Air-Sea Battle and China’s Anti-Access and

Area Denial Challenge

November 2013

By David W. Kearn, Jr.

David W. Kearn, Jr. is Assistant Professor of Government and Politics at St. John’s
University. He is the author, most recently, of Facing the Missile Challenge: U.S. Strategy and the
Future of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty—published by RAND in 2012.

Abstract: The challenge presented by China’s military modernization has seemingly altered the
conventional balance in the Western Pacific, with significant implications for U.S. national security
policy, and, thus, deserves the focus of planners and decision-makers.

T his article examines the concept of Air-Sea Battle (ASB) as a response to the
growing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) challenge posed by the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). 1 While U.S. defense officials and experts have
been quick to point out that the concept is not directed at any single country, the
increasingly formidable capabilities deployed by China present the most appropriate
scenario for considering Air-Sea Battle’s potential contribution to U.S. national
security interests. It may be true that countries such as Iran, North Korea and Syria
also present A2/AD threats. However, they are typically “lower-end” in nature and
limited in scope and can be addressed by the conventional military superiority of the
United States and its regional allies. 2
The article proceeds as follows: the first section briefly describes and
discusses the nature of the Chinese A2/AD challenge. The illustrative case of a
potential conflict over Taiwan’s future status underscores what China’s military has
been able to accomplish and the difficulties confronting U.S. experts in forging an
effective response to a crisis or conflict initiated by Beijing. The second section lays
out the key components of Air-Sea Battle, based on the recently released de-
classified version of the concept, as well as other official statements. Using existing

1
Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges
(Washington: Air-Sea Battle Office, 2013), Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle?
(Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), Jan Van Tol, Mark
Gunziger, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
Concept (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010).
2 On the nature of the Iran A2/AD threat, see Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle?, pp. 28-35.

©2014
© 2013Published
Published forForeign
for the the Foreign Policy Institute
Policy Research Research Institute
by Elsevier Ltd.by Elsevier Ltd.

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doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2013.11.006
 China

and emerging technologies, including weapons systems but also focusing on

cyberspace and information warfare, Pentagon planners seek to create a highly
integrated, adaptive, and robust Joint Force approach to the A2/AD threat. Thus,
Air-Sea Battle and the overarching Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) can
be expected to shape and inform U.S. defense policy in the areas of planning,
research and development, procurement, and future force structures and postures. 3
The third section assesses the Air-Sea Battle concept in the larger geopolitical
context of a rising China and the relations of the Western Pacific. The critical
question that emerges is whether Air-Sea Battle—a warfighting concept—is
necessary for deterring China from aggressive behavior, or effectively defending
against Chinese offensive operations? The fourth section briefly considers two
alternative approaches—distant blockade and enhanced theater deterrence—and
programs that could enhance U.S. conventional military capabilities and contribute
to a greater Joint and allied capability to deter China and also avoid some of the
potential problems that challenge the perceived efficacy of Air-Sea Battle.

China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities

U.S. security concerns about the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are
driven primarily by a possible crisis or conflict involving Taiwan. For more than a
decade, the development and deployment of robust conventional short-range
ballistic missile (SRBM) capabilities have been as a specific focus of China’s military
modernization efforts. With over 1,000 shorter-range ballistic missiles (CSS-6 and
CSS-7) deployed in areas adjacent to Taiwan, these weapons have been viewed as
primarily dedicated to the mission of deterring leaders in Taipei from unilaterally
altering Taiwan’s current status and formally declaring independence or to
compelling the leadership in Taipei to reverse such a declaration and return to the
status quo ante. 4 However, as China’s missile capabilities have expanded, the nature
of the threat to Taiwan has also increased significantly. A coordinated Chinese
attack, utilizing its missile forces to degrade Taiwan’s air defenses and potentially
destroy much of the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) on the ground, even
units located within hardened, well-defended shelters, would virtually provide the
PLA Air Force (PLAAF) with air superiority over the Straits. With its quantitative
advantage in fighter and strike aircraft, the PLAAF would be expected to
overwhelm any surviving ROCAF units. Such a scenario underscores the crucial
role of the United States in a defense of Taiwan in the event of such an attack, but
the capacity for the United States to mount an effective response is now also in
doubt. 5 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has also deployed a formidable array
of intermediate-range missiles. The quantities and qualitative improvement of those

3 Joint Operational Concept (JOAC), United States Department of Defense, January 17, 2012.
4 David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry Wilson, Dire Strait?, Military Aspects of the
China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,
2000).
5 David A. Shlapak, et al., A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-

Taiwan Dispute (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), pp. 128-29.

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systems (particularly in terms of accuracy) combine to increasingly hold U.S. forces

in the region at risk. The conventional version of the CSS-5 IRBM, which is also
believed to be the basis of a “carrier-killer” anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
variant, is capable of hitting major U.S. air bases in the Western Pacific, including
Kadena on Okinawa and Kunsan in South Korea. 6 China also has developed and
deployed large numbers of DH-10 ground-based land attack cruise missiles (LACM)
which are estimated to possess a range of approximately 2100 km and are reportedly
re-targetable and highly accurate. Taken together with programs like fourth
generation strike aircraft, modern surface and sub-surface vessels, and significant
investments in anti-satellite (ASAT), as well as offensive cyberspace capabilities, U.S.
planners are now confronted with a complex and increasingly difficult challenge. 7
Given the importance of forward bases to any U.S. scenario for aiding
Taiwan in the event of a conflict, coupled with the important role that U.S. aircraft
carrier battle groups would have in responding to a crisis, China’s investment in
large quantities of increasingly lethal missile systems places those erstwhile assets in
danger. These capabilities are really at the core of what has been termed the “Anti-
Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD) strategy by defense experts in Washington. 8

Anti-Access (A2) – Action intended to slow deployment of friendly forces

in theater or cause forces to operate from distances farther from the locus
of conflict than they would otherwise prefer. A2 affects movement to a
theater. Area-Denial (AD)–Action intended to impede friendly
operations within areas where an adversary cannot or will not prevent
access. AD affects maneuver within a theater. 9

China’s efforts have focused squarely on blunting the U.S. ability to project power
into its immediate region and transforming what had previously been a major U.S.
advantage (relatively short-range strike aircraft launched from forward regional
bases and aircraft carriers) into a potential liability. Combined with advanced air-
defenses and other assets, China has created a zone around its coastal regions that
could be potentially too dangerous for U.S. forces to operate in, thus limiting the
offensive capabilities that the United States could bring to bear in a conflict. 10

While A2/AD ideas are not new—the desire to deny both access and the
ability to maneuver are timeless precepts of warfare—technological
advances and proliferation threaten stability by empowering potentially
aggressive actors with previously unattainable military capabilities. A new

6 Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, "On the Verge of a Game Changer," Proceedings
135, no. 5 (2009).
7 John Stillion, “Fighting Under Missile Attack,” Air Force Magazine, Aug. 2009, pp. 34-37.
8 Roger Cliff, et al., Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications

for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007).

9 Air-Sea Battle, p. 2.
10 Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea?: Chinese

Analysts Consider the Anti-ship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review 62:4 (2009).

134 | Orbis
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generation of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles with

improved range, accuracy, and lethality is being produced and proliferated.
Modern submarines and fighter aircraft are entering the militaries of many
nations, while sea mines are being equipped with mobility, discrimination,
and autonomy. 11

Beyond eroding U.S. firepower and capacity to mount an effective defense of

Taiwan, however, this also could undermine the ability of the United States to deter
Chinese aggression against Taiwan in the future. 12 If the conventional balance were
to shift so far in China’s favor, the decrease in expected costs may actually provide
incentives to strike first. 13 In a worst-case scenario, if China were able to launch a
well-coordinated, perfectly executed attack that effectively disarmed Taiwan, the
United States might be deterred from responding because its airbases would be
targeted and U.S. Naval forces could not approach the area without the risk of
taking heavy losses.
It is important to note that this is not to imply that Beijing is seeking to
prevail in a conventional war in the traditional sense. Even under the worst of
conditions, the United States would still have extensive capabilities to utilize outside
of the theater of operations. However, in the event of a crisis, China might seek to
seize the initiative by using its conventional military advantage (specifically its missile
forces) to achieve its political objectives vis-à-vis Taiwan, with a relatively large
scale, but “limited” use of military force to confront effectively the United States
with a fait accompli that would be perceived ostensibly as too costly to reverse in
Washington. 14 A potential U.S. military response under such circumstances is
obviously an open question, but clearly the potential for escalation to a much wider-
ranging conflict is high. This would obviously have grave implications for U.S.
interests in the region.

11 Air-Sea Battle.
12 Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and
U.S.-China Relations,” International Security 27: 2 (2002).
13 On deterrence, see: Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign

Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Paul K. Huth,
Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); John J.
Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Glenn Snyder,
Deterrence and Defense: Toward and Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1961).
14 On China’s strategy and doctrine, see for example: Stuart E. Johnson and Duncan Long

(eds.), Coping with the Dragon: Essays of PLA Transformation and the U.S. Military (Washington:
National Defense University, 2007); James C. Mulvenon,et al., Chinese Responses to U.S.
Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2006); James C. Mulvenon and David Finklestein, eds., China’s Revolution in
Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operation Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(Washington: CNA Corporation, 2005); Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security
Environment (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2004); Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese
Views of Future Warfare (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002).

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Effectively undermining integrated U.S. and allied operations, the

aggressor is likely [to] drive allies and partners to seek accommodation
with potential aggressors, or to develop alternate means of self-defense
with potentially destabilizing effects. Such an environment induces
instability, erodes the credibility of U.S. deterrence, can necessitate
escalation in U.S. and allies responses, and weakens U.S. international
alliances, including associated trade, economic, and diplomatic
agreements. 15

China’s modernization efforts were designed to rectify the vulnerabilities

perceived by Chinese leaders in the wake of the 1996 Taiwan Crisis, when President
Bill Clinton dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Straits in
response to provocative missile tests by China. 16 The tests, which were seen as an
attempt to intimidate Taiwan and pro-independence leaders in Taipei, failed to have
the desired political effect and the crisis passed. Considering the perceived lessons
of the 1991 Gulf War and 1999 Kosovo air campaign, both of which highlighted the
significant impact of U.S. precision-guided munitions (PGMs), the A2/AD strategy
plays to China’s geography, and its primary concern for maintaining Taiwan’s
status. 17 In engaging in a conflict with the United States, it is necessary to have a
buffer zone against U.S. forces to push them far enough away from critical targets
that its (primarily short-range) strike aircraft and PGMs are out of range.

The Emergence of Air-Sea Battle

In response to the Anti-Access threat, thinking within the Pentagon and the
security community has appeared to center on a new operational concept called Air-
Sea Battle. Analogous to the Air-Land Concept—that envisioned close
coordination between U.S. airpower and land forces and the use of cutting edge
surveillance and precision-strike capabilities to defeat numerically superior Soviet
conventional forces in Western Europe 18—ASB would combine all elements of U.S.
power to both maintain and expand the capacity of the United States to obtain
access in China’s coastal regions. While U.S. Air Force (USAF) and Navy (USN)
contributions are critical, a key assumption of the concept is that all domains will be
contested by the adversary: space, cyberspace, air, maritime, and land. U.S. forward
bases and allied assets should be considered within the A2/AD zone and, thus,
likely to be attacked with little warning, perhaps with coordinated missile strikes. 19
Nonetheless, U.S. forces and supporting capabilities must be robust and able to

15 Air-Sea Battle, p. 3.
16 Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the
Use of Force,” International Security 25:2 (2002).
17 Barry Watts, The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington: Center for Strategic and

Budgetary Assessments, 2011).

18 Van Tol, et al., AirSea Battle, pp. 5-8.
19 Assumptions of the concept are discussed in Air-Sea Battle, pp. 3-4.

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withstand the initial attack, seize the initiative and take the battle to the adversary
attacking in-depth to overcome and defeat it.

The ASB Concept’s solution to the A2/AD challenge in the global

commons is to develop networked, integrated forces capable of attack-in-
depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat adversary forces (NIA/D3). 20

Success in withstanding an attack likely will involve some mix of active and passive
defenses, increased diversification of bases (perhaps an increasing emphasis on sea-
basing or platforms that are less dependent on existing infrastructure), and other
efforts to complicate the adversary’s ability to target key assets.
However, one critical component of ASB is the maintenance of robust
Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) networks. Given China’s investment in ASAT weapons and offensive cyber
warfare capabilities, it is essential that U.S. forces maintain the integrity of their
networks to support effective situational awareness and contribute to seizing the
initiative by providing prompt information on targets for offensive operations.
Having withstood an initial attack, these assets would then execute a “blinding” or
“dazzling” campaign against Chinese targets with the objective of degrading their
networks and ability to effectively coordinate operations. This would set the stage
for offensive “suppression” operations against targets like SRBMs and IRBMs, C2
nodes, and airbases. 21

Attack enemy anti-access/area-denial defenses in depth rather than rolling

back those defenses from the perimeter…. The penetration is designed to
disrupt the integrity of the enemy defense system, the preferred defeat
mechanism, by striking at critical hostile elements, such as logistics and
command and control nodes, long-range firing units, and strategic
operational reserves. 22

Having seized the initiative, U.S. forces would then sustain the momentum across all
domains, rapidly identifying targets and breaking down the adversary’s defenses in a
prompt manner in depth—targeting the adversary’s reserves, fire support, logistics,
and command and control.
To illustrate the difference, consider the traditional alternative, attrition:

The historical alternative to this approach is to attack the perimeter of the

enemy’s defenses, pushing back those defenses while advancing. Such an
approach operates primarily by attrition and does not threaten the
integrity of the enemy’s defensive system, but rather merely compresses
those defenses as they fall back. This may actually play into the enemy’s
anti-access/area-denial strategy, which likely will attempt to use space and

20 Air-Sea Battle, p. 4.
21 For a thorough discussion of the various campaigns associated with the ASB concept, see
Van Tol, et al., AirSea Battle, pp. 53-74.
22 Joint Operational Access Concept, p. 24.

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time to inflict cumulatively unacceptable casualties on an advancing joint

force. 23

ASB is thus an operational concept that builds upon the notion of a complementary
Joint Force approach. It is expected to shape the way the Pentagon procures new
weapons systems, invests in research and development, and reconfigures force
structures over the longer-term. At its root Air-Sea Battle would maintain
operational access to critical regions. 24
In the case of the Western Pacific, it would, thus, deter China from
provocation, reassuring Taiwan and America’s allies in the region, and enhancing
stability in the event of a political crisis.

To meet the challenges described above, future joint forces will leverage
cross-domain synergy—the complementary vice merely additive
employments of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances
the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others—
to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will provide
the freedom of action required by the mission. 25

A2/AD capabilities create such a difficult challenge precisely because they combine
to provide China with a defensive zone that would significantly complicate U.S.
offensive operations in response to an attack. But this also reflects the geographic
“home field” advantage that China would seem to have in a conflict.
Having pushed the conflict zone away from its territory, the United States
position has been transformed into what effectively is a defensive posture. As ASB
assumes, China will have the initiative, with critical U.S. bases being within range of
China’s missiles and the areas around Taiwan increasingly dangerous for U.S. naval
forces to enter. In a conflict scenario, an Air-Sea Battle campaign would reverse
these unfavorable situational factors and seize the initiative to deny the potential
benefits of a Chinese attack and carry the conflict to China. It is a daunting
challenge that ASB has been developed to address.

Air-Sea Battle: Some Considerations

As presented in official sources, Air-Sea Battle is not without potential

drawbacks. As an operational concept, it is not just a war plan, but is expected to
shape and inform the ways in which military capabilities are developed, acquired and
utilized under conflict scenarios. It is, thus, expected to influence significantly
operational planning, tactics and training. In doing so, it is important to place Air-
Sea Battle in the context of U.S. national security strategy. Given relations between

23 Joint Operational Access Concept.

24 “Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenet, Chief of Naval Operations,” United States
House of Representatives, March 2012.
25 Joint Operational Access Concept, p. 14.

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 China

the United States and China, Air-Sea battle may have important implications that
should be considered alongside its perceived utility as an operational concept. First,
the perceived challenge of China’s A2/AD capabilities is predicated on its
geographic “home field” advantage in the Western Pacific. Even with sufficient
resources, this geographic advantage may be difficult to “overcome,” even with
innovative operational concepts and new and emerging capabilities in the ways
portrayed by ASB. Secondly, and related to the geographic realities of the region,
ASB seems to have significant risks of escalation, even to the level of nuclear
exchange. Finally, the explicit objectives of ASB— of defeating the adversary—may
only exacerbate existing mistrust between Washington and Beijing and prove to
reinforce fears of U.S. intentions in the region. In turn, this could make China more
assertive and difficult to negotiate with in the future, as well as increase the
probability of a crisis or conflict over Taiwan or other disputed territories in the
region.

China’s Asymmetric Advantages

First, in practice it may be difficult to develop cost-effective technological

solutions to overcome China’s geographic “home field” advantage, particularly to
the level of defeating the adversary envisioned in the existing presentations. 26 What
has been termed the “tyranny of distance,” presents U.S. planners with significant
difficulties in attempting to address the A2/AD challenge, as does combating
extensive Chinese anti-satellite, offensive and defensive cyber warfare capabilities,
and maintaining “guaranteed” friendly network communication activities under
conflict conditions. 27 There may be programmatic solutions to the less ambitious
objective of improving the conventional military balance between the United States
and PRC in order to enhance the U.S. ability to deter Chinese provocations by the
threat of punishment, but Air-Sea battle seems to move well beyond that notion of
deterrence.
Given its goal of disrupting, destroying, and defeating the enemy, ASB is a
warfighting concept that incorporates significant elements of damage limitation and
deterrence-by-denial. Aside from involving (likely) expensive weapons systems and
technologies, this not only has potential escalatory pressures under crisis conditions
(as discussed below), but more generally is likely to be viewed as highly provocative
and could spur further Chinese investments in improving or expanding the elements
of its A2/AD capacity. This arms race instability might contribute to increased
fears of U.S. intentions, thus, making Beijing more difficult to deter in the future. It
might also make the United States worse off if its investment only spurs reciprocal
or even greater Chinese investment to precipitate or exacerbate existing imbalances

26 Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea?,” Naval War
College Review, Autumn 2009, pp. 53-86.
27 Joint Operational Access Concept, pp. 36-39.

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in forces. 28 The demands of operating within the contested zone will make many
proposed air and surface platforms exceedingly costly, as we have already witnessed
in some notable existing programs. 29
Taken to the extreme, the ASB concept seems to be premised on
components that are not only likely to be prohibitively costly in a constrained
budgetary environment, or perhaps technologically unachievable in a relevant
timeframe, but could also be highly provocative and decrease stability in the
region. 30 Consider, for example, the notion of ringing China’s periphery with new
short- or medium-range conventional ballistic missiles. 31 While such an expansive
program could be effective in puncturing China’s A2/AD strategy and removing its
defensive buffer, it would also seem highly provocative, potentially destabilizing in
the event of a crisis (both sides may have incentives to strike first), as well as both
excessively costly and diplomatically controversial. Escalation will be considered in
the next section but much of the propositions associated with ASB would seem to
have significant implications for crisis stability. 32 Rather than removing the
incentives for either side to strike first in the event of a diplomatic crisis, the
presence of formidable counterforce weapons may actually push leaders to consider
first-strikes. More generally, as discussed, there is little reason to believe that the
deployment of U.S. theater missiles in China’s vicinity would have any reaction
other than to spur Chinese to react—whether through its weapons acquisition
programs or through strategic or doctrinal adjustments—that could ultimately make
the United States and its allies worse off over the long-term. 33
In contrast, other programs like a next-generation penetrating bomber
would also be costly, but might provide the United States with more flexible
capabilities and contribute to a wider range of missions. Similarly, investments in
extended-range munitions such as the proposed hypersonic-cruise missile that
leverage existing and planned platforms like the legacy bomber fleet and F-22 and F-

28 See, for example, Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics
30 (1978), pp. 167-214; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisted," World Politics
50 (1997), pp. 171-201.
29 The littoral combat ship may be a good example of this type of mission/capability

overload. See: Geoffrey Ingersoll and Brian Jones, “19 Reasons the Navy Should Cut This
$37 Billion Floating Eyesore,” Business Insider, June 19, 2019.
30 Joint Operational Access Concept, p. 37.
31 Jim Thomas, “Why the U.S. Army Needs Missiles,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2013, pp.

137-144.
32 Robert Jervis, “Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War,” Political Science Quarterly

108: 2 (1993), pp. 239-53.

33 The United States currently is prohibited from developing or deploying these types of

missiles under the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia, which is
similarly constrained. For a full discussion of the potential role of a new U.S. IRBM, see
David W. Kearn, Jr., Facing the Missile Challenge: U.S. Strategy and the Future of the INF Treaty
(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012).

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35 strike aircraft, could enhance U.S. capabilities without directly attempting to

defeat China’s A2/AD capabilities. 34

Air-Sea Battle and the Potential for Escalation

Second, escalation—even to a nuclear exchange— is a real risk. 35 While

most discussions of Air-Sea Battle assume that nuclear deterrence will hold, three
potential pathways emerge in most foreseeable ASB campaigns against China. The
first would involve attacks that were perceived to be on China’s strategic deterrent
(whether intended or not). Given that some portion of China’s nuclear-armed
IRBMs and ICBMs are believed to be road mobile, deployed on theater erector
launchers (TELs), if U.S. attacks happened to hit TEL units dedicated to nuclear
missions, China’s leadership may interpret that as an attack on China’s ability to de-
escalate the conflict or prevent a decisive defeat. Under such circumstances, China
may face pressures to “use it or lose it” and fearing being disarmed of this critical
capability, would opt to launch a nuclear strike, whether against U.S. targets in the
region or even the U.S. homeland. 36
The second pathway would involve a situation in which China’s leadership
determined that it was facing a devastating, perhaps irreversible defeat (or the loss of
Taiwan) that could also threaten the regime’s survival in the longer-term. In a
desperate attempt to alter their fortunes, a “gamble for resurrection,” China might
use their nuclear weapons to salvage what they could perceive as a face-saving end
to the conflict that avoided further losses. 37 The final pathway, touched on above,
would be if the Chinese leadership inferred that U.S. war aims in an ASB campaign
included regime change and the end of the CCP. Fearing for regime survival,
nuclear weapons may be used within the theater of operation to degrade U.S. forces,
target U.S. bases and allied forces, and potentially target the U.S. homeland. If the
stakes are perceived as “all or nothing” then there may be little cause for restraint
and it may be difficult for the U.S. to signal that its intentions are limited. 38
Finally, given the opaque nature of the regime, an additional concern would
be to focus on the operational control of China’s nuclear weapons under conflict
conditions. If, for example, the United States were successful in knocking out
Beijing’s ability to coordinate its offensive operations, would unit commanders have
the ability or authority to seize the initiative and launch a nuclear weapon? This was
a major concern vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War and it could be in a

34 “Hypersonic Cruise Missile: America’s New Global Strike Weapon,” Popular Mechanic, Dec.
4, 2006.
35 Joshua Rovner, “Changing Military Dynamics in East Asia: AirSea Battle and Escalation

Risks,” SITC-NWC Policy Brief, Jan. 2, 2012.

36 Rovner, “Changing Military Dynamics in East Asia,” p. 4.
37 Rovner, “Changing Military Dynamics in East Asia.”
38 Rovner, “Changing Military Dynamics in East Asia,” pp. 4-5.

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scenario in which the United States executes an Air-Sea Battle Campaign against
China. 39
Considering that a key objective of Air-Sea Battle appears to be the
“blinding” or “dazzling” of the enemy to have the ability to launch effective
offensive operations in-depth, the United States may be targeting the specific
capacity to keep a conflict limited and avoid loss of control of strategic weapons by
Beijing. At the very least, even assuming that Beijing could maintain control, the
“use it or lose it” dynamic would seem to be in effect. U.S. policymakers must
consider these risks precisely because of the proposed characteristics of an Air-Sea
Battle campaign against China. These are difficult problems to reconcile.

China and Taiwan: An Asymmetry of Interests

Third, at a fundamental level, China will always value Taiwan more highly than the
United States. 40 Even with a completely resource-unconstrained response that
could acquire and deploy all of the component parts of an Air-Sea Battle approach,
the fear of punishment or failing to achieve its full objectives may yet fail to deter
China from launching a punitive campaign against Taiwan, in the event that its
leaders declare independence. In this regard, the challenge confronting the United
States is quite different from that which spurred it to develop the Air-Land Battle
approach in Europe. An improved NATO conventional deterrent capability with
the peristentthreat of escalation may have increased the expected costs and
perceivedrisks of any Soviet move against Berlin, but the analogy breaks down
inconsidering a possible Chinese strike to reclaim or avoid the loss ofTaiwan. While
the United States is obligated to defend Taiwan, Beijing clearly views Taiwan’s status
as a central core interest, irrespective of the nature of the U.S. commitment. More
expansive deployment of highly effective, counterforce weapons would likely
reinforce a spiral of hostility and mistrust. 41 Prudent improvements of U.S.
conventional capabilities in or near (or capable of being rapidly deployed to) the
region should also be capable of reassuring Taipei and contributing to a more stable
cross-Straits balance.
At the same time, for other scenarios outside of Taiwan, such as a clash
over the Senkaku/Diayou Islands or the Spratlys that precipitated a crisis with other
U.S. regional allies, it is unclear whether Air-Sea Battle is required to deter China.
Enhancing existing U.S.-conventional capabilities, specifically munitions with
increased range and platforms that can operate effectively in contested zones, would
threaten China with significant damage.

39 See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), pp. 47-92.
40 Joint Operational Access Concept, p. 38.
41 Robert S. Ross, The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy is Unnecessary

and Counterproductive,” Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2012, pp. 70-82; Andrew J. Nathan and
Andrew Scobell, “How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing Fears,” Foreign Affairs,
Sept./Oct. 2012), pp. 32-47.

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Potential Alternative Approaches and Candidate Programs

The critical question seems to be whether Air-Sea Battle—which is

predicated on degrading the adversary’s C4ISR and, thus, its situational awareness,
executing offensive operations in depth, and effectively defeating the adversary—is
necessary to deter China from attempting to unilaterally resolve the status of Taiwan
or engaging in provocative behavior against other regional neighbors. At a basic
level, China’s A2/AD capabilities have eroded U.S. offensive capabilities that could
be expected to be utilized in the conflict. This suggests two important questions:
First, can the United States improve this conventional offensive balance, thus,
enhancing its ability to deter China, without deploying the capabilities or embracing
the operational plans that would most likely lead to escalation? Second, can the
United States develop and deploy capabilities that will confront Beijing with clear,
guaranteed costs in the event of provocative behavior even if it was successful in
launching a first strike? I would argue the answers are “yes, and yes.” The United
States can improve the conventional balance and can develop and deploy such
forces, and that this should be the focus of U.S. planning and procurement moving
forward. Two basic approaches will be considered here, as well as some exemplar
or candidate programs to maintain and enhance U.S.-conventional offensive
capabilities even in the context of a robust Chinese A2/AD challenge.

Distant Blockade/War at Sea?

Perhaps at the far end of the continuum from Air-Sea Battle, one potential
alternative concept would rely on a standoff approach that entails a long-range strike
on key targets and a distant blockade, targeting China’s interests (such as trade and
flows of energy and resources) outside of the A2/AD zone. 42 This would play to
existing U.S. strengths in surface and subsurface warfare, carrier aviation, as well as
antisubmarine warfare operations (ASW) which would be less difficult for U.S. Navy
assets further from the Chinese littoral. Access to basing outside of the immediate
theater—such as in Australia—would prove useful in facilitating logistical and
resupply operations. Such an approach would gradually (and perhaps too slowly in
domestic political terms) impose significant costs on Beijing, but could be sustained
as long as the U.S. political leadership deemed necessary, even to the point of
preparing for a larger scale counterattack into the theater.
It is understandable that a strategy of distant blockade is not attractive to
Pentagon planners. It effectively acknowledges that U.S. forward-deployed bases on
allied territories like Japan and South Korea are impossibly at-risk in the event of a
conflict and that A2/AD essentially has provided a riddle that cannot be solved.
Moreover, for assurance purposes, it would be unpalatable diplomatically (and

42For a detailed discussion, see: Douglas C. Peifer, “China, the German Analogy, and the
New AirSea Operational Concept,” Orbis, Winter 2011, pp. 114-131; also, see Jeffrey E.
Kline and Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., “Between Peace and The Air-Sea Battle,” Naval War College
Review, Autumn 2012, pp. 35-40.

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impossible in domestic U.S. political terms) to communicate to Tokyo, Seoul, and

Manila that they would be effectively on their own during the early stages of conflict
in which China was able to execute a first strike and employ it A2/AD approach.
For allies within the contested zone this would be disconcerting and potentially
destabilizing.

Enhanced Theater Deterrence

While a distant blockade approach prior to the crisis would be unattractive

in the event of a crisis or conflict with China, a more straightforward approach
would be to develop and deploy platforms and munitions that could enhance U.S.
offensive capabilities within and around the theater in the event of a crisis. It could
further operate at extended ranges with less risk than forward-deployed, short-range
strike aircraft. Such an approach acknowledges the increasing difficulties of
operations in the contested zone in China’s coastal areas but also leverages existing
and viable future U.S. assets to raise the expected costs China would face in the
event of a conflict. Focusing on platforms that could operate effectively from
longer ranges or survive in the contested zone would increase the ability of the
United States to deter China without the potential drawbacks of Air-Sea Battle
discussed above. 43 These types of weapons could also be brought into the theater
during a crisis to gradually ramp-up U.S. capabilities to signal resolve. Similarly, they
could be removed when a crisis is concluded. This graduated response greatly
contributes to a more stable deterrent posture but would also contribute to a
defensive campaign should deterrence fail.
One point that does seem to emerge from a discussion of distant blockade
and enhanced theater deterrence approaches that should not be forgotten is that the
threat of escalation is something that the United States can use against China. While
China may have succeeded in improving its capacity to initiate a first strike that
would undermine U.S. capabilities to effectively defend Taiwan in the theater, this
does not mean that the United States has no recourse. Communicating resolve and
willingness to escalate is inherently difficult, but there is no reason to assume that
the United States would be “self-deterred” from launching a campaign to punish
China for an attack on U.S. forces or allies in the region. Some experts may fear
that a flawlessly executed first strike that effectively knocked U.S. forces off-line, but
with minimal casualties and collateral damage to regional allies, would present the
United States with a fait accompli that Washington would then view as too costly to
reverse. Ultimately, it is a political question as to how the United States would
indeed react under such circumstances. Yet, it is difficult to assume that Beijing and

43On deterrence, see: Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign
Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Paul K. Huth,
Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); John J.
Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Glenn Snyder,
Deterrence and Defense: Toward and Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1961).

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the PLA leadership believe that such an “antiseptic” and relatively costless campaign
could be executed without a formidable and costly U.S. response.

Exemplar Programs

Consider the following programmatic alternatives. 44 One platform that

seems tailor-made for this mission is the Ohio-Class SSGN-726 or Guided (Cruise)
Missile Submarine. The United States Navy currently deploys four of these nuclear-
powered submarines, which can carry 126 Tactical Tomahawk Cruise Missiles.
They are highly survivable and capable of operating within the contested zones of
China’s coastal areas. Additional SSGNs, whether reconfigured from older ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs) or procured to maintain or enhance offensive
capabilities in the Pacific could make a contribution to restoring the conventional
offensive balance. Continuing to expand the range, penetrability, and targeting
capabilities of munitions like the Tactical Tomahawk also seems like a prudent
target of sustained investment in research, development and procurement. 45
Over the medium-term, revisiting concepts like the “Arsenal Ship,” a
relatively lightly-protected vessel that would carry approximately 500 Tactical
Tomahawk Missiles in vertical launch cells, or the “Arsenal Plane,” a reconfigured
P-8 Poseidon (based on a civilian 737 air frame), armed with 20-cruise missiles
similarly could provide significant, enhanced standoff offensive capabilities to
commanders in the theater. 46 Finally, over the long-term a next-generation long-
range penetrating bomber or a family of bombers that provide both penetrating and
standoff capabilities may be a prudent investment to support U.S. global interests
beyond the Taiwan Straits and the Western Pacific. 47 Additionally, continuing U.S.
successes in the field of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs) may offer a greatly
improved capacity to operate in contested zones.
All of these programs are premised on improving U.S. offensive capabilities
and, thus, enhancing the capacity of the United States to deter Chinese aggression or
provocations by increasing the expected costs that Beijing can expect to accrue even
if it is successful in executing a first strike. However, none of these are dedicated to
directly overcoming the A2/AD challenge, particularly the offensive operations in
depth that would be most likely to trigger escalation under conflict conditions.

44 Kearn, Jr., Facing the Missile Challenge, pp. 64-71.

45 “Ohio-Class SSGN-726 Tactical Trident,” GlobalSecurity.Org, 2011.
46 On the “Arsenal Ship,” see Robert S. Leonard, Jeffrey Drezner, and Geoffrey Sommer,

The Arsenal Ship: Acqusition Process Experience (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999). On
the modified P-8, see “Boeing P-8,” http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-
space/military/p8/.
47 Mark Gunzinger, Sustaining America's Advantage in Long-Range Strike (Washington, D.C.:

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010).

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Conclusion

Air-Sea Battle is an important starting point for understanding what the

United States needs to possess and deploy to deter China from attempting to
impose its preferred resolution to the status of Taiwan. However, its maximal
approach is likely to be costly in a time of budgetary austerity, risky in terms of
escalation, and highly threatening to Beijing, which may only make deterring future
aggression more difficult. While worst-case planning may be prudent, the United
States must also develop alternative approaches and the programs necessary to
enhance its abilities to deter China while also avoiding the problems of escalation
and provoking Beijing into a conflict that we are all seeking to avoid.
Ultimately, Air-Sea Battle seems like a military-technical solution to a
political problem—the contested political status of Taiwan. It is appropriate for
military planners who seek to provide the president and his advisers the maximal
flexibility and a diverse menu of options for a potential crisis or conflict to propose
and develop Air-Sea Battle as an operational concept. 48 However, for the reasons
discussed above—potential program costs of defeating China’s geographic
advantages, the real likelihood for escalation, and the low probability of actually
deterring Chinese actions if Beijing views its interests as fundamentally threatened—
Air-Sea Battle may not be optimal for U.S.-strategic interests. A war-fighting
approach would appear more appropriate in a political context in which the United
States was actively engaged in containing China, as it sought to contain the Soviet
Union during the Cold War.
However, where the United States and China are in a much more complex
and interdependent relationship, the Air-Sea Battle approach seems both premature
and disproportionate to the potential threat. Maintaining a stable conventional
military balance across the Taiwan Straits and in the Western Pacific as China
continues to grow may be difficult, but it is not impossible. The focus of overall
U.S. policy should remain squarely on deterring China from provocative behavior
while reassuring regional allies and fostering cooperation and stability in the region.
It is not clear that Air-Sea Battle is necessary to achieve these objectives.

48 Amitai Etzioni, “Who Authorized Preparations for War with China?” Yale Journal of

International Affairs, Summer 2013, pp. 37-51.

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