the presidency. The argument there of
Estrada’s Lawyer was that the term of office is six
years but the Constitution is silent on the issue on
whether resignation may be considered as an
interruption.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law) 26
Q: In the Constitution, resignation or voluntary the members of the Interim
renunciation is not considered an interruption of the Batasang Pambansa (IBP),
term of office for purposes of determining the and. As to the Prime Minister
consecutiveness or successiveness of the term. In the he stayed in power for as long
case of the President, there is no successiveness of as he held the trust and
term to speak of because the term is only one. But the confidence ultimately of the
trouble is, Estrada was not able to finish the full term President not of the IBP
because allegedly he resigned. Should that then be
considered as a disqualification? As to whether a government is De jure or De facto

A: That is an issue that has to be resolved by the The distinction between de jure and de facto is only
Supreme Court because instead of deciding the case relevant when there are two governments at the same
on the merit, the SC dismissed the case because time. If there is only one government there is no need
Estrada was never elected; the issue has become to make a distinction.
moot and academic. The SC held that there was no a) De jure –
actual case or controversy. The fact remains that the
term of office of the President is six (6) years without A De jure government is the legitimate
re-election. government. It usually has the general support
and consent of the people. How this is
TN also of the main differences of a Parliamentary System and manifested is by the ratification of a Constitution
a Presidential System of Government. The two features that and elections of government officials.
dominate the differences between Parliamentary and
Presidential Systems are the following:
b) De Facto –
Parliamentary Presidential
There is fusion of the There is fusion of the A De Facto Government is one that is
Executive and Legislative Executive and Legislative established against the will of the people.
Departments where there is Departments where there is Usually, it does not have the general support of
the supremacy of the the supremacy of the the people.
Legislature; the Legislature Legislature
is the parliament and there is As regards to a de facto government, take note
always the supremacy of the that there are three kinds. Read the case of Co
parliament in the government; Kim Cham vs Tan Keh G.R. No. L-5  September
the Members of the Cabinet 17, 1945
come from the parliament
thus the fusion of powers 1. ”The first, or government  de facto  in a proper legal
between the Executive and sense, is that government that gets possession and
the Legislative departments control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the
so there is no confusion as to majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains
who is more superior to the itself against the will of the latter, such as the government
other because it is understood of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament
that there is the supremacy of and later by Cromwell as Protector.”
the parliament.
The Prime Minster has no The president enjoyed a When the control of the government is usurped by the
fixed term of office. He is fixed term of office of 6 voice of the majority, and this government maintains itself
chosen by the members of years against that rightful authority which is the legitimate
the parliament. He stays in government. So you have an incumbent government and
power for as long as he holds then you have another force that overthrows the
the trust and confidence of incumbent government. So there are two governments at
the members of the the same time.
parliament. Where there is
major conflict of issues That was precisely the question on that government of
between the two departments, Cory Aquino – the Revolutionary Government. The
either the President or the Marcos government was what the Cory Aquino
Prime Minister will dissolve government was maintaining against so that considered
the Parliament, OR the the Aquino government as de facto.
Parliament will remove the
Prime Minister through a vote If the basis was the 1973 Constitution, then the Marcos
of no confidence. government was the De Jure Government. If the Marcos
government was successful the Aquino government had
In a modified parliamentary As to his re-election, the possession and control then. The thing is that, there was
system where Mr. Marcos Constitution was silent – already no more Marcos government. What was left was
was the president, and you which means that he could only the Aquino government.
had a prime minister who was run as many re-elections for
nominated by Mr. Marcos, as long as he lives
elected Consuelo de bobo by
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
While we were saying that there cannot be a distinction if
there is only one government left, can we consider the
Aquino government as de facto?
The Supreme Court explained that, it may have been
initially considered as de facto because it was not based
on the 1935 or 1973 Constitution. There was no
Constitution. It was established by direct action of the
people through a revolution. In fact, the Freedom
Constitution was only formulated some time on March 14,
1986 and was established on February 28, 1987. Between
those periods, you can consider the Aquino government
as de facto. It eventually became a De Jure government
when the 1987 Constitution was already promulgated as
basis of the Aquino government and later recognized by
the Family of Nations; and eventually there was a
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the election of
government officials. It was only then that it became clear
that it was established by the consent of the people who
ratified the Constitution and elected the government
officials.
2. “The third is that established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state of such as the
government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not
concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only
with the second and third kinds of de facto governments.”
Another kind of de facto government is a government
established by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the mother country.
Example –
The government of Aguinaldo; June 12 was the
declaration of independence not from the Americans but
from the Spaniards in Kawit, Cavite that led to the
establishment of the first Philippine Republic otherwise
known as the Malolos Republic. It was never recognized
by the Family of Nations because it only lasted for a
month. When it was introduced it died in its natural death.
There was no government to speak of at least as a de
facto government against the de jure government of the
Spaniards.
3. “The second is that which is established and
maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is
denominated a government of paramount force”
Another kind of de facto government is that which is
established by the foreign military troops in a defeated
territory. This is called as Government of Paramount
Force or Belligerent Occupancy. This was the kind of de
facto government that we had during the Japanese
Occupation under the leadership of the Red, the de jure
government being the Common Wealth Government
which was established by Filipinos under the Second
Philippine Republic under the leadership of Laurel can only
be described as a de facto government.
Consequences of the Change in Government
27
Q: TN What are the consequences or effects of having this
kind of government while the Commonwealth was still
considered as the de jure government?
A: Under a de facto government or belligerent occupancy, the
political laws of the de jure government are merely
SUSPENDED. They are not automatically abrogated. The
municipal laws still apply unless they are repealed by the
belligerent occupant.
Q: What were the effects of liberation on the de jure
government? What were the effects when the Japanese left
the country? The Doctrine of Postliminum…
A: Political laws passed by the belligerent occupant or de facto
government were automatically considered as repealed or
nullified or abrogated.
Non- political laws that were passed by the belligerent
occupant are still considered as good and valid.
Decisions or policies of the government which are tainted
with political complexion are automatically abrogated.
Indac vs Director of Prisons G.R. No. L-1133            
November 29, 1946,
[Judge was actually talking about Justice Perfecto’s dissent in
this case by saying that the judgment of conviction was void
because it was tainted with political complexion, but the
majority in this case decided to deny the release of Indac in his
petition for habeas corpus]
J. Perefecto’s dissent:
“Santiago Indac was sentenced for theft to an aggregate
maximum penalty of 24 years, 11 months and 11 days, which
he began serving on March 28, 1944, in criminal cases Nos.
2332 and 2333 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
His wife now seeks his release by  habeas corpus.
There is no question that the decisions in the two cases were
rendered by a court under the Japanese regime in 1944 which,
according to our opinion in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
(L-5, 41 Off. Gaz., 779), formed part of the processes declared
null and void in one of the proclamations of General Douglas
MacArthur.
There is also no question that the scrap iron, electrical
supplies, cables, and fixtures stolen by the prisoner from the
Japanese imperial army formed part of its vital supplies; and
petitioner contends that the stealing of the them was a form of
sabotage, directed against the enemy, for the purpose of
weakening him.
No copy of the decisions could be presented to us, and there
is no way of ascertaining the circumstances under which the
prisoner committed the thefts. Considering the fact that the
Japanese army's ownership of the stolen goods is, at least,
doubtful, upon facts of general knowledge and of which the
members of this court had ample opportunity to learn — the
Japanese not having brought, during their invasion and
occupation, any scrap iron, but collected it from all parts of the
country by illegal means, to be sent to Japan to bolster up their
dwindling materials of war — and the electrical supplies,
cables, and fixtures which were stolen by the prisoner were
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
most probably commandeered from our people; xxx Under
such circumstances, although we understand the fact that the
prisoner has been convicted and sentenced to the heavy
penalty of from 11 years to 24 years of imprisonment — an
unprecedented cruelty as penalty for simple theft — the
prisoner explaining that the Japanese military authorities had
instructed all courts to impose heavy penalty on crimes having
the nature of political offenses, we are of opinion that, after
liberation, the prisoner is entitled to be immediately released
as, from the point of view of our people he did not commit any
punishable act.”
Penal laws are not political laws. It has nothing to do with the
relationship of the government and the governed. The
judgment is supposed to be valid. But what complicated the
situation was, apparently the conviction was tainted with
political reasons because one was charged with robbery. The
reason of the robbery was to undermine the operation of the
Japanese military authorities. He was stealing cables of the
Japanese in order to undermine their operation. The judgment
was tainted with political complexion, in which case it should
be abrogated. The Judgment was invalidated. Otherwise, in
the absence of any political complexion, penal laws are non-
political and they should be respected as good and valid
notwithstanding the liberation of the people from the de facto
government.
(Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738, March
02, 2001)
Q: Was the Arroyo government a de jure government?
A: It was resolved by the Supreme Court that the Arroyo
government was a de jure government as it was done or it
happened by way of succession when Pres. Estrada was
considered resigned.
Q: What is the Difference between Federal and Unitary System
of Government? (BAR)
A: In Unitary government the powers are concentrated in the
national government; the local government is dependent upon
the national government.
In Federal, the executive, legislative, and judicial powers
are distributed equally between national and local wherein the
local government is considered supreme within their own
sphere, independent of the National government.
A good example is the government of U.S. The federal
government as national government and the different states
with their respective local governments considered as the local
counterparts. These different states are independent from the
federal government. They can make their own laws for as long
as it is not contrary to the US constitution. Different states have
different laws. The common denominator is the laws should not
be contrary to the US Constitution. (TN) Laws against the
federal government or federal laws are alright, but not against
the Constitution.
We are trying to establish a federal system by having this
concept of Bangsamoro political entity. How we talk about it
without violating the constitution, we will wait and see if there
28
are any objections to that. Basically you are practically
establishing a substate that is prohibited by the constitution.
Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP GR No. 183591 October
14, 2008 enumerates the objections in the constitutionality of
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. More or less this Bangsamoro
(political entity) is patterned from the Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity. The difference is in the Bangsmoro Juridical Entity,
there is no ratification from the people who might be affected
by it. Unlike in the Bangsamoro Political Entity there is a
framework agreement signed by the president to be submitted
to Congress. Congress would then pass a law adapting it.
Before adapting it, they will discuss it and they will always
consider if the contents is within the framework of the
provisions of the constitution. Assuming that it will be passed
into law, according to the framers of this agreement, it is more
democratic because it will still be submitted to the people for
ratification. According also to that framework, there will be an
election of government officials, they will not be appointed.
There will be election of members of legislature who will elect
the head of the Bangsamoro Entity. It’s like a parliamentary
system of government. They will be independent in the making
of their own laws. Laws would be different from the national
government.
To make it more acceptable, they are saying that the name is
just changed but it will be the same as an autonomous region,
just a mere replacement to ARMM. It is however different to
ARMM as regard to the concept and operation.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things,
that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating
it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an "associative"
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous
region recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status
of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is
a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention,154 namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to
enter into relations with other states.
Q: What is the difference between Martial Law, Military
Government and Revolutionary Government?
A: When a government is under Martial Law, it is still civilian.
The head of State will only be assisted by the Armed Forces. It
doesn’t make it a military government. There will be more or
some regulations on civil rights but there is still the bill of rights.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Military government - the president is the head of a military
group rather than one who is ordinarily the president of a
civilian government. Executive and legislative powers are
removed from a civilian authority and transferred to the head of
the military government. The government is more controlled by
the military. It is usually established after a war between two
countries or states, not just a coup d’état within. It technically
involves two countries fighting against each other, thereafter
the military government is established in the invaded/defeated
territory. An example would be the kind of government we had
at the beginning of the American Occupation. The government
then was under the President of the U.S. Pres McKinley, the
commander in chief until there was a transfer of power to the
civilian this time by the US Congress, when the land laws were
enacted. In layman’s understanding, a government ran by the
military.
Revolutionary government - a government that is not based
on any constitution. The establishment of the government is
based on the direct action of the people who directly seize the
power from the incumbent government and establish a
government of its own.
In these kinds of government (military, martial law,
revolutionary) the leader is very powerful because both
executive and legislative powers are exercised by the leader of
the group, usually a member of the military. Even judicial
function may be exercised by the leader of the group.
During martial law, President Marcos exercised both legislative
and executive power, even judicial powers. Cases against
civilians who were charged of violations against national
security were not tried before the civilian courts. They were
tried before court martials, whose decisions are appealable to
the commander in chief of the armed forces.
In the Constitution of 1973 and 1987, notwithstanding the
definition of martial law, there is always at all times the
supremacy of the civilian authority. The 1987 Constitution
provides safeguards to make sure that we will not have the
same experiences we had under the Marcos administration
during Martial Law.
The government of Cory was a Revolutionary Government. All
executive and legislative powers were exercised by Cory
Aquino. Why? Because the 1973 Constitution that justified the
existence of the Batasang Pambansa was not recognized by
the government of Cory. In other words, there was no
legislature. In its absence it was for Cory Aquino to exercise
legislative powers that allowed her to promulgate her own
Constitution by issuing Proclamation No. 3 – The Freedom
Constitution. Until there was the enactment of Proclamation
No. 9 creating the constitutional commission to draft the 1987
Constitution, which created a legislature. The first thing that
had happened was in 1987 when we had election for the
members of Congress that became the legislature. Finally the
concept of Revolutionary government was diminished by
having the complete branches of government under the 1987
Constitution.
III. Legislative Department
29
A. Who may exercise legislative power
Q: What is Legislative Power?
A: It is the power to propose, enact, amend or repeal laws.
Different Kinds of Legislative Power:
1. Orginal v. Derivative
Original power is the power vested directly in the people, who
is the source of Sovereignty. What is exercised by the
legislature is merely a Derivative power.
2. Constituent v. Ordinary
Constituent function is the power of Congress propose
amendments to the Constitution acting as a constituent
assembly, it is not a law-making power. On the other hand,
Ordinary function is the power of Congress to make laws and
changes in the law.
Other Functions of Congress that are not law-making power
1. Electoral Function
There are also other non-legislative functions vested in
Congress like electoral function, whereby Congress canvasses
electoral returns for the Vice President and Presidential
positions. Ordinarily this function is given to the COMELEC
however, by the express provision of the Constitution, it is
vested in Congress.
2. Concurrence of Appointments made by the President
It is for Congress to concur appointments made by the
Presidents to certain positions in the Government such as,
heads of the executive branch, officers of the AFP,
Constitutional Commission appointees (COA, COMELEC, and
CSC), and regular members of the JBC.
3. Concurrence of Treaties made by the President
4. Impeachment - Described somehow as quasi-judicial
function on the part of Congress.
Others
1. Congress
Q: Where is Legislative Power Vested?
A: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum. (Art. VI, Section
1)
2. Regional/Local legislative power
3. People’s initiative on statutes
The Reservation in the People to make Laws
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system
of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body xxx (Art. VI, Section 32)
So, since there is a constitutional mandate to provide a system
of initiative and referendum, Congress has enacted RA 6735.
a) Initiative and referendum
4. The President under a martial law rule or in a revolutionary
government
B. Houses of Congress
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
TN: We have a Bicameral Congress.
Qualifications
Q: Are you qualified?
A: Yes. Definitely. Even if you did not finish law? Yes. Because
all that is required is able to read and write. As long as you
know how to sign your name, you are qualified. One has to be
a natural born. For senator 35 yrs, house of Representatives at
least 25.
TN: on the day of election, not on the assumption of office. Not
even at the time you filed your certificate of candidacy. You
may qualify on the day of election. Now you must also be a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines if you are running
for the Senate 2 years and 1 year for the house of
representatives except for the party list sectoral
representation, the residency Is not required.
Special Elections
TN: on special elections. In case a vacancy occurs in either
house before expiration of the term of office, should there a
special election, is it mandatory?
A:The answer is no. Special election is discretionary. And if
special election must be called by congress or the house
concerned, vacancy must be occurring not less than 18
months. Meaning if vacancy occurs within 18 months, there is
no more election. You just have to wait for the regular election.
If vacancy occurs in the house of Representatives within one
year, again you just have to wait for the regular election. No
more special election.TN
1. Senate
Q: How are the members of Senate chosen?
A: Under Art. VI, sec. 2, Senators shall be elected at large.
Q: Is there a possibility that Senators may be chosen
differently as we use to elect them?
A: Yes, they can be chosen in a different manner determined
by law, as clearly gleaned from the phrase “as may be
provided by law” (Art. VI, sec. 2). This is illustrated by the
prevailing Philippine method of choosing twelve (12) senators
every three years.
A different manner choosing may involve as much as changing
the election of senators from national votes into votes per
region instead. This can be done by passing a law.
For Senators:
The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who
shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, as may be provided by law. (Art. VI, Section 2)
TN: The composition of Senators cannot be altered by an
ordinary law (except if the constitution would be amended for
that matter) as it is fixed by the Constitution, while that of the
House of Representatives can be increased as expressly
provided by the phrase “unless otherwise fixed by law”.
2. House of Representatives
For the House of Representatives:
30
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law. (Art. VI, Section 5)
a) District representatives and questions of apportionment
Composition of the Lower House
Insofar as the lower house is concerned, it is composed of both
representatives from the districts and party-list representatives.
There is some issue with regard to district representatives as it
would relate to the apportionment of districts and its voters.
In making legislative districts it is required that territories
contiguous, compact and adjacent, as far as practicable, to
another to prevent gerrymandering. Gerrymandering means
lumping of voters, who may be from separate areas or districts,
into one district or place in order to get a favorable
concentration of votes to a particular party.
On another point, TN of the number of registered voters per
district to be considered as such because the Constitution is
silent on this matter. TN of jurisprudential principles pertaining
to this issue. The Contstitution is silent on the minimum
number of voters to be declared as a legislative district
because one province is entitled to one district regardless of
the population. In other words, so long as it is a province, it is
entitled to at least one legislative district representative.
For a City, the rule is different.
Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 07, 2010
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a
province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
Aldaba, et. al. vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 188078, 15 March
2010.||| 
This has reference to the creation of City of Malolos as a highly
urbanized City in order to be considered a legislative district
It was not established that City of Malolos has actual or
projected population of not less than 250,000 population before
May 2010 elections.
SC: Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the
City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected,
prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following
election after the supposed attainment of such population.
Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative
district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution.
Q: Who can apportion a district?
A: It is the Congress.
Montejo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
This was in relation to the creation of Biliran as a province
separate from Leyte. It was the COMELEC that apportioned
these municipalities but was declared by the Supreme Court as
unconstitutional.
The SC emphasized that insofar as the apportionment of
legislative districts, such is a legislative function. Not at all a
function of the COMELEC.
Q: What about the Regional assembly of ARMM, can they
create cities, provinces or legislative districts?
A: No.
SEMA vs. COMELEC GR No. 134163 December 13, 2000
SC said that Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts.
The power to increase the allowable membership in the House
of Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is still
vested EXCLUSIVELY to Congress.
Q: How often can apportionment of legislative districts be
done?
A: It can be done every after three (3) years from the survey.
b) Party-list system
Party-list System
Q: What is the percentage in the composition in the House of
Representatives?
A: Not more than 20% of the House of Representatives.
Depending on the number of members coming from the
different districts you will have as many as 20% of them
coming from the party list system.
TN: The following cases in determining qualification in order to
get a seat from the party list:
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC||| G.R. No. 136781,
October 6, 2000|||  cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of
Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v. COMELEC|||  G.R. No. 179271, April 21,
2009|||  present.
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives, the
Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to
party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
xxx
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the
manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives.
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,[22]
the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
31
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for
the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis,
rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to
the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization,
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the
party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides
that “those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes.” This is where petitioners’ and intervenors’
problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets
the clause “in proportion to their total number of votes” to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is
contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats,
the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.
This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party
list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two
percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose
there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats.
Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this
situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes
parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in
relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two
percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.”[30]
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed
seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according
to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall
no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats”
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System
less the guaranteed seats.
Recently: The case on Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec GR No.
203766 (April 02, 2013)
Q: Veteran’s Case: it was emphasized there that to qualify for
a seat, the party list must garner how many votes?
A: 2% of the total votes cast for the party list.
Our perception was, that even with additional seats, you must
also get at least 2%, that was the perception. But the Supreme
Court said in the BANAT case that it will defeat the purpose of
filling up the 20% allocation. Thus it was clarified under the
BANAT case that while 2% is required for a guaranteed seat,
you may get less than 2% for as long as in the ranking in the
determination of the 20% allocation, you would still be
included. Even if you get just 1% of the total votes cast for the
party list. Just as long as you first fill up the seats from the
party list members who garnered the 2%. Additional seats will
be proportionate to the seats available for the party list. But
shall in no case shall 1 party list organization get more than 3
seats, that is the threshold.
Important numbers that you should therefore remember
for the Bar exam:
Total membership coming from party list – 20%
To get a guaranteed seat – 2% (of the total votes cast)
Maximum seats that one party list can get – Only 3 seats
Q: Do you need to represent a sector if you are coming from a
party list in order to be accredited as such?
A: Clarified in the Atong Paglaum Case. The SC has reminded
organizations participating in the party list, there are 3 kinds:
(1) National Parties or Organizations,
(2) Regional Parties or Organizations,
(3) Sectoral Parties or Organizations.
Insofar as the National and Regional Parties or
Organizations, they do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
under-represented sector. So they need not represent certain
sectors like labor, fisherfolks, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities. For as long as they are organizations, national or
regional, they can be accredited to join the party list system
without needing to represent any sector of the marginalized or
under-represented.
But focused on the requirement of representation coming from
the marginalized or under-represented groups are the Sectoral
parties or organizations.
They MUST represent these sectors (this is mandatory),
sectors like labor, peasants, fisherfolks, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicaps, veterans and overseas
workers.
The Sectoral parties or organization must may either be (1)
marginalized or
32
(2) under-represented OR (this is now what is clarified by the
SC)
(3) “lacking in well-defined political constituency”
Q: What does “lacking in well-defined political constituency”
mean?
A: In the case of peasants, klaro man na imong members kay
farmers. In the case of labor, klaro pud na workers. But there
are too many kinds of professions, so there arises these
professions lacking in well-defined political constituency, way
klaro kung kinsay ilang miyembro. Or you have for example the
elderly, the womens sector or the youth. All that is required of
them is to have an advocacy pertaining to their special
interests or concerns.
The members of which may not necessarily be a specific
group, for as long as they advocate for the interests of their
sector, they qualify already for accreditation. That is new in this
particular case, it’s a new thing now. It is clearer in other
words, in the determination of who can be accredited in the
party list. The membership coming from the party list has
become broader as compared to before, because our
understanding then of the representation coming from the party
list is that it must represent a marginalized or under-
represented sector of society, that is only so far as Sectoral
Parties or Organizations. But for those lacking in well-defined
political constituency, it is enough that there is advocacy.
Another point that was clarified in Atong Paglaum is on the
participation on major political parties. The SC was rather
unclear on whether they should be allowed to participate in the
party list system, their decisions were flip-flopping. At one time,
the SC said no. But in BANAT they said yes.
Now in the recent decision in Atong Paglaum the SC ruled that
major political parties can participate in the party list system.
However, there is a condition to that: That they must not
participate in the legislative district representation. So,
Supreme Court said then in this particular case that insofar as
political parties, they can participate in party list elections
provided (1) they register under the party list system, and (2)
they do not field candidates for the district elections. A political
party whether major or not that fields legislative candidates in
an election can participate in the party list system only through
its sectoral wing. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
Another point to TN, this is with reference to disqualification of
a nominee representing the party list. That does not disqualify
the party list organization itself so long as there are other
nominees available to replace him. That is precisely the reason
for the requirement of submission of 3 names for the
nominees. In case one is disqualified, there are still others that
may still represent the party list organization. The
disqualification of the nominee does not automatically
disqualify the party list from accreditation.
Summary of Parameters in Atong Paglaum case:
“In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May
2013 and subsequent party-list elections, theCOMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the
party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
2. National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list
elections provided they register under the party-
list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.  TN of RA 7941 as to what may be accredited. The more
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector.
The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-
defined political constituencies" include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-
defined political constituencies" must belong to
the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be  bona-fide  members of
such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified. THESAD
||| (Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April
02, 2013)
TN: On the party list, read the case of Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010,|||
That is sectoral representation, representing the marginalized
and under-represented sector of society. In the Ladlad case
the SC has explained the qualifications to represent a
marginalized group. The SC said in this case that the LGBT
qualifies to be accredited under the marginalized group
because it has qualified with the following qualifications:
(1) there must be possible division or discrimination suffered by
the group, and certainly they are discriminated.
33
(2) a distinguished characteristic, attribute or experience that
defines them as a discreet group. Definitely there is a
distinguishing characteristic.
(3) there is present political or economic powerlessness.
According to the SC, ang Ladlad has shown that the LGBT
sector has been historically disadvantaged or discriminated
against because of negative public perception. And there have
been alleged acts of violence perpetrated against the members
of the LGBT community by reason of their sexual orientation
and gender identity. It added that the massive opposition to the
participation of the LGBT in the party list system is by itself
demonstrative of the lack of political power, so too is the fact
that legislation to prohibit the discriminatory treatment against
them is languishing in the Congress.
important part there is those disqualifications for accreditation.
Q: What are the organizations that cannot be accredited for the
party list system? (BAR)
(1) Religious group that represents the church. If layman lang
but does not represent the church, it is allowed. Ex: Ang
BUHAY, it’s linked to El Shaddai.
(2) Supported by a foreign government or organization
(3) Supported or subsidized by the Government
(4) Groups promoting violence or the purpose of which is to
overthrow the present Government.
TN, in the BANAT case the SC said that major political parties
can participate under the party list provided that they have to
run under the sectoral organization, that was the qualification.
Now, you should not also field a candidate in the legislative
district.
TN, the matter of advertising or disclosing the name of
nominees coming from the party list. Always remember that in
the party list system, you do not elect the nominees unlike in
the legislative election where you elect the candidate
representing the political party, not the political party itself. In
the party list, you elect the organization.
Not the political party itself. In the party list, you elect your
competition. May it be national, regional, or, sectorial. Thus the
prohibition against disclosure on the names of the nominees in
the certified list that must be posted at the polling place.
What you see on the certified list are only the names of the
organizations. Now, at one time in the case of [Judge cited
Bara case, but the doctrine discussed here is not there], they
asked for the names of the nominees of this different
organizations accredited by the Comelec because they
suspected that most of them are relatives of President Arroyo,
if not friends, and Comelec said that is confidential, that cannot
be disclosed. Supreme Court said however, the Comelec
abused its discretion because that is of public record and there
is no prohibition against disclosure for as long as it is not
disclosed in the certified list. You have seen this in the polling
place.
We used to have alphabetical names of organizations. You’ll
notice that most of the organizations start with a letter A. what
was the election 2016? Not anymore alphabetical but random.
The sequence instead of alphabetical, there will be a raffle
instead. They will listed in the certified list but not anymore
alphabetical so they will have equal chance.. Short memory
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
raman ta. Kung unsay unang nalista, they will also be the only
thing that you will write in your ballot. Dili man ni check-check,
you have to write the name of the organization that you are
trying to vote. Hasol kaau so. Ang makita ninyo sa folder na
nag-una, usually will get your vote. Now it is being written in a
certified list, randomly.
C. Legislative privileges, inhibitions and disqualifications
Term of Office
President and Senate is 6 years. In the house of
Representatives, 3 years. But not more than 3 successive
terms. Common denominator that YOU SHOULD REMEMBER
IN THE BAR, that voluntary renunciation or resignation shall
not in any way interrupt in the continuity of the service. It will be
considered as one full term. In the computation of the
successiveness of term.
This is what is lacking in the case of the President because
there is no restriction in so far as the President completing his
term of six years. Is he still qualified to run for President. Mao
ni gipanindigan ni Erap Estrada. He was just saying yesterday
that he is going to run as President again if Binay will be
anointed by President Aquino as Presidential candidate. That
will be his third running for election as President. The second
time, he almost won the election. However the case of
Pormento vs Estrada et al (id) was dismissed by the supreme
court for the issue has been found to be moot and academic as
he was not elected. That issue has never been settled. And as
long as the issue is not settled he would run again in election.
Because the provision regarding the resignation as not an
interruption in the continuity applies to only to the members of
the Senate and even for local elective officials. They have not
anticipated that of the term of office of the President. That is
still debatable.
Salary of members of congress is only 204k per annum, for
officers such as the President of the Senate or the Speaker of
the House, that is only 240k per annum. How do they became
billionaires? Some. I think not everyone because some of them
are already billionaires when they entered the congress.
Q:Can their salary be increased?
A: Yes. So long as they do not enjoy it. It will be enjoyed by the
members of the next term. Which means, for example, dba ang
Senate 6 yrs, hor 3 yrs.
Q:You finished already the term as member of the house of
Representatives, can you now enjoy the increase if u run the
next election?
A:Answer is no. Because at the time the salary was increased,
the term of office of the senators has not yet been completed.
It has to be upon the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the house to effect the proposed the increase of
the salary.
Q:Can it be decreased by law?
A:Oh, definitely. There is no prohibition against it.But they are
not stupid to passing law against themselves. So that is
impossible.
34
Now there are some of the perks enjoyed by the members of
the congress. The privileges that they enjoy.
TN this may be relevant especially the impending arrest of the
2 other senators.
Q: Now what are the perks?
A: You have 2 Privileges: Immunity from arrest and
detention and the freedom of speech.
Immunity from arrest and detention
For as long as the penalty is only 6yrs or lower, one cannot be
arrested during tenure. For as long as he is a member of
congress, he cannot be arrested to make sure that he will
attend the session. Even if he is not attending the session and
just sleeping in his mansion, he cannot be arrested if the crime
he is charged with is not punishable by more than 6yrs of
imprisonment. Definitely plunder is punishable by death as
maximum. With the suspension of death penalty, Reclusion
Perpetua, that means more than 6yrs of imprisonment.
Therefore he can be arrested anytime even if you are attending
session in Congress. Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., G.R. No.
179817, June 27, 2008 and Pp. vs Jalosjos G.R. Nos.
132875-76. November 16, 2001
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that
of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep.
Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was  already convicted, albeit his
conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar
to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is
a  mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to
enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of
innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with
crimes involving moral turpitude,  i.e., two counts of statutory
rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is
indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political
offense".
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of
noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the
rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in
the AFP.  CASaEc
In sum, petitioner's  first ground posits that there is a world of
difference between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the
type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and
other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability
of  Jalosjos.
A plain reading of  Jalosjos  suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the
pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. 
 
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is
taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice.
No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by  reclusion
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
perpetua  when evidence of guilt is strong ,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ ofhabeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.   (Underscoring
supplied) ASTDCH
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by  reclusion perpetua  or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt
is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. 
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and  coup
d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua,   is
beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the
stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no
distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude
involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's
application for bail and for release on recognizance was
denied.  The determination that the  evidence of guilt is strong,
whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail   or
imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction,   justifies
the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right
to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the
denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the
stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement
with its underlying rationale of public self-defense  applies
equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted
prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos
||| (Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., G.R. No. 179817, June 27,
2008)
TN: The case of Jalosjos. He was convicted already of rape
and the judgment has already become final. Prior thereto he
was reelected as congressman. And so he said in effect he
was exculpated or exonerated following the Aguinaldo case in
the administrative cases. Supreme Court was saying this is
different. Your election does not erase your criminal liability. So
even if you are reelected, still the fact remains that you are
convicted and the judgment has already become final and
executory. Now as for the penalty is more than 6 years of
imprisonment, that he will be allowed to attend sessions with
escorts from bilibid, the supreme court denied it saying that
before the eyes of the law he is not special because he is a
member of the congress apart from an ordinary criminal. The
supreme court did not allow him to attend sessions and in fact
he was expelled because the decision became final and that
disqualified him from holding any public office. In the case
however of Trillanes, it was different.
You TN, this is significant… if the three senators or sila tanan
makasohan ug Plunder, wala na mabilin sa senado. What will
happen to the operation of the Senate? Because they can be
arrested and detained of the penalties more than 6yrs.
TN of the hypothetical question that might be asked on the bar.
What if for example Enrile and Estrada will be arrested, the
same with Revilla, they can be arrested and detained any day
as the matter immunity does not apply. Now, the argument of
Trillanes in his case is, you are not convicted as of yet because
of the presumption of innocence. He wanted to attend session
and was approved because according to him when he was
charged with an offense that is punishable by reclusion
Perpetua.. more than 6yrs imprisonment but he was not yet
35
convicted. He said, do not compare me to Jalosjos. Jalosjos
was convicted, I am only a detention prisoner. The case is still
pending. I have in my favor presumption of innocence.
Supreme court say however in the case of Trillanes,
presumption of innocence does not necessarily carry with it the
enjoyment of civil and political rights. Still the case of Jalosjos
applies to him. He was not allowed because he was facing
charges that was punishable by more than 6 yearrs
imprisonment.
Q: By his detention, is he deprived of his duty to function as
member of the congress?
A: Answer is no. He can continue to perform his functions as a
member of congress. Because he is not yet convicted. The
judgment is not yet final. They can continue to do their job from
camp Crame. They should not be deprived to represent the
constituents because the people, because we have elected
them nationwide. You should not forget that they are not yet
convicted but only detention prisoner. But because of media,
we thought that they are already guilty. There is still the
hearing and the presumption of innocence. So even if they are
convicted by the trial court, for as long as judgment has not
become final and executory, they continue to hold public office
unless suspended indefinitely or if expelled from the roster of
Senate members or of the House of Representatives.
As to Trillanes, he cannot attend, but he can still continue to do
his function. And he did. In fact there was an issue against him
because insofar as his PDAF. He had expended his PDAF and
how is that possible when he was detained. Because he
continue to perform his legislative function according to him.
Trillanes was never denied to continue his functions. So why
make an exception with these three others that are charged
with plunder. Unless of course if they are suspended. I doubt it.
Then they run as president. Free promotion. (Story of Revilla
and Jinggoy)
TN, Its security from arrest and detention has always been
considered only as a privilege and must be granted in the
restrictive sense (it is more of an exception rather than a
general rule)
You cannot detain a congressman going to Manila to attend
session. You can be penalized under the RPC.
Freedom of speech.
You can say anything you want to say under the sun. No civil
or criminal liability. For as long as it is said in the halls of
congress or anywhere else as long as that member is
performing a legislative function. So committee meetings is
included (outside the hall of congress). This is applied to their
agents, meaning to their staff and applies even to their reports.
This is because, it is not limited oral statements delivered but
also includes or applies to all matters communicative in nature
is covered in the immunity from prosecution maybe civil or
criminal liability
TN: There is no immunity to administrative liability, if that would
constitute a disorderly behavior. Osmeña vs Pendatun, G.R.
No. L-17144, October 28, 1960. Where the Supreme Court
said that the immunity applies only to civil and criminal. While
they cannot be held liable for damages or be sued for libel or
slander, for communications or speeches may be written or
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
verbal, delivered in the Halls of Congress or while in the
performance of a legislative function, but not for administrative
liability
“It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his
words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof.”
PROHIBITIONS
Disclosure (Sec 12)
These are part of the transparency of the government. That
requires the disclosure of financial and business interest of the
members of congress to avoid any conflict of interest. So if
they are into the business of real estate, they have to disclose
that.
Example: A corporations owned by a congressman, bidding a
contract with government. Unya mo ingon ra sila na thay have
already renounced or waived their shares of stock in that
corporation in favor of our children. It is the same, they still own
the corporation, as long as you are alive and kicking.
Prohibited and Forbidden Offices (Sec. 13)
You cannot hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government0owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall be appointed to any office
which may have been created or emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
TN: Two kinds of office which he cannot be appointed to, for
as long as he is still a member of the congress:
1. Forbidden appointments
- Even if the senator or congressman resigns, he is
still disqualified for appointment to a particular office
when that member of Congress is responsible to the
o Creation of the office which he may be appointed
later
o Responsible in the increase of salary or
emoluments of that office
2. Prohibited/ incompatible appointments
- you cannot be appointed to any other positions in
government that are in conflict with your legislative
function
- Ex. you cannot be appointed as cabinet member
without forfeiting your seat during your TENURE (so if
you accept the appointment, then you need to resign)
. making functions. Usually mo adjourn na sila if the elections is
The prohibition is that he cannot be appointed to an office
which is incompatible to his office, to a possibility of fusion of
powers of legislative and executive. For example, he cannot be
appointed at the same time as secretary of department under
an executive branch. If he accepts, he automatically forfeits his
eat in the congress. Many members of congress being
appointed to the cabinet of the president, automatically they
forfeit. Even for controlled corporations if appointed, he forfeits
his seat in the congress
36
Gordon vs Liban GR NO. 175352 July 15, 2009. Gordon was
the chairman of the Red Cross. The question is, should he
forfeit his seat in the congress when he was appointed or
elected as the chairman of the Red Cross. TN. SC said
Richard Gordon did not relinquish his senatorial post despite
his election to and acceptance of the position of Chairman of
Philippine National Red Cross Board of Governors [Note: This
was overturned in the January 18, 2011 resolution of the MR
which ruled that Red Cross is sui generis status not anymore a
simple private corporation, but the ruling that Gordon doesn’t
violate this prohibition of a Senator]
Q: Why?
A: Because PNRC is a private organization merely performing
governmental function and PNRC Chairman is not a
government official or employee. Not being a government
office, PNRC Chairmanship may be held by any individual
including a Senator or House of Congress. PNRC is
autonomous, neutral and independent of the Philippine
government. It is a voluntary organization that does not have
government assets and does not receive any appropriation
from Congress. PNRC is not part of any of the government
branches; PNRC Chairmanship is neither a government office
nor an office in a GOCC for the purposes of the prohibition in
the Constitution. Senator Gordon therefore can validly serve as
Chairman of PNRC without giving up his Senatorial position
Q: What kind of office is this that even if you resign as a
senator or congress, you cannot be appointed to that office?
A: If that office is created during your term or that the
emoluments of that office where increased during your term.
You cannot be appointed to those offices even if you resign.
This is called the forbidden office.
D. Quorum and voting majorities
Sessions of Congress
TN: Session of congress may be regular or special. BAR
(there is also a sine die session)
Regular session should be every 4th Monday of July and it
should continue until 30 days before the opening of the next
regular session excluding Saturdays Sundays and regular
holidays. So there will be recess of 30 days
Special session- is a session called by the president during
the recess of congress
Sine die session- is where they kill the clock. (US vs Pons
G.R. No. L-11530 August 12, 1916.) This is done if expiring na
ila term. So they can continue to act on administrative matters,
no more legislative functions. They would not consider the
clock. So they continue on administrative matters no longer law
forthcoming, they will have a sine die session to attend
administrative matters. Examples on matter regarding on
canvassing.
Officers in the congress. TN
Q: Who are the officers in congress?
A:
In the Senate:
1. President
2. Majority floor leader
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
3. Minority floor leader
4. Chairmen of the different committees
In the house of representative:
1. Speaker of the house
2. Deputy Speaker (in the Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao
and representing the women sector)
3. Majority floor leader
4. Minority floor leader
5. Sergeant of arms
6. Chairmen of the different committees
TN
Q: How are they chosen?
A: by majority votes. Regardless of political party affiliation. In
other words, a president of the house may not belong to the
majority political party, he may come from the minority political
party. Like Enrile, he came from the minority party.
CASE of Santiago.
Q:What do you mean by majority?
A: More than 50% of the membership. For as long as you get
the number, regardless of your political party affiliation, then
you can be elected as an officer in the congress, either be in
the Senate or House of Representatives
Q: What is quorum?
A: refers to majority only of the membership of house. It maybe
a simple mathematical computation but take not of the case of
Avelino v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 6322, February 21, 1912. Let
us say, there are 24 members, 5 of whom are absent.
Q: What would be the basis of computation for majority? A: On
the total membership of 24.
Q: Why?
A: Because they can always be compelled to attend the
session. If they are alive and congress. for as long as there are
13 who attended the session, they can proceed legally with
their business. And to pass a legislative proposal, all there is
need is the majority of the quorum
Principle of shifting majority, because as the number of
members’ attendance increase, then the increase also in the
requisite majority of the passing of the law.
Q: What if for example, one is really sick and he cannot attend
the session (in the ICU) – will he be included in the
computation of the quorum?
A: Yes! For as long as he is under the coercive power of the
congress. Under the jurisdiction of the congress.
But if he is abroad, in the case of Avelino of Cruz. Even if a
warrant of arrest is issued, it cannot be enforced aboard since
it is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the congress. Thus, it is
useless to include him in the computation of the quorum. Thus
if one of the members of the senate is abroad, then the basis
of computation of majority is only 23, not 24. Divided by 2 plus
1.
Santiago vs Guingona.
On the rules of proceeding, every congress, they have to
promulgate their own proceedings. But they are not obliged to
follow them if they do not want to. Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R.
No. 127255, June 26, 1998) SC cannot compel them to follow
the proceedings, under the separation of powers. SC: they are
mere procedures which may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative party.
37
E. Discipline of members
BAR: if you have immpeachment to remove the president or
vice president? How do you remove the member of congress
before the expiration of his term of office?
A: you have by expulsion. To discipline members of congress,
each house has a committee. You have a committee on
discipline.
Q: what will be a ground for removal? Or for disciplining?
A: in impeachment there are 6 grounds enumerated under the
constitution. But in congress there is only disorderly behavior.
Defined by the house concerned through their rules of
proceedings. they define what is disorderly behavior and that is
discretionary on the house.
TN: the penalty to be imposed from reprimand to expulsion,
should suspension be the penalty, the constitution is clear that
it should not be more than 60 days, if you suspend a member
for more than 60 days then it will be expulsion.
Preventive suspension that may be imposed by the courts will
not violate the separation of powers because preventive
suspension of members of congress by the courts
example: Revilla, Estrada and Enrile, they can be suspended
indefinitely because they are charged with corruption. The
suspension is 90 days (3 months) mandatory. Ministerial
functions are exercised by the court for preventive suspension
of not more than 90 days.
Q: can they complain about the violation of separation of
powers as of this provision that only congress can suspend
them
A: no because preventive suspension is not a penalty yet. It is
a mere precautionary measure and therefore it does not violate
the separation of powers provided in article 6 section 16
paragraph 3
“(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel
a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.”
Q: How many votes is needed to expel a member? Or to
convict a member?
A: 2/3 votes. The same as you convict an impeachable official
you need 2/3 votes of the members of the senate.
JOURNAL and ENROLLED BILL
Q: Publication of the proceedings in the journal
There are 2 records that you need to remember for purposes
of determining on how are laws passed in congress?
A: The journal and the enrolled bill. These are evidences of the
enactment of a law.
The journal is being kept by the secretary of each house.
Q: The matters contained in the journal there are 4.
1. the yaes and the nays of every law that is being
carried out by the majority votes
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
2. the veto of the president
3. the votes of yes and nays overriding the veto of
the president
4. the result of any deliberation as long as it is
requested by at least 1/5 of the members
Those contained in the journal are conclusive as to the
probative value and they are binding upon the courts
Q: What about an enrolled bill?
A: when it is enrolled or engrossed
Q: When is it enrolled?
A: After a certification is issued by the speaker of the house or
the senate president that here is the version that we agreed on
and as to any insertions to the bill while it is submitted to the
president for signature
Q: What is its probative value?
A: It is binding as so far as to its execution, the tenor as to its
contents, it is binding upon the courts.
So if you want evidence on that is the tenor of the bill then you
refer to the enrolled bill because that is conclusive as far as the
court is concerned.
The due execution of the bill you go back to the enrolled bill
Q: what if there will be a conflict between the enrolled bill and
the journal
A: the journal is practically a transcript of the proceedings of
deliberations of a particular bill, it is verbatim. Records of what
happened.
Q: apparently a conflict was created, your journal is different as
a result of the deliberation but in the enrolled bill it is differently
stated? Which of the 2 will prevail?
A: when the question as to whether the bill was properly
passed you go by the journal. Or if it is with regard to the tenor,
then you go by the enrolled bill.
[Judge forgot the title of the case, but it’s more likely to be
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 on VAT]
They were confused on what is the subject of the product and
the raw materials because in the journal apparently it is subject
to tax because the raw material are the byproducts but it came
out in the enrolled bill that what was subject is already the by
product. It is clear in the intention of congress is for the
byproduct but it is not that way in the enrolled bill.
Supreme Court said that what must be with always is the
enrolled bill you go by the tenor or the validity of the bill.
Q: What then would be the remedy of congress?
A: They have to amend the bill. Withdraw it rather than just
change it without going through the process. As far as the
court is concerned, the enrolled bill is binding as to its tenor.
Q: Whether there was a valid deliberation of the bill?
A: What will prevail is the journal. On how many votes was
passed then it will be the journal.
TN: US vs Pons
Neither House during the sessions of the
Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn
for more than three days, nor to any other place than that
in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
F. Electoral tribunals and the Commission on Appointments
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
38
Section 17 of Article 6
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in
the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
TN: these are favorite in the bar
Electoral tribunals. There are 2 electoral tribunals. One in the
senate and one is in the house of congress.
Q: what is the Composition of the electoral tribunals?
A: there are 9 members each. 3 senior justices of the supreme
court and 6 coming from the political parties on proportionate
representation.
TN: Q: once you are elected in the electoral tribunal, is there
any security of tenure?
A: even if you change your political party affiliation it will not be
a ground to remove you from the electoral tribunal that is the
case Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991
electoral tribunals practically exercise the electoral function.
Q: What is the function of the Electoral tribunals.
A: It is the sole judge (only judge) of election contest.
Involving election returns and qualification of members of
congress ( senate or house of representatives) as the case
may be.
Q: Define our terms
A: sole judge meaning- there a=can be no other judge or
courts that will have jurisdiction over members of congress.
You cannot go to the supreme court to question the election
return or qualification of the members. That is the exclusive
jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals. It is the sole judge and
therefore its decision is not appealable unless there is abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Case of Abubakar v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 173310, 173609, March 07, 2007
The SC jurisdiction to refute decisions of HRET operates only
upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise
its decision is final and executory.
Q: what are the cases that are within the jurisdiction of the
electoral tribunals?
A: election contest.
Q: what is an election contest?
A: it may be a winner or a loser. The loser has the intention to
remove the winner so that he will become the member of
congress.
Q: Therefore if isa lang ang candidate in one legislative district.
Do they have jurisdiction if a voter of that district will question
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
the qualification of the sole candidate of that district? Where do
you question?
A: with the electoral tribunal, comelec or the Supreme Court
The Sampayan v. Daza, G.R. No. 103903, September 11,
1992. Only candidate of northern Samar in his district. There
was a question on his qualification because according to the
complainant he is not a resident of the Philippines as he is a
green card holder.
Q: Does the electoral tribunal have jurisdiction over him?
A: No, because the constitution is clear that only when there is
an election contest where there is a winner and a losing
candidate where the losing candidate will replace him in
congress.
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction as well because that should
have been asked before the election as to a qualification
contest to COMELEC.
Q: If it was not resolved by the COMELEC and election was
conducted?
A: over run by the election. The moment that candidate has
sworn into the house as member. COMELEC will lose
jurisdiction.
Q: Who is going to question of one already a member?
A: Supreme Court said that the congress or the house
concerned is never precluded to conduct exclusionary
proceedings in order to preserve the integrity of the house that
only qualified members shall continue to serve the house. Shall
remain as members as the house
Q: Jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals because sometimes it
will overlap with the jurisdiction of COMELEC. When does the
electoral tribunal assume jurisdiction over an election contest.
A: only when it involves a member.
Q: If he is not yet a member because he is not yet proclaimed
as the winner?
A: Then it would have to be resolved first by the COMELEC on
the issue on qualification or returns or election prohibition and
returns.
Q: define returns? What is involved in the election in the
jurisdiction of the electoral tribunal? What do you mean by
election?
A: when it was attended with fraud or when there was vote
buying, violence or intimidation of election. It is in the electoral
tribunals. As to qualifications those that are provided for in the
constitution. Or even to his loyalty to the republic. The returns
should be something to do with the election figures and results.
G. Powers of Congress
1. Legislative
The Law-Making Process
Q: What are the limitations?
A: There are substantial and procedural limitations.
Substantial limitations:
For as long as they are not contrary to the
Constitution, there cannot be any problem as to
whatever law that may be passed by Congress.
It must not be irrepealable , all laws passed by
Congress are subject to amendments or even repeal.
Except: for a law that may violate the non-
impairment clause. (ex. the grant of tax
39
emption for a valuable consideration. It
cannot be repealed as it will violate the non-
impairment clause).
Matters relating to the prohibition against the increase
of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
without its advice and consent.
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal
roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770  cannot validly authorize an  appeal  to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases
the  appellate  jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing
argument has been cogently presented to justify such
disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was
intended to give this Court a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise,
the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the
Court.||| (Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742,
September 16, 1998)
There should not be any law that would allow
recognition of nobility. Walay queen or king.
Procedural/ Process
If there is any proposal, it may be initiated by the
House of the Representatives or House of the
Senate. The session may be held simultaneously on
the same subject matter or sequential. From one
house to the other house, following the same process.
Q: What is the process?
A: First, there is the calendaring of the bills at the
beginning of their term. E-calendar na nila with the
Secretary of the House. The secretary will set a
schedule in the calendar when is it to be called. Iya
rang title ang tawagon. It will be referred to the
concerned committee. If your bill pertains to local
governments, it will be given to the committee on local
governments.
Q: What would the committee on local governments
do upon receipt of your bill?
A: it is discretionary, this is what makes a chairman of
the committee very powerful, he may act on it or gave
due course to your proposed bill or simply ignore it.
If it is acted upon, research will be done; if
not, public hearings will be conducted. The
Committee will propose changes to your bill.
The Committee will submit a draft of their
proposals to your bill as to the changes, and
It will be submitted to the plenary session;
meaning, as a house.
Q: What would happen if it is submitted to the plenary
session?
A: This time, not only the title will be read, but the
provisions with the recommended proposals for
changes by the Committee will be discussed, so that
debates and discussion will follow on the bill.The final
draft will be prepared, it will be printed and distributed
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
among the members of the House, and thereafter the
vote will be taken, this time only the title will be read.
(TN) A bill must embraced only one subject
matter to prevent log rolling, Hodge podge.
They will submit a draft of their proposal to your bill as to the
changes and they will be submitted to plenary session,
meaning as a house
Q: Now what will happen after it was submitted to the plenary
session?
A: This time not only the title will be read but the provisions
with the recommended proposal for changes by the committee
will be discussed, so that debate and discussion will follow
Q: Now what will happen?
A: The final draft will be prepared, printed and distributed
among the members of the house and thereafter a vote will be
taken, this time only the title will be read, then that will go to the
house of the senate to go through the same process.
Q: What if they cannot agree on their version??
A: Then there is bicameral conference committee to iron out
the differences or conflicts of version between the two houses
they shall be compose equal number coming from both
houses.
Q: is this a third house?
A: NO, their purpose is only to iron out,
Q: Do they prevail?
A: Virtually they prevail but TN: there has to be approval or
concurrence by MAJORTIY VOTES OF BOTH HOUSES, in
other words they may also amend the version of both houses
and come up with their own version, mao ni gitwag nila ug
AMENDMENT BY SUBSTITUION but such will only be
effective if approve by majority votes of both houses, it will be
submitted to plenary session of both houses and thereafter
Q: what will happen?
A: if they can agree now then there is the signing by officers of
both houses certifying to the effect that this is now the version
of both houses and then it will be submitted to the president,
and then
Q: what will the president do??
A: He has a period of 30 days to act if he does not act on the
bill
Q: what will happen?
A: The bill becomes a law regardless of his objection, if he has
to make an objection he has to do that within 30 days..
Q: What will he do??
A: He can VETO THE ENTIRE BILL AS A GENERAL RULE
not just a portion of it but the entire bill the only..
EXCEPTION to that if it involves what??
40
1. Appropriation bill
2. Revenue bill or
3. Tariff bill
 then he can make ITEM VETO, this is denied by the
president in the PDAF CASE, there is no vetoing of the
identification of the projects and as to the amounts that
may be spend for that project the president would not
have that opportunity with regards to the PDAF that’s why
one of the reason it was declared unconstitutional
because it will violate the veto power of the president.
Another point you should TN as to the presidents signing it
so if he disagrees with the bill,
Q: what will he do?
A: He returns the bill to the house of origin with his veto
message,
Q: is there a chance for the bill to be save?
A: YES. 2 INSTANCES
1. If they do not agree with the president they may
vote again upon the bill without any changes
notwithstanding the recommendation of the
president that’s what we call REPASSING of the
bill, overriding the power of the president
however you need a vote 2/3 of both houses not
just from the house of origin but also to the other
house, if they fail to get the 2/3 votes of the other
house the bill is as good as dead or
2. They may consider the recommendation of the
president to amend the bill and return the bill to
the president so that he will sign it.
By the way on ITEM VETO it involves like appropriation,
revenue or tariff bill one condition that must be complied that
the remaining provisions of the veto bill can stand independent
from that portion vetoed by the president also the president
may veto in effect, reject INAPPROPRIATE provisions being
inserted in the bill, that may also be veto by the president by
way of exception to the exception.
There is also that IMPOUNDMENT POWER of the president is
so far as appropriation are concerns even if there is an
appropriation for a particular disbursement of the government
the president may refuse spend the appropriated amount.
BAR Q: WHEN DOES A BILL BECOME A LAW?
A: When the president does not act within the period
of 30 days from receipt
When the president signs the bill
When the bill written by the president is
overridden by the 2/3 votes of both houses
Q: WHEN DOES A BILL BECOME A LAW WITHOUT THE
SIGNATURE OF THE PRESIDENT?
A: Executive action
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Overriding the veto power of the president
Recall of the emergency power of the president
The calling of a special election for president need
have the signature of the acting president
BAR Q: is the three reading of the bill indispensable or
dispensable??
A: Indispensable
Q: is the three reading on separate days indispensable or
dispensable?
A: Dispensable, for as long as there is certification by the
president as to the urgency of the bill, that if it is not acted
upon immediately, there will be danger to public safety or
national security, TN it can be done in one day not on separate
days, nonetheless three readings gihapon, its indispensable
that’s on of the procedural limitations.
TAXATION
Q: in case of doubt whether you are taxable or not? How do
you resolve the doubt
A: against the taxpayer
Q: characteristics of our taxation?
A: uniform; equitable; and progressive.. Equitable meaning
according to the capacity to pay taxis, this was ask in the BAR
exam
BAR Q: what is the difference between uniform taxation and
equitable taxation?
A: equitable because that would depend on the capacity to pay
taxis, uniform that whatever tax that would be impose should
be applied to all person situated under the same
circumstances. Progressive because as your tax base
increases your tax rate increases base on uniformity and
equitable taxation.
BAR Q: who grants tax exemption?
A: it is only congress by majority votes of all members of
congress
Q: how about tax treaties?
A: is should be with the concurrence of the 2/3 votes of the
senate
Another point on the grant of tax exemption it could be by a
statue or by a constitutional provision
TN: on properties that are actually, directly, and exclusively
use for religious purpose, exempted from property tax only,
public cemeteries, monasteries etc. charitable institution, in
relation to this guys if funds should be appropriated to the
church, its priest or any dignitaries of the church or religious
sec.
Q: is that allowed?
41
A: NO, that would be a violation of separation of church and
state EXECPTION if payment are made to priest working for
AFP; penal institution; and orphanage and leprosarium
On congress with regards to delegation Tariff power to the
president, go over with section 28.
TN: on sec. 32 on the mandate on passing of a law to allow the
people to legislate through the process of initiative and
referendum RA 6735.
a) Legislative inquiries and the oversight functions
Legislative Inquiry
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by,
such inquiries shall be respected.
TN: What is important with regards to legislative inquiry, this
power is a discretionary power of Congress.
Q: Who may be required to appear before a legislative inquiry?
A: Any person.
Q: Does that include the president and his cabinet?
A: The president NO because of the executive privilege. As
regards the cabinet members, YES they may be compelled
unless the president invokes his executive privilege.
(TN) |||Senate of the Phils. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777 April
20, 2006
“It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned
by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be
covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded
reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive
Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This
is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive
Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter
indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse
of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no
longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear
before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary
legal means to compel his appearance.
The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for
requiring officials to secure the consent of the President under
Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of
public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation." That
such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo
from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that
"[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is
essentially an authorization for implied claims of executive
privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such
authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect
for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the
authorization itself.”
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, September
04, 2008
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
“Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of
respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid
of legislation,  not the people's right to public information. This
is the reason why we stressed in the assailed Decision the
distinction between these two rights. As laid down in  Senate  v.
Ermita,  "the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have
the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecumissued
by Congress" and "neither does the right to information grant a
citizen the power to exact testimony from government
officials". As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not
to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture
that the parties here are respondent Committees and
petitioner Neri  and that there was no prior request for
information on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will
not be swayed by attempts to blur the distinctions between the
Legislature's right to information in a legitimate legislative
inquiry and the public's right to information.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed
Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from
inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from
them is to respect matters that are covered by executive
privilege.”
Q: What is the subject matter covered in a legislative inquiry?
A: Any matter. Not necessarily in relation to a pending
legislation for as long as it relates to the scope of its legislative
inquiry. One can be asked whatever topic and he may be
asked to appear before the House or any of its committee to
shed light on those subject matters.
TN: They must promulgate their own rules and regulations and
the most important part, these rules must be PUBLISHED.
There will be a violation of DUE PROCESS OF LAW should
there be failure to publish such rules and regulations. (Senate
of the Phils. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006)
The same principle was then invoked by Ombudsman
Gutierrez as regards to impeachment. The one who initiates
the impeachment is the House of Representatives and it is the
Senate which hears the proceedings. OMB Gutierrez was then
saying that the right to due process was violated because the
impeachment rules and regulations were not published. SC
was saying that unlike proceedings in a legislative inquiry, the
Constitution requires that it should be published in compliance
with due process but there is no such publication insofar as
publishing the rules and regulations with respect to the conduct
of the impeachment proceedings. Just to emphasize that
indeed the requirement of publication of the R&R with respect
to the conduct of legislative inquiry is MANDATORY.
‘While  "promulgation"  would seem synonymous
to  "publication,"  there is a statutory difference in their
usage.
The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times.  Senate Blue Ribbon Committee already had a pending case
A number of those instances involves the promulgation of
various rules, reports and issuances emanating from xxx It is
not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of
government how  to promulgate  when the Constitution itself
has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation.The
Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation
beyond the dictates of the Constitution.|||xxx Had the
Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules
published, it could have stated so  as categorically as it did  in
the case of the rules of procedure  in legislative inquiries,
per  Neri. Other than "promulgate," there is no other single
42
formal term in the English language to appropriately refer to an
issuance without need of it being published.  (Gutierrez v.
House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011)
(TN) The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such
inquiries shall be respected. This includes his right against self-
incrimination.
(TN) The subject matters that may not be looked into by
Congress thru a legislative inquiry notwithstanding the
prerogative of exercising the power. It must always be in aid of
legislation not in aid of prosecution.
Case in point: Bengson v The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
This one has to be read in the light of the decision of the SC in
the Standard Chartered Bank v The Senate Committee on
Banks.
“Citing  Bengzon, Jr.  v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee,   the petitioners claim that since the issue
of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered
foreign securities is already preempted by the courts that took
cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this
investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested
solely in these courts.
The argument is misplaced.  Bengzon  does not apply
squarely to petitioners' case.
It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the issue to
be investigated was  one  over which jurisdiction had already
been acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the
[Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate the matter
would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that
the inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an
encroachment on  the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction
that had set in much earlier.
To the extent that, in the case at bench, there are a number of
cases already pending in various courts and administrative
bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of
unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance
between this case and  Bengzon. However, the similarity ends
there.
Central to the Court's ruling in  Bengzon  — that
the  Senate  Blue Ribbon  Committee  was without any
constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative investigation
— was the Court's determination that the intended inquiry
was  not in aid of legislation.  The Court found that the
speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such investigation
contained no suggestion of any contemplated legislation; it
merely called upon the  Senate  to look into possible violations
of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019.”  (Standard Chartered
Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions
and Currencies, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007)
Q:What was invoked here (in Bengzon)?
A: In Bengzon, the person who was summoned before the
before the Sandiganbayan.
The separation of powers between Congress and the
Judiciary, represented by the Sandiganbayan. Congress has
no power to determine the guilt of a person in a legislative
inquiry, because theirs is limited only to understanding possible
subject matter of future legislation. Congress cannot determine
whether a person has a violated a law, or whether he is guilty
or not.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Q: What happened in Standard Charter Bank vs. The Senate
Committee on Banks?
A: This was a case about the sale of shares of stocks of
Standard Charter without the approval of Bangko Sentral.
Those investigated said there’s already a pending investigation
by the BSP. To have them appear before the Senate
committee would violate their right against self-incrimination
and the separation of powers.
TN SC said the mere filing of a criminal or administrative
complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry, otherwise it
would be easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress
through the institution of any particular criminal or
administrative action. This is the most recent one with respect
to the extent of legislative inquiry of congress.
Q: What is subjudice?
A: TN, this is a limitation on the conduct of legislative inquiry.
SC said this subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid pre-judging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. This is from Romero II vs. Estrada.
“The  sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. A violation of the  sub judice  rule may render one liable
for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court.||| XXX
At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still
pending final adjudication by the Court, still, such circumstance
would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation.
What we said in Sabio v. Gordon suggests as much:
The same directors and officers contend
that the Senate is barred from inquiring
into the same issues being litigated before
the Court of Appeals and
theSandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that
the filing or pendency of any prosecution
or administrative action should not stop or
abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative
purpose. 
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court
proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts
conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle,
through the application of a law, actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On
the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are,  inter alia,
undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather
information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively;   and to
determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or
enact new or remedial legislation,  albeit the inquiry need not
result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial
proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of
legislation”.
||| (Romero II v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 02, 2009)
Q: Why are these cases relevant?
A: Now that the cases have been filed against the 3 senators
regarding the PDAF, I suppose that if they continue legislative
inquiry, they must be excluded. TN that if it goes into disclosing
information that might affect the prosecution of the cases
43
against the accused senators, you must comply with the
subjudice rule.
Q: What is the exercise of contempt power?
A: Incidental to the legislative inquiry power, but is not
expressly provided by the Constitution. It is implied that should
Congress choose to exercise the legislative inquiry, Congress
can cite one in contempt should a person refuse to cooperate
by not appearing if summoned by Congress or any of its
committee.
Q: How long will you be detained if the power of contempt is
exercised through detention as penalty?
A: Contempt by Senate – forever. Because Senate is a
continuing body. The seats are never vacant, because you
only elect 12 Senators every election.
Contempt by HR or any of its committees– 3 years. TN.
Q: What is question hour?
A: This is upon Congress’ initiative, in compliance with its
oversight function.
Q:Two modes of question hour.
First, a cabinet member with the consent of the President may
ask that he appear before any of the committees or any of the
houses. Once Congress refuses, he cannot impose because of
the principle of separation of powers.
Second, it may be the House concerned that would request the
appearance of a certain department head, in compliance with
its oversight function.
The oversight function has always been mentioned with
regards to DAP and PDAF as justification.
Q: What is an oversight function?
A: TN, this is a function that embraces all activities undertaken
by Congress to enhance its understanding of an influence of
the legislation it has enacted. This function is complied with
under Section 22, Article 6.
Q: What does oversight encompass?
A: Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures taken
by Congress to:
1. monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives
2. determine whether agencies are properly
administered
3. eliminate executive waste and dishonesty
4. prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority
5. assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest
Q: When can it be held?
A: Only in executive sessions, with the exclusion of media
when the matter involves national security or if requested by
the President that it should be done in closed doors.
Q: TN, what are the acts done by Congress in the exercise of
its oversight power?
A: Scrutiny, Investigation, Supervision
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Q: What is operational proximity test?
A: It involves communication with the President and his
subordinate if it involves consultative communication. Because
of the proximity of that officer with the President, there may be
communication that should not be disclosed to the public, as it
becomes part of the executive privilege.
Q: What matters can Congress not look into?
A: Matters under executive privilege; diplomatic negotiations of
the President entered into with foreign countries
“It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while
possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the
field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21
provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the
validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of
negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not
even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to
concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the
President, but only the Senate.
Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as
private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of
Representatives fail to present a  "sufficient showing of
need" that the information sought is critical to the performance
of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include
treaty-negotiation”
||| (Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516,
July 16, 2008)
Q: Who is going to determine whether it is EP or not?
A:SC is the one that defines what may be covered under EP or
not. Now they want that Congress may define by law what may
constitute matters that may not looked into by Supreme Court
or Congress in the exercise of its legislative inquiry.
b) Bicameral conference committee
c) Limitations on legislative power
TN of the Non-delegation of legislative powers, and the
permissible delegation
Delegation of Power
1. To the People, to a certain extent under RA 6735 (Initiative
and Referrendum)
2. To the President, under Secs. 23 and 28 of Article VI
3. To the Administrative bodies
4. LGU’s under RA 7160
Q: Can the President exercise legislative power on its own
under Secs. 23 and 28 of Article VI without a valid delegation?
A: NO. Since, what the Philippines have is a Republican
system which maintains the principle of Separation of Powers.
However, under Martial Law (even if there is a legislative body
like the Interim Batasang Pambansa), or if the government is
revolutionary and there is no legislative body at the moment,
the president may exercise legislative powers on its own.
Anyway, a good example of contests involving issues
regarding on election whether it was attended with fraud, vote
buying, violence or intimidation in elections, then accusations
like these are within the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunal
ordinarily if the candidate has already been sworn into office as
member of congress. When we say qualifications, obviously it
pertains to whether he has the qualifications prescribed by the
constitution like whether he is a natural born citizen or even
including his loyalty to the Republic, that is included in the
qualifications.
44
Q: When you say returns, it has something to do with the
election returns. Have you seen an election return?
A: It is a tabulation of the number of votes obtained in the
election. And then you have the corresponding words and
figures of the votes that you have obtained. That is with
respect to the election returns. Sometimes, pag-ihap nimo sa
kahon, it does not jibe with the figures and the words as stated
in the election returns. Example, sa kahon-kahon, it shows
therein one million, but when they counted it again, it was only
500,000. Now in things like this, you go to the Electoral
Tribunal if the member has already become a member of the
house. These are the controversies involving election contest.
Q: What could be the process?
A: It would be an ordinary election contest or quo-warranto.
Kung election contest, ordinarily qualification etc. Kung Quo
Warranto, those involves qualifications, that he is not qualified
because he does not have the qualifications prescribed by the
constitution or he has been convicted of disloyalty to the
republic of the Philippines. Quo warranto na siya ang imong
petition. Either petition the electoral tribunal has jurisdiction.
Q: Going back to what I was asking earlier: When does the
jurisdiction of the Electoral tribunal start?
A: Upon the valid proclamation of the member and he swears
in office as member of congress. COMELEC shall be ousted
from jurisdiction. Thereafter, the electoral tribunal shall have
sole jurisdiction over the election contest. TN however of the
cases of Codilla and the Limkaichong case.
Codilla vs De Venecia G.R. No. 150605   December 10, 2002
Diba Ormoc man ni siya nga Congressman before Lucy Torres
Gomez. What happened in this case is that he was disqualified
even before the election because he was engaged in
electioneering. He was accused of kana bitawng you are not
supposed to spend public funds during the election period
because you might be using the funds just to promote your
own interest. What happened was, I think, naappropriate na
siguro ang funds for the, kana bitawng, there are too many
libaongs in their place. Unya, it was during the election period
nga gi-pang fill-up-pan. He was accused of electioneering and
the Comelec disqualified him. Notwithstanding his
disqualification, he still won the election. But it was disregarded
by the COMELEC because he was already disqualified. Ang
kontra was proclaimed as the duly elected member of
congress. Codilla however was able to seasonably file his
motion for reconsideration with the disqualification.
In other words, even before the election, or even before the
proclamation of Locsin, he already filed the MR. Ang problema
lang ka delayed ang pag resolve sa MR. The MR was not
resolved after the election and after the proclamation of Locsin.
It was only resolved finally by the COMELEC at least two
weeks before the next election. Imagine ka, 2 weeks nalang
and the COMELEC said reversed ang decision! Meaning
Codilla was not involved in electioneering therefore he is
qualified. His vote should be counted and in the counting, he
won in the election. Karon, ni adto siya ni De Venecia. He
asked De Venecia that he be sworn in kay hapit na mo expire
ang term. De Venecia refused. De Venecia said that you file
first a petition for quo warranto to remove Locsin because
Locsin now is a member. The case went all the way to the SC
questioning De Venecia for his refusal to swear him in. Was De
Venecia correct in this case.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
SC said De Venecia was incorrect. Why? Because when the
COMELEC made a declaration, that indeed it was Codilla who
won, the Electoral Tribunal.
TN here, the tribunal has no jurisdiction over the case of
Codilla because the COMELEC was not ousted yet of its
jurisdiction over the controversy. This is because Codilla was
able to file his MR seasonably even before the proclamation of
Locsin. Sa ato pa, ang proclamation diay ni Locsin was
premature and therefore invalid. If there is any question on the
qualification, it is the COMELEC. And the resolution then here
of the COMELEC with respect to Codilla is still valid because
the comelec was never yet ousted of jurisdiction over the
controversy.
Limkaichong vs COMELEC G.R. Nos. 178831-32              
July 30, 2009
Limkaichong of Negros Oriental ran for member of Congress
from here district. A petition for disqualification was filed
against her. Kay kuno, ang papa ni Limkaichong was a
naturalized Filipino citizen, Chinese man. But they alleged that
ang naturalization kuno sa iyang papa was invalid. So kung
invalid ang naturalization sa iyang papa, that means that she
never acquired the citizenship of the father as Filipino because
in the first place, the proceedings were invalid. That was
pending in the COMELEC. In the meantime, nag election and
limkaichong won. She was proclaimed notwithstanding the
disqualification case. And she became the member of
congress.
Q: What is the difference between the Codilla case and her
case.
A: There is a lot of difference. In the Limkaichong case, the
COMELEC passed a resolution that even if there is a pending
disqualification case, if you won in the election, you should be
proclaimed because time is of the essence. That resolution
was not issued yet in the case of Codilla. But in that resolution,
it made some reservations that this is without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceedings. This time, because that
candidate is now a member, the Electoral Tribunal has
jurisdiction. Comelec has no more jurisdiction upon publicly
proclaiming the candidate as the duly elected member of
Congress. That is what happened to the case of Limkaichong.
Now, because of the proclamation of Limkaichong, she
became a member of congress. The disqualification case
continued at the electoral tribunal.
Q: Does electoral tribunal has jurisdiction over the
disqualification case against Limkaichong? This is on the
citizenship of Limkaichong. Kung ordinaryo ra unta to siya nga
question of citizenship, most definitely, the electoral tribunal
has sole jurisdiction over the qualification of that member. But
TN, what was questioned here is the naturalization of the
father of Limkaichong which the electoral tribunal has no
jurisdiction. Who has jurisdiction over naturalization?
A: You have a Naturalization Tribunal to revoke the
naturalization of a particular alien who is now a Filipino citizen
by virtue of the alleged naturalization taken as invalid. In other
words, what will the electoral tribunal will do is that it will refer it
to the naturalization tribunal. You will wait for the result and by
then, tapos na. Duha na siguro ka term ang natapos before a
resolution can be secured from the naturalization tribunal to
say WON the naturalization of the father of Limakaichong is
valid or not. So what happened in the case of Limkaichong, it
45
was dismissed because the electoral tribunal has no
jurisdiction on the naturalization proceedings. If it was just a
simple question of qualification of Limkaichong, definitely,
Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction over the case.
So as it was declared in the case of Limkaichong vs.
COMELEC, Biraogo vs. Nograles, Paras vs. Nograles and
Brillante vs. COMELEC, once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member
of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of
the proclamation.
In the case of Villando vs. HRET and Limkaichong, SC said
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may question the
illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization proceedings. HRET no matter
how complete and exclusive does not carry with it authority to
delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the
pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would
operate as a collateral attack of the citizenship of the Father of
Limkaichong which is not permissible.
Again I repeat, two modes of Petition may be filed.
A Petition for Electoral Protest or Petition for Quo
Warranto.
You also have those cases like Pimentel vs.  Zubiri (SET Case
No. 001-07), where you have to look into the election returns in
Maguindanao. That opening of the ballot boxes and the
election returns is administrative kuno sa COMELEC and that
the COMELEC has the authority to order the Election
supervisor to bring them in the Comelec for them to see if
indeed there are something wrong in the election returns.
Pimentel went all the way to the SC asking the court to compel
the COMELEC to produce the ballots and the election returns.
SC said we don’t have jurisdiction. Should you have such
request, and then go to the electoral tribunal who has
jurisdiction because in this case, Zubiri was already proclaimed
as member of the Senate. Should there be any questions with
the election returns, it must be with the Senate, not any other
tribunal either the comelec or the SC.
Q: What about party-list, who has jurisdiction on the
qualifications of the Nominees? If you are to question the
qualification of the nominee, who has jurisdiction, the Comelec
or the Electoral Tribunal? Two instances that may happen.
There may be a question on the validity of the nomination of a
nominee by a party-list organization. Who is to resolve the
conflict? Is it Comelec or electoral tribunal. If there is a
question on the qualification of the nominee himself, who has
jurisdiction?
Let us have the consolidated cases of Abayon vs. HRET,
Palparan vs. HRET G.R. No. 189466   February 11, 2010. SC
said party-list nominees are considered as “elected members,”
therefore, HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. But if it is a question of leadership of the
accredited partylist organization that based the nomination, TN
that in the case of Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, GR
No. 193808,  June 26, 2012, Villanueva claimed his own
nomination while Perla the Secretary General also claimed
their own nomination. There was confusion. Who has
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
jurisdiction to resolve the issue as to who was validly
nominated.
A: As this would involve a question of leadership of the
organization, jurisdiction is with the COMELEC. Comelec must
first resolve who is the rightful authority to make the
nomination. So the SC said in this case RA 7941 vested the
comelec with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list
representatives and prescribing qualifications of each nominee
and that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
Comelec’s First Division and Comelec en banc which had
declared President Villanueva as the proper party to submit
CIBAC’s certificate of nomination instead of Perla. Again I
repeat, if it falls into the validity of the nomination, ultimately to
the leadership of the organization, COMELEC has jurisdiction.
But if it falls into the qualification of the nominee, HRET has
jurisdiction.
Q: Can you represent the partylist in the HRET?
A: YES, if they comply with the requirement of proportionate
representation of the political party as member of congress. If
they can, then definitely, they may have seat in the HRET
Q: What forum has jurisdiction over party-list representatives?
A: In terms of qualifications, they shall be considered as
elected and therefore jurisdiction is still with the Electoral
Tribunal but if it relates to leadership of the organization that
the nomination of such leader is being questioned then it would
not be with the Electoral Tribunal rather it will be with the
COMELEC. (TN)
Q: What forum has jurisdiction over party-list representatives?
A: In terms of qualifications, they shall be considered as
elected and therefore jurisdiction is still with the Electoral
Tribunal but if it relates to leadership of the organization that
the nomination of such leader is being questioned then it would
not be with the Electoral Tribunal rather it will be with the
COMELEC. (TN)
(i) Limitations on revenue, appropriations and tariff measures
Power of the Purse
Though both houses can make bills, they’re equal, but this is
with respect to some of the bills that must originate from the
HR before Senate can act on them.
Q: What are these bills?
A: Memorize them. *****
1. Appropriation bills
2. Revenue or Tariff Bills
3. Bills Increasing Public Debts
4. Bills of Local Application
5. Private Bills
Q: What does it mean that it should be HR that should initiate
these kinds of bills?
A: The senate may prepare its version, but they cannot act on
their version before they receive a copy of the bill coming from
the HR.
Q: Can Senate amend the bill that originated from the HR
entirely by substituting it with their own version of the bill?
A: Yes, that is called amendment by substitution. This is
allowed, for as long as it has been initiated by HR.
46
Section 25 – Pay particular attention to this because of PDAF,
DAP, etc. This is with respect to appropriations in general.
Q: Who prepares the budget?
A: President
Q: What is a budget?
A: List of expenses of the government by different agencies,
with the corresponding amounts.
Q:When is it submitted by the President?
A: Within 30 days from the opening of the regular session of
Congress.
Q: To whom is it submitted?
A: Congress
Q: What is an appropriation?
A: An authority or law that authorizes the disbursement of
public funds for a public purpose or for a specific public
purpose.
Q: That budget of the President, can it be increased by
Congress?
A: No, but it may be decreased. Remember.
Q: Effectivity?
A: 1 fiscal year
Q: What if no appropriation law was passed, like what if they
can’t find funds? What is the effect?
A: Automatically, the budget of the previous fiscal year is
carried out for the meantime during that year where there is no
approval yet of a general appropriation law.
TN with regards to the general appropriation that there should
be no riders, no insertions. GA bills are approved easily,
generally, because without authority to disburse, the
government will be paralyzed in their rendering of services.
Q: What are riders or insertions?
The insertions of some subject matters in the appropriations
bill that is not related to it, like the creation of offices for
example. Or maybe a particular substantive law that may
relate to the appropriation of funds for the implementation of
that substantive law. These are riders that cannot be allowed.
TN of procedure in approving appropriation in Congress (will
be discussed more as we go along)
Specifically state the amount, for example. Or if amount is not
specified, it must be determinable.
Ex. If there is utang in the IMF, and it has to be paid next year,
then that appropriation bill will be approved because the
amount is already determinable. You don’t have to include that
in the next budget, because it is understood to be automatically
included because you have to pay your utang, as that’s your
obligation.
Q: Special Appropriation vs. General Appropriation
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A: General Appropriation - you may not specifically state there
the project
Special Appropriation – you have to specify the project, its
purpose, and the availability of funds. Needs a certification
from the National Treasury that there are funds allocated
specifically for this purpose.
This section is Important. The bone of contention of asking the
DAP to be declared unconstitutional.
Q:What happened in this DAP?
A: The President supposedly took some savings from the other
departments of the executive branch and augment the
allocations of the Congressmen, for projects that they can
identify.
Q: What is the general rule in appropriation?
A: The general rule is it cannot be transferred, it is already
appropriated. And therefore cannot be transferred for one
department to another. Or within the same department. Or for
one item to another item.
Q: Who are the persons allowed by law to transfer
appropriations?
A: Executive Branch – The President
The President of the Senate with respect to the House of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives with
respect to the budget of the House of Representatives, you
have the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with respect to
appropriations of the Supreme Court and the Heads of the
Constitutional Bodies with respect to their budget. Again, I
repeat, there has to be a law, because this is an exception.
There has to be a statute, it is Congress that authorized; these
officers that I have enumerated to transfer their savings from
one department to another or from one item to another.
The word is savings that must be transferred to augment the
appropriation of an item in their department that is lacking or
insufficient.
Q: Would you consider savings of a department of which the
President deliberately impound the disbursement or budget?
What do you mean by impoundment? Where the President
refused to disburse the amounts appropriated for that particular
project in his department.
A: Because, at the end, I supposed, that was June, at the
middle of the year; because the appropriations were not
expended, they were impounded by the President, the money
was still there. Instead he had that money transferred for the
expenditures for acceleration programs to be identified by
Members of Congress.
Q: That is why they are saying, how can they be savings?
A: Savings are only accounted for after spending it and then
there is excess of the spending for that appropriation. In this
case, there was no expenditure for the purpose it was
appropriated. It was impounded, and they were considered as
savings and thereafter transferred, that’s the question;
because when we speak of savings, it must have been
expended and the excess of the expenditure are now
considered as savings. You would only know that at the end of
the fiscal year, not at the middle of the fiscal year.
47
So then, they are expecting that it might be declared
unconstitutional, aside from the fact that there was no law
authorizing the President to transfer, and it should be from one
department to another department under the same branch, or
from one item to another item within the same department.
Here, from the President to Congress.
The money that was given to Congress, in relation to the
impeachment of Corona were taken from DAP. There were
proves that the DBM Secretary wrote letters to the
Congressmen asking them, what project do they want for their
money that was earmarked for them from the DAP to spend
for. Thus, violating not only par. 5 of section 25, but as well as
the separation of powers.
Q (student): Is DAP a law?
A: It is not a statute, that was the term they described the
expenditure of the money. It is still questionable because it
should be within the department, and the money should be
savings. How could there be savings when they were never
spended, because the President impounded the funds.
Although the President has that discretion to impound; this one
happened before during the time of Cory Aquino. She did not
like the CAFGU. The money appropriated for the CAFGU was
not appropriated by her. Since there was no money coming
from the government to support CAFGU, CAFGU died in its
natural death. [In the case of Araullo vs Aquino, it happened to
be provided in a Budget Circular issued by Sec. Abad]
Q: Can she be compelled to spend the money?
A: No, because under the principle of separation of powers it is
for Congress to appropriate, it is for the President to spend. If
the President does not spend, he cannot be compelled by
Congress or by the Supreme Court. Congress is to appropriate
or authorize the disbursement. In this case, the President was
authorizing himself through an Executive Order, and they are
asking where the Executive Order is? They cannot produce it.
Because according to them, he (President) is authorized under
Article VI Sec. 25 par 5. But you have to define your terms,
because the law is very clear that there cannot be any transfer
of appropriation; this is to prevent juggling of funds.
Q: What was the question on, that may have been violated
here, on the separation of powers?
A: Because in effect, it was the President who determines for
what the project the money will be spent for, when it should
have been Congress having the power to appropriate funds.
TN (DAP issue)
Q: who has the authority, if authorized by law, to transfer
funds?
At one time, it was the Chief of the AFP that transfer the funds
from the savings of AFP for a particular item to another item.
(BAR)
Q: Does the Chief of Staff have that power?
A: No, he doesn’t have that power. If at all, the power is given
to the President being the commander-in-chief of the AFP but
is limited only to the executive branch. If AFP is under the
executive branch then probably, the President has the power if
authorized by law.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Paragraph 6 Section 25 of Article VI, on discretionary funds,
most of the funds that are discretionary, they need not liquidate
them. You just state there that it was spent for a public
purpose. so I doubt there are appropriate vouchers; most of
the intelligence funds are discretionary funds, there are no
receipts attached supporting the disbursement for as long as
you have the certification to the effect that it was spent for a
public purpose.
Suplico, et al. vs Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July
14, 2008 (TN) – if you can recall the ZTE; in order for us to
implement the project we need money. So we borrowed money
from China also.
Q: What did the government do on this?
A: We contracted a loan. Instead of remitting the proceeds of
the loan to the national treasury, they applied the proceeds
directly to the project. In effect, there was no appropriation law
authorizing the disbursement of those proceeds.
Gi automatic nila, pareho ba og mangutang ka nga dili na
kinahanglan og appropriation law kung monthly na nimo or
annual amortization because the amount is already
determined. In the next budget, you don’t even have to include
that, it is understood that it is included in the budget of that
department nga naka-utang, and automatically the money is
disbursed and is with authority. It is what exactly they did,
shortcut, they borrowed the money for a specific purpose of
government and then it was approved, they got the money and
supposedly applied it directly for the project.
Q: Is that allowed:
A: Supreme Court said, “Any government expenditure without
the corresponding appropriation from Congress is
unconstitutional. There can be no dispute that the proceeds of
foreign loan, whether concluded or not, cannot be obligated in
a procurement contract without prior appropriation from
Congress. When the executive branch secures a loan to fund a
procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds enter the
National Treasury as part of the general funds of the
government. Congress must appropriate by law the loan
proceeds to fund the procurement of goods or services,
otherwise the loan proceeds cannot be spent by the executive
branch.”When the loan falls due, Congress must make another
appropriation law authorizing the repayment of the loan out of
the general funds in the National Treasury. This appropriation
for the repayment of the loan is what is covered by the
automatic appropriation.
“The Constitution requires an appropriation law before public
funds are spent for any purpose. Section 29 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution provides:
No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
The power of the purse — or the power of Congress to
authorize payment from funds in the National Treasury –
is lodged  exclusively  in Congress. One of the
fundamental checks and balances finely crafted in the
Constitution is that Congress authorizes the amount to be
spent, while the Executive spends the amount so
authorized. The Executive cannot authorize its own
spending, and neither can Congress spend what it has
authorized. The rationale of this basic check and balance
is to prevent abuse of discretion in the expenditure of
public funds.
48
Thus, the Executive branch cannot spend a single centavo of
government receipts, whether from taxes, sales, donations,
dividends, profits, loans, or from any other source, unless
there is an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure.
Any  government  expenditure  without  the corresponding appr
opriation from  Congress  is unconstitutional. There is no
exception to this constitutional prohibition that "no money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." This constitutional prohibition is
self-executory.
To further insure compliance with Section 29 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987 expressly
prohibits the entering into contractsinvolving the
expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements are
satisfied. First,  there must be an appropriation law
authorizing the expenditure required in the
contract. Second,  there must be attached to the contract a
certification by the proper accounting official and auditor
that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds
are available. Failure to comply with any of these two
requirements renders the contract void.”
||| (Sulpico v. NEDA, G.R. No. 178830, 179317, 179613, July
14, 2008)
So in this case, nang loan ka e-remit nimo, to get the money
back, in order to apply it to the project you appropriate the
funds. Pagkatapos bayaran nimo ang utang, then there has to
be also appropriation law authorizing payment. Pero ang iyang
repayment na, subsequent payment it will now be covered by
automatic appropriation.
There was a case involving the COMELEC. There was
appropriation of funds for the procurement of election
paraphernalia, but what happened here, nagbidding, ang
nakada-ug ang highest bidder, beyond the appropriated
amount. (BAR)
Q: What happened?
A: it was nullified by the Supreme Court saying that it was not
authorized by an appropriation law.
(ii) Presidential veto and Congressional override
2. Non-legislative
a) Informing function
b) Power of impeachment
c) Other non-legislative powers
Confirmation of Appointments
Q: What is the Commission on Appointments? (TN)
A: This is another extension of Congress where members all
come from Congress. 12 Senators and 12 members coming
from the HR to be headed by the President of the Senate who
can only vote if there is a tie.
Q: When can they hold session? (TN)
A: Only when Congress is in session.
Q: Does the composition need to be fully or completely filled
up? (TN)
A: No. For as long as they will constitute a forum, that is alright.
Q: What are its functions? (TN)
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A: Basically, just to confirm and affirm nominations made by
the President while Congress is in session. These are what we
call Regular Appointments.
Q: What is the Commission on Appointments? (TN)
A: This is another extension of Congress where members all
come from Congress. 12 Senators and 12 members coming
from the HR to be headed by the President of the Senate who
can only vote if there is a tie.
Q: When can they hold session? (TN)
A: Only when Congress is in session.
Q: Does the composition need to be fully or completely filled
up? (TN)
A: No. For as long as they will constitute a forum, that is alright.
Q: What are its functions? (TN)
A: Basically, just to confirm and affirm nominations made by
the President while Congress is in session. These are what we
call Regular Appointments.
Q: What are these appointments that require confirmation by
the CA? ***
A:
1. Heads of the different departments of the Executive
Branch except for the VP who may be appointed to a
Cabinet position; that does not require confirmation of
the CA.
2. Officers of the AFP whose rank ranges from Colonel
to General in the army. In the navy, Captain to Admiral.
3. Ambassadors and other public officers including the
consuls.
4. Appointment vested in the President by the
Constitution (i.e. appointment of Constitutional
Commissioners and Regular members of JBC)
TN: With regards to the enumeration, that can’t be increased or
reduced by ordinary legislation, should you increase the
number of government official requiring confirmation by the
CA, you need an amendment to the Constitution. Similarly, if
you are going to reduce those appointments that would require
confirmation, it has to be an amendment to the Constitution.
Additionally, here’s the list in the Commission on
Appointments’ Primer
 Heads of Executive Departments (Cabinet and
Cabinet-rank officials)
 Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls
(under the 1987 Constitution and the Foreign Service
Act)
 Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel
or Naval Captain
 Regular Members of the Judicial and Bar Council
 Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service
Commission
 Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections
 Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on
Audit
 Members of the Regional and Consultative
Commissions
49
1. Chairman of the Commission on Higher
Education 
2. Chairman of the Commission on Information and
Communications Technology 
3. Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council 
4. Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority 
5. National Security Adviser
6. Director-General of the National Economic and
Development Authority Presidential Adviser on Peace
Process 
7. Lead Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty
Commission Punong Chairman of the Commission on
Filipinos Overseas 
 Chief of Philippine National Police
However, it must be noted that the appointments of all
judges and the Ombudsman shall not be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. Instead, they are
recommended by the Judicial and Bar Council, and the
President shall select from the recommendations.
Q: 2 kinds of Presidential Appointments?
1. Regular Appointments - President makes a
nomination while Congress is in session
2. Recess / Ad – Interim Appointments –
Nominations made while the Congress was
not in session. Such does not confirmation
by the CA.
Q: How about if the appointment is only temporary or in acting
capacity? (TN)
A: That would not need any confirmation by the CA.
[Temporary appointments are provided in Admin Code]
Case in point: Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978,
October 13, 2005
SC sustained the President Arroyo in this case. If only a
temporary capacity to fill in the gap while the President is still
meditating on who to appoint (regular appointment) as
Secretary of a particular department or Cabinet member, that
would not require a confirmation by the CA. As regards Ad
interim appointment however, it becomes effective upon
qualification of the nominee.
“Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of
appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse.
Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot
exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3),
Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of  EO 292. The law has
incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of
acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.
In distinguishing  ad interim appointments from
appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook writer on
constitutional law has observed:
Ad-interim appointments must be
distinguished from appointments in an acting
capacity. Both of them are effective upon
acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are
extended only during a recess of Congress,
whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling
important offices but, if abused, they can also
be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.  would be a violation of the separation of powers. What they
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The
absence of abuse is readily apparent from President
Arroyo's issuance of ad interim  appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way
before the lapse of one year.”
|||
Q: What is the process in regular appointments? (Primer of the
Commission on Appointments)
A: The regular appointments which are contemplated under the
first paragraph of Article VII, Section 16 of the 1987
Constitution go through the following stages:
1.            nomination
2.            consent
3.            appointment
4.            acceptance by the nominee
What the President sends to the Commission is just a
nomination. After the Commission has given its consent, the
President issues the appointment. It is only when the last stage
has been completed may the officer concerned take his oath of
office.
Q: What is the process in ad interim appointments? (Primer of
the Commission on Appointments)
The second paragraph of Article VII, Sec. 16, of the 1987
Constitution also empowers the President to issue
appointments while Congress is not in session. Such
appointments are called ad interim appointments, and it goes
through the following stages:
1.            appointment
2.            confirmation
An ad interim appointment is permanent in nature and takes
effect immediately. Thus, one who was issued an ad interim
appointment may immediately enter upon the discharge of his
functions.
An ad interim appointment ceases to be valid upon disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or, if not confirmed, until
the next adjournment of Congress.
Judge: Unlike temporary appointment, this is PERMANENT.
This is issued by the President when Congress is not in
session and therefore CA is not in session. It is effective upon
qualification of the nominee. However, if it’s not confirmed, it
will last only until the next adjournment of Congress. Such
nominee can be renominated.
Q: If disapproved, can the President re-nominate the same
candidate?
A: NO.
Q: If approved, what will happen next?
A: The President would issue a Commission. Thereafter, that
officer is going to take his oath of office.
Q: If not acted upon, what would be the effect/consequence?
A: It is understood that the appointment shall last only until the
next adjournment of session of Congress.
50
Q: Can such appointee be re-nominated?
A: Yes. That happened to De Lima, Dinky Soliman. For 4
years, they have not been confirmed, until finally, just recently,
their nominations were confirmed by the CA.
Q: Is there a limit on the number of re-nomination?
A: No. That is the prerogative of the President. To limit that
must do is DISAPPROVE so that, that candidate will not be re-
nominated.
TN: CA promulgates its own rules and regulations,
independent of the rules and regulations of the Congress.
Congress cannot interfere in the promulgation of such rules. In
that sense, CA is independent. Although highly partisan
because if you are no longer a member of the political party
that nominated you as a member of the CA, automatically you
cease to be a member of the CA. (Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R.
No. 164978, October 13, 2005)
Case in point: |  Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April
02, 2002
20.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DISAPPROVED CANNOT BE
REVIVED BY ANOTHER  AD INTERIM  APPOINTMENT. —
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C
of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-
passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved  ad
interim  appointment cannot be revived by another ad
interim  appointment because the disapproval is final under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a
reappointment is prohibited under Section 1(2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution. A by-passed  ad interim appointment can be
revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no
final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the
appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years
Q: Would that constitute a violation against prohibition on re-
appointment if the same person is re-nominated by the
President?
A: No violation because that statement in the provision of the
Constitution stating that it is without re-appointment is
applicable only to REGULAR APPOINTMENTS. An ad
interim/recess appointment is not the kind of appointment
contemplated by law that prohibits re-appointment. (TN)
Q: Any chance of a party-list representative being represented
in the electoral tribunal or in the commission on appointments?
A: Yes. For as long as the representative complies with the
requirements under the Constitution for appointment as
member of the said bodies such as proportional representation
from the political parties. It’s up for these bodies to promulgate
the rules and regulations that may allow the members coming
from the party-list to represent in the electoral tribunal and/or in
the commission on appointments.
Congressional Records and Books
The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be
preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law,
and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit
which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to
and expenses for each Member.
IV. Executive Department
What you must TN on article VII guys that is EXECUTIVE
BRANCH, you have to know what is Executive Power,
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Q: if executive power is vested in the president, what would be
the consequence?
A: He is the chief executive and the administrator of the laws of
the land, you know already if he is the chief executive, he
controls the executive branch and all offices belonging to the
executive branch, as the administrator of the laws of the land
he make sure that laws are faithfully executed.
There are powers however, that are not expressly provided in
the constitution being given either to the legislative or judiciary
branch it is understood that this power should be exercise by
the president, this is what we call RESIDUAL POWER of the
president, being the chief executive. One of these powers is
the power to deport undesirable aliens; the power on who is to
enter into the country is also a residual power TN of the case
of Marcos vs Manglapus.
Another power of the president which is not provided in the
constitution that is understood that this power should be
exercise by him, this what we call the IMMUNITY OF THE
PRESIDENT FROM SUIT, the source of immunity is not by
express provision of the constitution rather it is more of
jurisprudential source rather than provided by the constitution
TN of the extent of the enjoyment of the presidential immunity
always remember this guys if the president is immune from suit
Q: up to what extent?
A: only for acts he committed in the performance of his official
function as president during his incumbency, actual tenure
NOT TERM, so even if he has still five years, however, is no
longer the president of the republic he can no longer enjoy the
immunity from suit, TN of the case of Estrada vs Desierto, and
the case of Romualdez vs Sandiganbayan so you notice in all
cases although the target is the president, he is never
impleaded as the defendant rather it is always the executive
secretary that’s the case of David et al vs Ermita, SC said it is
not proper to implead the president as respondent settled is
the doctrine that the president during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case and there is no need provide for it in the constitution.
CIVIL OR CRIMINAL ha sa ato pa.
“We now come to the scope of immunity  that can be claimed
by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases  filed
against petitioner Estrada are  criminal in character.  They
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch
of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability.  It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The
rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the
State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.”|||  (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15,
146738, March 02, 2001)
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as
respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during
his tenure of office or actual incumbency,  may not be sued
in  any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for
51
it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes
the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does
not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like
any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he
may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law
and that is by impeachment.||| (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 171396, May 03, 2006)
Q: if a case is filed against the president for collection of sum
of money during his incumbency, will the action prosper?
A: no
Q: case for murder? Will the action prosper?
A: no, you wait until he finishes his tenure
Another point you should TN also on immunity from suit it is
special to the president therefore, only the president can
invoke the immunity not his cabinet members even if they are
consider as there alter ego, so you remember also that case of
Soliven vs Makasiar, where Soliven ask for the dismissal of the
complaint filed by president Aquino against the star(not sure)
and the publisher on the ground is immune from suit, they are
saying that wla tay dag anan ani we cannot file a counter suit
because he is immune from suit, SC said the privilege pertains
to the president by virtue of his office, there is nothing in our
laws that would prevent the president from waiving the
privilege, the choice whether to exercise the privilege or to
waive it is solely belongs to the president you cannot use that
as a defense against the president
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION
OF OFFENSES; LIBEL; RULES THEREON SHOULD BE
EXAMINED FROM VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES IF DIRECTED
AT A HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL; THE SUPREME
COURT SHOULD DRAW A FINE LINE INSTEAD OF
LEAVING IT TO A LOWER TRIBUNAL. — In fact, the Court
observed that high official position, instead of affording
immunity from slanderous and libelous charges would actually
invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. It would
seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the
typical person should be examined from various perspectives if
directed at a high government official. Again, the Supreme
Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower
tribunals.|||  (Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 82827,
83979, November 14, 1988)
Now on the qualifications of the president the most important
part on the qualification on citizenship he must be natural born,
registered voter, able to read and write, 40 yrs of age on the
day of election and resident of the Philippines for 10 yrs, just
over with that guys, the VP shall have the same qualification,
although he may be nominated as a cabinet secretary without
need of confirmation by the CA.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Q: Section 4, what is the controversy relating to this? Formento
vs. Estrada (id). What is the term of office of the President?
A: This would now be an issue aside from the fact that there
was a question as to the qualification of Estrada due to his
conviction for plunder. They are asking for the disqualification
of Estrada as mayor because according to the complainant in
as much as he was convicted for plunder his right to run from
public office likewise is removed from him by perpetual
disqualification. What is the defense of Estrada was that he
was granted with absolute pardon. If absolute pardon was
granted to him then he will be restored to his political and civil
rights. And that is discretionary also to the president as one of
his powers not subject to review even by the Supreme Court.
Term of Office
TN as to the term of office. The president and the vice
president are directly elected by the people for a definite term
of 6 years. As to re-election; the president shall not be eligible
for any re-election. The vice president has 1 re-election.
Q: Any possibility of the president serving more than 6 years?
A: Yes, provided that he has not served for more than 4 years
as acting president rather as president’s successor. Meaning,
he was a vice president and he succeeds to the presidency,
provided he has not served for more than 4 years he can run
for election as president in the next election then definitely if he
has fully served the 6 years term as president in the election
after that election, then he would like have 10 years. Now, is
this disqualification perpetual regardless he did not finished his
term. Like Estrada, he served only for like 3 years. He did not
finish his 6 years. That is why he ran for president.
Q: What was the theory here?
A: Because he has not finished his term and therefore the
disqualification against re-election will not apply. But it has
never been resolved by the Supreme Court. TN
TN: as regards to Vice president, 2 terms and the 2 nd
paragraph is clear that no voluntary renunciation in the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected. That only applies to the VP not to the President. That
if he resigns before the term expires it didn’t say that it will be
an interruption in the continuity of his term. What is mentioned
is that it is not an interruption it is only with the respect of the
term of office of the vice president because apparently he has
2 terms to compute the consecutiveness of the term they have
to say that. Since there is no mention about interruption on the
continuity of his term should he not finish his term then he is
still eligible for election as president. There can hardly be
called as re-election I suppose as far as he understands the
law.
Q: On the canvassing of the election returns. Who does that?
A: It is not the COMELEC neither the SC but the members of
the congress as the canvassers of the election returns of the
president and the vice president. Whoever garners the highest
number of votes shall be declared as the winner. In case of a
tie, it shall be broken by majority votes of the members of the
congress voting in a joint session voting separately.
Presidential Electoral Tribunal
52
Electoral tribunal for vice president and president is the PET.
Macalintal questioned the constitutionality of the creation of
PET consisting of the justices of the SC because under the
Constitution it says that they’re not supposed to do non-judicial
function as it will violate the separation of powers. This is an
election function (electoral tribunal). It was then asked by
Macalintal whether or not it is constitutional. SC said that a
plain reading of article 7 par.7 sec.4 readily reveals a grant of
authority to the SC sitting en banc in the same vein although
the method by which the SC exercise this authority is not
specified in the provisions the grant of power does not contain
any limitation on the SC’s exercise thereof. The SC method of
deciding presidential and vice presidential election contest
through the PET is actually a derivative of the exercise of
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision thus the subsequent directive in the provision for the
SC to promulgate its own rules for the purpose. It is beyond
cavil that when the SC, as PET, resolves Presidential or Vice
Presidential Contest it performs what is essentially a judicial
power.
“It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court,
as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the
landmark case of  Angara v. Electoral Commission,  Justice
Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels."
In fact,  Angara  pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a
definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time,
the  1935 Constitution  did not contain the expanded definition
of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of
the present Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution
has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's
exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts,  the task of
deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests,
with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by
PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to
courts of law,  expressly provided in the Constitution. On the
whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct
line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members
of the Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in
Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the
first to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which,
in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme
Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-
Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII.
In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4,
Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court,
constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an
agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once
again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution,
is to be an institution  independent, but not separate,  from the
judicial department,  i.e., the Supreme Court.”
||| (Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
191618, November 23, 2010)
In the landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission, JP
Laurel inoculated that it would inconceivable if the constitution
had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels. In fact
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Angara pointed out that the constitution is a definition of the
powers of the government and yet at that time the 1935
constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial
power. So, this is not an electoral function but rather, it was
emphasized in this case that this is a judicial power and
therefore does not violate article 7 section 4 par. 7 thereof. TN
of that.
Q: Also, in relation to the filing of the election protest in the
presidential electoral tribunal, what will happen if the protestant
will resume the function of whatever position that he left before
he ran as president? Like, Santiago she went back as member
of the senate because she can’t wait for the result of the
election. What was the effect of her returning to the senate
while there was still the pending election protest that he filed
against Ramos?
A: She is then considered to have withdrawn or abandon her
election protest against ramos. In the case of legarda, legarda
filed an election protest against de castro. While waiting for the
outcome of the election protest she ran as senator.
Q: What was the effect?
A: Like in the case of Santiago she was considered to have
effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when she ran
in the senate which term coincides with the term of the Vice
Presidency.
Q: On the Salaries of President and Vice President, it shall be
determined by law. Can it be decreased during his tenure?
A: No, it cannot be decreased. But it can be increased.
However, it will only take effect after the expiration of the term
of office.
Filling up of vacancy
Q: 2 ways by which vacancy may occur:
(1) at the beginning of the term or
(2) during the incumbency of the president.
At the beginning of the term it could be temporary or
permanent.
Temporary Vacancy, when the president does not qualify in
the meantime because there are still controversies as to his
qualification, no president was chosen
Q: Who will succeed?
A: The VP shall only act as the president.
Q: What if there is no Vice President?
A: It will be the President of the Senate that will act as
President.
Q: In the absence of the President of the Senate?
A: It will be the Speaker of the House of Representative.
Q: In Permanent Vacancy, What if at the beginning of the
term the president dies, resigns, permanently unable to
perform his duties? What will happen?
A: The VP will not just be acting but becomes the new
president. There will be a vacancy in the office of the VP.
Q: How will it be filled up?
A: There will be a nomination of the President coming from
congress who will be chosen by majority votes of the members
of the congress.
53
During incumbency:
Q: Permanent vacancies: 4 ways to have a permanent
vacancy.
A:
1) he dies
2) he resigns (TN of the definition of resignation in the case of
Estrada vs. desierto. What was emphasized is that there is no
form of resignation. It may not be formal, need not be in
writing. For as long as there is the intention to relinquish the
powers of the office and his acts corresponds to the
renunciation or to the giving up of the powers then one is
considered to have resigned. Vice president will be now the
President.)
3) removed through impeachment
4) one who is permanently incapacitated to perform his duties.
Q: Temporary Vacancies: (TN)
A:
1) When the president is under temporary disability (TN of the
circumstances)
a) president himself declares that he cannot performs
his duties. Automatically the VP will act as the president.
b) by the declaration of the majority of the members of
the cabinet to the congress that the president is unable to
perform his duties. Automatically the VP shall act as a
president but of course that can be disputed by the president if
he does not agree and can simply tell the congress that his
cabinet is lying.
c) if this majority of the cabinet would inist the 2
second time that indeed the president is unable, then the
congress will now have to decide to declare the president
under temporary disability.
Q: How many votes of the congress is needed?
A: 2/3 of the members voting separately.) TN of the case of
Estrada vs Desierto on temporary disability.
“Petitioner now appears to fault Congress for its
various acts expressed thru resolutions which brushed off
his temporary inability to govern and President-on-leave
argument. He asserts that these acts of Congress should
not be accorded any legal significance because: (1) they
are  post facto and (2) a declaration of presidential
incapacity cannot be implied.
We disagree. There is nothing in section 11 of
Article VII of the Constitution which states that the
declaration by Congress of the President's inability  must
always be a priori or before the Vice-President assumes
the presidency. In the cases at bar, special consideration
should be given to the fact that the events which led to the
resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed
and culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in
session and had no reasonable opportunity  to act a
priori  on petitioner's letter claiming inability to govern.”
||| (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738, April
03, 2001)
Q: Going back to permanent vacancy, who will succeed?
A: It will be for the VP.
In the absence of VP, it will be the President of the Senate.
In the absence of the President of the Senate, it will be the
Speaker of the House of Representative.
Q: Now then, in the absence of those mentioned above?
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A: They will convene and pass a law providing for the manner
of succession.
Q: Can they call for a special election?
A: You remember if the vacancy occurs within 18 months
before the next regular election, no more special election. You
have to wait until a regular election will be called which is every
2nd Monday of May.
TN: the calling of special election does not need the signature
of the acting president.
TN: Printing of the bill before it is voted upon is dispensable if
there is a certification that the bill is urgent.
Q: When there is vacancy in both offices (president and VP)?
A: There will be a special election. [Art. 7 Sec. 10 of 1987
Consti]
Section 13 HOLDING OTHER OFFICES/ CONFLICT OF
INTERESTS
He cannot appoint any of his relatives either by consanguinity
or affinity in the fourth civil degree.
BAR Q: To what positions in the government during his
tenure?
A:
1. As members of the constitutional commission
2. Office of the ombudsman
3. Secretaries under secretaries
4. Chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices
including GOCCs and their subsidiaries.
Section 14 APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED BY AN ACTING
PRESIDENT
It will only be effective until it is not revoked within 90 days.
From the assumption of office by the president regular, it
becomes permanent. If there is any revocation of the
appointments of the acting president , it should be done within
90 days from the assumption and re-assumption of office.
Section 15 MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS
The President should not make any appointments. TN: Within
60 days or 2 months before the regular Presidential election.
This does not apply to local chief executives. It only applies to
the President.
Q: What is the extent?
A: Practically, all government positions including the judiciary,
except justices of the Supreme Court.
CASES: de Castro vs. JBC; Soriano vs. JBC.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in
Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to
appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers
did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the
Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC  and their
subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for
judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate  prior process
of the  JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight
appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the
mold of  Aytona  were made in haste and with irregularities, or
made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his
administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the
incoming President or for partisanship,   the appointments to
54
the Judiciary made after the establishment of the  JBC would
not be suffering from such defects because of the  JBC's prior
processing of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory
construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the
enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or
meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the
enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on "the
law of the statute," i.e.,  the intent; hence, the enactment
should be construed with reference to its intended scope and
purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this purpose
rather than to defeat it.  |||  (De Castro v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)
The gist of the Supreme Court regarding the midnight
appointments even applied to appointments of the judiciary
except for the Supreme Court because of that provision of the
constitution that the President must make an appointment
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. He has to
fill that up. It is mandatory. The same goes with the
Sandiganbayan. Controversy: Relating to the return of the JBC
list for appointment to the Sandiganbayan, which the JBC also
returned to the President because they are not going to
change the list and so the President was compelled to make
the appointment because the period within which to make the
appointment which is 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy had already lapsed. Because of that requirement,
under the Constitution, that the appointment of the justices of
the Supreme Court, according to the Supreme court, the
matter of midnight appointment does not apply to the SC
justices.
CASE: Pimentel vs. Ermita regarding on the acting
appointments not requiring any confirmation from the CA
because that is a discretionary power of the President that
cannot be included into by the CA or the Commission on
Appointments.
“Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become
vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the President's
confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a
department secretary, the President mustappoint  in an acting
capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in
session. That person may or may not be the permanent
appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that
the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such
acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III
of  EO 292  states that "[t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or  any
other competent person to perform the functions of an office
in the executive branch." Thus, the President may
even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the
government service, as long as the President deems that
person competent.”
||| (Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October
13, 2005)
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Section 16 APPOINTMENTS REQUIRING THE
CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS
To emphasize, on the appointments of the President during
recess, it is permanent. Immediately effective upon
qualification of the nominee, however, the term is limited if not
confirmed. It shall last only until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
Section 17 CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENT OVER THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND OFFICES
To ensure that laws are faithfully executed, TN: As part of the
control, the President has the power to reorganize the office.
Q: As part of the reorganization of the executive branch, what
is included?
A: He can create offices without violating the separation of
powers or even abolish the office.
The creation of the Truth Commission that was sustained by
the Supreme Court as constitutional after all that is part of his
executive power as regards to make sure that laws are
faithfully executed. According to the Supreme Court in those
cases where the President makes an office under the
executive branch, it is not usurpation of legislative function
because it does not entail another appropriation of funds for
the operation of the office because the funds will be taken from
the appropriated amount for the executive branch.
With regards to the abolition, inasmuch as the office is created
by law, it is understood that if there is any abolition of that
office, that is within the prerogative of the Congress.
TN: CASE: Buklod ng Kawaning EIIP vs. Zamora where the
Supreme Court said,
GR: The power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature.
EXC: However, is that as far as bureaus, agencies (TN: this
may also be asked in administrative law), or offices in the
executive department, Executive Department are concerned,
the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate
the function of a particular office or certain laws may grant him
broad authority to carry out the organization measures for
simplicity, transparency and expigiency in the government
service. The Chief Executive under our laws has the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the office
of the President.
CASE: Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, Supreme
Court said suffice to say there will be no appropriation but only
an allotment or allocation of existing funds already
appropriated accordingly there is no usurpation on the power
of the Congress to appropriate funds for the establishment of
the Truth Commission therefore there cannot be a violation of
the separation of powers.
Difference between control and supervision:
In control, the President can change the decision of the
subordinate. In the matter of supervision, the President only
oversees to make sure that the government official performs
his functions in accordance with law. He cannot change the
decision of the subordinate. That is the difference, the
President who is only supervision over local governments.
Q: Who has control over local governments?
A: It is the congress through the Local Government Code.
55
But the President has only supervision over the local
government units therefore the President cannot change the
decisions of local governments.
ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE
TN: With respect to the secretaries or heads of the executive
branches of government, they are considered as extensions of
the office of the President. In other words, the secretaries are
considered as the alter-egos of the President. The act of a
Secretary is considered to be the act of the President, unless it
is reprobated, repealed or disapproved by the President.
TN: There are certain functions of the President that cannot be
delegated to an alter ego
BAR: Limitations on the Delegation Power of the President
Even if it is delegated by the President, or even if ratified by
him, the same act of the alter-ego is ineffective and does not
bind because such functions can only be acted upon by the
President, that cannot be delegated.
1) Immunity from Suit -can only be enjoyed
by the President
2) Power to declare Martial Law
This cannot be delegated to any secretary of
the President. Even if the President
declares it or ratifies it through the Executive
Secretary or Justice Secretary, such is
invalid.
3) Power to suspend of the privilege of the
writ of Habeas Corpus
4) The power to enter into treaties-
exclusive to the President and cannot
be delegated
5) The power to grant pardon
Case:
With constitutional parameters already established, we may
also note, as a source of suppletory guidance, the provisions
of  R.A. No. 245. The afore-quoted Section 1 thereof empowers
the Secretary of Finance with the approval of the President
and after consultation of the Monetary Board, "to borrow from
time to time on the credit of the Republic of the Philippines
such sum or sums as in his judgment may be necessary, and
to issue therefor evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine
Government." Ineluctably then, while the President wields the
borrowing power it is the Secretary of Finance who normally
carries out its thrusts.|||(Spouses Constantino v. Cuisia, G.R.
No. 106064, October 13, 2005)
Section 18 POWER OF THE PRESIDENT AS THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE AFP
Q: What are the calling-out powers of the President?
A: These are:
1. Declaration of Martial Law
2. Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
3. Review decisions of Court Marshalls
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW
Q: When can the President call out the AFP to assist him in
the discharge of his functions?
A: Whenever it becomes necessary in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
Q: Is it subject to judicial review?
A: NO.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Q: Is it subject to revocation by Congress?
A: NO. In fact, it is the most potent power that the President
may exercise as the Commander In Chief of the AFP.
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Q: When?
A: When there is actual rebellion or invasion, when public
safety requires it. It is only effective for 60 days if not extended
or revoked by Congress, automatically, it shall be lifted by
operation of law after expiration of the 60-day period,
reviewable by the SC under its exercise of judicial review.
Q: Is this Remedy of revocation of judicial review
simultaneous or the choice of a person who may question the
factual basis of the declaration of ML or the suspension of
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus? Would you go directly
to the SC or should you wait until after the Congress shall have
decided whether to revoke the declaration of Martial Law?
A: This is successive, not simultaneous. Precisely the
requirement of the President from the declaration of ML or the
suspension of the privilege of he writ of habeas corpus to do a
report within 48 hours. Immediately then, the Congress will
convene and will decide whether to revoke it or not.
BAR:
Q: How many votes are needed to revoke it?
A: MAJORITY VOTING JOINTLY. The revocation of the
declaration of Martial Law or the suspension of the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas corpus is the only instance where there is
joint voting. Thereafter, if it is not revoked, there is another
option: To go to the Supreme Court and ask for a judicial
review.
***Remember that the Bill of Rights are not suspended,
therefore, you cannot be detained for more than 72 hours
without being judicially charged. The right to bail is still
available if the offense charge is bailable.
In reality, as regards to the suspension of the priv writ of
habeas corpus, it will not be suspended for a period of 60 days
with respect to the person arrested without a warrant. The
suspension of the privilege with respect to a particular
individual arrested without a warrant shall last only for a period
of three (3) days because if he is not judicially charged, he
should be released otherwise you can demand for habeas
corpus so that the court can inquire to the legality of detention.
For a particular individual, whether it is a suspension of the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, it is only for a period of
three (3) days that he cannot avail of the privilege of the Writ of
habeas corpus because the Court has no jurisdiction due to
the suspension.
LIMITATION: You should not be detained without being
judicially charged for more than 72 hours.
In effect, this suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus merely extends the period of custodial investigation
without judicial interference because the longest period under
grave offenses that you can be detained without the court
interfering for a custodial investigation is 36 hours only. When
there is a suspension of the privilege, it will be extended to 72
hours so However it is limited only to involving offenses related
to the declaration of ML or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. The offenses that you may be
charged have to relate to invasion or rebellion. If there is no
56
relation to those offenses, then there is no effect on the
suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus for
ordinary offenses. The court still has the jurisdiction to inquire
into the legality of detention.
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AS THE COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
A. Calling out power
 To call on the members or the AFP
Q: What is the purpose?
A: Whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out the
members of the Armed Forces to assist him in the discharge of
his functions in order to prevent or to suppress lawless
violence, rebellion or invasion
B.Declaration of Martial Law
C. Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
D. Reviewing decisions of Court Martial
TN the difference between the calling out power of the
President and the declaration of martial law.
Q. Can this power be delegated to local chief executives? A.
That was the issue in the Kulayan case, whether or not the
governor of Maguindanao can also call out the Armed Forces
of the Philippines in order to assist him in the suppression or
prevention o lawless violence or rebellion in his locality?
A. JAMAR KULAYAN VS. TAN, JULY 3, 2012
Where the SC said that the calling out power contemplated
under the constitution is exclusive to the President of the
Philippines as Commander-in-Chief, that a provincial governor
is not endowed with the power to call upon the Armed Forces
at his own bidding. It ruled that only the President is authorized
to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23,
Art. 6 and the calling out power under Section 7, Art. 7 of the
1987 Constitution. SC said that while the President exercises
full supervision and control over the police, a local chief
executive such as the governor only exercises operational
supervision over the police and may exercise only a day to day
operation. As discussed in the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission only the President has full discretion to call on
the, military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in
order to prevent or suppress lawless violence,, invasion or
rebellion.
Q. How is it different from the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
A. On the calling out, it is the discretion of the President,
unless there is abuse of discretion that cannot be reviewed by
the SC under the power of judicial review. Likewise, the
President is not obliged to report to Congress if he exercised
the power.
Unlike martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus you will not that if the President does that it
must be for a particular ground or grounds:
1. Either there is rebellion or invasion
2. The public safety requires the declaration or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus
TN, should the President do that, he has to make a report in
writing within 48 hours and immediately Congress must
convene. That power of the President then may be checked by
Congress because if Congress finds it baseless, meaning no
factual basis to declare martial law or suspends the privilege of
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
the writ of habeas corpus, Congress can always revoke it by a
MAJORITY VOTE in a joint session, voting jointly.
Q. If Congress failed to check the power of the President, is
there still a remedy to correct what has been done by the
President in so far as the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
A. It can be brought up all the way to the SC under the power
of judicial review. Therefore, in the matter as to whether or not
the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is a justiciable question, it is settled
that it is a justiciable question.
Q. Who is a proper party to question the factual basis or the
validity of the declaration of martial law or he suspension of the
writ of the privilege of habeas corpus?
A. TN, that it can be raised by any citizen of the country. He
need not be the person directly injured. The constitution
expressly provides that any citizen can question the factual
basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Other limitations on the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
 Its only good for 60 days, meaning if not extended by
Congress, it shall automatically be lifted after the
lapse of 60 days from its declaration
 Secondly, If one is arrested without a warrant, can he
still avail of his right to bail? Answer is YES, the only
guarantee here that there will be no judicial
intervention within a period of 72 hours. If one is
detained for more than 72 hours already without being
charged in court, then he can always ask for habeas
corpus. It is not precluded, because the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a
particular individual who was arrested without a
warrant actually is effective only for 72 hours.
Although the effectivity of the suspension is good for
60 days but for a particular individual it should not last
more than 3 days.or 72 hours without being judicially
charged. Once charged and it is not bailable then you
can be detained until your case is terminated.
PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT (Art. 19) ******
If you can recall, Estrada was convicted after 6 years of
prosecution, spending millions of money. After he was
convicted, what happened? He filed a motion of
reconsideration and even before that was resolved by the
court, Arroyo offered pardon to him. He didn’t ask for it, it was
offered to him through Secretary Puno and he accepted the
pardon that was offered to him and it was not clear whether it
was absolute or conditional. Apparently, if it is not clear
whether he was absolutely extended with pardon, what would
be the consequence because this is now an issue as against
Estrada. If you are convicted and you are granted pardon, you
may be relieved only of the effects of further infliction of the
punishment. So if you were detained and granted pardon, you
will be released without fully serving the sentence. But
remember if convicted, there are accessory penalties.
Q. What are the accessory penalties?
A. It could be perpetual public disqualification and that’s the
question on Estrada. The point there here guys is you have to
take note of this power of the president because it might be an
issue when you take the bar examination next year. I suppose
there is a pending complaint already filed in the Supreme
57
Court disqualifying Estrada as mayor of Manila because of his
previous conviction. They believed that it was never erased
that conviction. That conviction did not at all affect his public
disqualification as the pardon granted to him was silent as to
whether or not he was restored to his civil or political rights.
Always remember that this power is vested in the President. It
is a full discretionary power of the President This power is one
of the powers that cannot be delegated to an alter ego. This is
exclusive to the president.
Q. What are the different kinds of pardon that may be granted
by the President?
A.
1. Pardon
2. Amnesty
3. Commutation
4. Reprieves
5. Remission of fines and forfeiture
Comparing Pardon and Amnesty
Pardon, usually is granted by the President to persons
convicted by final judgment for ordinary offenses. Take note of
the conditions, ha. Here the accused is already convicted and
the conviction is already final and executory and he is granted
pardon by the President.
Q. What will be the effect if granted pardon?
A. It depends. There are two kinds of pardon that may be
granted:
1. Absolute
If it is absolute, there is no need of acceptance by the
pardonee. Whether he likes it or not, he will be
granted the pardon and enjoy the benefits of the
grant.
2. Conditional
If it is conditional, it has to be accepted because it
might be more burdensome to accept it. They would
rather continue with the service of the sentence and
stay free board and lodging in the Bilibid rather than
going out of the prison. Sometimes, they will not
accept because there are certain conditions that they
need to comply before they will be granted pardon.
Now, as I was saying earlier , pardon has to be final.
There has to be a conviction, and it must be final, so
that if you have still a pending appeal, you cannot be
granted pardon by the President.
Q. What would be then effect if granted pardon assuming
that you are convicted, the judgment of conviction has become
final , you accepted the grant of pardon. What would be the
effect?
A. The effect would be, that you would be relieved of further
infliction of the punishment. Say for example your sentence is
20 years of imprisonment. After 1 year of serving without
appealing the judgment you were granted pardon.
Q. Do you need to serve the 19 more years ?
A. The answer is NO, once granted pardon. In other words that
further infliction of punishment is removed because of the grant
of pardon. If convicted there is the accessory penalty.
Q. What is the accessory penalty? You have public
disqualification, not only that, you will be deprived of your civil
rights like for example, parental authority over your minor
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
children, or your authority over your wife, you would also be
denied of that right over your wife , administration over your
conjugal properties that’s one among what we call civil
interdiction.
Public disqualification for office is either for appointive or
elective public positions. As a consequence of disqualification
from public office, you cannot run for public office anymore or
you cannot anymore be appointed to any office of government.
You cannot also be reinstated to any public office.
Q: Now then, if for example, you already fully served your
sentence, is pardon still relevant to you? You have served your
sentence for 20 years and thereafter you were granted pardon.
Is that still important?
 
A: Yes. For purposes of removing the accessory penalties
such as public disqualification or civil interdiction. If pardon is
granted, it may restore your civil and political rights.
Let us apply this to the case of Erap Estrada. Erap Estrada
was convicted of plunder. That was only after six years that he
was convicted and millions of pesos were spent by the
government to arrive at his conviction. It took so long, only to
be granted pardon by Arroyo only a few months or weeks after
his conviction. In the meantime, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and then he accepted the pardon granted on
Arroyo. There was no resolution on that Motion for
Reconsideration.
Q: Was the conviction final or still pending, given that the
Motion for Reconsideration was not resolved? Was the MR
mooted by the grant of pardon?
A: The theory here is that Arroyo may have abused her
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The grant
of the pardon was null and void. One can still question it
anytime or any stage before the Supreme Court.
 
The things that they were pointing out questioning the grant of
pardon to Estrada are:
 
 The things that they were pointing out questioning the
grant of pardon to Estrada was that the judgment was not
yet final when the pardon was granted due to the pending
MR.
 Arroyo abused here discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction because she granted the pardon to
Estrada without any qualification considering the number
of years and the amount spent to arrive at Estrada's
conviction.
 
Hopefully, that would be laid to rest with the SC with this
pending complaint filed for the disqualification of Estrada,
questioning the validity of the pardon given by Arroyo to
Estrada.
 
Q: Is this pardon, if granted, subject to Judicial Review by the
SC?
A: Generally, NO. Pardon is subject to the full discretionary
power of the President. It is final and executory unless there is
an allegation of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. That is now their assertion as to the
pardon given by Arroyo to Estrada.
 
TN that NOT ALL cases may be subject of pardon.
58
EXCEPTIONS:
 
 Impeachment
 Convicted of election offenses - you cannot be
granted pardon unless there is a favorable
recommendation form the COMELEC
 If cited in contempt by the Congress pursuant to
a Legislative Inquiry
 If cited in contempt by Civil Courts
 
AMNESTY
 
TN that this is not under the sole discretion by the President.
This is subject to the favorable recommendation of the
Congress.
 
TN that this can only be granted to individuals or class of
persons who are charged with offenses of political nature.
This can be granted even before conviction. So this particular
power of the President may be availed of before or after the
conviction. You need not wait for the final conviction of the
person granted amnesty.
 
Q: If granted, what will happen?
A: It would be as if he never committed the crime. There is total
absolute exculpation and exoneration from the criminal
culpability.
TN of the concurrence of the Congress to the grant of
amnesty. There has to be a law where there is the grant of
amnesty.
Q: What are powers similar to the pardoning power of the
President?
A:
 
 Commutation - reduction of the penalty by one degree
lower
 Reprieve - postponement of the execution of
judgment
 Remission or Cancellation of Fines and Forfeiture.
 
The president may also grant pardon to persons who are
convicted in administrative cases for the purpose of reinstating
him in his office. However, there is one exception that the
president cannot grant pardon in administrative cases. That is
when the administrative case involves judges and other court
personnel. They cannot be granted pardon by the president.
Amnesty may be granted by the Supreme Court but not by the
President.
 
TN/Q: Parole if granted, what would be the effect?
A: You are still in custody of the law but outside of jail. You are
continuing to serve your sentence BUT you continue serving it
outside of jail.
 
Probation - granted to those who have been convicted in cases
where the penalty is less than 6 years of imprisonment but it is
not up to the President to grant probation, rather, it is the
courts who grant probation.
Article VII, Section 20:
 
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of
the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.  Q: What other powers does the President have?
BAR: This was asked in the Bar Examination on guaranteeing
of foreign loans in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
This may be delegated to the chairman of the Bangko Sentral.
TN that this does not need the concurrence of the Senate. All
that is needed here is the concurrence of the Central Monetary
Authority (BSP).
Article VII, Section 21:
 
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
 
TN: You must note the difference between an Executive
Agreement and International Agreement/Treaty.
 
International Agreement/Treaty - requires concurrence
by 2/3 vote of the members of the Senate in order to
validate it. The one who ratifies the treaty is the
President but to bind the public, there must be the 2/3
vote of the Senate.
 
Executive Agreement - does not need the concurrence
of the Senate.
  V. Judicial Department
Q: So what they're doing in the DFA is that they are
making the Visiting Forces Agreement which implements
the RP-US Mutual Defense Agreement into a simple
Executive Agreement. The RP-US Mutual Defense
Agreement is the one that requires the concurrence of
the Senate but not the VFA. What is the difference?
A: Usually, a treaty or international agreement affects
political or national issues that are more or less
permanent. Executive agreements only provide for
details, transitory, implementing international
agreements which is why it does not need Senate
concurrence.
There is an issue related to this because of the
impending establishment of military bases, whether
temporary or permanent by the US forces in Subic
Olonggapo while we still have this ongoing conflict with
China. They are trying to amend the VFA in order to
allow them entry into the country with their arms (the
US).
 
TN that those cases like Bayan v Exec. Secretary, and
that case of Smith - we will tackle that in our discussion
on transitory provisions.
 
TN of the power of the President in his participation in
treaty-making. It is the sole power of the President to
ratify a treaty. Not even the SC can compel the President
to submit a treaty to the Senate for concurrence.
(Pimentel vs Exec. Secretary)
 
In other words, if the President refuses to submit the
treaty to the Senate for concurrence, the President
cannot be compelled to submit the treaty to the Senate.
The Senate, even if they concur to the treaty, if the
President refuses to ratify the treaty, the Senate cannot
compel the President to do so because the matter of
59
ratification of a treaty is up to the sole discretionary
power of the President.
 
A:
Sec. 22 (Budget)
 Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress,
within thirty days from the opening of every regular
session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a
budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including
receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures 
Section 23 (SONA)
 Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the
opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it
at any other time.
  
The President will lay down his programs, what he has
achieved, WON he has already complied with his
promise. That is part of the transparency of the
government.
 
If you will be asked to cite provisions of the Constitution
which promotes transparency, one of those would be
under Section 23 on SONA of the President. This is
usually the time that he appears before the Congress to
address the Congress, although he may appear any time
he wants to appear.
 
The Judicial Department is vested with judicial power.
 
Q: What does judicial power mean?
A: The ordinary meaning of judicial power is the power to
settle disputes among parties involving rights that are
legally demandable or enforceable; simply settling
conflicts and controversies.
 
However, there is the expanded judicial power. The
courts can now determine whether there exists a grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. This is done by the courts via judicial review.
Q:Where is this power vested?
A: It is vested in one Supreme Court and other such
courts as may be established by statutes i.e. Statutory
Courts.
 
Q: Who exercises judicial power?
A: It is exercised, not only be the Supreme Court, but
also by the lower courts.
 
Q: Cite provisions in the Constitution which supports the
principle that judicial review is not only exercised by the
Supreme Court but also by all other courts.
A:
Section 1 - It is vested in the SC and the other statutory
courts.
Section 5 - relating to the review power of the SC of the
session of the lower courts as to the constitutionality of
laws, treaties, etc. What will the SC review if the courts
do not also exercise the power in reviewing WON a law
or an act is in consonance of the Constitution?
 
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
These two legal provisions arrive at the conclusion that
even lower courts exercise judicial review.
However, the difference between the SC's judicial review
power and that of the lower courts is that the lower
court's reviews are not final because they are still subject
to review by the Supreme Court which means that it can
be reversed by the SC. What will bind the whole country
or the world insofar as the decision of the court is
concerned is the prevailing principle or jurisprudence is
always the deicison of the SC, and not the lower court.
 
Another point is that, while this is a power enjoyed be the
lower courts, it must be exercised by the lower courts
with utmost prudence and caution because it may cause
political unrest resulting from different interpretations of
the laws and the Constitution.
 
Q: You must also master Judicial Review. What are the
requisites?
 
A: There must be an actual case or controversy raised by
the proper party at the earliest opportunity of time
The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.
 
Q: Who is the proper party?
A: One who is directly injured or in the imminent danger
of sustaining injury.
 
Q: In the ratification of the Constitution as to its validity,
who is the proper party?
A: An ordinary citizen may be the proper party, even if
not directly injured. This is an exception.
 
Q: What about the factual basis of the declaration of
Martial Law? Who is the proper party?
A: Also an ordinary citizen may be a proper party.
 
Q: When is the taxpayer considered a proper party?
A:
 
 When it involves disbursement of public funds that is
anomalous or contrary to law; misapplication of public
funds
 Involves imposition of unreasonable taxes. This
amounts to deprivation of property without due
process of law.
 
Q: Who else can be a proper party? Can the government
be a proper party in relation to the validity of its laws?
A: Yes. Case in point - People vs Vera.
Q: What about members of Congress, may they be a
proper party in a question involving the validity of laws?
A: Yes. When they will intrude into the legislative
prerogative or impairs their discretionary powers, in
which case they can be a proper party.
 
The bottomline, regardless of whether you have an
actual interest in the outcome of the case is what we call
legal standing or locus standi. That's all that you need.
You dont need to have a real right on the outcome of the
case. For as long as you have the legal standing, you
can be a proper party. However, all this can be set aside
60
by the Supreme Court at its discretion when the issue
raised is of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance. Take note of this since this is
common in the bar exams.
 
In all questions regarding constitutionality, you will
observe the PDAF cases, the RH law, when there was a
question on constitutionality of these laws, there was
always a question on whether the party who filed the
case was a proper party. So, the requirement of the
proper party may be set aside as a mere procedural
technicality if the issue raised is of transcendental
importance or of paramount public interest.
 
Q:And then there's the requirement of actual case or
controversy. What does this mean?
A: That by "actual case", it means that the case is
existing until the issue is resolved because it is possible
that the controversy is existing at the time of filing but
becomes moot and academic as the time lapses or as
the circumstances change, in which case it will be
dismissed because the case has become moot and
academic.
In the case of Pormento vs Estrada.
 
Since Estrada was not elected as president, that was the
change in circumstance. It may have been relevant at the
time of filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for President
since he was running for presidency notwithstanding the
fact that he already served the six-year term as President
where the Constitution provides that he is no longer
eligible for another election. Instead of discussing the
minutes of the case on the constitutionality, the SC said
that the case is already moot and academic since
Estrada lost the election and thereafter dismissed the
case. I repeat, the controversy must be existing.
But even if the issue has become moot and academic,
according to the SC in the case of David et. al. vs. Exec. Sec.,it
is not a mathematical formula that the SC would not just
discuss on the merits because it is possible that it may occur
again in the future especially when there is blatant violation of
the constitution and the issue raised is of transcendental
importance or of paramount public interest. If you can recall in
the case of the constitutionality of the declaration of a state of
national emergency, the SC was saying that even if it was lifted
and the issue therefore has become moot and academic,
nonetheless the SC proceeded in discussing the merits of the
case because there is always a possibility that it will recur, it
will be repeated in the future and yet it will evade any
discussion or resolution on the merits of the case.
So these are the requisites:
There has to be a blatant violation of the constitution and a
possibility that it will be repeated and yet it will evade any
resolution.
And finally, that the issue raised is of transcendental
importance or of paramount public interest.
(TN) Another point on actual case and controversy, that it must
be a justiciable question. In other words, it is only involving
questions that are based on a law or a constitutional provision
because if you go into the wisdom of the act complained of, or
the reason why the law was passed, or its propriety, that is a
political question beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry, therefore
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
should have been answered by makers of the law themselves
being the representatives of the people, or the president
himself who implements the law. But there is an exception to
this again because even if the issue is political however there
is allegation of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction, still the court may look into it by way of
exception as part of the expanded jurisdiction of the SC.
(TN) Another point also, it must be raised at the earliest
opportunity of time.
Q: What is earliest opportunity of time?
A: You have to allege that in the pleading otherwise, if not
alleged, you may not be allowed to raise that for the first time
during the trial, or if it is not raised during the trial, you may not
be allowed to raise that for the first time on appeal.
Exceptions:
1. When the issue raised is the jurisdiction- anytime at
any stage of the proceeding
2. When you cannot resolve the case without first
settling the issue of constitutionality in civil cases
3. In criminal cases- anytime because after all, where
there is no law punishing the act, no crime is
committed. So if the law is nullified, it is as if there’s
no crime committed by the accused.
(TN) And finally, the issue raised must be the lis mota of the
case because if it is not, then the court by all means must use
other grounds to dispose of the issue without going into the
merits of the case in order to maintain the equality among the 3
branches and maintain the separation of powers so that one
cannot be accused of intruding into the prerogative of the 2
other branches of the government.
So you take note of those requisites for a valid exercise of
judicial review because they are repeated in the subsequent
and more recent decisions of the SC.
Q: What would then be the consequences after the resolution
of the case?
A: It depends on what the resolution is.
Q: If the law is valid, what would SC do?
A: Make a double negative declaration- that the law is not
unconstitutional. In effect legitimating, if not ratifying the validity
of the law.
Or the SC will declare the law to be null and void for being
unconstitutional. By that act, through the exercise of judicial
review, the SC checks. That’s part of the checking power of the
court over the act of executive and legislative departments.
Either way, the SC will perform its symbolic function to educate
the bench and the bar by providing principles, precepts,
guidelines on how the law should be construed or interpreted
in actual cases.
Q: (BAR) If the law is declared unconstitutional, what would be
the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality?
A: What we follow is the modern view.
Q: What does it mean?
A: It is valid until declared null and void for being
unconstitutional but you have to respect the operative effects
of this law before the declaration of nullity.
61
We have some case on this where SC does not disturb the
effect of the application of the law before the law is declared
unconstitutional. They must be respected.
Once declared a nullity, you follow the traditional view. It is not
a law, it creates no rights, imposes no obligations, creates no
office and affords no protection. It will be as if the law has
never been passed. Just take note of that operative effect
principle. Because that was asked in the bar exam particularly
in the MCQ.
As regards to that, read the cases of Dulay vs. JBC, Chavez
vs. JBC.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially  no interaction
between the two Houses in their participation in the  JBC.
No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House
of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial
officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers
arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular
members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of
government – the Chief Justice as  ex-officio  Chairman
(representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of
Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a
representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative
Department). The  total is  seven (7), not eight. In so providing,
the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not
because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in
reverence to it as a major branch of government.(Chavez v.
Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013)
However, the Supreme Court has provided some guidance
regarding the issues we have raised. In the  en banc decision
in  Dulay vs. Judicial and Bar Council and Executive Secretary
Paquito Ochoa, the Supreme Court made two significant
rulings. First, the court ruled that the most senior justice who is
not an applicant for the position of chief justice shall "preside
over the proceedings in the absence of the said constitutionally
named Ex-Officio Chairman." Second, the proposition that the
JBC may only be chaired by the incumbent chief justice is
without merit. http://jurist.org/sidebar/2012/07/
On Section 2, this is with reference to the powers being
vested to the courts by congress
So you have the Rules of Court enumerating the jurisdiction of
court. But take note, in so far as amending the Rules of Court,
that is now exclusive to the SC under Section 5 as part of its
rule-making power. But, in the case of Gingoyon v. Republic,
the SC was saying that notwithstanding that the SC has the
power to amend the Rules of Court, still the power being
legislative in nature, plenary in so far as congress is
concerned, it was never precluded from making a law that will
amend Rules of Court. You remember that case involving
payment of just compensation? Because there is definition
there in the Rules of Court particularly Rule 67 on just
compensation determined by the court at 10% of the assessed
value of the property for taxation purposes, that was amended
by R.A. 8974 passed by congress where it was based on
market value or BIR zonal valuation- 100% and not just 10%
and it was an amendment of Rules of Court and it was
questioned, and SC was saying that the congress was never
precluded from amending Rules of Court although now, that
power is govern to the SC promulgating rules governing
pleadings and procedures in the practice of law. You have writ
of amparo, writ of habeas data, and writ of kalikasan. You have
the judicial affidavit rule, etc. in effect amending the Rules of
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Court without passing through congress although in Section 2,
it should have been congress because it is congress that
vested and prescribed and apportioned jurisdiction on various
courts.
On Section 3 on fiscal autonomy
it is one of the factors that maintain the independence of SC
and there had been so many instances that this fiscal
autonomy has been challenged by the 2 other branches in the
government.
Q: What do you mean by fiscal autonomy?
A: It means that their budget cannot be reduced by congress
even if they hate the guts of the justices of the SC. Whatever is
the budget in the last fiscal year, if they will not increase it, they
cannot also reduce it. Should they reduce the budget,
automatically the old budget will be adopted because of fiscal
autonomy. They cannot interfere on how the SC should spend
the money appropriated for the SC but recently there is a
question regarding on this because there are so many
vacancies in the court. At the end of the year, you’re supposed
to remit kuno the money that was expended, intended for this
vacant court to the national treasury. But what did SC do?
Asserting its fiscal autonomy, they put up a separate fund
where this savings will go and not to the general fund of the
national treasury and that’s the start of the quarrel between the
executive department, including now the congress, and the SC
because the SC was saying, we enjoy fiscal autonomy, ayaw
mo panghilabot in so far as our budget is concerned. Karon ka,
what they’re doing now, ang DBM will not release the whole
budget for the Judiciary. They will wait until you fill up that
vacancy then they will release the money. That will be the
challenge regarding fiscal autonomy.
On section 4, this is with regard to the composition of the SC.
There is 1 chief justice and 14 associate justices.
Q: In case of vacancy, what is the period of filling up?
A: 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Q: For vacancy in the lower courts, how should it be filled up?
A: It’s actually 90 days from the submission of the list of names
of nominees of JBC reckoned from the submission. So it may
have been vacant for 20 years, but the moment the list is
submitted by JBC to Malacañang, the President has the period
of 90 days from the submission of the list within which to make
an appointment. But how come it can go beyond 90 days?
Because it can easily retroact the date of appointment.
*** Q: What are the cases that are decided by SC sitting en
banc and sitting in Division? The more important part there is
the sitting en banc. What are the cases?
A: You have to memorize Section 4 on cases involving
constitutionality of treaty or international agreement or
executive agreement; cases that had been decided by a
Division and case of modification or reversal; to reverse a
prevailing principle or jurisprudence; dismissal or fine of a
judge or any court personnel for more than 10,000; when the
Division cannot obtain the majority, it has to be transferred to
SC siting en banc; where the penalty for the capital offenses
Reclusion Perpetua to death.
Q: What would be the composition of a Division?
A: It could be a Division of three, five, or eight. So if you want
to get a majority for very decision, a Division of 3- always 3,
unanimous. If you cannot get that it will be decided by SC
62
sitting en banc. If it’s a Division of 5- you should have no less
than 3. In the Division of 8- that is 5. You should have also at
least 3 votes if there is only quorum of 5.
Practically most of the cases are decided in division but there
are specific cases however that must be decided en banc. You
take note of that.
*** Now the most import part of the judicial department-
Section 5. If you want to know all the powers of
SC, memorize section 5.
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
 
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax,
impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower
court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of
law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to
other stations as public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed six months
without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to
the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
(1987 Constitution [1987])
Q: In criminal cases where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua, is that automatic reviews of SC?
A: There is now a circular of SC. It is no longer automatic to sc.
It must pass through an intermediate review by the CA before it
goes to the SC. And that is declared as constitutional.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
You have on purely questions of law, also with the SC.
The temporary assignment of judges. If it’s for more than 6
months, you need the consent of the judge.
On the change of venue, also you must ask permission from
SC. In case of doubt whether it should be granted or not, it
should be decided in favor of the change of venue to avoid
miscarriage of justice.
(BAR) Sec 5(5) on the rule-making power of the SC
Rules concerning enforcement and protection of constitutional
right, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts; admission
in the practice of law; the Integrated Bar; legal assistance to
the underprivileged.
(BAR) As regards to the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, take note of the writs promulgated by SC:
writ of amparao, writ of habeas data, writ of Kalikasan and
other rules and regulation amending the Rules of Court.
Kadagahan na nigawas ang writ of amparo ug writ of habeas
data. They’re related to each other but they’ re not the same.
Q: All this in protection of the right to privacy particularly the
writ of amparo, what is being protected?
A: Right to life, liberty and security, not property. The recent
decision on the writ of amparo is this: that to apply the writ of
amparo there must be an element of government involvement.
If there is no government involvement, although it may also
apply to private entities, but without government involvement,
the writ of amparo is not the proper remedy. That’s the bottom
line on the recent decision of SC.
To give you an example, this is a case involving a person who
was abducted by a security guard of a subdivision. Then he
made a complaint to the security guard, it was not acted upon.
And then that person became missing. So the relatives of this
person who was abducted accused the security guard and filed
a writ of amparo.
Q: Will the action prosper?
A: According to the SC, no because the security guards are
private individuals. No showing that it involves the government
or its law enforcers. Here it was dismissed.
Q: (TN) What are the remedial or preliminary remedies you
may avail of while you are applying for writ amparo?
A:
1. temporary protection order
2. inspection order
3. production order
4. witness protection order
You have also the Writ of Habeas data which is a limitation to
the right of information. It is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee or a private individual or entity engaging in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family home, correspondence of the aggrieved
party (A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC).
Q: If you think that because of some erroneous information the
military is following you because you are suspected to be a
member of the NPA. What do you do?
63
A: You ask the military to produce the information so that it can
be corrected or destroyed if it is totally untrue. You can avail of
that by obtaining a writ of habeas data.- TN
On the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules the
only limitation in the promulgation of rules by the Supreme
Court is that it shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights (Sec. 5(5), Art. XVIII, Constitution).
Power to Appoint
Also, the Supreme Court has the power to appoint its own
officials and employees in accordance with the Civil Service
Law (Sec. 5(6), Art. XVIII, Constitution). This is to maintain its
independence subject to civil service law.
The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof (Sec. 6, Art. VIII).
The administrative supervision of the Supreme Court over
judges and court personnel is exclusive. The Ombudsman
does not have jurisdiction over judges and court personnel
because the supervision over them is exclusive to the
Supreme Court.
Q: Can the ombudsman investigate a judge involving a
criminal case?
A: The Ombudsman has to wait for the recommendation of the
Supreme Court to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Q: In an administrative case?
A: It should be dismissed because the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction since the Constitution provides that supervision of
judges and court personnel is exclusive to the Supreme Court.
In fact, the President cannot grant pardon to a judge or court
personnel who is convicted. – TN
Section 7. Qualifications.
No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme
Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme
Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have
been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of
lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof
unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the
Philippine Bar.
A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence. - TN
Q: What is the qualification for a member of the judiciary that is
not required in ordinary employees in the government?
A: He must be a person of proven competence, integrity and
independence. – (BAR)
(BAR) Section 8. Composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.
The regular members of the Council shall be appointed
by the President for a term of four years with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the
Members first appointed, the representative of the
Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor
of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years,
and the representative of the private sector for one year.
XXX XXX XXX
XXX XXX XXX
The Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme
Court may assign to it.
Q: What would the President do if he does not like any of the
nominees in the list? Can he return it to the JBC?
A: No. He has to choose from the list. Otherwise, the purpose
of the JBC to screen applicants for the judiciary, ombudsman
and deputy ombudsman would be useless. However, the
nominees in the list should be at least 3 for every vacancy. The
President’s choice should be limited only in the names that
were submitted by the JBC.
The Composition of the JBC is shared by the Justice of the
Supreme Court. Now, there is a controversy involving the Chief
Justice as chairman of the JBC because the SOLGEN applied
for the Supreme Court as Justice. Now, he wants the Chief
Justice to inhibit in participating because according to him the
Chief Justice had already made statements against him. The
thing is it is chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
–
TN
It is also composed of ex-officio members and regular
members. In Chavez v. JBC, there is a controversy because
supposedly each branch of the government should be
represented in the JBC. For the executive department, it is the
DOJ secretary. For Congress they must also have a
representative. But Congress have two (2) representatives, 1
in the Senate and 1 in the House of Representatives while the
Constitution is very clear that it should only be “A
REPRESENTATIVE”- singular. Back then, it was alright to
have two representatives for Congress because each
representative will be entitled to ½ vote. But in has been the
practice to accord each representative 1 full vote. Thus, it is
unfair on the part of the other branches of the government and
there is no more equality among the three branches of the
government.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
(Self-Explanatory). The Salary of the justices and judges is
fixed by law.
Section 11 Retirement Age
The retirement age is 70 years old but we are given an option
to retire at 60 or 65.
The Supreme Court Justices enjoy security of tenure which
means that they cannot be removed in any other manner
except on impeachment.
64
Q: Can you sue a justice of the Supreme Court involving a
criminal case?
A: You cannot. Not even a disbarment case against them
because it is a circumvention of the Constitution. You have to
wait until they retire so you can sue them criminally. But I
suppose you can sue them for collection of sum of money.
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of
other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
function.
In Macalintal v. PET, the Supreme Court acted as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). There was a question of
constitutionality on the creation of the PET because according
to Macalintal by being a member of PET, in effect, the
Supreme Court performs a quasi-judicial function. But the
Supreme Court said that the PET does not perform quasi-
judicial functions but judicial functions.
Q: What are the two exceptions of Section 12?
A: Justices of the Supreme Court appointed to the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal and the Chief Justice as the chairman of the
JBC.
Section 13 Procedure in the making Decisions.
There must be a deliberation either in en banc or division.
Usually, the decision is written by the most junior Justice.
There is a certification that will be made by the Chief Justice to
the effect that whatever decision may have been reached is a
result of consultation and concurrence of the majority of the
Supreme Court. If there is no certification, it will not affect the
validity of the decision.
Section 14. SC Decisions
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. This is mandatory. However, the exception to this is
cases on certiorari or petition for review filed before the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court can issue a 1 page
minute resolution dismissing the petition for lack of merit. This
is an exception because a petition for certiorari is not a matter
of right. It is merely a privilege. The Supreme Court has the
discretion either to give due course or not to the petition. If the
Supreme Court denies the petition, it is in effect adopted the
decision in toto of the lower court. However, if the Supreme
Court gives due course to the petition and dismisses it
thereafter the Supreme Court has to comply now with Section
14. – (BAR)
Section 15. Resolution of Cases.
This is mandatory because a judge can be sanctioned or
punished for non-observance of the prescribed period. It is,
however, directory in the sense that even if the judgment is
rendered beyond the prescribed period the decision remains
valid.
Cases relating to the Judiciary
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT;
"RESOLUTIONS" ARE NOT "DECISIONS";
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE NOT APPLICABLE TO
RESOLUTIONS. — As early as Novino, et
al.  vs. Court  of Appeals, et al., it has been stressed that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within the constitutional
requirements of  Section 14, Article VIII; they merely hold that
the petition for review should not be entertained and even
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the
petition to review the decision of  the Court  of Appeals is not a
matter  of right but  of sound judicial discretion, hence there is
no need to fully explain the Court's denial since, for one thing,
the facts and the law are already mentioned in
the  Court of  Appeals' decision. This was reiterated in  Que vs.
People, et al., and further clarified in Munal vs. Commission
on Audit, et al.  that the constitutional mandate is applicable
only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course
and after the filing of  briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course,
with the resolution therefor stating the legal basis thereof.
Thus, when the  Court, after deliberating on a petition and
subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the
petition and states that the questions raised are factual or
there is no reversible error in the respondent  court's decision,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.|||  (Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998) HDATCc
The grant of due course to a petition for review is not a matter
of right, but of sound judicial discretion. Thus, when the Court
denies due course to a petition because it fails to show any
reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals (CA), there
is no need to fully explain the Court's denial. For one thing, the
facts and law are already discussed in the CA's opinion. A
minute resolution denying a petition for review of a decision of
the CA can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with or
adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA, and deems the
CA decision as correct.  done material to pending cases, except where a party
We reiterate that a "resolution" is not a "decision" within the
constitutional requirement of Section 14, Article VIII.  The
constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted
for decision",  i.e., where the petition is given due course and
after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings,
but not where the petition is denied due course, with the
resolution stating the legal basis thereof.  (3)Court records which are "predecisional" and
In  Candelaria v. CA,  we held that a resolution denying a
petition for review on certiorari actually states the legal basis
therefor, which is that the petition failed to sufficiently show
that the appellate court committed any reversible error in the
challenged decision. The patent significance of such ground
for denial is that the allegations of the petition aimed at proving
errors in the challenged decision failed to persuade the
Supreme Court that the imputed errors had been committed
and, thus, there was no cause to reverse or modify the
conclusions set forth in the decision. In such case, there is no
point in reproducing or restating in the resolution of denial the
conclusions of the appellate court thereby affirmed.| (Joaquin-
Agregado v. Yamat, G.R. No. 181107, March 30, 2009)
Included in the judiciary on judicial privilege (different from
judicial review) but more or less the same as executive
privilege especially on issues relating to whether or not the co-
equal branches of gov’t may compel the judiciary to produce
information relating to a particular case for to whatever acts
may have been discharged by the supreme court in the
performance of its functions.
This was an issue in that case involving the Arroyos when a
TRO was issued against the DOJ when they wanted to abroad
for medical treatment. This came out during impeachment
proceedings where there were questions whether or not the
justices who issued the TRO can be compelled by congress
acting as a tribunal to testify on the circumstances relating to
the issuance of the TRO whether or not there was compliance
to the requirement as conditions of the TRO. Testify on the
circumstances on the issuance of the TRO. Issue whether they
65
may invoke judicial privilege for they may not be compelled to
testify on those matters relating to the issuance of the order.
In Re: Production of Court Records and
Documents and the Attendance of Court
officials and employees as witnesses under
the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the
various letters for the Impeachment
Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25,
2012.n February 14, 2012
“Under the law, therefore, the Members of the Court may not
be compelled to testify in the impeachment proceedings
against the Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about
information they acquired in the performance of their official
function of adjudication, such as information on how
deliberations were conducted or the material inputs that the
justices used in decision-making, because the end-result
would be the disclosure of confidential information that could
subject them to criminal prosecution. Such act violates judicial
privilege (or the equivalent of  executive privilege) as it pertains
to the exercise of the constitutional mandate of adjudication.”
“To summarize these rules, the following are privileged
documents or communications, and are not subject to
disclosure:
(1)Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases
and the actions taken by the Court on each case
included in the agenda of the Court's session on acts
litigant requests information on the result of the raffle
of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the
IRSC;
(2)Court deliberations  or the deliberations of the Members
in court sessions on cases and matters pending
before the Court;
"deliberative" in nature, in particular, documents and
other communications which are part of or related to
the deliberative process,  i.e., notes, drafts, research
papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda,
records of internal deliberations, and similar papers.
(4)Confidential Information  secured by justices, judges,
court officials and employees in the course of their
official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are
privileged even after their term of office.
(5)Records of cases that are still pending for decision  are
privileged materials that cannot be disclosed, except
only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have
been made available by the court to the general
public.
(6)The principle of comity or inter-departmental
courtesy demands that the  highest officials of each
department be exempt from the compulsory
processes of the other departments.
(7)These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an
institution, not to any justice or judge in his or her
individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than the
individual justices or judges, no sitting or retired
justice or judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim
exception without the consent of the Court.”
Basically, when we speak of judicial privilege, there are
information that is confidential. That cannot be disclosed just to
anyone. Specially on testimony made on a witness during a
judicial proceeding or statement made by the presiding judge
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
or the lawyers. All of them may not be compelled to testify on
what transpired.
In relation to the TRO, they may not be compelled to testify on
the circumstances especially on deliberations how the SC may
have voted on certain issues. There were dissenting opinions
by Carpio and Sereno saying that Judicial privilege may not be
invoked if it relates to matters that are criminal in nature that
may involve illegal acts. What was emphasized by the
dissenting opinion was Judicial privilege is not absolute.
Carpio’s Dissent
“However, there are clear limits to Judicial Privilege, as there
are clear limits to Executive and Legislative Privilege. One
overriding limitation on Judicial Privilege is that it can be
invoked only if the information arose from the performance
of  official adjudicatory functions  of Members of the
Judiciary. As succinctly stated in the Resolution, Judicial
Privilege refers only to"matters that are part of the internal
deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of
the(ir)  adjudicatory functions and duties"  of Justices. The
Resolution further states that the matter must refer to "the
performance of the(ir) official functions of adjudication"  of
Justices.”
Sereno’s Dissent
Thus, in U.S. jurisprudence, judicial privilege has always been
qualified and had been found to exclude any protection for
administrative and non-adjudicatory matters in cases where a
Member of the judiciary is being investigated for criminal acts
or wrongdoing.
I am taking this up with you because of the statement made by
Congress that they may summon the Chief Justice to testify on
matters relating to the Judicial Development Fund.
Q: Can they compel?
A: First of all, they are co-equal branches. To compel a Chief
Justice to testify, even if it may relate to matters of public
interest, there is no obligation on the part of the justices
because of the separation of powers and give respect between
co-equal branches.
Just take note of this just in case. TN of the basic knowledge
about judicial privilege.
VI. Constitutional Commissions
On constitutional commissions, you have three: COMELEC,
Civil Service and Commission on Audit.
TN Safeguards to the Independence of the Constitutional
Commissions
1. First of all, they’re created by the Constitution therefore they
cannot be abolished by ordinary legislation. They’re considered
to be independent, and therefore cannot be controlled by the
three branches of government. Each constitutional commission
is conferred with powers that cannot be reduced or diminished
by ordinary legislation to maintain their independence.
Likewise, always remember that they are removable only
through impeachment.
TN of the term of office of the commissioners.
2. It is 7 years without re-appointment. We have the scheme to
have continuity in their term of office. We have the staggered
66
appointment – the first appointment to each commission – 7, 5,
3 years.
It says without re-appointment. The term applies only to regular
appointments of a commissioner (TN). So that if he is
appointed in a recess session, so it’s by a recess appointment
– such as that case of Benipayo, then-chairman of the
COMELEC before, during the time of Arroyo. He was
appointed when the Commission on Appointments was in
recess. And so it was a recess appointment. The appointment
though was permanent, because it was effective immediately
upon Qualification of Benipayo, because it was not however
confirmed by CA upon its resumption of its session – in effect it
was bypassed, so it lasted only until the next adjournment of
session of Congress. So when the term of Benipayo then
expired, he was again re-appointed by Arroyo to the same
position, thus the Question now on constitutionality of the re-
appointment. Remember the case of Matibag v. Benipayo.
Q: What did SC say on the matter? Was there a violation of the
constitution by the re-appointment of Benipayo?
A: The SC was saying that: That provision against re-
appointment applies only to regular appointment by the
President that would reQuire confirmation by the CA (TN).
There’s a recent decision of the SC related to it as well.
Remember the case of Funa, involving the appointment of
Villar as the Chairman of the Commission on Audit.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX (D)
of the 1987 Constitution  proscribes reappointment of any kind
within the  commission, the point being that a second
appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to
another position of commissioner) or upgraded position
(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment
and is a nullity ab initio. Attention is drawn in this regard to the
Court's disposition in  Matibag v. Benipayo. 
Villar's promotional appointment, so it is argued, is
void from the start, constituting as it did a reappointment
enjoined by the Constitution, since it actually needed another
appointment to a different office and requiring another
confirmation by the Commission on  Appointments.
Central to the adjudication of the instant petition is the
correct meaning to be given to Sec. 1 (2), Article IX (D) of the
Constitution on  the ban against reappointment in relation to
the appointment issued to respondent Villar to the position of
COA Chairman.
Without question, the parties have presented two (2)
contrasting and conflicting positions. Petitioner contends that
Villar's appointment is proscribed by the constitutional
ban on  reappointment under the aforecited constitutional
provision. On  the other hand, respondent Villar initially
asserted that his appointment as COA Chairman is valid up to
February 2, 2015 pursuant to the same provision.
The Court finds petitioner's position bereft of merit.
The flaw lies in regarding the word "reappointment" as, in
context, embracing any and all species of appointment. XXX
XXX
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1 (2), Article IX (D) that
explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from
Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the
aforestated circumstances or conditions.|||  |||  (Funa v. Villar,
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012)
Q: What were the circumstances in that appointment?
This also further explained the nature of the appointment and
the term of office of a commissioner because this applies not
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
only to COA but to all commissioners. In this particular case,
Villar had been appointed as a member of the COA. However,
he didn’t finish his term – he resigned. And then, he was
appointed thereafter as chairman of COA, when the Chairman
retired.
When the chairman retired and the question on wether or not
he is qualified for appointment, wherein it was practically a re-
appointment this time as chairman of COA. The Supreme
Court in this case said that for as long as he did not finish his
term, because he did not finished as he resigned. He may be
appointed to the commission as chairman, provided, that there
is a vacancy caused by death or resignation or removal of that
previous chariman whose term has not been completed. So
that he can only be appointed and assume office of the un-
expired portion of the term of office of his predecessor.
TN It says here, “the appoinment of the members of any of the
3 Constitutional Commissions after the expiration of the un-
even terms of office of the first set of the commissioner will
always be a fixed term of seven years. An appopintment for a
lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing
officer cannot validly shorten the full term of seven years in
case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the
distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the
Constituion.”
Q: What is this Rotational System of the Term of Office of
the commissioners? (BAR)
A: Where if one of the commissioner’s term of office expires
there will be always two others who are left. There cannot be
any vacancy that would occur in the commission in the event
one of the commissioner’s term of office expires.
SC was saying here that appointments to vacancies resulting
from certain causes like death, resignation, disability or
impeachment shall only be for the unexpired portion of the tem
of office of the predecessors. Such appointement cannot be
less than the unexpired portion as this will distrupt the
staggering of the terms lay down under SEC. 1 PAR. 2 of ART.
IX. Members of the commission are appointed for the full term
of seven years and who served the entire period are BARred
from re-appointemnt to any position in the commission. The
commissioner in this case, Villar, who resigned after being in
the commission for less than seven years is eligible for
appointment to the position of the Chair for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chair. Such appoinment is
not covered by the ban on re appoinment provided the that the
aggregate period of length of service as commissoner in the
unexpired period of the term of office of the predecessor will
not exceed seven years and provided further, the vacancy
position of the chair resulted from death, resignation, disablity
or impeachment and any member of the commission cannot be
appointed or designated in temporary or acting capacity. In this
case, Villar served for only 3 years so he has then remaining
four years at the time he resigned. Thereafter, he was
appointed as chairman of COA when the chairman of COA at
that time, also resigned.
Q: Was the appointment of Villar to the chairmanship valid
considering that it was a re-appoinment but this time as
chairman?
A: SC was saying that he is eligible provided that it will not
exceed seven years. So if he already served 3 years, he has 4
more years to serve. In this case, the term of the predecessor
chairman, the remaining term was only 3 years also so he
could not ecxeed the unexpired portion of his predecessor. In
67
other words, while he is eligible for appoinment, his term
should not ,in total, what he had served before he resigned and
now his new appoinment be more than seven years. And
should not also exceed the term of the remaining portion of the
term of his predecessor. He can assume the unexpired but not
more than seven years. TN of that. Also being empahized in
this case that being appointed,
Q: Can there be appointment in acting or temporary capacity?
A: No. It should be permanent. This is to guarantee the
independence of the Constitutional commissions.
Q: Can the salaries of the Chairmen and Commissioners be
decreased? Increased?
A: They are fixed by law and they cannot be decreased during
their term. May be increased but cannot be decreased.
Q: How do the Constitutional Commissions enjoy fiscal
autonomy?
A: Their budget cannot be reduced lower than they are
presently enjoying. So that in the event that their budget for the
next fiscal year is reduced, automatically that is void,
automatically the budget of the previous year shall be
reenacted.
Q: Can the ConComs pass their own rules and regulations?
What are the limitations?
A: They also can promulgate their own rules and regulations
for as long as it will not diminish decrease or modify
substantive rights. This is without prejudice of course to the
Supreme Court’s power to promulgate rules and regulations
governing pleadings and procedures in court.
Q: In cases of conflict, whose rules should prevail?
A: There is this one case where the COMELEC promulgated a
rule governing their procedure, however, affecting the rules
promulgated by the SC governing procedures in courts. So in
cases of conflict, always the rules promulgated by the SC shall
prevail because that is exclusive to the Supreme Court if this
will affect procedures in court.
Q: What rules govern in appointing the officials and employees
of ConComs?
A: It must be in accordance with the civil service law to
maintain their independence.
Q: How many votes are needed in decision making?
A: It has to be majority of all the members of the commission.
TN: A commission that has only three commissioners, always
unanimous.
TN: For the COMELEC, we will have a majority of seven. But
in adjudicatory cases, when they decide the case on merits, it
is always decided by a division, so still unanimous– three.
Q: When a decision decided by a COMELEC division is
unfavorable, cann you go directly to the SC?
A: No. the Motion for Reconsideration must be decided first by
the COMELEC en banc because of the requirement of the
constitution that only decisions en banc of the commissions
can be appealed directly to the SC. They are also required to
decide cases within 60 days from the submission of the case
for decision or resolution.
Q: Where do you appeal the decisions of the COMELEC, COA
and the Civil Service?  
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A: Except for the Civil Service, COA and COMELEC decisions
are appealable directly to the SC on certiorari under rule 65 of
the Rules of Court and it should be within 60 days from the
receipt of decision of the judgment of the tribunal.
CSC
Q: What about Civil Service Commission?
A: There is SC circular that you have to pass through CA first
before you go to the SC. That is under Rule 43 of the ROC.
TN: Qualifications of the commissions.
There are only 3 -  one chairman and two members. This is
important -  Section 2, you should know the scope of the Civil
Service covered by its jurisdiction.
Q: What is within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission?
A: All branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters [Sec. 2(1), Art. IX-
B,Constitution].
Q: What do you mean by “original charters”?
A: Original charter means that the GOCC was created by a
special law by congress.
Those without original charters are those created by the
corporation code, it is not under the Civil Service. They are not
subject to the Civil Service Commission.  So they are
considered as an ordinary corporation.
As to the previously GOCCs, when they are later privatized,
they cease to be under the Civil Service.
TN of the cases regarding the scope of the Civil Service
Commission.
[BAR] TN Q: Are water districts under the Civil Service Law?
A: Water districts are under the Civil Service.
TN: MWSS v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 71818, August 19, 1986if
one is employed in a GOCC whether or not regular, the Civil
Service Law applies. So it is not true either that with respect to
money claims, the Labor Code applies. In this case, since the
employment or claim of an employee in a GOCC with an
original charter is governed and covered by the Civil Service
Law.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CIVIL SERVICE LAW; GOVERNS
EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATION. —  Republic Act No.
6234created it as a "government corporation to be known as
the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System." As in the
case of the National Housing Authority, therefore, employment
in the MWSS  is governed not by the Labor Code but by the
civil service law, rules and regulations; and controversies
arising from or connected with that employment are not
cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEES OF
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATION. — The argument of the Labor Arbiter that it
is only disputes between the MWSS  and
its  regular  employees that are beyond the jurisdiction of the
NLRC, not those between it and its "non-regular or contractual"
employees, is sophistical. There is no legal or logical
justification for such a distinction. Indeed, it is ruled out by the
68
fact that positions in the civil service are classified
into  career  and  non-career  service, and that the non-career
service includes  inter alia— ". . . Contractual personnel or
those whose employment in the government is in accordance
with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job,
requiring special of technical skills not available in the
employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period,
which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or
accomplishes the specific work of job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from
the hiring agency."
||| (MWSS v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 71818, August 19, 1986)
Question [student]: Who determines if it is a GOCC?
A: It is governed by the law that created it. It is in the law.
So if it is created by a special law or charter, it is a GOCC. So
even if created by a general law, it is covered by the
Corporation Code, that is not under the civil service law. You
would note that it is in the charter itself.
Question by Luj (regarding Red Cross)
A: It is a private corporation. It renders only public service. That
is not under civil service. That was the case of Liban v.
Gordon. The most recent one, the Supreme Court said, it is
private. It is only that they render public service. It is not part of
the Government of the Philippines, not a corporation of the
Philippines.  That was settled. [Judge was talking about the
2009 case, there’s a recent 2011 resolution on this case]
[Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is
now sufficiently established. Although it is neither a
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor
a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a subsidiary
thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15,
2009, so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was
correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion
does not  ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a "private
corporation" within the contemplation of the provision of the
Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation
Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto A. Abad,
the  sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case
basis.||| (Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011)
Caveat: It was not discussed in the case the implications on
the jurisdiction of employment disputes with such
pronouncement as sui generis corporation]
TN: The different kinds of positions in Civil Service. The
Competitive and Non-Competitive. So this is relevant also
when you are ask about administrative laws.
So basically kung competitive, the entry in the government is
based usually in merit and fiTNess determined through
competitive examinations. While non-competitive, it does not
require civil service eligibility.
There are three kinds of non-competitive: Policy-
determining, Primarily Confidential and Highly Technical.
Policy-determining - it is the government that formulates the
method of action; what is the policy that you have been
appointed to in which case that would not require any eligibility.
Primarily Confidential - because the relationship is based on
trust and confidence with the appointing authority. Ex:
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Executive Assistants, Executive Secretaries. But PAGCOR, as
it was settled in one case, the employees, while it is true that
they are supposedly working in confidence because they are
trying to protect their clients, diba? The deckers and managers
in the casino, while their operations may be confidential for
security reasons, Supreme Court was saying that it was not a
confidential position and therefore they are not covered under
this non-competitive but competitive position.   qualifications?
Highly Technical - that is also non-competitive because that
would be based on skills, not on a civil service eligibility.
(TN) Q: What would then be the test whether one is
competitive or non-competitive?
A: It will be based on the nature of the responsibilities; not the
administrative or legislative description given to it.  That was in
the case of PAGCOR, take note of that.
2.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; P.D. NO. 1869; SECTION 16
THEREOF CLASSIFIES ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE CASINO
AND RELATED SERVICES AS "CONFIDENTIAL"
APPOINTEES; CLASSIFICATION, NOT BINDING ON
COURTS. — Petitioner argues that pursuant to Section 16
of  Presidential Decree No. 1869, respondent is a primarily
confidential employee. Hence, he holds office at the pleasure
of the appointing power and may be removed upon the
cessation of confidence in him by the latter. Such would not
amount to a removal but only the expiration of his term.
However, there should be no lingering doubt as to the true
import of said Section 16 of  P.D. No. 1869. We have already
definitively settled the same issue in  Civil Service Commission
v. Salas, to wit: . . . we approve the more logical interpretation
advanced by the CSC to the effect that "Section 16 of P.D.
1869 insofar as it exempts PAGCOR  positions from the
provisions of Civil Service Law and Rules has been amended,
modified or deemed repealed by the  1987
Constitution and Executive Order No. 292  (Administrative
Code of 1987). However, the same cannot be said with
respect to the last portion of Section 16 which provides that "all
employees of the casino and related services shall be
classified as 'confidential' appointees." Justice Regalado's
incisive discourse yields three (3) important points: first, the
classification of a particular position as primarily confidential,
policy-determining or highly technical amounts to no more than
an executive or legislative declaration that is not conclusive
upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position.
Second, whether primarily confidential, policy-determining or
highly technical, the exemption provided in the Charter
pertains to exemption from competitive examination to
determine merit and fiTNess to enter the civil service. Such
employees are still protected by the mantle of security of
tenure. Last, and more to the point, Section 16 of P.D. 1869,
insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR  as primarily
confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts.
3.ID.; ID.; CASINO OPERATIONS MANAGER, NOT
PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL. — Respondent's duties and
responsibilities call for a great measure of both ability and
dependability. They can hardly be characterized as routinary,
for he is required to exercise supervisory, recommendatory
and disciplinary powers with a wide latitude of authority. His
duties differ markedly from those we previously ruled as not
primarily confidential. In this sense, he is a tier above the
ordinary rank-and-file in that his appointment to the position
entails faith and confidence in his competence to perform his
assigned tasks. Lacking, therefore, is that amplitude of
confidence reposed in him by the appointing power so as to
qualify his position as primarily confidential. I
||| (PAGCOR v. Rilloraza, G.R. No. 141141, June 25, 2001)
69
Q: This competitive or non-competitive, do they enjoy security
of tenure?
A: Definitely. They only differ in the manner in which they are
filled out as regards to qualifications or requirements.
Q: You know already who provides or prescribes the
A: It’s always by the law.
Q: And what is the role of the Civil Service Commission with
respect to appointments?
A: Only to attest whether this particular appointee or nominee
has the minimum qualifications described by law. So once it is
found that the qualifications are complied with, what they can
only do is to attest to the validity or the eligibility of the
appointee. It’s not for them to decide who is more qualified
among the appointees. That discretion is still left to the
appointing authority. In other words, the Civil Service cannot
add qualifications other than those provided by law.
Q: Another point which is asked in Administrative Law relating
to the Civil Service is on the Next-in-Rank Policy. Is this
mandatory?
A: No. While the person next-in-rank is entitled to preferential
consideration, it does not follow that only he and no one else
can be appointed. In other words, still it is within the discretion
of the appointing officer or authority to choose from among the
candidates. What is required by law is that the appointee has
complied with the minimum qualifications prescribed by law.
Another classification of position is - according to Tenure: you
have Career service and Non-career service. The other one is
Competitive and Non-competitive. This one is now on tenure,
career or non-career.
Career service is usually based on merit and fiTNess to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations
based on technical qualifications; whereas in Non-career,
entrance is based on other than usual test of merit and
fiTNess. Let’s say for example, elective positions are non-
career. Usually the executive officers of government or those
even rank-and-file but based on civil service eligibility, that’s
considered as career, when there is room for promotion. When
you are elected as BARangay captain, there’s no way that you
would be promoted as governor if you don’t run as governor.
Q: For career, they are entitled to security. What about non-
career? Like if you are an elected official, what is your security
of tenure?
A: It is limited only, during the period of your term of office. If
you are, for example, a confidential employee, like you are an
executive assistant, yours is only co-terminus to the appointing
authority. Once your appointing authority is dismissed, it’s
good as you are already also dismissed; or once the term of
office of the appointing authority has already expired, your term
also is good as expired. Or limited to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose the employment was
made. So once the project is completed, you’re done.
(BAR) Q: What is favored in the BAR exam is this doctrine and
principle of Security of Tenure. Do you what this security of
tenure is?
A: It’s that you cannot be removed from office without just
cause provided by law. All government officials and employees
as a rule enjoy security of tenure.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
(TN) But take note, when you say you can only be removed for
legal cause provided by law, it must be related to and affects
the administration of office. It must be substantial, directly
affecting the rights and interests of the public. Of course, you
always have the Civil Service Law providing for the process. It
also presupposes that even if there is a basis for your removal,
you cannot just be outrightly removed without hearing. So
there is always due process both substantial and
***** What is important is you have to have the necessary
qualifications to the position and eligibility.
Even if you have the qualification but not the eligibility, there is
no guarantee that you will stay in that position under the
principle of security of tenure. That is not the kind of security of
tenure we are referring to.
For example: you’re a lawyer occupying a position as director
of the LTO. There is now a requirement of CESO – Carrier
executive eligibility. You may have the best qualifications that
are required but it also requires this particular eligibility. If you
don’t have that you can always be removed or transferred and
security of tenure cannot be invoked.  Same applies for the
reverse, no qualification but has the eligibility.
In other words, the qualifications and requisite eligibility
must concur.
TN: Achacoso v Macaraig (BAR)
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SECURITY OF
TENURE; PERMANENT APPOINTMENT ISSUED ONLY TO
PERSONS QUALIFIED. — A permanent appointment can be
issued only "to a person who meets all the requirements for
the position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed."
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS APPOINTED WITHOUT THE
REQUISITE QUALIFICATION DEEMED IN ACTING
CAPACITY. — The mere fact that a position belongs to the
Career Service does not automatically confer security of
tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the
required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the
nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the
first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be
appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of
appropriate eligibles.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT; PURPOSE. —
The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to
prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by
authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the
selection of a permanent or another appointee.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITION IMPOSED ON APPOINTEE.
— The person named in an acting capacity accepts the
position under the condition that he shall surrender the office
once he is called upon to do so by the appointing authority.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPIRATION OF TERM; METHOD OF
TERMINATING TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT. — In these
circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a method
of terminating official relations known in the law of public
officers as expiration of the term. His term is understood at the
outset as without any fixity and enduring at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. When required to relinquish his office, he
cannot complain that he is being removed in violation of his
security of tenure because removal imports the separation of
the incumbent  before  the expiration of his term. This is
70
allowed by the Constitution only when it is for cause as
provided by law. The acting appointee is separated precisely
because his term has expired. Expiration of the term is not
covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; LUEGO CASE (143 SCRA 327) NOT
APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — The case of Luego  v.
Civil Service Commission is not applicable because the facts
of that case are different. The petitioner in Luego
was  qualified  and was extended a permanent appointment
that could not be withdrawn on the ground that it was merely
temporary. In the case at BAR, the petitioner was not
eligible and therefore could be appointed at best only in a
temporary capacity. The other cases he cites,  viz.
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Palma-Fernandez  v. De la Paz, and
Dario  v. Mison, are also not pertinent because they also
involved permanent appointees who could not be removed
because of their security of tenure.
||| (Achacoso v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991)
A permanent appointment can be issued only “to a person who
meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.”
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service
does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant
even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of appointment which
interdepends on his eligibility or lack of it.
(BAR)
Q: Is there security of tenure for non-competitive positions?
A: Yes, however, limited. Even non-career. Confidential
employees hold office only as long as confidence remain in
them.
In other words, if the appointing authority loses confidence,
then he is fired. This shall not be taken as dismissal but as an
expiration of term. For there must be a genuine loss of
confidence, there is no removal. Non-career employees do not
enjoy security of tenure.
Political appointees in the Foreign Service possess tenure,
coterminous with the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure. So, there has to be a valid appointment in order to
enjoy security of tenure. Otherwise, appointment is void; there
is no expectation of security of tenure.
Q:  How about temporary employees, are they covered by the?
Are they protected by the security of tenure?
A: No.  In fact, even if the appointing authority does not give
any reason simply does not want or like the way the
employees must adhere that could be a ground for his
removal. He does not have to explain because a temporary
employee does not enjoy security of tenure. He can be
removed anytime even without cause. So, if they are
dismissed, it just simply an expiration of their term.
Another prohibition if you are an employee in the government,
you cannot engage directly or indirectly in political partisanship
or electioneering political activity (TN)
Q: And then on the matter of, can you organize a union or
association to protect your economic interest? (BAR)
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A: There is no prohibition against joining a union. It is not
prohibited under the constitution.
What is, however, prohibited by statutes not by the constitution
is the right to strike because after all, according to the SC, in
many cases, the right to strike does not formally integral part of
the right to association. You can always have an association or
organization even without engaging in concerted activities.
So we have statutes, executive order, there is the Civil Service
Memorandum prohibiting the employees engaging in concerted
activities.
Another thing to (TN), losing candidate. Political laying ducks
are prohibited. They are disqualified for appointments within 1
year from the election that he loss. (TN)
Elective official are not eligible for appointment in any capacity
to any public office or position during their tenure. They may
accept it, however they have to resign from their local position.
And that’s why we need to amend this provision in order to
totally ban elective officials from appointment so that they
cannot just leave their office and accept an appointment, that
would not be fair to their constituents. But her it is allowed
provided that he resigns or he forfeits his elective position.
Now, the exception to the appointment to any other positions in
the government is when you are appointed, you have an
appointment now regular, you can be appointed to another
position but it must be in ex officio capacity. Like the President
that you selected is also appointed as the chairman chief of the
national housing corporation and authority or a congressman
sitting as member of the JBC.
TN on civil service with respect to suspension and dismissal in
relation to security of tenure, i.e., the entitlement to
reinstatement with backpay; if reinstated, would he be entitled
to backpay:
Q: For example, he’s under preventive suspension for three
months, then he was exonerated, can he recover his salary for
the period of his preventive suspension?
A:  Generally, for as long as it’s legitimate, we follow the
principle no work, no pay; unless it is expressly provided in the
constitution that he is entitled to payment of backpay during the
period he was placed under preventive suspension.
If it is suspension as a penalty or even dismissal from the
service, this does not apply.
Q: If in the event, in an appealed case, he is reinstated
because he is found to be innocent, is he entitled to backpay?
A: General rule still applies—no work, no pay—unless the
dismissal or suspension is illegal.
TN: case of DOTC v Cruz G.R. No. 178256 July 23, 2008 the
SC follows as a precedent, DOTC did not effect Cruz's
termination with bad faith and,
consequently, no backwages can be awarded in his favor.
In all these cases, the suspensions and/or
dismissals were held unjustified, the therein
petitioners having been either exonerated from the
charges-bases of suspension or dismissal or were
victims of proscribed abolition of office or issuance of
appointment to a different position which soon after
resulted in dismissal therefrom.
That the DOTC's termination of [Mamaril's]
services in accordance with the August 20, 2001
Resolution of the CSC was not attended with bad
71
faith and/or grave abuse of discretion, it cannot,
under the facts and circumstances of the case, be
gainsaid. 
||| (Department of Transportation and
Communications v. Cruz, G.R. No. 178256, July
23, 2008)
But if it is illegal, like in David v Gania G.R. No.
156039.  August 14, 2003 a civil service employee who has
been found illegally dismissed or suspended is entitled to be
reinstated and to backwages and other monetary benefits from
the time of his illegal dismissal or suspension up to his
retirement. If he is already of retirement age, he is entitled not
only to backwages, but also to full retirement benefits.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT RULED, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT DID NOT
ACTUALLY ASSUME AND PERFORM THE DUTIES OF HER
POSITION SO AS TO DEPRIVE HER OF BACKWAGES AND
OTHER BENEFITS. — There is more than substantial
evidence in the record consisting of the general payroll and
attendance sheets to prove that petitioner assumed and
exercised the functions of Director II and Manila Information
and Liaisoning Officer at MSU as early as June 1995 after the
MSU Board of Regents approved her permanent appointment
which was issued earlier on 10 April 1995. It cannot be refuted
that in September 1998 she was terminated from the service
on the alleged ground of expiration of her term and stopped
from performing the functions of her position, and
subsequently reinstated to her job upon the declaration of the
CSC that her dismissal from the service was illegal. Clearly,
the CSC gravely erred when thereafter it ruled that respondent
did not actually assume and perform the duties of her position
so as to deprive her of back wages and other benefits.
In  Gabriel v. Domingo  this Court held that an illegally
dismissed government employee who is later ordered
reinstated is entitled to back wages and other monetary
benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his
reinstatement. This is only fair and sensible because an
employee who is reinstated after having been illegally
dismissed is considered as not having left his office and should
be given a comparable compensation at the time of his
reinstatement. Respondent cannot be faulted for her inability to
work or to render any service from the time she was illegally
dismissed up to the time of her reinstatement. The policy of
"no work, no pay" cannot be applied to her, for such
distressing state of affairs was not of her own making or liking
even as her family suffered tremendously as a consequence of
her removal and while she was jobless. Verily, to withhold her
back salaries and other benefits during her illegal dismissal
would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure for those in the civil service.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE STATE UNIVERSITY CANNOT BE MADE
TO PAY ALL ACCRUING BACK SALARIES AND OTHER
BENEFITS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT; THE SUPERIOR
OFFICERS FOUND TO BE IN BAD FAITH OR HAVE ACTED
WITH PERSONAL MALICE WILL BE HELD PERSONALLY
ACCOUNTABLE. — We also agree with the Court of Appeals
that MSU cannot be made to pay  all accruing back salaries
and other benefits in favor of respondent. There are
allegations to the effect that officials of MSU disobeyed in bad
faith the writ of execution issued by the CSC. In Gabriel v.
Domingo we held that if the illegal dismissal; including the
refusal to reinstate an employee after a finding of unlawful
termination, is found to have been made in bad faith or due to
personal malice of the superior officers then they will be held
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
personally accountable for the employee's back salaries;
otherwise, the government disburses funds to answer for such
arbitrary dismissal. This rule is also enunciated in Secs. 38
and 39 of Book 1,  E.O. 292, and in Secs. 53, 55, 56 and 58 of
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
||| (Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania, G.R. No.
156039, August 14, 2003)
I was talking about compensation earlier; double compensation
is prohibited, but
TN/Q: if you have retired already from the government service
and you’re receiving pension, and you're re-employed by the
government, this time can you receive the salary from your
current employment with government after retirement,
considering that you’re receiving pension?
A/TN: Yes. Pension is different from salary. Santos v CA G.R.
No. 139792.  November 22, 2000 SC said that double
compensation is not applicable to pension. A retiree receiving
pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or
gratuity even if he accepts another government position to
which another compensation is attached.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; DOUBLE COMPENSATION, CONCEPT; A
RETIREE RECEIVING PENSION OR GRATUITY CAN
CONTINUE TO RECEIVE IT EVEN IF HE ACCEPTS
ANOTHER GOVERNMENT POSITION TO WHICH ANOTHER
COMPENSATION IS ATTACHED. — The petitioner cannot
take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article
IX-B of the Constitution, which provides: Pensions or gratuities
shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect
compensation. This provision simply means that a retiree
receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such
pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government
position to which another government position to which
another compensation is attached. Indeed, the retirement
benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving
under R.A. No. 910, as amended, do not constitute double
compensation. He could continue receiving the same even if
after his retirement he had been receiving salary from the
defunct MMA as Director III thereof. This is but just because
said retirement benefits are rewards for his services as MeTC
Judge, while his salary was his compensation for his services
as Director III of the MMA.|||  (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 139792, November 22, 2000)
Earlier I was saying that the holding of strike is prohibited,
TN/BAR: SSS Employees Association v CA G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989 while the Constitution and the Labor Code are
silent as to whether government employees have the right to
strike, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of
Memorandum Circular No. 6 series of 1997 of the Civil Service
Commission and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
1.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE; PROHIBITION
TO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FROM STRIKING. — While
the Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether or
not government employees may strike, they are prohibited
from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular
No. 6 series of 1987 of the Civil Service Commission and as
implied in E.O. No. 180.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDIES IN LIEU OF RIGHT TO STRIKE. —
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions
or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment
of the terms and conditions of employment which are within
the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate
72
government agencies for the improvement of those which are
not fixed by law.
3.ID.; CIVIL SERVICE; SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
EMPLOYEES ARE PART THEREOF AND COVERED BY
MEMORANDUM PROHIBITING STRIKES. — SSS employees
are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.
4.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 180; ALLOWS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO
NEGOTIATE WHERE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT AMONG THOSE FIXED BY LAW.
—  E.O. No. 180  which provides guidelines for the exercise of
the right to organize of government employees, allows
negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment
involved are not among those fixed by law.
5.ID.; ID.; TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN
GOVERNMENT ARE GOVERNED BY LAW; EMPLOYEES
SHALL NOT STRIKE TO SECURE CHANGES. — Section 4,
Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of
the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization,
which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms
and conditions of employment in the government, including
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not
strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
||| (SSS Employees Ass'n. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
85279, July 28, 1989)
Kindly check again, we were discussing about judicial review
on judicial powers, we mentioned about operative fact doctrine
as a consequence of a law that was declared
unconstitutional…
  
We follow the modern view. It is valid until it is declared a
nullity. However, you cannot just simply ignore the effects of
the law while it was still being enforced. It may affect
substantive rights if you will also nullify those acts as a
consequence of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the law
or of the act of government. You TN of this Operative Fact
Doctrine because that was emphasized in the recent DAP
case.
As already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP resulted
into the use of savings pooled by the Executive to finance the
PAPs that were not covered in the GAA, or that did not have
proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment items
pertaining to other departments of the Government in clear
violation of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of
the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior
implementation constituted an operative fact that produced
consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the
Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair.
Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the
disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the
recipients could be required to undo everything that they had
implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would
be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity
alleviates such burden.
The other side of the coin is that it has been
adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the
implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably positive results
that enhanced the economic welfare of the country. To count
the positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones,
like public infrastructure, could easily include roads, bridges,
homes for the homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like.
Not to apply the doctrine of operative fact to the DAP could
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy results by
destruction, and would result in most undesirable
wastefulness.
Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the
deliberations, the doctrine of operative fact does not always
apply, and is not always the consequence of every declaration
of constitutional invalidity. It can be invoked only in situations
where the nullification of the effects of what used to be a valid
law would result in inequity and injustice;   but where no such
result would ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional
law is totally ineffective should apply.  EIaDHS
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the
doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs
(Programs, Activities and Projects) that can no longer be
undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the
validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors,
proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are
concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper
tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and
other liabilities.
||| (Araullo v. Aquino, III, G.R. No. 209287, July 01, 2014)
As we have explained before, it was declared unconstitutional,
and we have expected that because number one, it violated
Section 25 paragraph 5 thereof, where the transfer of savings
was violated in this particular case because they did not follow
what savings means. Apparently, they get the unobligated
funds of the different departments and impound them, did not
spend them, and at the middle of the year, they were then
taken by the President and classified them as savings. And
then the same is thereafter transferred to other offices, other
than the executive department like COA, the Autonomous
Region of Cordillera, members of Congress likewise were also
benefited from it. There was a violation of cross border here as
regards the transfer of appropriation and it was without the aid
of the appropriation law because they simply got it from the
savings and allocate them to projects as it may be desired by
the President.   *****Q: And if you still lose the case in the COMELEC, where
The Supreme Court was saying that under the Operative Fact
Doctrine, it will not affect the projects, but this does not apply to
the persons responsible for the illegal acts of transferring these
funds from the executive department into other offices of
government other than the executive department.
You have to make then a distinction as to the declaration of
unconstitutionality following the principle of the Operative Fact
Doctrine. Again, what was emphasized by the Supreme Court
is that this only applies to the projects as recipients of the
disbursement of the funds, but cannot apply as to liability if
there’s any for those government officials. Just TN of that.
COMELEC
Q: Can they issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus?
A: Answer is yes, but only in aid of their appellate jurisdiction.
Let’s go into the powers of the COMELEC guys. This will be
discussed in detail in your Election Laws, so I’m not going to
deal so much on that. We’ll just go to provisions that are
mentioned in the Constitution. Now let’s go directly to Section
2, on powers and functions. Enforce and administer all
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall. You must know the meanings
of these terms.
73
*****Q: Okay, so they have exclusive original jurisdiction over
all contests relating to what? Election returns and qualifications
of all elective officials coming from the regional, provincial and
city officials. Let’s now go to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC?
Have you mastered this? Election contests involving barangay
officials, where do you file your election protest or Quo
Warranto Petition?
A:  You file it with the MTC or the City Courts that has
jurisdiction.
*****Q: If the decision is rendered by the MTC, you are
aggrieved, where do you appeal?
A: You don’t appeal to the RTC. You appeal directly to the
COMELEC. MTC to COMELEC.
*****Q: If the decision is rendered by the COMELEC, where do
you appeal?
A: You cannot appeal anymore. The decision is Final and
Executory.
Unless there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, then you can go
directly to the Supreme Court on Certiorari. However, on the
condition precedent to that you have to file a Motion for
Reconsideration because decisions – election cases that are
adjudicatory in nature are only decided by the COMLEC by
division and under the Constitution, only the decisions of the
Constitutional Commissions en banc are appealable to the
Supreme Court on Certiorari.
*****Q: What about election contests involving municipal
officials, where do you file?
A:  File it with the RTC.
*****Q: If you lose the case in RTC, where do you appeal?
A: You go to the COMELEC.
do you go?
A: Nowhere. Because decision of the COMELEC is final and
executory, unless you allege grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
*****Q: If it involves City Officials or Provincial Officials, where
do you file?
A:  You file directly with the COMELEC. Original Jurisdiction.
Q: If you lose the case in the COMELEC, where do you
appeal?
A:  You appeal to the Supreme Court on Certiorari, as a matter
of right.
In other words, COMELEC has only appellate jurisdiction
involving Barangay and Municipal Elective Officials. And their
decisions are Final and Executory.
Q: Does COMELEC have contempt powers?
A:  Yes, but only in relation to its Quasi-Adjudicatory or Quasi-
Judicial Function. It cannot exercise this in connection which is
purely executive or ministerial functions.
TN In a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC
exercises Quasi-Judicial and Administrative Powers. Its
jurisdiction over Election Contest is in exercise of its Judicial
Functions.
TN Bedol Case.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Do you know where Bedol now is? He is now a classmate of
the Senators at the PNP Custodial Center (laughs) You know
what happened to that Bedol? [Provincial COMELEC
Maguindanao Chief]. He was asked to submit all Election
Returns, sa Maguindanao bah, involving the Election of
Senators where Zubiri was proclaimed as the Elected Senator,
last Senator. And Pimental was saying, No, he was cheated.
And Pimentel wanted to know where are the Election Returns
so that they would be able to know if what was indicated
therein are correct. What happened?  Bedol did not appear.
He said he lost all the Election Returns. Gi Magic. So he was
cited for Contempt.
He was saying, ‘You cannot cite me for Contempt because that
was an exercise of Administrative Functions of the COMELEC,
when he was ordered and summoned to appear before
COMELEC and bring all the Election Returns and
Paraphernalia.’What did the Supreme Court say in this case of
Bedol? Ngano na priso naman na siya karon?
The Supreme Court said the COMELEC possess the power to
conduct investigation as an adjuct to its constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all Election Laws, by virtue of the
explicit provisions of the Constitution.
In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the
power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-
finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to
attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC's investigative
power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional
mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible
elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was
however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear
during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the
various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen
while they were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly,
the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious
refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was
acting as a board of canvassers at that time it required
petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to
rule that the powers of the board of canvassers are not purely
ministerial. The board exercises quasi-judicial functions, such
as the function and duty to determine whether the papers
transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the
proper officers.  When the results of the elections in the
province of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for
various candidates posited numerous questions on the
certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC. The
COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it in order to
shed light on the issue of whether the election documents
coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not. When
petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC
undeniably acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed resolutions.
||| (Bedol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179830, December 03,
2009)
So what happened here with Bedol.
The Supreme Court here was saying that the Task-Force-
Maguindanao Fact-Finding-Investigation was created for the
purpose of probing into the veracity of the alleged fraud that
marred the elections in the Province of Maguindanao and
consequently, to determine whether the certificates of canvass
were genuine or spurious and whether an election offense had
74
possibly been committed could by no means be classified as
purely ministerial or administrative function.
So since it is not a ministerial or administrative function, it was
a quasi-judicial function according to the Comelec. It was just
right for the Comelec to sight this Atty. Bedol in contempt. So
the Comelec from the Task-Force-Maguindanao (TF) was
exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind
the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao; to achieve its objective the TF conducted
hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned,
including Bedol, and the counsels  to give them the
opportunity argue and support their respective positions.
Task Force Maguindanao's fact-finding investigation — to
probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the
elections in said province; and consequently, to determine
whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious,
and whether an election offense had possibly been committed
— could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or
administrative function.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was
exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind
the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force
conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties
concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to
argue and support their respective positions.
||| (Bedol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179830, December 03,
2009)
So when Bedol therefore was cited for contempt, it was an
exercise of its quasi-judicial power; because of his
contumacious refusal to attend the TF hearings thus he was
arrested. Here, as you would note, to withhold, according to
the Supreme Court, from the Comelec the power to punish
individual who refuse to appear in a fact-finding investigation
despite previous notice in order to attend would render
nugatory the Comelec’s investigative power which is an
essential incident to its constitutional mandate – to secure the
conduct of honest and credible elections; in this case, the
purpose however of the investigation was derailed when Bedol
obstinately refuse to appear during said hearings in order to
answer questions regarding the various elections documents
which he claimed was stolen when they were in his possession
and custody. The issue then of Pimentel vs. Zubiri was
mooted by Zubiri’s resignation and so Pimentel then took over
the remaining term of office of Senator Zubiri.  
Q: Does this include the setting the date of the elections? Do
they have the power to set the date of elections?
A. Answer is NO.
Take note of the case of Maguindanao Federation of
Autonomous Irrigators Association Inc. (represented by
Abas Kida) et. al vs. The Senate. Remember that the terms
of office of the officials of the ARMM had already expired;
because of the situation in the Maguindanao, they wanted to
postpone the elections, and in effect, by postponing it what
would happen is Comelec would be extending the term of
office of the incumbents.
Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC)  is sufficiently
empowered to set the date of  special elections in the ARMM.
To recall, the Constitution has merely empowered the
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct  of an election.  Although the legislature,
under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang
[BP]  881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone
elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific
terms and circumstances provided for in the law. XXX XXX
XXX
As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both
Section 5 and Section 6 of  BP 881  address instances where
elections have already been scheduled to take place but do
not occur or had to be suspended
because of  unexpected  and  unforeseen  circumstances,such
as violence, fraud, terrorism, and  other analogous
circumstances.
In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law,
in  furtherance  of the constitutional
mandate of  synchronization  of national and local elections.
Obviously, this does not fall under any of  the circumstances
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of  BP 881.
More importantly,  RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for
the next ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no authority
to set a different election date.
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold
special elections, and this Court can compel the COMELEC to
do so, there is still the problem  of having to shorten the
terms  of the newly elected officials in order to synchronize the
ARMM elections with the May 2013 national and local
elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor the COMELEC has
the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an
amendment of  Section 8, Article X of  the Constitution, which
limits the term of  local officials to three years.
||| (Abas Kida v. Senate of the Phils., G.R. No. 196271,
196305, 197221, 197280, 197282, 197392, 197454, February
28, 2012)
So again –
Q: Does the Comelec have the power to postpone and set the
date of elections, or if not does the Congress have the power
to extend the term of office of these local elective officials in
ARMM?
These were the issues in the case of Maguindanao Federation.
A. TN -The Supreme Court said, the power to fix the date of
the elections is essentially legislative in nature as evident from
and exemplified by Section 8, Article VI, and also Section 4,
par. 3 of Article VII.
So, it is not for the Comelec but it is for the Congress.
Nonetheless, it was also emphasized in the Maguindanao case
that while it is Congress that fixes the date of elections, it
cannot extend the term of office because in effect that will
amend the Constitution. The Constitution is very clear on the
term of office.
In the meantime where there cannot be an election because of
the circumstances –
Q: Who has the power then to fill the vacancy because the
term had already expired and so vacancy had occurred? There
cannot be an extension by the Congress because in effect that
would violate the Constitution.
75
A. It is then for the President, having the supervision over the
Local Government Units, to appoint an officer-in-charge in the
meantime until elections shall be held.
TN Sema vs COMELEC
Supreme Court said that the COMELEC does not have the
requisite power to call elections as the same is part of the
plenary legislative power.
Q: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction to determine
leadership of or the election in political parties? Do they have
the power to intervene? For example in the LP case there was
a question of leadership, during the time of Arroyo, between
Atienza and Drilon. They had their sets of officers elected as
officers of LP. They were questioning the validity of the election
of Drilon and others. Atienza filed at COMELEC. Does
COMELEC have jurisdiction over the controversy involving
leadership of a political party?
A: Yes. The political party’s identity is crucial here. Its
accreditation is with the COMELEC. So in as much as this
would involve leadership affecting the political party itself, it is
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to settle the
controversy.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is
limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and
all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are
generally free to conduct their activities without interference
from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes
internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party leadership
disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court
ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections   that the
COMELEC's powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-
C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity
of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for
its acts." The Court also declared in another case   that the
COMELEC's power to register political parties necessarily
involved the determination of the persons who must act on its
behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party
leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas' election as LP president is a
leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the
amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing
authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for
all national elective positions. It is also the LP president who
can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of
nomination for candidates to local elective posts.  In simple
terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard
bearer of the party.
The law also grants a registered political party certain rights
and privileges that will redound to the benefit of its official
candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered
political parties that have to be carried out through their
leaders. The resolution of the leadership issue is thus
particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly
conduct of the elections.    
||| (Atienza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, February 16,
2010)
Supreme Court said, reiterating the case of LDP vs
COMELEC, the COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide questions
of leadership within a party and to ascertain its legitimate
officers and leaders. The COMELEC is endowed with
wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great
objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and
honest elections”.   A: No. you have to file an MR for the purpose of having it
Q: What about disciplining members? Does COMELEC have
jurisdiction over the controversy? As a consequence of the
case involving LP, Atienza was hereinafter removed/expelled
as a member of LP. Atienza complained and went to the
COMELEC. Does COMELEC have jurisdiction?
A: No. This is under the jurisdiction of the political party. It is
within the discretion of the political party.
“While the question of party leadership has implications on the
COMELEC’s performance of its functions under Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the
issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the LP.
Such expulsion is, for the moment, an issue of party
membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot
intervene, given the limited scope of its power over political
parties “
TN
Limkaichong vs COMELEC    COMELEC's authority to do so, considering that the suppletory
Case regarding the proclamation of the winners,
notwithstanding the pendency of disqualification cases against
them. This is allowed pursuant to Resolution No. 8062, issued
by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative
function.
Registration of political parties, TN of RA7491. --TN
Q: What are political parties that cannot be accredited in order
to participate in the party list system? –TN
A: (1)It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2)It advocates violence or unlawful means to
seek its goal;
(3)It is a foreign party or organization;
(4)It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes; cdtai
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
(6)It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year;
or
(8)It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two  per centum  (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
||| (Party-List System Act, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941 [1995])
On the rules of procedure they are promulgated by the
COMELEC.   ||| (Balajonda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166032, February 28,
The thing you should TN is on decision making, kung purely
administrative it is always decided by the COMELEC en banc,
meaning 7 of them, pero kung Adjudicatory powers, it is always
decided in division.  So kung in Division, and its say for
example you file a case in a division and it was dismissed
outright,
76
Q: Can you directly go to the supreme court on certiorari?
resolved by the COMELEC en banc –TN
The only exception: Where the COMELEC may call
adjudicatory. Adjudicatory gani means division gyud na. The
only exception here is when the Comelec en banc may directly
assume over to a petition to correct manifest errors in the
tallying of results by the board of canvassers. Direcho na en
banc, di na mu agi og division.
Q: Can the COMELEC execute its own judgment?
A: YES. They can issue a writ of execution. Balajonda v.
COMELEC –TN
Early last year, the Court, through Mr. Justice Antonio T.
Carpio in Batul v. Bayron,   affirmed a similar order of the
COMELEC First Division directing the immediate execution of
its own judgment. Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the
application of the Rules of Court is expressly authorized
by  Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which provides that absent any applicable provisions therein
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be
applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
Batul  also clearly shows that the judgments which may be
executed pending appeal need not be only those rendered by
the trial court, but by the COMELEC as well. It stated, thus:
It is true that present election laws are
silent on the remedy of execution pending
appeal in election contests. However,
neither Ramas  nor Santosdeclared that
such remedy is exclusive to election
contests involving elective barangay and
municipal officials as argued by Batul.
Section 2 allowing execution pending
appeal in the discretion of the court
applies in a suppletory manner to election
cases, including those involving city and
provincial officials. 
Batul  is different from this case in that in Batul  the decision
subject of the order of immediate execution was rendered by
the poll body in the exercise of its original jurisdictionwhile the
decision in this case was promulgated in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Still, there is no reason to dispose of this
petition in a manner different from Batul. The public policy
underlying the suppletory application of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 is to
obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as
determined by either the courts or the COMELEC.   Towards
that end, we have consistently employed liberal construction of
procedural rules in election cases to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by
mere technical objections.   Balajonda's argument is anchored
on a simplistic, literalist reading of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 that
barely makes sense, especially in the light of the COMELEC's
specialized and expansive role in relation to election cases.
2005)
Q: unsay election period?
A: Art 11 Sec 9.
It commences 90 days before the date of the election and 30
days thereafter unless the COMELEC fixes another period.
Election period applies even, it could be lesser, it could be
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
shorter but generally it is 90 days, 30 days and this applies to
plebiscites and referendum as well not just election of officers.
Another thing is on grant of pardon as one of the exceptions
where the president cannot unless there is a favorable
recommendation from the COMELEC.
Q: What is your political party system?
A: It’s free and open, it’s multi - party. We don’t have two-
party system here.
Q: Is Block Voting allowed?
A: Prohibited
COMISSION ON AUDIT
Section II on the powers of the commission audit. Examine
audit and settle accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of
funds or property or expenditures or uses of funds.
Recent decision on audit
There are 2 kinds audit:
1. post audit
2. pre-audit
The provision didn’t mention about pre-audit, only conduct of
post audit with respect to the following.  There is never any
mention of pre-audit.  The COMELEC has exclusive power to
determine the scope of their audit-- that is discretionary of
COA.
TN—recent decision of the Supreme Court relating to audit
Most recent case: Dela Llana v. Chairperson of COA
“Petitioner's allegations find no support in the
aforequoted Constitutional provision. There is nothing in the
said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of
all government transactions and for all government agencies.
The only clear reference to a pre-audit  requirement is found in
Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is
mandated for certain government or private entities with state
subsidy or equity and  only when the internal control system of
anaudited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the
COA  may adopt measures, including a temporary or special
pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory
duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This
discretion on  its part is in line with the constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to
define the scope of its  audit  and examination. When the
language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application.  Neither can the scope of the
provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.”
||| (Dela Llana v. Chairperson of COA, G.R. No. 180989,
February 07, 2012)
Supreme Court said:
There is nothing in the provision that requires COA to conduct
a pre-audit because you know the controversy relating to the
PDAF and all; it was always involving COA because apparently
what COA did was to only make special audit.
Apparently what COA did was only to make special audit.
Because there is no pre-audit, they do so only after the
expenditure is made. That is post-audit.
77
Q: Can they be compelled to do pre-audit?
A: No. (See case citation)
So pre-audit is discretionary, only when the internal system of
a department has failed or is inadequate.
However, the audit that they do is not exclusive to COA. This
was emphasized in the case of DBP, that a private accounting
firm may also be hired by the Government to do the accounting
and audit, especially when the funds subject of the audit is
borrowed money from an international bank where it is
required (because they do not trust the Government, much
less the COA to do the audit).
The thing is, the audit is not exclusive to COA. In this case of
DBP vs. COA,
“2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON AUDIT;
POWER THEREOF TO EXAMINE AND AUDIT IS NON-
EXCLUSIVE. — The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a
reading of the entire Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution, is that the COA's power to examine and audit is
non-exclusive. On the other hand, theCOA's authority to define
the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and
regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is
exclusive. Moreover, as the constitutionally mandated auditor
of all government agencies, the COA's findings and
conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors,
at least insofar as government agencies and officials are
concerned. The superiority or preponderance of the  COA audit
over private audit can be gleaned from the records of the
Constitutional Commission. . . . The findings and conclusions
of the private auditor may guide private investors or creditors
who require such private audit. Government agencies and
officials, however, remain bound by the findings and
conclusions of the COA, whether the matter falls under the first
or second paragraph of Section 2, unless of course such
findings and conclusions are modified or reversed by the
courts. The power of the  COA to examine and audit
government agencies, while non-exclusive, cannot be taken
away from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution
mandates that: "Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any
entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise
whatsoever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit." The mere fact that
private auditors may audit government agencies does not
divest the COA  of its power to examine and audit the same
government agencies. The  COA is neither by-passed nor
ignored since even with a private audit the COA  will still
conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and
conclusions will still bind government agencies and their
officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger
whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual
scrutiny of a COA  audit. Manifestly, the express language of
the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to
only one indubitable conclusion — the  COA does not have the
exclusive power to examine and audit government agencies.
The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the needs
to allow independent private audit of certain government
agencies in addition to the  COA audit, as when there is a
private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or
when a government corporation is privatized or publicly listed,
or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money
from abroad.”||| (DBP v. COA, G.R. No. 88435, January 16,
2002)
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Supreme Court said that the mere fact that these private
auditors may audit Government agencies do not divest COA of
its power to examine and audit the same agencies.
Nonetheless, the intent of the framers of the Constitution point
to one indubitable proposition, that COA does not have the
exclusive power to examine and audit Government agencies.
The only thing that is exclusive to them is to determine the
scope of their audit and their system of audit. But the conduct
of the audit itself is not exclusive.
Q: Who can be audited by COA?
A: All government agencies.
Q: What about private agencies? Can they be audited by
COA?
A: Yes, if they are holding Government funds or property. We
have the case of Blue Bar Coconut Philippines vs Tantuico Jr.:
“3.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON AUDIT;
JURISDICTION; SECTION 2(1), ART. IX-
D,  PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION; AUTHORITY TO EXAMINE
AND AUDIT FUNDS INCLUDES SUCH NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES RECEIVING SUBSIDY OR
EQUITY FROM THE GOVERNMENT. — The petitioners also
question the respondents' authority to audit them. They
contend that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit"
power which is confined to government-owned or controlled
corporations. This argument has no merit. Section 2 (1) of
Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that "The Commission
on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property,
owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the Government, or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporation with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis . . . (d)  such non-
governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or
indirectly from or through the Government which are required
by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity." The Constitution formally
embodies the long established rule that private entities who
handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be
examined or audited in their handling of said funds by
government auditors.”(Blue Bar Coconut Phil. v. Tantuico, Jr.,
G.R. No. L-47051, July 29, 1988)
Corporations covered by COA’s auditing powers are not
limited to GOCC’s. Where a private corporation or entity
handles public funds, it falls under COA’s jurisdiction.
TN, they only have jurisdiction over liquidated funds. So if the
funds are still unliquidated, you can still go to court to contest it
because they are civil liabilities. The amount is not yet actually
determined, COA has no jurisdiction.
They only audit liquidated funds. So kung unliquidated pa cya,
jurisdiction is with the court, not with COA.
Q [student]: Can you increase the functions of COA (widen
scope of audit)?
A: Yes. Section 8, common to all, each commission shall
perform such other functions as may be provided by law so it
may be increased. But not diminish their functions though.
XII. Local Governments
Local governments would be, HOT ISSUE WHEN YOU TAKE
THE BAR EXAM, because of the operation of the BANGSA
MORO, political entity.
78
Q: So as now under the constitution, what are the territorial
and political subdivisions mentioned?
A: Provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. It didn’t say
BANGSAMORO. It says however, there should be
Autonomous Regions in  Muslim Mindanao and in Cordillera.
So it will then be considered as an Autonomous Region rather
than a sub state. It must be within the framework on the
provision to the constitution otherwise, magkamali sila. While
they may not describe it as a sub state, but virtually it is as
such,  not an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. Then
that would be contrary to section 1. And this is self-executing.
Q:They enjoy local autonomy, but that autonomy does not
mean what?
A: Independence from the national government. So we have
several decisions on this. Still we have a unitary system of
government. These local governments do not enjoy the same
power as that of the national government. And there is more to
decentralization of administration or devolution of services
rather than transfer of powers. So you should know, well, you
will have a separate subject for local government.
These are the only things you should TN, for purposes of the
BAR relating to local governments, this pertains to, ang
importante ani.
Q: Who has control over local governments?
A: Its congress. Through a law, Local government code RA
7160. And the president has only supervision.
Q: What is the difference between control and supervision?
A: Control is when the head of office or the superior can even
change the decision of the subordinate and replace it with his
decision. Supervision, its only monitoring to make sure that the
government officials act in accordance with law. He cannot
change or modify the decision of a subordinate because it’s
only supervision.
Now, TN of section 5 also. That’s also asked in the BAR exam.
Q: what are the sources of income of local government units?
A: So basically they can raise their own revenues by levying
local taxes, fees and charges.
The emphasis will be local autonomy. We must understand its
nature or implication (BAR)
Q: What will be the extent of the supervision or control of the
national gov’t over the local gov’t under the concept of local
autonomy?
A: Control over local government under the concept of local
autonomy. Control over local gov’t is by congress by virtue of
the Local Government Code. The president only has
supervision.
Pimentel et al v Executive Secretary
- Relating to the Pantawid ng Pamilyang Pilipino
Program of the DSWD or the conditional cash
transfer.
- This was questioned by former Senator Pimentel
being the father of local autonomy. He sponsored this
concept. He questioned the program through the
DSWD.
-
Pimentel et al v Executive Secretary Ochoa and DSWD
[G.R. No. 195770. July 17, 2012.]
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
“The essence of this express reservation of power (Sec. 17 (c)
of LGC) by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no
power over a program for which funding has been provided by
the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of
basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
The Court held in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals 17  that while it
is through a system of decentralization that the State shall
promote a more responsive and accountable local government
structure, the concept of local autonomy does not imply the
conversion of local government units into "mini-states." 18  We
explained that, with local autonomy, the Constitution did
nothing more than "to break up the monopoly of the national
government over the affairs of the local government" and, thus,
did not intend to sever "the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and local
government units."  19 In  Pimentel v. Aguirre,  20 the Court
defined the extent of the local government's autonomy in terms
of its partnership with the national government in the pursuit of
common national goals, referring to such key concepts as
integration and coordination.
XXX
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government
powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services
cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs
against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded
from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially
where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs
concerned”
Q: Can Barangay also levy their own taxes without express law
granting it such authority?
A: YES. Sec. 5 is self –executing. It doesn’t need an enabling
law to execute the provision.
TN If there is any law to that effect, it is only limiting the
exercise of their taxation power.
Q: Can the Local Govt. tax their local government
instrumentalities?
A: Recall the examples. It is part of the power to tax by these
local governments. It is settled in the case of MCIAA (Lapu—
lapu) that the LGU has the power totax because it is engaged
in proprietary functions.
In contrast however, in the case of MIAA (Pasay), this property
is owned by the state in its sovereign capacity, and therefore
exempt from tax although exercising proprietary functions.
Because they are titled in the name of the Republic not as
patrimonial properties, but as properties owned by the state in
its sovereign capacity, therefore exempt.
PPA is subject to tax. Because while they are rendering public
service, the property is owned in their proprietary capacity.
GSIS is subject to tax. Accdg to the SC, unless it is exempt!
Because under the LGC, they (LGU) are authorized to tax
them. And so because of that decision against GSIS, the law of
GSIS was amended expressly authorizing their exemption from
taxation of local taxes.
79
Q: In case of doubt whether an entity is subject to local tax or
not, how do you resolve the doubt?
A: Against the local taxing authority. Meaning, it is exempt from
taxation
Sec. 6 Internal Revenue Allotment.
That is automatically released. The amount is to be determined
by Congress, subject to the availability of funds.
What is subject to the discretion of Congress is only the
amount. But as to its released, once it is determined, it should
be automatically released.
Sec. 7
TN The case involving Palawan and the Malampaya. DOE
doesn’t share with the Palawan province. SC upheld the right
of the Palawan Province of an equitable share from the
proceeds of the utilization and development of its national
wealth within its area, invoking this provision, including sharing
the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
[couldn’t find exact case]
TERM OF OFFICE
3 years term, except barangay ha which cannot be changed by
law. The term of the barangay officials can be changed by law,
not the other local elective officials. 3 years but in no case shall
be more than 3 consecutive terms.
When you serve, even if you don’t finish your term, it may be
considered one full term for purposes of determining the
continuity or successiveness of the term of office. Regular
election ra ha! Not succession, recall election TN
And then you have the case of Maguindanao (Abas Kida
case). That’s the most recent decision on the term of office.
Unsay sulti sa SC? DIba na-expire na ang term of office sa
local officials, unya kay napostpone man ilang elections kay
tungod sa peace and order, so they cannot call for an election.
Q: Can Congress, by postponing the elections, extend the term
of these local elective officials?
A: In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has
been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself
and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this
Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should
stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot
be extended by holdover by Congress. ADSTCa
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively
another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for
the new term. This view — like the extension of the elective
term — is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do
indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if
acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly,
then all laws would be illusory.  Congress cannot also create a
new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position
for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by
Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President.  Hence,
holdover — whichever way it is viewed — is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
XXX XXX XXX
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint
OICs to undertake the functions of the elective members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor
innovative.|||  Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
||| (Abas Kida v. Usman, G.R. No. 196271, 196305, 197221,
197280, 197282, 197392, 197454, o, October 18, 2011)
Q: who can fill up the vacancy because the term of the
government officials have already expired
A:  the grant to the President the power to appoint an OIC to
undertake the function of the elective of the members of the
regional legislative assembly is neither novel or innovative
There were previous decisions to this supporting  the ruling  of
the Supremer Court that it should be the President to appoint
the  Officer-in –charge.
TN OF THE FOLLOWING CASES:
Aldovino vs COMELEC (Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 184836, December 23, 2009) Preventive suspension does
not constitute voluntary renunciation.
(infra)
Bolos vs COMELEC
“In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected
as  Punong Barangay  for three consecutive terms, satisfying
the first condition for disqualification.
What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed to
have voluntarily renounced his position as  Punong
Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won
as  Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed said office.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC  that there was voluntary
renunciation by petitioner of his position as Punong Barangay.
The  COMELEC correctly held:
XXX He knew that his election as
municipal councilor would entail
abandonment of the position he held, and
he intended to forego of it. Abandonment,
like resignation, is voluntary.  12
Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong
Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and,
upon winning, assumed the position ofSangguniang
Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office
as  Punong Barangay  which the Court deems as a voluntary
renunciation of said office.”
||| (Bolos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009)
Adormeo vs COMELEC citing Lonzanida vs COMELEC
(which was also cited by Judge)
2.  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT;
ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS; VOLUNTARY
RENUNCIATION OF OFFICE DOES NOT CANCEL THE
RENOUNCED TERM IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE
THREE-TERM LIMIT; CASE AT BAR. — Neither can
respondent's victory in the recall election be deemed a
violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as "voluntary
renunciation" for clearly it is not.
In  Lonzanida  vs. COMELEC,  we said: . . . The second
sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
"Voluntary renunciation of office  for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which he was elected." The clear intent of the
framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
80
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term is evident in this provision.
renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his
post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by
voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process
of writ of execution issued by the  COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term.  |||  (Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 147927, February 04, 2002)
Borja vs COMELEC
1.  POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; TERM OF
OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS; PROHIBITION
AGAINST SERVING FOR MORE THAN THREE
CONSECUTIVE TERMS; TO BAR THE ELECTION OF A
LOCAL OFFICIAL BECAUSE HE HAS ALREADY SERVED
THREE TERMS, ALTHOUGH THE FIRST AS A RESULT OF
SUCCESSION BY OPERATION OF LAW RATHER THAN
ELECTION WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE PEOPLE'S
RIGHT TO CHOOSE THOSE WHOM THEY PLEASE TO
GOVERN THEM. — A fundamental tenet of representative
democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose
those whom they please to govern them. To bar the election of
a local official because he has already served three terms,
although the first as a result of succession by operation of law
rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.
2.  ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE X, SECTION 8 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION CONTEMPLATES SERVICE BY LOCAL
OFFICIALS FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS AS A
RESULT OF ELECTION. — Not only historical examination
but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of
the  COMELEC that Art. X, Section 8 contemplates service by
local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of
election. The first sentence speaks of "the term of office
of  elective  local officials" and bars "such official[s]" from
serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second
sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be
deemed to have served his full term of office, states that
"voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected." The term
served must therefore be one "for which [the official
concerned] was elected." The purpose of this provision is to
prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of
terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is
not serving a term for which he was elected because he is
simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term
notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its
expiration. DCcHAa
||| (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133495, September 03,
1998)
Ong vs Alegre
1.POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS; TERM OF OFFICE; THREE-TERM LIMIT RULE;
PETITIONER'S PROCLAMATION AS THE DULY ELECTED
MAYOR IN THE 1998 MAYORALTY ELECTION COUPLED
BY HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE AND HIS CONTINUOUS
EXERCISE OF THE FUNCTIONS THEREOF FROM START
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
TO FINISH OF THE TERM, SHOULD BE LEGALLY BE
TAKEN AS SERVICE FOR A FULL TERM IN
CONTEMPLATION OF THE THREE-TERM RULE. – The
three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Section 43 (b) of
the Local Government Code restates the same rule. For the
three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply,
two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has
fully served three (3) consecutive terms. With the view we take
of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein,
thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004
elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner
Francis  Ong having been duly elected mayor of that
municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001
elections and serving the July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and the
July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein
controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term,
albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor
of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and
actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a
proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the
municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs to be
addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis's assumption
of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July
1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term
service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis,
"service for the full term," and should be counted as a full term
served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by
the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local
elective officials from being elected and serving for more than
three consecutive term for the same position. It is true that the
RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case
No. 6850, that it was Francis' opponent (Alegre) who "won" in
the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected
mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be
stressed, was without practical and legal use and value,
having been promulgated after the term of the contested office
has expired. Petitioner Francis' contention that he was only a
presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a
duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the
1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office
and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start
to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full
term in contemplation of the three-term rule. The absurdity and
the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern.
Such contrary view would mean that  Alegre  would – under the
three-term rule – be considered as having served a term by
virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when
another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation
made in due course after an election.||| (Ong v. Alegre, G.R.
No. 163295, 163354, January 23, 2006)
Example: if you resign that is not considered as  an
interruption.
Q: what if you are suspended?
A: depends
Preventive suspension – no interruption
Mandatory suspension – there is interruption
Q: Dismissal?
81
A: there is an interruption because he did not finish the term .
then it is not considered as the full term that they serve.
CASE OF ALDOVINO JR VS  COMELEC
The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt
their term for purposes of the 3 term limit rule under the
Constitution and the local government code.  Preventive
suspension by its nature does not involve an effective
interruption of service.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the
total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the
Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is
therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-
term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an
effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a
reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a
threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it
an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a
preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary
renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of
office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily
fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon
after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this
sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective
interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more
potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution
expressly disallows as an interruption.
So for example, first term, elected. Second term, elected,Third
term elected. During his third term, he was placed under
preventive suspension. So nakuhaan iyang term because he
was suspended for six months. Instead of 3 years, he only
served for two years and 6 months.
 
Q: Can he run in the next election?
A: No. Because the preventive suspension was not considered
an interruption.
 
It would have been different if suspension was not preventive
suspension but suspension imposed as a penalty then he has
not fully served his third term, which makes him qualified. Or
he has been dismissed . When you are suspended as a
penalty or you are dismissed, that is not considered as a
voluntary interruption. But it was qualified if preventive
suspension because here, you still hold the title and the office.
There is no interruption in preventive suspension.
 
The interruption of a term exempting an official from the three-
term limit is no less than an involuntary loss of the title to the
office. In involuntary suspension, the suspended official is
barred from exercising the functions of his office but does not
vacate and lose title to his office. Loss of office is a
consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt
or liability. TN
BAR; Case - Bolos Jr vs COMELEC
 
FACTS: Bolos Jr. served as a barangay captain in his third
term. He didn't finish it.
Then there was an election in the town municipal hall so he ran
for the office of a municipal councilor and he won. Afterwards,
he got bored because he was only a councilor compared to
when he was the barangay captain where he is the boss. So
during the next barangay election, he ran for barangay captain.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
 
ISSUE: Is he qualified to run for Bgy Capt. when his third term
as a barangay captain was a voluntary resignation.
HELD: The SC said that Bolos was serving his third term as
punong barangay when he ran for the Sangunian Bayan
membership and upon winning and assuming the position as a
Sangguniang Bayan member, thus voluntarily relinquishing his
office as Punong Baranggay. The court deemed this as a
voluntary loss of title to the office of Punong Baranggay and
therefore, does not interrupt the three-term limit.
An interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation of
law, is exemplified in Montebon v. Commission on Elections.  interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his
The respondent therein, Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr., was
elected and served three consecutive terms as Municipal
Councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and
2004-2007. However, during his second term, he succeeded
as Vice-Mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of the Vice-
Mayor pursuant to Section 44 of  R.A. No. 7160.  Potencioso's
assumption of office as Vice-Mayor was considered an
involuntary severance from his office as Municipal Councilor,
resulting in an interruption in his second term of service.  The
Court held that it could not be deemed to have been by reason
of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of
law.   Hence, Potencioso was qualified to run as candidate for
municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu in the
May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.  |
(Bolos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009)
 
Ardomeo Case; Recall Term
 
Facts: First, Second and Third Election, he won. Pagkatapos,
iyang kontra ni-daog. However, he ran during a recall election.
 
ISSUE:  Was he qualified?
HELD: Yes.Because there was already an interruption. He did
not run the fourth election . He ran only during the recall
election which was after the fourth election. Therefore, the
three-term limit is already interrupted.
1.POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; DISQUALIFICATION;
THREE-TERM RULE; CONDITIONS FOR THE
APPLICATION. — The issue before us was already addressed
in  Borja, Jr. vs.  COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157, 169 (1998),
where we held, To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local
officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has  served  three consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been  elected  to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can
apply. . . . Likewise, in the case
of  Lonzanida  vs. COMELEC,  311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), we
said, This Court held that the two conditions for the application
of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post and 2) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms.
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT;
ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS; VOLUNTARY
RENUNCIATION OF OFFICE DOES NOT CANCEL THE
RENOUNCED TERM IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE
THREE-TERM LIMIT; CASE AT BAR. — Neither can
respondent's victory in the recall election be deemed a
violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as "voluntary
renunciation" for clearly it is not.
82
In  Lonzanida  vs. COMELEC,  we said: . . . The second
sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
"Voluntary renunciation of office  for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which he was elected." The clear intent of the
framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by
voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process
of writ of execution issued by the  COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term.  aTcESI
||| (Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, February 04,
2002)
 
TN: Creation of cities, municipalities and provinces, in terms of
requirements
 
Q: What are the requirements?
A: In terms of INCOME, POPULATION and AREA. ****
 
One thing you should take note is Navarro vs Ermita.
 
FACTS: This is the creation of the Kingdom of Ecleo, Dinagat
Island. There is a specific requirement for area. This is an
island which was sought to be considered as a province. IT
was considered as a province even though it lacked the area
requirement to form a province.
ISSUE:  Why was it created as a province when in terms of
area, it was lacking?
 
RULING: The land area requirement area does not apply
where the proposed province is composed on one or more
islands. Thus it was declared valid. Accordingly, RA 9355,
creating Dinagat Province is declared as valid and not
unconstitutional. The proclamation of Dinagat Islands as a
province and the officers thereof are also valid.
 
The land area requirements of a province comprising of one or
more islands does not apply.
TN: League of the Cities of the Philippines v Comelec – gi
increase ang income, from 20M to 100M.
Q: Is MMDA a local government unit?
A: No. It is only an administrative coordinating body. So
therefore it does not exercise those powers that are given to
LGU’s.
XI. Accountability of Public Officers
***Memorize Section 1
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
***Memorize impeachable officials: (President, Vice-President,
Supreme Court Justices, Commissioners of the Constitutional
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Commissions and Ombudsman). That is EXCLUSIVE and the
GROUNDS also are EXCLUSIVE.
Grounds for Impeachment:
1. Culpable violation of the Constitution
a. Q: Is the offense relating to that impeachable
offense? Can the President be impeached
for it?
b. A: It is impeachable but whether he can be
impeached is another story. It’s a waste of
time according to Fr. Bernas. You know
some people they just want to put an
impeachment complaint on record even if it
may not prosper at all. Makataghap diay. (It’s
clear that there was a violation, particularly
Section 25(5) of Art. VI, whether there was
good or bad faith, but the next question is
whether it is culpable. That’s another story.)
2. Bribery
3. Graft and Corruption
4. Betrayal of Public Trust
5. Treason
6. Other high crimes
The most important part here is the process. So we have:
1. Initiation
2. Prosecution
Q: How is initiation done?
A: There has to be a filing of the complaint. Any citizen may file
a complaint but it has to be endorsed by a member of the
House, if the one who filed is a member of the House, there’s
no more need of endorsement.
Q: How many votes are needed in order to affirm a resolution
with the Articles of Impeachment?
A: 1/3. The Articles of impeachment will be prepared and filed
with the Senate.
Q: Assuming that it was filed by a private individual and it was
endorsed by a member of the House of Representatives, what
will happen next?
A: It will be referred to the Committee on Justice. The moment
it is referred, regardless of the action, that may be taken by
that committee. It is deemed initiated.
Section 3.
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall
be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote
of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
83
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of
the Philippines is on trial, theChief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment, according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section
Q: What happens the moment it is referred to the Committee
on Justice?
A: Regardless of the action that is taken by the committee, is it
deemed initiated. Once it is deemed initiated, you cannot file a
complaint within the one year because of the one year bar rule.
Q: What about several complaints?
A: In the case of Gutierrez vs. The Ombudsman, there were
several complaints filed against her, it was made the same
year, the Supreme Court ruled that for as long as it is
simultaneously referred it is considered as one initiation. It is
possible that in one year’s time there are several complaints,
however, they are to be consolidated and simultaneously
referred to the committee and considered as one initiation only.
Q: What may the Committee do once the complaint is referred
to it?
A: Once it is referred to the committee, the committee may
recommend its dismissal or it the filing.
Q: To whom it is recommended?
A: To the plenary session of the House.
Q: Within how many days does the Committee act?
A: 60 days and it is mandatory. They can be compelled to file
their report by mandamus should they fail to file it in 60 days
because it is their ministerial duty to submit the report in 60
days.
Q: What if the recommendation is the dismissal of the
complaint? Is there any chance of that complaint prospering?
And it will be brought to the senate for prosecution?
A: Yes, all that is needed is one-third (1/3) even if two thirds of
the members of the house are agreeable to the dismissal. If
there is still one third of the membership left, that is against the
dismissal. Still, that case is initiated and it can be filed with the
senate for prosecution.
Even if the recommendation is for filing and two thirds are
against the filing for as long as the recommendation has the
support of one third of the members of the house it can still be
filed with the senate.
Q: So what will happen in the Senate?
A: There will be a hearing.
Q: Who is going to preside it?
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A: Ordinarily, if the impeachable official is not the president, it
would be the president of the senate. Otherwise if the subject
of the impeachment is the President, then it would be Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court.
Q: How many votes in order to convict?
A: 2/3 votes. TN
Q: Does the requirement of publication, under the Rules of
Procedure, apply to impeachment proceedings?
A: Again in the case of Gutierrez vs. The Ombudsman, one of
her grounds for dismissal of the case was that the rules of
procedure on impeachment was not published. She said that it
violated her right to due process. Is she correct? Supreme
Court said No, she is not correct because the requirement of
publication of the rules of procedure in congress applies only to
the rules of procedure relating to legislative inquiry not to
impeachment proceedings. So even if it is not published there
can’t be a violation of due process because that is not required
under the Constitution.
Sec. 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law
Q: is this a Court?
A: Yes.
Q: Is this part of the Judiciary?
A: Yes, it is part of the Judiciary but it is not part of the
Ombudsman. It is a court not an Office, an Anti-Graft Court.
Q: What is the role of the Ombudsman?
A:  In relation to the Sandiganbayan, it becomes the
prosecutor. But there is the Special Prosecutor’s Office that is
under the Office of the Ombudsman that presents evidence in
the Sandiganbayan.
Q: Can a private prosecutor appear in the Sandiganbayan?
A: No, unless the intention is to recover civil liabilities. If there’s
no civil liability, then a private prosecutor has no personality to
appear in an Anti-Graft cases.
Q: What powers does The Ombudsman, have?
A: It has investigatory and prosecutorial power. When they
conduct investigation in a criminal case, they act like a regular
prosecutor.
In a criminal case, they act like a regular prosecutor determine
probable cause, whether a crime has been committed and the
person charged is probably guilty thereof. It will be filed with
the regular courts in the event they will find probable cause. It
is not for them to determine whether he is guilty or not.
In an administrative case, the Ombudsman acts like a judge to
determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent public
officer.
So many cases wherein the Ombudsman had dismissed
government officials.
Q: Is the dismissal executory?
A: Yes.
Q: Pending appeal?
A: Yes. Immediately executory. (TN)
Cases
Facura vs CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011. –
Appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in
84
administrative cases do not stay the execution of the penalty
imposed.
Ombudsman vs CA, Et al., GR NO. 1772224, January 26,
2011 – The decision of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases may be executed pending appeal. This is pursuant to
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which
explicitly states that an appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executor. Also, the power of the Ombudsman to
implement the penalty is not merely recommendatory but
mandatory. Because the Constitution says it may recommend,
No, it should be interpreted as mandatory.
Administrative cases
Q: Who are covered by the Ombudsman’s investigatory
power?
A: Tanan. Except President, Vice-President because they are
impeachable; Members of Congress because they are subject
only to the exclusive disciplinary power of each house; Justices
of the Supreme Court because they are impeachable; and
Judges and even ordinary court personnel because
supervision is exclusive to the Supreme Court.
Criminal Cases
Q: what is the extent of the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman?
A: All, including the senators. Even the President but only after
his tenure. Justices of the Supreme Court also after their
tenure.
Q: Does the power to prosecute or to investigate criminal
cases is exclusive to the Ombudsman?
A: No. It is concurrent with DOJ, concurrent with the fiscals.
So you may file the anti-graft case in the fiscal’s office.
However, there is a condition to that, if the case is within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it has to be with the
imprimatur of the Ombudsman or the deputy of the
Ombudsman; otherwise, the information can be quashed for
lack of authority on the part of the prosecutor to file the case in
court.
Again, if the case is triable before the Sandiganbayan it should
be always with the approval of the Ombudsman or the deputy
Ombudsman. (TN)
Q: How long can the Ombudsman place someone under
preventive suspension?
A: Not more than six (6) months.
Q: how long can the ombudsman place someone under
preventive suspension?
A: not more than six (6) months
Q: On recovery of ill gotten wealth, is there any prescriptive
period?
A: There is none. Walay prescriptive period, forever, but
prosecuting these persons responsible, TN 15 years from the
commission of the crime or from the time of discovery of the
crime, it prescribes ang criminal action but not on the recovery
of ill gotten wealth.
(BAR) Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law) 85
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and of other officials of
justice, and lead modest lives. the government.

It is now provided by decree (see P.D. No. 1606) that justices

*** Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
The enumeration is exclusive. It cannot be modified by
legislation.
Q: Is the Deputy Ombudsman impeachable?
A: NO. It was answered in Office of the Ombud vs CA and
Mojica [G.R. No. 146486. March 4, 2005.], citing the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commissions
of the Sandiganbayan may be removed only through process
of impeachment, the purpose evidently being to withdraw them
from the removal power of the Supreme Court. This prohibition
is of dubious constitutionality. In the first place, the list of
impeachable officers is covered by the maxim "expressio unius
est exclusio alterius." Secondly, Article VIII, Section 11, of the
Constitution states that all judges of inferior courts — and this
would include the Sandiganbayan – are under the disciplinary
power of the Supreme Court and may be removed by it.”
Q: Can President remove the Deputy Ombudsman?
You remember the case involving the Quirino hostaging of
Chinese Nationals by a police Rolando Mendoza? They said
the policeman acted this way because he had a pending MR
with the Deputy Ombudsman with the Military which was not
immediately acted upon. As a result of such incident, the
president removed the deputy ombudsman from office. Now,
the deputy ombud is not an impeachable official. Who then can
remove him from his office? Can he be removed by the
President considering that it was the President who appointed
him to the position, which then includes the power of removal?

A: NO. The President cannot remove the Deputy Ombudsman.

“The impeachable There is a process that we must follow otherwise, it would
officers are the undermine the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
President of the This was enunciated in the recent case of
Philippines, the
Vice-President, Gonzales III vs. OP of the Phil., G.R. No. 196231 & 196232,
the members of January 28, 2014
the Supreme
Court, the “In more concrete terms, we rule that  subjecting the Deputy
members of the Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the
Constitutional President, whose own alter egos and officials in the
Commissions, and Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman's
the Ombudsman. disciplinary authority,  cannot but seriously place at risk
(see Art. XI, Sec. the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman
2) The list is itself.  The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional
exclusive and may mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to
not be increased support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
or reduced by Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted
legislative independence is what Section 8 (2) of RA  No. 6770 exactly
enactment. The did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the
power to impeach independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of
is essentially a the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks
non-legislative and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks
prerogative and to revitalize.
can be exercised
by the Congress What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and
only within the necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the
limits of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The
authority Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete
conferred upon it trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as
by the she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and
Constitution. This controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is
authority may not true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like
be expanded by the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major
the grantee itself problem for the government. For these reasons,  Section 8 (2)
even if motivated of  RA No.  6770  (providing that the President may remove
by the desire to a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.”
strengthen the
security of tenure Q: How then can the Deputy Ombudsman be removed?
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A: There is a procedure in the office of the ombudsman. It will
go through a committee of peers, among themselves in the
office of the ombudsman, to investigate and discipline the
deputy ombudsman and the special prosecutors.
Q: what about the Special prosecutor which is an organic part
of the office of the ombudsman?
If you can recall, because of that plea – bargaining with deputy
ombudsman Gonzales, which allowed Major Carlos Garcia to
plead to a lesser offense. It was later found that the plea –
bargaining was disadvantageous to the government. The
President thereafter fired Deputy Ombud Gonzales and
Special Prosuctor Sulit. In this same case, SC upheld the
Presdient’s disciplinary power as limited only to the Special
Prosecutor because it is not part of the Office of the
Ombudsman. [Judge said there is still no resolution yet on this
matter as the case is still pending with the CA, most probably
daw different from the Deputy Ombud nevertheless, here’s the
excerpt from the Gonzales case, which tells us Judge is
correct.]
“Under Section 11 (4) of RA  No. 6770, the Special Prosecutor
handles the prosecution of criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan and this prosecutorial authority includes
high-ranking executive officials. For emphasis, subjecting the
Special Prosecutor to disciplinary and removal powers of the
President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive
Department are subject to the prosecutorial authority of the
Special Prosecutor, would seriously place the independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk.
Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not
expressly made part of the composition of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of
that Office militates against a differential treatment between
the Ombudsman's Deputies, on one hand, and the Special
Prosecutor himself, on the other.What is true for the
Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her
Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office
who act directly as agents of the Ombudsman  herself in
the performance of her duties.
In  Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman,   the Court was
confronted with an argument that, at bottom, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor is not a subordinate agency of the Office of
the Ombudsman and is, in fact, separate and distinct from the
latter.
||| (Gonzales III vs. OP of the Phil., G.R. No. 196231 &
196232, January 28, 2014)
Non-disclosure of maters in the SALN there is no such
provision as a ground for impeachment
Q: What was then the ground for which corona was
impeached?
A: It was betrayal of public trust, not even for graft and
corruption.
“culpable violation of the constitution” it is not just a violation of
the constitution, but there has to be willful, intentional violation
of the constitution that is legal or unlawful. I am referring to this
because when the SC declares a law to be unconstitutional
86
would it necessarily follow that the president may be charged
of culpable violation of the constitution?
What they’re afraid of after the administration’s term of office
expires, they might be charged with technical malversation of
public funds or other violations of the anti-graft law. That’s why
they are trying to invoke good faith.
TN: no jurisprudence yet on “culpable violation of the
constitution”, you can only understand it in its ordinary concept.
The RPC defines: treason, bribery while other special penal
laws define graft and corruption like RA 3019. On the other
hand, “other high crimes” and “betrayal of public trust” have not
been defined yet, ultimately it is for the senate to define that,
and they did not even explain why they removed Corona, only
that they have decided that he has betrayed public trust
because of his non-disclosure of his real income in his SALN.
Sec. 4 on impeachment proceedings
Q: Who initiates impeachment proceedings (not impeachment
complaint), how is it initiated, what are the limitations?
A: TN to consider an initiation of impeachment proceedings,
there has to be a filing of the complaint, which has to be
sufficient in form and substance.
“form” means it has to be a verified petition and endorsed by a
member of congress.
There is no need for an endorsement of a member of congress
IF it was filed by a member of congress himself or if it was
signed by at least 1/3 of the members of the house of
representatives—that would no longer go to committee on
justice, rather, what will happen thereafter is the preparation of
the articles of impeachment that would be filed in the senate
for trial.
Q: Assuming that a complaint is filed and endorsed by a
member of congress, is there an initiation of impeachment
proceedings?
A: Not yet until it is referred to the committee on justice.
The initiation of impeachment proceedings consists of the filing
the complaint and its referral to the committee on justice
regardless of whatever action that may have been taken by the
committee. That’s the case of Francisco et al vs House of
Representative Gr No. 160261 November 10, 2003
“7.POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT;  IMPEACHMENT POWER; ONE-YEAR BAN
PROHIBITING THE
INITIATION  OF IMPEACHMENT  PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIALS UNDER SECTION 3(5)  OF THE
CONSTITUTION; MEANING  OF TIE TERM "INITIATE"; CASE
AT BAR. – From the records of  the Constitutional
Commission, to the  amicus curiae briefs  of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the
term "to initiate" refers to the
filing  of the  impeachment  complaint coupled with Congress'
taking initial action on said complaint. Having concluded that
the initiation takes place by the act  of filing and referral or
endorsement of  the impeachment complaint to
the  House  Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least
one-third of  the
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
members of  the Houseof Representatives with the Secretary
General of  the House, the meaning of  Section 3(5) of  Article
XI becomes clear. Once an  impeachment  complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF  CONGRESS TO MAKE AND
INTERPRET ITS RULES ON  IMPEACHMENT IS NOT
ABSOLUTE;  IMPEACHMENT RULES MUST EFFECTIVELY
CARRY OUT THE PURPOSE  OF THE CONSTITUTION. –
Respondent House of  Representatives  counters that under
Section 3 (8)  of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it
and only it has the power to make  and interpret its rules
governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate
its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced. Section
3(8)  of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate
its rules on  impeachment  to effectively carry out the
purpose of  this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its
rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively
carry out the purpose  of this section." Hence, these rules
cannot contravene the very purpose of  the Constitution which
said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover,
Section 3  of Article XI clearly provides for other specific
limitations on its power to make rules.”
In the case of Gutierrez vs. House of Representatives
Committee on Justice Gr No. 193459 remember the
ombudsman who was the subject of impeachment Here, there
were several complaints filed against her, so she invoked the
“one year bar” of filing of a petition for impeachment wherein
you can only have the initiation of the impeachment
proceedings once in a year.
Since there were several complaints that were all referred to
the committee on justice, was there a violation of the one year
bar rule?
SC held that there was no violation of the one year bar rule
because while there were several complaints, they were all
together referred to the committee on justice at the same time.
“The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment
complaint that is filed without a subsisting bar. To refer an
impeachment complaint  within an existing one-year bar,
however, is to commit the apparently unconstitutional act of
initiating a second impeachment proceeding, which may be
struck down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion. It
bears recalling that the one-year bar rule itself is a
constitutional limitation on the House's power or function to
refer a complaint.
Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly
constitutionally-prohibited second impeachment complaint on
the matter of whether to make the appropriate referral goes
precisely into the propriety of the referral and not on the merits
of the complaint. The House needs only to ascertain the
existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year,
without any regard to the claims set forth in the complaint.
XXX IN SUM, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the
twin rule of filing  and  referral  in the present case,
with  Francisco  as the guiding light”  House of Representatives, it will prosper and the impeachable
(Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
G.R. No. 193459, March 08, 2011)
87
This may apply now since there were three or four
impeachment complaints filed against the president, for as long
as they were endorsed simultaneously to the committee
referred to then there is only one initiation of the impeachment
proceedings.
TN: The House of Representative is given the discretion to
promulgate its own rules and regulation governing the initiation
of impeachment proceedings. This is in relation to the issue
raised in the Gutierrez case wherein she contended that the
complaint and the proceedings were invalid because the rules
regarding the impeachment proceedings were never published.
The Supreme Court was saying that the Constitution does not
state that its rules and regulations governing impeachment
proceedings should be published. The only thing that was
mentioned by the Constitution regarding on the rules governing
rules and regulations are those rules governing legislative
inquiry. Remember the case of Neri vs Executive Committee
(supra). In that case, the proceedings were nullified because
there was no publication of the rules and regulations governing
the legislative inquiry in that Congress. Again, and for brevity,
that requirement is not needed in impeachment proceedings,
because again, the rules need not be published. And you
should also TN that it is exclusive to the House of
Representatives.
Another point that you should TN here guys is on the voting for
the impeachment complaint.
Q: What is the requirement in order to prepare the Articles of
Impeachment?
A: All you need is one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives. From the filing, it is referred to the Committee
of Justice. They have only 60 days within which to act on it.
That means should they not act or refuse to act on that
complaint;
Q: can they be compelled by mandamus?
A: The answer is yes. The recommendation of the Committee
could either be dismissal or they will recommend for the
indictment, or the Articles of Impeachment is prepared.
Q: How many votes are needed?
A: Either way it’s one-third.
Q: What does this mean?
A: It means that even if the recommendation is for the
dismissal, it can easily be overturned by the House of
Representatives members, for as long it can obtain one-third
votes of the members of the House of Representatives
regardless of the recommendation of dismissal of the
committee. Or even if the recommendation is for indictment, for
as long as it is supported by 1/3 votes of the members of the
official can be indicted. Thereafter, the Articles of the
Impeachment will be prepared, there’s a charge sheet.
Q: What is the nature of the proceedings once it reaches the
Senate?
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A: It is a kind of specie or genus, of its own, but the nature
would be administrative because the purpose of the
proceedings is to determine whether the official is guilty or not,
for purposes of removing him from office. But because it’s
adversarial, it’s also criminal in nature, and therefore the
respondent impeachable official shall be treated like an
accused, and that means that he should be afforded with all
the Constitutional rights of the accused.
Q: Now who is going to preside over the hearings?
A: You have the President of the Senate if it is the President
who is the subject of impeachment, it will be the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court.
Q: How many votes is needed in order to convict and remove
him from office?
A: It will be 2/3 votes of the members of the House.
Q (student): Judge, can it be endorsed by a member of the
Senate?
A: No, it has to be a member of the House of Representatives.
If it’s the Senator, it still needs to be endorsed by a member of
the House.
This is exclusive to the House of Representatives, but there is
no provision exactly in the Constitution which states that he
should be a member of the House, because it might be from
the Senate. That depends on the rules and regulations that
may be promulgated by the House of Reps, but what is certain
is that the initiation is exclusive and the initiation is not just
limited to the filing, but as well as referral.
Q(student): But when 1/3 has signed it already Ma’am?
A: No need to sign anymore. It’s already deemed initiated
already.
Q (student): What if the complaint is irregular in form and
substance, will it still be considered initiated?
A: The one who’s going to determine that is the committee, so
it’s deemed initiated. Regardless of the action, when you say
initiated, filing and referred to, so the form and the substance
will be determined by the committee. So if it’s not compliant
with the requirements insofar as form is concerned, then it will
be dismissed so it’s deemed initiated already. Commenced na
ang proceedings, and so that would bar another impeachment
proceedings within the same year.
You should differentiate the initiation of the proceedings from
indictment. Not the complaint, because the complaint for
example, one of the things that they have to establish is that
the ground must be one of those enumerated in the
Constitution and secondly, it has to be verified. If you cannot
comply with that, then it’s defective, in which case the
Committee would recommend its dismissal. Again, and just for
emphasis, if it’s referred already, then it is deemed initiated.
That’s precisely the emphasis on the proceedings being
initiated for purposes of determining whether the one year bar
against the filing of the impeachment complaint would now
apply.
88
Q (student): What if it does not go through the referral part or
when it’s already deemed initiated by 1/3 of the members of
the House?
A: They don’t go into the form anymore. They’re already in the
Senate.
Q: But the one year ban still applies?
A: Yes, definitely.
[Judge’s point is that for so long as it has the imprimatur of 1/3
of the House Reps, then the one-year bar rule already applies,
even if it doesn’t go through referral in cases where the 1/3 of
the HR themselves initiate the impeachment.]
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The SDB is the anti – graft court. It is a part of the Judiciary. It
is NOT part of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office
of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one
Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A
separate Deputy for the military establishment may
likewise be appointed.
Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the
Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed
by the Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law
The Ombudsman is vested with both Investigatory and
Prosecutorial functions.
For the Prosecutorial functions, this is where the Ombudsman
files cases either to the Sandiganbayan or to the regular courts
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
Under its Investigatory Functions, we have both Administrative
and Criminal Jurisdiction.
Ombudsman’s Administrative Jurisdiction
It covers all public officers and employees. There are no
exceptions, whether he occupies consultancy or contractual
positions, so long as you received salary from government
funds. Here, the Ombudsman acts like a judge. It determines
whether the public officer is guilty or not.
There is an exception though for Impeachable Officials.
Ombudsman’s Criminal Jurisdiction
Ombudsman acts as a prosecutor. This power, however, is not
exclusive to the ombudsman.
This is concurrent with DOJ.
(TN) (BAR) - What must be taken into consideration should the
DOJ also investigate a public officer, if the case is triable
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
before the Sandiganbayan, is that the information prepared by
the DOJ must be with the imprimatur of the Ombudsman.
Q: Who is subject to the criminal investigatory power of the
Ombudsman?
A: All public officers. There is no exception. Except the
president because he is immune from suit.
Q: Can Binay, an impeachable official, be investigated by the
Ombudsman?
A: For purposes of removal, NO. Administrative aspect
For the criminal aspect, YES. He can be prosecuted in the
Sandiganbayan.
Q: Can the Ombudsman prosecute cases in the regular courts,
through the office of the deputy ombudsman?
A: YES.
George Uy vs Sandiganbayan has already been
reversed. The SC now says that the Ombudsman or the
deputy Ombudsman has the power to prosecute cases
even in the regular courts through the ombudsman
prosecutors and investigators. The information may only
be signed by the deputy ombudsman or the ombudsman.
Should the case be filed in the Sandiganbayan, even
if the prosecution of cases involving graft and corruption is
concurrent with the DOJ, it has to be with the imprimatur in
the Ombudsman.
Employees of the Ombudsman are appointed by the
Ombudsman in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Q: Can the Ombudsman execute its own judgment?
A: Yes!, to give teeth to anti – graft laws.
“Thus,  Section  7, Rule  III of  the Rules  of Procedure of  the Of
fice  of the  Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative
Order  (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical in providing that an appeal
shall not stop an Ombudsman decision from being executory.
This rule applies to the appealable decisions of the
Ombudsman, namely, those where the penalty imposed is
other than public censure or reprimand, or a penalty of
suspension of more than one month, or a fine equivalent to
more than one month's salary. Hence, the dismissal of De
Jesus and Parungao from the government service is
immediately executory pending appeal.” ||| (Ombudsman v. De
Chavez, G.R. No. 172206, July 03, 2013)
Sec. 8 Qualifications of the Ombudsman and the Deputy
Ombudsman (TN)
The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their
appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity
and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar,
and must not have been candidates for any elective office
in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman
must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged
in the practice of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same
disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in
Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.
89
(TN) they are subject to the screening of the Judicial and Bar
Council, not the Commission on Appointments
Q: What is the term of office for an ombudsman, a deputy
ombudsman?
A: 7 years.
Sec. 13 Powers and Functions of the Ombudsman. Go
over.
Sec 14 Fiscal Autonomy.
Ombudsman has its own budget, like the Supreme Court. It
cannot be reduced. Whatever budget that has been allocated
to it this year, the next fiscal budget may be maintained but
cannot be reduced.
Sec. 15. Recovery of ill-gotten wealth (BAR)
No prescription.
However, in prosecution of public officers involving graft and
corruption or ill-gotten wealth there is a prescription of 15 years
from the commission or the discovery of the commission of the
crime.
Sec. 17 Statement of assets and liabilities.
Required upon entry to government office.
Should be filed on or before the 30th day of April every year.
Controversial because of the refusal of the Justices of the
Supreme Court to give copies to the BIR.
Before it used to be the refusal to present SALN to the media.
There has been a recent decision that the SALN is a part of
public record, and a part of public accountability, and should be
disclosed to the public. (Supra)
The Supreme Court in its refusal did not say that they don’t
have the right. The SC is just asking for the legal bases of why
they should be given copies of the SALN. Especially when they
found out that there has been an increase considerably of the
income of all Justices.
Sec. 18 Change of citizenship because of double allegiance
Dual citizenship is not prohibited, what is prohibited is dual
allegiance.
Green card holders, change of citizenship or of status as an
immigrant with another country shall be dealt with accordingly
by our laws.
ARTICLE XII NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Regalian Doctrine *****
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations
or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may provided by law. In cases of water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use
may be the measure and limit of the grant.
Concept: That all lands and mineral resources belong to the
State
Classification of lands:
1. Lands of public domain
2. Private lands
Classification sof Public domain:
1. Agricultural lands
2. Mineral lands
3. Timber lands
4. National parks
Only agricultural lands are alienable and disposable, meaning
can be acquired only by the citizens of the country. However
it is limited, not more than 12 hectares
Q: What about a qualified Filipino corporation? Can it acquire?
A: He can’t. It is a public domain. It can only lease.
Q: What is the extent or duration?
A:
Individual citizen: 500 hectares for 25 years, renewable for
another 25 years
Qualified Filipino corporations: 1000 hectares for 25 years,
renewable 25 years
The most important part relating to this:
Q: When does a qualified Filipino corporation acquire a land of
public domain?
A: Once a public domain is acquired by a Filipino individual
citizen, it becomes a private land. And when it becomes a
private land, it can now be acquired by Filipino corporations.
Case: Amari case
When you say agricultural land, it is not necessary that you
plant rice, corn or coconut. It simply means, that it can be
alienated or disposed of or acquired by individual citizens.
Now, what happened in this case, it was reclaimed then it was
later classified as agricultural land, the corporation who
reclaimed it wanted to acquire the land as some kind of
payment for the reclamation.
Q: Can they do that?
A: No, but there is no ban against the members of the
corporation or for the board of directors who are Filipino
citizens to acquire the land. And once they are acquired by this
board, it becomes a private land and it can now be acquired by
a qualified Filipino Corporation. That is on an assumption that
a reclaimed land was converted into an agricultural land.TN
BAR
“1.  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;  REGALIAN DOCTRINE;
SUBMERGED LANDS ARE PROPERTY OF THE STATE
90
AND ARE INALIENABLE. — Submerged lands are owned by
the State and are inalienable. [Pursuant to] Article XII of
the  1987 Constitution. . . Submerged lands, like the waters
(sea or bay) above them, are part of the State's inalienable
natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public
dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside' the commerce of
man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale
of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the
Constitution.
2.  ID.; ID.; ID.; RECLAIMED LANDS ARE NO LONGER
FORESHORE OR SUBMERGED LANDS AND THUS MAY
QUALIFY AS ALIENABLE AGRICULTURAL LANDS; COURT
RULING IN PONCE  CASES NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT
BAR. — This is why [in the  Ponce  Cases], the Cebu City
ordinance merely granted Essel, Inc. an "irrevocable option" to
purchase the foreshore lands  after the reclamation and did
not actually sell to Essel, Inc. the still to be reclaimed foreshore
lands. Clearly, in the Ponce Cases the option to purchase
referred to  reclaimed lands, and not to foreshore lands which
are inalienable. Reclaimed lands are no longer foreshore or
submerged lands, and thus may qualify as alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain provided the
requirements of public land laws are met. In the instant case,
the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are
still  submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the 750
hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares
or  78% of the total area are still submerged, permanently
under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA,
the PEA conveyed to Amari  the submerged lands even before
their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the
deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would
be made only after actual reclamation.”
||| (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250
(Resolution), November 11, 2003)
Question of SRP, the first corporation that acquired a portion of
SRP is Big Foot, how come they acquired it? Where it should
have been individual citizen of the country! (case still pending)
What was applied in that case is the NHA case, The NHA
case, they reclaimed Smokey mountain, ang NHA maoy nag
pa reclaim, daun ang RH building company, ang contractor
asked for payment by way of acquiring lands. The question
was WON that corporation can acquire the land that they
reclaimed, so, there was a comparison in the case of Chavez
vs PEA (the Amari land) , ingon ang Supreme Court in that
Chaves case, a corporation cannot acquire a reclaimed land
since it is a land of public domain, however it was classified as
agricultural until it is acquired by a private individual citizen and
then sell it to a qualified Filipino corporation, since it becomes
a private land.
NHA case relating to Smokey Mountain, take note:
Read: Chaves vs PEA and Chavez vs NHA
The Supreme Court said:
To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private
person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable
lands of public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino
citizens but not to a private corporation.  This is because PEA
under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose of
alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it is
transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
property.  On the other hand, the NHA is a government
agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its charter
—The Revised Administrative Code of 1987.   and it is inalienable until it is reclassified.
The NHA is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands.  The moment titles
over reclaimed lands based on the special patents (like SRP)
are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are
automatically converted to patrimonial properties (meaning
private lands, not land of public domain) of the State which can
be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of
which are owned by Filipinos.   or disposable lands only to those lands which have been
The reason is obvious:  if the reclaimed land is not converted
to patrimonial land (or private land) once transferred to NHA,
then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it
cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of public
domain.  More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed
purposes and goals since it can only transfer patrimonial lands
to qualified beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds
for the SMDRP. 
“4.  ID.; ID.; PRIVATE CORPORATIONS ARE BARRED
FROM ACQUIRING ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN; CASE AT BAR. — Finally, the Ponce Cases were
decided under the  1935 Constitution which allowed private
corporations to acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
However, the 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, and
the  1987 Constitution reiterated this prohibition. Obviously, the
Ponce Cases cannot serve as authority for a private
corporation to acquire alienable public lands, much less
submerged lands, since under the present Constitution a
private corporation like  Amari is barred from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain.” |||  (Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250 (Resolution), November
11, 2003)
The moment titles over reclaimed land based on special
patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds
they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties
meaning private lands of the government. Dili lang of public
domain so it says here which can be sold to Filipino citizens
and to private corporations 60% of which are owned by
Filipinos
The reason is obvious if the reclaimed is not converted to
patrimonial land or private land once transferred to NHA then it
would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot
alienate lands of public domain. More importantly it cannot
attain its avowed purposes since it can only transfer
patrimonial lands who qualify beneficiary and prospective
buyers.
TN: The only issue with the SRP is that it can only be done in a
public bidding. A qualified Filipino corporation may acquire
however possible through a public bidding. That is now
pending in the Supreme court. There is a decision already
sustaining the decision of the CA that is has to go through a
public bidding
TN: in the case of DENR vs YAP involving DENR and the
Boracay Island. It is a timberland. Save for those that have
titles you consider them as agricultural land but generally half
of the island is classified as a timberland even if it is no longer
91
a woody land. It doesn’t matter as long as it has not been
reclassified because in its classification it is still a timberland
“A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
that there must be a  positive act of the government, such as
an official proclamation, 80  declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. 81  In fact, Section 8 of  CA No. 141  limits alienable
"officially delimited and classified."  82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable. 83  To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable. 84  There must still be a positive act declaring land
of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. 85  The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable.  86”aI
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied
by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent
such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private
claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.  87
||| (Secretary of DENR v. Yap, G.R. No. 167707, 173775,
October 08, 2008)
Q: Who is going to reclassify?
A: it is the president upon the recommendation of the DENR
TN: that friar lands are supposedly inalienable but once
reclassified it may be applied for title.
TN and BAR: case of Malabanan vs Republic of the
Philippines has been asked even in Civil Law it has been
asked in the Bar. How do you convert public domains as
patrimonial property to private property? Only upon a
declaration that it is alienable and disposable together with the
express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth . only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of the property of public domain begin to run.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
“To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the
disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely: EaIDAT
(1)As a general rule and pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine, all lands of
the public domain belong to the
State and are inalienable. Lands
that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to
belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated
or disposed;
(2)The following are excepted from the
general rule, to wit:
(a)Agricultural lands of the public
domain are rendered
alienable and
disposable through any
of the exclusive modes
enumerated under
Section 11 of the  Public
Land Act.  If the mode is
judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under
Section 48 (b) of
the  Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject
of the application needs
only to be classified as
alienable and
disposable as of the
time of the application,
provided the applicant's
possession and
occupation of the land
dated back to June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the
applicant has performed
all the conditions
essential to a which case the occupants may now apply for title provided they
government grant
arises,  36 and the
applicant becomes the
owner of the land by
virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal
fiction, the land has
already ceased to be
part of the public
domain and has
become private
property. 37
(b)Lands of the public domain
subsequently classified
or declared as no longer
intended for public use
or for the development
of national wealth are
removed from the
sphere of public
dominion and are
considered converted
into patrimonial lands or
lands of private
ownership that may be
92
alienated or disposed
through any of the
modes of acquiring
ownership under
the  Civil Code. If the
mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether
ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that
the land has been
already converted to
private ownership prior
to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive
period is a
condition sine qua
non in observance of
the law (Article
1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not
patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of
prescription.”
||| (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987,
September 03, 2013)
TN: so if you have been an occupant of the property of your
predecessors. Take note of the period when to recon from the
possession to recon the 30 years. You must have the
possession of the property since June 12, 1945. That at the
time of the occupation of the land it was not yet classified as
alienable or patrimonial property of the government. 30 years.
Q: when can you apply for title once this is classified as
private land?
A: you have until December 21, 2020 within which you can
apply for title. This applies to friar lands a lot of them in cebu
actually which was a land of public domain and later
reclassified as patrimonial or a land of the government, In
can prove that they have been occupying the land since June
12, 1945.
EXN to the Regalian Doctrine TN: on the concept of
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN on lands are not covered by the
regalia doctrine. It is based on a native title of the indigenous
people or the cultural communities. They are considered as
private lands and therefore they never belong to the state and
never became part of the state.
Case of Cruz vs the secretary of the DENR and the case of
Cariño vs the Insular Government where the supreme court
said that in relation to this TN: of the RA 8371 categorically
declares ancestral lands as domains held by native title as
never to have been public land. Domains and lands under
native title are therefore undisputedly presumed to have never
been public lands and they are private lands. The right to
ownership granted to indigenous people over their ancestral
domains does not include the natural resources. The right
granted to the indigenous people to negotiate the terms and
conditions over the natural resources covers only the
exploration to ensure ecological and environmental protection.
This is emphasized because of the Bangsamoro. The reason
why it is delayed is the one thing they cannot just yet reconcile
is that their claim over the ancestral lands and especially on
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
the exploration natural resources. The sharing now on the
resources because while they own the land and domain but the
exploration they are given only. I think they are sharing now
over the natural resources because while they own the lands
or the domain but, their exploration, they are given only the
priority. They are like sharing 80-20 if not 100%. So I think they
have agreed like 60-40, 60 to the Bangsamoro, 40% to the
national government on the exploration of the natural
resources that may be found there because of the premise that
the ancestral lands do not belong to the state unlike all other
lands or other resources because even on private lands, you
may own the private land but the natural resources found in
your land, you don’t own them, they belong to the state. That is
the concept of the Regalian doctrine. So that is the reason
why.
“As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded
primary power and responsibility in the exploration,
development and utilization of these natural resources. The
State may directly undertake the exploitation and development
by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector
through co-production,224 joint venture, 225 or production-
sharing agreements. 226 These agreements may be for a
period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State,
through Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale
exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils, the State, through the President, may
enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with
foreign-owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the
People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three
types of agreements,  i.e., co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale  227  and
small-scale mining. 228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining
activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple
implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy
mining equipment." 229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to
the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral
domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly
defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"SECTION 7.a)Right of ownership. — The
right to claim ownership over lands, bodies
of water traditionally and actually occupied
by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time
within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over
"lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied
by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration
does not mention  bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs,  minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the
traditional hunting grounds, fish  in the traditional fishing
grounds, forests  ortimber in the sacred places,  etc. and
all other natural resources found within the ancestral
domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7
(a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests  or timber, wildlife,
flora  and  fauna  and  all other natural resources"
93
enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution as belonging to the State.  AECcTS
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian
doctrine.”
||| (Cruz v. DENR Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, December 06,
2000)
Before we used to pay royal taxes. Now, what is the
requirement? Mu-abang ra ang government sa pag gamit sa
imong yuta because the mineral resources on your land do not
belong to you. They belong to the state. Unlike the 1973
constitution, both mineral resources and the land belong to
you.
Q: So let us say for example, because of the typhoon
Yolanda, you have your land, and a hole was created in your
land where water is found, a lake is formed in your land.
Question, who owns the lake which is now found in your land?
A: It is not you, it belongs to the state. You only own the
surface but not the mineral resources.
That is the point there.
So unlike the ancestral lands, the ancestral lands belong to the
IP.
Q: What about the natural resources?
A: What was emphasized is the priority in the exploration of
the natural resources. The case of Cruz is actually based on a
land mark case that is Carino vs. The Insular Government.
This is the camp john hay case recognizing the existence of a
native title to land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under
the claim of ownership since time immemorial as an
exception to the theory of jus regalia.
Another point that you should take note here, on private lands.
Private lands are owned by private individuals.
Q: Who can acquire them?
A: They can be acquired by Filipino citizens, and a qualified
Filipino corporation.
Q: How about a foreigner, can he acquire private lands?
A: Yes but only in hereditary succession where he is a
compulsory heir. Not as a voluntary heir.
Q: (BAR) Who has the exclusive right to enjoy the nation’s
marine wealth in the archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
EEZ?
A: It is reserved in its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
Citizens only. That is why the argument relating to kaning gi-
claim sa China. Can we instead settle the issue by just having
a joint venture with them to explore the natural resources in the
economic zone? NO. because that will violate paragraph 2
section 2. So put a star on that. That was explained then by
Justice Carpio. One of the things is that it might violate
because it says use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens. There cannot be a joint venture or co-production in the
exploration with the chinese. TN Also, fish farming cooperative.
TN. Subsistence to Filipino citizens also.
And then you have enter into agreements—foreign. Kung small
scale lang nah siya, dili pwede ang foreign corporations. Pero
kung large scale na gani ang exploration, of natural resources,
you may enter into contract with foreign corporation, like
mining for example. However limited only to provisions of
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
service contracts to provide financial or technical assistance.
They cannot enter into joint venture.
Kung Filipino corporation, it may enter into joint venture,
production sharing or co-production. But not with a foreign
corporation. Limited only into entering service contracts to
provide financial or technical assistance.
By the way, private lands ha, limited only—foreigners. A
condominium is not a land so therefore, it can be acquired by
foreigners. While the condominium building may have been
erected on the land, the land is not acquired by the foreigner.
Only the condominium unit that can be acquired by a foreigner.
Q: What about a balikbayan, can he acquire? By balikbayan,
we mean he is a former natural born citizen now a foreigner.
Can he acquire lands in the PH?
A: Yes but limited. For whatever purposes now, ma-agricultural
or residential, they can acquire. What is the limit? 3000 sq
meters kung rural. Kung residential it will be in the city, 5000 sq
meters. TN
Section 10 on NEDA, just read that.
Section 11 on Franchise, Operation of Public Utilities.
Q: Who can operate?
A: Filipino citizen and a Qualified Filipino Corporations.
Q: What is the capital?
A: 60-40.
Q: What is a public utility?
A: That which renders public service.
Example is transportation, communication etc. I think there is a
controversy relating to PLDT because more than 60% is
owned by Malaysian Corporation. There is still an MR pending
in the SC regarding on that. This is one of the things that they
want to amend. They want the foreigner investors that there
will be no limit on the percentage. If there is, they might
probably increase the limitations on investments that may be
made by foreigners in certain areas of business investments.
Also that you must take note on public utilities—this does not
include build, operate and transfer (BOT). Example is NLEX
and SLEX. BOT man nah siya. MRT, LRT, these are not
covered by public utilities. So the limitation on investments by
foreigners does not apply. So it could be 100% foreigner.
Foreigner man na ang NLEX and SLEX I think. A corporation
that is building the highway like you are in abroad. It is so wide.
They collect toll fess as payment. So that is not covered by the
Public Utility. BOT is not a public utility.
The franchise is good for 25 years. Renewable for another 25
years. Section 11 is the exception to the non-impairment
clause. Because a franchise may be a contract between a
corporation or an individual citizen engaged in the operation of
public utilities, that however is subject to amendment, repeal or
alteration. That is so provided in the constitution itself.
Q: What about the officers of these public utilities?
A: Proportionate to the investment made. As to the election
and the citizenship of the managing officers of the corporation
or association that has been asked already in the bar exam.
(BAR) Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential
use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
94
produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive.
Section 13.
This was the case of Angara. That there is no violation of
sovereignty sa WTO. That there is no violation of sovereignty
because it is the trade, the policy, the basis of which is serving
the general welfare and utilizing forms and arrangement of
exchange on the basis of equity and reciprocity. Put a star
there. That was asked in the bar.
Section 14
The sustained development of a reservoir of national
talents consisting of Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs,
professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower
and skilled workers and craftsmen in all fields shall be
promoted by the State. The State shall encourage
appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for the
national benefit. The practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in
cases prescribed by law.
What was asked is the second paragraph of section 14. On the
practice of profession in the PH shall be limited only to Filipino
citizens unless allowed by law.
Section 15,
That is on social justice and economic development. That is a
matter of policy. It needs to be enforced by law.
Section 16.
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for
the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to
the test of economic viability.
****Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
****Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national
welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries
and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to
public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to
be operated by the Government.
This is with respect to the taking over of government over
certain industries. One is temporary, the other one is
permanent.
If it is temporary in cases of emergency, there is no just
compensation.
if it is permanent for reasons of general welfare, there has to
be payment of just compensation.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Section 17 is only temporary. In times only of national
emergency when public interest so requires.
BAR: You must read Section 17 in relation with Sec 23 of
Art VI.
Article VI Section 23.
1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
2. In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for
a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
Section 18 is permanent. No need of emergency but only for
reasons in the interest of national welfare or defense. May also
operate vital industries. In this case, there has to be payment
of just compensation.
Section 19
Q: WON monopoly of certain industry is unconstitutional.
A: NO. Here the State may only regulate. Prohibit only when
the interest of the public so requires. Because sometimes there
is monopoly in transportation or communication in fact for lack
of investment. For as long as it doesn’t affect public interest, it
may not be prohibited.
Section 20
Q: What is the role of the Central Monetary Authority especially
in contracting foreign loans
A: It must be with the concurrence of the CMA (foreign loans).
Read the case of Labugal Bulaan vs. Ramos, this is in relation
to service contracts with foreign corporations.
Exploration of the natural resources especially mining must be
under the control of the state, if they contract a foreign
corporation to the large-scale mining, it is not a violation of the
Constitution as long as it is limited to service contract
“Consonant with the State's "full supervision and control" over
natural resources, Section 2 offers the State two "options."  mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial
One, the State may directly undertake these activities itself; or
two, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or entities
at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
A third option is found in the third paragraph of the same
section:
The Congress may, by law, allow small-
scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence
95
fishermen and fish-workers in rivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons.
While the second and third options are limited only to Filipino
citizens or, in the case of the former, to corporations or
associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipinos, a fourth allows the participation of foreign-owned
corporations. “(La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Asso. Inc. v. Ramos,
G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004)
ARTICLE XIII– SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Human Rights
Q: Is the Commission on Human Rights a constitutional body?
A: No. it is only a statutory body.
TN, the chairman must be appointed permanently not as acting
capacity. This is order to preserve its independence.
Q: What are the powers of the Commission?
A: Basically, they only have investigatory/recommendatory.
They do not have adjudicatory power.
Q: What will the commission do if they found a violation of
human rights?
A: They will recommend the filing of the administrative case to
the proper forum or recommend the filing of a criminal case to
the prosecutor’s office for the proper filing of the case in court.
Q: Can the Commission impose penalty?
A: They cannot, they do not have the power.
Q: Can the Commission issue writ of injunction?
A: No, they cannot issue injunctive writ or TRO against any
violators of human rights.
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights  have been violated or
need protection" may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on  the Commission to issue a restraining order or
writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution
would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by
the Constitution or by law (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete,
G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never
derived by implication. (Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R.
No. 88158; Tobon Uy vs.  Commission  on Election, et al., G.R.
Nos. 97108-09. March 4, 1992.).
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services"
remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the
CHR may seek from the proper courts  on behalf of the victims
of  human  rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the
CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any
court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It
may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial court] in any action pending in an inferior
court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A
writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the  rights and interests of a party
thereto, and for no other purpose. prcd
||| (Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on
Human Rights, G.R. No. 101476, April 14, 1992)
Q: What is the role of the Commission in relation to the Human
Security Act?
A: They are given prosecutorial power against the police or
military who may have violated the Human Security Act.
Q: What is Human Rights?
A: It is limited to violation of civil and political rights either by a
government official or private individual.
Q: The Constitution mandates the highest budget for
education, is this mandatory?
A: No, it is only directory. As emphasized by the Carague case.
Q: Who can own educational institution?
A: Filipino or Qualified Filipino Corporation (60% of capital is
owned by Filipino and 40% owned by foreigner). Except, those
established by religious groups or mission boards but control
and ministration should be left to the Filipino Citizens.
The revenues and assets of non-stock, non profit educational
institutions are exempt from taxes and duties.
Proprietary educational institutions are allowed the same
exemptions unless otherwise provided for by law. Ex. Local
Ordinance subjecting them to tax.
ARTICLE XIV ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Article XIV, Section 5, par. (2) – “ Academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.” (TN) (Take note of
the cases)
Q: unsay academic freedom?
From the point of view of the institution, of the academe, from
the students. You should know what is the extent of academic
freedom.
Q: Only enjoyed by whom?
A: institution of higher learning.
A review center is not covered by the academic freedom. An
elementary school is not covered by academic freedom.
“A review center is not an institution of higher learning as
contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting
program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A
review course is only intended to "refresh and enhance the
knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees." A
reviewee is not even required to enroll in a review center or to
take a review course prior to taking an examination given by
the PRC. Even if a reviewee enrolls in a review center,
attendance in a review course is not mandatory. The reviewee
is not required to attend each review class. He is not required
to take or pass an examination, and neither is he given a
grade. He is also not required to submit any thesis or
dissertation. Thus, programs given by review centers could not
96
be considered "programs . . . of higher learning" that would put
them under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing
"review or tutorial services" in areas not covered by licensure
examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not
limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services
examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial
services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning”
||| (Review Center Ass'n of the Phil. v. Ermita, G.R. No.
180046, April 02, 2009)
From the standpoint of the educational institution and the
academe it has the power to determine who may teach,
what may be taught and how shall it be taught and who
may be admitted to study. (TN)
The above conclusion, however, will not deter this Court from
proceeding with the judicial determination of the basic legal
issues herein. We must bear in mind that procedural rules are
intended to ensure the proper administration of law and justice.
The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice.  14 A deviation from its rigid
enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective,
for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for
the existence of courts. 15  Noting that this case involves the
exercise of a fundamental right — academicfreedom no less
— of the State University, and that the petitioner has, in any
event, raised before us the legal question of whether the RTC
correctly required respondent to confer cum laude  honors on
the petitioner because of respondent's alleged grave abuse of
discretion, for pragmatic reasons and consideration of justice
and equity, the Court must go on to resolve the second
assignment of error.
As enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San
Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 16  the discretion of schools of
learning to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of
honors for purposes of graduation forms part
of  academic  freedom. And such discretion may not be
disturbed much less controlled by the courts, unless there is
grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not
disturb the University's decision not to confer honors to
petitioner.
||| (Morales v. Board of Regents of the University of the
Phil., G.R. No. 161172, December 13, 2004)
UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- this is with reference to a UP
professor who went AWOL (absence without leave)
despite his having gone AWOL, he went back and got
promoted. He should have been dismissed under the Civil
Service Law because he went on leave without permit, he
went absent, missing without leave from the
administration. Instead, because he was very good, he
was promoted so he would stay. So it was then question
before the Supreme Court and SC here, as between the
Civil Service Law and the academic freedom of UP to
choose who may teach in the university, the latter
prevails.
“UP  contends that under its charter, to wit, Act 1870, enacted
on June 18, 1908, it enjoys not only academic freedom but
also institutional autonomy. Section 6(e) of the said Act grants
the  UP Board of Regents the power "to appoint, on
recommendation of the president of the university, professors,
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
instructors, lecturers, and other employees of the university, to
fix their compensation and to remove them for cause after an
investigation and hearing shall have been had." Pamplina was
dismissed by virtue of this provision.  Cdpr
The  Civil Service  Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the
Commission appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary
cases involving members of the  Civil Service. Section 9(j)
mandates that the Commission shall have the power to "hear
and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly
with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on
appeal." And Section 37(a), provides that, "The Commission
shall decide  upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of  suspension for more
than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal
or  dismissal from office."
||| (University of the Phil. v. Regino, G.R. No. 88167, May 03,
1993)
The University has the academic freedom to determine
for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.” Clearly, this freedom encompasses
the autonomy to choose who should teach and,
concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls
of professors and other academic personnel.   It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in
This Court declared in Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong: “As corporate entities, educational institutions
of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to
establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure.”
ADMU vs Capulong G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993
“It is to be realized that this individual aspects of
academic freedom could have developed only pari
passu with its institutional counterpart. As corporate
entities, educational institutions of higher learning are
inherently endowed with the right to establish their
policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by
external controls or pressure. In
the  Frankfurter  formulation, this is articulated in the
areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum
and (2) who may be admitted to study.”
There was a case involving a professor who after
probational period was not accepted, admitted as a
regular professor. She complained to the Supreme Court,
the SC said, that is a discretion part of the academic
freedom of the school to determine whether she should
be admitted to teach or who may be employed to teach
and how it should be taught that is also within the
academic freedom of the institution. So if they, for
example they have a way of how they should be graded.
This is important because of these expulsions of some
students who got involved in hazing.
Q: Can they be interfere with the courts should the
parents of the students would then complain, especially
for graduating, to the Supreme Court questioning on the
expulsion of the students in this incident?
A: here there is a precedent case of this De La Salle
University vs CA, so notorious na jud ni sila into this
hazing thing because it was also incident involving
97
hazing. Tapos they were expelled and they complained to
the Supreme Court. De LaSalle University vs. CA,
December 19, 2007- Section 5(2), Article XIV of the
Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom.  This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for
itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them
free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public interest calls for some
restraint. According to present jurisprudence, academic
freedom encompasses the independence of an academic
institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2)
what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who
may be admitted to study.
“Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all
institutions of higher learning  academic  freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school
or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how
best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for
some restraint.  74 According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself
(1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall
teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study. 75
teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling
discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right
to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom
"what to teach."  76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated
under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to
freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula
and to continue their course therein up to graduation," 77  such
right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary
standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner
DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom,
which includes its free choice of students for admission to its
school.”
||| (De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 127980, December 19, 2007)
ARTICLE XIV LANGUAGE
This was ask in the bar, Sec. 6.
Q: unsa kuno ang ato-ang national language? (BAR)
A: Filipino.
Q: what are our official languages? (BAR)
Official languages, those are used as our medium of
instruction not only in school but as well as in government
offices.
Q: Unsa man kuno nga language nga gigamit nato in our
recording?
Q: Unsa kuno ato gi gamit nga language in our recording? sa
court proceeding or sa government offices for example
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A: it says under sec. 7 the official languages of the Phils. Are
Filipino, unless otherwise provided by law its English so mainly
its Filipino. So ang ma maintain ang Filipino
Q: do you have to repeal the law in order to have another
official language?
A: NO, only by law and what can be change is the other foreign
language could be English or any other foreign language
You have your regional languages as your auxiliary official
language so it becomes auxiliary ang Cebuano or medium of
instruction in schools, being auxiliary it can be required, or
even in courts.
Sec. 8 on promulgation Filipino and English or regional
languages or dialects in Arabic and Spanish
Sec. 9 science and technology just read
Arts and culture wla man ni, these provisions are not self
executing mao rani ang relevance
Family, the issues that may be raised here and the issues on
the pending divorce bill whether it violates the constitution?
Marriage is an inviolable social institution therefore it is against
divorce (not necessarily noh?!) just go over that
ARTICLE GENERAL PROVISIONS
Q: On Adoption of the name of the country cannot be change
by ordinary legislation?
A: Yes, provided it has the approval or ratification of the people
not in a plebiscite but in a national referendum
Composition of the arm forces of the Philippines
This once ask in the MCQ, it consist of the armed citizens
because of the principle of supremacy of the civilian authority
at all times over the military, parihas ra gud nah but they
emphasize on “citizen armed”
This on sec. 5 paragraph one
Section 5.
1. All members of the armed forces shall take an
oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this
Constitution.
This was ask in the bar exam, kani bitawng who can take an
oath and affirmation to uphold and defend the constitution? Dili
lang ang president, the armed forces of the Philippines and
public officers and employees
Also the 4th paragraph that was also ask in the bar exam
4. No member of the armed forces in the active
service shall, at any time, be appointed or
designated in any capacity to a civilian position in
the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or any of their
subsidiaries.
98
No member of the military shall directly or indirectly, in any
partisan political activity, allowed except to vote including
public employees and officers. Except cabinet members or
political officers.
Par 4. AB: To maintain the supremacy of the civilian authority
at all times over the military
For as long as you are still active in the military service you
cannot be appointed to any civilian positions in the government
including GOCCs. You must first retire and then you can be
appointed now.
Then you have this proportionate recruitment. Proportionate to
the population. Otherwise it could be easy to create a leak in
the military which is prohibited because of the possibility of a
coup de etat.
Q: On the matter of tour of duty of the chief of staff, how many
years?
A: 3 years unless it is extended. Retirement age of a military is
55 and it cannot be extended. It says here … (TN) Officers and
men of the regular force; laws of retirement shall not allow
extension of the service. 55 ra intawn na sila.
5. Laws on retirement of military officers shall not
allow extension of their service.
6. The officers and men of the regular force of the
armed forces shall be recruited proportionately
from all provinces and cities as far as practicable.
7. The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed
forces shall not exceed three years. However, in
times of war or other national emergency declared
by the Congress, the President may extend such
tour of duty.
Sections 6.
Police Force is Civilian. National in scope but civilian in
character. Under authority of the local executives. They are
only operational because they are directly under the DILG.
Under the president through the DILG.
Section 11
On mass media: (pending amendment) No foreigner shall be
allowed to engage in this kind of business but in advertising,
foreigners are allowed. 70% fil 30 % foreigner. But in mass
media 100% Filipino. However, the truth of the matter is, wala
nka kwarta ang government because our media companies are
directly entering into contracts with the foreign outfits and they
are feeding them news from the Philippines. They are giving
them news. So why not allow them instead to invest money in
mass media so they can be regulated by the government
because ,as of now, it is prohibited. The requirement in mass
media is still 100% Fil.
BAR: In advertising, proportionate gihapon ang iyang
managing officers. (70%fil – 30% Foreign)
ARTICLE XVII AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
TN: who can propose; the process; proposal; submission and
then ratification.
Q: Who can propose?
1.) We have the congress as a constituent assembly by ¾
votes or at the discretion of congress by majority votes may
call for a referendum to ask the people whether or not they
want a constitutional convention or
2.) 2/3 votes to create a constitutional convention to propose
either amendment or revision.
3.) 3rd way of proposing, we have the people, however limited
only to amendments, through initiative.
The petition is signed or initiated by at least 12% of the total
registered voters of which 3% of each legislative district is
represented by at least 3% of its registered voters. Take note
of the case of Santiago vs. Ramos, Lambino case on the
requirements of people’s initiative on amendments of the
constitution.
In the case of Santiago case, it was emphasized that RA 6735
is insufficient but not in Lambino case. Instead, in Lambino
case, the Supreme Court laid down the procedure on how to
initiate amendments to the constitution. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the people, being the authors of the proposal,
must sign the petition itself.
On submission, TN that there can’t be a piece meal
submission of a proposed amendment or revision to the
constitution.
On ratification, TN that the effectivity of any proposed
amendment or revision is only upon ratification of the proposed
amendment or revision by majority votes cast during the
plebiscite called for the purpose. That is as to effectivity.
Another point that you should take note is that any question as
to the validity of the ratification that can be raised by an
ordinary citizen. It is an exception, even though he may not be
directly injured, the constitution allows any citizen to question
the validity of the ratification.
TN also on the plebiscite that may be called, it should not be
called earlier that 60 days not more than 90 days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
In the case of Province of North Cotabato vs GPI, the Supreme
Court said that the president cannot propose changes to the
constitution unlike Marcos and Cory Aquino. Marcos was able
to propose amendments because the constitution during that
time, allows him to exercise legislative power and we were
under martial law also he was exercising legislative power.
Cory Aquino, under the revolutionary government, the freedom
constitution likewise allows her to propose changes but not
under the 1987 constitution.
“The Executive branch thus guarantees to the MILF that
the Constitution shall be drastically overhauled to
conform to the MOA-AD. The Executive branch completely
disregards that under the Constitution the sole discretionary
power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies with
Congress, and the power to approve or disapprove such
proposed amendments belongs exclusively to the
people.”|||  (Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, G.R. No.
183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, 183962, October 14, 2008)
99
What is important in Article 18 are the transitory provisions,
especially with this EDCA, amending the VFA. Take note of the
cases Lim vs Executive Secretary and Bayan vs. Zamora. We
have a mutual defense agreement or treaty that we signed
with the US. Now if it is a treaty, it needs the concurrence of
the senate.
“The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers
of the Chief Executive when it provides that  "[n]o treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate." 12  Even more pointedly, the Transitory Provisions
state:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of
America
concerning Military  Bases,foreign  military 
bases, troops or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate
and, when the Congress so requires,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting state.
The aforequoted provisions betray a marked antipathy
towards foreign military  presence in the country, or
of  foreign  influence in general. Hence, foreign troopsare
allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct
exception. Conflict arises then between the fundamental law
and our obligations arising from international agreements.”
||| (Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11,
2002)
Q. How many votes are needed?
A. 2/3 votes
The VFA was and executive agreement.
Q. Does an executive agreement require the concurrence of
the senate?
A. NO. Unless it will be an international agreement.
Q. What is the difference between a treaty or international
agreement and executive agreement? You should the know
the difference especially in PIL.
A. A treaty or international agreement is permanent. It’s a
matter of policy that would make a permanent change in
political matters or even in our dealings with another country
which is more or less permanent.
An executive agreement, just simply make some changes
and provide some details for purposes of implementing a treaty
or an international agreement and that does not need any
concurrence.
The VFA was not a treaty but was an executive agreement. It
was treated as an international agreement. In fact it was
concurred by the senate. According to the SC in the case of
Lim or Bayan, even if US would not treat it as treaty, we don’t
care. We treat that as an international agreement. In fact it was
concurred by the Senate. Should there be any changes to it ,
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
you follow treaty making changes. That’s the case of Nicolas
vs. Romulo.
“Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US
Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the
VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to
the US Congress under the Case — Zablocki Act within 60
days of its ratification. It is for this reason that the US has
certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international
agreement, i.e.,  a treaty, and this substantially complies with
the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution.  Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is
complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US
Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence "allowed under"
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by
both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no
violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such
presence. IcDESA
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are
required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms
and provisions.”
||| (Nicolas y Sombilon v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, 176051,
176222, February 11, 2009)
The VFA for example. Di ba VFA allows joint military training
of US soldiers with Filipinos. The US-RP Military Base
Agreement had not renewed and we have a prohibition in our
Constitution against military troops. It was emphasized in the
case of Lim, take note because of this EDCA controversy,
where the SC said that under Sec. 25 of the transitory
provision , shows a marked antipathy. It is against towards
foreign military presence in the country or a foreign influence
in general. Hence foreign troops are allowed entry into the
Philippines only by way of direct exception. Now, here under
the constitution US forces are prohibited from engaging in an
offensive war in Philippine territory against the Chinese even.
The SC however cannot accept in this case per allegation
that Arroyo administration engaged in doublespeak in trying to
pass off a military training exercise, and offensive effort by
foreign troops on native soil.
In the case of Bayan vs. Zamora, SC said, the VFA was duly
concurred by the Philippine senate and has been recognized
as a treaty by the US and attested and certified by the duly
authorized representative of the US government. The fact that
the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the US
Senate does detract from its status as a binding international
agreement or a treaty recognized by the said state for this is a
matter of internal US law. Notice can be taken of the
internationally known practice by the US submitting to its
Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policy
making.
“One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the
determination of which provision of the Constitution applies,
with regard to the exercise by the Senate of its constitutional
power to concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that Section
25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for
its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the
Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that
Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is
not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves
merely the temporary visits of United States personnel
engaged in joint military exercises.
XXX XXX
100
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international
agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at
least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is
required to make the subject treaty, or international
agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines.
This provision lays down the general rule on treaties or
international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with
a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to,
extradition or tax treaties or those economic in nature. All
treaties or international agreements entered into by the
particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence
of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that
applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this
provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the
requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the
Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that
"foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in
the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by
the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress,
and recognized as such by the other contracting state.
To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the
Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate
extended its concurrence under the same provision, is
immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21,
Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is
crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to
comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the
treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines”.
||| (Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, 138572, 138587,
138680, 138698, October 10, 2000)
In the case of Nicolas vs.Romulo. Remember, in the VFA, we
have jurisdiction over offenses that maybe committed by the
American soldier. Whoever takes the rights over the case has
the exclusive jurisdiction. Nakauna man ta sa rape case. In fact
he was convicted. The law says that kung kita gani ang nag-
hearing sa kaso he should be put in our jail. Now, na-
convicted na siya gibalhin man noon siya didto sa US
embassy premises. Wa man silay prisohan, nagbuhat sila
prisohan in a container van, however air-conditioned. Na-
convicted siya, gi-appeal sa Court of Appeals and we
wondered why,apparently VFA was amended by the
agreement between Secretary Romulo and the Ambassador of
the US.
Q. Is that a valid amendment of the VFA, the transfer of
custody of the US soldier to the US while the appeal was still
pending?
A. In the cases of (Nicolas vs. Romuloet al ; Salonga vs. Smith
et al; Makabayan vs. Arroyo et al) SC said that the Visiting US
Agreement between the Republic of Philippines and the US
entered into on February 10, 1987 is upheld as constitutional
but the Romulo-Kenny agreement on December 1992 was
declared not in the accordance with the VFA and respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith
negotiate with the US representatives for the appropriate
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
agreement on detention facilities under the Philippine
authorities as provided in Article 5, Section 10 of the VFA,
pending which the status quo shall be maintained under further
orders by the Court.
In other words, you have to go to the process of treaty making
rather than just through an informal agreement between
officers of the government. That has nothing to do with treaty
making because we should not be content it that way because
it was treated as an international agreement. Should there be
any change it should go through the process.
ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
First, you must TN what person is being referred to here,
natural or juridical persons. However, with respect to juridical
persons, what is protected here is only the right to property
because they cannot be protected in terms of life or liberty as
their existence is determined by law. Another thing that you
should TN/(BAR), hierarchy in the protection insofar as the
right of life, liberty or property. So you have, according to how it
is being phrased, you have the right to life and then you have
liberty and then, finally, the least protected is the right to
property. TN in the case of Social Justice Society et al vs.
Atienza where the SC said, essentially the oil companies are
fighting for the right to property, they alleged that they spend
billion of pesos to force to relocate. However, based on the
hierarchy on the constitutionally protected rights, the right to
life enjoys precedence over the right to property, the reason is
obvious, life is irreplaceable while property is not. So you TN of
this guys.
Social Justice Society vs Atienza G.R. No. 156052
February 13, 2008
“Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to
property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if
forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys
precedence over the right to property. 171 The reason is
obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or
LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’
right to property, the former should prevail.”
Insofar as the matter of life, liberty and property as to
definition, you know that already. But to emphasize on the
right to property, what is being covered it does not include the
right to possess firearms, that is not included. It is neither a
property right nor property subject to the protection of due
process and equal protection clause. As well as, to operate a
mobile/a car/vehicle is not covered by the protection under the
right to property. Like the right to bear firearms, is neither a
property nor a property right covered by the protection of due
process and equal protection clause. TN of that guys.
We have the cases of:
Garin vs. MMDA G.R. No. 130230             April 15, 2005
“The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a
motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by
101
the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in
the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public
safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process
requirements.  This is consistent with our rulings in  Pedro v.
Provincial Board of Rizal8 on the license to operate a
cockpit,  Tan v. Director of Forestry9 and Oposa v.
Factoran10 on timber licensing agreements, and  Surigao
Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao11  on a legislative
franchise to operate an electric plant.”
Chavez vs Romulo G.R. No. 157036             June 9, 2004
“In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion
in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866
which state that "the Chief of Constabulary may,  in
meritorious cases as determined by him and under such
conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of
firearms to carry them outside of residence." Following the
American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR
does not constitute a property right protected under our
Constitution.”
Now, another point you should TN on Sec. 1, the concept of
due process of law. Due process of law applies only to
government exercising its powers. This does not apply to
private entities exercising its powers.
There are two kinds of due process. We have the substantive
and procedural due process. On substantive due process, you
must comply with the requirements for the valid exercise of this
power: subject matter is to be lawful, and the means of
achieving is, likewise, legal or lawful.
Now then, what about procedural due process, there is more
questions on the procedural aspect of due process. The
essence of the procedural due process of law is simply giving
the opportunity of hearing before one is condemned for
whatever judgment. So, when we say, opportunity of hearing,
case in point is Pichay Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs et al this was decided on July 24,
2012 where the SC, in all proceedings of the government, may
be criminal or administrative or civil, we have specially in the
Pichay case, the administrative proceedings the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person
charged to answer the accusation against him, continue as the
minimum requirements of due process. Which simply means
having the opportunity to explain one’s side. That’s the
bottomline of the procedural due process of law.
“… his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-
ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint
against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to
oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer
the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process,   which simply means having the
opportunity to explain one's side.  Hence, as long as petitioner
was given the opportunity to explain his side and present
evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily
complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack
of opportunity to be heard.  The records show that petitioner
was issued an Order requiring him to submit his written
explanation under oath with respect to the charge of grave
misconduct filed against him. His own failure to submit his
explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent claim of
denial of due process.|||  (Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-IAD, G.R. No. 196425,
July 24, 2012)”
Minimum Requirements of Procedural Due Process (TN)
Procedural due process in civil cases
“5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE  PROCESS. — As applied
to judicial proceedings, due process of law implies that there
must be a court of tribunal clothed with the power to hear and
determine the matter before it, that jurisdiction shall have been
lawfully acquired, that the defendant shall have an opportunity
to be heard, and that judgment shall be rendered upon lawful
hearing.”|| (El Blanco Español - Filipino vs Palanca G.R. No. L-
11390, March 26, 1918)
Procedural due process in criminal cases
“2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;  DUE PROCESS; COURT OF
COMPETENT URISIDICTION CAN NOT BE QUESTIONED
ON GROUND OF INJUSTICE AS DUE  PROCESS WAS
OBSERVED. — A due process question would have arisen if
the decision arrived at the endds of justice were not served.
Such is not the case, however. It is an admitted fact in this
case that respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
presided by then Judge Jose T. Surtida, was vested with
jurisdiction to try and decide the case against petitioners. As
admitted in the petition, the decision reached by him,
thereafter affirmed with modification by respondent Court of
Appeals, was "duly rendered and signed" on July 25, 1966 at a
time before his retirement; though it was not until after his
retirement on August 23, 1966 that said sentence was read to
petitioners. had it been promulgated then and there, this
particular question raised in this petition would not have risen.
3.ID.; ID.; DUE  PROCESS MEANT TO EMBODY  cross-examination is not, contrary to petitioners' view, an
CANON  OF FAIRNESS AND AVOIDANCE OF
ARBITRARINESS. — What gave petitioners' cause plausibility,
was that it was not until after his retirement on August 23,
1966 that such a sentence was read to petitioners.
Considering all the circumstances detailed above and the
Tijam doctrine on which reliance could be had, it cannot be
said that injustice was thereby committed against petitioners.
They were given all the opportunity to defend themselves not
only before the respondent Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur but likewise before respondent Court of
Appeals. Petitioners cannot rightfully complain of having been
the victims of arbitrary governmental action. They tried to have
this Court, in an earlier petition for certiorari, to review the
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals, but they did not
meet with success because of their inability to demonstrate
that they failed to receive the protection
that  due  process  accords every accused. What was said by
Justice Cardozo fits the occasion: "The law, as we have seen,
is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime
whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an
opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be
inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable
to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and
inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of
incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is
due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be
strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the
balance true.” (Vera v. People, G.R. No. L-31218, February
18, 1970)
Procedural due process in administrative proceedings
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. — There
are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the
right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
102
interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given
an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty
to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. Not only must
there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
The  Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
The  Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of
this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it.||| (Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496,
February 27, 1940)
Procedural due process in disciplinary cases
But, to repeat, the imposition of  disciplinary  sanctions requires
observance of procedural  due  process. And it bears stressing
that  due  process  in disciplinary cases involving students does
not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed
for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The
proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and
essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards
which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students
must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence
in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.||| (Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. L-68288,
July 11, 1986)
What is important here guys is the opportunity of hearing,
where there is total absence of hearing that is what is
abhorred. For as long as there was opportunity of hearing
there cannot be a violation of due process of law. However,
there are instances where hearing is not required and it cannot
be a violation of due process, regardless of the lack of hearing.
Q. What are the exceptions? (see Admin notes) *****
A.
1. When administrative agencies are exercising quasi-
legislative function no need for a hearing;
2. abatement of nuisance per se, also no need of
hearing;
3. granting of court of provisional remedies, such as the
writ of preliminary attachment or a temporary
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
restraining order, it can be issued ex parte by the
court, provided that the defendant is notified and
simultaneous with service of the writ;
4. you have removal of a temporary employee in the
government service because they do not enjoy
security of tenure;
5. we have preventive suspension, no need to first notify
the erring public respondent. He can be suspended
right away, preventively, because after all it is not a
penalty, it is merely a precautionary measure;
6. Issuance of warrants of distraints or levy by BIR
commissioner, no need of hearing because there was
already a notice of delinquency or inefficiency prior to
the distraint; and,
7. the cancellation of passport of the person charged
with the crime;
8. Issuance of sequestration orders/ judicial orders
which prevents an accused from travelling abroad.
9. Judicial orders which prevent an accused from
travelling abroad – this is what we call, the hold
departure order, if the accused has not been arrested
yet. Or you have what they call in the DOJ, the
watchlist. You need not be notified prior to placing you
into watchlist.
10. And then you have suspension of bank operations by
the Monetary Board upon a prima facie finding of
liquidity problems in such bank.
11. you have extradition proceedings – there’s no need
first to notify the extradite before he is being
(inaudible) in court.
12. Then of course you have reinvestigation of criminal
cases already subjected to a preliminary investigation.
where it merely reiterates its earlier finding of
probable cause against the accused – there’s no
need of notifying there.
Equal Protection of Laws
That all persons should be treated alike by the law, insofar as
they are situated under the same circumstances. It does not
guarantee absolute equality. What is being guaranteed under
this – only legal equality, that, in terms of rights that may be
conferred by law and obligations imposed – here it should be
treated alike if you’re situated under the same circumstances.
TN however of valid classification that you must memorize.
Q: What are the requisites for valid classification as an
exception to equal protection clause?
A:
1. First there has to be a substantial distinction
2. and it must be relevant to the purpose, or germane to
the purpose of the law.
3. It applies to all persons who are situated under the
same circumstances
4. not only for existing conditions but also for future
conditions.
103
TN of those guys and some of the examples on this, you have
the case of Trillanes relating to the case of Jalosjos relating to
classification in terms of the enforcement of the law. There
shouldn’t be any classification. Because of the condition of
Jalosjos, he wanted to continue to attend sessions in
Congress, SC was saying, “you are already a convicted felon
and the rule should be applied equally to you as applied to all
convicts”.
Insofar as Trillanes, the SC was saying “while not convicted,
but the same; Election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinction which lifts one
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement.
Also you TN of the case of Fariñas v. the Executive Secretary
with respect to appointive officials who may run for public
office. If you’re appointive you’re automatically considered to
have resigned. If you’re elective it does not apply. There’s valid
classification here because elected officials are elected for a
definite term whereas an appointive is accountable only to the
appointing authority. SC was saying here, “there is valid
classification”.
People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February
03, 2000 also cited in Trillanes IV vs Pimentel
8.ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS;  EQUAL PROTECTION  CLAUSE;
PERFORMANCE OF LEGITIMATE DUTIES BY PUBLIC
OFFICER IS NOT AN EXCUSE TO FREE A PERSON
VALIDLY IN PRISON. — The performance of legitimate and
even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed
by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of
250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention
the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ELECTION TO POSITION OF
CONGRESSMAN IS NOT A REASONABLE
CLASSIFICATION IN CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT. —
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. We,
therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is
not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class.
Fariñas v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 146494 July
14, 2004
“The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced.The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.”  means in committing a crime. So you apply for a search
Another point you should TN is PAGCOR. PAGCOR was
assessed with taxes and they were saying, “we are a
government corporation, we should not be taxed by the BIR”.
PAGCOR, according to the SC, cannot find support in the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, because it was
granted a franchise subject to amendment, alteration or repeal
by the Constitution. So, equal protection of laws does not
apply. (See Tax Case)
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.  KNOLEDGE OF THE PETITIONER OR HIS WITNESSES;
The right to privacy. If you’re asked in the BAR, “cite a
provision in the Constitution that protects the right to privacy”.
TN of this, this is applicable not only to Filipino Citizens but as
well as to Foreigners. It’s demandable as a matter of right.
This is guaranteed also under the writ of Amparo insofar as
protecting your right to privacy, your right to life, liberty or
security. While Section 1 includes property, Section 2 applies
insofar as your right to privacy insofar as liberty and security
against intrusion into your person.
Q: Who is protected?
A: Your person, your houses, your papers and effects.
Should there be any search and seizure of these things, there
has to be a warrant whatever the reason or purpose. Without
the warrant, then it is unreasonable therefore unconstitutional.
Should there be any arrest or seizure of a person or search of
a person it has to be with a warrant – a warrant of arrest or a
search or seizure warrant. Without such warrant then it is
unreasonable whatever is the reason or purpose therefore
unconstitutional. TN of that.
Now, the next question would be,
Q: How do you acquire a search warrant or a warrant of
arrest?
A: The requirements are enumerated in Section 2.
Let’s first take up on the Search Warrant.
SEARCH WARRANT
104
Q: What would be covered by your search warrant? Why do
you apply for a search warrant?
A: First of all, you apply for a search warrant to search what?
1. The things that are used in the commission of the crime.
2. when the things are the fruits of the crime or used as a
warrant.
Q. what are the requirements?
A. There has to be determination of probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge. It should be in a
searching question and answer.
Q. what is probable cause? what else that do you need to
establish here?
A.aside from probable cause to be determined by the judge,
there has to be a summary hearing ex parte through a
searching question and answer. If the judge is convinced then
the court issues the warrant.
Microsoft v. Maxicorp  – software – probable cause – such
reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant
a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means
taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper; OATH must
refer to the truth of the facts WITHIN THE PERSONAL
probable cause deals with probability and not absolute
certainty
Q. what are the requirements in the issuance of the warrant?
A. you have to state that particularly what was the crime
committed and what are the things or items that are to be
searched and seized including the place that are to be
searched. Without the particularity as required in the
constitution the warrant is general and therefore it is
unconstitutional. There should be one warrant for every crime
or offense. This is to prevent a scrattered shot warrant. A
scattered shot warrant is a general warrant prohibited by law.
Q. On particularity, do you need a tax declaration or a title that
would define technically the place to be searched and seized?
A. you dont have to as long as it can be identified by the
searching party.
As a genral rule there has to be a warrant for every search.
There are exception you have to memorize them. TN
Q. What are the exception? For even without a warrant the
search is valid.
A. first is when there is consent. When there is a waiver.
To make it a valid waiver TN of the requirements. The person
subject of the search knew that he has that right,either actually
or constructively and despite having known that he has that
right, he intelligently and voluntarily relinquished that right. This
must concur otherwise there cannot be a valid waiver.
Q. what else?
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A. when the search is made incidental to a lawful arrest.
Search is incidental so therefore the arrest must be lawful to
make the seacrh also lawful. So that if the arrest is in the first
place unlawful then there cannot be a valid search.
In this particular case you should TN on the lawful arrest there
has to be a warrant, if not then it false under the exceptions
provided under RULE 113 of the RULES OF COURT,
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. —
A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been
committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Otherwise if the search is not made under any of the
circumstances then the search is likewise invalid. Another
point, it must be done within the area or premises under the
control of the person being arrested. You cannot make a
separate search after the arrest of the accused. Like you arrest
him here in the AVR while one will search his place at the 4th
floor. It has to be in the same premises where the accused is
arrested. TN of that.
By the way, you have to compare the search incidental to
lawful arrest with stop and frisk search under the terry search.
The Terry search refers to the stop and frisk. This is limited
only to protective search for one is suspected to be engaged in
illegal activity or is committing a crime.
Q. What would the police do?
A. the police may ask him to stop and if he does not stop then
it is a justification for extensive search, not just frisking. In the
stop and frisk, you are stopped and then you are frisked,
however the frisking is limited only to protective search which
means only to outer garments and not extensive but if probable
cause is established that you are commiting a crime then in the
course of the search they found a contraband in your
possession then search ca be made now after lawful arrest
because here it will be as if you are commiting a crime in the
presence of the arresting officers search conducted is
incidental to that lawful arrest. So then on mere suspicion you
can stop and frisk but if you are to make an arrest and make a
search incidental to that arrest you must establish probable
105
cause, otherwise there is no justification for further extensive
search.
Q. another exception?
A. the search of a moving vehicles, especially at the check
points. TN moving vehicle is limited only to visual search
unless when probable cause is established that would justify
an extensive search. Check point also limited to visual search
unless proabable cause is established.
Customs search, limited only on warehouses but not
residential houses where there is a suspicion that the
smuggled goods are kept for non-payment of taxes, you
cannot search without a warrant. In a warehouse, you may
even without a search warrant.
Then you have on Armed conflict , check points, exigent and
emergency circumstances the conduct of area target zone and
saturation drives
Routine airport security is now one of its exceptions.
Then you also have evidence in plain view.
TN: Requirements of evidence in plain view:
1. The searching party must have justification to be in
the premises to the search.
Q: How do you justify presence in the premises?
A: By virtue of a search warrant or otherwise they are
there because of a buy bust operations, there is a
commission of the crime in the presence of the arresting
officer
So, first of all, the presence of the officer must be
legitimate.
2. The evidence is immediately apparent to the eye or
the hand of the searching party without need of
further search.
Then in this case, you can seize it even without a
search warrant.
TN: Del Rosario vs. People (taken up in Evidence)
The Supreme Court enumerated the requirements.
1. There has to be a valid intrusion based on a valid
warrantless arrest.
2. The evidence is discovered by accident or
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the
right to be present as to where they are.
3. The evidence must be immediately apparent and
plain view justifies the seizure without further search
conducted.
TN: Manalili Case (taken up in Evidence)
Q: What would be the consequence if the right of a person
against an unreasonable search is violated?
A: The evidence is inadmissible. TN: Under the principle or
rule on exclusionary.
[BAR]: Q: What does it mean as being the fruit of the
poisonous tree?
A: It’s a poisonous free. Therefore, inadmissible.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law) 106
He was not present when the crime was
You have the right to recover the things searched and seized committed but he has personal knowledge of facts
unless they are contraband or prohibited by law. Then they indicating that this person to be arrested must
shall remain in custody by law. If not returned you can always have committed the crime.
ask for a Writ of Replevin.
Then in which case, you can make an arrest even
Summary to Execptions of Prior Issuance of a Search without a warrant.
Warrant:
If it is based only from an information of an
1. Consented Search informant or from a source eventhough reliable,
2. Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest but not personal to the police, he cannot make an
3. Stop and Frisk arrest under the hot pursuit.
4. Search of Moving Vehicles
5. Customs Search TN: There should be no interruption from the time
6. Armed conflict , exigent and emergency of the commission of the crime to the actual
circumstances the conduct of area target zone and apprehension of the accused. The immediacy of
the arrest, no gap. Because if there is gap, then
saturation drives (Justifications for the conduct of a
there is no more hot pursuit. In which case, you
checkpoint)
have to file a case in court to issue the warrant if
7. Routine Airport Security there is an interruption in the chain of events from
8. Evidence in Plain View the commission of the crime to the actual
apprehension of the accused.
WARRANT OF ARREST
TN: [BAR] Luz vs. People
SC: If the offense charged the penalty is a fine, not
First, there has to be a warrant of arrest. But unlike in a search
imprisonment, you cannot make an arrest. So there is no
warrant, it is not necessary that its application has to be done
justification to a search incidental to an arrest.
summarily. There’s this PI conducted by the fiscal and then if
there is probable cause or it is established, the case is filed in
Ang nahitabo gidakop nila ni ang suspect for violation of traffic
court.
laws. Wa mani siguro siya nag helmet. Then, he was advice to
go with the law enforcer didto sa police station. At the police
station, he was asked to remove all the things from his pants
Q: What does the judge do?
and they found out the contraband. He was then put to jail
A: The judge within 10 days from receipt of the records must
thereafter. What was the justification of the police? It was kuno
determine probable cause, not for the purpose of indicting, but
a search and seizure incidental to a lawful arrest. In traffic
for the purpose of determining whether there is basis to believe
violation, the penalty is only fine.
that a crime was committed and the person to be arrested
must have committed the crime. He must immediately be place
“The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist
in the custody of law.
therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at
the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed
Here, the court may base on the finding of probable cause of
under custody (such that he should have been apprised of
the fiscal for as long as it is personally examined ang records
his  Miranda  rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be
of the PI by the judge and he makes his own personal
fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal
judgment. Unless, he needs for more clarifications, then he
arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered
may call for a hearing ex parte.
"under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being
made.
If the court finds that there is no basis, the court can dismiss
the case outright and not issue the
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012,
warrant of arrest.
which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash
helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only.
*** Q: What are the exceptions to the rule on the issuance
Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be
of warrant?
issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
A: Rule 113
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that
1. Caught in the act or in flagrante delicto. When the
neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
person to be arrested must have committed a
crime, in the process of committing a crime and
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a
about to commit the crime in the presence of the
traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of
arresting officer.
the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take
the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have
When you say in the presence, doing those within
arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer's
the hearing distance of the arresting officer.
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even an ordinary citizen can make an arrest.
Provided that, he surrenders him to the nearest
Even if one were to work under the assumption that
police station before the expiration of the period of
petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged
detention under Article 125 of the RPC.
down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
2. Hot Pursuit
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
arrest were not complied with.” (Luz y Ong v. People, G.R.
No. 197788, February 29, 2012)
Q: Can there be a search incident to a lawful arrest for
violation of traffic rules?
A: No. In traffic violations, the penalty is only a fine. And
therefore, he cannot be arrested. And if he cannot be arrested,
there cannot be a search incidental to a lawful arrest because
in the first place, there was no arrest. There cannot be an
arrest when the penalty for the offense charged is only fine.
Q: What is an Administrative Arrest?
A: In some instances, you can arrest even without a warrant
Q: What are examples of these instances?
A: If you breach the peace and order in the locality, when you
disrupt a court hearing, if you’re in a drunken state in public
highways, in case of blocking traffic without authorization,
refusing to give your ID and you’re in that country illegally
Summary of Exceptions to Prior Issuance of a Warrant of
Arrest
1. In flagrante delicto
2. Hot Pursuit
3. Arrest of an Escapee
4. Apprehension of a violator of a crime punished with a
fine
5. Administrative Arrest
Section 3.
1.The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law.
2.Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Q: What is covered by this protection?
A: It covers everything, including electronics communication
now. Emails, texting, cellphone calls, etc.
Q: Is evidence obtained in violation of this protection
admissible? What are the Exceptions?
A: Any evidence in violation of this right is inadmissible. The
only exception are when there is a warrant or a lawful order of
the court or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
may be prescribed by law.
What you must consider then in the privacy of communication
and correspondence is:
Q: With respect to prisoners, do they have privacy of
communication and correspondence?
107
A: They have no right. According to the Supreme Court, under
the law, the right of one who is detained, their expectation of
privacy is not as much as those who are outside of jail or the
public at large. If they are detained, there is their loss of right to
privacy.
But take note of the case of Alejano et al vs. Cabujay on letters
of prisoners.
CASE: Alejano v. Cabujay (case of Trillanes)
- Regarding the privacy of communication enjoyed by
prisoners or detainees, including one who has already
been convicted of final judgment or only a preventive
detention prisoner (pending case)
- The fact that a person is facing criminal charges in
court, he does not enjoy the same privacy with those
who are free or the public at large
ISSUE: WON the letter should be opened and read by the
officers of the prison
- Complained that it was a violation against their
privacy of communication and correspondence
RULING OF THE SC:
- While it is true that it is guaranteed under the
Constitution, however, insofar as detention prisoners
are concerned, the right is limited
- The letters can be opened, for as long as they are not
privileged communication between lawyer and client
- The prison officers can open, however, without
reading them. Unless it is stated that the letter is
confidential, then it can be read.
“8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN RIGHT TO PRIVACY
OF COMMUNICATION IS NOT VIOLATED
EVEN WHEN THERE IS AN INSPECTION OF
FOLDED LETTERS OF DETAINEES;
RATIONALE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR.
– Thus, we do not agree with the Court of
Appeals that the opening and reading of the
detainees' letters in the present case violated the
detainees' right to privacy of communication. The
letters were not in a sealed envelope. The
inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure
as it serves the same purpose as the opening of
sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the
ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters
between the detainees and their lawyers. The
petitioner who received the letters from detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting
as the detainees' personal courier and not as
their counsel when he received the letters for
mailing. In the present case, since the letters
were not confidential communication between
the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of
the ISAFP Detention Center could read the
letters. If the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read
the letters but only open the envelopes for
inspection in the presence of the detainees. That
a law is required before an executive officer
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
could intrude on a citizen's privacy rights is a
guarantee that is available only to the public at
large but not to persons who are detained or
imprisoned. The right to privacy of those
detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as
well as to the limitations inherent in lawful
detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of
their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted
prisoners have a diminished expectation of
privacy rights. In assessing the regulations
imposed in detention and prison facilities that are
alleged to infringe on the constitutional rights of
the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S.
courts "balance the guarantees of the
Constitution with the legitimate concerns of
prison administrators." The deferential review of
such regulations stems from the principle that:
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison
officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis
would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate
security problems and to adopt innovative
solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration.”|  (Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No.
160792, August 25, 2005)
TN: Remember also the case of Zulueta, even private letters
cannot be used as evidence if they violated the privacy of
communication and correspondence.
TN: You have to read this case in relation to the Waterous
Drugs case.
TN: You have the protection under RA 4200 or the Anti-Wire
Tapping Law and it provides for exceptions.
TN: Also take note of the human security act where it provides
for exceptions as regards the intrusion of privacy of
communication and correspondence.
TN: Read these in relation to Writ of Habeas Data where the
government may order the production of information that may
violate the privacy of a particular individual.
Q: As between Privacy of Communication and
Corresprondence and Public Interest, which shall prevail?
A: ALWAYS accommodate public interest.
Section 4. No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of
grievances.
Case in point, you have the most recent decision of Chavez vs
Secretary Gonzales
“Having settled the applicable standard to content-based
restrictions on broadcast media, let us go to its application to
the case at bar. To recapitulate, a governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or of the press  based on
content  is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government
having the burden  of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality by the  clear and present danger rule. This
108
rule applies equally to  all kinds of media, including
broadcast media.
This outlines the  procedural map to follow in cases like the
one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the
presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge
the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary. On
the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who
have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge
freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear
and present danger test. It appears that the great evil  which
government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording
in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of
the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and
respondents' evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and
present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the
Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is
also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two
versions, one supposed to be a "complete" version and the
other, an "altered" version. Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on the who's and the how's of the wiretapping act
is ambivalent, especially considering the tape's different
versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its
commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of
the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled
facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would
violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that  not every violation of a law will justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of
the press. Our laws are of different kinds  and doubtless,
some of them provide norms of conduct which even if violated
have only an adverse effect on a person's private comfort but
does not endanger national security. There are laws of great
significance but their violation, by itself and without more,
cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In
fine,violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure,
which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain
freedom of speech and of the press. The  totality of the
injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest
must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by
the Constitution and by related international covenants
protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a
careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all
these factors to determine compliance with the clear and
present danger test,  the Court should not be misinterpreted
as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of
law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they
breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat,  the need to
prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of
free speech and free press, a preferred right whose
breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and
present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the
exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing
that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly
endangers the  national security of the State.”
||| (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338,
February 15, 2008)
Take note of the possibility that this might be violated – the
chilling effect of people afraid of expressing themselves
because of laws limiting the exercise of their freedom of
expression. And even before its application,
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
Q: Can a law allegedly infringing on the freedom of expression
be challenged even before its application?
A: Yes, it can be questioned on its face, as what happened in
the Cybercrime Law.
Relevant excerpts on the Cybercrime SC Ruling Disini vs
Secretary of Justice:
“Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of
expression and violates the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that
this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a
presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself
that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right
mentioned.
Computer data  99 may refer to entire programs or lines of
code, including malware, as well as files that contain texts,
images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into a
lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is
indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their
writers or authors may constitute personal property.
Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches
and seizures, whether while stored in their personal computers
or in the service provider's systems.  aEcAD
H applied" to the actual, attending circumstances before it. 37  An
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
right to be secure in one's papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no
search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in
effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control
and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice
order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech.
In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the
freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms
of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional
bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for
an executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected
without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of
the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so
would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into
one. 100
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but
it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to
determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on
free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a
combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine,
the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger
rule.  101  Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to
be blocked be found  prima facie  in violation of any provision of
thecybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this
can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal
provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three
tests mentioned above.  EHSIcT
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for
being violative of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of
expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
XXX
109
The very public structure of the Internet and the nature of
traffic data per se undermine any reasonable expectation of
privacy in the latter. The Internet is custom-designed to
frustrate claims of reasonable expectation of privacy in traffic
data per se, since the latter are necessarily disclosed to the
public in the process of communication. DTEAHI
Individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the
data they disclose to the public and should take the risks for
that disclosure. This is the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court
in  Smith v. Maryland.
XXXX
A facial challenge refers to the call for the scrutiny of an entire
law or provision by identifying its flaws or defects, not only on
the basis of its actual operation on the attendant facts raised
by the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that
the very existence of the law or provision is repugnant to the
Constitution. 35  This kind of challenge has the effect of totally
annulling the assailed law or provision, which is deemed to be
unconstitutional per se. The challenge is resorted to by courts,
especially when there is no instance to which the law or
provision can be validly applied. 36  TADCSE
In a way, a facial challenge is a deviation from the general rule
that Courts should only decide the invalidity of a law "as
as-applied challenge refers to the localized invalidation of a
law or provision, limited by the factual milieu established in a
case involving real litigants who are actually before the
Court.  38 This kind of challenge is more in keeping with the
established canon of adjudication that "the court should not
form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is applied." 39  Should the petition
prosper, the unconstitutional aspects of the law will be
carved away by invalidating its improper applications on a
case-to-case basis. 40  For example, in Ebralinag v. Division
of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 41  the Court exempted
petitioner-members of the religious group Jehovah's Witness
from the application of the  Compulsory Flag Ceremony in
Educational Institutions Act on account of their religious
beliefs. The Court ruled that the law requiring them to salute
the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge cannot be enforced against them at the risk of
expulsion, because the law violated their freedom of religious
expression. In effect, the law was deemed unconstitutional
insofar as their religious beliefs were concerned.
Because of its effect as a total nullification, the facial
invalidation of laws is deemed to be a "manifestly strong
medicine" that must be used sparingly and only as a last
resort.  42 The general disfavor towards it is primarily due to
the "combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy,
the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and
above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes."  43 Claims
of facial invalidity "raise the risk of 'premature interpretation of
statutes on the basis of factually barebones records.'"  44”
||| (Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R.
No. 203335, February 18, 2014)
Q: What acts are within the scope of the protection to freedom
of expression?
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
A: Freedom of speech is not limited to oral utterances, it could
also be acts which conveys message to the public (including
picketing)
Q: Are there speeches that are NOT PROTECTED by law?
A: Yes, they are those that are libelous, violent, seditious
statements.
36:51 – 43:50
You have private speech, commercial speech or general
speech. And then you have government speech.
On private speech, there is more leeway for the protection of
your freedom of speech. TN that on so many principles on this,
speeches the content of which are general speeches like
political, religious, historical, YOU HAVE THE LEEWAY to say
anything you want to say. You can say whatever you want.
However, if it is a government speech or commercial speech, it
is LIMITED.
There may be a restriction on what you should say about the
stance of the government.
Example: The government is for the promotion of the
reproduction health. So if you have to speak about it, it
should AWAYS be for the promotion if you are speaking
as a connection of the government. You have no choice,
especially in its implementation.
So then, if you are restricted or even punished for what you
should say against what the government stands for, you
cannot invoke freedom of speech since it is limited here in
government speech.
Therefore, be an ordinary individual so that you can speak
whatever you want about the law which you are against.
Otherwise, shut your mouth.
On commercial speeches, it may also be restricted by
government, especially when it involves an interest protected
by the government and you are defrauding the public insofar
as the item or property or transaction that you are promoting is
concerned. If it is against the law, there may be a restriction on
commercial speeches involving advertisement of goods or
services.
Another thing you should take note on speeches like Heckler’s
Veto.
There may be a restriction on your delivery of your speech
publicly if it disturbs the peace and order. That is called
Heckler’s Veto because of the ‘heckle’ to the public. You may
be stopped right away from continuing the delivery of the
speech so that it will not disturb the peace and order. That is
Heckler’s Veto.
Another point, you have to consider the restrictions on your
freedom of expression, may it be freedom of speech, press or
assembly.
Q: What are the restrictions? Because corollary to that, you
have what?
A:
110
1. The Clear and Present Danger Rule
2. Dangerous Tendency Rule
3. Balancing of Interests
Q: In the determination of the restriction, you have what? What
are the Prior Restrictions?
1. Content-based Restrictions
2. Content-neutral Regulations
The Content-based Restrictions are restrictions on the
content of the speech itself. It can be restricted only when
there is a clear and present danger of a substantial evil to
happen which the state has the obligation to prevent.
On Content-neutral Regulations, it has nothing to do with the
content of the speech. It has something to do with the time,
place and the circumstances in the delivery of the speech that
can be regulated.
e.g the permit to use a public place can be a form of content-
neutral regulation. BP 880 requiring a permit before using
public place. What they apply there is not content-based, only
content-neutral regulations; regulating only the time and place
and manner of the exercise of the freedom of expression.
You already mastered clear and present danger, dangerous
tendency and balancing of interests. Just go over that.
Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales (supra)
- Example of content-based regulations
- Hello Garci Tapes
- The DOJ Secretary and NTC threatened ABS-CBN
that should they continue to publish or replay the
Garci Tapes, the franchise of ABS-CBN will be
cancelled.
- SC: This violated the freedom of expression of the
petitioner in that case because it goes to the content
already of the speech or the expression here of the
petitioner and that is prohibited under the law
because that can only be regulated when there is a
clear and present danger of any substantial evil to
happen which the state has the obligation to prevent.
Also, you have to relate on the Freedom of Expression such
limitations as Void-For-Vagueness and the Overbreadth
Doctrine. They also apply to freedom of expression. Where the
basis for the question on the constitutionality ‘on the face’ of
the law is on two grounds:
1. It is void because it is vague and therefore violative of
due process of law, or it can be
2. Overbreadth (Overbroad?)
Know that there are differences between the two. They are
exact opposites of each other.
This Overbreadth and Void for Vagueness Doctrines can only
be used to challenge the constitutionality of a law affecting
freedom of expression, particularly freedom of speech ON THE
FACE (need not be AS APPLIED) in actual cases.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
FACIAL CHALLENGE (Overbreadth/Void for Vagueness Rule)
vs AS APPLIED CHALLENGE
“A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as
to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 255 Moreover, in
determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain
meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be
construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment.256”
“In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge"
embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality
of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The
rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons
not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing.” (Imbong vs Ochoa G.R. No.
204819     April 8, 2014)
And then you have the rule on the MTRCB. You know that
already. MTRCB only has supervision over the TV personality.
They do not have any control over them. They only have
supervision and monitoring of programs of TV and movies and
films. They cannot suspend a TV personality. That is clear in
the case of Soriano vs. Laguardia.
Soriano vs Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785               March 15,
2010
Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV
program in question does not, under the factual milieu of the
case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the nature of
subsequent punishment for past violation committed by
petitioner in the course of the broadcast of the program on
August 10, 2004. To be sure, petitioner has not contested the
fact of his having made statements on the air that were
contextually violative of the program’s "G" rating. To merit a
"G" rating, the program must be "suitable for all ages," which,
in turn, means that the "material for television [does not], in the
judgment of the [MTRCB], x x x contain anything unsuitable for
children and minors, and may be viewed without adult
guidance or supervision."3  As previously discussed by the
Court, the vulgar language petitioner used on prime-time
television can in no way be characterized as suitable for all
ages, and is wholly inappropriate for children.
(TN) Also take note on commenting on acts of government
officials. You must read the case of Borjal vs. CA, US vs.
Bustos.
Doctrine of Fair Comment in Borjal vs CA G.R. No.
126466.  January  14, 1999 citing US vs Bustos
“Indisputably, petitioner Borjal’s questioned writings are
not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of  The Revised Penal
111
Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they
are neither  private communications  nor fair and true report
without any comments or remarks.   However this does not
necessarily mean that they are not privileged.    To be sure,
the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of
qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries
on matters of public interest  are likewise privileged.   The rule
on privileged communications had its genesis not in the
nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution
guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. [19]  As early
as 1918, in United States v. Cañete,[20]  this Court ruled that
publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy
are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
speech.   This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the
mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in
the statute punishing libels.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in
the freedom of the press.   As held in  Elizalde v.
Gutierrez[21]    and reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals[22] -
To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to
petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing
violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in
the freedom of the press.   As was so well put by Justice
Malcolm in Bustos: ‘Public policy, the welfare of society, and
the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection of public opinion.   The inevitable and incontestable
result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine
of privilege.’
The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates
the rule that privileged communications must, sui generis, be
protective of public opinion.   This closely adheres to the
democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-
determination and eschews the strictly libertarian view that it is
protective solely of self- expression which, in the words of Yale
Sterling Professor Owen Fiss,[23]  makes its appeal to the
individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and political
culture.   It is therefore clear that the restrictive interpretation
vested by the Court of Appeals on the penal provision
exempting from liability only private communications and fair
and true report without comments or remarks defeats, rather
than promotes, the objective of the rule on privileged
communications, sadly contriving as it does, to suppress the
healthy effloresence of public debate and opinion as shining
linchpins of truly democratic societies.
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an
action for libel or slander.   The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every
false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in
his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.   In order
that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition.   If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as
it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.[24]”
But the same principle do not apply to the members of the
Supreme Court, as this might affect the sub judice rule. It is
stricter in so far as criticizing the Supreme Court.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
But not so much as the present political scenario. They’re not
afraid anymore of the courts. So they can just criticize, starting
with the President, they’re not afraid anymore. You cannot put
him in contempt. You cannot put him in jail. He is immune from
suit. That is in so far as the freedom of expression. Just take
note of that.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall
be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
On Section 5, that is on freedom of religion or the non-
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The thing you should take note on this…the cases you
need to take note…more recent decision, Escritor (supra); still
a prevailing principle. This can only be intruded by the state
when there is a clear and present danger of any substantive
evil to happen which may take the form of compelling state
interest. That is the Escritor case.
In the Ebralinag case (supra), the saluting of the flag is no
longer mandatory insofar as the members of the Jehovah’s
Witness, as it may violate the freedom of religion.
There are 3 things you should take note in Section 5:
(1) non-establishment of religion, (2) freedom of religion, and
(3) the religious test.
All of these will apply only to the government; not against
private entities that would require religion as a requirement for
one to be allowed to exercise a particular act. So this applies
only to the government entities. (TN) Just take note of that.
The bottom-line there, should there be any interference by the
State, you can only be justified by Clear and Present Danger
Rule.
Another one that is related to the religious test: Conscientious
Objector Test. That is respected by the State. Like for
example in some states they allow this - you cannot be
compelled to defend the state, to serve the military if it is
against your religion. In the Philippines, we don’t have that.
There is no exception to serving the defense of the State here.
You cannot use that Conscientious Objector Test.
I think they use Conscientious Objector Test with the RH Law.
The Conscientious Objector Test is applied with the RH Law.
Like it’s against your religion. You are working with PopCom.
You are working to promote population control through use of
contraceptives. That is against your Catholic beliefs. In that RH
Law, you can be punished. It can be a crime or you can be
charged administratively. And that was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court being violative of your
freedom of religion, taking to consideration the Conscientious
Objector Test. You read this case. That’s the most recent
decision of the SC where there is a discussion on the respect
for religion. However, whatever your beliefs are you should
also not impose that on the state. That was the bottom line in
the RH Law. So read that case Imbong vs. the Executive
Secretary. (TN) You take note of that case. There is the
112
application of the Conscientious Objector Test. That one has
not been asked in the bar exam but that is included in the bar
exam of 2014. How it was applied in the RH Law. [If you got
time, read this RH Bill case of Imbong vs Ochoa, it’s discusses
so many rights under the Bill of Rights]
A good example of a Conscientious objector is if you’re
released from the obligation to serve in the armed forces or to
participate in selective service registration. That is a good
example of Conscientious Objector test. The same with the
liability of a government employee who does not promote the
RH Law if it’s against his religion – there should be no criminal
liability or administrative liability. That would be a violation of
his freedom of religion.
Relevant excerpts from Imbong vs Ochoa G.R. No. 204819
April 8, 2014
“Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and
the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in
Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214  where it was stated "that
benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the
Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further
explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to
these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may
be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is
to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's
or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of
accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a
facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the
courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom,
the compelling state interest test is proper. 218Underlying the
compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is
a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine
these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise
Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the
"clear and present danger" test but did not employ it.
Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent
cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced
that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it
violates the established institutions of society and law. The
Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger"
test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability
may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least
restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case
also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest"
test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule.
Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger"
test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of
Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger"
test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not
surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and
present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test
is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other
hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious
freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society
and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by
German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only
case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as
explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to
the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible
Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and
present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were
appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate
effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having
been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality
approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to
Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising
from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is
proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of
human conduct has different effects on the state's interests:
some effects may be immediate and short-term while others
delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the
interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether
immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not
any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right
to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most
inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of
Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The
entire constitutional order of limited government is premised
upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the
Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a
just and humane society and establish a government." As held
in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of
interests which balances a right with just a colorable state
interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling
interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to
religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy
burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the
state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until
they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between
the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall
be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the
purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time
affording protection to the paramount interests of the state.
This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.
refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state
interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the
state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious
liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original.
Underlining supplied.]
xxxx
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court
to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's
participation in the support of modem reproductive health
measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For
the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom
and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
113
matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts."220  The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public
and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court
makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this
realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court
stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to
determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
religious freedom.
xxxx
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted
allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives
is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
xxxx
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what
the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They
can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and,
thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their
supposition that the State cannot enhance its population
control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious
beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its
legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one
render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God
the things that are God's.221
xxxx
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly
burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling
state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application.
In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under
the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily
so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the
RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious
objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in
Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a
conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to
the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the
other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of
penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of
medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent
with what the RH Law promotes.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by
the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against
his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has
been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has
written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect
for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out
clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes
pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act
that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in
conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One
may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the
offensive act by indirect participation.”
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
LIBERTY OF ABODE & RIGHT TO TRAVEL
On Section 6, on liberty of abode and the right to travel. What
you must take note on the liberty of abode is that you also
have the right to change the same within the limits prescribed
by law.
00:50:01-00:57:50 Ortezuela
TN: You also have the right to change the same within the
limits described by law. What are the limitations, exceptions
when there is a lawful order of the court, then you cannot
demand where you want to reside.
Q:But the right to travel, what are the restrictions?
A:In the interest of national security, public health or public
safety.
Q:Who determines?
A: It’s not the court. It could be administrative agencies
exercising its functions that may have the responsibility to
make sure that there is no violation of the state’s public health,
or public safety, or national security.
Q: And thus the question of the right to travel of the Arroyo
couple they are going abroad. Can it be restrained because
there is an impending investigation conducted on them? Of
course not. What is the limitation?
A: Only in the interest of national security, public health, public
safety. Which was not established by the DOJ nonetheless
they refiled for the TRO.And so they were not able to go
abroad because eventually there was a filing of an election
case against them where it became nonbailable as far as the
president is concerned and then after, the plunder case, which
is an even more nonbailable offense.
114
Q:But what about the requirement of judges and court
personnel?
A: To first secure a permit to travel before going abroad.
Q:Does this violate the right to travel?
A:TN the case of the Office the Administrator services, office
of the court administrator in Judge Ignacio Makarili, where the
supreme court said the right to travel guaranteed by the
constitution should by no means be construed as limiting the
supreme court’s inherent power of administrative supervision
over lower courts. The law does not restrict but merely
regulates by providing guidelines to be complied by the judges
and court personnel before they can go on leave to travel
abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing
something to regulate however is needed to govern or direct
according to rule. There is no prohibition but merely a
regulation.
“It has been argued that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B) on
vacation leave to be spent abroad unduly restricts a citizen's
right to travel guaranteed by Section 6, Article III of the  1987
Constitution. 10  Section 6 reads:
Sec. 6.The liberty  of abode and of
changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall theright to travel  be
impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or  public health,
as  may be provided by law. [Emphases
supplied]
Let there be no doubt that the Court recognizes a citizen's
constitutional right to travel. It is, however, not  the issue in this
case. The only issue in this case is the non-compliance with
the Court's rules and regulations. It should be noted that
respondent, in her Comment, did not raise any constitutional
concerns. In fact, she was apologetic and openly admitted that
she went abroad without the required travel authority. Hence,
this is not the proper vehicle to thresh out issues on one's
constitutional right to travel.  Cdasia
Nonetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exercise of one's
right to travel or the freedom to move from one place to
another, 11  as assured by the Constitution, is  not absolute.
There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations
regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself provides that
"neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health, as
may be provided by law."
Inherent limitations on the right to travel are those
that naturally emanate from the source. These are
very basic and are built-in with the power. An
example of such inherent limitation is the power of the
trial courts to prohibit persons charged with a crime to
leave the country. 13  In such a case, permission of
the court is necessary. Another is the inherent power
of the legislative department to conduct a
congressional inquiry in aid of legislation. In the
exercise of legislative inquiry, Congress has the
power to issue a  subpoena  and  subpoena duces
tecum  to a witness in any part of the country, signed
by the chairperson or acting chairperson and the
Speaker or acting Speaker of the House;  14 or in the
case of the Senate, signed by its Chairman or in his
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
absence by the Acting Chairman, and approved by
the Senate President.  15”aEcHCD |||  cannot be made accessible to the public? What are these
(Leave Division, Office of Administrative
Services-OCA v. Heusdens, A.M. No. P-
11-2927, December 13, 2011)
Q:Does this right to return to the country part of the right to
travel?
A:The answer is NO. what is the applicable to law on the right
to demand that you’d be allowed to return to the country after
going abroad? We have article 13 paragraph 2, and article 12
paragraph 4. Of the universal declaration of human rights …
civil and political rights respectively. Where it guarantees that
you have the right to return to the country of origin if you live
there.
Now they are considered as accepted principles of the
international law and under the incorporation clause part of the
legal system, they should be applied as if they are part of the
ordinary statutes.
And then you have on the human security act where (1) if you
violate suspected terrorism you can be placed under house
arrest, travel and communication is restricted, under section 26
of the human security act.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 7, the right to information.
What is important? Section 7. This is a political right. This is
not demandable by some matter of right.
Two things that you should TN on the right to information:
1. The right to information and
2. The right to access to information
This is relevant because of the pending approval of the FOI.
The Freedom of Information bill. This is self-executing but you
will notice that if you demand information from government, it is
for the government to determine whether it should considered
as a public information or confidential information. And since
there is no law defining what may be considered as information
as a public concern, it is now the supreme court that legislates
by way of jurisprudence. Defining what may be considered as
a public information that must be readily accessible to the
public or information that must remain confidential.
We can only rely on jurisprudence and they don’t want that.
They want congress to formulate the law that would state as a
fact on the information that are accessible to the public as a
matter of right.
The right to information is absolute. The access however to
this information is subject to such limitations as may be
prescribed by law.
115
Q:Now TN to the exceptions of this: what are information that
information?
A:You have, first of all, the executive privilege of the president.
The executive privilege example, the operational proximity
test. communication between the president and his
subordinate. That is consultative in nature, not accessible.
Negotiation made by the president not accessible to the public.
Anything that pertains to the performance of function of the
president that might undermine his authority he can invoke the
privilege which cannot be the subject of compulsion on the part
of any court for them to disclose that is considered as an
accepted privilege.
“Using the above elements, we are
convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the  presidential
communications privilege.  First, the
communications relate to a "quintessential
and non-delegable power" of the
President,  i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements  without the
concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.  45 Second,  the
communications are "received" by a close
advisor of the President. Under the
"operational  proximity" test, petitioner can
be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo's
cabinet.  And third,  there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.”|||
 (Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, March
25, 2008)
Q:What else that is not covered by the right to information?
A: You have military secrets, of course. Obviously, that cannot
be disclosed to the public. Otherwise it will be too dangerous if
it goes into the wrong hands. What else? Intelligence reports
on what? crime investigations. Even if it’s wrong, and therefore
not too intelligent, cannot be accessed by the public because
these are confidential. National security matters, trade secrets,
banking transactions –TN except when it is a subject of a court
litigation or impeachment. You notice that already when we
had the impeachment. Diplomatic correspondence, executive
sessions of congress, closed door meetings are confidential.
SUMMARY OF MATTERS NOT INCLUDED IN SCOPE OF
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
1. Executive Privilege
2. Judicial Privilege
3. Military Secrets
4. Intelligence Reports on Crime Investigations
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
5. Matters of National Security
6. Trade Secrets
7. Banking Transactions EXCEPT if subject to court
litigation and in impeachment cases
8. Diplomatic Correspondence
9. Executive Sessions and Closed – door meetings of
Congress
TN of the following cases:
> Chavez vs. PEA – ongoing contract negotiation of
Government, the people have the right to know. Treaty
negotiation that’s executive privilege, so try to spot out the
difference, do not be misled.
Latest jurisprudence on Freedom of Information citing
Chavez vs PEA
“The people's right to  information  is based on Art. III, Sec.
7  of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 7.The right of  the people
to  information  on matters  of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by
law.
The policy of  public
disclosure and transparency of  governmental
transactions involving public interest enunciated in Art. II,
Sec. 28 of  the Constitution complements the right of  the
people to information:
Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of  full
public disclosure of  all its transactions
involving public interest.
The purpose of  these two constitutional provisions, as we
observed in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, is:
to promote transparency in policy-
making and in the operations  of the
government, as well as provide the
people sufficient information to exercise
effectively other constitutional rights.
These twin provisions are essential to
the exercise of  freedom  of expression. .
. . Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public
discussions leading to the
formulation of  government
policies and their effective
implementation. An informed citizenry is
essential to the existence  and  proper
functioningof any democracy. 46
This right to information, however, is not without limitation. Fr.
Joaquin Bernas S.J. notes that the two sentences  of Section 7
guarantee only one general right, the right to  information  on
matters  of public concern. The right to access official records
merely implements the right to  information. Thus, regulatory
116
discretion must include both authority to determine what
matters are of  public concern  and  authority to determine the
manner of  access to them.  47
We have sufficiently elucidated the matter of  right
to  information  in Chavez, where We said:  DCISAE
We must first distinguish
between information the law on public
bidding requires PEA to disclose
publicly, and information the constitutional
right to information requires PEA to
release to the public.  Before the
consummation of  the contract, PEA
must, on its own  and without demand
from anyone, disclose to the public
matters relating to the
disposition  of its property. These
include the size, location, technical
description and  nature of  the property
being disposed of, the
terms  and conditions  of the
disposition, the parties qualified to bid,
the minimum
price  and similar  information. PEA
must prepare all these data  and  disclose
them to the public at the startof  the
disposition process, long before the
consummation of  the contract, because
the Government Auditing Code requires
public bidding. If PEA fails to make this
disclosure, any citizen can demand
from PEA this  information at any time
during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going
evaluation or review of  bids or
proposals being undertaken by the
bidding or review committee is not
immediately accessible under the right
to  information. While the evaluation or
review is still on-going, there are no
"official acts, transactions, or decisions" on
the bids or proposals. However, once the
committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a "definite
proposition" on the part  of the
government. From this moment, the
public's right
to  information  attaches,  and  any citizen
can access all the non-
proprietary information leading to such
definite proposition. In  Chavez v.
PCGG,  the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent  of the
framers  of the Constitution, we
believe that it is incumbent upon
the PCGG  and  its officers, as
well as other government
representatives, to disclose
sufficient public information on
any proposed settlement they
have decided to take up with the
ostensible
owners and holders of  ill-gotten
wealth. Suchinformation, though,
must pertain to definite
propositions of  the government,
not necessarily to intra-agency or
inter-agency recommendations or
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
communications during the stage
when common assertions are still
in the process of  being
formulated or are in the
"exploratory" stage. There is
need, of  course, to observe the
same restrictions on
disclosure of  information  in
general, as discussed earlier —
such as on matters involving
national security, diplomatic or
foreign relations,
intelligenceand  other
classified information."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The right covers three
categories of  information which are
"matters  of public concern," namely:
(1) official records; (2)
documents and  papers pertaining to
official acts,
transactions and  decisions;  and (3)
government research data used in
formulating policies. The first category
refers to any document that is part  of the
public records in the
custody of  government agencies or
officials. The second category refers to
documents and papers recording,
evidencing, establishing, confirming,
supporting, justifying or explaining official
acts, transactions or
decisions of  government agencies or
officials. The third category refers to
research data, whether raw, collated or
processed, owned by the
government and used in formulating
government policies.
xxx xxx xxx
We rule, therefore, that  the
constitutional right
to  information includes
official  information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract.
The  information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the
government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like
privileged information,
military  and  diplomatic secrets  and  similar
matters affecting national
security  and  public order. Congress has
also prescribed other limitations on the
right to information in several legislations.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
We further explored the matter  of right
to  information  in Chavez v. NHA, where We ruled that:
. . . [G]overnment agencies, without
need of  demand from anyone, must
bring into public view all the
steps  and  negotiations leading to the
consummation of  the
transactionand the contents of  the
perfected contract.
Such  information  must pertain to
"definite propositions  of the
government," meaning official
117
recommendations or final positions
reached on the different matters
subject of  negotiation. The government
agency, however, need not disclose
"intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications
during the stage when common
assertions are still in the
process of  being formulated or are in
the exploratory stage." The limitation
also covers privileged communication
like  information  on
military  and  diplomatic
secrets;  information  affecting national
security;  information  on
investigations of  crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of  the
accused; information on foreign
relations, intelligence,  and  other
classified information. 48
Even without any demand from anyone then, it behooved
PSALM to publicly disclose, information regarding the
disposition of  Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant|||(AHEPP).
Here, PSALM routinely published news and updates on the
sale  of AHEPP on its website. 49  It also organized several
forums where various stakeholders were apprised  of the
procedure to be implemented in the privatization  of AHEPP.
As there is yet no sufficient enabling law to provide the specific
requirements in the discharge  of its duty under the
Constitution, these unilateral actions from PSALM must be
construed to be a sufficient compliance of  its duty under the
Constitution.”
||| (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through
Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. PSALM Corp., G.R. No.
192088, October 09, 2012)
> Request for copy of 2008 SALN,PDA and Curriculum Vitae
of Supreme Court Justices. This case was decided 2013. This
issue was brought about by Kim Henares. The Supreme Court
did not categorically declare that it is prohibited from giving out
said documents but it asked Kim Henares to “state your legal
basis first.” The SC in this case said that the right to
information goes hand in hand with the Constitutional policies
of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service under
Sec. 17 ART XI has classified information disclosed in the
SALN as a matter of public interest hence there is a duty on
the part of members of the government to disclose their SALN
to the public in the manner provided by law. While the public
officers in the custody and control of public records have the
discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be
inspected or copied by interested parties, such discretion does
not carry with it the authority to prohibit access to inspecting
these records. After all, a public office is a public trust. In this
case, what they wanted was detailed disclosure, not just the
summary.
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF
ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND
PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF
THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY. A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC
June 13, 2012
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
“Corollary to the above pronouncements, Section 7, Article III
of the Constitution is relevant in the issue of public disclosure
of SALN and other documents of public officials, viz:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and
paperspertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
 
Emphasizing the import and meaning of the foregoing
constitutional provision, the Court, in the landmark case
of  Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,[50] elucidated on the import of the
right to information in this wise:
              The cornerstone of this republican
system of government is delegation of power
by the people to the State. In this system,
governmental agencies and institutions
operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people.  Denied access to
information on the inner workings of
government, the citizenry can become prey
to the whims and caprices of those to whom
the power had been delegated. The
postulate of public office is a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution to
protect the people from abuse of
governmental power, would certainly be
mere empty words if access to such
information of public concern is denied x
x x.
                  x x x The right to information
goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public
service. It is meant to enhance the
widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as
in checking abuse in
government. (Emphases supplied)
 
In Baldoza v. Dimaano,[51] the importance of the said
right was pragmatically explicated:
 
The incorporation of this right in the
Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy.  There can be
no realistic perception by the public of the
nation’s problems, nor a meaningful
democratic decision-making if they are
denied access to information of general
interest.  Information is needed to enable the
members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times.  As has been aptly
observed: “Maintaining the flow of such
information depends on protection for both
its acquisition and its dissemination since, if
either process is interrupted, the flow
118
inevitably ceases.” However, restrictions on
access to certain records may be imposed
by law. 
 
Thus, while “public concern” like “public interest”
eludes exact definition and has been said to embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because such matters directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen,[52]  the Constitution itself, under Section 17,
Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN
as a matter of public concern and interest.   In other words, a
“duty to disclose” sprang from the “right to know.”   Both of
constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter
is a permission.”
Section 8. The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
On Sec.8: The right to form unions. It does not allow the right
to strike. And it does not form an integral part on the right to
information.
The right to an association includes the right not to be
compelled to be a member. But TN of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, that is an exception. You can be compelled to be a
member for reasons of public interest.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.
On Sec. 9: Eminent Domain. The power of the State to take
private land for public use upon the payment of just
compensation.
The things you should TN, in expropriation cases, what are the
requirements?
1.) Private Property
2.) Entry to the property in the Constitutional sense
3.) For public use
4.) Payment of just compensation
5.) Observance of Due process
Private property is property owned by an entity or individual in
its private capacity. This includes patrimonial properties of
Government. If taken (by Government, for public use), it is
compensable.
Entry into the property in the Constitutional sense, TN the
case of Republic vs. Castillve, that there must be:
a. Actual entry in the property that is the subject of
expropriation, either legally or under the color of title.
b. That the entry must be for public purpose.
c. That it must be more or less permanent, not only for a
momentary period.
d. That the owner of the property is deprived of the use
and concession of his property.
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
“We hold, therefore, that the "taking' of the  Castellvi property
should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when
the  Republic  first occupied the same pursuant to the contract
of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for
the  Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis
of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did
not commit an error when it held that the "taking" of the
property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the
complaint in this case.”|||(Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, G.R.
No. L-20620, August 15, 1974)
If from the very beginning, if the entry of the Government is
without color of title, then there is no valid entry for purposes of
determining just compensation. It must be reckoned from the
time expropriation case was filed not from the time of actual
occupancy by the government, because for entry to be lawful it
must be under the color of title.
But generally the basis for determining just compensation
should be reckoned from the time of taking of possession by
the Government, even if this is before the filing of the
expropriation case.
It must be for public use, defined as anything that redounds to
the benefit of the public. Even if only a greater number of the
people or the public may be benefited from it. TN of the case of
Vda. De Ouano vs. The Republic. This was decided just last
2011, this is the IT Park case I think. Public use, according to
the Supreme Court, includes any use that is of usefulness,
utility or advantage.
“In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the
landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat
the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in
expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against
his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process
ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must show, at
the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to
take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or
least reasonably deducible from the complaint.
  DTAIaH
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired
an expansive meaning to include any use that is of
"usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit [of the public]."  41 If the genuine public
necessity – the very reason or condition as it were – allowing,
at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases
or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the
government's retention of the expropriated land. The same
legal situation should hold if the government devotes the
property to another public use very much different from the
original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit
another private person. It has been said that the direct use by
the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their
productive possession to another citizen, who will use it
predominantly for that citizen's own private gain, is offensive to
our laws. 42
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to
the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing
which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not,
then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to
its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government
cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any
manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment
119
of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair
play.
The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation
proceedings, acquires unrestricted ownership over or a fee
simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable. We
suggested as much in  Heirs of Moreno and in  Tudtud  and
more recently in Lozada, Sr.  Expropriated lands should be
differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which was
absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase
and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without
obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In that
case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is
really no occasion to apply the "fee simple concept" if the
transfer is conditional. The taking of a private land in
expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its
continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary
corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek
its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least,
of the just compensation received.
To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land is,
in itself, an already bitter pill to swallow for the owner. But to
be asked to sacrifice for the common good and yield
ownership to the government which reneges on its assurance
that the private property shall be for a public purpose may be
too much. But it would be worse if the power of eminent
domain were deliberately used as a subterfuge to benefit
another with influence and power in the political process,
including development firms. The mischief thus depicted is not
at all far-fetched with the continued application of Fery.  Even
as the Court deliberates on these consolidated cases, there is
an uncontroverted allegation that the MCIAA is poised to sell, if
it has not yet sold, the areas in question to Cebu Property
Ventures, Inc. This provides an added dimension to
abandon Fery.”
(De Ouano v. Republic, G.R. No. 1687702, 168812, February
09, 2011)
Specific v. General Purpose of Expropriation.
Here you must qualify whether the expropriation was for a
specific or general purpose. If the purpose is general, it is a
general conveyance, then the owner cannot recover from the
government the property expropriated if it is now being used
for a different public purpose. On the other hand, if it is for
specific purpose then the owner may recover in this particular
scenario.
When we say general purpose, it is an absolute conveyance;
there is this even what they call as fee simple.
In the case of Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corporation vs DOTC,
2008. SC said that the State thru the expropriation proceedings
may take private property even if admittedly it will transfer the
said property again to another private entity as long as there is
public purpose to the taking.
“In recognizing the right of AEDC to the award of the NAIA IPT
III project, would the public purpose of the expropriation be
defeated by the government's taking over a privately owned
structure, only to turn over its operation to another private
entity (AEDC)? The answer is no.
To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The meaning of
the term "public use" has evolved over time in response to
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
changing public needs and exigencies. Public use which was
traditionally understood as strictly limited to actual "use by the
public" has already been abandoned.  128  "Public use" has
'now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public
benefit," "public welfare" and "public convenience." 129 It
includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or
advantage.130  Whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.  131
(Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of
Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 169914,
174166, April 18, 2008)
Here in this case, it appears that the conveyance was of
general in nature because there was no specific purpose
specified.
Payment of Just Compensation
Q: In payment of Just Compensation, what rule or laws should
you consider?
A: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court as basis for the
compensation, and also RA 8974.
In the Local Government Code, it is 50%.
Insofar as Rule 67, it is 10% while
In RA 8974, it is 100%
TN: In rule 67, the base is the assessed value of the property
for taxation purposes. Under Rule 67, it must be based on the
market value or the zonal value of the property whichever is
higher.
RA 8974 applies only to “National Infrastructure”.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms
Corporation
“The LBP disputes this ruling, maintaining that while the
determination of just compensation is a judicial function, courts
should take into serious consideration the facts and data
gathered by the DAR, through the LBP, as the administrative
agency mandated by law to make an initial determination of
the valuation of the parcels of agricultural land acquired
for  land  reform.
We agree.
That it is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to
determine just compensation for parcels of  land  acquired by
the State, pursuant to the agrarian reform program, is made
clear in Section 57 of  RA 6657”
||| (LBP v. Honeycomb Farms Corp., G.R.
No. 169903, February 29, 2012)
“To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657
enumerates the factors that have to be taken into consideration
to accurately determine just compensation. “ xxx
Here, it is expressed that just compensation is a judicial power.
Whatever law there is, it is just a guideline, and determination
of just compensation still clearly lies in the sound discretion of
the court—discretionary power of the court.
120
Q: (Bar) If a Water District expropriates, what is the
requirement?
A: It must be a BOARD RESOLUTION subject to the approval
of the Local Water Utilites Administration.
Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. J. King and Sons Co.,
Inc., G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009
“Eminent domain is the right of the state to acquire private
property for public use upon payment of just
compensation. 25  The power of eminent domain is
inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the existence of
the State and inherent in government. Its exercise is
proscribed by only two Constitutional requirements: first, that
there must be just compensation, and second, that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law.  26
As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate
pertains to the legislature. However, Congress may, as in fact
it often does, delegate the exercise of the power to
government agencies, public officials and quasi-public entities.
Petitioner is one of the numerous government offices so
empowered. Under its charter,  P.D. No. 198, as
amended, 27  petitioner is explicitly granted the power of
eminent domain.
On 7 November 2000, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8974,
entitled "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way,
Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure
Projects and for Other Purposes". Section 2 thereof defines
national government projects as follows: SDHA
EC
Sec. 2.National Government Projects. —
The term "national government projects"
shall refer to all national government
infrastructure, engineering works and
service contracts, including projects
undertaken by government-owned and
-controlled corporations, all projects
covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7718,
otherwise known as the Build-Operate-
and-Transfer Law, and other related and
necessary activities, such as site
acquisition, supply and/or installation of
equipment and materials, implementation,
construction, completion, operation,
maintenance, improvement, repair and
rehabilitation, regardless of source of
funding". (emphasis ours)
R.A. No. 8974 includes projects undertaken by government
owned and controlled corporations,  28 such as petitioner.
Moreover, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 8974 explicitly includes water supply, sewerage, and
waste management facilities among the national government
projects covered by the law.  29 It is beyond question,
therefore, that R.A. No. 8974 applies to the expropriation
subject of this case.”IHETS
||
There is a deadline in the payment of just compensation. It
should be paid within 5 years from the finality of the decision in
the expropriation case, otherwise the owner has the right to
recover the property and file a case for reconveyance.
Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)
“In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that
"the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of
the expropriated lots,  26 however, in cases where
the government failed to pay just compensation within
five (5)  27 years from the finality of the judgment in
the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned
shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. This is in consonance with the principle that
"the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment."  28 To be sure, the five-year
period limitation will encourage the government to
pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping
with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private
persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of
just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of
Appeals, 29  we defined just compensation as not
only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the property owner but also the payment of
the property within a  reasonable time. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just."||| (Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29,
2005)
From the finality of the judgment in the expropriation case
otherwise, the owner of the property shall have the right to
recover it. This is already settled.
Q. What would be the just compensation?
A. Money. Money should be the payment except regarding on
the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program. In this
program it could be through bonds. It could also be through tax
credit – in so far as the taking of income because of the
implementation of VAT. The payment is in a way of
expropriation because it is beneficial to the public. The
payment of the government to the owner of the stores or
companies granting VAT is through tax credit.
Again, the manner of payment could be in Money, Bonds, or
Tax Credit.
TN: By the way another definition of public use; Socialized
Housing is considered public use. “Tourism purposes” is also
public use.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed.
The rule is, Congress is prohibited from passing a law that
would modify or change the terms of an agreement of an
existing contract affecting rights and obligation of the parties.
TN: Take note of the exceptions. Despite of an agreement it
may be superseded by the State’s exercise of Police Power,
Eminent Domain, Taxation, or when the parties themselves
stipulate in the contract that is subject to future laws that may
change the terms of the agreement. There is a waiver against
non-impairment clause.
TN: The exception regarding on Taxation, just take note of this,
if the exemption from taxation is based on valuable
consideration that cannot be repealed or changed, as it would
violated the non-impairment clause. But if the exemption is
121
based on gratuitous consideration, then it can be repealed any
time without violating the non-impairment clause.
Let’s go directly to Civil Liberties
Section 18.
1. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist
except as a punishment for a crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted.
TN: Take note of the other exceptions to Section 18 where
you can be compelled to serve: punishment of a crime, service
in the defense of the State, Naval enlistment, (Fosi Comitatus
{I don’t know how to spell Luj. Not so familiar with this}), return
to work order, patria potestas.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-
payment of a poll tax.
Non-imprisonment for debt or for non-payment of poll tax; the
only thing you should take note for non-imprisonment of debt is
“a debt arising from contract” and not from the commission of a
crime. It has to be contractual obligation in order for you not to
be imprisoned.
BAR: This applies to non-payment of rentals. You cannot be
put be put to jail for non-payment of rentals. Case in point
Vergara vs. Vigorio. This has been asked in the bar exam
many times.
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Benjamin Vergara, G.R. No. 154037, April 30, 2003
Quick Facts: At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45  of the Rules  of Court assailing the decision  of the
Court  of Appeals which denied for lack of  merit petitioners'
petition for issuance  of a writ  of habeas corpus. Petitioners
were arrested by virtue of  a warrant of  arrest issued by the
probate court. Among other, petitioners contended that the
appellate court erred in affirming the Decision of  the probate
court finding them guilty of  indirect contempt for non-
compliance with its October 5, 1999. Order which required
petitioners, as recognized lessees of  the estate of  the
deceased Anselma P. Allers, to pay rentals to the
administratrix, herein private respondent, and directed their
imprisonment until they comply with the probate court's order.
According to petitioners, they did not comply with the order for
the reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person
to whom to pay the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P.
Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to
them.||| 
“4.  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL  OF RIGHTS; NO PERSON
SHALL BE IMPRISONED FOR DEBT;
PAYMENT  OF RENTALS COVERED BY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE; CASE AT BAR. — In
Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of  the 1987
Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no person shall
 USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law) 122
be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution,
refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. It
means any liability to pay arising out  of a contract, express or
implied. In the present case, petitioners, as recognized
lessees of  the estate of  the deceased, were ordered by the
probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix.
Petitioners did not comply with the order for the principal
reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to
whom to pay the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P.
Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to them.
Clearly, the payment of  rentals is covered by the constitutional
guarantee against imprisonment.|||

Non-payment of Poll Tax means non-payment of community

tax. You cannot be put to jail for that.

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