World War [I

US Armored Infantry

Tactics
ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND ILLUSTRATOR
G O R D O N L R O T T M A N e n t e r e d t h e U S A r m y in 1967, v o l u n t e e r e d
for S p e c i a l Forces a n d c o m p l e t e d t r a i n i n g as a w e a p o n s specialist. H e s e r v e d
in t h e 5 t h S p e c i a l Forces G r o u p in V i e t n a m in 1969-70 a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y
in a i r b o r n e infantry, l o n g - r a n g e patrol a n d i n t e l l i g e n c e a s s i g n m e n t s until
retiring after 26 y e a r s . H e w a s a S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s Forces s c e n a r i o w r i t e r
at t h e J o i n t R e a d i n e s s Training C e n t e r for 12 y e a r s a n d is n o w a f r e e l a n c e
writer, living in Texas.

P E T E R D E N N I S w a s b o r n in 1950. I n s p i r e d b y c o n t e m p o r a r y m a g a z i n e s
s u c h as Look and Learn h e s t u d i e d illustration at L i v e r p o o l A r t C o l l e g e .
Peter has since contributed to hundreds of books, predominantly o n
historical s u b j e c t s , i n c l u d i n g m a n y O s p r e y titles. A k e e n w a r g a m e r
a n d m o d e l m a k e r , h e is b a s e d in N o t t i n g h a m s h i r e , U K .
Elite • 176

World War II
US Armored Infantry
Tactics

GORDON L ROTTMAN ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS

Consultant editor Martin Windrow
First p u b l i s h e d in G r e a t Britain in 2 0 0 9 b y O s p r e y P u b l i s h i n g ,
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
M i d l a n d H o u s e , W e s t W a y , Botley, O x f o r d 0 X 2 OPH, UK
T h e a u t h o r is g r a t e f u l f o r t h e a s s i s t a n c e p r o v i d e d b y Y v e s B e l l a n g e r a n d
4 4 3 Park A v e n u e S o u t h , N e w York, NY 10016, USA
J.J. H a y s
Email: info@ospreypublishing.com

© 2009 Osprey Publishing Ltd.

ARTIST'S N O T E
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Designs a n d Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication m a y be
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r e p r o d u c e d , s t o r e d in a retrieval s y s t e m , or t r a n s m i t t e d in a n y f o r m
All e n q u i r i e s s h o u l d b e a d d r e s s e d t o :
or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical,
p h o t o c o p y i n g , recording or otherwise, w i t h o u t the prior written permission Peter D e n n i s , 'Fieldhead', T h e Park,
of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers. Mansfield, N o t t i n g h a m s h i r e N G 1 8 2AT, UK

ISBN: 9 7 8 1 8 4 6 0 3 6 9 2 7 The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence u p o n
this matter.
e b o o k ISBN: 9 7 8 1 8 4 9 0 8 120 7

Editor: Martin W i n d r o w
D e s i g n : Ken Vail G r a p h i c D e s i g n , C a m b r i d g e , UK ( k v g d . c o m )
ABBREVIATIONS
T y p e s e t in S a b o n a n d M y r i a d Pro AAA antiaircraft artillery
Index b y Fineline Editorial Services A b n Div airborne division
O r i g i n a t e d by U n i t e d Graphic Pte Ltd, S i n g a p o r e AFA a r m o r e d field artillery
P r i n t e d in C h i n a t h r o u g h W o r l d Print L t d . AIB armored infantry battalion
AIR armored infantry regiment
0 9 1 0 11 12 13 1 4 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
AP armor-piercing

A C I P c a t a l o g u e r e c o r d f o r t h i s b o o k is a v a i l a b l e f r o m t h e B r i t i s h L i b r a r y A r m d Div A r m o r e d Division
AT antitank
CC Combat Command
CCA, CCB, CCC C o m b a t C o m m a n d s A , B, a n d C ( a k a C C R )
FOR A C A T A L O G U E O F A L L B O O K S P U B L I S H E D BY OSPREY M I L I T A R Y CCR C o m b a t C o m m a n d Reserve
A N D A V I A T I O N PLEASE C O N T A C T : GHQ General Headquarters
HE high-explosive
Osprey Direct, c/o R a n d o m House Distribution Center,
HHC Headquarters and Headquarters Company
400 Hahn Road, Westminster, M D 21157
HMG heavy machine gun
Email: uscustomerservice@ospreypublishing.com
HQ headquarters
Inf Div Infantry Division
Osprey Direct, The Book Service Ltd, Distribution Centre,
LMG light machine g u n
C o l c h e s t e r R o a d , F r a t i n g G r e e n , C o l c h e s t e r , Essex, C 0 7 7DW
MG machine gun
E-mail: c u s t o m e r s e r v i c e @ o s p r e y p u b l i s h i n g . c o m
NCO n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d officer
www.ospreypublishing.com OVE on-vehicle equipment
RC Reserve C o m m a n d
SMG submachine gun
SOP standard operating procedures
SP/SPM self-propelled/ m o u n t
TD tank destroyer
TF Task Force

LINEAR MEASUREMENTS
D i s t a n c e s , r a n g e s , a n d d i m e n s i o n s a r e g i v e n in t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y US
system of inches, feet, yards, a n d statute miles rather than metric. To covert
these figures t o metric t h e f o l l o w i n g conversion formulas are provided:

feet to meters multiply feet by 0.3058

yards to meters multiply yards by 0.9114
miles to kilometers m u l t i p l y miles b y 1.6093

THE WOODLAND TRUST

O s p r e y P u b l i s h i n g are s u p p o r t i n g t h e W o o d l a n d Trust, t h e UK's l e a d i n g
w o o d l a n d conservation charity, by f u n d i n g t h e dedication of trees.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 4

ORGANIZATION 8
The armored division - Combat commands . Armored infantry regiments and battalions

ANATOMY OF THE ARMORED INFANTRY BATTALION 17

Companies - platoons - squads

WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT 26

Individual weapons - crew-served weapons - The halftrack

TACTICS: THEORY, AND CAPABILITIES 30

Lack of doctrine - Lack of training . Movement formations - The squad and platoon:
life in the halftrack - dismounted formations - Mission capabilities: the rifle company -
the armored infantry battalion - the armored infantry regiment . Fire support

PRACTICE: TANK-INFANTRY COORDINATION 48

Understanding and exploiting the balance of strengths and weaknesses . Communications

UNITS IN ACTION 55
Failure and success: CCA, 12th Armored Division, January-February 1945 -
dismounted company action without armor - tank-infantry team clearing a town

ASSESSMENTS & CONCLUSIONS 61

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 63

INDEX 64
WORLD WAR II
US ARMORED INFANTRY
TACTICS

INTRODUCTION
In the y e a r s f o l l o w i n g the m o d e r a t e l y effective a p p e a r a n c e o f t a n k s o n the
battlefields o f the G r e a t W a r there w a s a g r e a t d e a l of d e b a t e in r e g a r d s their
future roles a n d e m p l o y m e n t , g i v i n g rise t o t w o b a s i c s c h o o l s of t h o u g h t o n
a r m o r tactics. O n e s a w tanks only as slow-moving gun platforms providing
direct s u p p o r t t o the infantry: in effect, s i m p l y m a c h i n e g u n - d e s t r o y e r s a n d
o b s t a c l e - b r e a c h e r s . T h e m o r e d y n a m i c s c h o o l e n v i s i o n e d highly m o b i l e
i n d e p e n d e n t a t t a c k forces with their o w n artillery, engineers, logistical s u p p o r t ,
a n d ( o h , yes...) s o m e infantry. A r m o r w a s the cavalry's r e p l a c e m e n t , intended
t o slice t h r o u g h e n e m y lines a n d strike d e e p in the rear t o d e s t r o y a n d d i s r u p t
c o m m a n d p o s t s , reserves, artillery, a n d logistics. In reality, b o t h capabilities are
n e c e s s a r y - t a n k s s u p p o r t i n g infantry, a n d i n d e p e n d e n t c o m b i n e d - a r m s a r m o r
f o r c e s - b u t r e g a r d l e s s o f the t a n k s ' r o l e , infantry is a critical necessity for the
successful e m p l o y m e n t o f a r m o r , a s a r e all other a r m s a n d services.

Pre-war M3 halftracks of a rifle

platoon line up for maneuvers.
Bumper markings were not
standardized at this time, but
were usually yellow; these
vehicles belongs to the 7th
Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized).
A.30cal M1917A1 water-cooled
machine gun can be seen
pointing skyward on the lead
halftrack.
 Three pre-war M3 halftracks
with winches in place of the
bumper-mounted roller.
Typically only the company
maintenance section had a
halftrack with a winch, but in
practice they were issued
irregularly and any number
might be found in a unit. All
three vehicles mount .50cal
M2 machine guns.

M o s t a r m o r - f o r c e p r o p h e t s a c c e p t e d the n e e d for s o m e infantry, b u t the

question w a s h o w to t r a n s p o r t them, a n d h o w exactly should they be
e m p l o y e d ? F o r the m o s t p a r t these v i s i o n a r i e s s e r i o u s l y u n d e r e s t i m a t e d the
r a t i o of infantry n e c e s s a r y t o s u p p o r t t a n k s . T a n k e r s v i e w e d i n f a n t r y j u s t a s
i n f a n t r y m e n v i e w e d t a n k s - a s essentially a s u p p o r t for their o w n a r m - a n d
the necessity for the c o m p l e t e i n t e g r a t i o n o f units o f all b r a n c h e s for effective
c o m b i n e d - a r m s o p e r a t i o n s w a s far f r o m u n d e r s t o o d .

T h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f infantry a n d a r m o r h a d a s l o w s t a r t . T h e first s u c h effort

w a s in 1 9 2 9 w h e n C o m p a n y H , 3 4 t h I n f a n t r y w a s m o t o r i z e d w i t h l ^ - t o n
s i x - w h e e l t r u c k s a n d w a s m a d e p a r t o f the f l e d g l i n g M e c h a n i z e d F o r c e , a
h o d g e - p o d g e o f s m a l l t a n k , a r m o r e d car, artillery, a n d s u p p o r t u n i t s . T h i s
" G a s o l i n e B r i g a d e " d i d n o t " b e l o n g " t o a p a r t i c u l a r b r a n c h ; a n effort w a s
m a d e t o p l a c e it in the c a v a l r y , since it w a s v i e w e d a s a n e x t e n s i o n o f the
c a v a l r y ' s m o b i l i t y a n d s h o c k p o w e r , t h o u g h m a n y felt t h a t the r e s u l t i n g
b r a n c h j e a l o u s i e s w o u l d be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e t o the F o r c e ' s d e v e l o p m e n t .
R e g a r d l e s s , A r m y Chief of Staff G e n D o u g l a s M a c A r t h u r d i s b a n d e d the F o r c e

An M3 halftrack secured by
rope and chocked in place
aboard a transport for overseas
movement. The canvas top
cover is in place, but without
the bows that would raise it
about a foot higher.

5
An M3 halftrack rolls through
an Algerian town. The
American flag adorned
the sides of halftracks in
North Africa as a means of
friend-or-foe recognition.
Rows of M3 halftracks stored in
Britain and waiting issue to
deploying units. All have
bumper winches. Note the soil
spread on the white star
marking on the hood, to make
it less noticeable to aircraft.
6
a n d t u r n e d its a s s e t s over t o the cavalry, w i t h the infantry c o m p a n y , engineers,
a n d artillery reverting t o their o w n b r a n c h e s ' c o n t r o l . A n e w unit w a s created
in 1 9 3 3 , 1st C a v a l r y R e g i m e n t ( M e c h a n i z e d ) ; this w a s n o t a c o m b i n e d - a r m s
unit, b u t p u r e l y cavalry. In the m e a n t i m e the infantry d e m a n d e d its o w n t a n k
c a p a b i l i t y s i m p l y a s s u p p o r t for i n f a n t r y m e n o n f o o t ; the I n f a n t r y T a n k
S c h o o l h a d b e e n c r e a t e d , a n d the e x i s t i n g 1st T a n k R e g t b e c a m e the 6 6 t h
Infantry Regt (Light T a n k ) .
In 1 9 3 8 the 7 t h C a v a l r y B r i g a d e ( M e c h a n i z e d ) w a s a c t i v a t e d , w i t h the
1 s t a n d 1 3 t h C a v a l r y R e g t s ; this relied o n c o m b a t c a r s (light t a n k s ) a n d
a r m o r e d c a r s for c o m b a t p o w e r , w i t h s o m e artillery b u t n o infantry. In 1 9 4 0
the i n f a n t r y c o n s o l i d a t e d its t a n k s i n t o the P r o v i s i o n a l T a n k B d e , strictly a
h o l d i n g u n i t f o r t a n k s . D u r i n g t h a t y e a r ' s L o u i s i a n a M a n e u v e r s the t w o
b r i g a d e s w e r e f o r m e d i n t o a n ad hoc t a n k d i v i s i o n ; the v a l u e of these units
w a s r e c o g n i z e d , a n d after the s u c c e s s of the G e r m a n P a n z e r s in E u r o p e it w a s
realized that c o m b i n e d - a r m s a r m o r e d divisions were essential, with
h a l f t r a c k - b o r n e i n f a n t r y a s s i g n e d t o the n e w f o r m a t i o n s . T h e 7 t h C a v a l r y
B d e b e c a m e the 1st A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n , a n d the P r o v i s i o n a l T a n k B d e the 2 d
A r m d D i v o n J u l y 1 5 , 1 9 4 0 . T h e a r r i v a l o f e q u i p m e n t w a s s l u g g i s h while
A m e r i c a s l o w l y g e a r e d u p for w a r .
In 1 9 4 1 - 4 2 the A r m y p l a n n e d t o
o r g a n i z e five m o t o r i z e d infantry divisions;
e a c h w o u l d be fielded a l o n g s i d e t w o
a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s , the three c o m p r i s i n g a n
a r m o r e d c o r p s . T h e y w e r e t o be o r g a n i z e d
a l o n g the lines o f a s t a n d a r d infantry
d i v i s i o n , b u t the infantry r e g i m e n t s w o u l d
be p r o v i d e d sufficient t r u c k s t o m a k e t h e m
c o m p l e t e l y m o b i l e . T h e r e w o u l d a l s o be
significantly i n c r e a s e d m a i n t e n a n c e a s s e t s ,
a n d a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s q u a d r o n rather than
a t r o o p . T h e o r i g i n a l test division - 4 t h Inf
Div - w a s partly equipped with halftracks,
but these were w i t h d r a w n . T h e 6th-8th
a n d 9 0 t h Inf D i v s w e r e a l s o r e o r g a n i z e d a s
 The effects of antitank gun fire
on an M2 halftrack car; the
contents of the ammunition
storage compartment had
detonated and caused the
entire vehicle to burn. The
3.7cm Pak 35/36 AT g u n -
nicknamed the Turklopfer
(Doorknocker) by German
soldiers, as it was ineffective
against most tanks - was still
deadly to lightly armored
American halftracks.

m o t o r i z e d , b u t d i d n o t receive a d d i t i o n a l t r u c k s . In early 1 9 4 3 these d i v i s i o n s

w e r e c o n v e r t e d b a c k t o s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y ; they r e q u i r e d t o o m a n y vehicles
a n d t o o m u c h s h i p p i n g s p a c e , fuel, a n d tires. T h e 4 t h M o t D i v w a s t o be
" a r m o r i z e d , " with halftrack-equipped a r m o r e d infantry regiments a n d
full-tracked self-propelled artillery. T h e 4 t h r e q u i r e d m o r e s h i p p i n g s p a c e t h a n
a n a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n ; r e j e c t e d by t h e a t e r c o m m a n d e r s , it w a s c o n v e r t e d t o
s t a n d a r d infantry.
T h e A r m o r e d F o r c e w a s established o n J u l y 1 0 , 1 9 4 0 at Ft K n o x , K e n t u c k y
to c o n d u c t service tests for a r m o r e d units a n d o v e r s e e their o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d
training. It w a s r e d e s i g n a t e d the A r m o r e d C o m m a n d o n J u l y 2 , 1 9 4 3 , w i t h a
lessening o f its c o n t r o l o f the a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s , a n d a t the s a m e t i m e the
a r m o r e d c o r p s w e r e r e d e s i g n a t e d a r m y c o r p s . 1 It w a s r e d e s i g n a t e d yet a g a i n ,
a s the A r m o r e d Center, o n F e b r u a r y 2 0 , 1 9 4 4 , b e c o m i n g e s s e n t i a l l y a
r e p l a c e m e n t t r a i n i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n . E v e n t h o u g h a r m o r e d infantry units w e r e
c o m p o n e n t s of a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s , m o s t o f their t a b l e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
d o c t r i n e , o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d training s t a n d a r d s w e r e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the
Chief of Infantry at Ft B e n n i n g , G e o r g i a .
T h e fighting in N o r t h A f r i c a in early 1 9 4 3 identified m a n y f l a w s in a r m o r
d o c t r i n e , tactics, o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d e q u i p m e n t . T h e U S A r m y suffered g r e a t l y
f r o m b r a n c h p a r o c h i a l i s m , a n d the c o s t o f s u c h self-centeredness w a s l e a r n e d
the h a r d w a y in c o m b a t ; in the early d a y s the s i t u a t i o n actually w o r s e n e d , a n d
c o - o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n a r m o r a n d infantry w a s e x t r e m e l y p o o r . S e p a r a t e t a n k
b a t t a l i o n s s u p p o r t e d infantry d i v i s i o n s , b u t often i n f a n t r y c o m m a n d e r s d i d
n o t include t a n k unit officers in their staff m e e t i n g s . E v e n the u n i t s o f the 1st
A r m d D i v w e r e frittered a w a y in s u p p o r t o f i n f a n t r y . F a r f r o m c o m b a t
w e l d i n g t h e m i n t o a t e a m , the d i s t r u s t b e t w e e n t a n k e r s a n d i n f a n t r y m e n
actually intensified. F o r t u n a t e l y , m a n y o f t h e s e i s s u e s h a d b e e n r e s o l v e d b y

1
Armored corps were redesignated standard army corps on October 10, 1943 before
deploying overseas: II Armd Corps became XVIII C o r p s , III became X I X C o r p s , and IV
became X X Corps. I Armd Corps w a s inactivated in Tunisia and its assets became Seventh
Army on July 10, 1 9 4 3 . The Army planned for 61 armored divisions in 1 9 4 1 , reduced this
to 4 7 along with 23 armor corps in 1 9 4 2 , then to 2 6 , then 2 0 . In practice only 16 armored
divisions were organized.

7
the t i m e o f the i n v a s i o n o f c o n t i n e n t a l E u r o p e in m i d 1 9 4 4 , w i t h the
r e c o g n i t i o n of the n e e d for i n c r e a s e d t a n k - i n f a n t r y training a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n .
O n l y the 1st a n d 2 d A r m d D i v s f o u g h t in N o r t h A f r i c a ; the 1st w e n t o n
t o fight in Italy a n d the 2 d o n Sicily a n d then in N o r t h w e s t E u r o p e . All other
a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s ( 3 d - 1 4 t h , 1 6 t h , 2 0 t h ) s e r v e d in N o r t h w e s t a n d C e n t r a l
E u r o p e . (The 16th a n d 2 0 t h s a w only one and t w o weeks' c o m b a t ,
respectively, in the w a r ' s final d a y s . )

T h i s s t u d y is d e v o t e d t o the a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s a n d r e g i m e n t s
o r g a n i c t o a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s a n d s u p p l y i n g their infantry c o m p o n e n t . T h e y
w e r e n o t s i m p l y s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y units r i d i n g h a l f t r a c k s , b u t w e r e u n i q u e l y
o r g a n i z e d , a r m e d , a n d e q u i p p e d . T h e a c t i o n s of a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s a r e m u c h
s t u d i e d , b u t often the t a n k s a r e h i g h l i g h t e d a t the e x p e n s e of the a r m o r e d
i n f a n t r y t h a t p r o v i d e d half o f the d i v i s i o n s ' m a n e u v e r b a t t a l i o n s . O n e r e a s o n
f o r this i n e q u i t y is t h a t the a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y s e l d o m f o u g h t f r o m their
h a l f t r a c k s , m o s t often fighting o n f o o t a l o n g s i d e S h e r m a n t a n k s .

ORGANIZATION
The armored division 2
T h e 1 9 4 0 a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n , w h i c h never s a w c o m b a t , w a s a t a n k - h e a v y force
w i t h a c u m b e r s o m e c o m m a n d a r r a n g e m e n t . It c o n s i s t e d o f a n a r m o r e d
b r i g a d e w i t h o n e t w o - b a t t a l i o n m e d i u m a n d t w o t h r e e - b a t t a l i o n light
a r m o r e d r e g i m e n t s , a n d a b a t t a l i o n - s i z e d artillery " r e g i m e n t " w i t h only 2 4
howitzers instead of 3 6 . A two-battalion "infantry regiment ( a r m o r e d ) " w a s
a s s i g n e d t o the d i v i s i o n , s e e m i n g l y a l m o s t a s a n a f t e r t h o u g h t . T h e r e w a s a l s o
a t h r e e - b a t t e r y artillery b a t t a l i o n t o s u p p o r t the infantry r e g i m e n t , b u t w i t h
o n l y f o u r t r u c k - d r a w n 1 0 5 m m h o w i t z e r s p e r b a t t e r y p l u s a b a t t e r y of eight
7 5 m m a n t i t a n k g u n s . D i v i s i o n a l u n i t s i n c l u d e d engineer, o r d n a n c e
m a i n t e n a n c e , q u a r t e r m a s t e r supply, a n d medical battalions; a signal
c o m p a n y ; a n d a b a t t a l i o n - s i z e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s q u a d r o n w i t h a light t a n k ,
a n a r m o r e d rifle, a n d t w o r e c o n n a i s s a n c e c o m p a n i e s . T h e d i v i s i o n p o s s e s s e d
3 8 1 tanks, 148 halftracks, and 9 7 scout cars, with 1 2 , 6 9 7 troops.
T h i s r a t i o o f o n l y t w o i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s t o eight of t a n k s w a s entirely
i n a d e q u a t e . C o u n t i n g a s s e t s in the r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s q u a d r o n , there w e r e 2 5
t a n k c o m p a n i e s (six m e d i u m , 1 9 light) t o o n l y s e v e n rifle c o m p a n i e s . T h e
d i v i s i o n c o u l d n o t s e c u r e the g r o u n d it t o o k , p r o v i d e flank a n d rear security,
m o p u p , a n d p r e p a r e the g r o u n d for d e f e n s e , m u c h less h o l d it. O n l y the 1st
a n d 2 d A r m d D i v s w e r e o r g a n i z e d under this excessively u n b a l a n c e d structure.
In M a r c h 1 9 4 2 the a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n w a s s t r e a m l i n e d t o i m p r o v e
c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l a n d i n c r e a s e the r a t i o o f i n f a n t r y t o t a n k s . T h e
b u r d e n s o m e brigade echelon w a s eliminated, along with one armored
r e g i m e n t ; there w e r e n o w t w o a r m o r e d r e g i m e n t s , e a c h w i t h o n e light a n d
t w o m e d i u m b a t t a l i o n s . T h e a r m o r e d infantry regiment w a s e x p a n d e d to three
b a t t a l i o n s , a n d there w e r e n o w three a r m o r e d field artillery (AFA) b a t t a l i o n s ,
e a c h w i t h three s i x - t u b e s e l f - p r o p e l l e d 1 0 5 m m h o w i t z e r batteries. C o m m a n d

2
See also Osprey Battle Orders 3: US Armored Divisions: The European Theater of
Operations, 1944-45.
 During the Louisiana
Maneuvers, an M2 halftrack car
of 78th Field Artillery Bn comes
off a pontoon bridge. Mainly
used as a prime-mover, this
one tows a 75mm M1897A2
field gun, which was the
standard divisional artillery
piece until it began to be
replaced by the 105mm M2A1
howitzer in 1940. The 78th FA
Bn later became an armored
field artillery (AFA) battalion of
the 2d Armored Division.

a n d c o n t r o l e l e m e n t s w e r e p a r t o f the d i v i s i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s : d i v i s i o n
h e a d q u a r t e r s , a r m o r e d s i g n a l a n d service c o m p a n i e s , h e a d q u a r t e r s o f the
division artillery c o m m a n d , a n d t w o s m a l l c o m b a t c o m m a n d h e a d q u a r t e r s
and headquarters detachments. T h e t w o C C s could control any m i x of tank,
a r m o r e d infantry, a n d a r m o r e d artillery units p l u s other s u p p o r t i n g e l e m e n t s .
While the r a t i o of infantry t o a r m o r h a d i m p r o v e d it w a s still n o t e n o u g h .
T h e r e w e r e n o w 1 9 t a n k c o m p a n i e s ( 1 2 m e d i u m , s e v e n light) a n d n i n e
a r m o r e d rifle c o m p a n i e s . T h e r e w e r e 3 9 0 t a n k s (an i n c r e a s e ) , 6 9 4 h a l f t r a c k s ,
4 0 scout cars, and 1 4 , 6 3 0 men. R e c o n n a i s s a n c e capabilities h a d been
i m p r o v e d ; the r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o n n o w h a d three c o m p a n i e s p l u s o n e o f
light t a n k s , h a v i n g lost its rifle c o m p a n y , a n d e a c h a r m o r e d r e g i m e n t n o w
had a reconnaissance company.
F u r t h e r i m p r o v e m e n t s w e r e i m p l e m e n t e d in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 . ( T h e n e w
o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s m u c h i n f l u e n c e d b y the n e w P a n z e r d i v i s i o n , w i t h its

M3 halftracks of 6th Armd Inf

Regt, 1 st Armd Div halt in a
desert oasis in Tunisia; note
the brown-on-olive drab
camouflage pattern. The 6th
AIR was the first armored
infantry unit to see action.
streamlined c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l a n d utilization o f s m a l l e r m i s s i o n - o r i e n t e d
t a s k f o r c e s ; the British w e r e a l s o u s i n g smaller, m o r e c o n t r o l l a b l e a r m o r e d
d i v i s i o n s . ) T h e r e v i s i o n s r e d u c e d the d i v i s i o n ' s s t r e n g t h b y a l m o s t 4 , 0 0 0
troops to 1 0 , 9 3 7 , with 2 6 3 tanks, 5 0 1 halftracks, and 5 4 a r m o r e d cars.
D i v i s i o n s in the S t a t e s r e o r g a n i z e d b e t w e e n S e p t e m b e r a n d N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 3 .
T h e o v e r s e a s 1st, 2 d , a n d 3 d A r m d D i v s r e t a i n e d the 1 9 4 2 s t r u c t u r e o f o n e
a r m o r e d infantry a n d t w o t a n k r e g i m e n t s ; they w e r e referred t o a s " h e a v y "
divisions a n d the o t h e r s a s " l i g h t . " T h e 1st w a s c o n v e r t e d t o a light d i v i s i o n
in Italy in J u n e - J u l y 1 9 4 4 . T h e 2 d a n d 3 d r e t a i n e d t h e h e a v y s t r u c t u r e
t h r o u g h the w a r ; the C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r a l , E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r o f O p e r a t i o n s ,
a p r o p o n e n t o f the o l d h e a v y s t r u c t u r e , d e c l a r e d t h a t there w a s n o t i m e t o
r e o r g a n i z e the d i v i s i o n s d u e t o o n g o i n g o p e r a t i o n s .
T h e 1 9 4 3 light d i v i s i o n r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a w the t a n k a n d i n f a n t r y
r e g i m e n t a l e c h e l o n s e l i m i n a t e d a l t o g e t h e r ; there w e r e n o w three b a t t a l i o n s
e a c h o f t a n k , a r m o r e d infantry, a n d a r m o r e d field artillery. T h e three t a n k

THE ARMORED INFANTRY'S MOUNT
This M3A2 halftrack passenger carrier mounts a .50cai M2
machine gun on an M49 m o u n t forward, and a .30cal
M1919A4 in the rear. The style and colors of nationality and
unit identification, bumper numbers, and other markings
varied over time and between units. Normally the right
bumper marking identified the division and battalion, e.g.
"8A49" for the 8th Armd Div's 49th AIB. The left bumper bore
company and vehicle identification, e.g. "A-12." Halftracks of
the HHC bore "HQ-number," and of the Service Co,
"SVC-number." Tie-down fluorescent AL-140 air-to-ground
signal panels (30.5in wide by 12ft long), intended for spelling
out codes, were used for recognition. They were available in
orange (as here), dark blue, cerise-red, and yellow, all with a
white reverse.
The vehicle is festooned with the rifle squad's personal
equipment, C-ration boxes, and other gear. Rather than
backpacks armored infantrymen were issued musette bags, a
haversack carried by a shoulder strap. When dismounted they
traveled light, leaving most of their gear in the halftrack -
usually including even their cartridge belt and canteen - and
carrying ammunition in their pockets. They were uniformed
no differently than other infantrymen, but were often seen
wearing tanker's jackets rather than field jackets, and they
sometimes wore mechanic's coveralls as opposed to fatigues
or wool field uniforms.
On their left shoulder they displayed the triangular
armored division patch (inset), in gold-yellow, blue, and red,
signifying the merger of cavalry, infantry, and artillery. (When
out of the line, most soldiers wore their garrison caps cocked
to the right, but armored infantrymen canted them to the left
- an unofficial practice.)
While the mainstay of the tank
battalions was the M4 Sherman
medium, the M5 Stuart light
tank (left) played a valuable
role in reconnaissance and
security missions. Note the
logs and sandbags attached
for additional protection.

b a t t a l i o n s w e r e m i x e d , w i t h o n e light a n d t h r e e m e d i u m c o m p a n i e s (a
r e d u c t i o n o f 1 2 7 t a n k s ) ; a d d i t i o n a l G H Q s e p a r a t e t a n k b a t t a l i o n s c o u l d be
a t t a c h e d t o infantry d i v i s i o n s . T h e d i v i s i o n n o w h a d 13 t a n k c o m p a n i e s (nine
m e d i u m , f o u r light) a n d nine a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y c o m p a n i e s - still n o t quite
e n o u g h g r o u n d - p o u n d e r s . W i t h the l o s s o f the t a n k r e g i m e n t s ' f o r m e r
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e c o m p a n i e s , the c a v a l r y r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s q u a d r o n - a
b a t t a l i o n - s i z e d unit - n o w h a d f o u r c o m p a n y - s i z e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e t r o o p s ,
a n a s s a u l t g u n t r o o p , a n d a light t a n k c o m p a n y . A r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s n o r m a l l y
h a d a n antiaircraft artillery a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s b a t t a l i o n a t t a c h e d , a l o n g with
a t least o n e t a n k d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n , s o m e t i m e s u p t o three. In r a r e instances
a G H Q t a n k b a t t a l i o n w a s a t t a c h e d . T o m a k e u p for the division's deficiency
in m e d i u m artillery, c o r p s artillery often p l a c e d a 1 5 5 m m t o w e d h o w i t z e r
b a t t a l i o n in direct s u p p o r t . 3

Combat Commands
T h e c o n c e p t o f t w o c o m b a t c o m m a n d s p r o v i d e d a g r e a t deal of flexibility. A n y
n u m b e r a n d m i x o f t a n k , a r m o r e d infantry, A F A , a n d T D b a t t a l i o n s a n d
c o m p a n i e s w e r e a t t a c h e d , a l o n g w i t h a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e t r o o p , a n engineer
c o m p a n y , a n d other elements a s necessary. T h e C C A H H C w a s c o m m a n d e d by
a brigadier-general (there w a s n o a s s i s t a n t division c o m m a n d e r ) a n d C C B by
a c o l o n e l ; these w e r e r o u g h l y 1 0 0 - m a n m a n e u v e r h e a d q u a r t e r s w i t h n o
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r logistical responsibilities. T h e n e w reserve c o m m a n d ( R C )
w a s only a n eight-man H Q (with another nine s u p p o r t personnel attached from
the division H H C ' s t r a n s p o r t a t i o n p l a t o o n ) ; it w a s c o m m a n d e d by a n infantry
c o l o n e l w h o w a s a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e for o v e r s e e i n g the A I B s ' infantry training.
T h e R C w a s n o t a " b a l a n c e d m a n e u v e r t a s k f o r c e , " b u t merely a m i n i m a l H Q
c o n t r o l l i n g units r o t a t e d t o the rear for m a i n t e n a n c e , resupply, a n d rest.
T h e c o n c e p t o f t h r e e m a n e u v e r u n i t s w a s j u s t a s v i a b l e for a r m o r e d
d i v i s i o n s a s infantry, a n d m a n y " l i g h t " a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s i n c r e a s e d the R C

3
The A A A Bn had four batteries each with 8x M 1 3 / M 1 4 twin or M 1 6 / M 1 7 quad .50cal SP
machine guns, and 8x M l towed 4 0 m m AA guns. The T D Bn had three companies each of
12x M 1 0 , M l 8 , or M 3 6 tank destroyers and 8x M 2 0 armored utility cars, and a
reconnaissance company with 6x M 8 armored and 3x M 2 0 armored utility cars and 12x
M G - a r m e d jeeps. See also Osprey B T O 10: US Tank and Tank Destroyer Battalions in the
ETO 1944-45.

12
 While each armored infantry
battalion was authorized an
M32 tank recovery vehicle
(on an M4 tank chassis), many
battalions had this M31 TRV
(on an M3 medium tank
chassis). The 75mm and 37mm
"guns" are actually dummies;
the M31 's only armament was
two .30cal machine guns. If
a tank was disabled then -
situation permitting - the
crew and some of the
accompanying armored
infantry would remain with
it until it could be recovered.
Crews of disabled tanks were
to continue to provide fire
support for as long as possible,
and MGs could be dismounted
for ground firing.

h e a d q u a r t e r s strength with its o w n H H C a n d e m p l o y e d it a s a third m a n e u v e r

force, referring t o it a s C C R . In t w o i n s t a n c e s a r m o r e d g r o u p H H C s p r o v i d e d
the C C R : the 1 0 t h A r m o r e d G r o u p w i t h the 8 t h A r m d D i v , a n d the 1 2 t h
A r m o r e d G r o u p with the 9th. T h e " h e a v y d i v i s i o n s , " irrespective of p o s s e s s i n g
three r e g i m e n t a l h e a d q u a r t e r s , h a d C C A a n d C C B h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d
h e a d q u a r t e r s d e t a c h m e n t s , a n d s o m e t i m e s the A I R h e a d q u a r t e r s d o u b l e d a s
a C C C . D i v i s i o n s e m p l o y i n g three C C s u s u a l l y " p e r m a n e n t l y a s s i g n e d " a n
A I B a n d t a n k battalion t o e a c h . (The 1 2 t h A r m d Div's C C a s s i g n m e n t s p r o v i d e
an example: C C A - 66th AIB & 4 3 d Tank Bn; C C B - 17th AIB & 14th Tank
Bn; C C R - 5 6 t h AIB & 2 3 d T a n k Bn.) R e c o n n a i s s a n c e a n d engineer
c o m p a n i e s a n d other s u p p o r t e l e m e n t s w e r e a t t a c h e d a s n e c e s s a r y , b u t the
s a m e units m i g h t n o t be h a b i t u a l l y a t t a c h e d . Artillery b a t t a l i o n s w e r e s e l d o m
a t t a c h e d b u t this s o m e t i m e s o c c u r r e d ; they g e n e r a l l y r e m a i n e d u n d e r d i v i s i o n
c o n t r o l , a l t h o u g h they w o u l d s u p p o r t a specific C C .
T h e r e w e r e three w a y s a C C c o u l d t a s k - o r g a n i z e its u n i t s ; p r a c t i c e s v a r i e d
b e t w e e n d i v i s i o n s , a n d w e r e s p e c i f i e d in s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s
( S O P ) . S o m e d i v i s i o n s v i r t u a l l y m e r g e d the A I B a n d t a n k b a t t a l i o n i n t o a
single u n i t , p a i r i n g off the s u b u n i t s a t all e c h e l o n s - a rifle a n d a t a n k
c o m p a n y , a rifle p l a t o o n w i t h a t a n k p l a t o o n , a n d in e x t r e m e c a s e s a s q u a d
w i t h a n i n d i v i d u a l t a n k or t a n k s e c t i o n . T h i s w a s a n effective b u t e x t r e m e l y
rigid s t r u c t u r e , a n d o n c e i m p l e m e n t e d a n d p r a c t i c e d for a w h i l e it b e c a m e
difficult t o r e - a l l o c a t e s u b u n i t s w h e n , for e x a m p l e , a n i n f a n t r y - h e a v y t a s k
f o r c e w a s n e e d e d . T h i s s y s t e m is s a i d t o h a v e b e e n c o n c e i v e d b y M a j G e n
L u n s f o r d E . Oliver, c o m m a n d e r o f the 5 t h A r m d D i v , w h o a s a C C
c o m m a n d e r w i t h the 1st A r m d D i v in N o r t h A f r i c a h a d s e e n the v a l u e o f
solid mutual s u p p o r t between tankers a n d infantrymen. H e required the
" m a r r i e d " u n i t s n o t o n l y t o t r a i n a n d fight t o g e t h e r , b u t t o live a n d m e s s
together w h e t h e r in the field o r q u a r t e r s . A 1 9 4 7 A r m o r e d S c h o o l s t u d y o f
W o r l d W a r II a r m o r e d infantry a n d t a n k t a s k o r g a n i z a t i o n r e c o m m e n d e d :

W h e n e v e r p o s s i b l e it w a s f o u n d b e s t t o j o i n u p the s a m e t a n k a n d
infantry units t o g e t h e r in t r a i n i n g a n d c o m b a t . N o t o n l y w o u l d the
staff sections function better but lower unit c o m m a n d e r s and

13
 individual tank crews a n d infantry s q u a d s became acquainted and
g a i n e d c o n f i d e n c e in e a c h other. U n i t s g a i n e d o b j e c t i v e s a s a t e a m a n d
n o t i n d i v i d u a l a r m s . T o r o u n d o u t this t e a m artillery f o r w a r d o b s e r v e r s
w e r e a t t a c h e d d o w n t o i n c l u d e t a n k a n d infantry c o m p a n i e s f r o m the
field a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n in d i r e c t s u p p o r t o f the u n i t . T h i s g a v e a
w e l l - r o u n d e d t e a m o f t a n k s , i n f a n t r y a n d artillery. T h e artillery
f o r w a r d o b s e r v e r o p e r a t e d d i s m o u n t e d w i t h the i n f a n t r y a n d the
o b s e r v e r w i t h the t a n k s r o d e in a t a n k . W h e n e v e r p o s s i b l e the s a m e
artillery b a t t a l i o n s w e r e k e p t in direct s u p p o r t o f the s a m e u n i t s .

M o r e o f t e n , the A I B a n d t a n k b a t t a l i o n o p e r a t e d a s t w o t a s k f o r c e s w i t h
c o m p a n i e s c r o s s - a t t a c h e d b e t w e e n t h e m . C r o s s - a t t a c h e d units often c h a n g e d
a s the m i s s i o n p r o g r e s s e d ; there w e r e t i m e s w h e n i n f a n t r y m e n d i d n o t k n o w
w h a t t a n k unit they w e r e w o r k i n g w i t h , b u t t h a t w a s a c t u a l l y n o t a s g r a v e as
it s o u n d s - the c o m m a n d e r s a n d staff k n e w w h a t unit they w e r e w i t h , a n d
even t h o u g h u n i t s m i g h t b e s w i t c h e d they m o s t likely h a d p r e v i o u s l y w o r k e d
t o g e t h e r . T F s w e r e either n u m b e r e d ( T F 1, T F 2 ) , c a r r i e d the b a t t a l i o n
n u m b e r ( T F 1 5 , T F 6 8 ) , or b o r e the n a m e of the c o m m a n d e r ; see T a b l e s 1 a n d
2 for e x a m p l e s .

Table 1 : C o m b a t C o m m a n d A, 12th A r m d Div; D e c e m b e r 29,1944

TF 1 TF 2 CCA Troops

43 TankBn (-) 66 AIB (-) HHC, CCA

B-66AIB C-43 Tank Bn 493 AFA Bn (-)
D-66AIB* D-43TankBn (-) A-82 Med Bn
A-493 AFA Bn B-493 AFA Bn A-134 0rd Bn
2-D-43 TankBn C-572 AAA Bn
1-A-119EngrBn
* 12th Armd Div AlBs were unique in that they received a fourth rifle
company in March 1945, manned by Colored troops.

T h e 5 t h A r m d D i v e m p l o y e d its C C A , C C B , a n d
T a b l e 2 : C o m b a t C o m m a n d B, 5 t h A r m d D i v C C R as co-equal maneuver forces, each with two
battalions. T h e companies cross-attached to form one
TF Anderson TF W i n t e r m u t e
l a r g e a n d o n e s m a l l t a s k f o r c e s n a m e d after the
HHC, 81 TankBn HHC, 15 AIB b a t t a l i o n c o m m a n d e r s , a n d the c o m p a n i e s w e r e
B & C 8 1 TankBn A, 15 AIB m a r r i e d : C o B o f the t a n k b a t t a l i o n w i t h C o B of the
B&Q15AIB A, 81 TankBn A I B , a n d s o o n - see T a b l e 2 .
Svc Co, 81 TankBn Svc Co,15thAIB O c c a s i o n a l l y a C C w a s d i v i d e d into three T F s if a
third b a t t a l i o n w a s a t t a c h e d ; this w a s c o m m o n w h e n
T a b l e 3: H a b i t u a l C C a s s i g n m e n t s , 5 t h A r m d D i v the R C s i m p l y f u n c t i o n e d a s a reserve c o m m a n d a n d
n o t a s a m a n e u v e r c o m m a n d . T a b l e s 4 a n d 5 give t w o
CCA CCB CCR
e x a m p l e s : as used by C C A , 12th A r m d Div with a
34 TankBn 81 TankBn 10 TankBn
b a t t a l i o n a t t a c h e d f r o m C C B ; a n d by C C B , 1 0 t h A r m d
46 AIB 15 AIB 47 AIB D i v w h e n a t t a c h e d t o the 1 0 1 s t A b n D i v at B a s t o g n e
47 AFA Bn 71 AFA Bn 95 AFA Bn - t h e C C B t r o o p s in effect p r o v i d e d a f o u r t h T F ,
A, 22 Engr Bn B, 22 EngrBn C, 22 Engr Bn referred t o a s " t e a m s " b y the 1 0 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n .
A, 85 Recon Sqn B, 85 Recon Sqn C, 85 Recon Sqn T h e r e w e r e e n d l e s s v a r i a t i o n s in the a s s i g n m e n t of
A, 387 AAA Bn B, 387 AAA Bn C, 387 AAA Bn u n i t s t o c o m b a t c o m m a n d s . T h e 4 t h A r m d Div, for
A, 628 TD Bn B, 628 TD Bn C, 628 TD Bn e x a m p l e , never a s s i g n e d units t o C C s o n a fixed b a s i s ,
b u t r e t a i n e d a h i g h d e g r e e o f flexibility for t a s k

14
 T a b l e 4: C C A , 12th A r m d D i v ; D e c e m b e r 7 , 1 9 4 4

TF1 TF2 TF3 CCA Troops

43 Tank Bn (-) 66AIBH 17 AIB HHC, CCA

B, 66AIB B, 43 TankBn C, 43 TankBn D, 43 TankBn
A, 92 Recon Sqn (-) 3-A, 92 Recon Sqn 2-A, 92 Recon Sqn A, 82 Med Bn
1 -A, 119 Recon Sqn 2-A, 119 Engr Bn 3-A, 119 Engr Bn A, 119 Engr Bn (-)
1-B, 92 Recon Sqn A, 134 Maint Bn
C, 572 AAA Bn

T a b l e 5: C C B , 1 0 t h A r m d D i v ; D e c e m b e r 2 1 , 1 9 4 5

Team Roberts Team Cherry Team Desobry Team O'Hara

HHC, CCB 3TankBn (-B&C) 20AIB(-A&C) 54AIB(-A&C)

B, 796th AAA Bn C, 20 AIB B, 3 Tank Bn C,21 TankBn
HQ-C, 55 Engr Bn 3-C, 55 Eng Bn plt-D, 3 TankBn plt-D, TankBn
HQ-D, 90 Recon Sqn 2-D, 90 Recon Sqn 2-C55 Engr Bn 1-C, 55 EngrBn
HQ-C, 609 TD Bn 1-C, 609 TD Bn 1-D, 90 Recon Sqn 3-D, 90 Recon Sqn
sec, B-80 Med Bn 2-C-609 TD Bn 3-C-609TD Bn

organization. A C C might have an AIB, tank battalion, reconnaissance troop,

o n e or t w o A F A b a t t a l i o n s , a battery of 1 5 5 m m h o w i t z e r s , A A A battery, t a n k
destroyer c o m p a n y , engineer c o m p a n y , a n d service elements. T h e s e units
w o u l d be further s u b d i v i d e d i n t o t w o o r three t a s k f o r c e s built a r o u n d a n
A I B o r t a n k b a t t a l i o n , w i t h a n y m i x o f i n f a n t r y , t a n k s , a n d artillery, a n d
c o n t r o l l i n g its o w n services.

Armored infantry regiments and battalions

T h e first a r m o r e d infantry unit w a s the 6 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t ( A r m o r e d ) ,
r e d e s i g n a t e d o n J u l y 1, 1 9 4 0 b y c o n v e r t i n g it f r o m a s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y
r e g i m e n t a n d a s s i g n i n g it t o the 1 s t A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n . F o u r t e e n s u c h
r e g i m e n t s w e r e o r g a n i z e d b e t w e e n 1 9 4 0 a n d 1 9 4 2 . O n J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 4 2 the
e x i s t i n g five r e g i m e n t s ( 6 t h , 3 6 t h , 4 1 s t , 4 6 t h , 5 1 s t ) w e r e r e d e s i g n a t e d
" a r m o r e d infantry r e g i m e n t s " ( A I R ) , a s w e r e all s u b s e q u e n t r e g i m e n t s ; they
p o s s e s s e d t w o b a t t a l i o n s until a u t h o r i z e d a t h i r d t h a t M a r c h . T h e y w e r e
initially m o u n t e d in IVi-ton c a r g o t r u c k s a n d W h i t e M 3 A 1 s c o u t c a r s w i t h
limited c r o s s - c o u n t r y mobility. T h e units l a c k e d a n t i t a n k w e a p o n s , u n d e r the
t h e o r y t h a t a c c o m p a n y i n g t a n k s w o u l d be sufficient. A n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f l a w
w a s t h a t they r e t a i n e d a s t a n d a r d e i g h t - m a n s q u a d a n d d i d n o t p r o v i d e
drivers a n d g u n n e r s - e q u a t i n g t o the h o r s e - h o l d e r s o f o l d - w h o r e m a i n e d
with the vehicles w h e n s q u a d s d i s m o u n t e d .
D u r i n g J u n e t h r o u g h S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 m o s t o f the A I R s w e r e b r o k e n u p
into three s e p a r a t e a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s , b u t r e m a i n e d a s s i g n e d t o
their p a r e n t a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s . T h i s w a s b e f o r e m o s t o f the d i v i s i o n s w e r e
c o m m i t t e d t o c o m b a t . T h e e x c e p t i o n s w e r e the 6 t h , 3 6 t h , a n d 4 1 s t A I R s ,
which remained as c o m p o n e n t units of the 1st, 3 d , a n d 2 d A r m d D i v s ,
respectively. In 1 9 4 4 the 1st A r m d D i v w a s c o n v e r t e d t o a " l i g h t " d i v i s i o n
a n d the 6 t h A I R t o o w a s b r o k e n u p . T h e A I R w a s n o t s i m p l y three s e p a r a t e
A I B s w i t h a r e g i m e n t a l h e a d q u a r t e r s ; the s m a l l e r b a t t a l i o n s l a c k e d s e r v i c e
 c o m p a n i e s a n d m e d i c a l d e t a c h m e n t s , this s u p p o r t b e i n g p r o v i d e d by larger
v e r s i o n s o f the u n i t s u n d e r the r e g i m e n t .
A t h r e e - b a t t a l i o n A I R c o n t a i n e d 2 , 6 8 0 t r o o p s , slightly r e d u c e d in 1 9 4 5 .
It w a s o r g a n i z e d i n t o a h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d h e a d q u a r t e r s c o m p a n y ( H H C ) ,
three a r m o r e d infantry b a t t a l i o n s , service c o m p a n y , a n d m e d i c a l d e t a c h m e n t .
T h e b a t t a l i o n s h a d a n H H C a n d t h r e e rifle c o m p a n i e s : 1st B a t t a l i o n , C o s
A - C ; 2 d B n , C o s D - F ; a n d 3 d B n , C o s G-I. ( T h e s t r e n g t h figures in T a b l e 6
a r e : o f f i c e r s - w a r r a n t officers-enlisted m e n . )
W h e n the A I R s w e r e b r o k e n u p the 1st a n d 2 d B n s received n e w
non-sequential d e s i g n a t i o n s . T h e r e w a s n o discernible pattern in the assignment
o f b a t t a l i o n n u m b e r s other t h a n t h a t the f o r m e r 1st Bn received the higher of
the t w o n e w b a t t a l i o n n u m b e r s . T h e A I R H H C , Service C o , a n d 3 d Bn were
a s s i g n e d the lineage a n d n u m b e r of the former A I R while
T a b l e 6 : A r m o r e d I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t , T O E 7-21 the other t w o b a t t a l i o n s c o n t i n u e d their former battalion
March 1,1942
l i n e a g e s . A s a n e x a m p l e , the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of the 5 t h
A r m d Div's 4 6 t h A I R is s h o w n in T a b l e 7; note that the
91-5-2,493 (100-5-2,575 w/medical detachment)
o r i g i n a l A I R ' s 2 d B n a l s o p r o v i d e d a s s e t s t o the
H Q & H Q C o m p a n y , T O E 7-22 13-2-123
reorganized 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.
Regimental Headquarters 9-0-19 P e r s o n n e l w e r e shifted b e t w e e n units, t o include others
Headquarters Company 4-2-104 within the division, t o a c c o m m o d a t e the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n .
Company Headquarters 2-1-41 T h e o r i g i n a l 1 9 4 0 r e g i m e n t a l A I B s c o n s i s t e d of a
Reconnaissance & Intelligence Platoon 1-0-42 h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d h e a d q u a r t e r s d e t a c h m e n t , three rifle
Communication Platoon 1-1-21 c o m p a n i e s , a n d a heavy w e a p o n s c o m p a n y , closely
p a r a l l e l i n g the s t a n d a r d infantry b a t t a l i o n . In the 1 9 4 2
A r m o r e d I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n , T O E 7-25 24-0-676
r e o r g a n i z a t i o n the h e a d q u a r t e r s d e t a c h m e n t was
HQ & HQ Company, TOE 7-26 9-0-157
e x p a n d e d t o a c o m p a n y , w i t h the d i s b a n d e d w e a p o n s
Company HQ (& Recon Platoon) 2-0-34
c o m p a n y ' s e l e m e n t s r e a s s i g n e d t o the H H C . T h e
Mortar Platoon 1-0-31 battalion's rear staff echelon, supply, transport, and
Assault Gun Platoon 1-0-32 m a i n t e n a n c e e l e m e n t s w e r e a s s i g n e d t o the n e w service
Machine Gun Platoon 1-0-27 c o m p a n y . T h e t h r e e rifle c o m p a n i e s ( A - C ) a l s o
Armored Rifle Company (x3), TOE 7-27 5-0-144 u n d e r w e n t a d r a s t i c r e o r g a n i z a t i o n - see T a b l e 9.
Company Headquarters 2-0-29
T a b l e 8: A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y u n i t a s s i g n m e n t s t o A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n s
Rifle Platoon (x3) 1-0-48
S e r v i c e C o m p a n y , T O E 7-23 6-3-142 1st Armd Div 6th AIR (1940-44): 6th, 11th, 14th AIB
Company Headquarters 3-0-38 2d Armd Div 41 st AIR (1940-46)
Maintenance Platoon 1-1-60 3d Armd Div 36th AIR (1941-45)
Transportation Platoon 1-1-30 4th Armd Div 51 st AIR (1941 -43): 10th, 51 st, 53d AIB
Personnel Section 1-1-8 5th Armd Div 46th AIR (1941 -43): 15th, 46th, 47th AIB
Supply Section 0-0-6 6th Armd Div 50th AIR (1942-43): 9th, 44th, 50th AIB
Medical Detachment 9-0-72 7th Armd Div 48th AIR (1942-43): 23d, 38th, 48th AIB
Headquarters Section 3-0-15 8th Armd Div 49th AIR (1942-43): 7th, 49th, 58th AIB
Battalion Section (x3) 2-0-19 9th Armd Div 52d AIR (1942-43): 27th, 52d, 60th AIB
1 0th Armd Div 54th AIR (1942-43): 20th, 54th, 61 st AIB
T a b l e 7: R e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f 4 6 t h A I R ; S e p t e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 4 3
11th Armd Div 55th AIR (1942-43): 21 st, 55th, 63d AIB
Old unit N e w unit 12th Armd Div 56th AIR (1942-43): 17th, 56th, 66th AIB
46th AIR (less 1st & 2d Bn) 46th AIB 13th Armd Div 59th AIR (1942-43): 16th, 59th, 67th AIB
1stBn,46th AIR 47th AIB 14th Armd Div 62d AIR (1942-43): 19th, 62d, 68th AIB
2d Bn, 46th AIR 15th AIR & 85th Cav 16th Armd Div 18th, 64th, 69th AIB
Recon Sqn (less TrpD&E) 20th Armd Div 8th, 65th, 70th AIB

16
 B e s i d e s the 4 8 d i v i s i o n a l A I B s , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e o r g a n i c t o A I R s , 1 6
s e p a r a t e A I B s ( 5 2 6 t h - 5 4 0 t h ) w e r e r a i s e d in M a r c h a n d M a y 1 9 4 3 . T h e s e
w e r e i n t e n d e d t o fill the r e q u i r e m e n t for G H Q s e p a r a t e b a t t a l i o n s p o o l e d a t
a r m y level for a t t a c h m e n t t o i n f a n t r y a n d a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s . T h e " G H Q
p o o l " c o n c e p t p r o v i d e d v a r i o u s c o m b a t b a t t a l i o n s ( t a n k , t a n k destroyer, field
artillery, A A A , e n g i n e e r ) for j u s t s u c h p u r p o s e s , b u t this w a s n o t the c a s e
with the s e p a r a t e A I B s . M o s t w e r e a s s i g n e d t o the A r m o r e d F o r c e or II C o r p s .
Ten w e r e i n a c t i v a t e d in A u g u s t 1 9 4 3 a n d their p e r s o n n e l r e a s s i g n e d t o
reorganizing and deploying AIBs; t w o were converted to a m p h i b i a n tractor
b a t t a l i o n s , a n d t w o r e m a i n e d a s t r a i n i n g u n i t s i n t o 1 9 4 4 . O f the s e p a r a t e
A I B s , only the 5 2 6 t h s a w limited c o m b a t in E u r o p e .

ANATOMY OF THE ARMORED

INFANTRY BATTALION
While the 1 9 4 3 A I B w a s o r g a n i z e d o n the s t a n d a r d b a s i s o f three s u b u n i t s p e r
e c h e l o n , there w e r e u n i q u e differences f r o m the s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n .
It w a s a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d u n i t , s i n c e t h e r e w a s n o r e g i m e n t a l e c h e l o n f o r
s u p p o r t . T h e S e p t e m b e r 1 5 , 1 9 4 3 T O E - see T a b l e 9 - p r o v i d e s a n e x a m p l e
of the c o m p o n e n t s u b u n i t s c o m p r i s i n g a n A I B ' s c o m p a n i e s ; c h a n g e s w e r e
m a d e e a c h year, b u t they w e r e m i n o r . ( A g a i n , p e r s o n n e l s t r e n g t h s a r e g i v e n
as: officers-warrant officers-enlisted men.) " B a z o o k a " 2.36in A T rocket
launchers w e r e widely d i s t r i b u t e d t h r o u g h the b a t t a l i o n for a t o t a l o f 7 4 ; they
were not provided dedicated crews. T h e battalion's 7 5 halftracks m o u n t e d a
. 5 0 c a l or a . 3 0 c a l m a c h i n e g u n , s o m e t i m e s b o t h , a n d e a c h w a s p r o v i d e d a
T h o m p s o n s u b m a c h i n e g u n a s on-vehicle e q u i p m e n t ( O V E ) .

Battalion Headquarters &c Headquarters Company

T h i s w a s h o m e for the b a t t a l i o n staff a n d the v a r i o u s c o m b a t s u p p o r t a n d
crew-served w e a p o n s p l a t o o n s . A r m a m e n t w a s 1 4 x 2 . 3 6 i n b a z o o k a s , three
7 5 m m SP h o w i t z e r s , three 8 1 m m SP m o r t a r s , seven . 3 0 c a l M G s , 1 3 x . 5 0 c a l
M G s , 2 9 S M G s , 3 4 rifles, 1 0 7 c a r b i n e s , a n d three p i s t o l s . T h e b a t t a l i o n
h e a d q u a r t e r s c o n s i s t e d of a l i e u t e n a n t c o l o n e l c o m m a n d e r ; t w o m a j o r s a s
the X O (executive officer) a n d S-3 ( o p e r a t i o n s officer); three c a p t a i n s - S-2
( c o m m u n i c a t i o n s officer), S-3 (air), a n d S-4 ( s u p p l y officer); a n d t w o
lieutenants - S-l (administrative officer) a n d liaison officer. N C O s included the
sergeant m a j o r (master sergeant); o p e r a t i o n s , intelligence, a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
chiefs (technical s e r g e a n t s ) , a s e r g e a n t m e s s a g e center chief, p l u s 1 6 c l e r k s ,
drivers, r a d i o o p e r a t o r s , a n d m e s s e n g e r s . Vehicles w e r e t w o M 3 halftracks a n d
four ^ - t o n t r u c k s ( " j e e p s " ) ; t w o b a z o o k a s w e r e p r o v i d e d .
The H H C ' s headquarters and maintenance sections both h a d a halftrack
a n d a jeep p l u s a b a z o o k a , a n d the a d m i n , m e s s , a n d s u p p l y s e c t i o n a IVi-ton
truck a n d 1-ton trailer.
T h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a t o o n w a s e q u i p p e d w i t h a h a l f t r a c k a n d a jeep w i t h
b a z o o k a in the h e a d q u a r t e r s , a n d t w o j e e p s in e a c h o f t h e t w o s q u a d s
(without m a c h i n e g u n s ) . T h e p l a t o o n w o u l d s c o u t r o u t e s a n d a s s e m b l y a r e a s ,
a n d help to g u i d e u n i t s .
T h e a s s a u l t g u n p l a t o o n h a d a h a l f t r a c k in b o t h the h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d the
a m m u n i t i o n s e c t i o n , the latter w i t h a n a r m o r e d a m m u n i t i o n t r a i l e r ; b o t h
 e l e m e n t s h a d a b a z o o k a . 4 T h e three
ARMORED
INFANTRY
assault gun sections each had a
BATTALION
7 5 m m SP howitzer. T h e 7 5 m m
M 1 A 1 pack howitzer mounted on
Hq 8 HQ Service ) Mtdtcol a n M 3 h a l f t r a c k , the T 3 0 , w a s u s e d
f r o m 1 9 4 2 - 4 3 , a n d r e p l a c e d by the
Co Co

7 5 m m M 8 SP howitzer. T h e a s s a u l t
Bn Adm & B n Sup
8 T Compony Bn Momt g u n p l a t o o n n o r m a l l y o p e r a t e d in
P a n Sac Plot Hq Plot
s u p p o r t o f the m a i n a t t a c k ; s e l d o m
if ever w o u l d s i n g l e g u n s be
Rifle
attached to companies. The platoon
Company Antitank Rifle Rifle
Hq Plot Plot Plot Plot

c o u l d relieve the artillery o f s o m e

c l o s e s u p p o r t m i s s i o n s , b u t did n o t
Bn Hq
Sec r eodquarters
Co
r e p l a c e it. A s a s e c o n d a r y m i s s i o n ,
assault guns could be g r o u p e d as
Compony Ren Assault G u n Mortar Mocrtine Gun| reinforcing artillery, but such
Hq Plat Plot Plot Plat
m i s s i o n s c o u l d n o t interfere w i t h
The armored infantry battalion. their p r i m a r y c l o s e s u p p o r t m i s s i o n .
Most AIBs received 105mm
h o w i t z e r - a r m e d M 4 or M 4 A 3 t a n k s
as assault guns between December 1 9 4 4 and April 1 9 4 5 .
T h e m o r t a r p l a t o o n h e a d q u a r t e r s h a d a h a l f t r a c k a n d three s q u a d s e a c h
w i t h a n 8 1 m m M 4 m o r t a r c a r r i e r ; e a c h o f the f o u r vehicles h a d a b a z o o k a .
T h e p l a t o o n u s u a l l y o p e r a t e d a s a unit t o c o n c e n t r a t e its fires, b u t i n d i v i d u a l
s q u a d s c o u l d b e a t t a c h e d t o c o m p a n i e s . M o r t a r s p r o v i d e d i n d i r e c t fire
s u p p o r t a g a i n s t t a r g e t s d e f i l a d e d f r o m o t h e r w e a p o n s , fired o n a r e a s w h e r e
h o s t i l e s h a d n o t b e e n definitely l o c a t e d , d e s t r o y e d o b s t a c l e s , a n d fired s m o k e
t o s c r e e n friendly m o v e m e n t s o r b l i n d the enemy.
T h e light m a c h i n e g u n p l a t o o n h e a d q u a r t e r s h a d a h a l f t r a c k , a s did e a c h
o f the t w o s e c t i o n s . T w o f i v e - m a n s q u a d s r o d e in e a c h h a l f t r a c k , e a c h s q u a d
w i t h a . 3 0 c a l M 1 9 1 9 A 4 light m a c h i n e g u n ; s o m e units u s e d . 3 0 c a l M 1 9 1 7 A 1
H M G s a s a m o r e a c c u r a t e a n d l o n g e r r a n g e d direct a n d indirect fire w e a p o n .
T h e g u n s c o u l d b e m o u n t e d o n the h a l f t r a c k w h e n m o v i n g , b u t w e r e m a i n l y
u s e d d i s m o u n t e d . A s e c t i o n c o u l d b e a t t a c h e d t o the t w o f o r w a r d rifle
c o m p a n i e s o r k e p t u n d e r b a t t a l i o n c o n t r o l . E a c h o f the p l a t o o n ' s three
halftracks carried a b a z o o k a .
U n i t s d i d n o t a l w a y s strictly c o m p l y w i t h T O E s . F o r e x a m p l e , in early
1 9 4 5 the 6 6 t h A I B ' s m o r t a r p l a t o o n h a d s i x 8 1 m m m o r t a r s o r g a n i z e d into
three t w o - t u b e s e c t i o n s , a n d the a s s a u l t g u n p l a t o o n h a d t w o 7 5 m m M 8 SP
howitzers and one 1 0 5 m m howitzer-armed Sherman.

Rifle companies
T h e earlier o r g a n i z a t i o n u s e d f r o m M a r c h 1 9 4 2 s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d before
t h a t i n t r o d u c e d f r o m S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 . A n o d d i t y of the a r m o r e d rifle p l a t o o n
w a s t h a t the h e a d q u a r t e r s d o u b l e d a s the first rifle s q u a d , led by a d e s i g n a t e d
s q u a d l e a d e r w h e n d i s m o u n t e d ; it w a s s o m e t i m e s called the " p l a t o o n leader's
s q u a d . " O t h e r p l a t o o n p e c u l i a r i t i e s w e r e the M G a n d m o r t a r s q u a d s ,
e l e m e n t s n o t f o u n d in s t a n d a r d infantry rifle p l a t o o n s a s they w e r e p a r t of the

4
M 8 armored a m m o trailer (limited standard - capacity 93x 7 5 m m ) , or M 1 0 (standard from
1944 - 117x 7 5 m m or 4 4 x 1 0 5 m m ) .

18
T a b l e 9: A r m o r e d I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n , S e p t e m b e r 1 5 , 1 9 4 3 , T O E 7-25

36-3-962 (39-3-995 w/medical detachment)

H Q & H Q C o , T O E 7-26 14-0-159

Battalion Headquarters 8-0-21

Headquarters Company 6-0-138

Company Headquarters 2-0-37

Headquarters Section 1-0-5

Maintenance Section 1-0-7

Admin, Mess, & Supply Section 1-0-25

Reconnaissance Platoon 1-0-20

Platoon Headquarters 1-0-4

Reconnaissance Squad (x2) 0-0-8

Assault Gun Platoon 1-0-23

Platoon Headquarters 1-0-6

Assault Gun Section (x3) 0-0-4

Ammunition Section 0-0-5

Mortar Platoon 1-0-6

Platoon Headquarters 1-0-6

Mortar Squad (x3) 0-0-6 It was not uncommon for armored infantrymen to wear
mechanic's coveralls or one-piece herringbone twill working
Machine Gun Platoon 1-0-34 suits, as worn by this lieutenant. He appears to have his serial
Platoon Headquarters 1-0-10 number stenciled on the right pocket flap and possibly his name
on the left. Armored infantrymen were sometimes called
Machine Gun Section (x2) 0-0-12
"armored doughs" or "blitz doughs" (derived from "doughboys"),
Section Headquarters 0-0-2 though these were mainly news reporters' expressions.
Machine Gun Squad (x2) 0-0-5

A r m o r e d R i f l e C o ( x 3 ) , T O E 7-27 6-0-245

Company Headquarters 2-0-48

Headquarters Section 1-0-8

Maintenance Section 1-0-6

Admin, Mess, & Supply Section 1-0-34

Rifle Platoon (x3) 1-0-55

Platoon Headquarters & Rifle Squad 1-0-11

Rifle Squad (x2) 0-0-12

Mortar Squad 0-0-8

Machine Gun Squad 0-0-12

Antitank Platoon 1-0-32

Platoon Headquarters 1-0-2

Antitank Squad (x3) 0-0-10

S e r v i c e C o , T O E 7-29 4-3-68

Company Headquarters 2-0-22

Headquarters Section 1-0-4

Maintenance Section 1-0-4

Admin, Mess, & Supply Section 0-0-14

Battalion Supply & Transportation Platoon 1-1-21

This armored infantryman, armed with the .45cal M 1 A 1
Battalion Maintenance Platoon 1-1-20 Thompson SMG that was issued as "on-vehicle equipment,"
Battalion Admin & Personnel Section 0-1-5 wears the one-piece HBT working suit. He has a gasmask bag
slung under his left arm, an item not much seen after the
Medical Detachment 3-0-33
North African campaign.

19
A crew of a company's antitank
platoon unlimbers its 57mm
M1 AT gun from an M2
halftrack car. Note the crew's
musette bags slung on the
rear; it was quickly found that
hanging them on the sides
would get them torn off by
vegetation and rubble.

c o m p a n y w e a p o n s platoon. The former had two L M G s ; standard M G squads

had only one gun. T h e p l a t o o n headquarters t o w e d a 3 7 m m M 3 A 1 A T gun
b e h i n d its h a l f t r a c k , a l t h o u g h this s o m e t i m e s h a m p e r e d m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y ; it
h a d o n l y t w o d e d i c a t e d c r e w m e n , b u t riflemen w o u l d serve a s a m m u n i t i o n
h a n d l e r s . T h e r e w a s n o f o r m o f c o m p a n y w e a p o n s p l a t o o n , all s u p p o r t i n g
w e a p o n s b e i n g o r g a n i c t o the rifle p l a t o o n s . A l t h o u g h n o t o r i g i n a l l y
e n v i s i o n e d for t h a t p u r p o s e , this o r g a n i z a t i o n p r o v e d t o be o f v a l u e w h e n
rifle p l a t o o n s w e r e m a r r i e d t o t a n k p l a t o o n s . T h e c o m p a n y h e a d q u a r t e r s
s e c t i o n h a d a n a d d i t i o n a l 3 7 m m M 3 A 1 A T g u n , a n d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,
m e s s , a n d s u p p l y s e c t i o n h a d a 3 7 m m M 6 S P A T g u n (with a t o w e d 3 7 m m
a s a s u b s t i t u t e if the % - t o n t r u c k - m o u n t e d M 6 w a s n o t a v a i l a b l e ) . T h i s
o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s u s e d in N o r t h A f r i c a - see T a b l e 1 0 .

The company maintenance

sections and the battalion
maintenance platoon were
responsible for keeping the
battalion's 130 half-tracked,
full-tracked, and wheeled
vehicles operational. Note
the haftrack's "chevron" tires
for maximum traction. Some
units mounted them reversed,
on the theory that the vehicle
had more power in reverse
gear and could more easily
back out if stuck in mud.

20
T a b l e 10: A r m o r e d Rifle P l a t o o n , M a r c h 1,1942

(platoon total, 49 all ranks)

P l a t o o n H e a d q u a r t e r s & 1st R i f l e S q u a d (12)
Platoon commander 2nd lieutenant Ml carbine
Platoon sergeant staff sergeant M1 carbine
Squad leader sergeant M1 rifle
Antitank gunner pvt/pfc Ml carbine
Assistant AT gunner pvt/pfc M1 carbine
Rifleman (x5) pvt/pfc M1 rifle
Basic soldier pvt/pfc M1 rifle
Driver pvt/pfc M1928A1 SMG
M3 halftrack personnel carrier w/.30cal Ml 919A4 LMG
37mm M3A1 AT
2d & 3 d Rifle S q u a d s (each 12)
Squad leader sergeant M1 rifle
Asst squad leader corporal M1 rifle
Rifleman (x9) pvt/pfc M1 rifle
Driver pvt/pfc M1928A1 SMG
M3 halftrack personnel carrier w/.30cal M1919A4 LMG
Mortar Squad (7)
Squad leader sergeant M1 carbine
Mortar gunner pvt/pfc M2 mortar, M1911A1 pistol
Asst mortar gunner pvt/pfc M1911A1 pistol
Ammunition handler (x2) pvt/pfc Ml carbine
Basic soldier pvt/pfc M1 rifle
Driver pvt/pfc M1928A1 SMG
M3 halftrack personnel carrier w/.30cal M1919A4 LMG
Machine Gun Squad (8)
Squad leader sergeant M1 rifle
Asst squad leader corporal M1 rifle
Machine gunner (x2) pvt/pfc M1919A4LMG,M1911A1 pistol
Ammunition handler (x2) pvt/pfc M1 carbine
Basic soldier pvt/pfc M1 rifle
Driver pvt/pfc M1928A1 SMG
M2 halftrack car w/.50cal M2 MG

T h e S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n - see T a b l e 1 1 - r e t a i n e d the b a s i c
1 9 4 2 p l a t o o n s t r u c t u r e w i t h the m o r t a r a n d M G s q u a d s e n l a r g e d ; the latter
received three riflemen, a l l o w i n g it t o f u n c t i o n t o s o m e e x t e n t a s a m a n e u v e r
s q u a d , b u t a l s o t o c a r r y m o r e a m m u n i t i o n a n d p r o v i d e security. C a r b i n e s
replaced pistols to p r o v i d e m o r e " r i f l e " strength. T h i s p l a t o o n h a d the highest
strength a n d the m o s t f i r e p o w e r o f a n y U S rifle p l a t o o n . E x c l u s i v e o f d r i v e r s ,
the 1st S q u a d w a s t w o m e n s m a l l e r t h a n the o t h e r s a n d l a c k e d a n a s s i s t a n t
s q u a d leader, t h o u g h a m a n w o u l d be a p p o i n t e d . T h e p l a t o o n s e r g e a n t w o u l d
ride in a different h a l f t r a c k t h a n the c o m m a n d e r .
All five s q u a d s received a b a z o o k a ; the 3 7 m m A T g u n s were w i t h d r a w n f r o m
the c o m p a n y a n d p l a t o o n headquarters, since the b a z o o k a alleviated the need for
them. T h e former p l a t o o n A T g u n s w e r e c o n c e n t r a t e d in a n e w c o m p a n y A T
 (2) 6 0 m m M o r t a r S q u a d (3) L i g h t M a c h i n e G u n S q u a d (4) H e a v y M a c h i n e G u n (5) A n t i t a n k S q u a d
( 1 ) 2 d & 3 d Rifle S q u a d s
SL = Squad leader SL = Squad leader SL = Squad leader Section SL = Squad leader
ASL = Asst squad leader ASL = Asst squad leader ASL = Asst squad leader S = Section leader D = Driver
D = Driver D = Driver D = Driver D = Driver 1 = Antitank gunner
1 - 9 = Riflemen 1 = Mortar gunner 1 & 2 = Machine gunners 1 SL = 1 st Squad leader 2-5 = Cannoneers
2 = Asst Mortar gunner 3 & 4 = Asst machine gunners 2SL = 2d Squad leader 6-8 = Ammunition handlers
3-5 = Ammunition handlers 5 & 6 = Ammunition handlers 1 & 2 = Machine gunners
7-9 = Riflemen 3 & 4 = Asst machine gunners
5-8 = Ammunition handlers
p l a t o o n , so did n o t hinder the m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y of rifle p l a t o o n halftracks.
A n u m b e r o f w e a p o n c h a n g e s w e r e a u t h o r i z e d in 1 9 4 4 . T h e M 3 S M G
a n d M I C sniper rifle r e p l a c e d M l / M l A l S M G s a n d the M 1 9 0 3 A 4 rifle in
A u g u s t 1 9 4 4 , a n d the M 1 9 1 9 A 6 L M G a n d M 2 c a r b i n e r e p l a c e d t h e
M 1 9 1 9 A 4 L M G a n d M l c a r b i n e in N o v e m b e r . H o w e v e r , f e w if a n y u n i t s
received these w e a p o n s other t h a n the M 3 " g r e a s e g u n , " a n d n o n e r e c e i v e d
the M 2 c a r b i n e b e f o r e the w a r ' s e n d . In m o s t c a s e s there w a s n o s n i p e r rifle.
T h e M 1 A 1 b a z o o k a w a s r e p l a c e d by the M 9 in J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 a n d b y the
M 9 A 1 in N o v e m b e r , a n d these w e r e s o o n i s s u e d . It s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t the
rifle a n d m o r t a r s q u a d s ' h a l f t r a c k - m o u n t e d . 3 0 c a l w a t e r - c o o l e d H M G s w e r e
u s u a l l y r e p l a c e d w i t h . 5 0 c a l or . 3 0 c a l a i r - c o o l e d g u n s .
T h e rifle c o m p a n y h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d m a i n t e n a n c e s e c t i o n s b o t h h a d a
h a l f t r a c k a n d a j e e p , the latter s e c t i o n w i t h a trailer; the a d m i n , m e s s , a n d
s u p p l y section h a d t w o IVi-ton trucks a n d trailers, a n d each section h a d a
b a z o o k a . A l i e u t e n a n t m o t o r t r a n s p o r t officer h e a d e d the m a i n t e n a n c e
section a n d the first s e r g e a n t o v e r s a w the a d m i n , m e s s , a n d s u p p l y s e c t i o n .
T h e r e w a s n o d e s i g n a t e d c o m p a n y X O , b u t the M T O u s u a l l y p e r f o r m e d this
duty. T h e n e w a n t i t a n k p l a t o o n - see T a b l e 1 2 - h a d a j e e p in t h e
h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d three h a l f t r a c k s t o t o w the 5 7 m m M l A T g u n s ; s o m e u n i t s
u s e d the 3 7 m m M 3 A 1 until sufficient 5 7 m m p i e c e s w e r e a v a i l a b l e in 1 9 4 4 .
Rifle c o m p a n y f i r e p o w e r w a s c o n s i d e r a b l e , w i t h 1 8 x 2 . 3 6 i n b a z o o k a s , three
5 7 m m A T g u n s , three 6 0 m m m o r t a r s , 1 6 x . 3 0 c a l M G s , l O x . 5 0 c a l M G s , 2 5
S M G s , 1 4 5 rifles, 7 8 c a r b i n e s , a n d 18 M 7 rifle g r e n a d e l a u n c h e r s ( t w o p e r
rifle s q u a d f r o m 1 9 4 4 ) . M o b i l i t y w a s p r o v i d e d b y 2 0 h a l f t r a c k s , t w o IVi-ton
c a r g o t r u c k s , three 1-ton c a r g o t r a i l e r s , a n d three j e e p s .

Service Company
T h i s w a s w h e r e the b a t t a l i o n c o n c e n t r a t e d its a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , s u p p l y ,
t r a n s p o r t , a n d m a i n t e n a n c e a s s e t s . It c o n t r o l l e d a s the b a t t a l i o n ' s r e a r
e c h e l o n , a l t h o u g h e l e m e n t s w o u l d o p e r a t e f o r w a r d w i t h the line c o m p a n i e s .
T h e c o m p a n y p o s s e s s e d s i x 2 . 3 6 i n b a z o o k a s , o n e 8 1 m m m o r t a r , five . 3 0 c a l
a n d six . 5 0 c a l M G s , 2 2 S M G s , a n d 5 3 c a r b i n e s . T h e h e a d q u a r t e r s s e c t i o n
h a d a % - t o n D o d g e c o m m a n d c a r ; the m a i n t e n a n c e s e c t i o n h a d a j e e p a n d a
IVi-ton t r u c k w i t h trailer; a n d the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , m e s s , a n d s u p p l y s e c t i o n a
2 % - t o n t r u c k a n d trailer.
The supply and transportation platoon's supply trucks delivered
a m m u n i t i o n , fuel, l u b r i c a n t s , r a t i o n s , a n d w a t e r t o the line c o m p a n i e s a n d
H H C e l e m e n t s . It w a s e q u i p p e d w i t h n i n e IVi-ton c a r g o t r u c k s w i t h five
1-ton c a r g o a n d f o u r a m m u n i t i o n t r a i l e r s , a M-ton D o d g e w e a p o n s carrier,
a n d a j e e p , a n d h a d three b a z o o k a s . T h e m a i n t e n a n c e p l a t o o n c o n d u c t e d

HALFTRACK SEATING ARRANGEMENTS diagrams; he w o u l d usually ride in the platoon's tail-end

The specified seating arrangements were intended t o allow
the troops to dismount and move quickly into tactical
formations, or get their crew-served weapons into operation,
with the m i n i m u m of shuffling about. The Platoon
Headquarters and 1st Rifle Squad (not shown) w o u l d be
mounted similarly to the 2d and 3d Squads (1), but with the
platoon commander riding in the place of the squad leader
(SL). Note that the platoon sergeant is not shown in any of the
halftrack, often that of the Mortar or Machine Gun squad. The
Antitank Squad (5) is a c o m p o n e n t of the company AT
Platoon, but the Heavy Machine Gun Section (4) is a
component of the battalion MG Platoon. Halftrack drivers
received specialized training and oversaw their vehicle's
maintenance, in which all squad members assisted; they in
turn would train other squad members as relief drivers, and
one was appointed as the assistant driver.
vehicle a n d e q u i p m e n t m a i n t e n a n c e a n d r e c o v e r y o f d a m a g e d vehicles. Its
vehicles i n c l u d e d a n M 3 2 t a n k r e c o v e r y vehicle ( M 4 c h a s s i s ) , a h a l f t r a c k , a n
M l o r M I A 1 (late 1 9 4 4 ) L a F r a n c e h e a v y wrecker, t w o IVi-ton t r u c k s with
1-ton t r a i l e r s , a n d a j e e p . A r m a m e n t i n c l u d e d t w o b a z o o k a s , a n d a n 8 1 m m
m o r t a r m o u n t e d o n the M 3 2 t o deliver s c r e e n i n g s m o k e w h e n r e c o v e r i n g
vehicles (the M 3 1 w i t h the M 3 m e d i u m t a n k c h a s s i s , u s e d by s o m e u n i t s ,

T a b l e 1 1 : A r m o r e d Rifle P l a t o o n , S e p t e m b e r 1 5 , 1 9 4 3

(platoon total, 49 all ranks)

P l a t o o n H e a d q u a r t e r s & 1st R i f l e S q u a d (12)
Platoon commander 2nd lieutenant M1 carbine
Platoon sergeant staff sergeant M1 carbine
Squad leader sergeant M1 rifle
Rifleman (x7) pvt/pfc M1 rifle
Rifleman (sniper) pvt/pfc M1903A4 sniper rifle
Driver tech 5 M1/M1A1 SMG
2.36in M1A1/M9/M9A1 rocket launcher
M4 ground signal projector
M3A1 halftrack personnel carrier w/.50cal M2 MG
2 d & 3 d Rifle S q u a d s (each 12)
Squad leader sergeant M1 rifle
Asst squad leader corporal M1 rifle
Rifleman (x9) pvt/pfc M1 rifle
Driver tech 5 M1/M1A1/M3 SMG
2.36inMlAl/M9/M9Al RL
M3A1 halftrack personnel carrier w/.30cal Ml 917A1 HMG
Mortar Squad (8)
Squad leader sergeant M1 rifle
Asst squad leader corporal M1 rifle
Mortar gunner pvt/pfc M2 mortar, M1 carbine
Asst mortar gunner pvt/pfc Ml carbine
Ammunition handler (x3) pvt/pfc Ml carbine
Driver tech 5 M1/M1A1/M3 SMG
2.36inM1Al/M9/M9A1 RL
M3A1 halftrack personnel carrier w/.30cal Ml 917A1 HMG
Machine Gun Squad (12)
Squad leader sergeant M1 rifle
Asst squad leader corporal M1 rifle
Machine gunner (x2) pvt/pfc M1919A4LMG, M1 carbine
Asst machine gunner (x2) pvt/pfc M1 carbine
Ammunition handler (x2) pvt/pfc M1 carbine
Rifleman (x3) pvt/pfc M1 rifle
Driver tech 5 M1/M1A1/M3 SMG
2.36inM1A1/M9/M9A1 RL
M3A1 halftrack personnel carrier w/.50cal M2 MG
{Note: Staff sergeant, sergeants, and corporals increased one grade Jan 7,1944)
 Each of the battalion's five
companies had a maintenance
section, and the service
company a maintenance
platoon; each was assigned an
M3A1 halftrack with winch as a
recovery vehicle. Some units
fitted a hoisting boom, as being
demonstrated here.

l a c k e d the m o r t a r ) . T h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d p e r s o n n e l s e c t i o n h a d a 2V^-ton
t r u c k w i t h trailer, a n d a b a z o o k a . T h e m e d i c a l d e t a c h m e n t p r o v i d e d a
b a t t a l i o n a i d s t a t i o n , three litter t e a m s , a n d three h a l f t r a c k a m b u l a n c e s ; the
o n l y o t h e r vehicles w e r e a j e e p a n d a 1-ton t r a i l e r t o w e d b y o n e o f t h e
a r m o r e d a m b u l a n c e s . T w o m e d i c s w e r e d e t a i l e d t o e a c h rifle c o m p a n y , a n d
all p e r s o n n e l w e r e a r m e d w i t h c a r b i n e s .
O p e r a t i n g alongside a r m o r e d infantry, a m e d i u m t a n k c o m p a n y
h e a d q u a r t e r s w a s s i m i l a r t o the a r m o r e d rifle c o m p a n y ' s , b u t the
h e a d q u a r t e r s s e c t i o n a l s o h a d t w o 75176mm gun-armed M 4 Shermans, a
1 0 5 m m howitzer-armed Sherman assault gun, and a M 3 2 tank recovery
vehicle. M a n y c o m p a n i e s l a c k e d the a s s a u l t g u n , a n d o t h e r s r e p l a c e d o n e
t a n k in e a c h p l a t o o n w i t h a n a s s a u l t g u n . T h e three t a n k p l a t o o n s e a c h h a d

Table 12: Antitank Platoon, S e p t e m b e r 15,1943

(platoon total, 33 all ranks)

Platoon Headquarters (3)
Platoon commander 2nd lieutenant Ml carbine
Platoon sergeant staff sergeant M1 carbine
Messenger (truck driver) pvt/pfc M l / M l A1/M3 SMG
M4 ground signal projector
1
/4-ton truck

A T S q u a d (x3) (each 10)

Squad leader sergeant M1 carbine
Antitank gunner corporal M1 carbine
Cannoneer ( x 4 ) pvt/pfc Ml carbine
Ammunition handler ( x 3 ) pvt/pfc Ml rifle
Driver tech 5 M1/M1A1/M3 SMG
57mm M1 AT gun
M3A1 halftrack personnel carrier (2x w/.50cal M2 MG, 1x w/.30cal M1917A1 HMG)
(Note: Staff sergeant, sergeants, and corporals increased one grade Jan 7,1944)

25

The M49 mount for a .50cal M2
machine gun on an M3A2
halftrack. The ammunition belt
appears to contain repeating
five-round sequences of two
armor-piercing, two incendiary,
and one armor-piercing/
incendiary/tracer. Note the
camouflage net draped over
the vehicle's rear. Aircraft
sentries were always posted
when the squad was mounted;
by 1944 attack by Allied aircraft
was more likely than by
German, and all aircraft were
watched with equal suspicion.
26
five t a n k s , e m p l o y e d a s a " h e a v y s e c t i o n " o f t h r e e u n d e r the p l a t o o n
c o m m a n d e r a n d a t w o - t a n k " l i g h t s e c t i o n " u n d e r the p l a t o o n s e r g e a n t . T h e
light t a n k c o m p a n y e q u i p p e d w i t h the 3 7 m m g u n - a r m e d M 5 A 1 S t u a r t w a s
s i m i l a r l y o r g a n i z e d , b u t w i t h j u s t t w o light t a n k s in the h e a d q u a r t e r s . (Only
s m a l l n u m b e r s o f 7 5 m m g u n - a r m e d M 2 4 C h a f f e e light t a n k s w e r e i s s u e d to
s o m e a r m o r e d divisions from J a n u a r y 1945.)
WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT
Weapons
A r m o r e d infantry units u s e d the s a m e w e a p o n s a s other i n f a n t r y m e n , but they
w e r e a l l o t t e d s o m e w h a t differently. T h e y w e r e n o t i s s u e d . 3 0 c a l B r o w n i n g
a u t o m a t i c rifles ( B A R ) o w i n g t o the rifle p l a t o o n ' s seven m a c h i n e g u n s a n d five
s u b m a c h i n e g u n s . T h e G a r a n d . 3 0 c a l M l rifle w a s a s e m i - a u t o m a t i c with a n
eight-round magazine. The semi-automatic .30cal M l carbine had a 15-round
m a g a z i n e , a n d u s e d a s h o r t e r c a r t r i d g e t h a n the M l rifle a n d m a c h i n e g u n s ;
it w a s i s s u e d t o w e a p o n s c r e w m e n , s u p p o r t p e r s o n n e l , a n d officers. A r m o r e d
i n f a n t r y u n i t s p o s s e s s e d m o r e T h o m p s o n . 4 5 c a l M 1 9 2 8 A 1 , M l , or M 1 A 1
S M G s , w i t h 2 0 - a n d 3 0 - r o u n d m a g a z i n e s , t h a n a n y o t h e r unit; these w e r e
i s s u e d t o h a l f t r a c k d r i v e r s , a n d it w a s n o t u n c o m m o n for the s q u a d leader or
a n o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l in a s q u a d t o u s e o n e . F r o m m i d 1 9 4 4 the " T o m m y g u n s "
b e g a n t o be r e p l a c e d w i t h . 4 5 c a l M 3 " g r e a s e g u n s . "
Limited use w a s m a d e of .30cal M 1 9 0 3 , M 1 9 0 3 A 1 , a n d M 1 9 0 3 A 3
Springfield b o l t - a c t i o n rifles into 1 9 4 4 , w i t h o n e per rifle s q u a d ; Springfields
w i t h a n M l rifle g r e n a d e launcher w e r e u s e d until the M 7 launcher for the M l
b e c a m e a v a i l a b l e late in 1 9 4 3 . T w o M 7 s w e r e i s s u e d per s q u a d ; they l a u n c h e d
M9A1 antitank, Ml 7 antipersonnel, and various
p y r o t e c h n i c signal (colored s m o k e a n d flare) g r e n a d e s . H a n d
g r e n a d e s i n c l u d e d the M k II a n d M k I I A 1 " p i n e a p p l e "
fragmentation, M k IIIA1 " c o n c u s s i o n , " A N - M 8 white
smoke, AN-M14 thermite incendiary, Ml 5 white
phosphorus, and M l 6 and M l 8 colored smoke.
B o t h B r o w n i n g . 3 0 c a l M 1 9 1 9 A 4 light a i r - c o o l e d a n d
M 1 9 1 7 A 1 heavy water-cooled machine guns were important
w e a p o n s , a l t h o u g h the latter s a w less u s e ; m o r e e x p e n s i v e , it
w a s often r e p l a c e d with the M 1 9 1 9 A 4 . T h e B r o w n i n g .50cal
M 2 machine gun m o u n t e d on some halftracks w a s an
e x t r e m e l y d e a d l y w e a p o n for s u p p r e s s i v e fire o w i n g t o its
ability t o p e n e t r a t e typical cover. T h e s e m a c h i n e g u n s c o u l d
be u s e d a g a i n s t g r o u n d a n d a e r i a l t a r g e t s ; w h i l e the g u n s
w e r e m o u n t e d o n h a l f t r a c k s , t r i p o d s w e r e p r o v i d e d for
ground-firing.
T h e b a z o o k a p r o v i d e d the infantry w i t h a lightweight,
m a n - p o r t a b l e A T w e a p o n . T h e M l b a z o o k a (two h a n d g r i p s )
w a s i n t r o d u c e d in 1 9 4 2 a n d the M 1 A 1 ( o n e h a n d g r i p ) in
1943; both had a 250-yard range. The M 9 and M 9 A 1
( i m p r o v e d barrel c o u p l i n g latch) i n t r o d u c e d in m i d 1 9 4 4 h a d
a 300-yard range.
T h e 6 0 m m M 2 m o r t a r w a s p r o v i d e d t o rifle p l a t o o n s
w h i l e the 8 1 m m M l w a s a b a t t a l i o n w e a p o n , w i t h r a n g e s
o f 1 , 9 8 5 a n d 3 , 2 9 0 y a r d s r e s p e c t i v e l y ; b o t h fired
high-explosive, white p h o s p h o r o u s , and illumination (from
1 9 4 4 ) . T h e 6 0 m m w a s fired d i s m o u n t e d , a l t h o u g h it is
p o s s i b l e t h a t s o m e units m a y h a v e built a s a n d b a g p l a t f o r m
t o s u p p o r t firing it f r o m the b a c k o f their h a l f t r a c k . T h e
8 1 m m w a s fired f r o m the M 4 m o r t a r carrier b u t w a s a l s o
p r o v i d e d with a b i p o d a n d b a s e p l a t e for g r o u n d - f i r i n g .
The 5 7 m m M l antitank gun w a s an American-produced
c o p y of the British 6-pdr M k 2 w i t h a longer barrel. It w a s a
r e a s o n a b l y effective w e a p o n c a p a b l e o f p e n e t r a t i n g 3 i n o f
a r m o r at 1 , 0 0 0 y a r d s , a n d c o u l d k n o c k o u t P a n t h e r s w i t h
w e l l - p l a c e d side a n d r e a r s h o t s . It w a s p r o v i d e d w i t h
a r m o r - p i e r c i n g a n d A P c a p p e d a m m u n i t i o n ; a n H E shell
w a s n o t a v a i l a b l e until late 1 9 4 4 , thereafter i m p r o v i n g its
value a s a s u p p o r t w e a p o n . T h e 7 5 m m M 8 SP h o w i t z e r o f
the a s s a u l t g u n p l a t o o n w a s m o u n t e d o n a n M 5 light
t a n k c h a s s i s , a n d with a n o p e n - t o p p e d turret a n d very light
a r m o r it w a s n o t i n t e n d e d for direct c l o s e a s s a u l t . It h a d
a 9 , 6 0 0 - y a r d r a n g e a n d carried 4 6 r o u n d s , a n d a l s o m o u n t e d
a .50cal machine gun.

The halftrack
T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f h a l f t r a c k vehicles b e g a n a t the e n d o f W o r l d W a r I, b u t The 60mm M2 mortar
it w a s n o t until the m i d 1 9 2 0 s / e a r l y 1 9 3 0 s t h a t the U S A r m y u n d e r t o o k equipped the armored rifle
platoon's light mortar squad.
s e r i o u s d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e first h a l f t r a c k s w e r e e n v i s i o n e d a s u n a r m o r e d
Since there was no fire
artillery p r i m e m o v e r s a n d utility v e h i c l e s - f o r e x a m p l e , f o r l a y i n g field direction center for centralized
telephone wire. T h e A m e r i c a n designs were influenced by French fire control, the 60mm was
Citroen-Kegresse halftracks. usually used to engage
line-of-sight targets and
H a l f t r a c k s w e r e b a s i c a l l y t r u c k s w i t h the r e a r w h e e l s r e p l a c e d b y t r a c k
seldom for indirect fire. In the
s y s t e m s t h a t p r o d u c e d less g r o u n d p r e s s u r e , t h u s e n a b l i n g t h e m t o t r a v e r s e background, the squad leader
m u d , soft g r o u n d , a n d s n o w . T h e t r a c k s a l s o p r o v i d e d i m p r o v e d t r a c t i o n a n d uses an SCR-536 "handie-talkie"
e n a b l e d t h e m t o better n e g o t i a t e b r o k e n g r o u n d a n d d e b r i s . H a l f t r a c k s w e r e radio, which most armored
infantry units did not receive
p r o v i d e d a roller m o u n t e d o n the f r o n t b u m p e r t o a i d in c r o s s i n g ditches a n d
until the beginning of 1945.
gulleys; this w a s o n l y m a r g i n a l l y effective, a n d w a s r e p l a c e d b y a 2 0 0 f t c a b l e
w i n c h for s e l f - e x t r a c t i o n . T h e f r o n t w h e e l s w e r e p o w e r e d , b u t v u l n e r a b l e t o
a n t i p e r s o n n e l m i n e s . R e g a r d l e s s o f their i m p r o v e d c r o s s - c o u n t r y a b i l i t y
c o m p a r e d t o t r u c k s , they w e r e n o t h e a v y full-tracked vehicles a n d c o u l d o n l y
n e g o t i a t e m o d e r a t e l y difficult terrain a n d o b s t a c l e s , s o c o u l d n o t a l w a y s k e e p
up with tanks. T h e 12in tracks were heavy cleated continuous rubber b a n d s ,
not steel links like t h o s e of t a n k s . In the late 1 9 3 0 s the A r m y d e v e l o p e d lightly
a r m o r e d h a l f t r a c k s n o t only a s p r i m e - m o v e r s , w e a p o n s c a r r i e r s , a n d s u p p o r t
vehicles, but a l s o a s a r m o r e d p e r s o n n e l carriers i n t e n d e d t o a c c o m p a n y t a n k s .
T h r e e h a l f t r a c k s w e r e s t a n d a r d i z e d in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 0 .
T h e M 2 halftrack car w a s a l m o s t identical to the m o r e c o m m o n M 3 ,
e x c e p t for h a v i n g a lOin s h o r t e r p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t ; the " w h e e l b a s e " -
f r o m the center o f the f r o n t w h e e l t o the center o f the t r a c k s y s t e m - w a s the
s a m e o n b o t h vehicles. T h e M 2 w a s i n t e n d e d a s a p r i m e - m o v e r for A T g u n s ,
light artillery, a n d other t o w e d w e a p o n s , a n d ten m e n c o u l d b e s e a t e d in the
passenger c o m p a r t m e n t . T h e M 3 halftrack personnel carrier h a d a longer
passenger c o m p a r t m e n t seating 1 3 , and w a s provided with a rear exit d o o r
- a feature the M 2 l a c k e d . It w a s i n t e n d e d t o c a r r y a rifle s q u a d , a n d w a s a l s o

27

M1A1 antitank mines were
carried aboard halftracks to
enable the infantry to quickly
lay an AT barrier if a defense
was established, and to block
approaches from the flanks
when advancing; they might
sometimes be laid exposed,
and then recovered when the
advance continued. The 10.81b
mine contained 6lb of TNT; it
was painted olive drab with
black markings, a yellow band
around the bottom and a
yellow filler cap.
The M2 halftrack car had a 10in
shorter passenger
compartment than the M3
passenger carrier, but
otherwise had the same
dimensions. Note the
ammunition compartments
unique to the M2, with opening
hatches behind the cab doors.
28
u s e d a s the b a s i s for v a r i o u s s e l f - p r o p e l l e d
m o u n t s ( S P M ) for a w i d e variety of w e a p o n s .
T h e M 3 a n d its later p r o d u c t i o n v a r i a n t s
w e r e the w o r k h o r s e s of the a r m o r e d infantry.
T h e M 4 m o r t a r carrier w a s an M 2
modified to m o u n t a rearward-firing 8 1 m m
M l m o r t a r , a n d h a d b i n s installed for
a m m u n i t i o n ( 9 6 r o u n d s ) a n d mortar-specific
e q u i p m e n t ; it h a d a c r e w o f s i x a n d a rear
d o o r . In N o r t h A f r i c a it w a s f o u n d t h a t the
r e a r w a r d - f i r i n g m o r t a r w a s n o t the best
o p t i o n , a s it r e q u i r e d the c a r r i e r t o m a k e a
1 8 0 d e g r e e t u r n a n d b a c k into p o s i t i o n ; the
m o r t a r h a d o n l y a limited left a n d right
t r a v e r s e ( 6 5 m i l s either w a y ) . S o m e units
field-modified their vehicles a n d m o u n t e d the
m o r t a r t o fire f o r w a r d , t h u s a l l o w i n g the
carrier t o s i m p l y halt, c o n d u c t a fire m i s s i o n ,
and move on.
Halftracks were provided with various
c o n v e n i e n c e f e a t u r e s . C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t they m i g h t r u n a t high s p e e d
c r o s s - c o u n t r y , p a d d e d seats a n d b a c k r e s t s w e r e installed. T h e r e w e r e r a c k s for
the t r o o p s ' i n d i v i d u a l w e a p o n s , h a n d - g r e n a d e s t o w a g e , e q u i p m e n t s t o r a g e
s p a c e b e h i n d the p a s s e n g e r s e a t s , s m a l l e q u i p m e n t c o m p a r t m e n t s , e x t e r n a l
t o o l a n d e q u i p m e n t r a c k s , M G t r i p o d s t o w a g e , t w o 5 g a l g a s o l i n e c a n brackets,
a n d - o n later p r o d u c t i o n vehicles - e x t e r n a l r a c k s for A T m i n e s . T h e M 2 h a d
l a r g e a m m u n i t i o n s t o r a g e b i n s o n b o t h s i d e s in the f o r w a r d p a r t of the
p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t , a c c e s s e d t h r o u g h the t o p f r o m inside the
c o m p a r t m e n t or t h r o u g h e x t e r i o r side d o o r s ; these bins w e r e for a m m u n i t i o n
for the w e a p o n for w h i c h the M 2 w a s serving a s p r i m e - m o v e r . M o s t halftrack
v a r i a n t s h a d s t o r a g e for 7 0 0 r o u n d s o f . 5 0 c a l , 7 , 7 5 0 r o u n d s of . 3 0 c a l , a n d six
 A prototype M3A1 halftrack,
with the box-like M49 MG
mount over the commander's
seat. The large roll on the right
front fender is a 36 x 44ft
camouflage net, rolled in a
canvas cover to prevent
branches and brush from
snagging on it. The side rack
contains M1A1 AT mines.

b a z o o k a r o c k e t s . T h e driver's a n d p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t s w e r e o p e n - t o p p e d ,
e x p o s i n g the o c c u p a n t s to weather, air-bursting shells, a n d g r e n a d e s . A r a i s e d
c a n v a s c o v e r s u p p o r t e d by b o w s w a s p r o v i d e d b u t w a s s e l d o m u s e d in the
field, since it restricted a l l - r o u n d visibility, firing m o u n t e d a n d i n d i v i d u a l
w e a p o n s , a n d r a p i d exit over the s i d e s .
A r m a m e n t w a s initially a . 5 0 c a l M 2 H M G o n a p e d e s t a l m o u n t in the
f o r w a r d e n d o f the p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t a n d a . 3 0 c a l M 1 9 1 9 A 4 L M G o n
either side (or initially, w a t e r - c o o l e d M 1 9 1 7 A l s ) . O n early m o d e l s the . 3 0 c a l s
w e r e m o u n t e d o n s k a t e - r a i l s r u n n i n g the l e n g t h o f e a c h s i d e a n d c u r v i n g
a r o u n d the b a c k e n d ; these w e r e r e p l a c e d by three s i m p l e m o u n t i n g b r a c k e t s , An early production M4 mortar
carrier, with the 81 mm M1
o n e o n e a c h s i d e a n d o n e in the rear. E a r l y M 4 m o r t a r c a r r i e r s h a d a n
mortar facing to the rear. Note
a l l - a r o u n d s k a t e m o u n t for o n e . 3 0 c a l , a n d later m o d e l s a . 3 0 c a l m o u n t o n the skate-mount rail for the
either s i d e . In p r a c t i c e m o s t h a l f t r a c k s c a r r i e d o n l y o n e m a c h i n e g u n . .30cal M19191A4 machine gun,
Halftrack a r m o r w a s minimal, being only ^ i n ( 6 . 5 m m ) thick which allowed it to be
traversed to any position in the
h o m o g e n e o u s p l a t e o n the front a n d f a c e - h a r d e n e d a r m o r o n the s i d e s , rear,
vehicle. The SCR-509 and -510
a n d floors; the w i n d s h i e l d a r m o r flap w a s V2in ( 1 3 m m ) thick. V i s i o n slits w e r e radios are fitted atop additional
p r o v i d e d in the w i n d s h i e l d flaps a n d side w i n d o w s , c l o s e d w i t h sliding p l a t e s . ammunition storage compartments.
T h e later M 5 a n d M 9 h a l f t r a c k s h a d
5/16in (8mm) homogeneous armor
all a r o u n d , a n d a 5/8in ( 1 6 m m ) w i n d s h i e l d
flap; this w a s n o t a n u p g r a d e in p r o t e c t i o n ,
b u t t o c o m p e n s a t e for the use of " s o f t e r "
h o m o g e n o u s a r m o r . E x c e p t for the
s h u t t e r e d f r o n t grill a n d w i n d s h i e l d f l a p
virtually all the a r m o r s u r f a c e s w e r e
vertical. T h e a r m o r p r o v i d e d the b a r e s t
m i n i m u m p r o t e c t i o n f r o m s m a l l a r m s fire
a n d shell f r a g m e n t s ; at c l o s e r a n g e a n d
striking at a n e a r z e r o - d e g r e e a n g l e
G e r m a n 7 . 9 m m ball a m m u n i t i o n c o u l d
penetrate, and 7 . 9 m m S m K AP penetrated
easily. A c o m m o n c o m p l a i n t w a s t h a t

29

The roller aided the crossing
of obstacles such as ditches,
stream banks and gulleys,
preventing the halftrack's
bumper from digging into the
bank.
30
b u l l e t s p e n e t r a t e d o n e s i d e a n d r i c o c h e t e d a b o u t the
interior, r e s u l t i n g in h a l f t r a c k s b e i n g d u b b e d " P u r p l e
H e a r t b o x e s . " H a l f t r a c k s w e r e c o m p l e t e l y v u l n e r a b l e to
A T g u n s , P a n z e r f a u s t a n d similar w e a p o n s , a n d the fire of
a s s a u l t g u n s a n d t a n k s . E v e n s m a l l a n t i p e r s o n n e l mines
c o u l d d e s t r o y a halftrack's front tire, while a t a n k c o u l d
p l o w t h r o u g h s u c h minefields.
A s e r i o u s liability w a s the o p e n driver's a n d p a s s e n g e r
c o m p a r t m e n t s . Air- a n d t r e e - b u r s t i n g artillery r o u n d s
w e r e a s e v e r e t h r e a t ; the c o m p a r t m e n t s c o u l d be fired
i n t o w h e n the v e h i c l e s w e r e m o v i n g d o w n - s l o p e , a n d
w e r e o f c o u r s e e x p o s e d t o g r e n a d e s a n d t o fire f r o m
m u l t i - s t o r y b u i l d i n g s . T w o 3 0 g a l self-sealing fuel t a n k s
w e r e m o u n t e d inside the p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t , o n e o n
either s i d e , in the f o r w a r d p a r t in the M 3 a n d rear in the
M 2 / M 4 . A 41b fire e x t i n g u i s h e r w a s c a r r i e d in the
driver's c o m p a r t m e n t .
Substitute versions of the halftracks were
s t a n d a r d i z e d in 1 9 4 2 , the M 5 p a s s e n g e r carrier in J u n e
a n d the M 9 h a l f t r a c k c a r in J u l y (but the M 9 w a s never
p r o d u c e d , b e i n g s u p e r s e d e d by the M 9 A 1 ) . T h e M 5 / M 9
w e r e m e r e l y M 2 / M 3 v e r s i o n s built b y a different
m a n u f a c t u r e r , a n d b e g a n t o b e delivered a t the e n d o f 1 9 4 2 . A b o x - l i k e M 4 9
m a c h i n e g u n ring m o u n t o v e r the right s i d e o f the driver's c o m p a r t m e n t w a s
a d d e d , r e s u l t i n g in the M 2 A 1 , M 3 A 1 , M 5 A 1 , a n d M 9 A 1 . B e s i d e s n e w - b u i l d
M 3 A l s m a n y w e r e c o n v e r t e d f r o m M 3 s a n d earlier S P M s . 5 A l t h o u g h u s e d by
s o m e u n i t s for S t a t e s i d e t r a i n i n g the M 5 , M 5 A 1 , a n d M 9 A 1 w e r e m o s t l y
p r o v i d e d a s L e n d - L e a s e t o the C o m m o n w e a l t h , Free F r e n c h a n d S o v i e t s . T h e
M 3 A 2 w a s fielded t o c o m b i n e the roles of the p a s s e n g e r carrier a n d halftrack
c a r ; the p r o d u c t i o n o f h a l f t r a c k c a r s c e a s e d in M a r c h 1 9 4 4 . A n e w m o r t a r
carrier, the M 4 A 1 w i t h i n c r e a s e d t r a v e r s e ( 3 0 0 mils either w a y ) , b e g a n to be
p r o d u c e d in M a y 1 9 4 3 . A further i m p r o v e d m o r t a r carrier, the M 2 1 , b a s e d
o n the M 3 c a r r i e r b u t w i t h a f o r w a r d - f i r i n g m o r t a r , b e g a n p r o d u c t i o n in
J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 , b u t s a w o n l y l i m i t e d u s e ; it m o u n t e d a . 5 0 c a l rather t h a n a
.30cal machine gun.
TACTICS: THEORY AND CAPABILITIES
F o r t a n k s in direct s u p p o r t of infantry speed w a s n o t essential, a n d a " w a l k i n g "
p a c e w a s sufficient, b u t t a n k s o p e r a t i n g in a b r e a k t h r o u g h role a n d p u n c h i n g
into the enemy's rear a r e a s h a d t o m o v e faster. W h i l e it w a s recognized that
b r e a k t h r o u g h t a n k s w o u l d need s o m e infantry s u p p o r t , the extent w a s not fully
r e c o g n i z e d by m a n y a r m o r a d v o c a t e s ; the b a l a n c e of infantry t o a r m o r w a s
typically i n a d e q u a t e in all a r m i e s , a n d l e s s o n s learned at a high price t h r o u g h
the early d a y s of W o r l d W a r II w e r e n o t fully a c c e p t e d until 1 9 4 3 .
F o r all p r a c t i c a l p u r p o s e s t h e r e w a s n o f o r m a l U S a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y
5
The M 2 series were made by Autocar and White M o t o r C o , the M 3 series by the Diamond
T M o t o r Car C o and Autocar C o , and White produced all of the mortar carriers. The M 5
series and M 9 A 1 were built by International Harvester C o ; White produced all the
mortar-carriers. The SP mounts converted to M 3 A l s included the 7 5 m m gun M 3 , 5 7 m m
gun T 4 8 , and 1 0 5 m m howitzer T 1 9 .
 An M3 halftrack, showing a
non-standard bumper number
system, photographed during
exercises at the Desert Training
Center in California; the
camouflage net draped to the
rear has been pulled back to
give the .50cal MG a clear field
of AA fire. The 3d to 7th, 9th,
and 11th Armd Divs had the
benefit of maneuvers in this
massive training area in the
Mojave Desert; although none
of these formations would fight
in North Africa, the amount of
unrestricted space for
maneuver and live firing was an
invaluable training experience.

d o c t r i n e for m o s t o f the w a r . A r m o r m a n u a l s p a i d o n l y lip s e r v i c e t o t h e

e m p l o y m e n t a n d i n t e g r a t i o n o f a r m o r e d infantry, a n d n o a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y
m a n u a l s w e r e p u b l i s h e d until N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 4 , w h e n c o m p a n y a n d b a t t a l i o n
m a n u a l s w e r e i n t r o d u c e d . By the t i m e they w e r e d i s t r i b u t e d the w a r w a s in
its final m o n t h s , a n d e v e n t h e n t h e y w e r e o f little v a l u e , s i n c e u n i t s h a d
a l r e a d y perfected their o w n tactics a n d t e c h n i q u e s w h i c h s e l d o m m a t c h e d the
dictates o f the m a n u a l s . T h i s e x p l a i n s , for e x a m p l e , the w i d e v a r i a n c e in the
practice o f the t a s k o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d e m p l o y m e n t o f c o m b a t c o m m a n d s . T h e
m a n u a l s w e r e for the m o s t p a r t d e v e l o p e d o n o u t d a t e d t h e o r e t i c a l
information gleaned from pre- and early-war maneuvers and on lessons from
N o r t h A f r i c a . L i k e the t a n k e r s ' m a n u a l s d a t i n g f r o m 1 9 4 2 , t h e y o n l y
provided minimal information o n m u t u a l s u p p o r t a n d integration of t a n k s
a n d a r m o r e d infantry. F o r i n s t a n c e , a n e x a m p l e in the A I B m a n u a l o f a n
" i l l u s t r a t e d p r o b l e m ( a t t a c k o f a p o s i t i o n ) " s h o w s the A I B e x e c u t i n g all
a s p e c t s o f the a t t a c k w i t h the m e d i u m t a n k c o m p a n y h e l d in r e s e r v e a n d
never c o m m i t t e d , while in p r a c t i c e the t a n k c o m p a n y w o u l d n o r m a l l y b e in
the lead with the A I B s u p p o r t i n g it. T h e J a n u a r y 1 9 4 3 m a n u a l Armored Force
Drill p r o v i d e d j u s t a b o u t every p o s s i b l e f o r m a t i o n a n d t r a n s i t i o n f r o m o n e
f o r m a t i o n t o a n o t h e r for a r m o r e d infantry a n d t a n k u n i t s , f r o m p l a t o o n t o
b a t t a l i o n - b u t the t w o t y p e s o f u n i t s w e r e a d d r e s s e d s e p a r a t e l y , a n d n o
consolidated formations were s h o w n or discussed. M a n y veteran a r m o r e d
infantry l e a d e r s w e r e n o t even a w a r e t h a t m a n u a l s e x i s t e d .
C o m m a n d e r s were issued various after-action reports and training
m e m o r a n d u m s (often c o n t r a d i c t o r y ) b y the A r m o r e d F o r c e , c o r p s , a n d o t h e r
c o m m a n d s . T h e y a l s o s t u d i e d British b a t t l e r e p o r t s . M a n y t o o k w h a t l i m i t e d
g u i d a n c e there w a s a n d d i d the b e s t they c o u l d w i t h it, c o n f i d e n t t h a t it h a d
been tested a n d v a l i d a t e d by t h o s e m o r e k n o w l e d g e a b l e . F u t u r e r e g i m e n t a l
a n d d i v i s i o n a l c o m m a n d e r s w e r e sent t o N o r t h A f r i c a t o o b s e r v e o p e r a t i o n s
a n d learn f r o m c o m m a n d e r s a n d staffs first-hand. W h i l e c o m m a n d e r s g l e a n e d
i d e a s f r o m all these e f f o r t s , they c e r t a i n l y p r o d u c e d n o s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n o f
t a c t i c s . D i v i s i o n s d e v e l o p e d their t a n k - i n f a n t r y i n t e g r a t i o n p r a c t i c e s b a s e d

31
 o n their s t u d i e s a n d e x p e r i e n c e s in e x e r c i s e s . It w a s often s i m p l y the c a s e that
the t a c t i c s a n d t e c h n i q u e s u s e d b y a p a r t i c u l a r a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n w e r e the
o p i n i o n o f the c o m m a n d e r , w i t h i n p u t f r o m his staff a n d unit c o m m a n d e r s .
T h e y w e r e d e v e l o p e d by t r i a l - a n d - e r r o r in t r a i n i n g , w e r e refined in c o m b a t ,
a n d e v o l v e d a c c o r d i n g t o further l e s s o n s l e a r n e d , the a r r i v a l of n e w w e a p o n s
a n d equipment, a d a p t a t i o n to local terrain and weather, and responses to
new enemy tactics.

Armored infantry training

T h e r e w e r e n o d e d i c a t e d a r m o r e d infantry r e p l a c e m e n t t r a i n i n g units other
t h a n the 1 5 s e p a r a t e A I B s t h a t u n d e r w e n t b a s i c i n f a n t r y a n d s m a l l - u n i t
t r a i n i n g a n d w e r e then b r o k e n u p in 1 9 4 3 a s fillers t o d e p l o y i n g d i v i s i o n s .
( S o m e o f t h o s e m e n w e r e e v e n a s s i g n e d t o s t a n d a r d infantry units.) W h e n
first c o m m i t t e d t o c o m b a t v i r t u a l l y all r e p l a c e m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g N C O s a n d
o f f i c e r s , w e r e s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y m e n w i t h n o a r m o r e d infantry k n o w l e d g e ,
a n d m o s t h a d n o t even seen a h a l f t r a c k . R e p l a c e m e n t s q u a d l e a d e r s , p l a t o o n
s e r g e a n t s a n d p l a t o o n c o m m a n d e r s relied o n their h a l f t r a c k driver t o orient
t h e m , a n d e v e n t o tell t h e m w h e r e t o sit. M o s t r e p l a c e m e n t p l a t o o n
c o m m a n d e r s h a d u n d e r g o n e a s i x - w e e k tactical training c o u r s e at Ft Benning,
G e o r g i a , b u t this i n c l u d e d n o t h i n g o n a r m o r e d infantry; it f o c u s e d m o s t l y o n
w e a p o n s f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n a n d lectures o n fire a n d m a n e u v e r , w i t h few if a n y
p r a c t i c a l t a c t i c a l e x e r c i s e s . T h i s t r a i n i n g deficiency w a s a m p l i f i e d d u r i n g the
i n f a n t r y r e p l a c e m e n t s h o r t f a l l in the w i n t e r o f 1 9 4 4 / 4 5 , w h e n s o m e
r e p l a c e m e n t s a s s i g n e d t o A I B s in-theater w e r e n o t even t r a i n e d i n f a n t r y m e n .
Even units deploying f r o m the U S A suffered from inadequately trained
Typical "administrative" march
t r o o p s . It w a s n o t u n c o m m o n for a b a t t a l i o n t o h a v e g o n e t h r o u g h the unit
formation for an armored
infantry battalion. t r a i n i n g cycle a n d then t o be levied t o p r o v i d e s c o r e s o f N C O s a n d specialists
t o c a d r e a n e w l y r a i s e d unit; their original b a t t a l i o n w o u l d
itself r e c e i v e u n t r a i n e d r e p l a c e m e n t s o n the eve of
JRCN-
~0 o v e r s e a s d e p l o y m e n t , w i t h m a l i g n r e s u l t s for unit
cohesion and confidence.
ICP -*
0 W h i l e a r m o r e d infantry units w e r e generally successful,
t h e y w e r e s o m e t i m e s less t h a n efficient o w i n g to
4 75SP 0 i n a d e q u a t e l e a d e r s h i p t r a i n i n g . T h e s e w e r e in effect
c o m b i n e d - a r m s u n i t s d o w n t o p l a t o o n level; the rifle
Q p l a t o o n h a d its o w n m o r t a r a n d m a c h i n e - g u n s q u a d s , a s
0 well a s m a c h i n e g u n s m o u n t e d o n its five halftracks, which
-81 w e r e m a n e u v e r elements in their o w n right if u s e d a s such.

MED
L_0 T h e p l a t o o n s h a d t o be c a p a b l e o f w o r k i n g w i t h t a n k s
habitually, n o t just o n a n o c c a s i o n a l b a s i s .
"G BN CO
The situation was made more complex by
r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d the fielding o f n e w w e a p o n s a n d
0 S-l,S-4
e q u i p m e n t , for w h i c h t r a i n i n g - t i m e w a s a l w a y s brief a n d

MED
0 o f t e n n o n - e x i s t e n t . T h e r e w e r e u n i t s t h a t received
b a z o o k a s b u t w e r e u n a b l e t o e m p l o y t h e m ; since there
0 were n o m a n u a l s a n d n o one h a d been trained to use
t h e m , t h e y h a d t o w a i t until r e p l a c e m e n t s w h o h a d
0 BN SURG r e c e i v e d t r a i n i n g in their u s e j o i n e d the r a n k s .
DET |
Individual and small-unit training w a s conducted
BN M A I N T SEC I w i t h i n the A I B . T h e a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y m a n first u n d e r t o o k
s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y t r a i n i n g f o l l o w e d by a d d i t i o n a l

32
 Tank-infantry operations
required close cooperation
between tankers and armored
infantrymen. Here tankers and
infantrymen together study
their planned route of advance.

specialized a r m o r e d infantry skills, a s p r e s c r i b e d in the S e p t e m b e r 1 2 , 1 9 4 3

Infantry Training Program. A s c a n be seen in T a b l e 1 3 , the e x t e n t a n d f o c u s
of training w e r e m u c h different.
The formation of an AIB went through several steps of organization,
e q u i p p i n g , a n d t r a i n i n g p r i o r t o o v e r s e a s d e p l o y m e n t . U p o n a c t i v a t i o n the
unit's c a d r e o f officers, N C O s , a n d s p e c i a l i s t s w e r e a s s e m b l e d ; s o m e c a m e
f r o m t r a i n i n g units a n d o t h e r s w o u l d be levied f r o m e x i s t i n g units t o p r o v i d e
a n at l e a s t m i n i m a l l y - e x p e r i e n c e d c o r e t o b u i l d the u n i t a r o u n d . M o s t l y
c o n s c r i p t e d , u n t r a i n e d recruits w o u l d be a s s i g n e d a n d b a s i c t r a i n i n g w o u l d
c o m m e n c e f o l l o w e d by specialist a n d technical t r a i n i n g , all given by the N C O
a n d officer c a d r e . W e a p o n s a n d e q u i p m e n t t r a i n i n g w o u l d b e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o
this, a s w o u l d small-unit t r a i n i n g ( s q u a d , s e c t i o n , a n d p l a t o o n ) . T h i s is w h e r e
w e a p o n s c r e w s , s q u a d s , a n d s p e c i a l i s t s e c t i o n s l e a r n e d their j o b s . F u r t h e r
p l a t o o n a n d c o m p a n y t r a i n i n g w o u l d b e g i n , s o m e t i m e s c o n d u c t e d in
m a n e u v e r a r e a s a w a y f r o m the unit's h o m e p o s t . B a t t a l i o n - l e v e l t r a i n i n g w a s
undertaken as part of divisional maneuvers; with only a couple of exceptions
the a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s p a r t i c i p a t e d in a t l e a s t o n e o f t h e b i g L o u i s i a n a ,
T e n n e s s e e , or C a r o l i n a m a n e u v e r s . T h e W a r D e p a r t m e n t test t o a s c e r t a i n a
unit's r e a d i n e s s for o v e r s e a s d e p l o y m e n t w a s often c o n d u c t e d in c o n j u n c t i o n
with d i v i s i o n a l m a n e u v e r s . ( D u r i n g this p r o c e s s the d i v i s i o n m i g h t h a v e b e e n
s t a t i o n e d o n t w o or three different p o s t s , g i v i n g t h e m m a n e u v e r e x p e r i e n c e

Table 13: Infantry squad training comparison

Standard infantry Armored infantry

Subject Hours Subject Hours

Operations of patrols, day & night 8 Tactical training of the infantry soldier 16
Scouting & observing, day & night 8 Tactics of the crew & squad, day & night 56
Bayonet 8 Bayonet 8
Rifle, .30cal 68 Machine gun, ,30cal 32
Automatic rifle, .30cal 38 Vehicular crew drill & maintenance 4
Total 130 116

33
o n different t y p e s of terrain.) T h e y w o u l d then m o v e t o a p o s t t o g e t r e a d y
for d e p l o y m e n t , a n d then t o the p o r t o f e m b a r k a t i o n . In B r i t a i n they u s u a l l y
h a d s o m e t i m e for a d d i t i o n a l t a c t i c a l t r a i n i n g a n d r a n g e - f i r i n g , a t l e a s t a t the
small-unit level; however, f r o m the 7 t h A r m d D i v o n w a r d s the d i v i s i o n s s p e n t
only a b o u t t w o m o n t h s in B r i t a i n b e f o r e d e p l o y i n g t o F r a n c e , o r w e r e even
s h i p p e d directly f r o m the S t a t e s t o F r a n c e , a n d n e c e s s a r y m a i n t e n a n c e ,
p r e p a r a t i o n s a n d s t a g i n g left t h e m little t i m e for t r a i n i n g .

Movement formations
R e g a r d l e s s of the e c h e l o n , units u s e d the s a m e t y p e o f m o v e m e n t f o r m a t i o n s .
D e p e n d e n t o n w h e t h e r they w e r e c o n d u c t i n g a m o v e m e n t - t o - c o n t a c t or w e r e
e n g a g e d , the f o r m a t i o n a n d i n t e r v a l s selected w o u l d d e p e n d o n the t e r r a i n ,
visibility, a v e n u e s o f a p p r o a c h , e n e m y s i t u a t i o n , m i s s i o n , a n d a t t a c h m e n t s .
T h e unit c o m m a n d e r ' s vehicle w a s in the center o f the line, d i a m o n d , w e d g e ,
a n d i n v e r t e d w e d g e f o r m a t i o n s , a n d in t h e l e a d o f t h e line a n d e c h e l o n
f o r m a t i o n s . Irrespective o f the size of the unit its s u b u n i t s w e r e d e p l o y e d in
similar p a t t e r n s :
Inverted wedge A l s o k n o w n a s a " V " f o r m a t i o n , it h a d t w o s u b u n i t s f o r w a r d
and one t o the r e a r ; this s t a n d a r d " t w o u p a n d o n e b a c k " a l l o w e d a b r o a d
front to be c o v e r e d , w i t h the r e a r s u b u n i t a b l e t o s u p p o r t t h e f o r w a r d
subunits or m o v e t o either f l a n k .
Wedge O n e s u b u n i t f o r w a r d a n d t w o t o the rear, e c h e l o n e d t o the right a n d
left. T h i s w a s u s e d w h e n neither f l a n k w a s s e c u r e , o r w h e n t h e s i t u a t i o n
i n d i c a t e d t h a t a n e n v e l o p m e n t or f l a n k i n g a t t a c k m i g h t b e c o n d u c t e d t o o n e
or the other f l a n k .
Echelon T h e s u b u n i t s w e r e d e p l o y e d in a " s t e p p e d " o r s l a n t e d f o r m a t i o n t o
o n e flank or the other - the f l a n k t h a t w a s e x p o s e d .
Column S u b u n i t s f o l l o w i n g o n e b e h i n d the o t h e r o n r o a d s , n a r r o w a v e n u e s
o f a p p r o a c h , a n d w h e n the f l a n k s w e r e s e c u r e - the e a s i e s t f o r m a t i o n t o
c o n t r o l a n d the fastest m o v i n g .
Line T h e line f o r m a t i o n w a s o n l y u s e d b y d i s m o u n t e d s q u a d s a n d p l a t o o n s .
T h e d i s m o u n t e d M G a n d m o r t a r s q u a d s c o u l d a c c o m p a n y the p l a t o o n o r
p r o v i d e s u p p o r t i n g fire.
Diamond T h e b a s i c f o r m a t i o n for the i n f a n t r y p l a t o o n , n o t u s e d b y t a n k
units. T h e p l a t o o n leader's vehicle a n d the t w o o t h e r rifle s q u a d s f o r m e d a

FORMATIONS - MOUNTED ARMORED
• TANK PLATOONS
While armored rifle and tank platoons and companies worked
side by side and both platoons had five vehicles, their
movement formations were different. It should be noted that
the rifle platoon did not use the tank platoon's inverted wedge;
and that there was no tank platoon equivalent of the rifle
platoon's diamond. Each formation had its uses, allowing
maximum firepower to the front, flanks, all-round, or in
combinations. The column was for rapid and easily controlled
movement, and was used frequently, since so much
movement was by road. The diamond provided excellent
all-round fires; it allowed the mortar and MG squad halftracks
to maneuver to either flank, or switch easily into wedge and
line formations. The echelon and wedge provided fire to one or
RIFLE & both flanks, and the latter still provided effective fire to
the front; naturally, the line maximized frontal fire. Intervals
depended on terrain, visibility and the tactical situation;
the standard "by the book" interval between vehicles on level,
open terrain was 25 yards apart sideways and front to
rear, and in column formation a 25-yard interval was
recommended. Platoons had to learn an orderly transition
from one formation t o another, and adjustments had t o be
made when vehicles were battle-damaged, malfunctioned, or
left behind bogged down.
Key:
= Rifle squads; M 4 = Mortar
A r m o r e d rifle p l a t o o n : R1 t o R3
squad; M G 5 = LMG Squad
T a n k p l a t o o n : 1 = Platoon leader; 4 = Platoon sergeant

Air security on the march of an
armored rifle platoon: machine
guns are pointed to the front,
right, rear and left, and each
halftrack has all-round air
observers. The weapons can
just as easily engage ground
targets.
36
w e d g e , w i t h the p l a t o o n l e a d e r a n d 1st S q u a d at the a p e x , a n d
the m o r t a r a n d M G s q u a d s o n line t o the r e a r o f the w e d g e .
W h e t h e r the c o m p a n i e s w e r e f o r m e d in line, c o l u m n , e c h e l o n ,
w e d g e , o r i n v e r t e d w e d g e , w i t h i n e a c h c o m p a n y f o r m a t i o n the
p l a t o o n s c o u l d b e in the d i a m o n d f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h p r o v i d e d
a l l - a r o u n d o b s e r v a t i o n a n d fire f r o m the h a l f t r a c k ' s m a c h i n e
g u n s . D e p e n d i n g u p o n the t e r r a i n a n d t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n the
s u b u n i t s w o u l d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be in the s a m e f o r m a t i o n a s the
p a r e n t u n i t . F o r e x a m p l e , a c o m p a n y in a n i n v e r t e d w e d g e
m i g h t h a v e the t w o f o r w a r d p l a t o o n s in a line f o r m a t i o n t o
c o v e r a w i d e f r o n t , w h i l e the s u p p o r t p l a t o o n t o the rear m i g h t
b e in a c o l u m n .
In c o m b a t the c o m p a n y H Q vehicles (other t h a n the
c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r ' s ) w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e the c o m p a n y ' s rear
e c h e l o n a n d be c o - l o c a t e d w i t h the b a t t a l i o n service c o m p a n y .
T h e c o m p a n y C O ' s h a l f t r a c k is d e p i c t e d in m a n u a l s l e a d i n g
f o r m a t i o n s , b u t in reality it w o u l d n o r m a l l y be in the center a n d
t o the rear o f the f o r m a t i o n , or b e h i n d the lead p l a t o o n , in order
t o see m o r e of the f o r m a t i o n a n d better c o n t r o l it. O t h e r vehicles
m i g h t a c c o m p a n y the c o m p a n y a t t i m e s , s u c h a s the a r m o r e d
r e c o v e r y vehicle a n d the a r m o r e d a m b u l a n c e . T h e s e m i g h t
f o l l o w t o the rear or be integrated into the f o r m a t i o n , for instance between the
2 d a n d 3 d P l a t o o n s . T h e s a m e a p p l i e d t o the a n t i t a n k p l a t o o n , w h i c h is n o t
e v e n d e p i c t e d in s o m e m a n u a l s . F o r a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m o v e the c o m p a n y
h e a d q u a r t e r s vehicles w o u l d u s u a l l y trail the m a i n b o d y o f the c o m p a n y .
Tank/armored infantry deployment
W h e n t a n k s a n d a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y w e r e i n t e g r a t e d - a s w a s m o r e the rule
t h a n the e x c e p t i o n - all o r m o s t o f the t a n k s w o u l d u s u a l l y be d e p l o y e d
f o r w a r d w i t h the i n f a n t r y f o l l o w i n g , t o be m o v e d f o r w a r d w h e n necessary.
If o p e r a t i n g u n d e r the p a i r e d c o n c e p t the t a n k a n d rifle p l a t o o n s w o u l d be in
a m i x e d f o r m a t i o n , p e r h a p s w i t h the t a n k s f o r w a r d a n d the h a l f t r a c k s t o the
rear, or i n t e r m i x e d w i t h i n the j o i n t f o r m a t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o unit S O P .
C o m b a t s a w a n y m i x o f m o v e m e n t p r o c e d u r e s d e p e n d i n g o n the unit's
p r e f e r e n c e g a i n e d t h r o u g h e x p e r i e n c e , the t e r r a i n , a m o u n t o f d i s p e r s i o n
a l l o w e d b y visibility, a n d the e n e m y s i t u a t i o n a n d t a c t i c s . A typical s e q u e n c e
for a m o v e m e n t t o c o n t a c t w o u l d see the c o m b i n e d a r m o r e d infantry a n d
t a n k c o m p a n i e s a d v a n c i n g in a w e l l - d i s p e r s e d c o l u m n formation.
R e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a t o o n s a n d / o r light t a n k s w o u l d be r e c o n n o i t e r i n g f o r w a r d
a n d g u i d i n g the c o l u m n . T e r r a i n a n d e n e m y d i s p o s i t i o n s w o u l d d e t e r m i n e
the e x t e n t o f f l a n k s e c u r i t y ; this w a s k e p t t o a m i n i m u m , a s it s l o w e d the
c o l u m n . W h e n a p p r o a c h i n g the o b j e c t i v e o r w h e n e n e m y w e r e e n c o u n t e r e d
the c o l u m n w o u l d b e g i n t o d e p l o y i n t o a m o r e d i s p e r s e d f o r m a t i o n t o a l l o w
the m a x i m u m n u m b e r s o f w e a p o n s t o e n g a g e . A n e x p e r i e n c e d a n d p r u d e n t
c o m m a n d e r w o u l d n o t r u s h i n t o the a t t a c k b e f o r e d e p l o y i n g his t a n k s , T D s ,
A T g u n s , m o r t a r s a n d artillery i n t o s u i t a b l e a t t a c k f o r m a t i o n , a n d a s s i g n i n g
t a r g e t s . A n e x p e r i e n c e d unit c o u l d d o this quickly, t o m a i n t a i n t e m p o a n d
a l l o w the e n e m y o n l y m i n i m a l r e s p o n s e t i m e . T h e t a n k s m o v e d f o r w a r d ; the
i n f a n t r y d i s m o u n t e d f r o m their h a l f t r a c k s a n d j o i n e d u p w i t h the t a n k s ; a n d
the h a l f t r a c k s m o v e d t o / r e m a i n e d in e n f i l a d e , a l t h o u g h s o m e m i g h t h a v e
m o v e d t o firing p o s i t i o n s .
 A n a r m o r e d rifle c o m p a n y a t t a c h e d t o a
t a n k b a t t a l i o n m i g h t h a v e a rifle p l a t o o n
f o l l o w i n g the l e a d t a n k p l a t o o n a n d the rest
of the c o m p a n y f o l l o w i n g the t a n k c o m p a n y .
Alternatively, a t a n k c o m p a n y m i g h t be in the
lead with the rifle c o m p a n y f o l l o w i n g , a n d the
other t w o o r three t a n k c o m p a n i e s f o l l o w i n g
it. A n o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y w o u l d b e for rifle
p l a t o o n s t o be p a i r e d w i t h t a n k p l a t o o n s in
the lead c o m p a n y . T h e s e c o n d c o m p a n y in the
c o l u m n w o u l d be a t a n k c o m p a n y , f o l l o w e d
by a rifle c o m p a n y , a n d s o o n . E l e m e n t s s u c h
a s the a s s a u l t g u n a n d m o r t a r p l a t o o n s w o u l d
be p o s i t i o n e d w h e r e they c o u l d b e s t b e
b r o u g h t into a c t i o n d e p e n d e n t o n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Combat engineers with
T h e t a n k battalion's light t a n k c o m p a n y w a s often split u p . It or p a r t o f it SCR-625 mine detectors,
escorted by armored infantry to
might be directly under the C C a s a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e unit, or p l a t o o n s m i g h t be
the rear, clear a gap through a
attached to both the t a n k battalion a n d A I B for r e c o n n a i s s a n c e or flank security minefield which has already
m i s s i o n s . O n e e x a m p l e of their u s e w a s t h a t they w o u l d f o l l o w b e h i n d the claimed an M5 light tank.
infantry at night or in forests. W h e n c o n t a c t w a s m a d e g u i d e s led the t a n k s
f o r w a r d to e n g a g e the e n e m y w i t h m a c h i n e g u n s a n d 3 7 m m canister (the latter
r o u n d ' s 1 2 2 lead balls w e r e effective b o t h a g a i n s t t r o o p s in light cover, a n d t o
strip a w a y c a m o u f l a g e a n d v e g e t a t i o n ) . C o n s i d e r e d o b s o l e t e by s o m e , light
tanks h a d their uses; they c o u l d traverse m u d d y fields in w h i c h S h e r m a n s w o u l d
b o g d o w n , or t h r e a d their w a y t h r o u g h trees a n d b r o k e n g r o u n d . T D p l a t o o n s
or c o m p a n i e s m i g h t a l s o be integrated into b a t t a l i o n a n d c o m p a n y f o r m a t i o n s ;
integrated f o r m a t i o n s c o u l d be quite c o m p l e x a n d v a r i e d , d e p e n d i n g o n m a n y
factors. ( E x a m p l e s of f o r m a t i o n s are s h o w n in Plates C a n d D.)

The squad and platoon

T h e h a l f t r a c k w a s b a s i c a l l y a m e a n s of t r a n s p o r t i n g i n f a n t r y m e n r a t h e r t h a n
a c o m b a t vehicle; it w o u l d n o t be e m p l o y e d offensively a l o n g s i d e t a n k s w i t h
the i n f a n t r y m e n f i g h t i n g f r o m it. T h e m a n u a l Crew Drill for Half-Track
Vehicles s t a t e d : " S m a l l A r m s Fire F r o m Vehicle. - W h e n rifle o r c a r b i n e fire
f r o m the vehicle is d e s i r e d , the s q u a d l e a d e r h a l t s the vehicle a n d specifies in
the fire o r d e r the m e m b e r s o f the s q u a d w h o a r e t o fire. Rifle or c a r b i n e fire
f r o m a m o v i n g vehicle is o f little v a l u e . " T h e h a l f t r a c k ' s a r m o r w a s t o o light,
the o p e n t o p far t o o v u l n e r a b l e , a n d it c o u l d n o t a l w a y s k e e p p a c e w i t h t a n k s
o n difficult t e r r a i n u n d e r c o m b a t c o n d i t i o n s . L i k e the d r a g o o n s o f o l d ,

Armored infantrymen,
deployed in extended order,
cross a clear area to search
the forest on the far side. A
halftrack to the right, beside
a house, is prepared to give
covering fire with its
machine gun.

37

When the halftracks were left
in the rear, armored
infantrymen would frequently
hitch rides aboard tanks. While
it was recommended that no
more than a squad ride on
each tank, as can be seen
this was often ignored; this
particular scene is obviously
in a relatively secure area.
a r m o r e d infantry w e r e t r a n s p o r t e d into battle
a n d t h e n d i s m o u n t e d t o fight. M o s t units
d i s m o u n t e d w h e n e n g a g e d , o r w h e n the
a c c o m p a n y i n g a r m o r w a s e n g a g e d a n d they
m o v e d u p o n f o o t t o s u p p o r t the t a n k s . T h e
h a l f t r a c k s c o u l d b e left b e h i n d the n e a r e s t
cover or c o n c e a l m e n t ; s o m e units s e l d o m
e m p l o y e d the m o u n t e d M G s for fire s u p p o r t ,
r e g a r d i n g t h e m a s defensive a n d A A w e a p o n s ,
b u t m a n y units e m p l o y e d a t least s o m e of the
h a l f t r a c k s t o p r o v i d e s u p p o r t i n g M G fire for
the d i s m o u n t e d infantry. O n o c c a s i o n the
h a l f t r a c k s w e r e m a n e u v e r e d t o fire o n different
e n e m y p o s i t i o n s a n d a d v a n c e d b e h i n d the i n f a n t r y a n d t a n k s t o p r o v i d e
c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t . T h e y c o u l d a l s o be e m p l o y e d t o p r o t e c t e x p o s e d f l a n k s ,
the a t t a c k i n g unit's rear, a n d the s u p p l y line. In the d e f e n s e h a l f t r a c k s w e r e
p o s i t i o n e d a s m o b i l e firing p l a t f o r m s a n d p r o v i d e d a " b a s e " for s p a r e
a m m u n i t i o n , r a t i o n s , a n d g e a r ; they w e r e a l s o s o m e t i m e s u s e d t o e v a c u a t e
casualties and prisoners.
T h e driver a n d o n e o r t w o s q u a d m e m b e r s r e m a i n e d w i t h the halftrack t o
o p e r a t e its m a c h i n e g u n ( s ) , a n d o t h e r s q u a d m e m b e r s often g a v e letters a n d
p e r s o n a l i t e m s t o their driver for s a f e k e e p i n g . G u n n e r d u t y w a s r o t a t e d t o
g i v e m e n a b r e a k , a n d e v e n lightly w o u n d e d , i n j u r e d , or ill m e n d r e w this
duty. A n N C O w a s d e s i g n a t e d in c h a r g e o f the p l a t o o n vehicles - the senior
m a n p r e s e n t , the p l a t o o n s e r g e a n t , the m o r t a r o r M G s q u a d leader, or a rifle
s q u a d l e a d e r o r a s s i s t a n t s i m p l y n e e d i n g a b r e a k . T h e nine s q u a d riflemen
w e r e d e s i g n a t e d N o s . 1 t h o u g h 9 ; the N o . 4 w a s the b a z o o k a g u n n e r
( " r o c k e t e e r " ) a n d N o . 5 his l o a d e r , b u t all s q u a d m e m b e r s w e r e t r a i n e d t o
o p e r a t e the b a z o o k a . If the b a z o o k a w a s n e e d e d , then w h e n d i s m o u n t i n g the
s q u a d l e a d e r w o u l d o r d e r , " R o c k e t s , " a n d if n o t he w o u l d order, " N o
r o c k e t s , " a n d N o s . 4 a n d 5 w o u l d serve a s riflemen. N o s . 6 a n d 7 w e r e s c o u t s ,
t h o u g h this p r a c t i c e s o o n fell f r o m u s e . If a h a l f t r a c k M G w a s d i s m o u n t e d for
g r o u n d u s e it w a s m a n n e d by riflemen N o . 1 t h r o u g h 3 u n d e r the c o n t r o l of

FORMATIONS - MOUNTED ARMORED RIFLE
• TANK COMPANIES
Armored rifle and tank companies typically operated together in
combined formations, for all practical purposes as a single unit.
The deployment of platoons depended on the tactical situation
and terrain, although most units had more or less SOP
formations when moving to contact on roads, advancing
dispersed cross-country, or deployed in battle formation. The
platoon symbols do not indicate a particular formation. That
would depend on the tactical situation, terrain, and visibility, and
platoons might assume different formations from one another.
In these examples, the armored rifle company is Company A and
the tank company is Company B. In one instance a light tank
platoon from the tank battalion's Company D is attached, as is
the AlB's battalion HMG section and/or assault gun platoon.
1 : The armored rifle and tank companies are deployed in an
attack formation on a wide frontage. The 3d Tank Platoon
is short a tank. The infantry are dismounted, with squads
& following the tanks. The attached light tank platoon is
deployed in echelon to protect the exposed right flank.
2: The column formation was used for the approach and
even the movement-to-contact when engagement was
likely. This is because most movement was accomplished
on roads, and it allowed ease of control. Once engaged,
the formation w o u l d deploy as necessary, based on the
enemy's disposition, terrain, and obstacles. The lead rifle
and tank platoons' squads and tanks are interspaced,
followed by the t w o company HQs, while the other rifle
platoons follow the tank platoons. The AlB's assault gun
and 81 m m mortar platoons accompany the formation.
3: On each flank one tank platoon is forward in the inverted
wedge formation, with the dismounted squads of a rifle
platoon accompanying the tanks. A battalion HMG section
follows the 1 st Platoons on the left, to secure that flank and
support by fire. The supporting platoons follow, prepared to
deploy to either flank or relieve a platoon suffering losses.
 3d Plat

| • J I •
1st P l a t M
d P l a t

I • •
M
• I
I •

Plat/Lt Tk Co

Co HQ

8,
HQ/1

J
I
2/1 f
I
3/1
5
9
| Mort/1 KEY

I
J MG/1 •• ••
•• D i s m o u n t e d Inf

CD 1/B
CD 2/B

i HQ 0 A r m d Inf

COs
A r m d Inf A T
2/A

i A&B
121
1/A

i s I
Cmd Grp
• Medium Tank

Aslt
Gun ± • Light Tank

2/B
Bn MG CD Tank

Infantry
2/A
\ E 1
CD 3/B

3/B Platoon

3/A Section
3/A

3
Mort/A Squad

••• AT/A
AT/A
76mm gun-armed Shermans
spread out onto side streets as
they reach an intersection. No
infantrymen are apparent; this

ilSJ V11 n
may be an instance when they
are distancing themselves
owing to frequent Panzerfaust .W--%iiiiwgil.
or other AT fire. The infantry
may be ahead of the tanks
clearing likely firing positions.

the a s s i s t a n t s q u a d leader. In the M G s q u a d t w o riflemen w e r e the b a z o o k a

c r e w if n e e d e d . A n e x a m p l e o f h a l f t r a c k s b e i n g left in the r e a r is p r o v i d e d by
a 9 t h A I B (6th A r m d D i v ) i n f a n t r y m a n ; it is a p p a r e n t t h a t the t a n k s w e r e
relied u p o n t o n e u t r a l i z e e n e m y d e f e n s e s :

. . . f r o m b e h i n d a hill, s o m e o f o u r t a n k s t o o k u p p o s i t i o n s o n the rear

s l o p e a n d b e g a n firing i n t o the t o w n . F i r s t o n e t a n k , then a n o t h e r ,
w o u l d c r a w l u p t o a p o i n t w h e r e the g u n w o u l d clear the hilltop [hull
d e f i l a d e ] , fire a t the t a r g e t , b a c k o u t o f sight a n d a n o t h e r t a n k , a little
further d o w n the line, w o u l d roll u p a n d d o the s a m e t h i n g . W h e n the
t a n k s s t o p p e d f i r i n g , w e , the a r m o r e d infantry, left o u r h a l f t r a c k s
b e h i n d the hill a n d w e n t t o w a r d the t o w n in a s p r e a d o u t f o r m a t i o n .
A s w e c r o s s e d a s u g a r b e e t field, w e c a m e u p o n a n u n d e r g r o u n d
b u n k e r w h i c h w a s flush w i t h the s u r f a c e a n d s o well c a m o u f l a g e d , I
a l m o s t fell i n t o the e n t r a n c e . T h e r e w e r e G e r m a n s i n s i d e . A s e r g e a n t
t r i e d t o g e t t h e m t o s u r r e n d e r , b u t they r e f u s e d . We fired i n t o the
b u n k e r , then e n t e r e d t o m a k e s u r e o f n o further r e s i s t a n c e .

H o w h a l f t r a c k s w e r e d e p l o y e d w a s s o m e t i m e s n o t even s t a n d a r d i z e d
within u n i t s , a n d it w a s r e p o r t e d t h a t even p l a t o o n s within the s a m e c o m p a n y
m i g h t e m p l o y t h e m differently, d e p e n d i n g o n the e x p e r i e n c e a n d preferences
o f unit l e a d e r s .
T h e a d v a n t a g e s of e a c h s q u a d h a v i n g its o w n vehicle w e n t b e y o n d merely
b e i n g a b l e t o ride r a t h e r t h a n w a l k . T h e s q u a d w a s p a r t l y p r o t e c t e d f r o m
w e a t h e r even w i t h o u t erecting the c a n v a s c o v e r (this w a s d o n e d u r i n g
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a r c h e s , b u t it c o u l d still be a c o l d ride in the winter.) Rather
t h a n rely o n daily resupply f r o m the c o m p a n y rear, a r m o r e d infantry could carry
a c o n s i d e r a b l e a m o u n t of s p a r e a m m u n i t i o n , rations, a n d water with them; they
typically carried three d a y s ' w o r t h , a n d held s o m e in reserve in case the situation
prevented timely resupply. T h e y a l s o carried a considerable a m o u n t of " c o m f o r t
i t e m s , " including one-burner s t o v e s , g a s o l i n e lanterns, c o o k i n g gear, w a s h p a n s ,
b u c k e t s , 5 g a l w a t e r c a n s , l a u n d r y items, s o u v e n i r s , a n d s o forth. E a c h halftrack
c a m e w i t h a 3 6 x 4 0 f t c a m o u f l a g e net, a n a u t o m o t i v e t o o l kit, first-aid kit,
D - h a n d l e shovel, p i c k - m a t t o c k , a A V i k c r o s s c u t s a w a n d a single-bit a x e , which

40
c o u l d be b r o u g h t u p w h e n d i g g i n g in t o
a u g m e n t the men's small entrenching t o o l s . S o
m u c h e x t r a n e o u s g e a r w a s slung o n the sides
a n d carried o n e x t e r n a l s t o w a g e r a c k s t h a t
halftracks t o o k o n the a p p e a r a n c e of g i p s y
c a r a v a n s . A r m o r e d infantrymen carried their
bedrolls, a u g m e n t e d by liberated quilts, in the
vehicles, s o did not h a v e t o w a i t a n d h o p e for
the c o m p a n y trains t o bring t h e m u p , a s d i d
s t a n d a r d infantry. A c a n v a s t a r p c o u l d be
d r a p e d over the p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t , with
the s q u a d b u n d l e d u p w a r m inside, or it c o u l d
be attached to the vehicle's side a n d s t a k e d to
the g r o u n d as a shelter. S q u a d s p o o l e d their K-
a n d C-rations for c o o k i n g in their collection of p o t s a n d p a n s , a n d s o m e m e n An M 3 surrounded by its squad.
devised w a y s of heating C-ration c a n s o n the engine m a n i f o l d . T h e s t o w a g e in The infantrymen viewed their
a vehicle a l s o a l l o w e d t h e m t o m a k e use of the p o p u l a r 1 0 - i n - l r a t i o n s (three halftrack not as an armored
fighting vehicle, but as a means
meals for ten m e n for o n e d a y ) . of transport and a mobile home.
T h e s q u a d s h a d the benefit o f the s p a r e w e a p o n s s t o w e d in their
h a l f t r a c k s , w i t h the o p t i o n t o u s e the M G s , b a z o o k a s a n d m i n e s if n e e d e d .
W h e n d i s m o u n t e d the s q u a d a n d p l a t o o n u s e d b a s i c a l l y the s a m e m o v e m e n t
f o r m a t i o n s a s their s t a n d a r d infantry c o u n t e r p a r t s , b u t s o m e m o d i f i c a t i o n s
w e r e r e q u i r e d . 6 T h e 1st S q u a d w a s s m a l l e r t h a n the 2 d a n d 3 d , a n d t h e r e
w e r e n o B A R s . R e g a r d l e s s o f the d i s m o u n t e d f o r m a t i o n ( c o l u m n , l i n e ,
inverted w e d g e , w e d g e , e c h e l o n ) , the t w o - g u n M G s q u a d m i g h t be p o s i t i o n e d
t o the rear t o a l l o w it t o m o v e i n t o firing p o s i t i o n s in the center o r f l a n k s , o r
the g u n s m i g h t be a t t a c h e d t o specific rifle s q u a d s . A n o t h e r o p t i o n w a s for
rifle s q u a d s t o d i s m o u n t a . 3 0 c a l f r o m their h a l f t r a c k a n d u s e it o n its t r i p o d .
T h e m o r t a r s q u a d w a s t o the very rear, r e a d y t o p r o v i d e s u p p o r t .
T h e realities o f c o m b a t s a w m o s t s q u a d s d r a s t i c a l l y u n d e r s t r e n g t h , n o t
just f r o m c o m b a t c a s u a l t i e s b u t f r o m f a t i g u e , illness, a n d n o n - b a t t l e i n j u r i e s .
O n e or t w o h a l f t r a c k s w e r e t y p i c a l l y " d o w n , " u s u a l l y w i t h m e c h a n i c a l
p r o b l e m s . L o s s e s w e r e often heavy, w i t h c o m p a n i e s d o w n t o 4 0 - 5 0 m e n a t
t i m e s ; p l a t o o n s m i g h t field 2 0 - 3 0 m e n , w i t h the M G s q u a d b e i n g m e r g e d
into the t w o o r three s m a l l rifle s q u a d s . T h e m o r t a r s q u a d m i g h t r e m a i n o r
d i s a p p e a r ; s o m e units m a d e little u s e o f p l a t o o n m o r t a r s , a n d in s o m e c a s e s
u n d e r s t r e n g t h M G a n d m o r t a r s q u a d s w e r e m e r g e d t o u s e either w e a p o n a s
n e e d e d . A s a n e x a m p l e , in ten m o n t h s o f c o m b a t a c o m p a n y o f the 9 t h A I B
lost 89 d e a d , 2 9 2 w o u n d e d , 19 missing or c a p t u r e d - losses a l m o s t
a p p r o a c h i n g t w i c e the c o m p a n y ' s T O E s t r e n g t h .

Missions: the rifle company

A rifle c o m p a n y m i g h t be p a i r e d w i t h a t a n k c o m p a n y t o fight a s a t e a m , o r
c r o s s - a t t a c h e d t o a t a n k b a t t a l i o n , w h i c h h a d p r o b a b l y a t t a c h e d o n e o f its
o w n c o m p a n i e s t o the A I B in e x c h a n g e . W h i l e rifle p l a t o o n s m i g h t be p a i r e d
with t a n k p l a t o o n s , the p l a t o o n s o f a single rifle c o m p a n y a t t a c h e d t o a t a n k
b a t t a l i o n w e r e s e l d o m s e p a r a t e d t o t a n k c o m p a n i e s - this s t r e t c h e d the rifle
p l a t o o n s t o o far, a n d a c o m p a n y w a s m o r e effective if its s t r e n g t h w a s
c o n c e n t r a t e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e w e r e c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h a p l a t o o n

6
See Ospey Elite 1 0 5 : World War II Infantry Tactics: Squad and Platoon.

41
a t t a c h e d t o a t a n k c o m p a n y c o u l d be effective, e s p e c i a l l y if there w a s little
threat f r o m e n e m y infantry.
M o s t c o m m o n l y the t a n k s w o u l d be f o r w a r d a n d the infantry f o l l o w i n g
m o u n t e d , d i s m o u n t i n g w h e n n e c e s s a r y t o m o v e f o r w a r d t o s u p p o r t or p r o t e c t
the armor. T h e A T p l a t o o n w o u l d f o l l o w t o the rear. It m i g h t be e m p l o y e d w i t h
all three g u n s c o n c e n t r a t e d , b u t individual g u n s w e r e m o r e u s u a l l y p o s i t i o n e d
to p r o v i d e covering fire in o v e r l a p p i n g s e c t o r s . In the defense all o f the g u n s
might be p o s i t i o n e d in the m a i n line of r e s i s t a n c e , b u t s o m e m i g h t be p l a c e d in
the c o m b a t o u t p o s t line, c o v e r i n g g a p s b e t w e e n units or e x p o s e d f l a n k s .
T h e a r m o r e d rifle c o m p a n y w a s c a p a b l e o f c o n d u c t i n g a w i d e v a r i e t y o f
m i s s i o n s , a n d often several o f t h e m s i m u l t a n e o u s l y :

1. F o l l o w i n g a t a n k a t t a c k t o d e s t r o y r e m a i n i n g r e s i s t a n c e .
2 . Seizing a n d h o l d i n g t e r r a i n g a i n e d b y t a n k s .
3. A t t a c k i n g t o seize t e r r a i n f r o m w h i c h t a n k a t t a c k s c a n b e m a d e .
4. F o r m i n g a b a s e o f fire in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h A F A a n d T D s .
5. A t t a c k i n g in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t a n k s .
6. C l e a r i n g minefield l a n e s , w i t h or w i t h o u t e n g i n e e r s u p p o r t .
7. P r o t e c t i n g t a n k units in b i v o u a c , o n the m a r c h , in a s s e m b l y a r e a s ,
a n d at rally p o i n t s .
8. A s s i s t i n g in f o r c i n g a river c r o s s i n g .
9. A s s i s t i n g in seizing a b r i d g e h e a d .
1 0 . E s t a b l i s h i n g or b r e a c h i n g o b s t a c l e s .
1 1 . A t t a c k i n g or d e f e n d i n g b u i l t - u p a r e a s .
12. Organizing and defending a position.
13. Performing reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance.
1 4 . P e r f o r m i n g offensive o r defensive o p e r a t i o n s a s p a r t o f a b a t t a l i o n .
1 5 . T a k i n g limited o b j e c t i v e s w h e n s t r o n g e n e m y A T d e f e n s e s m a d e the
use of tanks impractical.
16. Sending out raiding parties.
1 7 . P e r f o r m i n g security m i s s i o n s .

T h e r e w e r e f e w a t t a c h m e n t s t o the c o m p a n y f r o m b a t t a l i o n a p a r t f r o m a
m e d i c a l t e a m , w i t h a h a l f t r a c k a m b u l a n c e , a litter t e a m , a n d a c o u p l e o f
medics. T h e M G p l a t o o n could be attached to a c o m p a n y or a t w o - g u n
section t o t w o c o m p a n i e s . T h e g u n s m i g h t be p o s i t i o n e d t o p r o v i d e o v e r h e a d
fire (least d e s i g n e d t e c h n i q u e ) , t o fire t h r o u g h g a p s b e t w e e n u n i t s or c o v e r
exposed flanks.
W h e n a defense w a s called for or the a t t a c k w a s p a u s e d t o a l l o w units t o
c o n s o l i d a t e , r e o r g a n i z e , r e s u p p l y , a n d rest b e f o r e c o n t i n u i n g the o f f e n s i v e ,

B A R M O R E D INFANTRY BATTALION IN THE

ATTACK
An illustrative problem, the attack of a position, was provided
in FM 17-42, Armored Infantry Battalion, November 1944. While
the manual was current with ongoing tactics, especially in
regard to integration with tank units, this example
demonstrates how the AlB's supporting weapons (assault
guns, mortars, AT guns) were deployed in a two-phase assault
to secure two ridgelines. Ridge "A" is occupied by the AIB, and
the weapons are deployed to support the assault on Ridge "B",
the intermediate objective. Once that objective is seized most
of the supporting weapons are brought forward to support
the follow-on attack on Ridge "C", the main objective. Note
that some supporting weapons remain in their original
positions, as they have the range to continue their support
without re-deploying. Some of the company 57mm AT guns
also remain in place to protect the rear of the advancing units.
( K e y t o s u b u n i t i d e n t i t i e s as p e r P l a t e D.)

Two armored infantrymen wolf
down a frontline Thanksgiving
dinner complete with turkey.
They wear the M1943 winter
field uniform; note the TL-122
flashlight tucked in the left
man's jacket opening.
44
then a d v a n c e d units m i g h t h a v e to p a u s e to a l l o w
l a g g i n g units t o c a t c h u p , r e s u m i n g the a d v a n c e
o n l y w h e n the f l a n k s w e r e s e c u r e . T e r r a i n ,
weather, e n e m y r e s i s t a n c e , a n d l a g g i n g r e s u p p l y
c o u l d a l s o force a h a l t , even if only t e m p o r a r y .
T h e infantry w o u l d be the m a i n defensive force,
b u t the t a n k s a n d T D s w o u l d be in c l o s e
p r o x i m i t y for fire a n d m a n e u v e r s u p p o r t ,
p r o t e c t i n g the i n f a n t r y a s they d u g in a n d
e s t a b l i s h e d their fire p l a n . Part, if n o t m o s t of the
t a n k u n i t s w o u l d m o v e f o r w a r d into h a s t y
d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s , hull d e f i l a d e if p o s s i b l e or
using whatever cover w a s available. They might
be a c c o m p a n i e d by infantry to protect t h e m f r o m
c l o s e - i n a t t a c k s , a n d w o u l d u s e their M G s a n d m a i n g u n s t o drive off
c o u n t e r a t t a c k s a n d c u r i o u s p a t r o l s . O t h e r t a n k s w o u l d r e m a i n b e h i n d the
infantry, p r o v i d i n g o v e r - w a t c h i n g fires a n d s e r v i n g a s a r e s e r v e . O n c e the
d e f e n s e w a s p r e p a r e d the t a n k s w o u l d w i t h d r a w b e h i n d the m a i n infantry
line; their a c c o m p a n y i n g infantry, o r at least p a r t of it, w o u l d r e m a i n f o r w a r d
m a n n i n g screening o u t p o s t s . T h e t a n k s , n o w p r o t e c t e d by the infantry screen,
w o u l d r e s u p p l y , pull m a i n t e n a n c e , a n d p r e p a r e t o r e n e w the a t t a c k .
Rifle c o m p a n i e s typically d e f e n d e d w i t h t w o p l a t o o n s f o r w a r d a n d the A T
g u n s positioned a m o n g them covering tank avenues of a p p r o a c h . Battalion
M G s e c t i o n s m i g h t be i n t e g r a t e d into the d e f e n s e , w h i c h c o u l d be reinforced
w i t h s o m e h a l f t r a c k m a c h i n e g u n s . O n e rifle p l a t o o n w o u l d be t o the rear;
this w a s the " s u p p o r t " p l a t o o n a n d w a s n o t c o n s i d e r e d a " r e s e r v e . " It w a s
p o s i t i o n e d t o s u p p o r t the f o r w a r d p l a t o o n s by fire, a n d c o u l d m a n e u v e r to
p r o t e c t a flank or c o u n t e r a t t a c k . It w a s this p l a t o o n that p r o v i d e d the o u t p o s t s
a n d local security p a t r o l s . If the A T g u n s w e r e n o t needed to s u p p o r t the attack
or d e f e n s e , the d i s m o u n t e d A T p l a t o o n w o u l d o p e r a t e a s a s m a l l rifle p l a t o o n ,
w i t h its t h r e e t e n - m a n s q u a d s ( e a c h w i t h three rifles, s i x c a r b i n e s a n d o n e
S M G ) p r o v i d i n g a v a l u a b l e a u g m e n t a t i o n t o the c o m p a n y .
The AIB
T h e m i s s i o n o f the A I B , a n d t h u s its s u b o r d i n a t e e l e m e n t s , w a s o r i e n t e d
t o w a r d o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s in conjunction with tanks. T h e 1 9 4 4 doctrine
s t a t e d t h a t : " T h e A I B in the a t t a c k m a k e s full u s e o f its mobility, firepower,
a n d light a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n f r o m s m a l l a r m s f i r e " ; b u t there is n o m e n t i o n of
t a n k s , or o f the fact t h a t the i n f a n t r y virtually a l w a y s d i s m o u n t e d t o fight,
their m o b i l i t y b e i n g e m p l o y e d s i m p l y t o k e e p p a c e w i t h the a r m o r . In the
o f f e n s i v e the A I B c o u l d b e u s e d in o n e o f t h r e e b r o a d w a y s : a s a n a s s a u l t
f o r c e , a t t a c k i n g o n a p r e d e t e r m i n e d f r o n t t o seize d e s i g n a t e d o b j e c t i v e s ; a s a
s u p p o r t f o r c e , s u p p o r t i n g the a s s a u l t f o r c e ( u s u a l l y t a n k s ) a n d c o n s o l i d a t i n g
its g a i n s ; a n d a s a r e s e r v e , p r o v i d i n g d e p t h for the a t t a c k a n d flank a n d rear
p r o t e c t i o n . T h e i n f a n t r y w o u l d be c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h the t a n k s t o fulfill the
r a n g e o f m i s s i o n s listed a b o v e for the a r m o r e d rifle c o m p a n y .
T h e battalion operations order provided information on enemy and
friendly t r o o p d i s p o s i t i o n s ; the b a t t a l i o n ' s m i s s i o n , a s s e m b l y a r e a or other
final a p p r o a c h - m a r c h d e s t i n a t i o n ; m o v e m e n t a n d a t t a c k p h a s e lines, z o n e of
a d v a n c e , w i t h f r o n t a g e s a n d m o v e m e n t directions for b a t t a l i o n e l e m e n t s , a n d
m o v e m e n t f o r m a t i o n s ; c o m m u n i c a t i o n s (call-signs, frequencies, signal
 Fire support: an armored
division had one or more tank
destroyer battalions habitually
attached to it, and they often
fought alongside the armored
infantry. Here, engineers
prepare to demolish a
knocked-out M10 with
demolitions; severely damaged
tanks and TDs were often
blown apart to prevent the
Germans from using them as
pillboxes.

flare/smoke c o l o r s ) ; route-of-march c o m m a n d p o s t a n d vehicle control;

m i s s i o n s for e a c h e l e m e n t o f the b a t t a l i o n ; a n d l o g i s t i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t s
( a m m u n i t i o n , s u p p l y a n d fuel p o i n t s , a i d s t a t i o n , vehicle recovery, e t c ) .
In the a t t a c k the halftracks w e r e u s e d t o q u i c k l y m o v e into a t t a c k p o s i t i o n s
where the infantry d i s m o u n t e d t o fight o n f o o t , u s u a l l y in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h
t a n k s . S o m e vehicles - s e l d o m all - w e r e p o s i t i o n e d for fire s u p p o r t , a n d the
others w i t h d r a w n to a p r o t e c t e d a r e a . T h e y m i g h t be c o n c e n t r a t e d at c o m p a n y
or battalion levels in a g r o u p for easy control. Refueling a n d quick m a i n t e n a n c e
could be undertaken. T h e y c o u l d be c o m m i t t e d to action w h e n required, m o v e d
to another p o s i t i o n , or m o v e d f o r w a r d w h e n n e e d e d .
P l a t o o n s or c o m p a n i e s w e r e n o t t o be c o m m i t t e d w i t h o u t c o o r d i n a t e d
fire s u p p o r t . A n t i t a n k g u n s , M G s , p l a t o o n a n d b a t t a l i o n m o r t a r s , a s s a u l t
g u n s , t a n k s , T D s , a n d 1 0 5 m m SP h o w i t z e r s w e r e t o deliver p r e p a r a t o r y fires
on objectives and k n o w n or suspected enemy positions, assembly areas, etc.,
a n d w e r e p r e p a r e d t o shift fires t o o t h e r t a r g e t s a s n e c e s s a r y .

The AIR
T h e tactical d o c t r i n e for the early a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t specified t h a t it
c o u l d a t t a c k t o drive-in hostile c o v e r i n g f o r c e s , t o d e v e l o p a s i t u a t i o n , a n d t o
seize terrain f r o m w h i c h t o l a u n c h the t a n k a t t a c k . It c o u l d f o l l o w the t a n k
a t t a c k closely t o d e s t r o y r e m a i n i n g r e s i s t a n c e , p r o t e c t the d i v i s i o n ' s f l a n k s ,
o c c u p y a n d h o l d c a p t u r e d g r o u n d , a n d c o v e r the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the t a n k
units by screening a n d o u t p o s t s a s they p r e p a r e d t o c o n t i n u e the a d v a n c e . It
w a s a l s o u s e d t o s e c u r e b r i d g e h e a d s , in w h i c h r o l e it w a s a s s u m e d t h a t the
retreating e n e m y h a d d e s t r o y e d b r i d g e s , w h i c h w o u l d h a l t the a r m o r . T h e
infantry w o u l d c r o s s the river by f o r d i n g , r u b b e r b o a t s a n d h a s t i l y erected
f o o t b r i d g e s ; they w o u l d clear the far s i d e , a n d e s t a b l i s h a d e f e n s e c o v e r e d by
artillery o n the friendly s i d e , w h i l e e n g i n e e r s e r e c t e d / r e p a i r e d b r i d g e s a n d set
u p ferries. T h i s w a s a g r e a t d e a l for the r e g i m e n t ' s t w o , o r l a t e r t h r e e
b a t t a l i o n s t o a c c o m p l i s h in s u p p o r t o f t h e d i v i s i o n ' s e i g h t o r e v e n t h e
p o s t - 1 9 4 2 six t a n k b a t t a l i o n s .

45
 T h e three remaining A I R s that s a w c o m b a t from 1 9 4 3 were mainly
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a d q u a r t e r s t o c o n t r o l a n d s u p p o r t each's three A I B s , w h i c h
w e r e d e t a i l e d o u t t o C C s . T h e A I R h e a d q u a r t e r s itself m i g h t function a s a n
H Q for a C C C o r o t h e r t a s k f o r c e .

Fire support
A p a i r o f " m a r r i e d " a r m o r e d infantry a n d t a n k b a t t a l i o n s fielded c o n s i d e r a b l e
f i r e p o w e r : 5 3 m e d i u m a n d 1 7 light t a n k s , nine a s s a u l t g u n s , six 8 1 m m a n d
nine 6 0 m m m o r t a r s , a n d nine 5 7 m m A T g u n s (if all w e r e p r e s e n t a n d
o p e r a t i o n a l , w h i c h w a s s e l d o m the c a s e ) . O f c o u r s e , only a p e r c e n t a g e of these
w e a p o n s c o u l d be directed at t a r g e t s at a n y given time o w i n g to their p o s i t i o n
in the f o r m a t i o n , terrain restrictions, a n d the enemy's d i s p o s i t i o n . T h e r e were
three other i m p o r t a n t m e a n s of fire s u p p o r t . T h e p a i r e d b a t t a l i o n s h a d scores
o f m o u n t e d m a c h i n e g u n s ; t h e s e t e n d t o be d i s c o u n t e d by c o m p a r i s o n
w i t h t a n k g u n s , m o r t a r s , a n d artillery, b u t in fact p r o v i d e d a very v a l u a b l e
s o u r c e o f fire s u p p o r t for o f f e n s i v e , d e f e n s i v e , a n d s u p p r e s s i v e fire, a n d
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e by fire.
A r m o r e d field artillery b a t t a l i o n s m o s t l y r e m a i n e d directly under division
c o n t r o l . A l t h o u g h specific b a t t a l i o n s w o u l d be p l a c e d in direct s u p p o r t of a
C C , the battalion w o u l d n o t necessarily a c c o m p a n y or even be in the immediate
vicinity o f the s u p p o r t e d C C , a n d its fires c o u l d be shifted t o s u p p o r t other
C C s o n order. T h e p r i o r i t y o f fires for all d i v i s i o n a l a n d a n y a t t a c h e d or
s u p p o r t i n g c o r p s artillery m i g h t be given t o the lead C C , split equally between
the t w o f o r w a r d C C s , or split w i t h the b u l k of the artillery a s s i g n e d to s u p p o r t
the m a i n a t t a c k a n d the b a l a n c e the s u p p o r t i n g or s e c o n d a r y a t t a c k . Battalions
o r batteries m i g h t be a t t a c h e d directly t o a C C , d e p e n d i n g o n the situation.
E a c h A F A h a d three f o r w a r d observer t e a m s , o n e of which a c c o m p a n i e d a C C s
lead elements, typically riding in a d e d i c a t e d t a n k or halftrack. W h e n resistance
w a s e n c o u n t e r e d d u r i n g the C C s a d v a n c e the F O w o u l d immediately call in the
a p p r o p r i a t e fire m i s s i o n s , a n d if timely these often neutralized or s u p p r e s s e d
resistance b e f o r e direct e n g a g e m e n t w a s necessary. T h e artillery a l s o fired o n
s u s p e c t e d or p o s s i b l e t a r g e t s including t o the flanks. T h e G e r m a n s were often
s t u n n e d by the s h o r t t i m e in w h i c h A m e r i c a n artillery r e s p o n d e d a n d by its
a c c u r a c y , v o l u m e , a n d r a t e of fire; they called it "automatische Artillerie."
B e s i d e s d e s t r u c t i o n , n e u t r a l i z a t i o n , c o u n t e r b a t t e r y , a n d h a r a s s i n g fires o n
p o i n t a n d a r e a t a r g e t s , artillery c o u l d a l s o deliver s c r e e n i n g s m o k e a n d , at

A R M O R E D INFANTRY COMPANY SUPPORTING
A DEFENSE
While armor was envisioned to be the "arm of decision,"
welding its shock-power, firepower, and armored protection
to mount unrelenting offensive, no armor unit could maintain
a non-stop, continuous offensive operation. They had to rest,
rearm, refuel, and refit; they might have t o hold up while
other units caught up, or phases of other operations were
completed, or when terrain, weather, or the enemy situation
delayed operations. Tank units could not effectively hold
ground, although they could reinforce the infantry's defense.
Infantry was essential to the defense; besides direct small-arms
fire they provided local security patrols, outposts and listening
posts, laid mines, emplaced obstacles, and conducted
counterattacks. To protect the infantry while they dug in and
readied the defense, tanks would screen the infantry, and they
themselves were protected from close-in attacks. Here two
platoons of an armored infantry company dig in and set up
crew-served weapons (1); the support platoon protects the two
forward screening tank platoons (2), while its machine guns
and mortar crews dig in with the other rifle platoons further to
the rear. The third tank platoon is held in reserve (3). A 57mm
AT gun is being positioned (4), and some of the rifle company's
halftracks and the service company's trucks have moved up to
drop off ammunition and supplies (5 & 6). Both rifle and tank
platoons are understrength.

Fire support: the armored
infantry battalion possessed
three 75mm M8 self-propelled
howitzers in the assault gun
platoon, each with a towed
ammunition trailer that could
be dropped at need. They
could provide both indirect and
direct fire support, but being
open-topped and built on an
M5 light tank chassis they
lacked sufficient armor to
function as true close-in assault
guns, and were generally
replaced late in the war by
up-armored 105mm gun-
armed Sherman tanks.
48
night, i l l u m i n a t i o n . S m o k e w a s v a l u a b l e
for s c r e e n i n g friendly m o v e m e n t s a n d
blinding e n e m y o b s e r v a t i o n , a n d if fired
o n m a n e u v e r i n g e n e m y units it w o u l d
s l o w a n d c o n f u s e t h e m a n d h a m p e r their
target acquisition and aim. Smoke
r o u n d s w e r e a v a i l a b l e for the 1 0 5 m m
howitzer, 7 5 / 7 6 m m and 1 0 5 m m tank
g u n s , 7 5 m m howitzer, a n d 8 1 m m and
6 0 m m m o r t a r s , a n d m a n y t a n k s h a d 2in
smoke mortars.
E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t w a s the air liaison
officer, w h o r o d e further b a c k in the
c o l u m n . Each advancing division w a s
t y p i c a l l y p r o v i d e d a c e r t a i n n u m b e r of
on-call air strikes per day, f r o m f i g h t e r - b o m b e r s that m i g h t be orbiting n e a r b y
t o deliver their o r d n a n c e o n call, or o n s t a n d b y alert at a f o r w a r d airstrip. T h e
P-47 T h u n d e r b o l t s a n d P-51 M u s t a n g s could attack targets with
general-purpose bombs (usually 250 and 5001b), anti-personnel
f r a g m e n t a t i o n b o m b l e t s , n a p a l m fire b o m b s , 4 . 5 / 5 i n r o c k e t s , a n d . 5 0 c a l
m a c h i n e g u n s . F i g h t e r - b o m b e r s a l s o r a n g e d a h e a d of a n a d v a n c i n g a r m o r e d
division attacking targets of opportunity, especially enemy armor, troop
f o r m a t i o n s , artillery, f l a k , a n d s u p p l y c o n v o y s .
A n A A A s e c t i o n , p l a t o o n , o r b a t t e r y of h a l f t r a c k - m o u n t e d twin or q u a d
. 5 0 c a l M G s w e r e often a t t a c h e d t o A I B s or C C s , interspersed t h r o u g h c o l u m n s
t o p r o v i d e A A p r o t e c t i o n ; the t w i n g u n s h a m m e r e d o u t a l m o s t 1 , 0 0 0 r o u n d s
p e r m i n u t e . H o w e v e r , their real v a l u e w a s a g a i n s t g r o u n d t a r g e t s , s u p p o r t i n g
the infantry a d v a n c e by p l a c i n g s u p p r e s s i v e fire o n w o o d l i n e s , villages, a n d
other a r e a s h a r b o r i n g k n o w n or s u s p e c t e d e n e m y p o s i t i o n s . O n e e x a m p l e of
their u s e w a s by the 6 t h A r m d D i v n e a r M e t z , w h e r e engineers w e r e w o r k i n g
t o r e c o n s t r u c t a b r i d g e b l o w n by the G e r m a n s , a n d infantry w e r e u n a b l e to
c r o s s the river t o clear the o p p o s i t e s h o r e . A t o w e d 4 0 m m g u n w a s e m p l a c e d
o n a hillside a n d a " q u a d - 5 0 " h a l f t r a c k p u l l e d o n t o o p e n g r o u n d n e a r the
b r i d g e ; the 4 0 m m n e u t r a l i z e d a n M G p o s i t i o n by achieving a i r b u r s t s a m o n g
the trees in w h i c h it w a s h i d d e n , a n d the q u a d - 5 0 s p r a y e d the r i d g e ,
eliminating rifle fire a n d p r o v i d i n g " t o u c h - u p " w h e n snipers g r e w b o l d . Often
t w o t o six t w i n / q u a d - 5 0 s w o u l d w o r k over a w o o d l i n e or a n objective village's
o u t s k i r t s even if n o fire w a s received, a n d w h e n the infantry m o v e d in they
often f o u n d c h e w e d - u p , a b a n d o n e d p o s i t i o n s . W h e n fire w a s received, the
" f i f t i e s " w o u l d h a m m e r s t r e a m s o f t r a c e r s into the a r e a , r e p o r t i n g t h a t the
enemy's fire c e a s e d o w i n g to a " p e r s o n n e l m a l f u n c t i o n . " (It is a g r o u n d l e s s a n d
i r r a t i o n a l m y t h t h a t it is illegal t o fire . 5 0 c a l M G s at p e r s o n n e l targets.)
PRACTICE: TANK-INFANTRY
COORDINATION
In i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s w i t h n i n e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s , s i n g l e t a n k a n d t a n k
d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n s w e r e t y p i c a l l y a t t a c h e d t o s u p p o r t the i n f a n t r y ; by
c o n t r a s t , in a n a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n the infantry u s u a l l y s u p p o r t e d the t a n k s , a s
they b r o k e t h r o u g h e n e m y p o s i t i o n s a n d a t t a c k e d into the e n e m y ' s rear.
 Armored infantrymen fight their
way through a town alongside
M4 tanks. Enemy fire could come
from any direction, including the
rear; time and manpower did not
always allow every building to be
cleared floor-by-floor. Typically,
the tank/infantry task forces
punched through towns
eliminating resistance, and left it
to follow-on reserve units to
completely clear the area.

A rifle squad hugs an M4 tank to

avoid sniper fire; note the Culin
hedgerow-cutter mounted on
the Sherman's bow, for tearing
T h e infantry served to protect the t a n k s f r o m close-in a t t a c k s , seized g r o u n d gaps through Normandy's
f r o m which the t a n k s c o u l d a t t a c k , a n d established a b a s e o f fire to s u p p o r t the banked hedgerows. Apart from
the at-least-notional shelter
t a n k a t t a c k ; they f o l l o w e d the t a n k s closely, a s s i s t i n g by fire, b r e a c h i n g A T
provided by their bulk, there
o b s t a c l e s , seizing the o b j e c t i v e , m o p p i n g u p , a n d p r o t e c t i n g the t a n k unit's were two other reasons for
r e o r g a n i z a t i o n a s it p r e p a r e d t o r e s u m e the a t t a c k . T h e infantry's s u p p o r t i n g infantrymen to follow close
w e a p o n s assisted in destroying or neutralizing e n e m y A T a n d other s u p p o r t i n g behind tanks. A Sherman had
w e a p o n s . T h e t a n k s , in t u r n , s u p p o r t e d the infantry a t t a c k w i t h direct fire, 16.5in-wide tracks (23in, on later
versions); infantrymen would
d e s t r o y i n g a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s , n e u t r a l i z i n g the o b j e c t i v e until the infantry walk in the tread path to avoid
arrived, breaking u p counterattacks a n d countering enemy reserves; they created antipersonnel mines, since the
p a t h s t h r o u g h b a r b e d wire, anti-personnel m i n e s a n d other light o b s t a c l e s , a n d impervious tank tracks would
neutralized enemy c o m m a n d , c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d logistics facilities. have touched them off. Another
reason to stay close during
T a n k s a l s o e n g a g e d e n e m y a r m o r - irrespective of the q u e s t i o n a b l e official wintertime was the hot engine
doctrine that t a n k d e s t r o y e r s e n g a g e d t a n k s a n d t a n k s d i d n o t ; if e n e m y t a n k s exhaust, welcome despite the
a p p e a r e d , the t a n k e r s e n g a g e d t h e m . T a n k d e s t r o y e r s a l s o s u p p o r t e d infantry noxious fumes. The left hand
man carries a BAR; although
m u c h like t a n k s ; they w e r e s o m e w h a t faster, less h e a v i l y a r m o r e d a n d h a d
these were not authorized for
semi-open-topped turrets, but otherwise they p o s s e s s e d m u c h the s a m e armored infantry until June 1945,
support capabilities as tanks. some units had occasionally
Effective t a n k - i n f a n t r y c o o r d i n a t i o n b e g a n w i t h j o i n t t r a i n i n g . N o m a t t e r managed to obtain a few.
h o w well a n a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y o r t a n k u n i t h a d t r a i n e d o n its o w n a n d
h o w p r o f i c i e n t it w a s , if they d i d n o t t r a i n
together in all a s p e c t s of their o p e r a t i o n s a n d
at all e c h e l o n s then their effectiveness w o u l d
be l i m i t e d , w i t h a c o n s e q u e n t c o s t in s p e e d
a n d lives. H a b i t u a l j o i n t t r a i n i n g allowed
both infantrymen and tankers to learn one
another's capabilities and limitations in
regards to cross-country movement,
maneuver, and w e a p o n s employment.
It m i g h t r e q u i r e t w o t o three d a y s of
o p e r a t i n g t o g e t h e r in c o m b a t b e f o r e they
functioned smoothly. While battalions or
elements of b a t t a l i o n s c o u l d be a s s i g n e d t o

49
 a n y c o m b a t c o m m a n d in a division, it w a s f o u n d that h a b i t u a l p a i r i n g ensured
c o m b a t effectiveness. If p o s s i b l e a n a r m o r e d infantry a n d t a n k b a t t a l i o n , a l o n g
w i t h their s u p p o r t i n g artillery b a t t a l i o n , w o u l d be r o t a t e d t o the reserve
c o m m a n d together t o m a i n t a i n the a s s o c i a t i o n .
It w a s f o u n d t h a t s m a l l t a n k - i n f a n t r y t e a m s fighting their w a y t h r o u g h
e n e m y d e f e n s e s w e r e e x t r e m e l y effective, b u t this r e q u i r e d the c l o s e s t
c o o p e r a t i o n a n d m u t u a l s u p p o r t , a n d s o u n d t r a i n i n g of e a c h i n d i v i d u a l in
his o w n a n d his unit's s h a r e o f the j o b w a s s t r e s s e d . J o i n t t r a i n i n g t o d e v e l o p
t e a m w o r k h a d t o s u p p l e m e n t t e c h n i c a l t r a i n i n g if m i s s i o n s w e r e t o be
a c c o m p l i s h e d a t m i n i m u m c o s t in lives a n d t i m e .
O f t e n i n f a n t r y m e n u n d e r t r a i n i n g w e r e given rides inside t a n k s ; this m a d e
t h e m a p p r e c i a t e the t a n k e r ' s limited field o f v i s i o n , a n d the c l o s e d - o f f feeling
t a n k e r s e x p e r i e n c e d in " b u t t o n e d - u p " t a n k s . S u c h a n i n s i g h t h e l p e d
i n f a n t r y m e n u n d e r s t a n d the difficulty t a n k e r s h a d in detecting a n d e n g a g i n g
t a r g e t s - i n c l u d i n g t h o s e s u p p o s e d l y m a r k e d for t h e m by the infantry - a n d
in selecting m o v e m e n t r o u t e s . It a l s o i n c r e a s e d the i n f a n t r y m a n ' s c o n f i d e n c e
w h e n f a c i n g e n e m y t a n k s , a s he better u n d e r s t o o d their l i m i t a t i o n s .
M u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the l i m i t a t i o n s o f i n f a n t r y a n d t a n k s in
n e g o t i a t i n g different t y p e s o f t e r r a i n w a s essential. In m u d , r o c k s , d e n s e trees
a n d b r u s h , b r o k e n g r o u n d , a n d r u b b l e d b u i l t - u p a r e a s the infantry w o u l d
h a v e t o c a r r y the a t t a c k , w i t h t a n k s p r o v i d i n g s u p p o r t i n g fires. O n o p e n
terrain, clear r o a d s a n d avenues of a p p r o a c h with limited m a n m a d e and
n a t u r a l o b s t a c l e s the t a n k s c h a r g e d o n t h r o u g h , w i t h the infantry k e e p i n g u p
t o p r o v i d e s u p p o r t w h e n n e e d e d . B o t h n e e d e d t o b e a b l e t o r e c o g n i z e the
s i t u a t i o n s in w h i c h o n e or the o t h e r s h o u l d t a k e the l e a d .
C l o s e a t t e n t i o n h a d t o be p a i d by t a n k e r s a n d i n f a n t r y m e n t o e a c h o t h e r s '
s i t u a t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e a p p a r e n t i n a b i l i t y o f the t a n k s t o effectively
e n g a g e t a r g e t s d e s i g n a t e d by the infantry m i g h t be d u e to excessive s m o k e a n d
d u s t o b s c u r i n g i n f a n t r y t r a c e r fire, f l a r e s , or m a r k i n g - s m o k e . C o n v e r s e l y , if
the t a n k s c o n t i n u e d t o a d v a n c e a n d f o u n d t h a t the infantry h a d l a g g e d behind
it m i g h t b e d u e t o M G p o s i t i o n s o v e r l o o k e d by the t a n k s , o r u n - b r e a c h e d
i n f a n t r y o b s t a c l e s . R a t h e r t h a n c h a r g i n g o n a h e a d w i t h o u t infantry s u p p o r t ,
it w a s c o n t i n g e n t o n the t a n k e r s t o d e t e r m i n e the i n f a n t r y ' s s i t u a t i o n a n d

BREACHING THE "SIEGFRIED LINE"
The formidable "Seigfried Line" or Westwall was breached in
September and October of 1944. Units developed their o w n
procedures for defeating bunkers. Typically, t w o or three tanks
would approach a bunker from different directions after it and
the surrounding area was barraged by artillery, assault guns,
and mortars. This served to drive the defenders into the
bunker from the t w o - and three-man fighting positions
scattered around it (these potentially offered more resistance
than the bunker itself). Most of the original antitank guns had
been removed from the bunkers during the course of the war,
leaving t h e m defended only by machine guns. While tank
main guns and MGs fired into embrasures and suspected
fighting positions (1), the infantry assault teams moved in with
bazookas, satchel charges, and sometimes flamethrowers (2).
The divisional armored engineer battalion possessed 18x
M1A1 flamethrowers until November 1944, when these were
withdrawn as they were so little used. Their disposition was
left to the discretion of the theater commander; they were
sometimes placed in storage, but other units retained them.
Flamethrowers were operated by engineers or specially
trained armored infantrymen. Often the simple demonstration
of firing a flame burst within the embrasure's field of vision
was all that was necessary to perusade the bunker's defenders
to wave a white flag*. An even more successful tactic was the
use of dozer-tanks, here a 105mm howitzer-armed M4A3
assault tank (3). The M l blade, introduced in 1943, was
designed for Shermans with VVSS suspension (shown here),
and the M l A1 for the wider HVSS suspension. If the garrison
refused to surrender, the dozer-tank would first plow earth
into the embrasures, and then bury the exits - the occupants
usually trotted out with Hande hoch before that final step.
Engineers would place 500lb charges inside to collapse the
bunker, preventing its reuse if recaptured during a
counterattack.
(* For more detail on the use of flamethrowers, see Elite 160:
World War II Infantry Assault Tactics.)

Armored infantrymen take
potshots at suspected enemy
positions in order to draw fire,
in which case the tank's 76mm
gun and MGs will come into
play.
Two armored infantrymen rush
across a plowed field under fire,
passing a knocked-out Panther
tank. The GIs wear tanker
jackets.
52
p e r h a p s s e n d a n e l e m e n t b a c k t o a i d t h e m in
r e s u m i n g their a d v a n c e .
T h e distance between infantry and tanks
w a s n o t a c o n s t a n t , a n d d e p e n d e d o n the
r o u g h n e s s of the g r o u n d , density of vegetation,
visibility ( f o g , r a i n , s n o w ) , the t y p e a n d
effectiveness o f e n e m y fire, a n d o b s t a c l e s .
I n f a n t r y m e n m i g h t h u g the r e a r or side o f a
t a n k for p r o t e c t i o n f r o m s m a l l - a r m s fire, but if
t a n k s w e r e r e c e i v i n g A T g u n , artillery, or
m o r t a r fire the infantry w o u l d h a v e t o distance
t h e m s e l v e s , s o m e t i m e s by a c o n s i d e r a b l e
m a r g i n . S m a l l - a r m s a n d A T g u n fire directed at
tanks ricocheted, m a k i n g them h a z a r d o u s to
infantry even 5 0 y a r d s a n d m o r e a w a y . A c o m m o n tactic w a s for the e n e m y
t o d r i v e the i n f a n t r y a w a y f r o m the t a n k s w i t h m a c h i n e - g u n , m o r t a r , a n d
artillery fire (one t a n k e r d e s c r i b e d the p i n g i n g s o u n d of M G fire, a n d hearing
the i n f a n t r y m e n " s q u e a l i n g like r a b b i t s " w h e n hit). O n c e the infantry were
s e p a r a t e d f r o m the t a n k s the e n e m y ' s o w n i n f a n t r y c o u l d m o v e in w i t h
c l o s e - a t t a c k w e a p o n s s u c h a s P a n z e r f a u s t s , P a n z e r s c h r e c k s , rifle g r e n a d e s ,
hand-delivered shaped-charges and demolition charges.
Tank-infantry c o o p e r a t i o n m e a n t not only c o m m a n d and support
c o o r d i n a t i o n a t c o m p a n y a n d b a t t a l i o n e c h e l o n s , b u t the s m a l l e s t d e t a i l s
o f t e a m w o r k in c o m b a t . A t n i g h t the i n f a n t r y w o u l d l e a d o u t w i t h the
t a n k s f o l l o w i n g , especially in w o o d l a n d a n d b r u s h . T h e t a n k p l a t o o n sergeant
o r l e a d e r w o u l d a c c o m p a n y the r i f l e m e n ; w h e n the t a n k s w e r e n e e d e d he
c o u l d q u i c k l y b r i n g t h e m u p , k n o w i n g the l o c a t i o n o f the i n f a n t r y a n d
h a v i n g h a d t a r g e t s p o i n t e d o u t t o h i m . T h i s a l s o r e d u c e d the c h a n c e of
infantrymen being run over - a very real d a n g e r ; there were n u m e r o u s
i n c i d e n t s in t r a i n i n g a n d c o m b a t w h e n t a n k s u n k n o w i n g l y r a n t h r o u g h
bivouac areas, with g r u e s o m e results.
A s the t a n k s m o v e d u p , a v o i d i n g o f t e n - m i n e d trails a n d r o a d s if p o s s i b l e
a n d led by the g u i d e s , the b o w g u n n e r s c o v e r e d the a r e a t o the left a n d the
c o a x i a l g u n n e r s the a r e a t o the r i g h t . T h e y w e r e p r e p a r e d t o m a c h i n e - g u n
 Crew survivors dash for cover
from a disabled Sherman
during street fighting; in such
situations accompanying
armored infantrymen gave
them covering fire.

a t t a c k i n g i n f a n t r y off o f a c c o m p a n y i n g t a n k s - "back-scratching."
M i n e - r e m o v e r s f o l l o w e d j u s t b e h i n d the i n f a n t r y t o c l e a r t a n k r o u t e s , a n d
the i n f a n t r y m e n c h e c k e d c l e a r i n g s f o r A T p o s i t i o n s o n the e d g e s . T w o
i n f a n t r y m e n r o d e o n e a c h t a n k , o n e a r i f l e m a n a n d the o t h e r m a n n i n g the
t a n k ' s t u r r e t - m o u n t e d A A m a c h i n e g u n ; b o t h c a r r i e d g r e n a d e s a n d u s e d the
turret for p r o t e c t i o n .
S m a l l - a r m s tracer fire often p r o v e d u n s a t i s f a c t o r y for d e s i g n a t i n g t a r g e t s
to t a n k s since there w a s t o o m u c h of it flying a b o u t ; the U S u s e d red t r a c e r s ,
a n d G e r m a n tracers first b u r n e d red then p a l e g r e e n , or vice v e r s a . R e d a n d
violet s m o k e h a n d g r e n a d e s w e r e generally u s e d t o m a r k t a r g e t s , t h o u g h since
they generated t o o m u c h s m o k e a n d c o u l d o b s c u r e the t a r g e t for the t a n k e r s
often half of the s m o k e c o m p o u n d w a s r e m o v e d . S m o k e h a n d g r e n a d e s fitted
to rifle g r e n a d e a d a p t e r s w e r e pre-ignited s o t h a t they w o u l d leave a s m o k e
trail to the t a r g e t , a n d s m o k e s t r e a m e r rifle g r e n a d e s w e r e later i n t r o d u c e d .
W h e n t a n k s m o v e d f o r w a r d to s u p p o r t the infantry, a n infantry leader directing
the t a n k s w o u l d signal his l o c a t i o n by p l a c i n g his helmet o n the r a i s e d m u z z l e
of his w e a p o n to attract the t a n k c o m m a n d e r ' s a t t e n t i o n ; the p l a t o o n leader's
t a n k w o u l d m o v e in that direction s o they c o u l d m a k e c o n t a c t .
Even t h o u g h the infantry w e r e p r o v i d e d h a l f t r a c k s , these often r e m a i n e d
in the rear a n d the infantry w o u l d m o u n t t a n k s . Typically, a s q u a d w o u l d ride
o n o n e t a n k ; they w e r e c a u t i o n e d t o w a t c h for l o w b r a n c h e s a n d
t e l e p h o n e / p o w e r lines, n o t t o s m o k e o w i n g t o the fire h a z a r d , a n d n o t to h a n g
o n t o other riders b u t only t o the t a n k itself. T h e t a n k - r i d e r s h a d t o be r e a d y
to a v o i d the traversing turret a n d be p r e p a r e d t o d i s m o u n t i m m e d i a t e l y if fired
upon. The tank c o m m a n d e r could order them to dismount at any time, a n d
only he c o u l d a l l o w t h e m t o m o u n t . T h e infantry l e a d e r w a s r e s p o n s i b l e for
e n s u r i n g t a c t i c a l integrity a n d o r g a n i z i n g the t r o o p s t o g o i n t o i m m e d i a t e
action w h e n d i s m o u n t i n g . T h e infantry w o u l d d i s m o u n t t o clear o b s t a c l e s a n d
debris, conduct reconnaissance, rout out snipers, and ground-guide tanks
w h e n necessary, a n d w o u l d s p r e a d o u t t o p r o v i d e security at a n y halt.
7
Colored smoke grenades were not available until late 1 9 4 3 . The M l 6 came in red, yellow,
green, violet, orange, blue, and black; the M l 8 , in the first four colors only, generated more
vivid and denser smoke.

53

Communications: an SCR-528
radio had one transmitter and
one receiver. It was similar to
the SCR-508, which differed by
having two receivers (the
smaller set to the right),
enabling it to simultaneously
monitor the frequencies of a
commander's own subunits
and that of his higher
commander. These radios had
a range of approximately 10
miles.
Leaving a village smouldering
after passing through it, an
M3A2 halftrack advances across
the fields. Halftracks were
sometimes brought up to
transport the infantry across
open ground exposed to
long-range machine gun and
mortar fire.
54
Tank-infantry communications
C o l o r e d s m o k e grenades, flares, tracers, and
a r m - a n d - h a n d s i g n a l s w e r e of only limited v a l u e for
communicating between tankers and infantrymen.7
H a l f t r a c k s a n d t a n k s w e r e p r o v i d e d a n M - 2 3 8 flag
set ( r e d , y e l l o w , g r e e n ) . V o i c e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w a s
i m p o s s i b l e o t h e r t h a n by r a d i o a n d t e l e p h o n e .
At company and platoon levels radio
communication w a s possible between tanks and
h a l f t r a c k s . T h e p r o b l e m w a s t h a t the h a l f t r a c k s w e r e
u s u a l l y in the rear, a n d the a r m o r e d infantry h a d n o
man-portable radios capable of talking to tank radios. M a n - p o r t a b l e radios
w e r e n o t a u t h o r i z e d for A I units a t all until N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 4 , a n d these c o u l d
n o t c o m m u n i c a t e or " n e t " w i t h v e h i c l e - m o u n t e d r a d i o s a n d w e r e strictly u s e d
for c o m m u n i c a t i n g b e t w e e n g r o u n d t r o o p s . T h e s e sets w e r e m o s t l y issued in
December 1 9 4 4 and January 1 9 4 5 ; one backpacked S R C - 3 0 0 "walkie-talkie"
F M r a d i o w a s a u t h o r i z e d for the c o m p a n y HQ, a n d a S C R - 5 1 1 " p o g o - s t i c k "
r a d i o m i g h t be s u b s t i t u t e d if the " 3 0 0 " w a s n o t a v a i l a b l e . T h e s e w e r e for
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h b a t t a l i o n . T h e c o m p a n y C O a n d e a c h p l a t o o n leader
w a s a u t h o r i z e d a S C R - 5 3 6 " h a n d i e - t a l k i e " u s e d o n l y for internal c o m p a n y
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a n d this s m a l l h a n d h e l d A M r a d i o c o u l d n o t net with the
" 3 0 0 . " In o r d e r t o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h the infantry's S C R - 5 3 6 s , a n o t h e r w a s
m o u n t e d in e a c h p l a t o o n l e a d e r ' s t a n k . A b o l t w a s r e m o v e d f r o m the
c o m m a n d e r ' s h a t c h r i m p r o v i d i n g a h o l e for the a n t e n n a , a n d a s h o r t piece of
r u b b e r h o s e w a s p l a c e d a r o u n d the aerial to k e e p it f r o m g r o u n d i n g . T h e r a d i o
w a s m o d i f i e d s o t h a t the t a n k c o m m a n d e r c o u l d use a t h r o a t m i c r o p h o n e a n d
o p e r a t e the s w i t c h w i t h a n i m p r o v i s e d e x t e n s i o n .
Rifle p l a t o o n l e a d e r s ' h a l f t r a c k s w e r e e q u i p p e d w i t h a n S C R - 5 1 0 r a d i o
a n d the c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r ' s w i t h a n S C R - 5 2 8 ( m o u n t i n g a r a d i o m e a n t
the l o s s o f t w o t r o o p s e a t s ) . T h e t a n k c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r h a d a n S C R - 5 0 8 ,
his p l a t o o n c o m m a n d e r s S C R - 5 2 8 s , a n d the i n d i v i d u a l t a n k s S C R - 5 3 8 s . T h e
S C R - 5 0 8 a n d 5 1 0 h a d a f r e q u e n c y r a n g e o f 2 0 - 2 9 . 9 M e g a c y c l e s ( M c ) a n d the
S C R - 5 2 8 a n d 5 3 8 h a d 2 0 - 2 8 M c ; this m e a n t t h a t all of these r a d i o s c o u l d net,
b u t this h a d t o b e finely c o o r d i n a t e d b e t w e e n the t w o b a t t a l i o n s at all
e c h e l o n s , a l o n g w i t h a s s i g n i n g f i r e - s u p p o r t a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e net
f r e q u e n c i e s . T h e s e w e r e all f r e q u e n c y - m o d u l a t e d ( F M ) r a d i o s , w h i c h w e r e
p i o n e e r e d by the U S a s a t a c t i c a l r a d i o b e c a u s e they o p e r a t e d m o r e r e l i a b l y
than a m p l i t u d e - m o d u l a t e d ( A M ) r a d i o s used by m o s t armies. A M r a d i o s
e n c o u n t e r e d difficulties w h e n m o u n t e d in vehicles a n d g e n e r a t e d m o r e s t a t i c .
A m e a n s w a s n e e d e d to e n a b l e a c c o m p a n y i n g i n f a n t r y m e n to
v o i c e - c o m m u n i c a t e with t a n k s , a n d a n effective m e t h o d w a s to p l a c e a n E E - 8
field telephone inside the turret with a flashlight fixed n e x t t o it. A 2 0 f t length
of four-strand electrical c o r d w a s run to the rear of the t a n k a n d a n EE-8 h a n d s e t
fitted, the h a n d s e t switch being m o d i f i e d s o it c o u l d trigger the flashlight inside
the turret, alerting the tank c o m m a n d e r of a call. Often the infantry c o m m a n d e r
simply carried the h a n d s e t rather t h a n leaving it a t t a c h e d t o the t a n k , w h e r e it
could be d a m a g e d by fire. S o m e units m o u n t e d the h a n d s e t with a n e x t e n s i o n
c o r d inside a .50cal a m m u n i t i o n c a n w e l d e d t o the tank's rear. A n o t h e r m e t h o d
w a s to d r a g a n u p - t o - 1 0 0 f t length of t e l e p h o n e w i r e b e h i n d the t a n k , s o the
f o l l o w i n g infantry c o m m a n d e r c o u l d a t t a c h a n E E - 8 h a n d s e t or T S - 1 0
s o u n d - p o w e r e d p h o n e t o the w i r e w h e n necessary. T h e s e a d d i t i o n s w e r e n o t
fitted o n all t a n k s , but o n p l a t o o n a n d c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r s ' .

UNITS IN ACTION
Dismounted company action without armor
In m i d - J a n u a r y 1 9 4 5 , C C A o f the 1 2 t h A r m d D i v w a s t a s k e d t o c l e a r a n
e n e m y b r i d g e h e a d in the W e y e r s h e i m - G a m b s h e i m - O f f e n d o r f - H e r r l i s h e i m
a r e a of n o r t h e a s t F r a n c e n e a r the G e r m a n frontier. T h i s w a s a r a r e i n s t a n c e
in w h i c h a n A I B f o u g h t o n its o w n w i t h o u t a r m o r , o t h e r t h a n a s i n g l e
p l a t o o n . T h e f o c u s will be o n C o m p a n y C , 6 6 t h A I B .
T h e 6 6 t h A I B m o u n t e d o u t a t l a m f r o m villages w h e r e it h a d b i v o u a c k e d ,
a n d h a d u n d e r t a k e n training in p r e p a r a t i o n for the o p e r a t i o n . T h e c o m p a n i e s
w e r e a t n e a r full s t r e n g t h . T h e b a t t a l i o n a p p r o a c h e d its a s s e m b l y a r e a a t
H o e r d t a b o a r d 7 5 h a l f t r a c k s , in the o r d e r C o C , H H C , C o A , a n d C o B. In
the a s s e m b l y a r e a at 3 . 1 5 a m they d i s m o u n t e d a n d w e r e b r i e f e d . C o m p a n y B
w o u l d be in reserve, C o A t o the left a n d C o C t o the right, a n d the b a t t a l i o n ' s
a s s a u l t g u n s a n d m o r t a r s w e r e set u p in t h e rear. T h e o b j e c t i v e w a s the
S t e i n w a l d , a s m a l l f o r e s t e d a r e a ; C o A w o u l d clear the w o o d l a n d t o the n o r t h
of a n e a s t - w e s t r o a d r u n n i n g t h r o u g h it, a n d C o C the s o u t h s i d e . A n
e s t i m a t e d 1 6 0 G e r m a n s w e r e in the w o o d s , a l o n g w i t h s i x a r m o r e d vehicles.
O n c e the f o r e s t w a s c l e a r e d the b a t t a l i o n w o u l d a s s e m b l e a n d , o n o r d e r ,
p r o c e e d to O f f e n d o r f for the R h i n e R i v e r c r o s s i n g s t o the s o u t h e a s t .
All c o m p a n i e s d e p a r t e d H o e r d t at 3 . 4 5 a m o n f o o t in the o r d e r o f C o C ,
C o A , H H C , a n d C o B; they f o l l o w e d the n o r t h s i d e o f the D e r i v a t i o n C a n a l ,
u n d e r c o v e r o f its r a i s e d b a n k . T h e c o m p a n i e s ' A T g u n s w e r e left in the
a s s e m b l y a r e a , the A T p l a t o o n s s e r v i n g a s rifle p l a t o o n s . T h e y r e a c h e d the

T a b l e 14: T a s k o r g a n i z a t i o n , CCA, 12th A r m d Div

CCA Troops TF1 TF2 TF3

HHC, CCA 43 TankBn (-) 66 AIB 17AIBR

C, 119EngrBn A, 119 Engr Bn 1-B, 43 TankBn D, 43 TankBn
A,134 MaintBn 1-B, 92 ReconSqn
C, 572 AAA Bn
This M3A1, its back festooned
with the squad's gear along
with an air-ground recognition
panel, mounts three machine
guns: (left to right) .30cal
M1919A4, water-cooled .30cal
M1917A1,and .50cal M2.
Ration boxes are stacked and
tied on the front bumper.

L a n d g r a b e n C a n a l a t 4 . 4 5 a m , a n d C o B d u g in a l o n g it w i t h H H C . T h e
e n g i n e e r s w e r e c o m p l e t i n g f o u r f o o t b r i d g e s o v e r the c a n a l , a n d C o s A a n d C
q u i e t l y c r o s s e d a t 5 . 1 5 a m in s i n g l e file, e a c h u s i n g t w o b r i d g e s a n d b e i n g
g u i d e d b y b l i n k e r lights t o their rear, w h i c h they k e p t a l i g n e d . T h e s u p p o r t
p l a t o o n w a s 1 5 0 y a r d s b e h i n d the l e a d p l a t o o n s , p r o t e c t i n g the f l a n k . A
f r o z e n d r a i n a g e d i t c h 4 f t d e e p , o r i e n t e d S W t o N E , w a s the b o u n d a r y
b e t w e e n the t w o c o m p a n i e s ; the line of d e p a r t u r e r a n p e r p e n d i c u l a r t o the
s o u t h w e s t e n d o f the d i t c h .
T h i s is w h e n p r o b l e m s b e g a n t o d e v e l o p . T h e r e w a s n o identifiable terrain
f e a t u r e for the line o f d e p a r t u r e , a n d in the d a r k n e s s a n d f o g visibility a c r o s s
the s n o w - c o v e r e d g r o u n d w a s o n l y a b o u t 2 0 feet. T w o o u t p o s t e d G e r m a n s
w e r e c a p t u r e d w i t h o u t f i r i n g ; b u t a s C o C a d v a n c e d o n the right they
d i s c o v e r e d t h a t they w e r e o n the N W side o f the d r a i n a g e ditch in the C o A
z o n e , f u r t h e r t o t h e left t h a n i n t e n d e d . T h e p l a t o o n s w e r e still in c o l u m n
f o r m a t i o n , a n d the c o m p a n y C O w a s c o n f e r r i n g w i t h the p l a t o o n l e a d e r s
w h i l e the t r o o p s r e s t e d , w h e n f o u r M G s o p e n e d fire f r o m a h e a d a n d the right
f l a n k , c a t c h i n g the p l a t o o n s in the o p e n . P i n n e d d o w n w i t h n o c o v e r a n d the
s u n r i s i n g , the c o m p a n y C O h a d n o c h o i c e b u t t o s i g n a l the a t t a c k .
H e a n d the first m e n t o rise w e r e c u t d o w n ; C o C m a n a g e d t o set u p a n
L M G and an H M G , but both were k n o c k e d out within 10 minutes. G e r m a n
m o r t a r s b e g a n b a r r a g i n g the c o m p a n y , e s p e c i a l l y the s u p p o r t p l a t o o n t o the
rear. M e n w e r e c r a w l i n g b a c k t o a f r o z e n s t r e a m o n w h i c h C o A m e n w e r e
a l s o falling b a c k u n d e r h e a v y fire; there a t l e a s t o n e m a n o u t of every three
w a s w o u n d e d , a n d all C o C officers w e r e d e a d . T h e A T p l a t o o n , w h i c h h a d
b e e n f o l l o w i n g f u r t h e r t o t h e rear, m o v e d i n t o the s t r e a m b e d for cover.
B a t t a l i o n c o u l d n o t be r a i s e d o n the r a d i o ; five P - 4 7 s b o m b e d a n d strafed the
S t e i n w a l d , b u t the o r d n a n c e s t r u c k the forest's center, s p a r i n g the G e r m a n s
d u g - i n o n the e d g e s . T h e 1st a n d 2 d P l a t o o n s o f C o C w e r e virtually w i p e d
o u t b y M G , m o r t a r , a n d s n i p e r fire, a n d 3 d P l a t o o n a t t a c h e d itself t o C o A .
O n e m a n m a n a g e d t o m a k e it t o the r e a r w i t h the G e r m a n p r i s o n e r s , w h o
helped carry t w o w o u n d e d . H e w a s ordered to return with an ammunition
t r u c k , b u t e n c o u n t e r e d m o r e t r o o p s drifting t o the r e a r a n d , t o l d t h a t it w a s
p o i n t l e s s , he r e t u r n e d w i t h the t r u c k .

56
 C o m p a n y A fell b a c k w i t h h e a v y l o s s e s , a n d the r e m n a n t s o f b o t h
c o m p a n i e s d u g in o n the L a n d g r a b e n C a n a l a t 1 . 0 0 p m w i t h a t a n k p l a t o o n in
s u p p o r t ; the b a t t a l i o n ' s a s s a u l t g u n s a n d m o r t a r s h a d n o t fired in s u p p o r t d u e
to a c o m m u n i c a t i o n s failure. T h e 7 0 r e m a i n i n g m e n o f b o t h c o m p a n i e s w e r e
sent b a c k t o H o e r d t for rest, b u t they r e t u r n e d t o the c a n a l a n d r e s u m e d the
defensive p o s i t i o n s the n e x t a f t e r n o o n , w h e r e they r e m a i n e d until the 1 9 t h .
T h e a t t a c k w a s a failure, b u t the benefit o f s t u d y i n g this p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n
is that it d e m o n s t r a t e s the i m p o r t a n c e o f e m p l o y i n g s u p p o r t i n g w e a p o n s a n d
a r m o r : it c o u l d h a v e r e s u l t e d in s u c c e s s if even a s m a l l n u m b e r o f t a n k s h a d
b e e n e m p l o y e d a n d better u s e m a d e o f a s s a u l t g u n s a n d m o r t a r s . T h e
p l a t o o n s p i n n e d d o w n in the o p e n h a d n o effective m e a n s o f r e t u r n i n g fire
o t h e r t h a n s m a l l a r m s ; direct-fire w e a p o n s c a p a b l e o f s u p p r e s s i n g the
w o o d l i n e s h o u l d h a v e b e e n p o s i t i o n e d t o s u p p o r t the c o m p a n i e s .
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s w e r e i n a d e q u a t e : n o field t e l e p h o n e s lines w e r e l a i d b y the
a d v a n c i n g c o m p a n i e s , w h i c h relied u p o n o n l y o n e r a d i o .

Tank-infantry team clearing a town

O n F e b r u a r y 4 , 1 9 4 5 , C C A o f the 1 2 t h A r m d D i v w a s still in a c t i o n in
n o r t h e a s t F r a n c e , p u s h i n g t o w a r d the G e r m a n f r o n t i e r n e a r C o l m a r . T h e
h e a v y l o s s e s suffered earlier by the 6 6 t h A I B h a d b e e n m a d e g o o d . T F D o c
w a s c o m p o s e d o f the 6 6 t h A I B (less C o C ) ; C o A , 4 3 d T a n k B n ; 1st P l a t o o n ,
T r o o p A , 9 2 d C a v a l r y R e c o n S q n ; a n d 1st P l a t o o n , C o A , 1 1 9 t h A r m o r e d
Engineer B a t t a l i o n . T h e t a n k p l a t o o n s e a c h h a d f o u r 7 5 m m - g u n S h e r m a n s
and one 1 0 5 m m Sherman assault gun.
This force w a s assigned t w o objectives. T h e t o w n of O b e r m o r s c h w i h r
w a s t o be t a k e n by C o A , 6 6 t h A I B , w i t h the b a t t a l i o n ' s a s s a u l t g u n p l a t o o n
a n d a n 8 1 m m m o r t a r section. H a t t s t a t t t o the s o u t h w e s t w o u l d be s e c u r e d by
C o B, 6 6 t h A I B a n d C o A , 4 3 d T a n k B n , u n d e r the c o m m a n d o f the f o r m e r ' s

With visibility cut off by the

thick, churning smoke from a
burning building, infantrymen
double-time down a village
street to clear it of any
Panzerfaust-armed Germans
lying in ambush. The tank
commander is covering them
as best he can with the .50cal
machine gun.

57
C O . T h e G e r m a n s w e r e c o n d u c t i n g a d e l a y i n g a c t i o n b u t their d e f e n s e s w e r e
w e a k . T h e b a t t a l i o n C O t o o k his c o m p a n y C O s t o a site w h e r e they c o u l d
o b s e r v e the t e r r a i n a n d their r o u t e s , a n d the u n i t s m o v e d u p t o t h a t p o i n t
a n d p i c k e d u p their C O s at 3 p m . T h e i n f a n t r y w e r e m o u n t e d in h a l f t r a c k s ,
a n d T F D o c m o v e d o u t in the o r d e r C o B , 6 6 t h A I B ; C o A , 4 3 d T a n k B n ; C o
A , 6 6 t h , a n d H H C , 6 6 t h . A t 4 p m A - 6 6 p u l l e d o u t o f the c o l u m n t o a d v a n c e
s o u t h w e s t a r d s o n O b e r m o r s c h w i h r , a n d the rest o f the f o r c e c o n t i n u e d o n t o
Hattstatt.
T h e H H C set u p its a s s a u l t g u n s a n d m o r t a r s o n a r i d g e o v e r l o o k i n g
O b e r m o r s c h w i h r , w h e r e a single O P h a d a n e x c e l l e n t v i e w t o s u p p o r t b o t h
a t t a c k s . T h e i n f a n t r y h a l f t r a c k s a t first p r e c e d e d the t a n k c o m p a n y , b u t
o u t s i d e H a t t s t a t t the S h e r m a n s t o o k the l e a d e x c e p t for t w o h a l f t r a c k s o n
the p o i n t . T h e rest of the c o m p a n y p u l l e d over, a n d the s q u a d s d i s m o u n t e d
to m o v e o n f o o t o n either side o f the r o a d t o a v o i d b e i n g seen f r o m the t o w n .
B e f o r e a d v a n c i n g the C O c a l l e d the p l a t o o n l e a d e r s f o r a final b r i e f i n g .
G e r m a n 1 0 . 5 c m artillery b e g a n i m p a c t i n g t o the rear, b u t n o n e l a n d e d a m o n g
the units. A t 4 . 4 0 p m i n f a n t r y m e n w h o h a d g o n e t o the t o p o f a hill t o o b s e r v e
the t o w n c a p t u r e d 2 0 G e r m a n d e f e n d e r s w i t h o u t r e s i s t a n c e .
A t 5 p m the a d v a n c e w a s s i g n a l e d , m o v i n g b a s i c a l l y e a s t t o w e s t . 1 s t
P l a t o o n of B-66 m o v e d a l o n g b o t h sides o f the r o a d w i t h the 1st T a n k P l a t o o n
f o l l o w i n g a t 5 0 y a r d s ; the p a i r e d - o f f 2 d a n d 3 d rifle a n d t a n k p l a t o o n s
f o l l o w e d in s e q u e n c e , the t a n k p l a t o o n s in a p a i r o f s t a g g e r e d c o l u m n s .
R o u n d i n g the b e n d l e a d i n g i n t o t o w n , they r e c e i v e d s o m e fire f r o m f o x h o l e s
t o the right o f the r o a d ; the t a n k s m a c h i n e - g u n n e d the a r e a a n d G e r m a n s
s t a r t e d c o m i n g o u t o f the w o o d s t o s u r r e n d e r , b u t the A m e r i c a n s i g n o r e d
t h e m a n d k e p t a d v a n c i n g . T h e 1st T a n k P l a t o o n ' s a s s a u l t g u n h a l t e d a n d w a s
i m m e d i a t e l y hit by m u l t i p l e A T r o u n d s ; the b u r n i n g S h e r m a n b l o c k e d the
r o a d , b u t the 2 d T a n k P l a t o o n o p e n e d fire w h i l e the G e r m a n s c o n t i n u e d t o
fire o n t h e m . T h e 2 d P l a t o o n i n f a n t r y m e n t o o k c o v e r in the d i t c h e s a n d w e r e
u n s c a t h e d . T w o m o r e t a n k s w e r e hit, w i t h o n e c r e w m a n killed in e a c h , a n d
at least o n e of the e s t i m a t e d three G e r m a n A T g u n s w a s k n o c k e d o u t .
In the m e a n t i m e , u r g e d o n b y the C O o f B - 6 6 , the 1 s t rifle a n d t a n k
p l a t o o n s c o n t i n u e d the a d v a n c e . T h e y fired a t d e t e c t e d a n d s u s p e c t e d e n e m y
p o s i t i o n s , a n d the artillery F O d i r e c t e d h o w i t z e r fire f r o m the s u p p o r t i n g
4 9 3 d A F A Bn into the a r e a w h e r e the A T g u n s w e r e firing o n the stalled t a n k s ,
f o l l o w e d by s m o k e t o blind the G e r m a n s . T h i s a l l o w e d the three r e m a i n i n g
t a n k s t o r u s h t h r o u g h f o l l o w e d by the 3 d T a n k P l a t o o n , its a s s a u l t g u n a l s o
firing s m o k e t o screen the f o u r t a n k s ; the rifle p l a t o o n s f o l l o w e d .

I TANK AND A R M O R E D RIFLE COMPANIES Buildings on the far side of the village burn from 105mm SP
HI SEIZE A VILLAGE howitzer fire (8), and the battalion 81 m m Mortar Platoon fires
A dismounted rifle company with a tank company attacks into WP smoke into the village's right flank buildings (9) to cover the
a French village. The 1 st Rifle and 1 st Tank platoons ( 1 ) attack on infiltration of the 3d Rifle Platoon moving in from the trees to
the main road and into the town square (2); the tank platoon's the right (10). The plan is for the two 1 st Platoons to fight their
light section has split off onto the road to the left (3). A 57mm way through the village to the far side (11), to link up with the
AT gun (4) has been positioned to cover the outer buildings on 3d Rifle Platoon and prepare to defend against any
the left. The 2d Rifle and 2d Tank platoons are attacking from counterattack. The t w o 2d Platoons will clean the rest of the
the right flank (5). The lead tank was knocked out after crashing village as the remainder of the Antitank Platoon moves up to
a stone wall (6) on its way toward the platoons' objective, the reinforce the 1st and 3d Platoons. A battalion heavy machine
church; another tank covers the evacuation of the crew, while gun section (not yet arrived) and the AT gun at (4) will secure
the rest of the platoon redirects further to the right flank (7). the left flank (12), covering the road passing the cemetery (13).
An armored infantry unit
passes through a German town.
Note the add-on equipment
rack on the rear of the jeep, of
which each AIB had 24 (some
units called them "peeps").

A t a n i n t e r s e c t i o n o u t s i d e o f the t o w n t w o M G s o p e n e d fire o n the 1st

Rifle P l a t o o n , w o u n d i n g t w o m e n , b u t w e r e q u i c k l y silenced by the lead t a n k .
T h e B - 6 6 C O p l a c e d the M G section ( f r o m b a t t a l i o n ) a n d a 2 d P l a t o o n s q u a d
a t the intersection t o k e e p fire o n the e n e m y p o s i t i o n to the s o u t h w e s t ; the rest
o f 2 d P l a t o o n w a s d i s p a t c h e d t o p r o t e c t the n o r t h flank. T h e 1st Rifle P l a t o o n
c o n t i n u e d o n i n t o t o w n , f o l l o w e d b y the 3 d s o m e 1 5 0 y a r d s b e h i n d , b u t o n e
s q u a d w a s d e t a c h e d t o r e i n f o r c e the 2 d P l a t o o n s q u a d a t the intersection (it
s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t this k i n d o f flexibility - c r o s s - a t t a c h i n g s q u a d s b e t w e e n
p l a t o o n s - is e s s e n t i a l for s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n s ) . T h e p o i n t s q u a d r a n into a
s t o u t l o g r o a d b l o c k i n s i d e the t o w n ; this w a s n o t m i n e d , b u t b l o c k e d the
a d v a n c e . O n e o f the s q u a d w a s hit by a s n i p e r a s they p u l l e d b a c k . A s a t a n k
r o l l e d u p a n d b l a s t e d H E r o u n d s into the r o a d b l o c k the riflemen fired o n the
sniper a n d threw grenades.
W i t h the r o a d b l o c k s h a t t e r e d , the t a n k r a m m e d t h r o u g h it a n d the 1st
Rifle P l a t o o n f o l l o w e d , s e a r c h i n g for s n i p e r s a n d A T g u n s a n d M G s h i d d e n
in a l l e y s . T h e riflemen a d v a n c e d 2 5 y a r d s d o w n b o t h sides o f the r o a d a h e a d
o f the t a n k , w h i c h c o v e r e d t h e m w i t h m a c h i n e g u n s ; o n c e a stretch h a d been
c l e a r e d they w o u l d r e t u r n t o the t a n k for c o v e r a n d close-in p r o t e c t i o n a s it
m o v e d u p , a n d the p r o c e s s w a s r e p e a t e d - it w a s slow, b u t effective. U p o n
r e a c h i n g the t o w n center a t a n k a c c o m p a n i e d by a rifle s q u a d w e n t a r o u n d
e a c h s i d e o f the s q u a r e c h e c k i n g the s i d e s t r e e t s . T h e s e c o n d t a n k then
f o l l o w e d the first d o w n the m a i n street. O n the far w e s t side of the t o w n a
s e c o n d l o g r o a d b l o c k w a s b r e a c h e d in the s a m e m a n n e r a s the first.
W h i l e the 1st rifle a n d t a n k p l a t o o n s w e r e w o r k i n g a c r o s s the t o w n center,
t h e 2 d P l a t o o n (-) m o v e d a r o u n d the n o r t h s i d e o f the t o w n m e e t i n g n o
o p p o s i t i o n . W h e n all e l e m e n t s r e a c h e d the w e s t s i d e o f the t o w n the B - 6 6
C O d e p l o y e d t h e m t o e s t a b l i s h a p e r i m e t e r a r o u n d it: 1st P l a t o o n o n the w e s t
s i d e , 2 d o n the n o r t h , a n d 3 d o n t h e s o u t h . T h e m a r r i e d t a n k p l a t o o n s
c o - l o c a t e d w i t h the rifle p l a t o o n s , e x c e p t t h a t p a r t of the 3 d T a n k P l a t o o n
w a s s t a t i o n e d o n the e a s t s i d e . P a t r o l s w e r e d i s p a t c h e d t o m a k e c o n t a c t with
a d j a c e n t p l a t o o n s . A d i s m o u n t e d A T P l a t o o n s q u a d s e c u r e d the e a s t s i d e ,

60
releasing the 2 d P l a t o o n s q u a d a n d M G s e c t i o n t o r e i n f o r c e the west side.
T h e o t h e r t w o A T s q u a d s set u p in b u i l d i n g s i n s i d e the t o w n t o c o v e r the
w e s t e r n a p p r o a c h e s . It w a s d a r k , a n d the t r o o p s w o u l d n o t s t a r t searching
h o u s e s for d i e h a r d d e f e n d e r s until d a y l i g h t . N o n e t h e l e s s , s e v e r a l stragglers
w e r e f o u n d , w h o r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e y h a d b e e n left b e h i n d t o construct
r o a d b l o c k s while m o s t o f the other d e f e n d e r s w i t h d r e w t o hills t o the w e s t .
By 1 1 p m the t o w n w a s r i n g e d by infantry a n d 1 4 t a n k s . T h e r e w e r e still
G e r m a n s i n s i d e , s o the i n f a n t r y m e n a n d t a n k e r s w e r e p r e p a r e d t o d e a l w i t h
a n y efforts t o e s c a p e a s well a s a t t a c k s or r e i n f o r c e m e n t a t t e m p t s f r o m the
o u t s i d e . T h e artillery F O in his o b s e r v a t i o n p o s t t o the n o r t h w a s c o n t a c t e d
o n the c o m p a n y r a d i o , a n d r e l a y e d the fire p l a n t o his b a t t a l i o n . P r e p l a n n e d
fires w e r e p l o t t e d a r o u n d the n o r t h , w e s t , a n d s o u t h s i d e s , p l u s fires f r o m the
6 6 t h AIB's o w n m o r t a r s a n d a s s a u l t g u n s . W i t h the firing d y i n g a w a y , j o y o u s
French i n h a b i t a n t s b e g a n e m e r g i n g f r o m b a s e m e n t s t o g r e e t their l i b e r a t o r s .
T h i s w a s a well e x e c u t e d o p e r a t i o n in w h i c h the a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y u s e d
their h a l f t r a c k s t o a p p r o a c h c l o s e t o their o b j e c t i v e . T h r e e t a n k s w e r e l o s t
o n the a p p r o a c h , b u t r e s i s t a n c e inside the t o w n w a s light. C l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n
b e t w e e n infantry a n d t a n k p l a t o o n l e a d e r s w a s effective; the o p e r a t i o n w a s
c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h the artillery, a n d o b s e r v e r s w e r e in p l a c e . T h e b a t t a l i o n ' s
supporting w e a p o n s were integrated, to include attaching a battalion M G
section t o the rifle c o m p a n y . T h e rifle a n d t a n k p l a t o o n s w o r k e d very c l o s e l y
in m u t u a l s u p p o r t , effectively b r e a c h i n g o b s t a c l e s a n d c l e a r i n g the m a i n street
of t h r e a t s . A n effective d e f e n s e b a c k e d b y a s o l i d fire s u p p o r t p l a n w a s
e s t a b l i s h e d , even t h o u g h night h a d fallen ( e s t a b l i s h i n g a d e f e n s e in the d a r k ,
e s p e c i a l l y in a b u i l t - u p a r e a , is a c h a l l e n g e ) . T h i s a c t i o n p r o v i d e s a g o o d
e x a m p l e o f the benefits a n d c a p a b i l i t i e s o f truly c o m b i n e d - a r m s o p e r a t i o n s .

ASSESSMENTS & CONCLUSIONS

A 1 9 4 6 a s s e s s m e n t o f a r m o r f o r c e s by the A r m y G r o u n d F o r c e f o u n d t h a t
" T h e b a s i c d o c t r i n e s o f the A r m o r e d F o r c e h a v e c h a n g e d v e r y little s i n c e
1 9 4 0 , b u t there h a v e b e e n m a n y c h a n g e s in t e c h n i q u e . M a n e u v e r a b i l i t y a n d
gunnery b e c a m e m o r e essential to success as antitank w e a p o n s developed,
a n d the principles of the c o m b i n e d a r m s a n d fire a n d m o v e m e n t w e r e s t r o n g l y
e m p h a s i z e d a s a result o f c o m b a t e x p e r i e n c e . T h e c o m b a t e x p e r i e n c e o f the
British a n d A m e r i c a n a r m o r e d units h a d a s o b e r i n g effect u p o n the t h e o r i e s
of invincibility w h i c h s o m e l e a d e r s h e l d . T h e y b e g a n t o a p p r e c i a t e t h a t t a n k s
were not all-powerful and invulnerable, that a r m o r e d tactics could not be
b a s e d u p o n the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t a n k s c o u l d f o r c e their w a y t h r o u g h a well
o r g a n i z e d d e f e n s e . " T h e G e n e r a l B o a r d o f the U S F o r c e s , E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t the t a n k - t o - i n f a n t r y r a t i o w a s u s u a l l y u n b a l a n c e d :

A n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t in m a n y o f the o p e r a t i o n s in w h i c h the m a i n
effort w a s e n t r u s t e d t o a r m o r , infantry w a s a t t a c h e d o n the u s u a l s c a l e
o f o n e [ s t a n d a r d ] r e g i m e n t per a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n . T h e s e a t t a c h m e n t s
w e r e m u c h m o r e f r e q u e n t in the c a s e o f the h e a v y a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s
for the o b v i o u s r e a s o n t h a t w h i l e t h e r e is p a r i t y a t b a t t a l i o n level
b e t w e e n i n f a n t r y a n d t a n k s in the light d i v i s i o n , a o n e - t o - t w o r a t i o
exists in the h e a v y unit. E v e n the light d i v i s i o n s , a l t h o u g h successful in
e x p l o i t a t i o n a n d p u r s u i t w i t h o u t a t t a c h e d infantry, r e q u i r e d a d d i t i o n a l
d i s m o u n t e d s t r e n g t h w h e n e m p l o y e d o n s e c o n d a r y m i s s i o n s . It c a n be
Armored infantrymen examine
a knocked-out and burned-out
Panther PzKpfw V. Formidably
armored from the front, it had
comparatively thin side armor;
what appears to be a 75mm
penetration hole can be seen to
the left of the leftmost man.

s t a t e d t h a t c o m b a t e x p e r i e n c e h a s definitely s h o w n the need for at least

p a r i t y b e t w e e n i n f a n t r y a n d t a n k u n i t s in a n a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n .
C o n s e n s u s o f field c o m m a n d e r s is t h a t the r a t i o o f infantry t o t a n k
units a t c o m p a n y level s h o u l d be three t o t w o .

Ideally, a fourth A I B w o u l d have been a d d e d to provide m o r e flexibility. Effective

infantry firepower w a s f o u n d essential for successful a r m o r o p e r a t i o n s . It w a s
often f o u n d after t a n k s w e r e sent in that the objective w a s occupied by m o r e A T
w e a p o n s a n d o b s t a c l e s t h a n e x p e c t e d ; the infantry w o u l d have to p a s s t h r o u g h
the h a l t e d t a n k s a n d a s s a u l t the o b j e c t i v e t h r o u g h c l o s e c o m b a t . O n c e the
objective w a s r e a s o n a b l y secure the t a n k s w o u l d m o v e f o r w a r d .
O n o t h e r o c c a s i o n s the i n f a n t r y w o u l d b e in defensive p o s i t i o n s a n d the
t a n k s l a u n c h e d their a t t a c k t h r o u g h t h e m , the infantry then f o l l o w i n g . T h i s
d i d n o t a l w a y s a l l o w effective c o o r d i n a t i o n b e f o r e the a t t a c k w a s l a u n c h e d ;
it w a s m o r e effective for the t a n k s a n d infantry a c c o m p a n y i n g the a t t a c k t o
link u p a n d c o o r d i n a t e in the a s s e m b l y a r e a b e f o r e e x e c u t i n g the a t t a c k .
A r m o r doctrine w a s basically solid, but tactics, techniques and
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f a c t o r s w e r e g r e a t l y refined in j u s t a b o u t all a r e a s ; the 1 9 4 4
m a n u a l s w e r e s o o n r e p l a c e d b y m o r e p r a c t i c a l e d i t i o n s , a n d this i m p r o v e d
b o d y o f k n o w l e d g e c o n t i n u e d t o serve the U S A r m y for m a n y y e a r s . T h e
a r m o r e d infantry o r g a n i z a t i o n , w e a p o n s , e q u i p m e n t , a n d tactics w e r e p r o v e n
v i a b l e after a l m o s t a y e a r of intense c o m b a t in N o r t h w e s t E u r o p e . T h e m o b i l e ,
s e l f - c o n t a i n e d b a t t a l i o n s w e r e c o n s i d e r e d q u i t e effective, b u t the m a j o r
deficiency w a s the h a l f t r a c k . It offered o n l y m o d e r a t e c r o s s - c o u n t r y
c a p a b i l i t i e s , c o u l d n o t k e e p u p w i t h t a n k s in m a n y t y p e s of t e r r a i n , l a c k e d
a d e q u a t e a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n , a n d the o p e n t o p g r e a t l y e n d a n g e r e d the
p a s s e n g e r s . A full-tracked a r m o r e d personnel carrier with o v e r h e a d protection,
a n d ideally a n a m p h i b i o u s capability, w a s desired; even t h o u g h a c c o m p a n y i n g
t a n k s w e r e n o t a m p h i b i o u s , a m p h i b i o u s p e r s o n n e l carriers w o u l d a l l o w the
infantry to c r o s s w a t e r o b s t a c l e s t o secure the far side, establish a b r i d g e h e a d ,
a n d a l l o w engineers t o c o n s t r u c t b r i d g e s a n d o p e r a t e ferries.
T h e b a s i c W o r l d W a r II a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n p r o v e d t o be a n
effective f o r m a t i o n a n d , w i t h u p g r a d i n g , it e n d u r e d for a l m o s t a n o t h e r 2 0
y e a r s . T h e three C C s b e c a m e c o - e q u a l m a n e u v e r f o r c e s , a l t h o u g h the third

62
w a s still referred t o a s C C R until r e d e s i g n a t e d C C C in 1 9 5 4 . F r o m 1 9 4 9 there
were four of e a c h t a n k a n d a r m o r e d rifle b a t t a l i o n s , w i t h four line c o m p a n i e s ,
b u t n o w r e d u c e d in strength. T h e f o u r t h t a n k b a t t a l i o n w a s e q u i p p e d w i t h
h e a v y t a n k s a n d h a d o n l y three c o m p a n i e s , the o t h e r b a t t a l i o n s h a v i n g
m e d i u m t a n k s . T h e infantry-to-tank r a t i o w a s i m p r o v e d , w i t h 1 6 rifle a n d 1 5
t a n k c o m p a n i e s ( 1 2 m e d i u m , three h e a v y ) . T h e b a t t a l i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d
service c o m p a n i e s w e r e c o m b i n e d . T a n k d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n s w e r e d i s b a n d e d
since the h e a v y t a n k b a t t a l i o n t o o k over their f u n c t i o n , a n d a n A A b a t t a l i o n
w a s m a d e o r g a n i c t o the d i v i s i o n . Rifle s q u a d s w e r e r e d u c e d in size a n d
o r g a n i z e d the s a m e a s s t a n d a r d infantry, b u t r e t a i n e d the a d d i t i o n a l driver;
issue of a s q u a d B A R w a s finally a p p r o v e d in J u n e 1 9 4 5 , r e c o g n i z i n g its
necessity w i t h s q u a d s fighting d i s m o u n t e d . Service s u p p o r t units w e r e m u c h
i n c r e a s e d in size a n d c a p a b i l i t i e s . P o s t - w a r A I B s still h a d W o r l d W a r II
h a l f t r a c k s , only p a r t l y r e p l a c e d by the interim M 4 4 a n d M 7 5 a r m o r e d utility
vehicles. T h e y b e g a n t o be r e p l a c e d by full-tracked, a m p h i b i o u s M 5 9 a r m o r e d
p e r s o n n e l carriers in 1 9 5 4 , a n d by M l 13 A P C s in 1 9 6 0 . T r u e c o m b i n e d - a r m s
units w e r e finally achieved in 2 0 0 5 , w h e n the distinction b e t w e e n m e c h a n i z e d
a n d t a n k b a t t a l i o n s w a s r e m o v e d (other t h a n t r a d i t i o n a l b r a n c h d e s i g n a t i o n s
being r e t a i n e d ) . T o d a y ' s M o d u l a r F o r c e c o m b i n e d - a r m s b a t t a l i o n s c o n s i s t o f
t w o rifle c o m p a n i e s e q u i p p e d with B r a d l e y M 2 - s e r i e s infantry fighting vehicles
and two A b r a m s Ml-series tank companies.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Emery, W e s t o n L . , C-66 - A World War II Chronicle of an Armored Infantry
Company (privately p u b l i s h e d , 1 9 9 2 )
G a b e l , C h r i s t o p h e r R . , The 4th Armored Division in the Encirclement of
Nancy (Ft L e a v e n w o r t h , K S ; C o m m a n d & G e n e r a l Staff C o l l a g e , 1 9 8 6 )
Gillie, M i l d r e d C . , Forging the Thunderbolt: A History of the Development
of the Armored Force ( H a r r i s b u r g , PA; M i l i t a r y Service P u b l i s h i n g , 1 9 4 7 )
H u n n i c u t t , R.P., Half-Track: A History of American Semi-Tracked Vehicles
( N o v a t o , C A ; Presidio Press, 2 0 0 1 )
M e s k o , J i m , M2/M3 Half-Track-Armor Walk Around (Carrollton, T X ;
S q u a d r o n Signal Publications, 2 0 0 4 )
M e s k o , J i m , M3 Half-Track in Action ( C a r r o l l t o n , T X ; S q u a d r o n S i g n a l
Publications, 1996)
W i l s o n , J o h n B. Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and
Separate Brigades (Washington, D C ; Center of Military History, 1 9 9 8 )
Z a l o g a , Steven, US Halftracks of World War Two ( L o n d o n : A r m s & A r m o r
Press, 1 9 8 5 )
F M 1 7 - 5 , Armored Force Drill ( J a n u a r y 1 9 4 3 )
F M 1 7 - 1 0 , Armored Force Field Manual Tactics and Techniques (March
1942)
F M 1 7 - 3 3 , The Armored Battalion, Eight and Medium ( M a r c h 1 9 4 2 )
F M 1 7 - 3 6 , Armored Employment of Tanks with Infantry ( M a r c h 1 9 4 4 )
F M 1 7 - 4 0 , Armored Infantry Company (November 1944)
F M 1 7 - 4 2 , Armored Infantry Battalion (November 1944)
F M 1 7 - 7 1 , Crew Drill for Half-Track Vehicles ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 )

( T h e s e m a n u a l s m a y be o b t a i n e d f r o m M i l i t a r y / I n f o P u b l i s h i n g ;
http://www.military-info.com/Index.htm)
INDEX
References to illustrations are shown in bold.
Plates are shown with page locators in
brackets.
AA battalions/guns 12, 48, 63
AAA battalions/platoons 12, 15, 17, 48
Admin, Mess, & Supply Section 20, 23
AFA battalions/platoons 8, 11, 12, 13, 15
field guns (40/75/105/155mm) 7, 8, 9, 9,
15, 45, 46,48, H8(58), 59
role of forward observer teams 46
use of in attack 36, 45, 46, 48, H8(58), 59
AIBs 15
"administrative" marches 32, 36, 40
assignment to ADs 15, 16
combat without armor 55-7
organization of 16, 17-21, 23-6, 63
and overseas deployment 33, 35
raising/breaking up of (1943) 17,32
small-unit training within 32-3
air liaison officers 48
air observers/security 36
air strikes (on-call provision of) 48, 56
air-to-ground signal panels A(10), 11, 56
armored cars 5, 6, 11, 12, 63
armored divisions 7, 8-9, 11, 15, 16, 63
Armored Force 7, 17, 31, 61-2
artillery forward observers 14, 59, 61
assault gun platoons 12, 17-18, 57
use of in attack 37, 38, D2(39)
assault guns (75/105mm) 17, 18, 25, 27,
30, E(42), 43, 45, 46, 48, 50, G3(51),
57, 61
use of in attack E(42), 43, 45, 46, 48,
50, G3(51), 59, 61
AT platoons/squads 15, 17, 23, 25, 27
bazookas (2.36in) 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 25,
26, 29, 32, 38, 40, 41, 50, G2(51)
guns (37/57/75mm) 8, 12-13, 20, 20, 21,
23, 27, 36, E(42), 43, 44, 45, 46,
F4(47), 55, H4(58), 59
mines 2 8 , 2 8 , 2 9 , 4 1
as small rifle platoon 38, 44, 55
transport of 20, 20, 21, B5(22), 23, 27
use of in attack 12-13, 36, E(42), 43, 45,
50, G2(51), 56, H4(58), 59, 60-1
use of in defense 43, 44, 46, F4(47)
carbines (JOcal) 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26,
37, 44
CCs 9, 12-15, 46, 62-3
demolition charges 45, 50, 52
Desert Training Center 31
dozer-tanks (M4/M4A3) 50, G3(51)
engineer battalions/companies 8, 12, 15, 17,
37, 4 5 , 4 8 , 5 0 , G2(51), 56, 62
field telephones 55, 57
fire support 45, 45, 46, 48, 49, 52-3, 52, 60
flag sets (M-238) 54
flamethrowers (Ml Al) 50, G2(51)
grenades 26, 28, 29, 30, 53, 54, 60
halftrack cars (M2/2A1/5A1/9/9A1) 7, 9,
20, 21, 23, 27, 28, 28, 29, 29, 30
halftrack drivers, roles of 23, 32, 38
halftrack recovery vehicles (M3A2) 24, 25
halftracks (M3/M3A1/M3A2) 6, 11, 17, 18,
20, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 30
armament (.30/.50cal) 4, 5, A(10), 11,
17, 18,25, 26, 2 8 - 9 , 2 9 , 3 0 , 3 1 ,
3 2 , 3 8 , 4 1 , 4 4 , 48,56
armor protection 27, 29-30, 37, 62
camouflage and markings 4, 6, 9, A(10),
11, 1 1 , 2 6 , 3 1 , 4 0
development/production 4, 5, 27, 30, 63
limitations/weaknesses 27, 29-30, 37, 62
movement formations C(34), 35, 36
OVE 5, 6, A(10), 11, 11, 27, 29, 30, 40-1
64
provision of air security from 36
seating capacity Bl-5(22), 23, 27, 29
squad use of as "home" A(10), 11, 41, 41
storage capacity A(10), 11, 11, 28-9, 29,
40,41,56
use of in attack of 36, 37, 37, 38, 40,
E(42), 43, 45, 53, 54, 54, 55, 59, 61
use of in defense 38, 46, F5(47)
HHCs 11, 13, 16, 17-18, 19, 57, 59-61
HMG sections B4(22), 23
use of in attack 38, D3(39), 60
use of in defense 44
HMGs (.50cal) 5, A(10), 11, 12, 17, 21,
23, 24, 25, 26, 26, 27, 29, 29, 31,
48,56, 56
HQ and service companies 9, 11, 15, 16,
19, 23-5, 25,36, 63
infantry assault teams 50, G2(51)
infantry battalions 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 48,
49-50
use of in attack 8, E(42), 43
infantry companies/platoons/squads 4, 5, 6,
8, 14, 19, 31, 35-6,44
coordination with tanks 5, 38, Dl-3(39),
E(42), 43, 44, 46, Fl-6(47),
H(58), 59-61
perception of tankers 5, 7, 13-14, 49-50
protection of 46, 48-9, 53
in urban warfare 49, 53
infantry-to-tank ratio 8, 9, 30, 61-2, 63
training program 30-1, 32-3
transport of 37, 38, 38
use of in attack 36, 37, 37, 38, 40, 41,
E(42), 43-4, 45, 46
use of in defense 41, 43-4, 45, 46,
Fl-6(47)
infantry divisions 6-7, 48, 49
infantry regiments 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15-16, 17
jeeps 12, 1 7 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 2 5 , 6 0
"light" armored divisions 11-13, 61
LMGs (.30cal) 4, A(10), 11, 13, 17, 18,
2 0 , 2 1 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 6 , 29, 29, 40,
41, 56, 56
Louisiana Maneuvers 6, 9, 33
maintenance battalions/sections 5, 6, 8, 17,
20, 23, 25
"married" AIB/tank battalions 13-14, 46
medical teams/units 8, 16, 19, 25, 43
MG platoons/squads/sections 18, 20, 26, 32,
37,38,40,41,43,45,60,61
movement formations 35, 36, 41
operational strength 21
transport of B3(22), 23
use of in attack 21, E(42), 43, 45, 46,
50, Gl(51)
use of in defense 44, 46, F2(47)
minefields/mines 30, 37, 46, 49, 53
mortar carriers 18, 27, 28, 29, 29, 30
mortar platoons/squads 18, 20, 31, 32,
38, 57
movement formations 35, 36, 38,
D2(39), 41
operational strength 21, 23
personnel/equipment 26-7, 27, 29, 29
transport of 18, B2(22), 23
use of in attack 27, 27, 29, 36, 37, 4 1 ,
E(42), 43, 45, 55, H9(58), 59, 61
use of in defense 46, F(47)
mortars (60/81mm) 17, 21, 23, 24, 25,
26-7, 27, 28, 29, 30, 36, 37, E(42),
4 3 , 4 5 , 4 6 , F ( 4 7 ) , 4 8 , 55, 57,
59, 61
Panthers/Panzers 6, 27, 30, 49, 52, 62
Panzerfausts/Panzerschrecks 30, 40, 52, 57
pistols 17, 21
radios 2 7 v 2 9 , 54, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61
reconnaissance units 6, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 36
Reserve Command 12-13, 14
rifle companies/platoons/squads 8, 9, 13,
15, 16
air security on the march 36
combined-arms formations 38, Dl-3(39)
cross-attachment/pairing of 41, 43, 60
movement formations C(34), 35-6, 37,
38, D2-3(39), 41
organization/strength 16, 17, 18, 19,20,
21,23,24, 32,38,41,63
transport of 4, 20, Bl(22), 23, 27, 38, 40-1
use of in attack 1 1 , 3 2 , 3 6 , 3 7 , 3 8 ,
Dl(39), H l - 2 , 5, 10(58), 59, 60, 61
tanks for cover/transport 49, 52, 52,
53, 57, 60
use of in defense 44, 46, Fl-6(47)
weapons 20, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26-7, 27
rifle grenades (launchers) 23, 26, 52, 53
rifles/sniper rifles (.30cal) 17, 21, 23, 24,
2 6 , 3 7 , 4 1 , 4 4 , 49, 63
satchel charges 50, G2(51)
scout cars 8, 9, 15
"Siegfried Line", breaching of 50, Gl-3(51)
signal companies 8, 9
SMGs (.45cal) 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 44
smoke, use of 46, 48, H9(58), 59
tank battalions 11-12, 15, 17, 37, 45, 63
close operations with AIBs 13
cross-attachment/pairing of 41, 49-50
ratio of to infantry battalions 8
tank companies/platoons 8, 9, 12, 13, 14,
25-6, 31, 57, 59, 63
cross-attachment/pairing of 41, 43, 61
in mixed formations 36, 37, 38, Dl-3(39)
movement formations C(34), 35, 38,
Dl-3(39)
organization/strength 12, 26
use of in attack 7, 11, 37, 38, Dl(39),
40, E(42), 43, 48, 49, Hl-7(58),
59, 60, 61
use of in defense 46, F2-3(47)
tank-infantry teams 8, 48-50, 49, 61-2
cooperation between elements 8, 31-2,
33, 43-4, 45, 57, 57
communications between 54-5, 54
effectiveness of 50, 52-3, 52, 53
joint training of 8, 49-50, 52-3, 52, 53
proximity of infantry to tanks 52, 52, 57
use of in attack 36-8, Dl-3(39), 40, 50,
Gl-3(51), 52, 57, Hl-13(58), 59-61
tank recovery vehicles 13, 13, 24-5
tanks see also tank-infantry teams
debate on best use of 4
enemy attacks on 52, 53
M3 Grant/Lee 13
M4/M4A3 Sherman 8, 12, 13, 18, 25-6,
33, 37, 40, 48, 49, 50, G l , 3(51), 52,
53, 57, 57, 59
M5/M5A1 Stuart 12, 12, 26, 27, 37, 48
M24 Chaffee 26
movement formations C(34), 35, 38, D(39)
tank-to-infantry ratio 8, 9, 30, 61-2, 63
use of in attack 8, 30, C(34), 35, 36, 37,
38, 38,D(39), 40, 40, E(42), 43, 44,
45, 46, F2-3(47), 48, 49, 49, 50, G l ,
3(51), 52-3, 52, 53, 57, 57, H6(58),
59, 60, 61
use of in defense 44, 46, F2(47)
task forces 14, 15,57,59-61
TD battalions/platoons 12, 15, 17, 37, 63
use of in attack 36, 45, 45, 48, 49
use of in defense 44
TDs 1 2 , 3 6 , 4 4 , 4 5 , 4 5 , 4 9
transportation platoons 12
trucks and trailers 5, 6, 7, 15, 17, 20, 23,
24, 25, 46, F6(47), 48, 56
uniforms/clothing A(10), 11, 19, 19,
44, 52
urban warfare 40, 49, 49, 53, 57, 57, 60
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The history of military forces, artifacts,
persona Iities and te;uJllllJUt~JJ..}!!l.dJUdJ~----,

World War II
US Armored Infantry
Tactics
When the USA entered World War II, the organization and combat
doctrine of armored infantry was in its infancy. In common with
other nations'forces, the US Army at first greatly underestimated
the necessary ratio of mechanized infantry to tanks, and it gained
painful experience in North Africa in early 1943. By the time US
armies landed in Europe in 1944 these lessons had been absorbed,
but they were still applied differently from one division to another,
depending on individual and unit experience. This book explains
in detail how the techniques and tactics of effective tank-infantry
cooperation were developed, and gives in-depth data on unit
equipment and organization .

• Full color artwork. Unrivaled detail • Photographs . Ta ctical scenarios

OSPREY US $18.95 UK£11.99

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IS B N 978-1-84603-692-7
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