APPRAC – FINALS CASE DOCTRINES Same; Same; Same; Where unexplained inconsistencies in the
minutes and the certificate of sale are material, they affect the
Rule 45 – Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc. vs. Online Networks
International, Inc., 641 SCRA 390, G.R. No. 171238 February
2, 2011
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Procedural Rules and Technicalities;
Procedural rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.—Given that
the TSN of the proceedings before the RTC forms part of the records
of the instant case, the failure of FAT KEE to attach the relevant
portions of the TSN was already cured by the subsequent
elevation of the case records to this Court. This pronouncement
is likewise in keeping with the doctrine that procedural rules should be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective and assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding.
Same; Questions of Law; Questions of Fact; A question of law arises
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts.—A question of law arises when there
is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
Tay Chun Suy vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 151, G.R. No.
93640 January 7, 1994
Appeals; Factual findings of trial court and of the Court of Appeals
entitled to great weight and respect.—Well-entrenched is the rule that
factual findings of the trial court, as well as those of the Court of
Appeals, are entitled to great weight and respect. This rule once more
finds application in the case at bar.
Same; Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the trial court ordinarily not considered by
a reviewing Court.—Petitioner takes exception to the aforequoted
ruling. He asserts that he never admitted that he knew of DBP’s prior
acquisition at the time of the execution sale on 16 July 1986. Petitioner
never challenged this particular ruling in his appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Hence, he cannot be allowed to ventilate it now in this
proceeding. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not
be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing Court
as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Judgments; Auction Sales; Sheriffs; In the performance of his duty in
the conduct of an auction sale, a sheriff is deemed to know what is
inherently right and inherently wrong.—Given the circumstances
obtaining in this case, a delay of a few hours could not have prejudiced
petitioner. A sheriff’s ministerial duty to conduct an auction sale
is not without any limitation. In the performance of this duty,
he is deemed to know what is inherently right and inherently
wrong. Nonetheless, Sheriff Reyes, Jr., upon the persistent proddings
of petitioner, proceeded with the auction sale. His poor judgment alone
would not have caused any suspicion of bias. However, his precipitate
action taken together with the anomalous proceedings that ensued,
and the haste with which he delivered the certificate of sale to
petitioner in the afternoon of the day of the auction sale lead to the
inevitable conclusion that the whole operation was contrived to benefit
petitioner. The handwritten Minutes (Exh. “D”) of the auction sale
clearly indicate the haste with which they were prepared, a telltale
evidence of the anomalous conduct of the proceedings. On its face,
one cannot determine the name of the successful bidder of the vessel.
1
integrity of the whole proceedings.—The procedure followed by Sheriff
Reyes, Jr., was patently irregular. The unexplained inconsistencies
in the minutes and the certificate of sale are so material as to
affect the integrity of the whole proceedings. Noteworthy, too, is
the fact that the Minutes (Exh. “D”) do not mention the request of
counsel for SCHI for deferment of the auction sale. While the request
was made prior to the auction sale, the trial court was correct in its
observation that the same should have been entered in the minutes
because of its importance and relevance to the sale. Under these
circumstances, the ruling of the appellate court sustaining the trial
court on the nullity of the auction sale cannot be faulted.
Res Judicata; Stare Decisis; Once a case has been decided one way,
then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be
decided in the same manner.—Petitioner vigorously maintains that the
failure of DBP to register its title to MV Sta. Clara I with the Philippine
Coast Guard is fatal to its claim of ownership. Likewise, he raises
doubts as to whether the trial court has jurisdiction to issue the writ
of preliminary injunction. In G.R. No. 78383, we rejected these
arguments in our resolution of 28 September 1987. This resolution is
now final and executory. The question of whether the non-registration
by DBP is fatal to its claim to the vessel or whether the trial court has
jurisdiction over the action should no longer be raised anew. Once a
case has been decided one way, then another case involving
exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same
manner.
Courts; Injunctions; Rule that no court has power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments of another court with concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction applies only when no third-party claimant
involved.—At any rate, our ruling in Santos v. Bayhon should put to
rest petitioner’s doubt as to the jurisdiction of the trial court—The
general rule that no court has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decrees of another court with
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction possessing equal power
to grant injunctive relief, applies only when no third-party
claimant is involved (Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 133 SCRA 142). When a third party, or a stranger to the action,
asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may
vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil court
which may stop the execution of the judgment on property not
belonging to the judgment debtor (italics supplied).
Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. Excelsa Industries, Inc.,
669 SCRA 470, G.R. No. 173820 April 16, 2012
Same; Same; Execution of Judgments; The remedy of a party from
the trial court’s order granting the issuance of a writ of possession is
to file a petition to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession,
and the aggrieved party may then appeal from the order denying or
granting said petition.— A special civil action for certiorari could be
availed of only if a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It has
been repeatedly held in a number of cases that the remedy of a
party from the trial court’s order granting the issuance of a writ
of possession is to file a petition to set aside the sale and cancel
the writ of possession, and the aggrieved party may then
appeal from the order denying or granting said petition. When
a writ of possession had already been issued as in this case,
the proper remedy is an appeal and not a petition for certiorari.
To be sure, the trial court’s order granting the writ of possession is
final. The soundness of the order granting the writ of possession is a
matter of judgment, with respect to which the remedy of the party
aggrieved is ordinary appeal. As respondent availed of the wrong
remedy, the appellate court erred in not dismissing outright the
petition for certiorari.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 10 and Section 15(a), Rule 110
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure place the venue and
jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense
was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took
place.—Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal
cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue
where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has
jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides: (a) Subject to existing laws, the
criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality
or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours] The above provision
should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: Place of commission of the
offense.—The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or
some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was
committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or
is necessary for its identification. Both provisions categorically place
the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court
where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of
jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the
Information states that the offense was committed or some of
its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Same; Civil Procedure; Certificate against Forum Shopping; Certificate
against forum shopping can be made either by a statement under oath
in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it
may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or
initiatory pleading.—Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a Certificate
against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping
can be made either by a statement under oath in the complaint
or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be
in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory
pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a
statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any
competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to
the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five
days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury,
the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the
truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against
litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora.
Same; Same; Venue; The venue of criminal cases is not only in the
place where the offense was committed, but also where any of its
essential ingredients took place.—Procedurally, the rule on venue of
criminal cases has been subject to various changes from the time
General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules
of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court
provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions and it expressly
included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential
ingredients of the crime took place. This change was followed by the
passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure’s expanded
venue of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not
only in the place where the offense was committed, but also
where any of its essential ingredients took place.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Perjury; The crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of
2
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is committed at the time the affiant
subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time
that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed; When the
crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding
that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the
testimony under oath is given.—We hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is
more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for
the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article
183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes
and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all
the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the
crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the
place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or
as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding
that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is
submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn
statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the
taking of the oath and the submission are both material
ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of
venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime committed.
Steelcase, Inc. vs. Design International Selections, Inc., 670
SCRA 64, G.R. No. 171995 April 18, 2012
Same; Same; Capacity to Sue; A foreign corporation doing business
in the Philippines without a license may still sue before the Philippine
courts a Filipino or a Philippine entity that had derived some benefit
from their contractual arrangement because the latter is considered to
be estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after it
had acknowledged the said corporation by entering into a contract with
it.—This Court has time and again upheld the principle that a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license
may still sue before the Philippine courts a Filipino or a
Philippine entity that had derived some benefit from their
contractual arrangement because the latter is considered to be
estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation
after it had acknowledged the said corporation by entering into
a contract with it. In Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
143 SCRA 288 (1986), this Court had the occasion to draw attention
to the common ploy of invoking the incapacity to sue of an unlicensed
foreign corporation utilized by defaulting domestic companies which
seek to avoid the suit by the former. The Court cannot allow this to
continue by always ruling in favor of local companies, despite the
injustice to the overseas corporation which is left with no available
remedy.
Estores vs. Supangan, 670 SCRA 95, G.R. No. 175139 April 18,
2012
Civil Law; Interest Rates; The general rule is that the applicable rate
of interest “shall be computed in accordance with the stipulation of the
parties.” Absent any stipulation, the applicable rate of interest shall be
12% per annum “when the obligation arises out of a loan or a
forbearance of money, goods or credits. In other cases, it shall be six
percent (6%).”—Anent the interest rate, the general rule is that the
applicable rate of interest “shall be computed in accordance with the
stipulation of the parties.” Absent any stipulation, the applicable rate
of interest shall be 12% per annum “when the obligation arises out of
a loan or a forbearance of money, goods or credits. In other cases, it
shall be six percent (6%).” In this case, the parties did not stipulate
as to the applicable rate of interest. The only question remaining
therefore is whether the 6% as provided under Article 2209 of the Civil
Code, or 12% under Central Bank Circular No. 416, is due.
Dalton vs. FGR Realty and Development Corporation, 640 SCRA
92, G.R. No. 172577 January 19, 2011
Remedial Law; Appeals; Factual findings of the lower courts are
binding on the Court; Exceptions. — The factual findings of the lower
courts are binding on the Court. The exceptions to this rule are (1)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings
are grounded on speculation; (3) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary
to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals
overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the facts set
forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and
(9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence
on record. Dalton did not show that any of these circumstances
is present.
Philippine National Bank vs. Perez, 652 SCRA 317, G.R. No.
187640 June 15, 2011
Civil Procedure; Certiorari; A special petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is availed of when a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.—A special petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is availed of when a “tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.” It is intended to correct errors of
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Its primary purpose is to keep an inferior court
within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original and
independent action. It is not a part or a continuation of the trial which
resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of.—Moreover, it
is a basic tenet that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an
original and independent action. It is not a part or a
continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the
judgment complained of. Neither does it “interrupt the course of
the principal action nor the running of the reglementary
periods involved in the proceedings, unless an application for a
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to the appellate
court is granted.”
Same; Pre-Trial; The absence of the notice of pre-trial constitutes a
violation of a person’s constitutional right to due process.—In Pineda
v. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 228 (1975), the Court therein discussed
the importance of the notice of pre-trial. It pointed out that the
absence of the notice of pre-trial constitutes a violation of a
person’s constitutional right to due process. Further, the Court ruled
that all subsequent orders, including the default judgment, are
null and void and without effect.
Same; Certiorari; The issues that can be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 are limited only to questions of law.—Time
and again, this Court has pronounced that the issues that can be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 are
limited only to questions of law. The test of whether the question
is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can determine
the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
Same; Appeals; Matters not raised in the trial court or lower courts
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.—It is settled that matters
3
not raised in the trial court or lower courts cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. “They must be raised seasonably in the
proceedings before the lower courts. Questions raised on appeal
must be within the issues framed by the parties; consequently,
issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.” Spouses Perez never raised this issue before
the CA. Hence, they cannot raise it before this Court now.
RGM Industries, Inc. vs. United Pacific Capital Corporation, 675
SCRA 400, G.R. No. 194781 June 27, 2012
The issue on partial payments and their application to the outstanding
balance involves a calibration of the evidence presented, hence,
factual in nature and not reviewable in the petition at bar. Oft-
repeated is the rule that petitions for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court may be brought only on questions of law, not on
questions of fact.
Sarona vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 663 SCRA
394, G.R. No. 185280 January 18, 2012
Same; The finality of the National Labor Relations Commission’s
(NLRC’s) decision does not preclude the filing of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. — The finality of the NLRC’s
decision does not preclude the filing of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. That the NLRC issues an entry of
judgment after the lapse of ten (10) days from the parties’ receipt of
its decision will only give rise to the prevailing party’s right to move
for the execution thereof but will not prevent the CA from taking
cognizance of a petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process
considerations. In turn, the decision rendered by the CA on a
petition for certiorari may be appealed to this Court by way of
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court has
the power to “review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments
and orders of lower courts in x x x all cases in which only an error or
question of law is involved.” Consistent with this constitutional
mandate, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy of an
appeal by certiorari from decisions, final orders or resolutions of the
CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, which would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case. Since an appeal to this
Court is not an original and independent action but a continuation of
the proceedings before the CA, the filing of a petition for review under
Rule 45 cannot be barred by the finality of the NLRC’s decision in the
same way that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA
cannot.
Same; Appeals; It is well-settled and oft-repeated that findings of fact
of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).—As a general rule, this Court
is not a trier of facts and a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must exclusively raise
questions of law. Moreover, if factual findings of the NLRC and the
LA have been affirmed by the CA, this Court accords them the respect
and finality they deserve. It is well-settled and oft-repeated that
findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies,
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality
when affirmed by the CA. Nevertheless, this Court will not
hesitate to deviate from what are clearly procedural guidelines
and disturb and strike down the findings of the CA and those
of the labor tribunals if there is a showing that they are
unsupported by the evidence on record or there was a patent
misappreciation of facts. Indeed, that the impugned decision of the
CA is consistent with the findings of the labor tribunals does not per
se conclusively demonstrate the correctness thereof. By way of
exception to the general rule, this Court will scrutinize the facts if only
to rectify the prejudice and injustice resulting from an incorrect
assessment of the evidence presented.
Sta. Maria vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 351, G.R. No. 127549
January 28, 1998
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Rule is settled that the jurisdiction of the
Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law; Findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive, exception.—The first,
second, and fourth assigned errors involve questions of fact. Settled
is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it
from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited
to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive,
except in the following instances: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making
its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
Republic vs. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, 717
SCRA 601, G.R. No. 171496 March 3, 2014
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on
Certiorari; Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that
appeals taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
raising only pure questions of law are not reviewable by the Court of
Appeals. In which case, the appeal shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed outright. Appeals from
the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of
law must, in all cases, be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.—Section 2 of Rule 50
of the Rules of Court provides that appeals taken from the Regional
Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only pure questions
of law are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In which case,
the appeal shall not be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead,
it shall be dismissed outright. Appeals from the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of law must, in all cases,
be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by notice of appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is proper if the appellant raises
questions of fact or both questions of fact and questions of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Question of Law” and “Question of Fact,”
Distinguished.—There is a question of law when the appellant raises
an issue as to what law shall be applied on a given set of facts.
Questions of law do “not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented.” Its resolution rests
solely on the application of a law given the circumstances. There is a
question of fact when the court is required to examine the truth or
falsity of the facts presented. A question of fact “invites a review
of the evidence.”
Same; Same; Same; Interlocutory Orders; Rule 41, Section 1,
paragraph (a) of the Rules of Court, which provides that “[n]o appeal
may be taken from [a]n order denying a motion for reconsideration,”
is based on the implied premise in the same section that the judgment
or order does not completely dispose of the case.—We take time to
emphasize that Rule 41, Section 1, paragraph (a) of the Rules of
Court, which provides that “[n]o appeal may be taken from [a]n order
4
denying a x x x motion for reconsideration,” is based on the implied
premise in the same section that the judgment or order does not
completely dispose of the case. The pertinent portion of Rule 41,
Section 1 provides: Section 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable. In other words, what Section 1 of Rule 41
prohibits is an appeal taken from an interlocutory order. An
interlocutory order or judgment, unlike a final order or judgment, does
“not completely dispose of the case [because it leaves to the court]
something else to be decided upon.” Appeals from interlocutory orders
are generally prohibited to prevent delay in the administration of
justice and to prevent “undue burden upon the courts.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Orders denying motions for
reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders.—Orders denying
motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A
motion for reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject
to an appeal, if “it puts an end to a particular matter,” leaving the
court with nothing else to do but to execute the decision. “An appeal
from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order
of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order
of dismissal itself.” It is an appeal from a final decision or order.
The trial court’s order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’
motion for reconsideration of the decision granting respondent Ortigas
the authority to sell its property to the government was not an
interlocutory order because it completely disposed of a particular
matter. An appeal from it would not cause delay in the administration
of justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal to the Court of
Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the former used
the wrong mode of appeal.
Altres vs. Empleo, 573 SCRA 583, G.R. No. 180986 December
10, 2008
Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping; Under justifiable circumstances, Courts have
already allowed the relaxation of the requirements of verification and
certification so that the ends of justice may be better served.—Under
justifiable circumstances, we have already allowed the
relaxation of the requirements of verification and certification
so that the ends of justice may be better served. Verification is
simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination
or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith;
while the purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and
penalize the evils of forum shopping.
Same; Same; Same; Same; On the requirement of a certification of
non-forum shopping, the well-settled rule is that all the petitioners
must sign the certification of non-forum shopping; The rule, however,
admits of an exception and that is when the petitioners show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.—On
the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping, the well-
settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign the certification
of non-forum shopping. The reason for this is that the persons who
have signed the certification cannot be presumed to have the personal
knowledge of the other non-signing petitioners with respect to the
filing or non-filing of any action or claim the same as or similar to the
current petition. The rule, however, admits of an exception and that is
when the petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification. The petitioners must be able to
convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition would
defeat the administration of justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinction between non-com-pliance
with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and
non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.—1) A distinction must be made
between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping. 2) As to
verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court
may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if
the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be
served thereby. 3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with
when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when
matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct. 4) As to certification against forum shopping,
non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax
the Rule on the ground of “substantial compliance” or presence of
“special circumstances or compelling reasons.” 5) The certification
against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share
a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense,
the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6) Finally, the
certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf.
Same; Civil Procedure; Distinction between a question of law and a
question of fact.—The Court had repeatedly clarified the distinction
between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law
exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application
of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question
of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevance of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
and the probability of the situation. When there is no dispute as to
fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct
is a question of law.
Alonso vs. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 618 SCRA 619, G.R. No.
188471 April 20, 2010
Civil Procedure; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping; The acts of breaching the hierarchy of courts by
going directly to the Supreme Court and bypassing the Court of
Appeals, and omitting of the sworn certification against forum
shopping from the petition for review on certiorari, warrant the
immediate dismissal of the petition for review on certiorari.—The Court
notes that the petitioners are guilty of two violations that warrant the
immediate dismissal of the petition for review on certiorari. The first
refers to the petitioners’ breach of the hierarchy of courts by
coming directly to the Court to appeal the assailed issuances
of the RTC via petition for review on certiorari. They should not
have done so, bypassing a review by the Court of Appeals (CA),
because the hierarchy of courts is essential to the efficient
functioning of the courts and to the orderly administration of
justice. Their non-observance of the hierarchy of courts has forthwith
enlarged the docket of the Court by one more case, which, though it
may not seem burdensome to the layman, is one case too much to
the Court, which has to devote time and effort in poring over the
papers submitted herein, only to discover in the end that a review
should have first been made by the CA. The time and effort could have
been dedicated to other cases of importance and impact on the lives
and rights of others. The second violation concerns the omission of a
sworn certification against forum shopping from the petition for review
on certiorari. Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that the petition for review should contain, among others, the
5
sworn certification on the undertakings provided in the last paragraph
of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Same; Certification of Non-Forum Shopping; The signing of the
certification by only one of the petitioners could not be presumed to
reflect the personal knowledge by his co-petitioners of the filing or
non-filing of any similar action or claim.—Only petitioner Tomas V.
Alonso has executed and signed the sworn certification against forum
shopping attached to the petition. Although neither of his co-
petitioners—Mercedes V. Alonso and Asuncion V. Alonso—has joined
the certification, Tomas did not present any written express
authorization in his favor authorizing him to sign the certification in
their behalf. The signing of the certification by only one of the
petitioners could not be presumed to reflect the personal
knowledge by his co-petitioners of the filing or non-filing of
any similar action or claim. Hence, the failure of Mercedes and
Asuncion to sign and execute the certification along with
Tomas warranted the dismissal of their petition.
Same; Actions; Parties; Words and Phrases; “Real Party in Interest,”
Defined; Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or the
rules.—Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or the
rules. A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. “Interest” within the meaning of the rule
means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. The rule refers to a real or
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest. One having no right or interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an
action.
Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 527, G.R. No. 116216
June 20, 1997
Remedial Law; Judgment; No valid service upon the public respondent
of the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review and
consequently, the CA Decision has become final.—Although the motion
for extension carried a registry receipt purportedly sent to Respondent
Court of Appeals, the affidavit of service attached thereto did not
state whether the service was effected by personal delivery,
ordinary or registered mail. That an entry of judgment was effected
by the Court of Appeals, on the other hand, indicates that there was
no valid service upon the public respondent of the motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review and that,
consequently, the CA Decision has become final. This is
consistent with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties by public officers and offices.
Same; Same; Appeal; Rule is settled that no question will be
entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below.—
Settled is the rule that no question will be entertained on
appeal unless it has been raised in the court below. Points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal. Basic considerations of due process impel this rule.
Rule 38 - Relief from Judgments, Orders, or Other
Proceedings
Purcon, Jr. vs. MRM Philippines, Inc., 566 SCRA 645, G.R. No.
182718 September 26, 2008
Actions; Relief from Judgment; A petition for relief from judgment is
not an available remedy in the Supreme Court—it is not included in
the list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by the Supreme Court.—
The threshold issue before Us is—Can petitioner avail of a petition for
relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure from Our resolution denying his petition for review? We
answer in the negative. A petition for relief from judgment is not
an available remedy in the Supreme Court. First, although Section
1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in
any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must
be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the
original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus: Section 1.
Original cases cognizable.—Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings
against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed
originally in the Supreme Court. A petition for relief from judgment is
not included in the list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this
Court.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; While Rule 38 uses the phrase “any
court,” it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial
Courts.—While Rule 38 uses the phrase “any court,” it refers
only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts. As
revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now
allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case
or issued the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, a
petition for relief from the judgment or final order of Municipal Trial
Courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Same; Same; There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the
petition for relief applicable in the Court of Appeals (CA) or the
Supreme Court (SC); If a petition for relief from judgment is not
among the remedies available in the Court of Appeals (CA), with more
reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court.—
The procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed
by separate provisions of the Rules of Court. It may, from time
to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither
the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA
allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA. There is no
provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief
applicable in the CA or this Court. The procedure in the CA from
Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the
Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before said Court
such as annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions
(Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial
(Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38
mentioned. If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the
remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this remedy
cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only
questions of law. A petition for relief raises questions of facts on fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which are beyond the
concerns of this Court.
Same; Same; The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a
party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when
the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or
mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise the petition
for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to
a mistake of procedure by counsel.—Even if We delve into the merits
of the petition, the same must still be dismissed. The late filing of
the petition for review does not amount to excusable
negligence. Petitioner’s lack of devotion in discharging his
duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For
a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing short
of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be shown. The
relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to
be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
6
remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of
procedure for that matter; otherwise the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost,
either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of
procedure by counsel.
Salinas v. NLRC, in the interest of justice, this Court has often
Yujuico vs. Atienza, Jr., 472 SCRA 463, G.R. No. 164282
October 12, 2005
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Appeals; An interlocutory order cannot be
made subject to an appeal.—Respondents have correctly pointed out
that an interlocutory order cannot be made subject to an
appeal. However, when viewed in context, the recitals of the petition
clearly disclose and the Court is convinced that the lower court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it granted respondents’ petition for relief from
judgment. While this case should have been elevated to this
Court not by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 but
through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, in the
exercise of our sound discretion and in order to write finis to
this case which has needlessly dragged on for so long, we shall
treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari. After
all, it was filed within the reglementary period for the filing of
a Rule 65 petition. As we held in judiciously treated petitions
erroneously captioned as petitions for review on certiorari as
special civil actions for certiorari. This is in line with the principle
that the strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder
the speedy disposition of the case on the merits.
Same; Same; Anent the alleged breach of the rule on hierarchy of
courts, the doctrine is not an iron-clad dictum—the rule may be
relaxed when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant the
exercise of this Court’s primary jurisdiction.—Anent the alleged breach
of the rule on hierarchy of courts, the doctrine is not an iron-clad
dictum. The rule may be relaxed when exceptional and
compelling circumstances warrant the exercise of this Court’s
primary jurisdiction. In this case, the judgment sought to be
satisfied has long attained finality and the expropriated property has
been utilized as a school site for five (5) years now; yet, the awarded
just compensation has not been fully paid. These circumstances, in
the Court’s estimation, merit the relaxation of the technical rules of
procedure to ensure that substantial justice will be served.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; The purpose of requiring verification is
to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been
made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative.—
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an
assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made
in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative.
This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of
pleadings and non-compliance therewith does not necessarily
render it fatally defective. Perusal of the verification in question
shows that there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of
the Rules and the alleged defects are not so material as to justify the
dismissal of the petition.
Same; Petition for Relief; Sections 2 and 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure provide that a petition for relief may be granted
upon a showing that (1) through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, a party has been prevented from taking an appeal, and
(2) the party has a good and substantial cause of action or defense.—
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide
that a petition for relief may be granted upon a showing that
(1) through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
a party has been prevented from taking an appeal, and (2) the
party has a good and substantial cause of action or defense.
The above requisites notwithstanding, it bears stressing that relief
from judgment is premised on equity. It is an act of grace which is
allowed only in exceptional cases.
Same; Appeals; Time and again, the Supreme Court has ruled that
the inability to perfect an appeal in due time by reason of failure of a
counsel’s clerk to notify the handling lawyer is not a pardonable
oversight.—Time and again, this Court has ruled that the inability to
perfect an appeal in due time by reason of failure of a counsel’s
clerk to notify the handling lawyer is not a pardonable
oversight. x x x Reiterated in numerous cases is the rule that the
clerks’ faults are attributable to the handling lawyers. Thus, excuses
offered based on the former’s negligence are not deemed excusable.
That the admonitions issued out by this Court were mostly directed
against lawyers in law firms does not exempt respondents herein from
the same treatment. For all intents and purposes, the set-up at the
OCLO is akin to that of a law firm, the only difference being that the
former serves a public entity while the latter caters to private clients.
Same; Same; Without doubt, it was grave abuse of discretion for the
lower court to have given due course to respondents’ appeal through
the grant of their petition for relief from judgment based on the flimsy
ground they proffered.—Without doubt, it was grave abuse of
discretion for the lower court to have given due course to
respondents’ appeal through the grant of their petition for
relief from judgment based on the flimsy ground they
proffered. Even assuming that the negligence invoked by
respondents could be considered excusable, still the petition should
not have been granted. It must be borne in mind that two
requisites must be satisfied before a petition under Rule 38
may be granted, the other being the existence of a good and
substantial cause of action or defense.
Cayetano vs. Ceguerra, 13 SCRA 73, No. L-18831 January 30,
1965
Pleadings and Practice; Letter-answer by ordinary layman deemed
substantial compliance with responsive pleading.—A letter-answer,
presented to the court by an ordinary layman, containing a
recital of facts, relied upon as defenses, is a sufficient and
substantial compliance with the requirements of the rules as
to responsive pleadings. In such a case, the defendants should be
entitled to notice of hearing, the absence of which, being a deprivation
of their day in court, amounting to lack of due process, renders all the
proceedings undertaken therein a nullity.
Same; Petition for relief may be taken from order of execution.—A
petition for relief may be taken from an order of execution,
inasmuch as Sec. 2, Rule 38, Revised Rules of Court, does not only
refer to judgments, but also to orders, or any proceedings.
Same; Registry Notice cannot convey actual knowledge of decision.—
Actual knowledge of a decision cannot be attributed to the
addressee of a registered letter where there is no showing that
the registry notice itself contained any indication that the
registered letter was a copy of the decision or that the registry
notice referred to the case being ventilated.
Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 398 SCRA 550, G.R. No. 127827
March 5, 2003
Actions; Relief from Judgment; Where a party’s counsel was absent
due to asthma which disabled him and made it difficult for him to talk,
the same could be considered an accident which may justify the grant
of relief from judgment; The rules of procedure are used only to help
secure and not override substantial justice.—We find that respondents
were deprived of their right to a hearing due to accident. In the
October 17, 1986 hearing, their counsel was absent due to
asthma, which disabled him and made it difficult for him to talk.
Similarly, when petitioners presented their evidence ex-parte on
December 5, 1986, the counsel for the respondents again failed to
appear as he experienced another severe asthma attack. On both
occasions, his absence is clearly excusable. x x x x x x Time and
again, we have stressed that the rules of procedure are not to be
applied in a very strict and technical sense. The rules of procedure are
used only to help secure and not override substantial justice. If a
7
stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the
demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter.
Agan vs. Heirs of Sps. Andres Nueva and Diosdada Nueva, 418
SCRA 421, G.R. No. 155018 December 11, 2003
Actions; Petition for Relief; The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court pertains generally to one of fact, not of law—the
word “mistake” according to its signification does not apply, and never
was intended to apply, to a judicial error which the court in question
might have committed in the trial.—Relief from judgment or order is
premised on equity. It is granted only in exceptional cases. It is an act
of grace. It is not regarded with favor. For relief to be granted, the
petitioner must show that the judgment or final order was entered, or
the proceeding thereafter against him was taken, through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The mistake
contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, as the Court of
Appeals correctly held, pertains generally to one of fact, not of
law. In Guevara v. Tuason & Co., the Court held that the “word
‘mistake,’ according to its signification in the act referred to, does not
apply, and never was intended to apply, to a judicial error
which the court in question might have committed in the trial
referred to. Such errors may be corrected by means of an
appeal. The act in question cannot in any way be employed as a
substitute for the said remedy.”
Gomez vs. Montalban, 548 SCRA 693, G.R. No. 174414 March
14, 2008
Appeals; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases;
“Questions of Law” and “Questions of Fact,” Distinguished; Section
2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court categorically provides that in all
cases where only questions of law are raised, the appeal from a
decision or order of the Regional Trial Court shall be to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45;
Simple as it may seem, determining the true nature and extent of the
distinction is sometimes complicated.—Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court categorically provides that in all cases where only
questions of law are raised, the appeal from a decision or order
of the RTC shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. The distinction between
questions of law and questions of fact has long been settled. A
question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or
when the issue does not call for an examination of probative value of
the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.
A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well
as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of
the situation. Simple as it may seem, determining the true nature and
extent of the distinction is sometimes complicated. In a case involving
a “question of law,” the resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue
in that query is factual.
Same; Jurisdictions; Words and Phrases; Jurisdiction is the right to act
or the power and authority to hear and determine a cause—it is a
question of law.—The first issue raised in the present petition is one
of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter—meaning, the
nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought. Jurisdiction is
the right to act or the power and authority to hear and
determine a cause. It is a question of law. The second issue
refers to the aptness of the grant of a Petition for Relief from
Judgment. These questions are undoubtedly one of law, as
they concern the correct interpretation or application of
relevant laws and rules, without the need for review of the
evidences presented before the court a quo. Thus, with only
questions of law raised in this Petition, direct resort to this Court is
proper.
Same; Same; Where the interest on the loan is a primary and
inseparable component of the cause of action, not merely incidental
thereto, and already determinable at the time of filing of the
Complaint, it must be included in the determination of which court has
the jurisdiction over such case.—The Court gleans from the foregoing
that petitioner’s cause of action is the respondent’s violation of their
loan agreement. In that loan agreement, respondent expressly agreed
to pay the principal amount of the loan, plus 15% monthly interest.
Consequently, petitioner is claiming and praying for in his Complaint
the total amount of P238,000.00, already inclusive of the interest on
the loan which had accrued from 1998. Since the interest on the
loan is a primary and inseparable component of the cause of
action, not merely incidental thereto, and already determinable
at the time of filing of the Complaint, it must be included in the
determination of which court has the jurisdiction over
petitioner’s case. Using as basis the P238,000.00 amount being
claimed by petitioner from respondent for payment of the
principal loan and interest, this Court finds that it is well within
the jurisdictional amount fixed by law for RTCs.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction can neither be made to depend on the
amount ultimately substantiated in the course of the trial or
proceedings nor be affected by proof showing that the claimant is
entitled to recover a sum in excess of the jurisdictional amount fixed
by law—jurisdiction is determined by the cause of action as alleged in
the complaint and not by the amount ultimately substantiated and
awarded; Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.—To this
Court, it is irrelevant that during the course of the trial, it was proven
that respondent is only liable to petitioner for the amount of
P40,000.00 representing the principal amount of the loan; P57,000.00
as interest thereon at the rate of 24% per annum reckoned from 26
August 1998 until the present; and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Contrary to respondent’s contention, jurisdiction can neither be made
to depend on the amount ultimately substantiated in the course of the
trial or proceedings nor be affected by proof showing that the claimant
is entitled to recover a sum in excess of the jurisdictional amount fixed
by law. Jurisdiction is determined by the cause of action as
alleged in the complaint and not by the amount ultimately
substantiated and awarded. Basic as a hornbook principle is
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred
by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint
which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of an
action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are
the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
Relief from Judgment; Pleadings and Practice; A petition for relief
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is only available against a final
and executory judgment.—On the propriety of the granting by the RTC
of respondent’s Petition for Relief from Judgment, the Court finds and
so declares that the RTC did indeed commit an error in doing so. First
of all, a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is
only available against a final and executory judgment. Since
respondent allegedly received a copy of the Decision dated 4 May 2004
on 14 May 2004, and she filed the Petition for Relief from Judgment
on 28 May 2004, judgment had not attained finality. The 15-day period
to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal had not yet lapsed.
8
Hence, resort by respondent to a petition for relief from judgment
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was premature and inappropriate.
Same; Words and Phrases; As used in Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court, “mistake” refers to mistake of fact, not of law—the word
“mistake,” which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was
never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have
committed in the trial; “Fraud,” on the other hand, must be extrinsic
or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party
from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or was used to
procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy.—In
her Petition for Relief from Judgment before the RTC, respondent
contended that judgment was entered against her through “mistake
or fraud,” because she was not duly served with summons as it was
received by a Mrs. Alicia dela Torre who was not authorized to receive
summons or other legal processes on her behalf. As used in Section
1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, “mistake” refers to mistake of
fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The word “mistake,”
which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was
never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court
might have committed in the trial. Such errors may be
corrected by means of an appeal. This does not exist in the case
at bar, because respondent has in no wise been prevented from
interposing an appeal. “Fraud,” on the other hand, must be
extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the
aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to
the court, or was used to procure the judgment without fair
submission of the controversy. This is not present in the case at
hand as respondent was not prevented from securing a fair trial and
was given the opportunity to present her case.
Same; Attorneys; Under Section 1, Rule 38, the “negligence” must be
excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is
imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client—what the
aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against
the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the court’s ruling.—
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. Under
Section 1, the “negligence” must be excusable and generally
imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel,
it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party
to disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite,
tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of
replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek
administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask
for the reversal of the court’s ruling.
Que vs. Court of Appeals, 467 SCRA 358, G.R. No. 150739
August 18, 2005
Actions; Courts; Judgments; Under Section 1, Rule 38, of the Rules of
Court, the Court may grant relief from judgment only “when a
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken
against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence.”—Under Section 1, Rule 38 (“Section 1”), the
court may grant relief from judgment only “[w]hen a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence x
x x.” In their petition for relief from judgment in the trial court,
petitioners contended that judgment was entered against them
through “mistake or fraud” because they were allegedly under the
impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed “the necessary
pleading.” This is not the fraud or mistake contemplated under Section
1. As used in that provision, “mistake” refers to mistake of fact,
not of law, which relates to the case. “Fraud,” on the other
hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which
prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting
his case to the court. Clearly, petitioners’ mistaken assumption that
Atty Ranot had attended to his professional duties is neither mistake
nor fraud.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Negligence; Under Section
1, Rule 38, of the Rules of Court, “negligence” must be excusable and
generally imputable to the party because it is imputable to the counsel,
it is binding on the client.—Under Section 1, the “negligence” must
be excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it
is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow
a contrary rule and allow a party to disown his counsel’s conduct would
render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by
the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved
litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the
erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the court’s ruling.
Same; Same; Same; For a claim of counsel’s negligence to prosper,
nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be
shown.—For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper,
nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must
be shown. Here, what petitioners’ first, second, and third counsels
did was fail to file the Answer, file a belated and defective motion for
reconsideration or new trial, and belatedly and erroneously file a
petition for relief from judgment, respectively. While these acts and
omissions can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, they do not
amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the
proceedings below.
Same; Same; Same; In essence, procedural due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard. Petitioners were afforded such opportunity.
Thus petitioners were served a copy of the complaint and the
summonses and given 15 days to file their Answer.—In essence,
procedural due process is simply the opportunity to be heard.
Petitioners were afforded such opportunity. Thus, petitioners were
served a copy of the complaint and the summonses and given 15 days
to file their Answer. While there is no showing from the records when
petitioners received their copy of the 18 May 2000 Order declaring
them in default, there is no dispute that Urian was present at the
hearing when the trial court issued that Order in open court.
Petitioners were also served a copy of the trial court’s Decision of 6
September 2000 from which they had 15 days to appeal, seek
reconsideration, or new trial. Indeed, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial albeit belatedly and without complying
with proper formalities. Plainly, there was no denial of due process to
petitioners.
Actions; Judgments; As an equitable remedy, a petition for relief from
judgment is available only as a last recourse, when the petition has no
other remedy.—As an equitable remedy, a petition for relief from
judgment is available only as a last recourse, when the
petitioner has no other remedy. This is not true here because
petitioners had at their disposal other remedies which they in
fact availed of, albeit belatedly or defectively, such as when they filed
their motion for reconsideration or new trial in the trial court. As the
Court of Appeals held: [A] “Petition for Relief from Judgment” is not a
general utility tool in the procedural workshop. The relief granted
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character and is
allowed only when there is no other available or adequate remedy. It
is not regarded with favor. The judgment rendered will not be
disturbed where the complainant has or by exercising proper diligence
would have had an adequate remedy at law. If the complainant lost
a remedy at law from an adverse judgment by his x x x
negligence, such inequitable conduct precludes him from relief
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. x x x
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Alejo, 364 SCRA 812,
G.R. No. 141970 September 10, 2001
Remedial Law; Judgment; Relief from Judgment; Relative to a motion
for relief on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence—Rule 38 of the Rules of Court only applies when the one
deprived of his right is a party to the case.—It must be emphasized
that petitioner was never a party to Civil Case No. 4930-V-96. In
Lagula, et al. v. Casimiro, et al. the Court held that—relative to a
motion for relief on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence—Rule 38 of the Rules of Court “only applies
9
when the one deprived of his right is a party to the case.” Since
petitioner was never a party to the case or even summoned to appear
therein, then the remedy of relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court was not proper.
The Heirs of the Late Faustina Borres vs. Abela, 527 SCRA 633,
G.R. No. 131023, G.R. No. 131505, G.R. No. 131768 July 17,
2007
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; It is well-settled that although the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioners unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum.—Petitioners erred in directly filing their
respective petitions before this Court for it violates the principle of
judicial hierarchy of courts. It is well-settled that although the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioners
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. Petitioners should
have filed their petitions before the Court of Appeals. However,
considering the peculiar circumstances of these cases and the length
of time that the proceedings herein have been pending, we deem it
necessary and practical to resolve the present controversy in order to
avoid further delay.
Same; Judgments; A decision that was penned by a judge after his
retirement is void and can never attain finality.—The January 30,
1995 Decision could never attain finality for being void. It was
penned by Judge Alovera after his retirement when he no
longer had the authority to decide cases. We take judicial notice
of this Court’s Decision in Administrative Case No. 4748 dated August
4, 2000, where the Court en banc disbarred Judge Alovera for gross
misconduct, violation of the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Same; Same; Relief from Judgments; Where a judgment is on its face
void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment in Rule 38
are inapplicable—that judgment is vulnerable to attack in any way and
at any time, even when no appeal has been taken.— Borres heirs claim
that the petition for relief was filed out of time. However, we likewise
held in Hilado that where a judgment is on its face void ab initio,
the limited periods for relief from judgment in Rule 38 are
inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack in any way
and at any time, even when no appeal has been taken. So it is
in this case where the decision cannot be said to have any force and
effect. The decision is null and void as it was rendered in the complete
absence of authority on the part of Judge Alovera. Accordingly, it is as
if no decision was rendered at all.
Mesina vs. Meer, 383 SCRA 625, G.R. No. 146845 July 2, 2002
Actions; Judgments; Relief from Judgment; Relief from judgment is an
equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional circumstances
and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is
present.— Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is
allowed only under exceptional circumstances and only if
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present.
Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy
such as a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse
decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.
Same; Same; Same; The petition for relief must be filed within sixty
(60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, and should be
filed with the same court which rendered the decision.—Under the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must
be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside and
must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the
facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause
of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it
should be filed with the same court which rendered the
decision.
Same; Same; Same; As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the
previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court
which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for
relief.— As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous
rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court
which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition
for relief. Under the old rule, petition for relief from the judgment or
final order of municipal trial courts should be filed with the regional
trial court.
Same; Same; Same; The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with
Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for municipal and regional trial
courts and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts
of record, and that while Rule 38 uses the phrase “any court,” it refers
only to municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts; As it stands,
neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of
Appeals.—Petitioners argue that apart from this change, the present
Rule extends the remedy of relief to include judgments or orders of
the Court of Appeals since the Rule uses the phrase “any court.” We
disagree. The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5,
prescribing uniform procedure for municipal and regional trial courts
and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts of
record. While Rule 38 uses the phrase “any court,” it refers only to
municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts. The procedure in the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by separate
provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be
supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of
Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Same; Equity; The Supreme Court will not allow a party,
in guise of equity, to benefit from its own negligence.— As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners’ allegation of
extrinsic fraud should have been brought at issue in the Metropolitan
Trial Court. If they truly believe that the default of the spouses Mesina
prejudiced their rights, they should have questioned this from the
beginning. Yet, they chose to participate in the proceedings and
actively presented their defense. And their efforts were rewarded as
the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in their favor. When the respondent
appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court, they never raised this
issue. Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed the finding of the
MeTC, and the Court of Appeals sustained this reversal, petitioners
made no effort to bring this issue for consideration. This Court
will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from
their own negligence.
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; It is a settled rule that relief will not
be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; In exceptional cases,
when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross
negligence, the Supreme Court affords a party a second opportunity
to vindicate his right.—Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not
be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects
of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due
to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure;
otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving
the right of appeal which has already been lost either because
of inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken mode of
procedure by counsel. Petitioners, however, place the blame on
their counsel and invoke honest mistake of law. They contend that
they lack legal education, hence, were not aware of the required period
for filing an appeal. In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel
is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this Court affords
a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity
10
is unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioners have
squandered the various opportunities available to them at the different
stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to every litigation
and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality
will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.
Rule 47 – Annulment of Judgments of Final Orders and
Resolutions
Philippine Tourism Authority vs. Philippine Golf Development
& Equipment, Inc., 668 SCRA 406, G.R. No. 176628 March 19,
2012
Annulment of Judgments; Extrinsic Fraud; Extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful
party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent.—“Extrinsic fraud refers
to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation
which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby
the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting
fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent.” Under the doctrine of this cited case, we do not see the
acts of PTA’s counsel to be constitutive of extrinsic fraud.
Same; Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is
a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases
where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
petitioner.—PTA’s appropriate remedy was only to appeal the RTC
decision. “Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in
exceptional cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioner.” In this case,
appeal was an available remedy. There was also no extraordinary
reason for a petition for annulment of judgment, nor was there any
adequate explanation on why the remedy for new trial or petition for
relief could not be used. The Court is actually at a loss why PTA had
withdrawn a properly filed appeal and substituted it with another
petition, when PTA could have merely raised the same issues through
an ordinary appeal.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Certiorari is not a mode of appeal, and
cannot also be made as a substitute for appeal.—A special civil
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only available in
cases when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. It is not a mode of appeal, and cannot also be made as a
substitute for appeal. It will not lie in cases where other
remedies are available under the law.
Grande vs. University of the Philippines, 502 SCRA 67, G.R. No.
148456 September 15, 2006
Actions; Judgments; Rule 47 applies only to petitions for nullification
of judgments rendered by regional trial courts filed with the Court of
Appeals—it does not pertain to the nullification of decisions of the
Court of Appeals.—The annulment of judgments, as a recourse,
is equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases, as
where there is no available or other adequate remedy. It is
generally governed by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 1 thereof expressly states that the Rule “shall govern the
annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil action of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”
Clearly, Rule 47 applies only to petitions for the nullification of
judgments rendered by regional trial courts filed with the Court
of Appeals. It does not pertain to the nullification of decisions
of the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Jurisdictions; Petitions for annulment of judgment are
not among the cases originally cognizable by the Supreme Court.—
Petitioners argue that although Rule 47 is a newly-established rule,
the procedure of annulment of judgments has long been recognized in
this jurisdiction. That may be so, but this Court has no authority to
take cognizance of an original action for annulment of
judgment of any lower court. The only original cases cognizable
before this Court are “petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against
members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.” Petitions for
annulment of judgment are not among the cases originally cognizable
by this Court.
Same; Same; Same; It is totally inappropriate to extend Rule 47 to
the review of decisions of the Court of Appeals.—If what is desired
is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals, which
petitioners could have been entitled to under ordinary
circumstances, the only mode of appeal cognizable by this
Court is “a petition for review on certiorari.” That is governed by
and disposed of in accordance with the applicable provisions of the
Constitution, laws, Rules 45; 48; Sections 1, 2, and 5 to 11 of Rules
51; 52; and 56. Notably, Rule 47 on annulment of judgments has
nothing to do with the provisions which govern petitions for
review on certiorari. Thus, it is totally inappropriate to extend
Rule 47 to the review of decisions of the Court of Appeals. Then
too, appeals by certiorari to this Court must be filed within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or the final order or resolution
appealed from. Even if we were to treat the petition for annulment of
judgment as an appeal by certiorari, the same could not be given due
course as it had been filed several months after the Court of Appeals
decision had already lapsed to finality.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has discretionary power to
take cognizance of a petition over which it ordinarily has no jurisdiction
“if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.”—This
Court has discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition
over which it ordinarily has no jurisdiction “if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.” Hence, in
Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 346 SCRA 485 (2000),
the Court took cognizance of an original petition for injunction after
determining that the allegations therein revealed that it was actually
one for prohibition. We, however, cannot adopt that tack for purposes
of this case. Ostensibly, even if the averments in the present petition
sufficiently present the existence of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and on that basis it could
be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, still it
could not be given due course since it was filed way beyond the period
for filing such special civil action. Moreover, certiorari can only lie if
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 306,
G.R. No. 128412 March 15, 2002
Actions; Judgments; Annulment of Judgments; The grounds to annul
a judgment of a lower court are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.—Pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, the grounds to annul a judgment of a
lower court are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Actions; Fraud; Annulment of Judgments; Words and Phrases;
Extrinsic fraud contemplates a situation where a litigant commits acts
outside of the trial of the case, “the effect of which prevents a party
11
from having a trial, a real contest, or from presenting all of his case
to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the
judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that
there is not a fair submission of the controversy.”—Extrinsic fraud
contemplates a situation where a litigant commits acts outside
of the trial of the case, “the effect of which prevents a party
from having a trial, a real contest, or from presenting all of his
case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in
which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of
the controversy.” The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his
day in court. Hence, the Court has held that extrinsic fraud is present
in cases where a party (1) is deprived of his interest in land, because
of a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when
in fact they are; (2) applies for and obtains adjudication and
registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows has not
been allotted to him in the partition; (3) intentionally conceals facts
and connives with the land inspector, so that the latter would include
in the survey plan the bed of a navigable stream; (4) deliberately
makes a false statement that there are no other claims; (5) induces
another not to oppose an application; (6) deliberately fails to notify
the party entitled to notice; or (7) misrepresents the identity of the lot
to the true owner, causing the latter to withdraw his opposition.
Fraud, in these cases, goes into and affects the jurisdiction of
the court; thus, a decision rendered on the basis of such fraud
becomes subject to annulment.
Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; There is no extrinsic fraud where the
failure of a party to present its case was caused by its own inaction,
such as when it was not impleaded as a party to a case because it
failed to effect the timely registration of its Deed of Sale.—We ruled
therein, as we now rule in the case at bar, that extrinsic fraud did not
attend the proceedings before the trial court for the reason that: x x
x It is well-settled that the use of forged instruments or
perjured testimonies during trial is not an extrinsic fraud,
because such evidence does not preclude the participation of
any party in the proceedings. While a perjured testimony may
prevent a fair and just determination of a case, it does not bar the
adverse party from rebutting or opposing the use of such evidence.
Furthermore, it should be stressed that extrinsic fraud pertains to
an act committed outside of the trial. The alleged fraud in this
case was perpetrated during the trial. Besides, the failure of petitioner
to present its case was caused by its own inaction. It was not
impleaded as a party to the case before the trial court because it failed
to effect the timely registration of its Deed of Sale. Had it done so, it
would have been able to oppose the issuance of the new duplicate
title, rebut Espinosa’s testimony, and prove that it already bought the
land in issue.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reconstitution of Titles; If an owner’s
duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in
the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and
the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction—the
decision may be attacked any time.—However, in consonance with the
Straight Times case, respondent David’s act of misrepresentation,
though not constituting extrinsic fraud, is still an evidence of
absence of jurisdiction. In the Straight Times case and in Demetriou
v. Court of Appeals, also on facts analogous to those involved in this
case, we held that if an owner’s duplicate copy of a certificate of title
has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person,
the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has
not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be attacked
any time. In the case at bar, the authenticity and genuineness of the
owner’s duplicate of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538 in the possession
of petitioner Rexlon and the Absolute Deed of Sale in its favor have
not been disputed. As there is no proof to support actual loss of the
said owner’s duplicate copies of said certificates of title, the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction and the new titles issued in replacement
thereof are void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Inasmuch as a petition for
annulment of judgment is classified as an original action that can be
filed before the Court of Appeals, the said court can admit, by way of
an amendment to the petition, new causes of action intimately related
to the resolution of the original petition; Non-inclusion of a necessary
party when there is an opportunity to include him would mean waiver
of the claim against such party.—It must be remembered that, in the
amended petition of Rexlon for annulment of judgment, respondent
Paramount was impleaded for the reason that the prayer therein
sought the nullification of the new titles issued in the name of
respondent Paramount. Inasmuch as a petition for annulment of
judgment is classified as an original action that can be filed
before the Court of Appeals, the said court can admit, by way
of an amendment to the petition, new causes of action
intimately related to the resolution of the original petition.
Hence, respondent Paramount became a necessary party in the
petitioner’s original cause of action seeking a declaration of the
existence and validity of the owner’s duplicate copy of the subject
certificate of title in the possession of the latter, and an indispensable
party in the action for the declaration of nullity of the titles in the name
of respondent Paramount. Indeed, there can be no complete relief that
can be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination of settlement of the claim subject of the action, if we
do not touch upon the necessary consequence of the nullity of the new
duplicate copy of the subject certificate of title. The Rules of Court
compels the inclusion of necessary parties when jurisdiction
over the person of the said necessary party can be obtained.
Non-inclusion of a necessary party when there is an
opportunity to include him would mean waiver of the claim
against such party.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The transferee of a land is deemed to
have duly consented to put in issue the validity of its titles by invoking
in its appeal to the Supreme Court the reasons espoused by the Court
of Appeals and the vendor for the dismissal of the petition to annul the
decision of the trial court.—Respondent Paramount has duly
consented to put in issue the validity of its titles by invoking in
this appeal the reasons espoused by the appellate court and
respondent David for the dismissal of the petition to annul the
decision of the trial court. In its Memorandum and respondent
David’s comment that it adopted, respondent Paramount has not
made any jurisdictional objection as regards its inclusion in the appeal
to the petition for annulment of judgment, and even participated in
the discussion of the merits of the case. Based on the principle of
estoppel, respondent Paramount is barred from raising any
objection over the power of this Court to nullify its titles.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a cherished rule of procedure that a
court should always strive to settle the controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation.—In order for a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
the case, we must decide on the effect of void duplicate copies of a
certificate of title that served as a basis for the sale of the property it
represents and the eventual issuance of titles in the name of
respondent Paramount. To require another proceeding only for the
purpose of annulling the said new titles when the same could be
decided in this very petition would promote judicial bureaucracy, a
practice abhorred by our legal system. As we have ruled in Gayos v.
Gayos, it is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding
leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.
Republic vs. “G” Holdings, Inc., 475 SCRA 608, G.R. No. 141241
November 22, 2005
Actions; Annulment of Judgment; Annulment of judgment is restricted
exclusively to the grounds specified in the rules, namely, (1) extrinsic
fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction; The remedy may not be invoked
where the party has availed himself of the remedy of a new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy and lost, or
where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own
fault or negligence.—A petition for annulment of judgment is an
12
extraordinary action. By virtue of its exceptional character, the
action is restricted exclusively to the grounds specified in the
rules, namely, (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
The rationale for the restriction is to prevent the extraordinary action
from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly
promulgated decision that has long become final and executory. The
remedy may not be invoked where the party has availed
himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedy and lost, or where he has failed to
avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or
negligence.
Same; Same; In a petition for annulment of judgment, the petitioner
must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an
absolute lack of jurisdiction.—The interpretation of the Republic
contravenes the very rationale of the restrictive application of
annulment of judgment. By seeking to include acts committed with
grave abuse of discretion, it tends to enlarge the concept of lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for the availment of the remedy. In a petition
for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the
petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional
discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the
concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a judgment
does not embrace abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; By claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court, the petitioner effectively admits that the two grounds for
which lack of jurisdiction may be validly invoked to seek annulment of
judgment do not exist.—By claiming grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court, the Republic actually concedes and
presupposes the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of
the case. Hence, the Republic effectively admits that the two grounds
for which lack of jurisdiction may be validly invoked to seek the
annulment of a judgment—want of jurisdiction over the parties and
want of jurisdiction over the subject matter—do not exist. It only
assails the manner in which the trial court formulated its judgment in
the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Jurisdictions; Exercise of Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction is the
authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein;
Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the
decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
jurisdiction.—Jurisdiction is distinct from the exercise thereof. We
amply explained the distinction between the two in Tolentino v.
Leviste, thus: Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of
jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter, the decision on all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the
jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Annexes; It is well-settled that the
documents attached to the pleadings form part thereof and may be
considered as evidence even if not formally introduced as evidence.—
No grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the trial court when it
rendered the decision. The pieces of evidence considered by the court
a quo to arrive at its decision were documents attached as annexes to
the various pleadings filed by the parties. It is well-settled that
documents attached to the pleadings form part thereof and
may be considered as evidence even if not formally introduced
as evidence. The court may and should consider as evidence
documents attached to the pleadings filed by the parties and
made a part thereof, without necessity of introducing them
expressly as evidence when their authenticity and due
execution have not been denied under oath.
Same; Jurisdictions; Judgments; Where the court has jurisdiction and,
having all the facts necessary for a judgment, it renders a decision
without holding any trial or hearing (where the parties are allowed to
present their respective evidence in support of their cause of action
and defense), such judgment cannot be assailed as having been
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction nor rendered with grave
abuse of discretion.—The conclusion that there was no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court would be the same even if it
were to be assumed that a procedural mistake was committed when
it decided the case before the parties could formally offer their
evidence. We have held that where the court has jurisdiction and,
having all the facts necessary for a judgment, it renders a
decision without holding any trial or hearing (where the parties
are allowed to present their respective evidence in support of
their cause of action and defense), such judgment cannot be
assailed as having been rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction nor rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Extrinsic Fraud; Words and Phrases; Extrinsic fraud refers to
any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful
party is prevented from fully proving his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent.—Extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful
party is prevented from fully proving his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic
where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting
his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.
Same; Same; To render a judgment void, the fraud must be
committed by the adverse party and not by one’s own counsel.—The
unfortunate predicament of the Republic was caused by the Solicitor
General, its own counsel. We have consistently ruled that, to render
a judgment void, the fraud must be committed by the adverse
party and not by one’s own counsel.
Manila vs. Gallardo-Manzo, 657 SCRA 20, G.R. No. 163602
September 7, 2011
Actions; Judgments; Annulment of Judgments; A petition for
annulment of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial Court in civil
actions can only be availed of where “the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”—A petition for
annulment of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial
Court in civil actions can only be availed of where “the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner.” It is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances and such action is never resorted to as a substitute for
a party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other
appropriate remedies. The only grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule
47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; When a party retains the services of
a lawyer, he is bound by his counsel’s actions and decisions regarding
the conduct of the case, and this is true especially where he does not
complain against the manner his counsel handles the suit.—We are
not persuaded by respondents’ asseveration. They could have directly
followed up the status of their case with the RTC especially during the
period of Atty. Atienza’s hospital confinement. As party litigants, they
should have constantly monitored the progress of their case. Having
completely entrusted their case to their former counsel and believing
his word that everything is alright, they have no one to blame but
themselves when it turned out that their opportunity to appeal and
other remedies from the adverse ruling of the RTC could no longer be
availed of due to their counsel’s neglect. That respondents
continued to rely on the services of their counsel
notwithstanding his chronic ailments that had him confined for
long periods at the hospital is unthinkable. Such negligence of
13
counsel is binding on the client, especially when the latter offered
no plausible explanation for his own inaction. The Court has held that
when a party retains the services of a lawyer, he is bound by
his counsel’s actions and decisions regarding the conduct of
the case. This is true especially where he does not complain against
the manner his counsel handles the suit. The oft-repeated principle is
that an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
Same; Same; Same; In a petition for annulment of judgment based
on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction—lack of
jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court
should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does
not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.—Lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the
subject matter of the claim. In a petition for annulment of
judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show
not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute
lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no
jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature
of the action or subject matter is conferred by law.
Same; Same; Same; The erroneous grant of relief by the Regional
Trial Court on appeal is but an exercise of jurisdiction by said court—
the ground for annulment of the decision is absence of, or no,
jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the
petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the
subject matter; The Regional Trial Court (RTC) acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in deciding the appeal when, instead of simply dismissing
the complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the
defendants, it ordered the lessors to execute a deed of absolute sale
in favor of the lessees, on the basis of its own interpretation of the
Contract of Lease which granted petitioners the option to buy the
leased premises within a certain period and for a fixed price.—In this
case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the
appeal of respondents when, instead of simply dismissing the
complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the
defendants (petitioners), it ordered the respondents-lessors to
execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners-
lessees, on the basis of its own interpretation of the Contract of Lease
which granted petitioners the option to buy the leased premises within
a certain period (two years from date of execution) and for a fixed
price (P150,000.00). This cannot be done in an ejectment case where
the only issue for resolution is who between the parties is entitled to
the physical possession of the property. Such erroneous grant of
relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an exercise
of jurisdiction by the RTC. Jurisdiction is not the same as the
exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein. The ground for annulment of the
decision is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court
should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the
law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Same; Same; Laches; Doctrine of Stale Demands; The principle of
laches or “stale demands” ordains that the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier—
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time—
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.—On the timeliness of the
petition for annulment of judgment filed with the CA, Section
3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for
annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed
within four years from its discovery; and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The
principle of laches or “stale demands” ordains that the failure
or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or
should have been done earlier—negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned
it or declined to assert it. There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances.
Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. vs. Presiding Judge,
RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br. 40, Cagayan de Oro City, 514 SCRA
326, G.R. No. 142628 February 6, 2007
Jurisdictions; Annulment of Judgments; Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129
vested in the CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments, but only those rendered by the RTCs. It does
not expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasi-
judicial bodies.—This brings to fore the issue of whether the petition
for annulment of the DARAB judgment could be brought to the CA. As
previously noted, Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments, but only those rendered by the RTCs. It does not
expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasi-
judicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano, 413 SCRA
669 (2003), the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that it has no
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of a final and
executory judgment of the NLRC, citing Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, which only vests in the CA “exclusive jurisdiction over
actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts.” This was
reiterated in Galang v. Court of Appeals, 472 SCRA 259 (2005), where
the Court ruled that the CA is without jurisdiction to entertain a
petition for annulment of judgment of a final decision of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
Annulment of Judgments; Under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the
remedy of annulment of judgment is confined to decisions of the
Regional Trial Court on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.—In Cole v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 692 (2000),
involving an annulment of the judgment of the HLURB Arbiter and the
Office of the President (OP), filed with the CA, the Court stated that,
“(U)nder Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment
of judgment is confined to decisions of the Regional Trial Court
on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction x x x.”
Same; Civil Procedure; In Macalalag v. Ombudsman (424 SCRA 741
[2004]), the Court ruled that Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
on annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions cover
“annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies could no longer be availed of through no fault of
the petitioner.”—In Macalalag v. Ombudsman, 424 SCRA 741 [2004]),
the Court ruled that Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on
annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions covers
“annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies could no longer be availed of through no fault of
the petitioner.” Thus, the Court concluded that judgments or final
orders and resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases cannot be annulled by the CA, more so, since The
Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an
aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only, and the
right to appeal is not to be considered granted to parties
aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in
criminal or non-administrative cases.
Same; The court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national
interest and of serious implication, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus
14
calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.—It must be stressed
at this point that the Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy
of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The Court finds no compelling
circumstances in this case to warrant a relaxation of the foregoing
rule. The Fortich case is not analogous with the present case such that
the Court is not bound to abandon all rules, take primary jurisdiction,
and resolve the merits of petitioners’ application for a writ of
prohibition.
Bulawan vs. Aquende, 652 SCRA 585, G.R. No. 182819 June 22,
2011
Remedial Law; Annulment of Judgments; In a petition for annulment
of judgment, the judgment may be annulled on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction; When fraud is considered
extrinsic; What is lack of jurisdiction; Where the questioned judgment
is annulled, either on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside and considered void.—In a
petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be
annulled on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party from having
a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the
manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. On the other
hand, lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim,
and in either case the judgment or final order and resolution are void.
Where the questioned judgment is annulled, either on the
ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall
be set aside and considered void.
Same; Same; Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent
of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered;
An action for annulment of judgment may be availed of even if the
judgment to be annulled had already been fully executed or
implemented.—Moreover, annulment of judgment is a remedy in
law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. Consequently, an action for annulment
of judgment may be availed of even if the judgment to be
annulled had already been fully executed or implemented.
Same; Same; A person need not be a party to the judgment sought
to be annulled; What is essential is that he can prove his allegation
that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and
that he would be adversely affected thereby.—However, even if
Aquende were not an indispensable party, he could still file a petition
for annulment of judgment. We have consistently held that a person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled.
What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the
judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and
that he would be adversely affected thereby.
Same; Same; A person who was not impleaded in the complaint
cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein for no man shall be
affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger.—Moreover, a
person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be
bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be
affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger. In National
Housing Authority v. Evangelista, 458 SCRA 469 (2005), we said:
x x x It will be the height of inequity to allow respondent’s title to be
nullified without being given the opportunity to present any evidence
in support of his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it
is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
Clearly, the trial court’s judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its
dispositive portion is concerned.
Same; Actions; Indispensable Parties; Definition of Indispensable
Parties; An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected
by the court’s action in the litigation.—Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court defines indispensable parties as parties in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected
by the court’s action in the litigation. As such, they must be joined
either as plaintiffs or as defendants.
Yu vs. Yu, 794 SCRA 45, G.R. No. 200072 June 20, 2016
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; Section 2,
Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that judgments
may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction or denial of due process.—Annulment of judgment is a
recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as
where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Section 2, Rule
47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that judgments may
be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction
or denial of due process. The objective of the remedy of
annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside
the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner
an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his
defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the
entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the
original action being refiled in the proper court. If the
judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground
of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court
to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been
granted therein.
Same; Same; Same; Extrinsic Fraud; Extrinsic fraud exists when there
is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the
trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from
presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on
him by the prevailing party.—Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a
fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of
the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting
fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the
prevailing party. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party had
been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by means of fraud or
deception, as by keeping him away from court, or by a false promise
of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the
suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a
party and connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show
that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the
case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside
and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair
hearing. Ultimately, the overriding consideration is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any
case against a defendant who does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over
his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.—Summons is a writ
by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Through its service, the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person. As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against
a defendant who does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring
jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in
court. Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, however, enumerates
the actions in rem or quasi in rem when Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they have
jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the
nonresident defendant is not essential.
15
Same; Same; Summons; Extraterritorial Service of Summons;
Extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three
(3) modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of
court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order
of the court by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address,
also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may
consider sufficient.—Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who
is a nonresident and is not found in the country may be served
with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1)
when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2)
when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a
lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has
been attached within the Philippines. In these instances,
extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any
of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with
leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the
summons and order of the court by registered mail to the
defendant’s last known address, also with leave of court; or (3)
by any other means the judge may consider sufficient.
Same; Same; Annulment of Judgments; Extrinsic Fraud; Due Process;
When defendants are deprived of such opportunity to duly participate
in, and even be informed of, the proceedings, due to a deceitful
scheme employed by the prevailing litigant, there exists a violation of
their due process rights.—Indeed, due process requires that those
with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an
opportunity to defend those interests. When defendants are
deprived of such opportunity to duly participate in, and even
be informed of, the proceedings, due to a deceitful scheme
employed by the prevailing litigant, as in this case, there exists
a violation of their due process rights. Any judgment issued in
violation thereof necessarily suffers a fatal infirmity for courts,
as guardians of constitutional rights cannot be expected to
deny persons their due process rights while at the same time
be considered as acting within their jurisdiction. This Court,
therefore, deems as proper the annulment of the Batangas
court’s judgment issued without proper service of summons.
Ancheta vs. Ancheta, 424 SCRA 725, G.R. No. 145370 March 4,
2004
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Annulment of Judgement; Grounds;
Annulment of a judgement or final order or resolution in civil actions
of the RTC may be based on two grounds.—An original action in the
Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to
annul a judgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC
may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Extrinsic Fraud; The petitioner must allege in the
petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer
available through no fault of hers.—Based on extrinsic fraud, the
remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely, the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner. The petitioner must allege in the petition
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are
no longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the
petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the
remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from judgment through her own
fault or negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals,
she cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise,
she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The petitioner must also explain and
justify her failure to avail of such remedies.—It is not enough to
allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer
available through no fault of her own. The petitioner must also
explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The
safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely to avoid abuse of the
remedy. Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be limits
thereto. Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in a valid final
judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled
license to sue anew. The prevailing party should not be vexed by
subsequent suits.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Lack of Jurisdiction; When grounded on
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or
over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege
in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration
of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer
available through no fault of her own.—In a case where a petition for
the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject
of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that
the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final
order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available
through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment
rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null
and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct
action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Summons; Service; Jurisdiction cannot
be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he
knows of the case against him unless he is validly served with
summons.—In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon, we held
that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person of
the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and
his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The
service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform
him that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to
defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the
plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of
a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and void.
Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of
the defendant even if he knows of the case against him unless
he is validly served with summons.
Ramos vs. Combong, Jr., 473 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 144273
October 20, 2005
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Annulment of Judgments; Annulment of
judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate
remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions, and Section 2, thereof explicitly provides only two grounds
for annulment of judgment, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.—Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no
available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for annulment of
judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2
thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of
judgment, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The
underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final
judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation
must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential
to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has
become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest.
The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that
at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the
award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some
definite date fixed by law.
16
Same; Same; Same; Extrinsic Fraud; Jurisdictions; Section 3 of Rule
47 lays down the period within which to bring an action for annulment
of judgment based on extrinsic fraud, to wit: Sec. 3. Period for filing
action.—If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within
four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.—Section 3 of Rule 47 lays
down the period within which to bring an action for annulment of
judgment based on extrinsic fraud, to wit: SEC. 3. Period for filing
action.—If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed
within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. (Emphasis
supplied) Based on the foregoing provision, petitioners should have
filed an annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud within four
years from discovery of the alleged fraudulent acts committed by
private respondents.
Same; Same; Same; While Rule 47 does not explicitly require that a
statement of material dates should accompany the petition,
nevertheless, there must be a manifest showing in the petition that it
was filed within the four-year period.—A perusal of the petition filed
before the CA shows that there is no indication of the dates or time
from whence petitioners discovered private respondents’ alleged
fraudulent acts. While Rule 47 does not explicitly require that a
statement of material dates should accompany the petition,
nevertheless, there must be a manifest showing in the petition
that it was filed within the four-year period. Consequently, the
CA was right in dismissing the petition, as it had no basis for
determining the timeliness of the filing of the petition.
Same; Same; Same; Extrinsic Fraud; Fraud is regarded as extrinsic
where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his
entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining
not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured.—
Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the
prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud
or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Fraud is
regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a
trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where
it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself
but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his
day in court.
Escareal vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 455 SCRA 119, G.R. No.
151922 April 7, 2005
Same; Same; The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides only two
remedies for aggrieved parties to annul a final and executory
judgment—the first, by filing a verified petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38, and the other is for a party to file a verified
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, though in addition
to these, jurisprudence has likewise recognized an additional relief
through a direct action, as certiorari, or by a collateral attack against
a judgment that is void on its face.—The 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides only two remedies for aggrieved parties to
annul a final and executory judgment. The first is by filing a
verified petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 on the
ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment to
be set aside, and not more than six months after such
judgment was entered. The other remedy is for a party to file
a verified petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47,
on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, within
four years from its discovery. However, in addition to these,
jurisprudence has likewise recognized an additional relief
through a direct action, as certiorari, or by a collateral attack
against a judgment that is void on its face.
 Rule 65 – Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus
Yap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 245, G.R. No.
68464 March 22, 1993
Certiorari; Criminal Procedure; Certiorari not proper remedy to annul
result of preliminary investigation.—Certiorari does not lie to annul
the municipal judge's order finding probable cause that the
accused committed the crime charged and consequently
ordering their arrest. It was well within the jurisdiction of the
municipal judge to conduct the preliminary investigation, if
only to determine whether a probable cause exists against the
accused.
Same; Same; On finding of probable cause, judge may issue a warrant
of arrest.—There should then be no further questions regarding the
issuance of the warrant by the municipal judge, respondent herein.
Firstly, he had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation
regarding the criminal complaint against herein petitioners. Secondly,
the issuance of said warrant was the consequence of a finding
by respondent judge that probable cause existed after having
conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with the
provisions of B.P. Blg. 129, P.D. 911 and the Rules of Court.
Respondent judge cannot be faulted for abiding by the
procedure dictated upon him by the law and jurisprudence
obtaining at the time the complaint was brought before him.
Criminal Procedure; Certiorari; Certiorari should not be allowed where
petitioner has other remedies available.—Anent the remedy
resorted to by petitioners (referring to the petition for
certiorari) from the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental
presided by Judge Diez, the same should not have been
granted. Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law against
Judge Lomeda's order for their arrest. These remedies are as
enumerated by respondent appellate court in its decision: "1. they can
post bail for their provisional release; 2. they can ask the Provincial
Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the charge against them. If unsatisfied
with the fiscal's resolution, they can ask for a review by the Minister
of Justice; (Sec. 1(d), RA 5180 as amended by P.D. 911); 3. if their
petition for review does not prosper, they can file a motion to quash
the information in the trial court. (Rule 117, Rules of Court). 4. If the
motion is denied, they can appeal the judgment of the court after the
case shall have been tried on the merits."
Same; Same; Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not
certiorari but to go to trial.—Moreover, in the case of Acharon vs.
Purisima, this Court held that when a motion to quash a criminal
case is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked
in said Motion, In the event that an adverse decision is rendered
after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom should be the next legal
step.
Villalon vs. Lirio, 764 SCRA 576, G.R. No. 183869 August 3,
2015
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The Supreme Court
(SC) has repeatedly held that a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 is proper only when there is neither appeal, nor plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.—This Court has
repeatedly held that a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 is proper only when there is neither appeal, nor plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for a
lost appeal; it is not allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment to the proper forum, especially if one’s own
negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned such
loss or lapse.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Liberal Interpretation; While it is
true that liberal application of the rules of procedure is allowed to avoid
17
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, it is equally true that a party
invoking liberality must explain his failure to abide by the rules.—We
find no basis to relax the rules of procedure in the present case. While
it is true that liberal application of the rules of procedure is
allowed to avoid manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, it is
equally true that a party invoking liberality must explain his
failure to abide by the rules. To reiterate, Lirio failed to explain why
he did not appeal the dismissal order while admitting that he could
have done so. Rather, he clung to his argument that he had correctly
filed a petition for certiorari because of the alleged grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC. Lirio’s reasoning is faulty.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Appeals; The remedies
of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive.—We are not convinced that Lirio filed the petition for
certiorari because the RTC allegedly gravely abused its discretion. The
more tenable explanation for his wrong choice of remedy is that the
period to appeal simply lapsed without an appeal having been filed.
Having lost his right to appeal, Lirio instituted the only remedy that he
thought was still available. This is contrary to the basic rule that the
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive.
Same; Civil Procedure; Complaints; Fraud; Mistake; Rule 8, Section 5
of the Rules of Court requires that in all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity, unlike in cases of malice, knowledge, or other conditions
of the mind which may be averred generally.—Rule 8, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court requires that in all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated
with particularity, unlike in cases of malice, knowledge, or
other conditions of the mind which may be averred generally.
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Philtranco Workers
Union-Association of Genuine Labor Organizations (PWU-
AGLO), 717 SCRA 340, G.R. No. 180962 February 26, 2014
Same; Same; Appeals; It has long been settled that the remedy of an
aggrieved party in a decision or resolution of the Secretary of Labor is
to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any
further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure.—It has long been settled that the remedy of an
aggrieved party in a decision or resolution of the Secretary of
Labor is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then
seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. There is no distinction: when
the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor case in an
industry indispensable to national interest, “he exercises great breadth
of discretion” in finding a solution to the parties’ dispute. “[T]he
authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions
and controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and
discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently
dispose of the primary dispute.” This wide latitude of discretion given
to the Secretary of Labor may not be the subject of appeal.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motions for
Reconsideration; Rule 65 states that where a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than 60 days
counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.—On the question
of whether the Petition for Certiorari was timely filed, the Court agrees
with petitioner’s submission. Rule 65 states that where a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later
than 60 days counted from the notice of the denial of the
motion. This can only mean that even though a motion for
reconsideration is not required or even prohibited by the
concerned government office, and the petitioner files the
motion just the same, the 60-day period shall nonetheless be
counted from notice of the denial of the motion. The very nature
of certiorari — which is an extraordinary remedy resorted to only in
the absence of plain, available, speedy and adequate remedies in the
course of law — requires that the office issuing the decision or order
be given the opportunity to correct itself. Quite evidently, this
opportunity for rectification does not arise if no motion for
reconsideration has been filed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; What needs to be realized is that while a
government office may prohibit altogether the filing of a motion for
reconsideration with respect to its decisions or orders, the fact remains
that certiorari inherently requires the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, which is the tangible representation of the
opportunity given to the office to correct itself.—Indeed, what needs
to be realized is that while a government office may prohibit
altogether the filing of a motion for reconsideration with
respect to its decisions or orders, the fact remains that
certiorari inherently requires the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, which is the tangible representation of the
opportunity given to the office to correct itself. Unless it is filed,
there could be no occasion to rectify. Worse, the remedy of certiorari
would be unavailing. Simply put, regardless of the proscription
against the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same may
be filed on the assumption that rectification of the decision or
order must be obtained, and before a petition for certiorari may
be instituted.
Municipality of Cordova, Province of Cebu vs. Pathfinder
Development Corporation, 795 SCRA 190, G.R. No. 205544
June 29, 2016
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; While there exists a
settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order
when appeal is available, a petition for certiorari may be allowed
when: (a) the broader interest of justice demands that certiorari be
given due course to avoid any grossly unjust result that would
otherwise befall the petitioners; and (b) the order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) evidently constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction.—While there exists a settled rule
precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when
appeal is available, a petition for certiorari may be allowed
when: (a) the broader interest of justice demands
that certiorari be given due course to avoid any grossly unjust
result that would otherwise befall the petitioners; and (b) the
order of the RTC evidently constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. In the past, the
Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the
availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 505 SCRA 8
(2006), the Court has declared that “the requirement that there
must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a)
when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury
to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be
danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be
slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised
is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and
(g) in case of urgency.”
Same; Same; Same; It is mere inadequacy, not the absence of all
other legal remedies, and the danger of failure of justice without the
writ, that must determine the propriety of certiorari.—If appeal is
not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy
remedy, the availability of appeal as a remedy cannot
constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from
making use of certiorari. It is mere inadequacy, not the
absence of all other legal remedies, and the danger of failure
of justice without the writ, that must determine the propriety
of certiorari. A remedy is said to be plain, speedy and adequate if it
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
18
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is
understood, then, that a litigant need not resort to the less
speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled
and set aside for being patently void. And even assuming
that certiorari is not the proper remedy against an assailed
order, the petitioner should still not be denied the recourse
because it is better to look beyond procedural requirements
and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise
supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower court
may be made conformable to law and justice.
Galang, Jr. vs. Geronimo, 643 SCRA 631, G.R. No. 192793
February 22, 2011
Remedial Law; Certiorari; In election cases involving an act or
omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be
filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.—Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which provides when and where a
petition for certiorari should be filed, states thus: SEC. 4. When and
where to file petition.—The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of
the denial of the motion. x x x In election cases involving an act
or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the
petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Interpretation of the phrase “in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.”—Interpreting the phrase “in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction,” the Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Jaramillo, et al., 9 SCRA 189 (1963), that if a case may be appealed
to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court
or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, 212
SCRA 823 (1992), where the Court stated that a court may issue a
writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has
jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or
decisions of the lower court.
People vs. Espinosa, 721 SCRA 53, G.R. No. 199237 April 7,
2014
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Courts are not given carte
blanche authority to interpret rules liberally.—Courts are constrained
to adhere to procedural rules under the Rules of Court. Section 6 of
Rule 1, however, grants courts leeway in interpreting and applying
rules: Sec. 6. Construction.—These Rules shall be liberally construed
in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. However, we
should point out that courts are not given carte blanche authority to
interpret rules liberally. In Building Care Corporation v. Macaraeg, 687
SCRA 643 (2012), we pointed out that: x x x the resort to a liberal
application, or suspension of the application of procedural
rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled
principle that rules must be complied with for the orderly
administration of justice.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Period to File Actions; Actions;
The Supreme Court deleted the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 that
permitted extensions of the period to file petitions for certiorari, since
sixty (60) days is more than ample time to sufficiently prepare for
filing; Exceptions.—Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, provides a strict deadline for
the filing of petitions for certiorari: SECTION 4. When and Where
to File the Petition.—The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of
the denial of the motion. x x x x We deleted the clause in Section
4, Rule 65 that permitted extensions of the period to file petitions for
certiorari, since sixty (60) days is more than ample time to sufficiently
prepare for filing. However, in Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges,
Inc., 678 SCRA 738 (2012), we allowed a liberal interpretation of the
foregoing rule: Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v.
Sandiganbayan, we ruled that the deletion of the clause in Section 4,
Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso facto, make the filing of
a motion for extension to file a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited.
We held in Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended,
the deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to
specifically prohibit an extension of time to file such petition.
Thus, because of the lack of an express prohibition, we held
that motions for extension may be allowed, subject to this
Court’s sound discretion, and only under exceptional and
meritorious cases. Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural
technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve
substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. (Emphasis
supplied) The 60-day period may be extended under any of the
circumstances provided in the earlier case of Labao v. Flores, 634
SCRA 723 (2010). The recognized exceptions are: 1. most
persuasive and weighty reasons; 2. to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; 3. good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of
the default; 4. the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; 5. the merits of the case; 6. a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules; 7. a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; 8. the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; 9. fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s
fault; 10. peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant
to each case; 11. in the name of substantial justice and fair
play; 12. importance of the issues involved; and 13. exercise of
sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of
the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
rules.
Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto, 156 SCRA 753, No. L-74766 December
21, 1987
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Writ of Certiorari and not
writ of Mandamus as the proper remedy available to petitioner.—The
remedy properly available to the petitioner in the premises, however,
is not the writ of mandamus. Well known is the rule that
mandamus issues only to compel performance of a mandatory,
ministerial duty. The determination that under the facts and
circumstances obtaining in a case a summary judgment is proper and
the motion therefor should be granted and summary judgment
consequently rendered, rests in the sound discretion of a trial court
and cannot be regarded as a duty or ministerial function compellable
by the extraordinary writ of mandamus. In this case, the respondent
Judge had discretion to make that determination. What happened
was that His Honor made that determination with grave abuse
of discretion Despite the plain and patent propriety of a
summary judgment, he declined to render such a verdict. The
writ of certiorari will he to correct that grave abuse of
discretion.
Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; Where the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional
Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the
writ's procurement must be presented.—We turn now to the second
question posed in the opening paragraph of this opinion, as to the
propriety of a direct resort to this Court for the remedy of mandamus
or other extraordinary writ against a municipal court, instead of an
attempt to initially obtain that relief from the Regional Trial Court of
the district or the Court of Appeals, both of which tribunals share this
Court's jurisdiction to issue the writ. As a matter of policy such a direct
19
recourse to this Court should not be allowed. The Supreme Court is
a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental
charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist
therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised
relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals,
or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies
whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by
the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the
specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented.
This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that
courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
De Lima vs. Guerrero, 843 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 229781 October 10,
2017
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; Both
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 require that the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition must be verified and accompanied by a “sworn certificate
of non-forum shopping.”—While there is jurisprudence to the effect
that “an irregular notarization merely reduces the evidentiary value of
a document to that of a private document, which requires proof of its
due execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence,” the
same cannot be considered controlling in determining compliance with
the requirements of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Both Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 require that the petitions for
certiorari and prohibition must be verified and accompanied by
a “sworn certificate of non-forum shopping.” In this regard,
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[a]
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.” “A
pleading required to be verified which x x x lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.”
Meanwhile, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that “[t]he plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in
the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to
the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact
within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.”
“Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not
be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided x x x.”
Same; Civil Procedure; Verification; Certification Against Forum
Shopping; Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping, there is no
assurance that the petitioner swore under oath that the allegations in
the petition have been made in good faith; or are true and correct,
and not merely speculative.—Without the presence of the notary
upon the signing of the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping, there is no assurance that the petitioner
swore under oath that the allegations in the petition have been
made in good faith; or are true and correct, and not merely
speculative. It must be noted that verification is not an empty ritual
or a meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the
name of mere expedience or sheer caprice, as what apparently
happened in the present case. Similarly, the absence of the notary
public when petitioner allegedly affixed her signature also negates a
proper attestation that forum shopping has not been committed by the
filing of the petition. Thus, the petition is, for all intents and
purposes, an unsigned pleading that does not deserve the
cognizance of this Court.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; The Supreme Court (SC) has
repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of courts is an
important component of the orderly administration of justice and not
imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons; Exceptions.—
Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with
disfavor by this Court. It will not entertain direct resort to it
when relief can be obtained in the lower courts. The Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of courts is an
important component of the orderly administration of justice and not
imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons. In The Diocese
of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court
explained the reason for the doctrine thusly: The Court must enjoin
the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now
affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the
Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time for the Court to
deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the
Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious
and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the
policy. x x x Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule
and direct resort to this Court were allowed in some instances. These
exceptions were summarized in a case of recent vintage, Aala v. Uy,
814 SCRA 41 (2017), as follows: In a fairly recent case, we
summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be
allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1)
when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must
be addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves
transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4)
when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this
Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject
of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when
there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes
questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the
order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the
appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.
Same; Same; Same; Even granting, for the nonce, the petitioner’s
position that the trial court’s issuance of the warrant for her arrest is
an implied denial of her Motion to Quash, the proper remedy against
this court action is to proceed to trial, not to file the present petition
for certiorari.—Even granting, for the nonce, the petitioner’s
position that the trial court’s issuance of the warrant for her
arrest is an implied denial of her Motion to Quash, the proper
remedy against this court action is to proceed to trial, not to
file the present petition for certiorari. This Court in Galzote v.
Briones, 657 SCRA 535 (2011), reiterated this established doctrine: A
preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety
of the chosen legal remedies availed of by the petitioner in the
lower courts to question the denial of his motion to quash. In
the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash
filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a
judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court’s
decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise
the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error
committed by the trial court but as an added ground to
overturn the latter’s ruling. In this case, the petitioner did not
proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial of his
motion to quash via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
20
of the Rules of Court. As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is
an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an
interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition
for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an
appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The
plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order
is to proceed to trial as discussed above.
De Lima vs. Reyes, 779 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 209330 January 11,
2016
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Any question on whether the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying
the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.—Even when an
administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the
exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave
abuse of discretion. In Auto Prominence Corporation v. Winterkorn,
577 SCRA 51 (2009): In ascertaining whether the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in his determination of the existence
of probable cause, the party seeking the writ of certiorari must
be able to establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his
executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an
evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is
not enough; it must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case,
but (he) transcended the same or acted without authority. Therefore,
any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may
be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Aguinaldo vs. Aquino III, 818 SCRA 310, G.R. No. 224302
February 21, 2017
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper as Court granted
exception to the 60-day period for Petitioners to file the Petition. The
peculiar circumstances of this case, plus the importance of the issues
involved herein, justify the relaxation of the 60-day period for the filing
of this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Rule 65, Section 4
explicitly states that certiorari should be instituted within a period of
60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be
assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable
delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy
disposition of their case. However, just like any rule, there are
recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the 60-day
period for filing a petition for certiorari: (1) most persuasive
and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice
not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of
the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and
equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the
name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of
the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by
the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. There
should be an effort, though, on the part of the party invoking liberality
to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure
to comply with the rules.
Villanueva vs. Judicial and Bar Council, 755 SCRA 182, G.R. No.
211833 April 7, 2015
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Judicial and Bar
Council; In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) neither acted in any judicial or quasi-
judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial
or quasi-judicial prerogative.—In this case, it is clear that the JBC
does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of
selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since
the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy
that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to
the exercise of the JBC’s constitutional mandate, a
determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Rule 122 – Appeal in Criminal Cases
Rodriguez vs. People, 684 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 192799 October
24, 2012
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; While
Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), involved the
period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh
period” to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in
criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.―The pivotal question is whether the “fresh period
rule” is applicable to appeals from conviction in criminal cases
governed by Sec. 6 of Rule 122 which pertinently provides: Sec. 6.
When appeal to be taken.―An appeal must be taken within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of
the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial
or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling
the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at
which time the balance of the period begins to run. (Emphasis
supplied.) While Neypes was silent on the applicability of the “fresh
period rule” to criminal cases, the issue was squarely addressed in Yu
v. Tatad, 642 SCRA 421 (2011), which expanded the scope of the
doctrine in Neypes to criminal cases in appeals of conviction under
Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the
Court held in Yu: While Neypes involved the period to appeal in
civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh period” to
appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal
cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is now settled that the fresh period rule
is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant case, where the accused
files from a judgment of conviction a motion for new trial or
reconsideration which is denied by the trial court. The accused will
have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such denial within
which to file his or her notice of appeal.―It is now settled that the
fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant case,
where the accused files from a judgment of conviction a motion for
new trial or reconsideration which is denied by the trial court. The
accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such
denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal. Verily, the
application of the statutory privilege of appeal must not
prejudice an accused who must be accorded the same
statutory privilege as litigants in civil cases who are granted a
fresh 15-day period within which to file an appeal from receipt
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of the denial of their motion for new trial or reconsideration. It
is indeed absurd and incongruous that an appeal from a conviction in
a criminal case is more stringent than those of civil cases. If the Court
has accorded litigants in civil cases―under the spirit and rationale in
Neypes―greater leeway in filing an appeal through the “fresh period
rule,” with more reason that it should equally grant the same to
criminal cases which involve the accused’s “sacrosanct right to liberty,
which is protected by the Constitution, as no person should be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
Tan vs. People, 381 SCRA 74, G.R. No. 148194 April 12, 2002
Remedial Law; Appeals; Neither the Constitution nor the Rules of
Criminal Procedure exclusively vests in the Supreme Court the power
to hear cases on appeal in which only an error of law is involved.—
Neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Criminal Procedure
exclusively vests in the Supreme Court the power to hear cases
on appeal in which only an error of law is involved. Indeed, the
Court of Appeals, under Rule 42 and 44 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, is authorized to determine “errors of fact, of law,
or both.” These rules are expressly adopted to apply to appeals
in criminal cases, and they do not thereby divest the Supreme
Court of its ultimate jurisdiction over such questions.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Certiorari can only be resorted to when there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.—Anent the argument that petitioner should
have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it might be pointed
out that this remedy can only be resorted to when there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Appeal, being a remedy still available to petitioner, a
petition for certiorari would have been premature.
Pobre vs. Court of Appeals, 463 SCRA 50, G.R. No. 141805 July
8, 2005
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Parties; Criminal Law; Parricide; The
sister of the deceased has legal standing to file a petition for certiorari
in a criminal case for parricide as she is a party-litigant who is akin to
the “offended party,” she being a close relative of the deceased.—
Initially, the Court recognizes the legal standing of herein petitioner
as she is the victim’s sister. In Narcisco vs. Romana-Cruz, involving
the crime of parricide, the Court sustained the legal standing of
the sister of the deceased to file a petition for certiorari as she
is a party-litigant who is akin to the “offended party,” she
being a close relative of the deceased.
Tamayo vs. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 175, G.R. No. 147070
February 17, 2004
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Technical and procedural rules are
intended to ensure, not suppress, substantial justice.–Except for
criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or death, an appeal from the judgment of the lower
court is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion.
The circulars of this Court prescribing technical and other procedural
requirements are meant to promptly dispose of unmeritorious
petitions that clog the docket and waste the time of the courts. These
technical and procedural rules, however, are intended to ensure, not
suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from their rigid enforcement
may thus be allowed to attain their prime objective for, after all, the
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.
Same; Same; Distinction should be made between the failure to file a
notice of appeal within the reglementary period and the failure to file
a brief within the period granted by the appellate court.–A distinction
should be made between the failure to file a notice of appeal
within the reglementary period and the failure to file a brief
within the period granted by the appellate court. The former
results in the failure of the appellate court to acquire
jurisdiction over the appealed decision resulting in its
becoming final and executory upon failure of the appellant to
move for reconsideration. The latter simply results in the
abandonment of the appeal which can lead to its dismissal
upon failure to move for its reconsideration.
Same; Same; There should be a wider latitude in exempting a case
from the strictures of procedural rules when the appellate court has
already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case and petitioner
failed to file the appellant’s brief.–In a considerable number of cases,
the Court has deemed it fit to suspend its own rules or to exempt a
particular case from its strict operation where the appellant fails to
perfect his appeal within the reglementary period, resulting in the
appellate court’s failure to obtain jurisdiction over the case. With more
reason, there should be a wider latitude in exempting a case
from the strictures of procedural rules when the appellate
court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case
and, as in this case, petitioner failed to file the appellant’s
brief.
Same; Same; The rules allowing motu proprio dismissals merely
confer a power and does not impose a duty, and the same is not
mandatory but merely directory, which requires a great deal of
prudence, considering all the attendant circumstances.–However,
while, as a general rule, a review on appeal is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion and may be granted only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, still it must be
remembered that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system.
Courts should thus proceed with extreme care so as not to deprive a
party of this right. “Laws and rules should be interpreted and
applied not in a vacuum or in isolated abstraction but in light
of surrounding circumstances and attendant facts in order to
afford justice to all.” The need to safeguard petitioners’ rights
should caution courts against motu proprio dismissals of
appeals, specially in criminal cases where the liberty of the
accused is at stake. The rules allowing motu proprio dismissals
merely confer a power and does not impose a duty; and the
same is not mandatory but merely directory, which therefore
requires a great deal of prudence, considering all the attendant
circumstances. Thus, substantial justice would be better served by
reinstating petitioner’s appeal.
Same; Same; Dismissal of an appeal on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon since our general policy is to encourage hearings of
appeals on their merits.–Moreover, dismissal of an appeal on
purely technical grounds is frowned upon since our general
policy is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits. This
Court is therefore constrained to relax the rules to give way to the
paramount and overriding interest of justice.
People vs. Latayada, 423 SCRA 237, G.R. No. 146865 February
18, 2004
Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; In every criminal conviction, the
prosecution is required to prove two things beyond reasonable doubt:
first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or the presence
of all the elements of the offense; and second, the fact that the
accused was the perpetrator of the crime.–In every criminal
conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two things
beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the commission of
the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements of the
offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the
perpetrator of the crime.
Same; Appeals; When an appellant escapes detention pending appeal,
the appeal is normally dismissed, and the lower court’s judgment thus
becomes final and executory; Rule does not apply to death cases, in
which an automatic review is mandated by law even if appellant has
absconded.–When an appellant escapes detention pending
appeal, the appeal is normally dismissed, and the lower court’s
judgment thus becomes final and executory. However, this Court
has held in People v. Esparas, People v. Pradesh, and People v.
Raquino that this rule does not apply to death cases, in which an
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automatic review is mandated by law even if appellant has
absconded.
Vitto vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 307, G.R. No. 134981 June
18, 2003
Courts; Actions; Appeals; An appeal by the accused is considered
abandoned where he fails to properly prosecute his appeal or does
some act inconsistent with its prosecution, such as when he refuses to
submit himself to the jurisdiction of the authorities.—In People vs.
Potajo, we held that an appeal by the accused is considered
abandoned where he fails to properly prosecute his appeal or
does some act inconsistent with its prosecution, such as when
he refuses to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
authorities. In the present case, the record shows that petitioner,
through counsel, asked the Court of Appeals for an extension until
December 20, 1997 within which to submit himself before it and to file
the appellant’s brief. However, petitioner failed to comply with his
commitment. Such omission is fatal to his appeal. Thus, the
Court of Appeals, in its Resolution of March 31, 1998, considered
petitioner’s appeal as having been abandoned and consequently
dismissed the same. The Resolution became final and executory on
May 5, 1998. As such, the Appellate Court, in its assailed Resolution
dated August 6, 1998, correctly denied petitioner’s subsequent Motion
For Leave To File Appellant’s Brief submitted on July 21, 1998, or more
than two (2) months after the finality of the Resolution dismissing the
appeal.
Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 63, G.R. No. 82483
September 26, 1990
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; The private offended party in a criminal
case may appeal the civil aspect of the case despite the acquittal of
the accused.—However, as to an appeal by the complainant on the
civil aspect of the case this Court has recently ruled that, subject to
the rules on double jeopardy, if a criminal case is dismissed by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on
the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may
represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended
party or complainant may not take such appeal. (People of the
Philippines vs. Hon. Santiago, G.R. No. 80778, June 20,1989)
However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal
the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused (citing Padilla
v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 [1984]; People v. Jalandoni, 131
SCRA 454 [1984]; and Rule 122, Section 11 (b), Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure). (Italics supplied).
Same; Same; Certiorari; A special civil action for certiorari filed by the
complainant in a criminal case to seek a review of the civil aspect of
the case should not be brought in the name of the People of the
Philippines, it may be prosecuted in the name of said complainant.—
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on
other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may
be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved
parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil
aspect of the case, so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not
bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines.
The action may be prosecuted in the name of said complainant
(Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3, supra;
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Pedro T. Santiago, G.R. No. 80778,
June 20, 1989).
People vs. Calo, Jr., 186 SCRA 620, G.R. No. 88531 June 18,
1990
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Bail; A private complainant has sufficient
legal personality to question in the appellate court an order granting
bail to accused.—While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals,
only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the
People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this
Court and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA
320 [1982]), the ends of substantial justice would be better served,
and the issues in this action could be determined in a more just,
speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar.
As an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has
sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge
Adao’s order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his
(private petitioner’s) father.

People vs. Banig, 679 SCRA 133, G.R. No. 177137 August 23,
2012

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; True, the finality of

acquittal rule is not one without exception as when the trial court
commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.―A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer
reviewable. As we have previously held in People v. Court of Appeals,
516 SCRA 383 (2007), “[a] verdict of acquittal is immediately
final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even
in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the
same offense.” True, the finality of acquittal rule is not one
without exception as when the trial court commits grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In
such a case, the judgment of acquittal may be questioned
through the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.

END

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