Luzon Surety Co vs de Garcia
6) On July 30, 1960, a writ of execution was issued against
FACTS:
1) Ladislao Chavez, principal, and petitioner Luzon Surety Co
Inc, executed a surety bond in favor of PNB Victorias Branch to
guaranty a crop loan granted by the latter to Chavez in the sum
of PhP9,000.
2) Vicente Garcia, together with Ladislao Chavez and Ramon
Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement binding
themselves solidarily liable to indemnify Luzon Surety Co Inc
against any and all damages, costs and and other expenses which
the petitioner may sustain or incur in consequence of having
become guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest at the rate of
12% per annum, computed and compounded quarterly until fully
paid; and to pay 15% of the amount involved in any litigation or
other matters growing out of or connected therewith for
attorney's fees.
3) On April 27, 1956, PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao
Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to recover the amount of
PhP4,577.95, in interest, attorney’s fees and other costs.
4) On August 8, 1957, Luzon Surety Co. instituted a third party
complaint against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia.
5) On September 17, 1958, a judgment was rendered ordering
Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to pay PNB in solidarity. The
same decision likewise ordered the third party defendants
Chavez, Garcia and Lacson to pay Luzon Surety Co. the amount
to be paid to PNB.
Garcia to satisfy the claim of the petitioner. A writ of
garnishment was soon issued levying and garnishing the sugar
quedans of the Garcia spouses from their sugar plantation.
7) Spouses Garcia filed a suit for injunction and the trial court
ruled in favor of them. Luzon Surety, Inc. elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals, which, as mentioned at the outset, likewise
reached the same result. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: WON the CPG could be liable on an indemnity
agreement executed by the husband to accommodate athird party
in favor of a surety agreement
HELD: No. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals of December 17, 1965, now under review, is affirmed
with costs against petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted
by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where
she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from
obligations which constitute a charge upon property of
either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the
 marriage upon the separate property of either the husband or
the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the
partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership
property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the
children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate
children of one of the spouses;
provision.Its language is clear; it does not admit of doubt. No
process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to. It
peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement is made
in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the
judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed. So it is in
this case. That is how the Court of Appeals acted, and what it did
cannot be impugned for being contrary to law.

(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a

professional, vocational or other course.

Petitioner contends that Garcia’s transaction as a guarantor

through which he acquires the capacity of being trusted, adds to
his reputation and enhances his standing in the community. He
can thus secure money with which to carry on the purposes of
their conjugal partnership. While not entirely without basis, such
argument cannot prosper for it would negate what is expressly
provided for in Article 161.In the most categorical language, a
conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for
such"debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite
showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses. There is none in this case. While Garcia
by thus signing the agreement may be said to enhance his
reputation, such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too
remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the