Technical Note: Trip-Circuit Supervision (TCS)

1MRS756959 EN
Technical Note
Issued: Aug 2009
ABB Oy, Distribution Automation Revision: B / 3 Nov 2009
Trip-Circuit Supervision (TCS)
Contents:
1 Scope .................................................................................................................2
2 Introduction......................................................................................................3
3 Technical implementation................................................................................4
3.1 TCS operation principle.............................................................................4
3.2 Current through the supervised circuit .......................................................6
3.2.1 TCS measuring circuit and current injection ...................................7
3.2.2 Situation 1: CB is closed, no trip.....................................................7
3.2.3 Situation 2: CB is closed, trip is performed ....................................8
3.2.4 Situation 3: CB is open, trip still active ..........................................9
3.2.5 Situation 4: CB is open, no trip ......................................................9
3.3 Value of external current limiting resistor Rext ......................................... 10
3.4 Recommended TCS connection examples ............................................... 12
3.4.1 Single-pole connections ................................................................ 12
3.4.2 Double-pole connections .............................................................. 14
3.5 Incorrect connection examples................................................................. 14
3.5.1 Using the two trip contacts separately ........................................... 14
3.5.2 Control open................................................................................. 16
3.5.3 Error when testing protection relay ............................................... 16
3.6 Applications ............................................................................................ 17
3.6.1 Polarity and operation at AC voltage ............................................ 17
3.6.2 TCS and other trip contacts........................................................... 18
3.6.3 Many TCS-circuits in parallel....................................................... 19
3.6.4 TCS with latched type (self-holding) trip contacts......................... 21
3.6.5 TCS with auxiliary relays ............................................................. 23
4 Reference list .................................................................................................. 24
Appendix 1: Advantages of using double-pole connection ...................................... 25
Appendix 2: Using normal binary input for TCS ..................................................... 28
Appendix 3: Note for 615 series relay TCS connection ........................................... 29
Document history, Disclaimer and Copyrights, Trademarks, Contact information.... 30
 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 1 (30)

Trip-Circuit Supervision (TCS) 1MRS756959 EN
1 Scope
The present document discusses the trip-circuit supervision (TCS), which is used for
monitoring and alarming faults in the circuit breaker (CB) trip circuit. The TCS can also be
used to supervise other control circuits like CB closing and disconnector opening or closing.
The TCS can be a build-in function in a protection relay or a separate device.
First, the operation principle and recommended ways of connecting the TCS is presented
with illustrative examples. Then, some typical incorrect connections are presented. Finally,
application examples for more sophisticated solutions are presented.
The information in this document is applicable for the protection relays series 610 and 615
and relays RE_ 541/3/5, REX 521, SPER and SPACOM (SPAC 3__C) relays.
KEYWORDS: Trip-circuit, supervision, auxiliary system.

2 Introduction
Power system protection deals with protecting the electrical power system from faults by
isolating the faulted part from the rest of the network. A protection system comprises not
only the protection devices (relays) but also auxiliary voltage system, measuring
transformers (CT's and VT's), circuit breakers (CB) and required secondary wiring, for
example. All these components in the protection system must work correctly. The chain is as
good as its weakest component.
In a study, where faults found in routine-tests of protection systems over 6 year time-span
were analyzed, it was found that about 15% of all faults the problem was in auxiliary
voltage, trip or alarm circuits. See reference /1/.
This emphasizes that the trip circuit, which comprises trip-contacts, wirings, auxiliary relays
and the CB opening coil, is a vital part in the protection chain and needs continuous
supervision.
Trip-circuit supervision (TCS) constantly supervises the health of the trip circuit. Faults
which can be detected with TCS are presented in table 2.-1. Should a fault be detected an
alarm is issued after set operation time, which typically is several seconds.
Table 2.-1. Faults normally detected by the trip-circuit supervision.
Type of fault Fault reason
The trip circuit is interrupted or the Broken wire, incorrect control operation,
resistance in the circuit increases galvanically bad contact, increased contact
substantially. resistance, etc.
The voltage over the monitored circuit A fuse has blown, battery failure, etc.
disappears.
The normal open (NO) trip contact(s) Welding of trip contact or incorrect setting,
remains closed exceeding the set TCS i.e. trip set for latching type.
supervision operation delay.

3 Technical implementation
3.1 TCS operation principle
The figure 3.1.-1 illustrates how the trip-circuit supervision (TCS) works in a simple trip
circuit. Basically the TCS only measures the voltage over the trip contact.
Normally the trip contact is open and therefore, in a healthy circuit, voltage over the contact
can be found. Should no voltage found or the voltage is below the TCS threshold voltage, it
indicates that the circuit is not healthy and closing of trip contact would not cause required
CB operation. Reason for the fault can be broken coil, open joints or missing auxiliary
voltage, for example.
As it can be understood from the figure, if the trip contact remains closed, the TCS naturally
can't see any voltage over the contact. Therefore, the operation time of the TCS must be set
long enough for allowing time for the trip contact to open again. Case of latching type
(lockout) trip contacts and suggested solutions is discussed later.
Fig. 3.1.-1. Simplified trip circuit with trip-circuit supervision.
The previous figure is oversimplified. The opening coil of the CB is designed for short time
operation only. I.e. the coil does not withstand long time voltage. Therefore, it is a common
practice that internally in the CB, an auxiliary contact is connected in series with the opening
coil (Fig. 3.1.-2). When the CB is at close-position, this CB internal contact is also closed.
When CB opens the contact is opened. The contact is closed again, when the CB is reclosed.

Fig. 3.1.-2. CB auxiliary contact.
Remark: In a similar way, the CB close coil has an auxiliary contact which is closed when
CB opens. The contact opens when CB is closed. In addition, a contact indicating whether
CB is ready can also be in series with the coil.
How does this affect the TCS? When the CB is opened, the CB internal contact opens the
trip circuit and thus the TCS will see a broken circuit and issue an alarm signal. One way to
avoid TCS operation would be to block TCS whenever the CB is open, but then the TCS
could only detect fault in the circuit when the CB is closed.
The recommended solution is to connect an external shunt resistor (Rext) in parallel with
another CB's internal contact, as shown in the figure 3.1.-3. Then, although the CB internal
contact is open, the TCS can see the trip circuit through the resistor Rext. The value of the
resistance Rext is discussed later in details.
Fig. 3.1.-3. Trip circuit with resistor Rext.

So far the trip contact has been shown as a single-pole contact only. Often a double-pole trip
contacts are used. I.e. the protection relays have two trip contacts operating in parallel. In the
figure 3.1.-4 the two different ways to connect double-pole trip contacts are shown.
Fig. 3.1.-4. Connecting double pole trip contacts.
In the left picture (a), the contacts are used as single-pole mode. Note that both contacts must
always be used in series. This is because of the breaking capacity for two contacts are
guaranteed only when connected in series.
In the right picture (b) the double-pole connection is shown. The advantages of double-pole
arrangement are discussed in Appendix 1.
As the figure 3.1.-4 shows, protection relay has an internal shut resistor Rint in parallel with
the relay's "upper" trip contact. Without this resistor, the TCS would see the trip circuit as
broken. With the resistor, the TCS is capable to see and monitor the trip circuit through the
Rint and Rext.
3.2 Current through the supervised circuit
So far, in the previous section, it is shown how the TCS can monitor the trip circuit by
monitoring voltage over the circuit. Further, the kind of arrangements that must be done in
order to TCS to receive voltage in all healthy conditions.
In order to be insensitive for disturbances and also to be able to detect too high contact
resistances in the CB auxiliary contacts, the TCS must drive a small test current through the
trip circuit. This current is typically 1.5 .. 5 mA.
In this section, first the TCS measuring circuit is studied, i.e. how the voltage measurement
of the TCS works. The goal is to learn that the measuring current is fixed and independent of
the voltage in the trip circuit. This also means that the input impedance of the TCS circuit is
depended on the voltage.

Then, step by step all possible operation situations in the trip circuit are studied. The key
interest is to find what is the current though the circuit in each case. This information further
helps to understand the basis of calculating value for the Rext, which is discussed in the next
section.
3.2.1 TCS measuring circuit and current injection
In the 3.2.1.-1, a simplified circuit diagram of the TCS voltage measuring input is shown. In
addition to the presented circuit, a real TCS input contains typically an overvoltage
protection, rectifier and filtering components.
Fig. 3.2.1.-1. TCS measuring input.
The transistor V2 has it's base current Ib through the resistor Rb. This causes emitter current Ie
to increase, which cause a voltage drop over the resistor Re. The base-emitter voltage (Vbe) of
the transistor is the zener-voltage V1 minus the voltage drop at Re. Should the emitter current
rise too high, the Vbe will drop, thus reducing the emitter current. And should the emitter
current decrease too low, the Vbe rises, thus increasing the emitter current.
As a result, this circuit, known as "current generator" (actually, a constant current sink), will
cause a fairly constant current Ie to flow through the circuit whenever the input voltage
exceeds the minimum operation voltage. The transistor in the circuit is used as variable
impedance, and thus the impedance of the circuit is not fixed, but depends on the input
voltage.
The status (TCS circuit is OK or faulty) is read from the output of the opto-coupler V3.
3.2.2 Situation 1: CB is closed, no trip
For a trip circuit, the most normal situation is that the CB is closed and no trip is active. In
this case the current flows through Rint, coil Rs and TCS (Fig. 3.2.2-1). As presented earlier,
the TCS has a "current generator" which keeps the current through it fairly constant (for
example 2 mA). Therefore, in this situation, the current depends only on the TCS current
generator. The Rint or coil Rs has no effect on the current value.

Fig. 3.2.2.-1. Trip circuit, situation 1.
3.2.3 Situation 2: CB is closed, trip is performed
When protection relay trips, i.e. the trip contacts are closed, the Rint and TCS becomes short-
circuited and the open coil receives full voltage (Fig. 3.2.3-1). Therefore, the current though
the coil depends only on the coil Rs.
This situation naturally will remain only a short time because the CB opens.

3.2.4 Situation 3: CB is open, trip still active
When the CB opens the fault in the primary network becomes isolated and the protection
relay reset. In a short time while the CB is open, but the trip is not yet reset, the external
resistance Rext is connected in series of the trip circuit (Fig. 3.2.4-1). The current depends on
Rs and Rext.
UC
I= (1)
RS + Rext
Where Uc = auxiliary voltage used in the circuit.
Typically, the coil does not withstand the full voltage for a long time. Therefore, the Rext is
also used for limiting the current thought the coil in case the trip contacts do not open. The
reason for contacts not to open can be that contacts are welded together, or that the trip
contacts are incorrectly set to operate as latching type, for example.
Note: During the time the trip is active the TCS can't see any voltage over the contact. But
the TCS should not give alarm under this situation. Therefore, the operation time of the TCS
must be set long enough for allowing time for the trip contact to open again. Case of latching
type (lockout) trip contacts and suggested solutions is discussed later.
3.2.5 Situation 4: CB is open, no trip
When the CB is open and there is no trip, the current flows through Rint, Rext, coil Rs and
TCS (Fig. 3.2.5-1). The current depends only on the TCS current generator. The Rint, Rext or
Rs has no effect on the current value.

3.3 Value of external current limiting resistor Rext
Each relay technical manual contains a table for selecting the Rext. The following table 3.3.-1
is excerpted from the REF 54_ documentation, see reference /2/.
Table 3.3.-1. External resistance values when using REF 54_ relay.
Often the continuous current though the CB coil is of interest. As shown in previous section,
the Rext effects only at situation 3.
Example. Voltage is 110V, Rext = 22 kohm, resistance of the coil Rs = 30 ohm.
UC 110V
I= = = 0.005 A
RS + Rext 22000Ω + 30Ω
Normally, for sizing the external resistor Rext, the relay manufacturer recommendations,
which can be found from the protection relay technical manual, should be followed.

However, here are the equations and examples for defining the maximum and minimum
values for Rext.
From TCS point of view, the Rext causes voltage drop and therefore defines the voltage over
the TCS-circuit when the CB is open, and trip contacts are open. This defines the maximum
value for Rext.
U C ,min − (Rext + Rint + RS ) × I C ,max ≥ U TCS ,min ⇔

U C ,min − U TCS ,min (2)
Rext ≤ − (Rint + RS )
I C ,max
where, Uc,min = auxiliary voltage (having, for example, 10% undervoltage)

UTCS,min = min. operation voltage for TCS-circuit
Ic,max = max. measuring current of the TCS circuit
Example: Uc,min = 110V-10%, TCS max. measuring current is assumed to be 2mA and
minimum operating voltage (threshold) 20V. Rint = 1000 ohm and coil resistance Rs = 30
ohm.
99V − 20V
Rext ≤ − (1000Ω + 30Ω ) ≈ 38.5kΩ
0.002 A
On the other hand, from the CB coil point of view, the Rext defines the current through the
coil when CB is open and trip contacts are closed. This defines the minimum value for Rext.
U C ,max
Rext ≥ − RS (3)
I coil,constant
Example, Uc,max =121V (110V + 10% worst case scenario), Rs = 30 ohm, maximum current
through the coil should be limited to 0.01A.
121V
Rext ≥ − 30Ω = 12070Ω ≈ 12.1kΩ
0.01A
The values of minimum operation voltage and measuring current for each relay type is
shown in table 3.3.-1.

Table 3.3.-1. Characteristics of TCS in each relay type.
Relay TCS min.operating voltage TCS measuring current
REF 541/3/5, REM 543/5, 20 Vac/dc 0.99 – 1.72 mA

RET 541/4/5, REX 521
610 and 615 series relays 20 Vac/dc Approx. 1.5 mA
SPAC 315C, 316C, 317C, 30 Vdc Approx. 1.5 mA

335C and 336C
SPER 1B1C4 and 40 Vdc Approx. 1.5 mA

SPER 1C1
SPER 1C2 20 Vdc Approx. 5 mA
TCS in 24V dc circuit:
The table 3.3.-1 does not give any value for 24V system. For 24V batteries, in case the
charging power is lost, a 10% voltage drop should be allowed. I.e. the TCS should operate
reliable also with 21.6V voltage. On the other hand, if the operation threshold (worst case)
for the TCS is 20V, only 1.6V voltage drop over Rint, Rext and coil Rs can be allowed.
Typically the Rint = 1000 ohm and by assuming worst case TCS measuring current to be 2
mA, the voltage drop over Rint is already 2 V. I.e. in this example, using the worst case
values, there is no solution. Therefore, should TCS operate at 24V system, each situation
must be considered case by case. The solution will then be a compromise that will work in
normal situation but problems like incorrect TCS alarms must be accepted, especially at
undervoltage situations.
Further, it should be remembered that if the system is tested and found, for example, that
TCS current and threshold voltage are actually only 1.7mA and 15V, respectively, some
change in these values over time because of component ageing must be accepted.
3.4 Recommended TCS connection examples
3.4.1 Single-pole connections
In the figure 3.4.-1 recommended single-pole connections are presented: (a) for a protection
relay with build-in TCS and (b) by using an external TCS device.

Fig. 3.4.1-1. Recommended single-pole connections.
Typically there are other trip-contacts as well as control contacts in parallel with the
protection relay trip contact. Figure 3.4.-2 shows recommended connections when the trip
circuit has a control contact (open CB button) in parallel of the protection relay's trip contact.
Fig. 3.4.1-2. Recommended single-pole connections with control.

3.4.2 Double-pole connections
Recommended connections for double-pole circuits is shown in figure 3.4.-2: (a) without and
(b) with control contact (open CB button). It is important to notice that when the relay trip is
connected as double-pole also the control open button has to be double-pole.
Fig. 3.4.2-1. Recommended double-pole connections
3.5 Incorrect connection examples
In this section, most typical incorrect connections are presented.
3.5.1 Using the two trip contacts separately
In case the protection relay has double-pole trip-contacts with internal resistance Rint, but
only single-pole connection is required, both relay's trip contacts must be connected in
series.
Figure 3.5.1.-1 illustrates an incorrect connection, where only one of the contacts is used.
But the trip contact breaking capacity in the relay technical manual is given for two-contact
connection only. For this kind of incorrect connection, the breaking capacity is not given or
guaranteed and as a result the contact can easily be damaged.

Fig. 3.5.1.-1. Incorrect connection, unknown breaking capacity.
Figure 3.5.1.-2 illustrates another incorrect connection. In addition to the problem with
breaking capacity, the Rint is not sized to withstand current without TCS circuit. As a result,
this kind of wrong connection will cause Rint to burn almost immediately when the CB is
closed and voltage is applied to the circuit.
Fig. 3.5.1.-2. Incorrect connection, Rint will burn.

3.5.2 Control open
Figure 3.5.2.-1 illustrates yet another incorrect connection where the open control contact is
connected only on the "upper" side. As a result the Rint will burn almost immediately when
the command is activated (and CB is in close-position).
Fig. 3.5.2.-1. Incorrect connection, Rint will burn.
The correct way is shown earlier in figure 3.4.2-1.
3.5.3 Error when testing protection relay
In the figure 3.5.3.-1 a connection of three protection relay, double-pole trip circuit is shown.
Only the relay 3 has internal TCS circuit.
In order to test relay 2 operation, but not to trip the CB, the 'upper' trip contact of relay 2 was
disconnected, as shown in the figure, while the 'lower' contact was still connected.

Fig. 3.5.2.-1. Incorrect testing, Rint will burn.
When the relay 2 operated, the coil current started to flow through the Rint of the relay 3
burning the resistor. This case emphasizes the fact that both trip contacts must operate
together.
3.6 Applications
3.6.1 Polarity and operation at AC voltage
TCS circuit can be designed to work only with DC-voltage having correct polarity. It is also
possible that the TCS works only with DC but the polarity has no effect. Further, the TCS
circuit can be designed to work both with DC and AC voltages. In the following table 3.5.-1,
the polarity and operation at AC voltage is shown.
Table 3.5.-1. Polarity and operation at AC-voltage.
Relay type Polarity and operation at AC-voltage
REF 541/3/5, REM 543/5, In the manual's example and terminal diagrams , the
polarity is shown but actually the TCS circuits works
RET 541/4/5, REX 521, with both polarities and with AC-voltage as well.
610 and 615 series relays
SPER 1B1 C4, SPER 1C1 DC-voltage only, polarity must be correct. See the
and SPER 1C2 device's documentation for more details /3/.
SPAC 315C, 316C, 317C, DC-voltage only, polarity must be correct. See the
335C and 336C relay's documentation for more details /4,5,6/.

3.6.2 TCS and other trip contacts
Typically, the CB trip circuit contains other contacts in addition with the protection relay trip
contact. These contacts can be control contact (CB open button, for example) or other trip
contacts. In the figure 3.6.2.-1 an example with totally three contacts in parallel is shown. In
the figure, the flow of the TCS test current is also indicated.
Fig. 3.6.2.-1. A three trip/control contact circuit.
The TCS test current does not follow through the other two trip contacts and therefore the
wiring and joints of the these contacts are not supervised. A better way for arranging the
wiring is presented in the figure 3.6.2.-2.
Fig. 3.6.2.-2. Improved connection for three trip/control contact circuit.

The wiring in the figure 3.6.2.-2 is made in such way that the TCS test current flows through
all wires and all joints. Thus the complete circuit, excluding the trip contacts itself, is
supervised.
Figures 3.6.2.-1 and 3.6.2-2 are for single-pole connection, figure 3.6.2-3 shows connections
for double-pole.
Fig. 3.6.2.-3. Improved double-pole connection for three trip/control contact circuit.
3.6.3 Many TCS-circuits in parallel
It is possible that the trip circuit has multiple TCS circuits in parallel as shown in the
example figure 3.6.3-1. Each TCS circuit causes its own supervising current to flow through
the monitored coil.
The actual coil current is therefore sum of all TCS currents and this must be taken into
consideration when determining the resistance Rext. Note also that setting the TCS function
in a protection relay to out-of-use typically does not effect to the supervising current
injection.
The maximum value for Rext can be calculated
U C ,min − (Rext + RS ) × I Total − Rint × I C ,max ≥ U TCS ,min ⇔

U C ,min − U TCS ,min − Rint × I C ,max (4)
Rext ≤ − RS
I Total

where, Uc,min = auxiliary voltage (having, for example 10% undervoltage)

UTCS,min = min. operation voltage for TCS-circuit
Ic,max = max. measuring current of the TCS circuit
ITotal = sum of TCS measuring currents Ic,max
Example 1: Uc,min = 110V-10%, total measuring current is 2x2mA = 4mA and minimum
operating voltage 20V. Rint = 1000 ohm and coil resistance Rs = 30 ohm.
99V − 20V − 1000Ω × 0.002 A

Rext ≤ − 30Ω = 19.2kΩ
0.004 A
Fig. 3.6.3-1. Example of two relays in parallel doubling the TCS current.
Example 2: Three TCS circuits are in parallel. All has same minimum operation voltage
20V, but the measuring currents are 2mA, 2mA and 5mA. Uc,min = 110V-10%, Rint = 1000
ohm and coil resistance Rs = 30 ohm. The calculation is done for each TCS-circuit and the
smallest value is chosen.
99V − 20V − 1000Ω × 0.005 A

Rext ≤ − 30Ω = 8.19kΩ
2 × 0.002 A + 0.005 A

3.6.4 TCS with latched type (self-holding) trip contacts
As explained earlier in this document, when the trip contacts are closed, the TCS-circuit
cannot measure any voltage over the contacts and will therefore issue an alarm after the TCS
operation time. This is unless the trip contacts opens before the TCS operation time or TCS
being blocked as long as the trip remains active/latched. Table 3.6.4.-1 lists how each relay's
TCS operates.
Table 3.6.4-1. TCS operation in each relay when using latched type contacts.
Relay type TCS operation
REF 541/3/5, REM 543/5, Freely configurable relay *)
RET 541/4/5
REX 521 TCS is blocked when output relay HSP01 is active

(trip active or locked out). Can be set to be blocked
also when CB is open (for cases when Rext is not
used)
610 series relays TCS is used only in output relay P01. The trip
lockout is routed to output relay P03, which has no
TCS.
Only if the P01 is set for latching-type the TCS

cannot be used (would give alarm).
615 series relays In default functionally the TCS is normally blocked

when trip is active or CB is open. Can depend on
relay variant and can be changed with Signal Matrix
Tool (SMT) in the PCM 600 tool.
SPAC 315C, 316C, 317C, TCS can be blocked (SPTO-module parameter S201)
335C and 336C when trip is active. TCS is automatically disabled
when CB is withdrawn, i.e. when the four-pole status
of both CB and CB truck indicates undefined status.
*) More sophisticated solution especially for freely-configurable relays
This solution allows continuous supervision of the TCS-circuit even when the trip-contacts
are latched. The solution is shown in figure 3.6.4.-1 both for (a) single-pole and (b) double-
pole connections. The resistor Rext replaced with an additional TCS-device. Table 3.6.4.-2
lists all possible healthy situations that can occur in the trip-circuit.

Fig. 3.6.4-1. Solution for trip-circuit supervision with self-holding trip contacts.
Table 3.6.4-2. Situations when self-holding trip contacts and two TCS is used
Situation TCS-states
1. CB is closed, no trip Relay's TCS sees the voltage,

TCS-2 has no voltage.
2. CB is closed, trip is performed Neither of the TCS sees voltages, but CB

opens and therefore this situation is very
short-time only. No alarm will be issued
because of TCS operation time.
3. CB is open, trip is latched Relay's TCS does not see voltage,

TCS-2 sees voltage
4. CB is open, no trip Both TCS sees voltage.
From the table above we can conclude that TCS alarm should be issued only if both TCS-
circuits indicates fault. Further, because of situation 4, two TCS should have same measuring
current and the required voltage over series connected TCS is naturally twice the TCS
minimum operation voltage.
Note: Relay binary input can be used for TCS-2 if the binary input is routed to block the
relay's own TCS supervision (Fig. 3.6.4.-2). This is possible, because the TCS and binary
inputs measuring circuits are almost the same. See Appendix 2 for more details.

Fig. 3.6.4-2. Using binary input instead of TCS-2.
3.6.5 TCS with auxiliary relays
Lot of retrofits are done partially, where just the old electromechanical relays are replaced
with new, but the CB not. Problem is that coil current of an old type CB can be too high for
protection relay trip contact to break.
The CB coil current is normally cut by the internal contact of the CB. However, the fear is
that, in case of CB failure, the protection relay trip contact will be destroyed since this
contact will be obliged to disconnect high level of electromagnetic energy accumulated in
trip coil.
An auxiliary relay can be used between the protection relay trip contact and CB coil. This
solves the question of breaking capacity, but then the TCS circuit in the protection relay
would monitor the healthy of the auxiliary relay coil, not the CB coil. This would require an
additional TCS device like SPER 1_1 (Fig 3.6.5-1).
Fig. 3.6.5.-1. TCS in trip circuit with auxiliary relay.
In freely configurable relays, a relay's binary input can be used for TCS-2 with restrictions.
See Appendix 2 for more details. In addition, there must be some time delay before an alarm
is issued. TCS alarm should be issued if either of the TCS detects fault (=no voltage).

4 Reference list
/1/ Vedenjuoksu, Timo (1993). Suojausketjun vikaantumisen analysointi. Bachelor's

thesis, Vaasa Institute of Technology.
/2/ 1MRS750527-MUM EN. Feeder Terminal REF 54_. Technical Reference Manual,
General.
/3/ 1MRS750231. SPER 1B1 C4, SPER 1C1 and SPER 1C2 Supervision relay. User's
Manual and Technical Description
/4/ 1MRS750177-MUM EN. SPAC 315C and SPAC 317C Feeder terminals. User's
Manual and Technical description.
/5/ 1MRS750120-MUM EN. SPAC 316C Feeder terminal. User's Manual and Technical
description.
/6/ 1MRS750122-MUM EN. SPAC 335C and SPAC 336C Feeder terminals. User's
Manual and Technical description.

Appendix 1
In the following text, the advantages of double-pole trip arrangement over the single-pole
tripping is discussed. Further, an earth-fault in the auxiliary circuit is discussed.
The fundamental idea in double-pole arrangement is to improve the security of the trip
circuit. Figure A1-1 (a) illustrates how a short-circuit between the positive voltage and trip
circuit can cause incorrect circuit-breaker (CB) operation. In case of double-pole connection
(figure b) there will not be incorrect operations.
Fig. A1-1. Short-circuit in the CB trip circuit.
If the auxiliary circuit is isolated (unearthed), then a single earth-fault in the system should
not cause any problem. However, in theory, a long line always forms a capacitance between
the line and the earth. In addition, devices connected into the auxiliary circuit might have
own line-to-earth capacitances. Figure A1-2 shows how, in case of an earth-fault in a single-
pole circuit, the capacitance in the negative line discharges through the trip coil causing a
current pulse.

Fig. A1-2. Earth-fault in the CB trip circuit, effect of line-to-ground capacitance.
Normally, the discharge current pulse does not have enough energy to cause the coil of the
circuit breaker to operate. However, in modern circuit breakers having high-impedance,
small current, coil problems can arise. Using double-pole connection problems are avoided.
Although an earth-fault in an isolated system might not cause problems, it should anyhow be
detected (with earth-fault supervision device) and removed. Otherwise, one day, another
earth-fault will eventually occur and then the system has two earth-faults which definitely
will cause problems.
In some cases, especially in older auxiliary systems, the circuit was earthed (directly or
through a resistance) from its middle point (figure A1-3).
Fig. A1-3. Earth-fault in the CB trip circuit, effect of battery grounding arrangement.
With middle-point earthing, the system is build to be fail-safe. I.e. in case of an earth-fault,
the fault current blows the fuse before any unwanted operation will happen. For example, in
the figure A1-3, when the contact is closed, the earth-fault current will blow the fuse.

However, before the contact is closed, half of the auxiliary voltage will be over the coil
through the earth-fault. This can cause problem with modern circuit breaker having high-
impedance coil. Using double-pole connection also this problem is avoided.

Appendix 2
The normal binary input of a relay is almost identical to the TCS input and can therefore be
applied for TCS applications. The differences are:
- Binary input can have higher minimum operation voltage.
- Binary input has a current suction functionality which draws momentary high current
when voltage is applied. For a time of some milliseconds the current can be ten times
or higher than normally.
- TCS input is slower than binary input.
Binary input in series with TCS
When a binary input is used in a circuit connected in series of real TCS input, the current
suction does not cause any problem because the real TCS will dominate the circuit.
It must however be checked what is the sum of the TCS and binary input minimum
operation voltages. For example, if the UTCS,min = 20V and UBI,min = 80V, the circuit will
work reliable (worst case scenario) at voltages 20V+80V=100V or higher.
In practice the situation will be better because either of the inputs will tends to dominate the
circuit and it is enough that either of the inputs has voltage high enough.
Binary input used alone for TCS purpose
A binary input can be used alone for TCS purpose, but only if it is checked that the current
suction (i.e. current peak) feature does not cause problems and open the circuit breaker.
A simple and practical way to check this is to connect two binary inputs in parallel. The two
inputs must be equal type having same threshold voltage. If the combined (doubled) current
of the binary inputs does not cause problems this is enough to secure that a single binary
input will not cause problems.

Appendix 3
In 615 series relays, since version 1.1, the connection of internal resistance Rint is different
than in other relays presented in this document. One end of the resistor is connected to own
terminal.
This means that if the user wants to use TCS supervision, the resistor must be externally
connected in parallel with the trip contact as shown in the figure A3-1, left picture.
If the user does not wish to use TCS, the terminal of the resistor is left open (right picture).
Because the two trip-contacts anyway must be used in series, this also means that no TCS
measuring current will flow in the circuit.
Fig. A3-1. Connections in the 615 series relays.

Document revision history
Document revision/date History

A / 14 August 2009 First revision
B / 03 November 2009 Template updated, new document number
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Contact information
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P.O.Box 699
Visiting address: Muottietie 2A
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Technical Note: Trip-Circuit Supervision (TCS)

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Technical Note: Trip-Circuit Supervision (TCS)

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Trip-Circuit Supervision (TCS)

Appendix 1: Advantages of using double-pole connection ...................................... 25

Appendix 2: Using normal binary input for TCS ..................................................... 28

Appendix 3: Note for 615 series relay TCS connection ........................................... 29

Document history, Disclaimer and Copyrights, Trademarks, Contact information.... 30

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 1 (30)

KEYWORDS: Trip-circuit, supervision, auxiliary system.

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 2 (30)

Table 2.-1. Faults normally detected by the trip-circuit supervision.

Type of fault Fault reason

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 3 (30)

Fig. 3.1.-1. Simplified trip circuit with trip-circuit supervision.

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 4 (30)

Fig. 3.1.-2. CB auxiliary contact.

Fig. 3.1.-3. Trip circuit with resistor Rext.

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 5 (30)

Fig. 3.1.-4. Connecting double pole trip contacts.

3.2 Current through the supervised circuit

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3.2.1 TCS measuring circuit and current injection

Fig. 3.2.1.-1. TCS measuring input.

3.2.2 Situation 1: CB is closed, no trip

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 7 (30)

Fig. 3.2.2.-1. Trip circuit, situation 1.

3.2.3 Situation 2: CB is closed, trip is performed

Fig. 3.2.3.-1. Trip circuit, situation 2.

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 8 (30)

3.2.4 Situation 3: CB is open, trip still active

Where Uc = auxiliary voltage used in the circuit.

Fig. 3.2.4.-1. Trip circuit, situation 3.

3.2.5 Situation 4: CB is open, no trip

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 9 (30)

Fig. 3.2.5.-1. Trip circuit, situation 4.

3.3 Value of external current limiting resistor Rext

Example. Voltage is 110V, Rext = 22 kohm, resistance of the coil Rs = 30 ohm.

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 10 (30)

U C ,min − (Rext + Rint + RS ) × I C ,max ≥ U TCS ,min ⇔

where, Uc,min = auxiliary voltage (having, for example, 10% undervoltage)

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 11 (30)

Table 3.3.-1. Characteristics of TCS in each relay type.

Relay TCS min.operating voltage TCS measuring current

REF 541/3/5, REM 543/5, 20 Vac/dc 0.99 – 1.72 mA

610 and 615 series relays 20 Vac/dc Approx. 1.5 mA

SPAC 315C, 316C, 317C, 30 Vdc Approx. 1.5 mA

SPER 1B1C4 and 40 Vdc Approx. 1.5 mA

SPER 1C2 20 Vdc Approx. 5 mA

TCS in 24V dc circuit:

3.4 Recommended TCS connection examples

3.4.1 Single-pole connections

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 12 (30)

Fig. 3.4.1-1. Recommended single-pole connections.

Fig. 3.4.1-2. Recommended single-pole connections with control.

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 13 (30)

3.4.2 Double-pole connections

Fig. 3.4.2-1. Recommended double-pole connections

3.5 Incorrect connection examples

In this section, most typical incorrect connections are presented.

3.5.1 Using the two trip contacts separately

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Fig. 3.5.1.-1. Incorrect connection, unknown breaking capacity.

Fig. 3.5.1.-2. Incorrect connection, Rint will burn.

 Copyright 2009 ABB Oy, Distribution Automation, Vaasa, FINLAND 15 (30)