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Afghanistan, four Navy SEALs were confronted with a critical moral dilemma. They
had been sent behind enemy lines to kill or capture a Taliban leader who controlled
between 150 to 200 fighters. However, they had just been discovered by three
unarmed Afghan goat herders. Their discovery by these three Afghani goat herders
jeopardized the Navy SEALs’ mission, and furthermore put their lives at stake.1 With
no reliable way of guarding these goat herders, what should these Navy SEALs do?
To sympathize with these goat herders and let them go would be to risk their lives if
these goat herders were colluding with the enemy. To act in their self-interest would
be to terminate three potentially innocent lives but, if their act were discovered, bring
on domestic and international media attention which could potentially lead to criminal
charges and/or political and diplomatic consequences for their country. Therefore,
considering these circumstances, what action should the Navy SEALs take and how
1
This case is based on Marcus Luttrell’s book, Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of
Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of Seal Team 10. An interesting discussion on this case
in terms of army’s rules of engagement can be found in Diana West’s article for The Washington
Times titled “Killed by the
rules”http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070817/EDITORIAL04/1081
70016/1013
Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 2 of 8
Sentiments, Smith claims that the rules of justice are the “only rules of morality which
are precise and accurate; that those of all the other virtues are loose, vague, and
indeterminate.”2 In this manner, Smith promises more than he can deliver as justice
overreaches in trying to define justice to fit too many different parts of his theory, and
this overuse confuses the reader’s understanding of justice and how to determine
just actions.
Smith explains that justice can be compared similarly to the rules of grammar3. This
relationship between the rules of justice and the rules of grammar is hard to
when he talks about justice. First of all, the comparison between justice and
but the rules of grammar are neither necessarily precise nor accurate—so this
comparison does not seem to fit and should not be used if we are to understand
Smith’s first claim that the rules of justice are precise. Grammar is neither
necessarily precise nor accurate because often the well-written essay can
circumvent the typical rules of grammar. Second, in many ways, one can argue that
the rules of grammar are “loose, vague, and indeterminate” according to the special
circumstances of the sentence and the paper at large. In this comparison, the rules
circumstances of the situation, just as the rules of grammar deal both with the
2
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 327 §1
3
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 327 §1 he writes “the first may be compared to
the rules of grammar… which present us rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought to
aim at”
Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 3 of 8
the paper at large. Therefore, if the comparison between the rules of justice and the
rules of grammar are apt, then Smith would mean to say (but doesn’t) that the rules
of justice can vary depending on the circumstance. Since there are two ways of
To start from the beginning, there are two important questions that must be
ascertained in order to codify a series of principles of morals, for Smith. The first, he
asks, is “wherein does virtue consist?” Secondly he wonders how, and by what
faculties, can we come about an answer for the first question, and prefer it to others.
In other words, what is virtue, what actions are virtuous, and how do we differentiate
these actions from others, which we would distinguish as wrong or unjust actions?
To answer the first question, Smith declares that virtue exists either in propriety,
principle of approbation, which is “the power of the faculty of the mind which renders
which are self-love, reason, and sentiment6. What does this all mean?
4
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 267 §4 “If the character of virtue, therefore,
cannot be ascribed indifferently to all our affections, when under proper government and
direction, it must be confined either to those which aim directly at our own private happiness, or to
those which aim directly at that of others. If virtue, therefore, does not consist in propriety, it must
consist either in prudence or in benevolence.”
5
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 314 §1
6
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 315 §2 “Self-love, reason, and sentiment,
therefore, are the three different sources which have been assigned for the principle of
approbation.”
Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 4 of 8
benevolence all exist in virtuous action, and that by reasoning through self-love,
reason and sentiment, we come to realize how some actions are virtuous compared
to others, and why other actions are not virtuous. I would posit that through this
method, Smith can best choose an action and justify it in a case such as that of the
Navy SEALs. But Smith avoids using this method to define just actions and justify
them. This is most likely because of the imprecise nature of such reasoning.
Propriety, prudence, and benevolence, and self-love, reason, and sentiment, are all
traits of virtue that vary from circumstance to circumstance, as Smith has admitted.
Rather, Smith would prefer that justice be described as the stable entity by which
social cohesion can flourish. It is “the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice”7 and
as such, for Smith, justice should be a rigid set of principles rather than one that is
support his claim that justice is rigid and precise, rather than situational and flexible.
In the same paragraph where Smith describes justice as a pillar, he describes men
support this claim he utilizes the example of a society of robbers and murderers
which he states could not exist unless they, “according to the trite observation,
abstain from robbing and murdering one another.”8 However, the foundation of this
society is not on justice, or beneficence, as Smith would argue. Even if they act
and murderers within rests on self-interest and ambition, and the concept of justice in
this sense is different from the concept of justice in other societies. A society of
robbers and murderers would not be a society founded upon the same ideas of
justice as a peaceful state of merchants. Smith does not distinguish justice and
beneficence from these two states in this sense, because he attempts to over-
prior discussion on the importance of sympathy and men’s desire for approbation in
over sympathy and other virtues in order to make the point that it is the power of
Men, though naturally sympathetic, feel so little for another, with whom
they have no particular connexion, in comparison of what they feel for
themselves; the misery of one, who is merely their fellow-creature, is of
so little importance to them in comparison even of a small conveniency of
their own; they have it so much in their power to hurt him, and may have
so many temptations to do so, that if this principle [of justice] did not stand
up within them in his defence, and overawe them into a respect for his
innocence, they would, like wild beasts, be at all times ready to fly upon
him; and a man would enter an assembly of men as he enters a den of
lions.10
Thus, based on this passage alone, it would appear that if Smith were to predict the
Navy SEALs’ next action, he would say that they should kill the three goat herders
and complete their mission without fear of retaliation. This passage tells us that he
9
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 9 §1 Recall his passage, “How selfish soever
man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it
except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for
the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.”
10
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 86 §4 Emphasis added.
Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 6 of 8
would not only say that the Navy SEALs should kill the three goat herders in order to
protect their mission and potentially their lives, but also because the Navy SEALs are
opportunistic. So, in the absence of law and the unlikelihood of being caught, they
would leap upon this opportunity “like wild beasts”, for they “may have so many
temptations to do so”. But this line of reasoning conflicts with the rest of Smith’s
Theory of Moral Sentiments because throughout the rest of the book (those
compassion and other forms of sympathy as the foundation for human interaction.
This is Smith’s major contradiction with his own philosophy, for sympathy
would require that the men spare the goat herders because they were unarmed and
potentially innocent. If the goat herders came back armed that would be another
matter, but as of their unfortunate meeting, those three goat herders had not
apparently wronged the SEALs. Smith could even argue that without sympathy,
more instances such as the My Lai massacre in Vietnam may occur.11 In this way
sympathy would be a good thing, in that it would prevent civilian deaths in a time of
war. However, when looking at sympathy in a different light, Smith also seems to
argue that one can be too sympathetic when justice is concerned. For example,
suppose that you were a juror or a judge casting judgment on a thief. Smith would
say that since the thief were caught, disarmed, and are now at your mercy; you
might sympathize with their condition, and be less inclined to lay punishment.12 In
this situation the juror’s sympathy may be too much, and society may be cheated out
11
An article on this incident may be found on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_Lai_Massacre
12
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 91 §11 we can use the example of the centinel
for comparison, “He looks upon the centinel as an unfortunate victim, who, indeed, must, and
ought to be, devoted to the safety of numbers, but whom still, in his heart, he would be glad to
save; and he is only sorry, that the interest of the many should oppose it.”
Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 7 of 8
between justice and sympathy leave much to be desired, since there seems to be no
hard and fast rule on rectifying the differences of the two concepts when they
conflict.
Smith is also wrong when he states that we should consider justice to be the
only precise virtue in our moral considerations. If justice were the only precise virtue,
then it would seem that all the other virtues would not be required because all unjust
acts would be punished, and just acts would be rewarded. But society is more
complicated than that, and thus it is not enough for Smith to say that that justice is
the one virtue that is required for harmonious social cohesion, as he does on page
86 §4 where he states:
many pillars that uphold society, of which justice is a complex component. I say this
because there are certain instances, such as in the case of the Navy SEALs, where
justice is in doubt and there is no precise measure of justice. Who is to say whose
lives are more valuable, the American soldier’s or the unarmed goat herders? Who
is to say that if the positions were reversed, we would not feel differently about a
particular outcome in this situation? Finally, does Smith give us moral guidance, if
we have to make necessary decisions where the only options are that which are
Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 8 of 8
Ultimately, in the case of the Navy SEALs, the Leading Petty Officer decided
to spare the goat herder’s lives. The SEALs release the goat herders and in less
than an hour, a sizable Taliban force attacked them. All but the Leading Petty Officer
are killed. In the battle, approximately a hundred Taliban forces were killed or
wounded, along with sixteen additional dead Navy SEALs and Army special ops
forces whose helicopter was shot down. It seems that sympathy for the goat herders
trumped the Navy SEALs’ self-interests. These soldiers sacrificed their lives to live
up to an ideal that the innocent should be spared the violence of war as much as
possible. The actions of the soldiers are not compatible with Smith’s passage stating
his theory on animalistic instincts. The actions of the soldiers are compatible,
however, with Smith’s main theory that even in the toughest situations, human
sympathy may rein supreme. This is the message that Smith should have
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from
it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the
emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or
are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.13
13
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 9 §1