RULE 64 30. G.R. No.
L-64033 July 25, 1983
29. G.R. No. L-31558 May 29, 1970
RASID LUCMAN, petitioner,
vs.
MACACUNA DIMAPURO and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD
OF CANVASSERS OF LANAO DEL SUR, respondents.
Rasid Lucman(Petitioner) was the official Liberal Party candidate for
the HOR in Lanao Del Sur. Macacuna Dimaporo(Respondent) was
then the official Nacionalista Party candidate for the same office.
Petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a petition
alleging that the precinct books of voters for the municipality of
Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, had been stolen on the eve of the
elections for reason that this should urge the COMELEC to
recommend to the President the suspension of the elections in
Tubaran; that the election returns therein are fictitious or
obviously manufactured; that the Board should be ordered to
suspend the canvass of said returns, as well as the proclamation of
the winning candidate.
By resolution, the Board was ordered to proceed with the
canvass subject to objections to which, in this case, the Board shall
withhold the proclamation of the winning candidate.
Petitioner moved, in writing, for the exclusion therefrom of the
returns for certain precincts upon the ground of being obviously
manufactured and owing to patent irregularities. Said petitions for
exclusion were soon denied by the Board, in view of which
Petitioner sought a review of its action by the Commission.
ISSUE:
W/N THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE FINDINGS
OF THE COMELEC
HELD: NO.
The Supreme Court cannot review the rulings or findings of fact
of the Commission on Elections, for the following reasons: (1) the
Constitution uses the term "review," not "appeal," and these
terms have different connotations in our jurisdiction; (2) Congress is
deemed to retain its general power to define the manner in which
the Supreme Court shall exercise its power of review, in the
absence of clear and specific provision to the contrary, and no
such provision exists; (3) pursuant to our Administrative Law,
the findings of fact of administrative organs created by ordinary
legislation will not be disturbed by courts of justice, except when
there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support
of such findings, and there is no reason to believe that the framers of
our Constitution intended to place the Commission on Elections—
created and explicitly made "independent" by the Constitution itself
—on a lower level that said statutory administrative organs; and (4)
the last paragraph of section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 which
provides that the Supreme Court may only review the rulings of
the Commission on Elections by writ of certiorari, which means
that only questions of law could be raised and decided, is
presumed to be valid until otherwise declared by competent
court.
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction the Commission on
Elections cannot take up any question not originally set up before the
Board of Canvassers.
The true nature and scope of the power of the Boards of Canvassers
and the Comelec, under our Electoral Code and jurisprudence, in
connection with the canvass of votes, is that the canvassers are to be
satisfied of the genuineness of the returns which means the exercise
of judgment or discretion, however limited, whether any given return
before them is genuine.
PROCESO SIDRO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NESTORIO
TEJANO, respondents.
Private respondent, Nestorio Tejano, the Nacionalista candidate,
was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Mapanas, Northern
Samar, having obtained more than two hundred votes as against
petitioner, Proceso Sidro, the KBL candidate. The latter filed a
quo warranto petition for disqualification of the victor-- alleged
that private respondent changed party affiliation within six
months immediately preceding the election.
Respondent Commission on Elections dismissed the same and
affirmed the election of all the respondents -- that such documents
cannot support a verdict of guilt for the alleged shift of party
allegiance by the respondents from the KBL to the NP.
ISSUE:
W/N THE FINDINGS OF COMELEC MAY BE DISTURBED AS
IN THIS CASE
HELD: NO.
There is no basis for disturbing the findings of the COMELEC
that private respondent has always been a member of the
Nacionalista Party same being supported by evidence. It was held
that respondent Tejano has always been an NP and logically was the
then official NP candidate for mayor. There is undisputed testimony
that he had been elected as mayor of Mapanas under the NP, three
times since 1967 to December 30, 1979 until his successor, the
petitioner herein, was appointed by the President as mayor on
January 2, 1980. It is not also denied that respondent Tejano presided
over the local NP convention before the January 30, 1980 elections.
And said respondent likewise denied that he was the chairman of the
local KBL during said elections, that he signed any affiliation paper,
or that he ever took his oath as a member of the party.
The SC has invariably followed the principle that in the absence of
any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost
gravity, the conclusion reached by respondent Commission on a
matter that falls within its competence is entitled to the utmost
respect.
RULE 65
31. G.R. No. 123782 September 16, 1997
CALTEX REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(CREA), petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE S. BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Acting
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, and
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), Inc., respondents.
Anticipating the expiration of their CBA, petitioner and private
respondent negotiated the terms and conditions of employment
to be contained in a new CBA. The negotiation between the two
parties was participated in by the NCMB and the Office of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. Some items in the new CBA
were amicably arrived at and agreed upon, but others were
unresolved.
To settle the unresolved issues, eight meetings between the parties
were conducted. Because the parties failed to reach any significant
progress in these meetings, petitioner declared a deadlock.
Petitioner then filed a notice of strike. 6 conciliation meetings
conducted by the NCMB failed. Marathon meetings at the plant
level, but this remedy proved also unavailing.
Secretary assumed jurisdiction and ordered that any strike or
lockout, whether actual or intended, is enjoined. But the
members of petitioner defied them and continued their mass
action despite repeated orders.
Thereafter, the contending parties filed their position papers
pertaining to unresolved issues. Because of the strike, private
respondent terminated the employment of some officers of
petitioner union. The legality of these dismissals brought additional
contentious issues.
Again, the parties tried to resolve their differences through
conciliation. Failing to come to any substantial agreement, the
parties decided to refer the problem to the secretary of labor and
employment. The latter issued the assailed Orders resolving the
deadlock. Dissatisfied with these Orders issued by public respondent,
petitioner sought remedy from this Court through Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking "reversal or modification" of three orders of
public respondent.
ISSUE:
W/N THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN RESOLVING THE INSTANT LABOR
DISPUTE
HELD: NO.
Petitioner’s claim of grave abuse of discretion is anchored on the
simple fact that public respondent adopted largely the proposals of
private respondent. It should be understood that bargaining is not
equivalent to an adversarial litigation where rights and obligations
are delineated and remedies applied. It is simply a process of finding
a reasonable solution to a conflict and harmonizing opposite
positions into a fair and reasonable compromise. When parties
agree to submit unresolved issues to the secretary of labor for his
resolution, they should not expect their positions to be adopted  in
toto. It is understood that they defer to his wisdom and
objectivity in insuring industrial peace. And unless they can
clearly demonstrate bias, arbitrariness, capriciousness or
personal hostility on the part of such public officer, the Court
will not interfere or substitute the said officer’s judgment with its
own.
In Flores vs. National Labor Relations Commission we explained the
role and function of Rule 65 as an extraordinary remedy: An
extraordinary remedy, its use is available only and restrictively in
truly exceptional cases—those wherein the action of an inferior
court, board or officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is
challenged for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction. The
sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not
include correction of public respondent NLRC’s evaluation of
the evidence and factual findings based thereon, which are
generally accorded not only great respect but even finality.
32. G.R. No. 158874             November 10, 2004
MAYOR SOBAIDA T. BALINDONG of the Municipality of
Tagoloan, Province of Lanao del Norte, petitioner,
vs.
VICE GOVERNOR TIMOTEO D. DACALOS, PROVINCIAL
BOARD MEMBERS CESAR R. CANOY, SITTIE AMIRAH
IRMA U. ALI, SIRAD D. TAHA, DAVID Q. DITUCALAN,
SIMPLICIO FERNANDEZ, Jr., RUFA L. BILIRAN,
MAGSAYSAY P. ARUMPAC, AGUAM M. MALO, MASTURA
B. USMAN, MANUEL D. RODA, AMER K. BAZER,
GOVERNOR IMELDA Q. DIMAPORO all of the Province of
Lanao Del Norte and MUNICIPAL TREASURER MIA M.
DIMAALAM, Al Hadj, of the Municipality of Tagoloan,
Province of Lanao del Norte, respondents.
Mayor Sobaida Balindong was elected Municipal Mayor of
Tagoloan, Lanao Del Norte. The Municipal Treasurer Mia M.
Dimaalam filed administrative case for Dishonesty, Oppression,
Grave Misconduct, Abuse of Authority, and Usurpation of Authority
against her before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The latter issued a
decision suspending petitioner for a period of 6 months.
Petitioner filed a petition under Rule 65 7 for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, with application for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction and prayer for
issuance of temporary restraining order or status quo order before the
Court of Appeals. The CA issued the TRO and injunction enjoining
respondents from executing or implementing the Order of suspension
against petitioner but later on dismissed the petition on the ground
that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive and that Petitioner should have appealed
the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to the Office of the
President.
ISSUE:
W/N THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WILL PROSPER
HELD: NO.
Since appeal was available from an administrative decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to the Office of the President, resort
to filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 is inapt. Petitioner should
have appealed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Lanao Del Norte to the Office of the President pursuant to the
Local Government Code. Sections 61(b) and 67(b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 are germane on the matter, to wit:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. – A verified
complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared
as follows:
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall
be filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may
be appealed to the Office of the President; . . . .
Sec. 67. Administrative Appeals. – Decisions in administrative cases
may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the
following:
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decision of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of
highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.
The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction; or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. The existence and availability of the
right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of the
requirements for availment of the latter remedy is precisely that there
should be no appeal.

The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right,
“never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.” Under
the circumstances of this case, petitioner failed to clearly show that
an appeal to the Office of the President was not the plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy, which would justify judicial intervention