conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California.
Adolfo Aznar vs
Helen Christensen
Garcia
 Civil Law – Application of Laws – Foreign Law
– Nationality Principle – Internal and Conflict Rule
Application of the Renvoi Doctrine
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated
to California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In
1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money
in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo
Aznar was the executor of the estate. Counsel for Helen
claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code,
California law should be applied; that under California law,
the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the
other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law
of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being
entitled to anything under California law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased
should be applied in determining the successional rights of
his heirs.
HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more
successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two
rules in California on the matter; the internal law which
applies to Californians domiciled in California and the
Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of
his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings – the determination
of the successional rights under Philippine law only.
Non v. CA
G.R. No. 137287 February 15, 2000
Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned several pieces
of property, among them was the disputed property.
Virginia died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado died
three years later on 15 November 1985.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a
common residence at the Isarog property. However,
tension would appear to have escalated between
petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado
(wife of Nilo Viado) after the former had asked that the
property be equally divided between the two families.
Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over
the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate
the portion occupied by the latter. Hence, petitioners,
asserting co-ownership over the property in question,
filed a case for partition before the RTC.
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute
ownership over the subject property on two documents —
a deed of donation executed by the late Julian covering
his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor
of Nilo and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which
Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs and petitioner Rebecca
waived in favor of Nilo their rights and interests over
their share of the property inherited from Virginia.
Both instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and
registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which TCT
No.373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the
validity of the foregoing instruments, contending that the
late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to coerce
Julian to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner
Rebecca, in her particular case, averred that her brother
Nilo employed fraud to procure her signature to
the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that
the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia, in the
extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter’s
preterition that should warrant its annulment. Finally,
petitioners asseverated that the assailed instruments,
although executed on 23 August 1983, were registered
only five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the three
parties thereto, namely, Julian, Nilo and Leah had
already died.
The RTC then found for respondents and adjudged Alicia
Viado and her children as being the true owners of
the disputed property. The CA affirmed with modification
by ordering the remand of the records of the case to the
court a quo for further proceedings to determine
the value of the property and the amount respondents
should pay to petitioner Delia for having been preterited
in the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
ISSUE: WON the partition should be rescinded due to
the preterition of Delia as an heir.
NO. The exclusion of petitioner Delia, alleged to be a
retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily
has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition,
however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith,
does not justify a collateralattack on TCT No. 373646.
The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the CA, instead
rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that
where the preterition is not
attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be
rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of
the share pertaining to her. The appellate court has thus
acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for
further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the
Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due
petitioner Delia Viado.
Johnny Rabadilla vs
Court of Appeals
Civil Law – Succession – Transmissible Obligations
A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee to a 511, 855 hectare land. A
condition was however imposed to the effect that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza,
sister of Aleja, during the lifetime of said Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria
Belleza, the near descendants, shall continue delivering
the fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged,
or sold only to a relative of Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny
Rabadilla.
In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to
compel Johnny to reconvey the said land to the estate of
Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to
comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny
failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the land was
mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a
violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near
descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the near
descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of
Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants
at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on
the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to
comply with the terms of the Will left by Aleja Belleza.
HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of
merit. The “near descendants” being referred to in the will
are the heirs of  Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised
property was already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when
Aleja died. Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died,
ownership over the same property was transmitted to
Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all
the property, rights and obligations of a person, not
extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were transmitted to his
forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations
not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on
the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted
to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear therefore,
that Johnny should have continued complying with the
terms of the Will. His failure to do so shall give rise to an
obligation for him to reconvey the property to the estate of
Aleja.
Elena Morente vs
Gumersindo De La
Santa
 Conditions on the Institution of Heirs – Prohibition to
Remarry
Sometime in the early 1900s, Consuelo Morente died
leaving a will which provides that she is leaving all her real
estate in favor of her husband, Gumersindo De La Santa. It
is also provided in the will that De La Santa “shall not
remarry anyone“.
But four months after the death of Consuelo, De La Santa
contracted a subsequent marriage.
Elena Morente, sister of Consuelo, now filed a petition to
annul the institution made in favor of De La Santa on the
ground that by reason of De La Santa’s subsequent
marriage, he ad forfeited his inheritance.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid prohibition in the
case at bar.
HELD: No. It is true that a prohibition to remarry imposed
by the testator on his or her spouse is allowed. However, in
this case, from the clauses in the will left by Consuelo, the
prohibition was not so worded. There was no express
prohibition. The phrase that De La Santa “shall not remarry
anyone” was a mere statement or declaration. There was
even no provision as to what consequences will happen if in
the event that De La Santa will remarry. The will did not say
that he should reconvey the property to the estate of
Consuelo. Therefore, his second marriage did not give rise
to an action for the annulment of the institution made in his
favor in the will of his deceased wife.