[3]

THIRD DIVISION judgment on November 23, 2006 in favor of petitioner. The trial
court ordered respondents to vacate the property involved and to pay
ALMA B. RUSSEL, G.R. No. 184542 [4]
Petitioner, attorneys fees and costs.
Present:

CORONA, J., Prejudiced by the ruling, respondents appealed to the Regional Trial
Chairperson, Court (RTC). The RTC, in its March 28, 2007 Decision,
[5]
reversed
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, the ruling of the MTCC and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Petitioner received her copy of the RTC decision on April 13,
TEOFISTA EBASAN and AGAPITO AUSTRIA, Promulgated: [6]
2007. Inclined to appeal the adverse ruling to the CA, petitioner, on
Respondents.
April 23, 2010 April 20, 2007, filed a motion for an extension of 15 days from the

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x expiry of the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for review.
Petitioner attached to her motion postal money orders representing
[7]
the filing and docket fees. She consequently filed viaregistered mail
RESOLUTION [8]
her petition for review with the appellate court on May 15, 2007.

NACHURA, J.: [9]

In the assailed June 18, 2007 Resolution, the CA dismissed the
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
[1]
appeal on the following grounds:
the Rules of Court, questioning the June 18, 2007 and the August
[2]
26, 2008 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 1. The petition is filed out of time, in violation of
No. 01675. Sec. 1, Rule 42. Even if petitioners Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review
were granted, the Petition would have still been
filed six (6) days late from the requested
The petition stems from a complaint for forcible entry filed by
extension of time.
petitioner Alma B. Russel against respondents Teofista Ebasan and
2. There is no Written Explanation why the
Agapito Austria. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) Petition was filed by mail instead of the preferred
of Iligan City heard the ejectment proceedings and rendered
 mode of personal filing, as is required under
Sec. 11, Rule 13. certified true copies of the complaint and the answer filed before the
[12]
trial court.
3. The Verification and Certification page is
defective, since there is no statement and
therefore no assurance that the allegations in The appellate court, however, in the assailed August 26,
the Petition are based on authentic records, in [13]
violation of Sec. 4, Rule 7. 2008 Resolution, denied petitioners motion. It ruled that the motion
for reconsideration was filed only on October 4, 2007, or 63 days
4. Pertinent documents such as the Complaint
and Answer filed before the MTCC, which are after the expiry of the reglementary period for the filing thereof.
material portions of the record referred to in the
Petition are not attached, in violation of Sec.
[10]
2(d), Rule 42. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to this Court via the
instant petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner received her copy of the June 18, 2007 Resolution

[11]
on July 18, 2007. On July 27, 2007, petitioner filed by registered
mail her motion for reconsideration and admission of her amended The Court grants the petition and remands the case to the

petition. She pointed out in her motion that the petition was filed appellate court for disposition on the merits.

within the extended reglementary period. She also explained that her
office clerk inadvertently failed to attach the page containing the Petitioners petition for review (under Rule 42) and motion for

explanation why filing by registered mail was resorted to. Petitioner reconsideration before the appellate court were filed well within the

also begged the appellate courts indulgence to accept the reglementary period for the filing thereof.

verification because only the phrase based on authentic records was

missing in the same. She claimed that this was merely a formal It must be noted that petitioner received her copy of the RTC

requisite which does not affect the validity or efficacy of the pleading. decision on April 13, 2007. Following the Rules of Court, she had 15

She then pleaded for liberality in the application of the rules of days or until April 28, 2007 to file her petition for review before the

procedure and for the consequent admission of her amended petition CA. Section 1 of Rule 42 provides:

containing the written explanation, the corrected verification, and the

Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.A
party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its
 appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same
time to the clerk of said court the corresponding
docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount
of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional
Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the
petition. The petition shall be filed and served within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought
to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion
for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of
the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees
and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant
an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within
which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
(15) days.
On April 20, 2007, petitioner filed before the
CA, via registered mail, her motion for extension of time to file the
petition for review. She pleaded in her motion that she be granted an
additional 15 days, counted from the expiry of the reglementary
period. Petitioner likewise attached to her motion postal money
orders representing the docket fees.
Fifteen days from April 28, 2007 would be May 13, 2007.
This was, however, a Sunday. May 14, 2007, the following day, was
a legal holidaythe holding of the national and local elections. Section
1 of Rule 22 states:
Sec. 1. How to compute time.In computing
any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable
statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be
excluded and the date of performance included. If
the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place
where the court sits, the time shall not run until the
next working day.
Therefore, when petitioner filed her petition for review with the
appellate court on May 15, 2007, the same was well within the
extended period for the filing thereof.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise filed on time. She
received a copy of the June 18, 2007 CA Resolution on July 18,
2007. Under Section 1 of Rule 52, she had 15 days from notice, or
until August 2, 2007, to file a motion for reconsideration.
[14]
Petitioner
filed by registered mail her motion for reconsideration on July 27,
2007. The fact of mailing on the said date is proven by the registry
return receipt,
[15]
the affidavit of service,
[16]
and the certification of the
Office of the Postmaster of Iligan City.
[17]
Section 3, Rule 13 of the
[18]
Rules of Court provides that if a pleading is filed by registered
mail, then the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of
filing. It does not matter when the court actually receives the mailed
pleading. Thus, in this case, as the pleading was filed by registered
mail on July 27, 2007, within the reglementary period, it is
inconsequential that the CA actually received the motion in October
of that year.
As to the CAs dismissal of the petition for review on the ground that
petitioner failed to attach a written explanation for non-personal filing,
the Court finds the same improper. Iligan City, where petitioner
resides and where her counsel holds office, and Cagayan de Oro
City, where the concerned division of the CA is stationed, are
separated by a considerable distance. The CA, in the exercise of its
discretion, should have realized that it was indeed impracticable for
petitioner to personally file the petition for review in Cagayan De Oro
City. Given the obvious time, effort and expense that would have
been spent in the personal filing of the pleadings in this case, the
written explanation why service had not been done personally, as
required by Section 11 of Rule 13, may be considered as
[19]
superfluous.
Relative to the defective verification, the Court excuses the same.
The purpose of the verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition have been made in good faith, or are true
and correct and not merely speculative. The requirement is simply a
condition affecting the form of pleadings and non-compliance
therewith is neither jurisdictional nor does it render the pleading
[20]
fatally defective. Here, the perceived defect is excusable and does
not justify a dismissal of the petition. In any case, petitioner, in her
subsequent pleading, submitted a corrected verification. The same
degree of liberality should apply to petitioners failure to attach a copy
of the complaint and answer filed before the MTCC in her petition for
review. After all, petitioner substantially complied with the
requirement when she filed her amended petition.
In sum, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing petitioners
appeal. The appellate court should have been more prudent in
computing the reglementary period for the filing of petitions. The CA
could have been more liberal in the application of the Rules
considering that, in this case, the MTCC and the RTC arrived at
conflicting rulings, necessitating a thorough review of the merits of
the case. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure
are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that
strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must
always be avoided. It is a far better and wiser course of action for the
Court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
conscientious review of the case in order to attain the ends of justice,
rather than dispose of it on a technicality and cause grave injustice to
the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases
which actually results in more delay, if not in an outright miscarriage
[21]
of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
instant case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for disposition
on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
 Inc. The contract of employment was for a period of nine months,
FIRST DIVISION
starting April 19, 1999, with a monthly basic salary of US$1,004.00
DANTE D. DE LA CRUZ, G.R. No. 172038
Petitioner, plus other benefits.

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, Petitioner was deployed to Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates and
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA, boarded M/S Arktis Morning on May 14, 1999.
*
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ.
In a logbook entry dated June 18, 1999, chief engineer Normann Per
MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING,
Nielsen expressed his dissatisfaction over petitioner's performance:
INC. and ELITE SHIPPING A.S.,
Respondents. Promulgated: rd
3 Eng. Dante D. de la Cruz has[,] since he signed
April 14, 2008
on[,] not been able to live up to the company's SMS
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x rd
job describtion (sic) for 3 Engineer[.] Today he has
been informed that if he do[es] not improve his
DECISION
Job/Working performance within [a] short time he will
be signed off according to CBA Article 1 (7).
CORONA, J.:

[1]
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the
Said Article 1 (7) of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
[2] [3]
November 26, 2004 decision and March 9, 2006 resolution of the
between respondent Elite Shipping A.S. and its employees reads:
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74097. (7) The first sixty (60) days of service is to be
considered a probationary period which entitles a
shipowner or his representative, i.e.[,] the master of
Respondent Elite Shipping A.S. hired petitioner Dante D. de la Cruz the vessel[,] to terminate the contract by giving
fourteen (14) days of written notice.
as third engineer for the vessel M/S Arktis Morning through its local

agency in the Philippines, co-respondent Maersk Filipinas Crewing

This entry was followed by another one dated June 26, 1999 which The labor arbiter (LA) ruled that petitioner was dismissed without just

was similar in content. cause and due process as the logbook entry (which respondents

On June 27, 1999, petitioner was informed of his discharge through a claimed to be the first notice to petitioner) was vague. It failed to

notice captioned Notice according to CBA Article 1 (7), to wit: expound on or state the details of petitioner's shortcomings or
rd
To: 3 engineer Dante D. de la Cruz infractions. As such, petitioner was deprived of a real or meaningful

Pls. be informed that you will be discharged opportunity to explain his side. Hence, the LA ruled that petitioner
according to CBA article 1 (7) in first possible port.
Reason for the decision is, as you have been was entitled to a monetary equivalent of salaries for three months,
informed by chief engineer Per Nielsen on several
occasions, he [does] not find you qualified for the moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
rd
position as 3 engineer onboard this vessel. The
chief engineer has also made 2 entries in the engine
logbook, regarding your insufficient job/working,
On appeal, the NLRC upheld the LA's finding of illegal dismissal but
which you are well aware of.
deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages. Respondents

moved for reconsideration. It was denied.

Petitioner was then made to disembark at the port of Houston, Texas
Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for certiorari (under Rule 65)
and was repatriated to Manila on July 17, 1999.
with the CA. It granted the petition. It held that, although the findings
Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims
of fact of the LA and NLRC were entitled to great respect, this rule
for the monetary equivalent of the unexpired portion of his contract,
was inapplicable because the NLRC committed grave abuse of
damages and attorney's fees in the National Labor Relations
discretion in upholding the LAs decision. The findings were not only
Commission (NLRC) on September 21, 1999.
unsupported by substantial evidence but were also based solely on
the ground that the logbook entries were vague and without concrete the motion for extension of time to file this petition for review was

standards. filed late.

The CA deemed the logbook entries to be sufficient In his petition, petitioner indicated that he received a copy of the CA

compliance with the first notice requirement of the law. It was a resolution (dated March 9, 2006) denying his motion for

written appraisal of petitioner's poor job performance coupled with a reconsideration on March 24, 2006.He, therefore, had until April 8,

warning that should he fail to improve his performance, he would be 2006 to appeal said resolution to this Court or to file a motion for

signed off in accordance with the provisions of the CBA. It reasoned extension of time to file the petition. However, as April 8, 2006 fell on

that a probationary employee may be dismissed at anytime during a Saturday, petitioner deemed it sufficient compliance to file his

the probationary period for failure to live up to the expectations of the motion for extension on April 10, 2006, in accordance with Section 1,

employer. Rule 22 of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. How to compute time. - xxx If the last

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. It was day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place
denied. Hence, this petition. where the court sits, the time shall not run until the
next working day.

The main issue raised before us is whether or not petitioner was Respondents countered that A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC dated February

illegally dismissed by respondents. 29, 2000 (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on

Saturday, Sunday or Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension on

Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we need to settle
Next Working Day is Granted) clarified that the aforementioned rule
two preliminary issues. First, respondents interposed in their
is applicable only to the filing of pleadings other than motions for
comment that the present petition should be dismissed outright as
extension of time, such that when a party seeks an extension to file a
desired pleading, the provision no longer applies and the motion

should be filed on the due date itself, regardless of the fact that it Section 1, Rule 22, as clarified by the circular, is clear. Should a

falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. party desire to file any pleading, even a motion for extension of time

to file a pleading, and the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a

Respondents contention is incorrect.
legal holiday, he may do so on the next working day. This is what

A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC provides: petitioner did in the case at bar.

xxx
Whereas, the aforecited provision [Section 1, Rule 22
of the Rules of Court] applies in the matter of filing of However, according to the same circular, the petition for review on
pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which case, the certiorari was indeed filed out of time. The provision states that in
filing of the said pleading on the next working day is
deemed on time; case a motion for extension is granted, the due date for the extended
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period period shall be counted from the original due date, not from the next
is extended ipso jure to the next working day
immediately following where the last day of the period working day on which the motion for extension was filed. In Luz v.
is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday so that when a
motion for extension of time is filed, the period of [4]
National Amnesty Commission, we had occasion to expound on
extension is to be reckoned from the next working
day and not from the original expiration of the period.
the matter. In that case, we held that the extension granted by the
NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the
guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to declare that court should be tacked to the original period and commences
Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of the last day of the
period so that when a party seeks an extension and immediately after the expiration of such period.
the same is granted, the due date ceases to be the
last day and hence, the provision no longer
applies. Any extension of time to file the required In the case at bar, although petitioner's filing of the motion for
pleading should therefore be counted from the
expiration of the period regardless of the fact that extension was within the period provided by law, the filing of the
said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday. (emphasis supplied) petition itself was not on time. Petitioner was granted an additional
period of 30 days within which to file the petition. Reckoned from the such, the findings of fact of the CA are binding and conclusive upon

original period, he should have filed it on May 8, 2006. Instead, he this Court. However, this rule is not absolute but admits of certain

did so only on May 11, 2006, that is, 3 days late. exceptions. Factual findings may be reviewed in a case when the

findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC are in conflict with those of
Nevertheless, we will gloss over this technicality and resolve the
[10]
the CA. In this case, the LA and the NLRC held that respondents
case on its merits in the exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction as
did not comply with the notice requirement; the CA found otherwise.
[5]
we have done in a number of cases.
Thus, although the instant petition involves a question of fact, that is,

Well settled is the rule that litigations should, as much as possible, whether or not the notice requirement was met, we can still rule on it.
[6]
be decided on their merits and not on technicalities. In accordance
Now, the merits of the instant controversy.
with this legal precept, this Court has ruled that being a few days late

in the filing of the petition for review does not automatically warrant The CA committed an error in holding that petitioner was not
[7]
the dismissal thereof, specially where strong considerations of illegally dismissed. The contrary findings and conclusions made by
[8]
substantial justice are manifest in the petition. Such is the case the LA and the NLRC were supported by jurisprudence and the

here. evidence on record.

The second preliminary issue we need to address is the

matter of this Court's jurisdiction in petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. It should be noted that our jurisdiction in such cases
is limited only to questions of law. It does not extend to questions of
[9]
fact. This doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases.
An employer has the burden of proving that an employee's dismissal
was for a just cause. Failure to show this necessarily means that the
[11]
dismissal was unjustified and therefore illegal. Furthermore, not
only must the dismissal be for a cause provided by law, it should also
As
 The Master shall comply with the following
comply with the rudimentary requirements of due process, that is, the disciplinary procedures against an erring seafarer:

[12] A. The Master shall furnish the seafarer with a

opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself.
written notice containing the following:

These requirements are of equal application to cases of Filipino 1. Grounds for the charges as
listed in Section 31 of this Contract.
seamen recruited to work on board foreign vessels. Procedural due 2. Date, time and place for a
formal investigation of the charges
against the seafarer concerned.
process requires that a seaman must be given a written notice of the

charges against him and afforded a formal investigation where he

B. The Master or his authorized representative
can defend himself personally or through a representative before he shall conduct the investigation or hearing, giving
[13] the seafarer the opportunity to explain or defend
can be dismissed and disembarked from the vessel. The employer himself against the charges. An entry on the
investigation shall be entered into the ship's
is bound to furnish him two notices: (1) the written charge and (2) the logbook.

written notice of dismissal (in case that is the penalty C. If, after the investigation or hearing, the Master
is convinced that imposition of a penalty is
[14]
imposed). This is in accordance with the POEA Revised Standard justified, the Master shall issue a written notice
of penalty and the reasons for it to the seafarer,
Employment Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of with copies furnished to the Philippine agent.

Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA Revised xxx xxx xxx

Standard Employment Terms and Conditions). Furthermore, the notice must state with particularity the acts or
[15]
omissions for which his dismissal is being sought.
Section 17 of the POEA Revised Standard Employment Terms and

Conditions laid down the disciplinary procedures to be taken against Contrary to respondents' claim, the logbook entries did not

erring seafarers: substantially comply with the first notice, or the written notice of

Section 17. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES charge(s). It did not state the particular acts or omissions for which
petitioner was charged. The statement therein that petitioner had not or omissions illustrating the same, along with the date and the

been able to live up to the company's SMS job description for approximate time of their occurrence. For how else could petitioner
rd
3 Engineer and that he had been informed that if he [does] not be expected to meet the charges against him if all he was given as

improve his job/working performance within [a] short time he will reason for his discharge was a vague and general accusation such

have to be signed off according to CBA Article 1 (7) was couched in as that handed down by the chief engineer? Even if the chief

terms too general for legal comfort. engineer verbally informed him of what his specific shortcomings

were, as insisted upon by respondents, the POEA Revised Standard

The CA held that the logbook entries were sufficient to enable
Employment Terms and Conditions and jurisprudence require that
petitioner to explain his side or to contest the negative assessment of
the charges be put in writing.
his performance and were clearly intended to inform him to improve

the same. We cannot fathom how the CA arrived at such a The same thing may be said of the written notice of dismissal. It

conclusion. The entries did not contain any information at all as to sorely lacked the necessary details that should accompany it.

why he was even being warned of discharge in the first place. Even Instead of delving into the grounds for petitioner's discharge, it

we were left to speculate as to what really transpired, calling for such merely echoed the logbook entries by nebulously justifying his

an extreme course of action from the chief engineer. The entries dismissal on the ground that the chief engineer [did] not find
rd
raised more questions than answers. [petitioner] qualified for the position as 3 engineer. Much like the

first notice, it barely made mention of the grounds for his discharge.
How exactly was he unable to live up to the company's SMS
Again, we were left in the dark as to the nature of the acts or
job description of a third engineer? Respondents should have
omissions relied upon as basis for the termination of petitioner's
indicated the grounds for the threatened termination, the specific acts
employment.
 the same amounts to a dismissal. Thus, no amount of justification
These ambiguities, attributable solely to respondents, should
from respondents can move us now to declare the dismissal as being
be resolved against them.
in accordance with the procedural requirements provided for by law.

Moreover, we observed that the records were devoid of any proof It cannot be overemphasized that sufficient notice should be given as

indicating that petitioner was ever given an opportunity to present his part of due process because a worker's employment is his property
[17]
side. In their comment, respondents in fact admitted not having in the constitutional sense.

conducted any formal investigation:

As to the substantive aspect of the requirement, suffice it to say that
A formal investigation in this case was not necessary
because the findings against petitioner were not in the respondents dismally failed to prove that petitioner's termination from
form of infractions that ought to be investigated. The
issue against petitioner was the quality of his work as employment was for cause. As the logbook entries were too general
rd
3 Engineer. Having been duly notified of his
shortcomings, it devolved upon the petitioner to and vague, we cannot even reach any conclusion on whether or not
improve the quality of his work in order to pass his
probationary period and be a regular employee. But
respondents had a valid cause to discharge petitioner. Not only was
petitioner did not.
petitioner's dismissal procedurally flawed, it was also without just

cause.
They also insisted that as petitioner was served notice of his

termination, the same constituted sufficient compliance with the

Lastly, petitioner and respondents were at odds over the former's
requirement of notice and due process as the notice gave him an
employment status when he was discharged from the vessel. It was
[16]
opportunity to defend himself.
petitioner's position that he was already a regular employee when his

services were terminated; respondents, on the other hand, insisted

Clearly, respondents were unmindful of the requirements explicitly
that he was then still on probationary status. This, according to
laid down by law and jurisprudence. Anything short of complying with
respondents, entitled them to dismiss him in accordance with the
It is an accepted maritime industry practice that the employment of
provisions of Article 1 (7) of the CBA (which allows the master to
seafarers is for a fixed period only. The Court acknowledges this to
terminate the contract of one under probation by merely serving a
be for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the employer.
written notice 14 days prior to the contemplated discharge) and the
Seafarers cannot stay for a long and indefinite period of time at sea
requirements on the termination of a probationary employee's
as limited access to shore activity during their employment has been
[18]
employment as laid down in Manila Hotel Corporation v. NLRC.
shown to adversely affect them. Furthermore, the diversity in

It is well to remind both parties that, as early as Brent School, Inc. v. nationality, culture and language among the crew necessitates the
[19] [22]
Zamora, we already held that seafarers are not covered by the limitation of the period of employment.

term regular employment, as defined under Article 280 of the Labor

While we recognize that petitioner was a registered member of the
Code. This was reiterated in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations
Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union of the Philippines
[20]
Commission. Instead, they are considered contractual employees
which had a CBA with respondent Elite Shipping A.S. providing for a
whose rights and obligations are governed primarily by the POEA
probationary period of employment, the CBA cannot override the
Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen (POEA Standard
provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. The law is
Employment Contract), the Rules and Regulations Governing
read into, and forms part of, contracts. And provisions in a contract
Overseas Employment, and, more importantly, by Republic Act No.
are valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
8042, otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas
[23]
public order or public policy.
[21]
Filipinos Act of 1995. Even the POEA Standard Employment
[24]
In Millares v. NLRC, this Court had occasion to rule on the
Contract itself mandates that in no case shall a contract of
use of the terms permanent and probationary masters and
employment concerning seamen exceed 12 months.
employees vis--vis contracts of enlistment of seafarers. In that case, SO ORDERED.

petitioners made much of the fact that they were continually re-hired

for 20 years by private respondent Esso International. By such

circumstances, they claimed to have acquired regular status with all

the rights and benefits appurtenant thereto. The Court quoted with

favor the NLRC's explanation that the reference to permanent and

probationary masters and employees was a misnomer. It did not

change the fact that the contract for employment was for a definite

period of time. In using the terms probationary and permanent

vis--vis seafarers, what was really meant was eligible for re-hire.

This is the only logical explanation possible as the parties

cannot and should not violate the POEA's directive that a contract of

enlistment must not exceed 12 months.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The November 26,

2004 decision and March 9, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. SP No. 74097 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The

March 22, 2002 resolution of the National Labor Relations

Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 029139-01 is REINSTATED.

 Before us are two consolidated petitions. The first is a Petition
THIRD DIVISION [1]
for Review filed by Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto under Rule 45 of the
[2]
Rules of Court, assailing the August 30, 2002 Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 70878. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
[G.R. No. 154994. June 28, 2005]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order of May 17, 2002 is
hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. The custody of the child is
JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner, vs. CRISANTO hereby ordered returned to [Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V].
RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, respondent.
The [respondent] court/Judge is hereby directed to consider, hear
and resolve [petitioners] motion to lift the award of custody pendente
[3]
lite of the child to [respondent].
[G.R. No. 156254. June 28, 2005]
[4]
The second is a Petition for Certiorari filed by Crisanto
Rafaelito Gualberto V under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, charging
the appellate court with grave abuse of discretion for denying his
CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V, petitioner,
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the August 30, 2002 Decision.
vs. COURT OF APPEALS; Hon. HELEN B.
The denial was contained in the CAs November 27, 2002 Resolution,
RICAFORT, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
which we quote:
Court Paraaque City, Branch 260; and JOYCELYN D.
PABLO-GUALBERTO, respondents.
We could not find any cogent reason why the [last part of the
dispositive portion of our Decision of August 30, 2002] should be
DECISION [5]
deleted, hence, subject motion is hereby DENIED.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably
results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often over the custody of
their children. The Court is now tasked to settle the opposing claims
of the parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is less than
seven years of age. There being no sufficient proof of any compelling
reason to separate the minor from his mother, custody should remain
with her.
The Case
The Facts
The CA narrated the antecedents as follows:
x x x [O]n March 12, 2002, [Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V] filed
before [the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City] a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to x x x Joycelyn D. Pablo
Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their
almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the child, for brevity), whom
[Joycelyn] allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and
his school (Infant Toddlers Discovery Center in Paraaque City) when
[she] decided to abandon [Crisanto] sometime in early February
2002[.] x x x [O]n April 2, 2002, [RTC Judge Helen B. Ricafort] heard
the ancillary prayer of [Crisanto] for custody pendente lite. x x x
[B]ecause [Joycelyn] allegedly failed to appear despite notice,
[Crisanto], a certain Col. Renato Santos, and Ms. Cherry Batistel,
testified before the x x x Judge; x x x documentary evidence [was]
also presented[.] x x x [O]n April 3, 2002, x x x [the] Judge awarded
custody pendente lite of the child to [Crisanto.] [T]he Order partly
read x x x:
x x x Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V testified. He stated that
[Joycelyn] took their minor child with her to Caminawit, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. At that time, the minor was enrolled at B.F.
Homes, Paraaque City. Despite effort[s] exerted by him, he has
failed to see his child. [Joycelyn] and the child are at present staying
with the formers step-father at the latters [residence] at Caminawit,
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he
was commissioned by [Crisanto] to conduct surveillance on
[Joycelyn] and came up with the conclusion that [she] is having
lesbian relations with one Noreen Gay Cuidadano in Cebu City.
The findings of Renato Santos [were] corroborated by Cherry
Batistel, a house helper of the spouses who stated that [the mother]
does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house
and on one occasion, she saw [Joycelyn] slapping the child.
Art. 211 of the Family Code provides as follows:
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their children. In the case of disagreement, the
fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary.
The authority of the father and mother over their children is exercised
jointly. This recognition, however, does not place her in exactly the
same place as the father; her authority is subordinated to that of the
father.
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and
foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral
welfare of the child, taking into account the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the contending parties.
The Court believes that [Joycelyn] had no reason to take the child
with her. Moreover, per Sheriff returns, she is not with him at
Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
WHEREFORE, pendente lite, the Court hereby awards custody of
the minor, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto X to his father, Crisanto
Rafaelito G. Gualberto V.
x x x [O]n April 16, 2002, the hearing of [Joycelyns] motion to lift the
award of custody pendente lite of the child to [Crisanto] was set but
the former did not allegedly present any evidence to support her
motion. However, on May 17, 2002, [the] Judge allegedly issued the
assailed Order reversing her Order of April 3, 2002 and this time
awarding custody of the child to [Joycelyn]. [T]he entire text of the
Order [is] herein reproduced, to wit:
Submitted is [Crisantos] Motion to Resolve Prayer for
Custody Pendente Lite and [Joycelyns] Motion to Dismiss and the
respective Oppositions thereto.
[Joycelyn], in her Motion to Dismiss, makes issue of the fact that the
person referred to in the caption of the Petition is one JOCELYN
Pablo Gualberto and not Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto. [Joycelyn] knows
she is the person referred to in the Complaint. As a matter of fact, the
body of the Complaint states her name correct[ly]. The law is
intended to facilitate and promote the administration of justice, not to
hinder or delay it. Litigation should be practicable and convenient.
The error in the name of Joycelyn does not involve public policy and
has not prejudiced [her].
This case was filed on March 12, 2002. Several attempts were made
to serve summons on [Joycelyn] as shown by the Sheriffs returns. It
th
appears that on the 4 attempt on March 21, 2002, both Ma. Daisy
and x x x Ronnie Nolasco, [Joycelyns mother and stepfather,

respectively,] read the contents of the documents presented after
which they returned the same.
The Court believes that on that day, summons was duly served and
this Court acquired jurisdiction over [Joycelyn].
The filing of [Joycelyns annulment] case on March 26, 2002 was an
after thought, perforce the Motion to [D]ismiss should be denied.
The child subject of this Petition, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto is
barely four years old. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, he shall
not be separated from his mother unless the Court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. The Court finds the reason stated by
[Crisanto] not [to] be compelling reasons. The father should however
be entitled to spend time with the minor. These do not appear
compelling reasons to deprive him of the company of his child.
When [Joycelyn] appeared before this Court, she stated that she has
no objection to the father visiting the child even everyday provided it
is in Mindoro.
The Court hereby grants the mother, [Joycelyn], the custody of
Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto, with [the] right of [Crisanto] to have
the child with him every other weekend.
WHEREFORE:
1. The [M]otion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED;
2. Custody pendente lite is hereby given to the
mother Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto with
the right of the father, x x x [Crisanto],
to have him every other week-end.
3. Parties are admonished not to use any other
agencies of the government like the
CIDG to interfere in this case and to
[6]
harass the parties.
[7]
In a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, Crisanto charged the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 260) of Paraaque City with grave abuse
of discretion for issuing its aforequoted May 17, 2002 Order. He
alleged that this Order superseded, without any factual or legal basis,
the still valid and subsisting April 3, 2002 Order awarding him
custody pendente lite of his minor son; and that it violated Section 14
of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Partly in Crisantos favor, the CA ruled that grave abuse of
discretion had been committed by the trial court in reversing the latter
courts previous Order dated April 3, 2002, by issuing the assailed
May 17, 2002 Order. The appellate court explained that the only
incident to resolve was Joycelyns Motion to Dismiss, not the
issuance of the earlier Order. According to the CA, the prior Order
awarding provisional custody to the father should prevail, not only
because it was issued after a hearing, but also because the trial
court did not resolve the correct incident in the later Order.
Nonetheless, the CA stressed that the trial court judge was not
precluded from considering and resolving Joycelyns Motion to lift the
award of custody pendente lite to Crisanto, as that Motion had yet to
be properly considered and ruled upon. However, it directed that the
child be turned over to him until the issue was resolved.
[8]
Hence, these Petitions.
Issues
In GR No. 154994, Petitioner Joycelyn submits these issues for
our consideration:
1. Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals, when it awarded
the custody of the child to the father, violated Art. 213 of the Family
Code, which mandates that no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.
2. Is it Article 213 or Article 211 which applies in this case involving
[9]
four-year old Rafaello?
On the other hand, Crisanto raises the following issues:
A. Did Respondent Court commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to or in excess of jurisdiction when, in its August 30, 2002
Decision, it ordered respondent court/Judge to consider, hear and
resolve the motion to lift award of custody pendente lite of the child to
petitioner and x x x denied the motion for reconsideration thereof in
its November 27, 2002 Resolution, considering that: (1) there is no
such motion ever, then or now pending, with the court a quo; (2) the
November 27, 2002 Resolution is unconstitutional; and (3) the April
3, 2002 Order of respondent Judge, the validity of which has been
upheld in the August 30, 2002 Decision of the respondent Court, has
become final and executory; and
B. Ought not the ancillary remedies [o]f habeas corpus, because the
whereabouts, physical and mental condition of the illegally detained
Minor Rafaello is now unknown to petitioner and preliminary
mandatory injunction with urgent prayer for immediate issuance of
preliminary [injunction], petitioner having a clear and settled right to
custody of Minor Rafaello which has been violated and still is being
continuously violated by [petitioner Joycelyn], be granted by this
Honorable Court?
[10]
Being interrelated, the procedural challenges and the
substantive issues in the two Petitions will be addressed jointly.
The Courts Ruling
There is merit in the Petition in GR No. 154994, but not in GR
No. 156254.
Preliminary Issue:
The Alleged Prematurity
of the Petition in GR No. 154994
Before going into the merits of the present controversy, the
Court shall first dispose of a threshold issue. In GR No. 154994,
therein Respondent Crisanto contends that the Petition for Review
was filed beyond the deadline (October 24, 2002) allowed by the
Rules of Court and by this Court. He claims that Registry Bill No. 88
shows that the Petition was sent by speed mail, only on November 4,
2002. Furthermore, he assails the Petition for its prematurity, since
his Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the August 30, 2002 CA
Decision was still pending before the appellate court. Thus, he
argues that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over Joycelyns
Petition.
Timeliness of the Petition
The manner of filing and service Joycelyns Petition by mail is
governed by Sections 3 and 7 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, which
we quote:
SEC. 3. Manner of filing. The filing of pleadings, appearances,
motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be
made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as
such personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by registered
mail. xxx In the second case, the date of mailing of motions,
pleadings and other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by
the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be
considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in
court. The envelope shall be attached to the records of the case.
xxxxxxxxx
SEC. 7. Service by mail. Service by registered mail shall be made by
depositing the copy in the office, in a sealed envelope, plainly
addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known,
otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid, and
with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender
after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in
the locality of either the sender of the addressee, service may be
done by ordinary mail. (Italics supplied)
The records disclose that Joycelyn received the CAs August 30,
2002 Decision on September 9, 2002. On September 17, she filed
before this Court a Motion for a 30-day extension of time to file a
[11]
petition for review on certiorari. This Motion was granted, and the
deadline was thus extended until October 24, 2002.
A further perusal of the records reveals that copies of the
Petition were sent to this Court and to the parties by registered
[12]
mail at the Bian, Laguna Post Office on October 24, 2002. This is
[13]
the date clearly stamped on the face of the envelope and attested
[14]
to in the Affidavit of Service accompanying the Petition. Petitioner
Joycelyn explained that the filing and the service had been made by
registered mail due to the volume of delivery assignments and the
[15]
lack of a regular messenger.
The Petition is, therefore, considered to have been filed on
October 24, 2002, its mailing date as shown by the post office stamp
on the envelope. The last sentence of Section 3 of Rule 13 of the
Rules provides that the date of filing may be shown either by the post
office stamp on the envelope or by the registry receipt. Proof of its
filing, on the other hand, is shown by the existence of the petition in
[16]
the record, pursuant to Section 12 of Rule 13.
The postmaster satisfactorily clarifies that Registry Bill No. 88,
which shows the date November 2, 2002, merely discloses when the
mail matters received by the Bian Post Office on October 24, 2002,
were dispatched or sent to the Central Mail Exchange for distribution
[17]
to their final destinations. The Registry Bill does not reflect the
[18]
actual mailing date. Instead, it is the postal Registration Book that
shows the list of mail matters that have been registered for mailing
on a particular day, along with the names of the senders and the
addressees. That book shows that Registry Receipt Nos. 2832-A and
2832-B, pertaining to the mailed matters for the Supreme Court,
were issued on October 24, 2002.
Prematurity of the Petition
As to the alleged prematurity of the Petition of Joycelyn,
Crisanto points out that his Urgent Motion for Partial
[19]
Reconsideration was still awaiting resolution by the CA when she
filed her Petition before this Court on October 24, 2002. The CA
ruled on the Motion only on November 27, 2002.
The records show, however, that the Motion of Crisanto
was mailed only on September 12, 2002. Thus, on September 17,
2002, when Joycelyn filed her Motion for Extension of Time to file her
Petition for Review, she might have still been unaware that he had
moved for a partial reconsideration of the August 20, 2002 CA
Decision. Nevertheless, upon being notified of the filing of his Motion,
she should have manifested that fact to this Court.
With the CAs final denial of Crisantos Motion for
Reconsideration, Joycelyns lapse may be excused in the interest of
resolving the substantive issues raised by the parties.
First Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
In GR No. 156254, Crisanto submits that the CA gravely abused
its discretion when it ordered the trial court judge to consider, hear
and resolve the motion to lift the award of custody pendente
lite without any proper motion by Joycelyn and after the April 3, 2002
Order of the trial court had become final and executory. The CA is
also charged with grave abuse of discretion for denying his Motion
for Partial Reconsideration without stating the reasons for the denial,
allegedly in contravention of Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules of
Court.
The Order to Hear the Motion
to Lift the Award of Custody
Pendente Lite Proper
 To begin with, grave abuse of discretion is committed when an
act is 1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
[20]
jurisprudence; or 2) executed whimsically or arbitrarily in a manner
so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty,
[21]
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. What
constitutes grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and arbitrary
exercise of judgment as that which is equivalent, in the eyes of the
[22]
law, to lack of jurisdiction.
On the basis of these criteria, we hold that the CA did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.
First, there can be no question that a court of competent
jurisdiction is vested with the authority to resolve even unassigned
issues. It can do so when such a step is indispensable or necessary
to a just resolution of issues raised in a particular pleading or when
the unassigned issues are inextricably linked or germane to those
[23]
that have been pleaded. This truism applies with more force when
the relief granted has been specifically prayed for, as in this case.
[24]
Explicit in the Motion to Dismiss filed by Joycelyn before the
RTC is her ancillary prayer for the court to lift and set aside its April
3, 2002 Order awarding to Crisanto custody pendente lite of their
minor son. Indeed, the necessary consequence of granting her
Motion to Dismiss would have been the setting aside of the Order
awarding Crisanto provisional custody of the child. Besides, even if
the Motion to Dismiss was denied -- as indeed it was -- the trial court,
in its discretion and if warranted, could still have granted the ancillary
prayer as an alternative relief.
Parenthetically, Joycelyns Motion need not have been verified
because of the provisional nature of the April 3, 2002 Order. Under
[25]
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, verification is required only when
relief is sought from a final and executory Order. Accordingly, the
court may set aside its own orders even without a proper motion,
whenever such action is warranted by the Rules and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.
[26]
Denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration Proper
Second, the requirement in Section 1 of Rule 36 (for judges to
state clearly and distinctly the reasons for their dispositions) refers
only to decisions and final orders on the merits, not to those
[27]
resolving incidental matters. The provision reads:
SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or
final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing
personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him,
and filed with the clerk of court. (Italics supplied)
Here, the declaration of the nullity of marriage is the subject of
the main case, in which the issue of custody pendente lite is an
incident. That custody and support of common children may be ruled
upon by the court while the action is pending is provided in Article 49
of the Family Code, which we quote :
[28]
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of
adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses,
the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the
custody and support of their common children. x x x.
Clearly then, the requirement cited by Crisanto is inapplicable.
In any event, in its questioned Resolution, the CA clearly stated that
it could not find any cogent reason to reconsider and set aside the
assailed portion of its August 30, 2002 Decision.
The April 3, 2002 Order Not
Final and Executory
Third, the award of temporary custody, as the term implies, is
provisional and subject to change as circumstances may warrant. In
this connection, there is no need for a lengthy discussion of the
alleged finality of the April 3, 2002 RTC Order granting Crisanto
temporary custody of his son. For that matter, even the award of
child custody after a judgment on a marriage annulment is not
permanent; it may be reexamined and adjusted if and when the
[29]
parent who was given custody becomes unfit.
Second Issue:
Custody of a Minor Child
When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably
results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often over the custody of
their children. The Court is now tasked to settle the opposing claims
of the parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is less than
[30]
seven years old. On the one hand, the mother insists that, based
on Article 213 of the Family Code, her minor child cannot be
separated from her. On the other hand, the father argues that she is
unfit to take care of their son; hence, for compelling reasons, he must
be awarded custody of the child.
[31]
Article 213 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court
shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally
or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their
[32]
child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount. No
mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.(Italics
supplied)
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall
not be separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the basic
[33]
need of minor children for their mothers loving care. In explaining
the rationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission
stressed thus:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where
a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound
the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender
age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling
reasons for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if
the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in
cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative)
divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her.
Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the
baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation. (Report of the
Code Commission, p. 12)
A similar provision is embodied in Article 8 of the Child and
[34]
Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603). Article 17 of
the same Code is even more explicit in providing for the childs
custody under various circumstances, specifically in case the parents
are separated. It clearly mandates that no child under five years of
age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to do so. The provision is reproduced in its
entirety as follows:
Art. 17. Joint Parental Authority. The father and the mother shall
exercise jointly just and reasonable parental authority and
responsibility over their legitimate or adopted children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary.
In case of the absence or death of either parent, the present or
surviving parent shall continue to exercise parental authority over
such children, unless in case of the surviving parents remarriage, the
court for justifiable reasons, appoints another person as guardian.
In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of age
shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to do so. (Italics supplied)
The above mandates reverberate in Articles 211, 212 and 213
of the Family Code. It is unmistakable from the language of these
[35]
provisions that Article 211 was derived from the first sentence of
[36]
the aforequoted Article 17; Article 212, from the second sentence;
[37]
and Article 213, save for a few additions, from the third sentence.
It should be noted that the Family Code has reverted to the Civil
Code provision mandating that a child below seven years should not
[38]
be separated from the mother.
Mandatory Character
of Article 213 of the Family Code
[39]
In Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, the Court held that the use of
shall in Article 363 of the Civil Code and the observations made by
the Code Commission underscore the mandatory character of the
[40]
word. Holding in that case that it was a mistake to deprive the
mother of custody of her two children, both then below the age of
seven, the Court stressed:
[Article 363] prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a
mother and her child below seven years, unless such a separation is
[41]
grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.
In like manner, the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code
[42]
and Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has been held to
[43]
connote a mandatory character. Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly
contemplate a situation in which the parents of the minor are married
to each other, but are separated by virtue of either a decree of legal
[44]
separation or a de facto separation. In the present case, the
parents are living separately as a matter of fact.
The Best Interest of the Child
a Primary Consideration
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that [i]n all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
[45]
consideration.
The principle of best interest of the child pervades Philippine
cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status,
minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it
has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom
custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the
[46]
paramount consideration. Courts are mandated to take into
account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the
childrens well-being and development. Aside from the material
resources and the moral and social situations of each parent, other
factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the
capability to attend to the physical, educational, social and moral
[47]
welfare of the children. Among these factors are the previous care
and devotion shown by each of the parents; their religious
background, moral uprightness, home environment and time
availability; as well as the childrens emotional and educational needs
Tender-Age
Presumption
As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition
that, as a general rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding
custody of children under the age of seven. The caveat in Article 213
of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except when the court finds
[48]
cause to order otherwise.
The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the
Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the
mothers unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have
custody of her children in one or more of the following instances:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or
[49]
affliction with a communicable disease.
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations
as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has
indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mothers
immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her
[50]
of custody.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove
parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is
a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her
[51]
unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of
custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses
have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have
distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental
[52]
care.
To this effect did the Court rule in Unson III v.
[53]
Navarro, wherein the mother was openly living with her brother-in-
law, the childs uncle. Under that circumstance, the Court deemed it
in the nine-year-old childs best interest to free her from the obviously
unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation in
which the mother ha[d] placed herself might create in [the childs]
[54]
moral and social outlook.
[55]
In Espiritu v. CA, the Court took into account psychological
and case study reports on the child, whose feelings of insecurity and
anxiety had been traced to strong conflicts with the mother. To the
psychologist the child revealed, among other things, that the latter
was disturbed upon seeing her mother hugging and kissing a bad
man who lived in their house and worked for her father. The Court
held that the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already
caused the child emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and
exposure to conflicting moral values x x x.
Based on the above jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough for
Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also
demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a
person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under
circumstances not conducive to the childs proper moral
development. Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no
evidence that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual
proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development
suffered as a result.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge, Helen
Bautista-Ricafort, ruled in her May 17, 2002 Order that she had
[56]
found the reason stated by [Crisanto] not to be compelling as to
suffice as a ground for separating the child from his mother. The
judge made this conclusion after personally observing the two of
them, both in the courtroom and in her chambers on April 16, 2002,
and after a chance to talk to the boy and to observe him firsthand.
This assessment, based on her unique opportunity to witness the
childs behavior in the presence of each parent, should carry more
weight than a mere reliance on the records. All told, no compelling
reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mothers
custody.
No Grant of Habeas Corpus
and Preliminary Injunction
As we have ruled that Joycelyn has the right to keep her minor
son in her custody, the writ of habeas corpus and the preliminary
mandatory injunction prayed for by Crisanto have no leg to stand on.
A writ of habeas corpus may be issued only when the rightful custody
[57]
of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto, a
situation that does not apply here.
On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of preliminary
mandatory injunction cannot be granted, because Crisantos right to
[58]
custody has not been proven to be clear and unmistakable. Unlike
an ordinary preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction is more cautiously regarded, since the latter requires the
performance of a particular act that tends to go beyond the
[59]
maintenance of the status quo. Besides, such an injunction would
serve no purpose, now that the case has been decided on its
[60]
merits.
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 154994 is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
the May 17, 2002 Regional Trial Court Order REINSTATED. The
Petition in GR No. 156254 is DISMISSED. Costs against Petitioner
Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 157752. March 16, 2005]
SALLY MIGUEL, MATILDE ALMIRA, JURINDA AGONCILLO,
ANACORETA AYUDA, PURITA BALINDAN, GILDA
BARCO, ZENAIDA BARTOLO, JOSE BOLANTE,
MERCEDES CASING, MYRNA CORDERO, ALFREDO
DAGUNDON, TERESITA DAGUNDON, LEONOR
ESPINELI, JUENITA GALLEVO, JOSEFH GARIBAY,
ZENAIDA GATERS, MARITA GRAZA, OTILLA HADLOC,
ERLINDA IBARRA, LORNA JANIOLA, ENGRACIA
LACAMBRA, MERLIE LEANILLO, MIGUELA LIVELO,
JANALITA LOPEZ, ROSEMARIE LOPO, AMELIA
MENDOZA, JUDITH NIETO, NORA NIMO, JULIANA
NUESTRO, THELMA ORTIZ, GLORIA PALARCA,
SALVADOR PAASILAN, SANTIAGO PELLOSIS, NELIA
PESTANO, SALVACION RICARIO, HILDA SALAYSAY,
NELIDA SANTIAGO, ANACETA TAMUNDONG,
GABRIELA TANEDO, EMMA TORRECAMPO, EDWIN
VELASCO, GLORIA VELASCO, VICTORIA BOLANTE,
SATURNINA ALAMAN, EMELITA ALMERA, VIRGINIA
AMACIO, ROSALINDA BUENDIA, RIZALINA SAMINI,
ESTER DELA PENA, EMELITA DELOS SANTOS,
MILAGROS DIOSO, AMELIA DIPAD, JELLY INOLINO,
LOLITA LLABUS, MARITES MARIANO, EUFEMIA
MERCADO, JENNY MOLINO, SIONEDA ORNOS, MORLIE
PALMIS, EMELIE SACANLE, ENAIDA SIMBULAN, EMMA
VANIEGAS, EVANGELINE BALTAZAR, VIRGINA
AGPOLDO, JULIA MALANA, AGNES PINEDA, EDITNA
CABIAO, DOLORES DIAZ, DOLORES MENDOZA,
EMELIA MENDOZA, HERMIE SALVANIA, FELICIDAD
LOPEZ, EDITHA CABRAL, NERY DELA CRUZ,
ANGELITO FLORES, ANITA FLORES, MELBA
PAHIMNAYAN, JACINTA TADIPA, LETICIA
VILLANUEVA, ENITA NOLASCO, LERMA RELATO,
LETACIA SARAMBAO, GLORIA BELLOSILLO, AMELITA
VILLON, ASTERIO ALAMAN, ROBERTO VALERIO,
REBECCA ALEMANIA, JOVITA BAQUILALA, TESSIE
GARCIA, AMELIA PINTOY, VIRGINIA TEODOSIO, MA.
AIDA ESTARIS, RHIETY SORIA, CARMEN CURA, NIDA
AMPONG, CHARITO DE LEON, REMEDIOS
PANDARAWAN, APOLONIA RIVERA, LETICIA PEREZ,
DIOSALINE GOMEZ, ROSALINDA DAELISAN, MERELYN
DOLORIEL, AGNES ISIP, ELVIRA MADRIAGA, EPIFANIO
MALAGUENO, CONCEPCION MANANSALA, TERESITA
MAYORES, LEVY MAJERA, ZENAIDA PANGILINAN,
SUSAN PASACSAC, CELIA RAPIZ, VIOLY SANDANG,
ADELAIDA SICAD, ALFREDO TORREFIEL, SOFIA
TORREFIEL, ESTER VILLEGAS, ELMA ANTANG,
DOMETILIA BARCEBAL, CLARITA SALA, MARCELINA
BALUYOT, CLEOFE IGNACIO, PHOEBE BARGO,
IMELDA CELANO, VENUS PEDREREA, ELVIRA
MENDIOLA, EVELYN SALVADOR, LOLITA BERNABE,
GLORIA CABANGANAN, ELVIRA VEDASTO,
LUZVIMINDA, TORRES, IRANDA LABRADOR,
FEDERICO BALIZA, JULIETA BALIZA, MARILOU
LATOZA, BERNADETTE PONTERES, JULIETA TAYSON,
IRENE BERCASIO, DONATO MENDOZA, BIBIANA
CATIBOG, FLORANTE MENDOZA, REBECCA EDRALIN,
SALLY BELAZON, EXEQUILA JORGE, EVANGELINE
GANENAS, FE DUPAYA, LOLITA GATCHALIAN, ANA
OVAL, ROSITA DESIATCO, MARLYN QUILANG, ANITA
LIMBO, IMELDA ALMONGUERA, FE SEGUNDO, NITA
FEDELIN, REBECCA FADREQUELA, TERESITA
ALCEDO, ERLINDA YMANA, EVELYNDA ZAMORA,
VIRGINIA PARAYNO, MARITA GUTIERREZ, MARGARITA
CAPINIG, LUDIVINA CABOTESA, JOSEFINA TIMOLO,
VIRGINIA ANCHETA, LORENA MALAGUENO, MALANA
JULIA, MARILOU AGUILAR, ALEGA BRIGIDA, AMPONG
LILIA, APIADO EMMA, ROMARIE BACOLOD, MONICO
BARCEBAL, ELIZABETH ESCUREL, RENATO ESCUREL,
LEODIVILLA LEBUDAN, MERCEDES MARFIL, ANICETA
SAPURCO, SUSAN SARMIENTO, ADELA TABOR, and
 HERMINIA VALDEZ, petitioners, vs. JCT GROUP,
*
INC., and VICENTE CUEVAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Labor arbiters are required to state the factual and legal bases
of their decisions. They thereby conform to the requirement of due
process and fair play, because parties to the controversy are
informed of why and how such decisions were reached. When no
factual findings support the conclusions made in a labor decision, a
remand of the case for further proceedings may become necessary.
The Case
[1]
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, challenging the October 15, 2002
[2] [3]
Decision and the March 21, 2003 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 51228. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and the
assailed decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission and
the labor arbiter are ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be
remanded to the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
[4]
Commission for further proceedings.
The March 21, 2003 Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:
For several years, Glorious Sun Garment Manufacturing Company
(or Glorious Sun) was a garment exporter until it folded up in October
[5]
1994. Thereafter, De Soliel [sic] Apparel Manufacturing Corporation
[or De Soleil] and American Inter-Fashion Corporation (or AIFC) took
over Glorious Suns manufacturing plant, facilities and equipment and
absorbed its employees, including the [petitioners].
Following the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (or PCGG) sequestered De Soleil and AIFC
and took over their assets and operations.
On April 24, 1989, JCT Group, Inc. (or JCT) and De Soleil, thru its
Officer-In-Charge and Head of the PCGG Management Team,
executed a Management and Operating Agreement (or MOA) for the
purpose of servicing De Soleils export quota to ensure its
rehabilitation and preserve its viability and profitability. The MOA,
which was for a period of one year commencing on May 1, 1989 and
renewable yearly at the option of JCT, expired on May 1, 1990 as it
was not renewed.
In July 1990, De Soleil ceased business operations, effectively
terminating [petitioners] employment.
In April 1993, [petitioners] filed complaints for illegal dismissal and
payment of backwages and other monetary claims before the
National Labor Relations Commission (or NLRC) Arbitration Branch
against De Soleil, AIFC, PCGG, Glorious Sun, JCT, Nemesio Co and
Vicente Cuevas III (or Cuevas). The cases were eventually
consolidated.
On May 26, 1993, JCT and Cuevas x x x filed a motion to dismiss
founded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
because of the absence of [an] employer-employee relationship
between them and [petitioners].
Without resolving the motion to dismiss, Labor Arbiter Vladimir P.L.
Sampang rendered a decision dated April 18, 1995 disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring [De Soleil, AIFC, PCGG, Glorious Sun, JCT, Nemesio
Co and Cuevas] jointly and severally guilty of illegal dismissal and to
pay complainants backwages, separation pay, service incentive
th
leave pay, 13 month pay, unpaid salaries as computed by the
Research and Information Unit x x x;
2) Declaring [De Soleil, AIFC, PCGG, Glorious Sun, JCT, Nemesio
Co and Cuevas] liable for the payment of attorneys fees equivalent to
ten (10%) percent of the total awards or P3,691,743.06.
The monetary award, inclusive of attorneys fees,
aggregated P41,313,094.98 as per computation of the Research and
Information Unit. Considering the amount involved, [Respondents
JCT and Cuevas] and Glorious Sun filed separate motions with the
NLRC for reduction of the appeal bond in order to appeal the labor
arbiters decision.
In an order dated September 20, 1995, the NLRC reduced the
amount of the appeal bond to P5,000,000.00 [which respondents
and Glorious Sun were each required to submit]. [Respondents] filed
a motion for reconsideration of said order by way of further reduction
of the bond to P500,000.00. However, the motion was denied per
order dated April 15, 1996. [Respondents] elevated the matter to the
Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 125749) but it
was denied per resolution dated September 2, 1996. [Respondents
petition was denied with finality in a resolution dated November 13,
1996. ]
[6]
Meanwhile, on May 4, 1995, Glorious Sun and [respondents]
appealed the labor arbiters decision to the NLRC. [Petitioners] filed a
motion to dismiss both appeals on the ground that the same were not
perfected for failure to post a bond as required [under] Art. 223 of the
Labor Code.
In a decision dated September 12, 1996, the NLRC modified the
labor arbiters decision by absolving Glorious Sun from liability and
dismissing [respondents] appeal. x x x
Aggrieved, [respondents] instituted [a] special civil action
for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Conformably with the
pronouncement in St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC (295 SCRA
494), however, the petition was referred to the [CA] for appropriate
[7]
action and disposition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA reversed the Decision of the NLRC and remanded the
case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. The appellate court
ruled that the circumstances presented factual questions whose
resolution had to precede that of the issue of whether private
respondents were liable to petitioners. It found no factual basis for
the ruling that JCT had become the employer of petitioners after the
cessation of operations of Glorious Sun. Similarly, the Decisions of
the NLRC and the labor arbiter failed to explain the reason for
[8]
holding Cuevas solidarily liable with AIF, De Soleil and JCT.
[9]
Hence, this Petition.
The Issue
Petitioners state the issues in this wise:
1. Whether or not, [the] Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or x x x excess of jurisdiction in giving
due course to x x x respondents Petition despite the said x x x
respondents [failure] to perfect their appeal with the National Labor
Relations Commission.
2. Whether or not, [the] Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or x x x excess of jurisdiction in giving
due course to x x x respondents Petition [when] the labor arbiter and
the National Labor Relations Commission did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in rendering their respective decisions.
3. Whether or not, [the] Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or x x x excess of jurisdiction in giving
due course to x x x respondents Petition despite the [fact that] x x x
respondents failed to file a motion for reconsideration [of] the
September 12, 1996 Decision of the National Labor Relations
[10]
Commission.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
The NLRCs Grave Abuse of Discretion
As the second issue is intertwined with the first and the third
issues, it will be resolved first. Petitioners contend that the CA should
not have remanded the case for further proceedings, because the
labor arbiter and the NLRC had committed no grave abuse of
[11]
discretion in their Decisions.
We disagree.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. That is, power is arbitrarily or despotically exercised by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and caprice is so
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
[12]
contemplation of law.
No Findings of Fact
In the present factual milieu, the labor arbiter and the NLRC
gravely abused their discretion when they ruled in favor of herein
petitioners without determining the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between them and respondents. The
Decisions were silent on why JCT and Cuevas were held liable. The
following observations of the appellate court are in point:
In finding for [petitioners], the labor arbiter considered them regular
employees for the reason that they performed duties, responsibilities
and functions necessary and desirable to the business of garments
manufacturing and exportation x x x and had been also working x x x
for more than one year at the time of the cessation of business
operation.
Save for his conclusion that [petitioners] were regular employees, the
labor arbiter made no determination whether there was employer-
employee relationship between [respondents] and [petitioners] and, if
so, whether [respondents] assumed the obligations of [petitioners]
previous employers. There is no dispute that given the nature of their
functions and length of services, [petitioners] were regular
employees. But the question is: who was/were their employer/s?
x x x Moreover, it does not appear from the decisions of the NLRC
and the labor arbiter that JCT x x x became the employer of
[petitioners] by virtue of its MOA with De Soleil.
xxxxxxxxx
The NLRC decision is silent on the basis for its ruling that JCT
became the employer of [petitioners] after Glorious Sun ceased
operations, save for its conclusion that petitioners were absorbed by,
or their work continued under x x x JCT. Similarly, the NLRC
decision, just like that of the labor arbiter, does not state the reason
for the decreed solidary liability of Cuevas x x x with JCT, De Soleil
and AIF.
Moreover, the computation [of] the monetary award
totaling P37,557,317.08 (exclusive of attorneys fees) covers a period
starting on [petitioners] initial employment (with Glorious Sun), some
dating back to 1978. However, the NLRC made no finding that JCT
(on the supposition that it became [petitioners] employer pursuant to
the MOA dated April 24, 1989) had assumed the obligations of
petitioners previous employers, i.e., Glorious Sun, AIF and De Soleil.
Given the factual backdrop of the case, several nagging questions
have not been resolved. Among them: x x x Was there [an]
employer-employee relationship between JCT and [petitioners] and,
if so, when should such relationship be reckoned? x x x Why was
Cuevas adjudged solidary liable with AIF, De Soleil and JCT?
[13]
The facts and the law on which decisions are based must be
[14]
clearly and distinctly expressed. The failure of the labor arbiter and
the NLRC to express the basis for their Decisions was an evasion of
their constitutional duty, an evasion that constituted grave abuse of
discretion.
Relevant to the present case is Saballa v. National Labor
[15]
Relations Commission, which explained how the decision of an
administrative body must be drawn:
This Court has previously held that judges and arbiters should draw
up their decisions and resolutions with due care, and make certain
that they truly and accurately reflect their conclusions and their final
dispositions. x x x. The same thing goes for the findings of fact made
by the NLRC, as it is a settled rule that such findings are entitled to
great respect and even finality when supported by substantial
evidence; otherwise, they shall be struck down for being whimsical
and capricious and arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. It is a
requirement of due process and fair play that the parties to a
litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of
the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it
was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a
[16]
higher tribunal.
Remand for
Further Proceedings
Where a judgment fails to make findings of fact, the case may
[17]
be remanded to the lower tribunal to enable it to determine them. It
is necessary to remand the present case for further proceedings,
because the labor arbiter and the NLRC failed to make the factual
findings needed to resolve the controversy.
The defense of respondents is anchored on an alleged lack of
employer-employee relationship with petitioners as stipulated in the
[18]
formers MOA with De Soleil. JCT further claims that any
relationship with De Soleil and the latters employees was severed
[19]
upon the termination of that Agreement. It is therefore imperative
to determine the nature of the MOA -- whether or not it partook only
of a consultancy agreement, in which no employer-employee
relationship existed between respondents and petitioners.
The test for determining an employer-employee relationship
hinges on resolving who has the power to select employees, who
pays for their wages, who has the power to dismiss them, and who
exercises control in the methods and the results by which the work is
[20]
accomplished. The last factor, the control test, is the most
[21]
important. In resolving the status of an MOA, the test for
[22]
determining an employer-employee relationship has to be applied.
Indeed, the only way to find out whether Respondents JCT and
Cuevas are liable to petitioners is by remanding the case to the lower
court. To uphold the Decisions of the labor arbiter and the NLRC at
this stage would amount to depriving respondents of property without
due process. In sum, the CA did not commit reversible error in
finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC and the
labor arbiter for their failure to state the facts upon which their
conclusions had been based.
Remand in Recognition of the
Policy Favoring Employees
To repeat, a decision with nothing to support it is a patent
[23] [24]
nullity. It should be struck down and set aside as void. Acting
with utmost regard for the rights of petitioners, however, the CA did
not outrightly set aside the Decisions of the NLRC and the labor
arbiter. Instead, the CA remanded the case for further proceedings to
allow petitioners to prove their claim of illegal dismissal. The remand
of the case, instead of the dismissal of the Complaint, was beneficial
to petitioners and was made in consideration of the policy to protect
and promote the general welfare of employees.
Second Issue:
Alleged Procedural Infirmities
The first and the third issues raised by petitioners refer to
alleged procedural infirmities. They argue that because respondents
allegedly failed to post the appeal bond, the latter failed to perfect
[25]
their appeal to the NLRC. Petitioners also argue that because
respondents also failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the
[26]
NLRCs Decision, the latters Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA
should have been denied outright.
Posting of an
Appeal Bond
Article 223 of the Labor Code regulates the posting of an appeal
bond. The pertinent portion states as follows:
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission, in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
This requirement is intended to discourage employers from
using an appeal to delay or even evade their obligation to satisfy
[27]
their employees just and lawful claims. Such a requirement has
been relaxed in several cases, however, following the rule that
substantial justice is better served by allowing appeals on the
[28]
merits. The policy of labor laws is to liberally construe rules of
[29]
procedure and settle controversies according to their merits, not to
[30]
dismiss them by reason of technicalities.
In the present case, the Decision of the labor arbiter is a patent
nullity, because it failed to state the factual and legal bases for its
conclusions. The award granted -- the basis for the appeal bond --
[31]
was a staggering P37,557,359.08, for which no factual findings
against respondents had been made. On April 26, 1995, the latter
filed with the NLRC an Urgent Motion for the Reduction of the Bond.
The Motion was later elevated to this Court, which decided on it with
finality only on November 13, 1996. Under the circumstances, the CA
did not err in liberally construing the provision of the law requiring the
filing of a bond and in holding that the NLRC should have given
respondents ample time to post the appeal bond.
Filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration
The requirement of a motion for reconsideration, as a
prerequisite to the filing of a petition for certiorari, is waived under
any of the following conditions: where the decision is a patent nullity,
where the issue raised is one purely of law, or where the questions
raised are exactly the same as those already squarely presented to
[32]
and passed upon by the court a quo. Taken together, the
circumstances of the present controversy place the case within the
exceptions to the rule requiring a motion for reconsideration. As the
Court has declared above, the NLRC Decision is a patent nullity and
would, if sustained, violate respondents right to due process.
Final Observation
The Court observes that the CA made a finding that the
Decisions of the labor arbiter and the NLRC had included a monetary
award for individuals who were not signatories to the
[33]
Complaint. Those individuals are not parties to the case and must
thus be dropped therefrom.
The Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission must determine whether there was an employer-
employee relationship between the JCT Group, Inc., and Vicente
Cuevas on the one hand and, on the other, petitioners who had
signed the Complaint; and, if there was, when respondents liability
should commence and when it should end.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21098. May 31, 1963.]
CARMEN P. NOVINO, and RODOLFO NOVINO, Petitioner, v. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, LINA Y. FUENTES, RAFAEL FUENTES
and PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION
(PHHC), Respondents.
Luis Meneses, for Petitioners.
Romualdo Valera for respondent People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation.
Campos, Mendoza & Hernandez for respondents Lina Y.
Fuentes and Rafael Fuentes.
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; PETITION TO REVIEW DECISION
OF COURT OF APPEALS; DENIAL OF PETITION NEED NOT BE
EXPLAINED. — Petitions to review decisions of the Court of Appeals
are not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there
is no need fully to explain the court’s denial thereof.
2. ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL BY SHORT RESOLUTIONS. — Resolutions
denying such petition are not decisions within the requirement of
Sec. 12 of Art. VIII of the Constitution. They merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions
of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
3. ID.; ID.; EVERY QUESTIONS OF LAW RAISED NEED NOT BE
DECIDED. — Courts are not required to decide each and every
question of law raised by one party, regardless of its materiality to
the litigation.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF COURT TO DECIDE ONE
IMMATERIAL LEGAL QUESTION, EFFECT OF. — The court’s
failure to decide one immaterial legal question does not infringe Art.
9 of the New Civil Code. The article refers to refusal of a judge to
decide a material legal issue on the excuse that the law on that point
is silent or obscure.
5. ID.; SALE; ANNULMENT OF; FAILURE OF WIFE TO GET
CONSENT OF HUSBAND TO THE SALE. — The wife can not
invoke her own failure to get the consent of her husband, to
invalidate a sale she had consummated.
RESOLUTION
BENGZON, C.J.:
This petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals has
been, by resolution, dismissed "for lack of merit."
Now comes petitioners’ counsel to argue that the resolution "does
not interpret or clarify any law or right raised by the petitioner but
simply denied or dismissed the petition without (giving) any reason
for such action." And by citing sec. 12 of Art. VIII of the Constitution,
counsel impliedly suggests that we disregarded it in failing to state
the facts and the law on which our resolution rested.
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has
been raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not
"decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely
hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of
the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered
that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no
need fully to explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and
the laws are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the
court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the
practice of the U. S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are
often merely ordered "dismissed."
But let us — this time at least — consider the petitioners’ arguments.
Regarding the claim that the Court of Appeals has failed to decide
one question of law (Art. 144 of the Civil Code) that herein petitioners
had submitted, it is enough to explain that the courts are not required
to decide each and every question of law raised by one party,
regardless of its materiality to the litigation.
And — contrary to petitioners’ contention — a court’s failure to
decide one immaterial or unnecessary legal question, does not
infringe Art. 9 of the New Civil Code, because that article refers to
refusal of a judge to decide a material legal issue on the ground or
excuse that the law on that point is silent or obscure or insufficiently
expressed.
True, the Court of Appeals did not expressly rule on the point. But it
impliedly held that at the time the property was acquired (by her) they
were not living as husband and wife; so, Art. 144 is immaterial.
The Court did not add — as it could have added — that if the sale
was defective by reason of the lack of Rodolfo’s consent, it was the
heirs of Rodolfo — not Carmen — who have a right to ask for
annulment. Carmen could not invoke her own fault or shortcoming
(she did not get his consent) to invalidate a sale she had
consummated. On the other hand, this Court takes into account in
the use of its discretion, that apparently, the money was used for the
benefit of Rodolfo, for his expenses at the Psychopathic Hospital.
The motion to reconsider is denied.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon,
Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

To uphold herein petitioners’ claim would bring about a situation Labrador and Barrera, JJ., took no part.
wherein the time of judges will be wasted with useless and
impertinent legal questions knowingly or unknowingly raised to delay
the litigation or befuddle the issues.

And yet, what is Carmen Novino’s gripe? She asserts that the Court
of Appeals failed to apply Art. 144 of the Civil Code. The facts in
short are these: Carmen sold some real property she had acquired
from the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation. Now she
wants the sale annulled alleging she had not obtained the consent of
"her husband" Rodolfo Novino. The Court of Appeals found that her
marriage to him was null and void from the beginning because both
of them had surviving spouses. 1 Therefore, the Court of Appeals
ruled: valid sale, no need of Rodolfo’s consent. Here she asks that
Art. 144 should be applied. 2 It says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 144. — When a man and a woman live together as husband

and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership."cralaw virtua1aw library
 [G.R. No. L-52027. April 27, 1982.]
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED and
NORTH BRITISH & MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO.,
LTD., Petitioners, v. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING
COMPANY and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Peña & Marcos,
for Petitioners.
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo for Private
Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent company shipped to a consignee in the United States
certain cargoes covered by two "all risks" marine insurance policies
issued by petitioners containing express stipulations that respondent
company has an interest therein. The shipments, which were
undertaken in accordance with the instructions of the insurer’s
surveyor, sustained damage in transit prompting private respondent
to file the corresponding insurance claims which were rejected.
Consequently, respondent company filed with the Court of First
Instance a complaint for recovery of damages which was dismissed
for lack of cause of action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
the Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited, Et. Al. v.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, Et. Al. trial court’s order of
dismissal. Hence, this petition for certiorari (herein treated as an
appeal) wherein petitioners contend, among others, that respondent
company is not the real party in interest and has no personality to
sue and that respondent’s complaint has no cause of action against
the insurers.
On review, the Supreme Court, without prejudging the merits of
respondent’s case and petitioner’s affirmative defenses, held that
there is prima facie showing in respondent’s complaint and pleadings
that it is a real party in interest under the policies and that it has a
cause of action against petitioners as insurers.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirmed.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PARTIES; RESPONDENT IN CASE
AT BAR PRIMA FACIE SHOWN A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. —
Where, based (1) on express stipulation in the two subject marine
insurance policies that respondent company has an interest therein
and (2) on the facts that it was the shipper (and presumably the
owner) of the insured cargoes, that the shipments were undertaken
in accordance with the instructions of the insurer’s marine surveyor
and that it was respondent company that filed the corresponding
claim with the adjuster when the cargoes were damaged, the
Supreme Court, without prejudging the merits of respondent
company’s case and petitioners’ affirmative defenses, ruled that
there is prima facie showing in respondent’s complaint and pleadings
that it is a real party in interest under the policies and that it has a
cause of action against the petitioners as insurers.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
This is a marine insurance case. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company alleged in its complaint of February 7, 1974 that on
November 8 and 23, 1971 it shipped (for smelting) copper ore
concentrates on board the vessels M/S Hermosa and M/S General
Aguinaldo from Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union to Tacoma,
Washington, U.S.A.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
The first shipment is known as No. 167 and the other shipment as
Nos. 168 and 168-A. The copper ore concentrates were stored on
board the carrying vessels under the supervision and approval of a
marine surveying firm designated by the insurer (pp. 8-9, Record on
Appeal). American Smelting and Refining Co., Ltd. (Asarco) was the
consignee. The ore was to be discharged at the wharf of Asarco’s
smelter at Tacoma (pp. 75-76, 98-9, Record on Appeal).
The shipments were covered by two "all risks" marine insurance
policies issued to Asarco by North British & Mercantile Insurance
Company Limited, a subsidiary of Commercial Union Assurance
Company Limited. The first policy was for US$4,509,014 or 80% of
the agreed total value of US$5,636,268 while the second policy was
for US$6,230,591.03 or 80% of the agreed total value of
US$7,788,233.79. The 20% balance was covered by insurance
policies issued by Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.
Both policies contain this stipulation: "It is hereby noted and agreed
that Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. have (has) an interest on this
Policy" (pp. 22 and 58, Record on Appeal). From the opening clause
of the policies (couched in Chaucerian English), it may be inferred
that Asarco and all persons having an interest in the shipments were
covered by the insurance (pp. 20-21, 45-46, Record on Appeal).
Because the two shipments were damaged in transit, Lepanto filed
claims under the policies. Commercial Union Assurance and North
British denied the claims.chanrobles law library : red
On February 8, 1974, Lepanto filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 22, against Commercial Union
Assurance and North British wherein it prayed that they be ordered
to pay Lepanto the sums of US$523,139.20 and US$553,564.80,
representing 80% of the damages suffered by Lepanto plus interest,
litigation expenses and attorney’s fees.
On motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, the lower court
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. Lepanto
appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its decision dated
September 27, 1979 reversed the order of dismissal (CA-G.R. No.
55948-R).
In a resolution dated November 12, 1979, it denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Commercial Union Assurance and North
British. A copy of that resolution was received by their lawyers on
November 19. Twelve days later, or on December 1, they filed a
special civil action of certiorari in this Court wherein they alleged that
the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction in entertaining
Lepanto’s appeal. The certiorari petition was treated as an appeal.
As directed, the parties filed their briefs.
The petitioners contend in their first assignment of error that the
Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Lepanto’s appeal because
it raised only a pure question of law.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That contention is devoid of merit because Lepanto in its notice of
appeal expressly stated that it was appealing on questions of fact
and law and because in its assignment of errors it contended that the
trial court erred in finding that the marine policies were issued solely
in favor of Asarco, in not finding that Lepanto was insured under the
said policies and in not finding that the insurers were estopped to
deny that Lepanto was an insured party.
The ventilation of those factual issues would explain why the Court of
Appeals did not certify the case to this Court as a case involving a
pure question of law.
The petitioners in their other assignments of error argue that the
Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in taking into account
Lepanto’s manifestation which is not a part of its complaint; in finding
that Lepanto claimed ownership of the cargo covered by the marine
insurance policies; in not finding that Lepanto is not the real party in
interest and has no personality to sue and in not finding that under
the ultimate facts alleged in Lepanto’s complaint Lepanto has no
cause of action against the insurers.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library
The issue is the correctness of the trial court’s conclusion that
Lepanto has no right to sue the insurers since it has no cause of
action against them (p. 119, Record on Appeal), or, as stated by the
Appellate Court, whether Lepanto can legally sue on the marine
insurance policies.
We hold, without prejudging the merits of Lepanto’s case and
petitioners’ affirmative defenses, that there is a prima facie showing
in Lepanto’s complaint and pleadings that it is a real party in interest
under the policies and that it has a cause of action against the
petitioners as insurers.

This holding is based (1) on the stipulation (already quoted) in the

two policies that it has an interest therein and (2) on the facts that it
was the shipper (and presumably the owner) of the insured cargoes,
that the shipments were undertaken in accordance with the
instructions of the insurer’s marine surveyor and that it was Lepanto
that filed the corresponding claim with the adjuster when the cargoes
were damaged (pp. 34-37, Record on Appeal).

It is noteworthy that when Commercial Union Assurance Company

Limited rejected Lepanto’s claims it did not question Lepanto’s right
and personality to file the claims nor did it state that Lepanto had no
interest in the marine policies and that it was not an insured party.
Commercial Union rejected the claims, not on those grounds, but
because "both cargoes were inherently vicious" (pp. 37-45, Record
on Appeal).

To say that Lepanto has no interest under the policies would render
meaningless the said stipulation in its favor. To say that Lepanto as
shipper of the insured property had no proprietary interest therein
before its delivery at Asarco’s wharf in Tacoma is to imply that the
insured property was res nullius. These conclusions are
preposterous.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Hence, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. Whether

after hearing the parties it would appear that Lepanto’s claims for
damages are justified or not is an issue on which we make no
anticipatory and premature finding.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-31762 September 19, 1973
JULIA ASIS AMARGO, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, MANUEL DE JESUS AND LUZ MIRANDA DE
JESUS, Respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Gelasio L. Dimaano for respondents.
ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal from the resolution dated January 10, 1970 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44212-R dismissing the petition for review,
and from that Court's resolution dated February 9, 1970 denying
petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
This case originated in the City Court of Manila, Branch III, where
private respondents filed on October 10, 1967 a complaint for
unlawful detainer against petitioner who, according to the complaint,
refused to pay the increased monthly rental of P180.00 (from
P140.00) for the use and occupation of private respondents'
premises at 346 Pureza St., Sampaloc, Manila. Petitioner filed an
answer. After trial the City Court rendered judgment on January 15,
1968 ordering petitioner to vacate the leased premises, to pay
private respondents the sum of P380.00 representing rents in arrears
as of October, 1967, the sum of P180.00 as monthly rent beginning
November, 1967 until petitioner vacates the premises, plus attorneys
fees and the costs of suit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila which,
after a pre-trial conference, set the case for hearing on June 20,
1969, on which date petitioner's counsel manifested the court that
after private respondents shall have presented their evidence, he
would submit the case for decision; whereupon, Presiding Judge
Hilarion U. Jarencio dictated in open court, in the presence of both
parties' lawyers, the following Order, to wit:
Atty. Manuel Jimenez, Jr. for the defendant manifested to the Court
that after the plaintiffs have presented their evidence he will submit
the case for judgment. The parties agreed that the reception of the
evidence be delegated to a Commissioner in the person of Atty.
Romulo J. Lapuz.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
"SO ORDERED.
The court accordingly delegated the reception of private
respondents' evidence to Commissioner Lapuz, and such reception
of evidence took place on June 23, 1969. In said proceeding,
petitioner's counsel cross-examined the witnesses for private
respondents, after which the latter submitted the case for decision.
Petitioner's counsel informed the commissioner that he would file a
motion with the court for permission to present evidence for the
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On July 12, 1969, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated
July 7, 1969 of the above-quoted Order of June 20, 1969 admitting in
effect the recital of facts contained in said order and of the fact that
during the reception of the evidence before said commissioner on
June 23, 1969, petitioner thru counsel, was allowed to cross-examine
the witnesses, but pleaded "for the sake of equity," that petitioner be
allowed to present her evidence. Private respondents opposed the
motion on the ground, among others, that the case had been
referred to the commissioner for reception of said respondents'
evidence and considered submitted for decision, precisely because
of the manifestation of petitioner's counsel at the hearing on June 20,
1969 that he was submitting the case for decision after the reception
of private respondents' evidence. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied in the Order of July 17, 1969, because
petitioner did not indicate "what evidence it intends to present" and
"[t]he impression of the court when the case was called for hearing
on June 20, 1969 was that the defendant did not desire to present
any evidence at all," and "[t]hat was why the reception of plaintiff's
evidence was delegated to a commissioner." Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration on July 26, 1969, to which private respondents
filed an opposition on August 6, 1969. The Court denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration on August 12, 1969, on the grounds that
petitioner "had been delaying the case," and "[t]here is no showing
what evidence the defendant intends to submit."chanrobles virtual
law library
On August 30, 1969, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered
judgment affirming in full the judgment of the City Court. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of said judgment on October 10,
1969, to which private respondent filed an opposition. On October
22, 1969, the court denied petitioner's
motion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On October 29, 1969, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a
petition for review, contending that the Order dated June 20, 1969 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila re-stating her counsel's
manifestation that he would submit the case decision after
presentation of private respondents' evidence to a commissioner, is
not supported by stenographic notes, and that in view of the absence
of stenographic notes to support incident, "a strong indication exists
to show that the statements contained in the blank form were not
really the manifestation made by counsel during the hearing of said
date."chanrobles virtual law library
In its resolution of January 10, 1970, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition, stating:
Petitioner's position shapes up to the form that since the Order of
June 20, 1969 is not supported by stenographic notes, the same is
not valid, and that the decision itself has no legal backing. Petitioner,
however, makes no pretense that the decision was not based on
stenograpic notes of the plaintiffs' testimony and of defendant's
cross-examination. Sec. 1 of Rule 36, which petitioner cites to
support her stand clearly refers to judgments which must be in
writing personally and directly prepared by the judge. "Judgments"
do not include the proceeding in
question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, the petition for review suffers from the legal defect that the
plaintiffs in the ejectment case were not joined as parties
respondents.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied on February 9, 1970. Hence, the present
appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In this appeal petitioner contends that the Order of June 20, 1969,
which stated that petitioner's counsel had manifested that he would
submit the case for decision after private respondents had presented
their evidence, and that the parties had agreed to delegate to a
commissioner the reception of such evidence, is null and void
because there are no stenographic notes to support the said order
as none were taken, and, for this reason, all the proceedings which
thereafter transpired, including the rendition of judgment, are void. In
this connection, petitioner claims that at the hearing on June 20,
1969, immediately after petitioner's counsel had made his verbal
manifestation that reception of evidence be made before a
commissioner to be appointed by the court, he and private
respondents' counsel were made to sign a blank form provided by
personnel of the court, but the same, as filled up, did not reflect the
statement made by petitioner's counsel which later became the basis
of the June 20, 1969 Order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
1. It is not clear, however, whether petitioner disputes the factual
foundation of the trial court's statement contained in its order of June
20, 1969, to the effect that petitioner's counsel had manifested at the
hearing held on that date that he would submit the case for decision
after private respondents had presented their evidence, thereby
waiving the presentation of petitioner's evidence, or assails the
validity of the order of said court of June 20, 1969 on the sole ground
that "no stenographic notes were taken" during the time such
manifestation was made. The vagueness of petitioner's position
stems from the fact that she does not clearly and categorically deny
that Atty. Manuel Jimenez, Jr., her former counsel, had in fact on
June 20, 1969 made such verbal manifestation to the trial court, but
simply asserts that the order of June 20, 1969 had no basis because
no stenographic notes of the proceedings were taken. If petitioner's
position stems from the fact that she does not clearly and
categorically deny that Atty. Manuel Jimenez, Jr., her former counsel,
had in fact on June 20, 1969 made such verbal manifestation to the
trial court, but simply asserts that the order of June 20, 1969 had no
basis because no stenographic notes of the proceedings were taken.
If petitioner's former counsel had in truth and in fact made the
aforecited manifestation and thereby waived the presentation of
petitioner's evidence, We fail to perceive how the purpoted lack of
stenographic notes would have rendered the trial no relevance in
petitioner's invocation of section 1 of Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of
1 When the trial court in its order of July 17, 1969 denied the aforesaid
Court. The rule invoked by petitioner refers to "judgments
determining the merits of cases," and petitioner does not pretend that
the trial court's decision on the merits of August 30, 1969 was not
based on stenographic notes of the plaintiffs' testimony and of
defendant's cross-examination, or that the said judgment does not
contain clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. Certainly section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules does not apply to
interlocutory orders, like the order of June 20, 1969, which delegated
to a commissioner the reception of private respondents'
2 plaintiffs' evidence before a commissioner to be appointed by the
evidence. chanrobles virtual law library
2. But assuming that in this petition petitioner disputes the factual
basis of the trial court's order of June 20, 1969, that petitioner's
former counsel manifested at the hearing held that date that the case
be considered submitted for decision "after the plaintiffs have
presented their evidence," before the commissioner, there are strong
reasons for disbelieving
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The order of June 20, 1969 was dictated by Judge Jarencio in open
court in the presence of the parties' respective lawyers, so that if it
were true that it did not faithfully reflect the intention of the parties,
particularly that of petitioner's counsel, the natural reaction would
have been for said counsel to immediately call the court's attention
thereto and forthwith move for a reconsideration of the order. We
note, too, that in the motion filed on July 7, 1969 by petitioner to
reconsider the order of June 20, 1969, petitioner, while invoking
equity as a ground for the re-opening of the hearing, never disputed
the factual foundation of the said order. On the contrary, petitioner's
aforesaid motion contains a virtual affirmation of the recital of facts
contained in said order, to wit:
1. On June 20, 1969, an Order was issued by the Honorable Court
authorizing Atty. Romulo J. Lapuz to act as Commissioner to receive
evidence for the plaintiffs and thereafter, as manifested by Atty.
Manuel Jimenez, Jr., counsel for the defendant, to have the case
submitted for resolution.
motion of petitioner dated July 7, 1969 and reiterated therein that "on
June 20, 1969, attorney for the defendant manifested in open court
that after the plaintiff had presented its evidence he will submit the
case for judgment," petitioner, instead of disputing clearly and
categorically the factual basis of the trial court's statement in her
second motion for reconsideration, merely stated that: "Atty. Manuel
Jimenez, Jr., (former counsel of petitioner) has assured the
undersigned counsel that while he moved to have the presentation of
court, he never manifested that he would submit the case without
presenting any evidence for the defendant." Petitioner, however, did
not submit any proof, such as the sworn statement of Atty. Jimenez,
Jr., to substantiate this assertion. Such an anemic posture in the
assertion of a claim is certainly no warrant for its
veracity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Finally, when the trial court in its decision of August 30, 1969, again
adverted to the fact that petitioner's counsel had manifested to the
court during the hearing of June 20, 1969 that "he has no evidence
to present and that after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence,
he will submit the case to the court for judgment," petitioner, instead
of challenging the factual basis of such statement in her "Motion for
3
Reconsideration" of October 10, 1969, confined her arguments to
the fact that since petitioner "had been judicially consigning the
mount of P180.00 regularly after she has been ordered by the lower
court," which indicates her "willingness to pay the rate as desired by
plaintiffs," the trial court should reconsider "its decision dated August
30, 1969, by allowing defendant to continue her stay on the premises
by paying the sum of P180.00 a month or P230.00 which is the
increased rental - whichever amount is deem reasonable for the
occupation of the premises." In other words, petitioner not only
conceded the right of the private respondents to collect the increased
rentals but also failed to press her previous claim that her former
counsel did not make the manifestation on June 20, 1969 adverted
to in the decision. It is also significant to note that before the court a
quo petitioner never impugned the order of the court of June 20,
1969, because of the alleged absence of stenographic notes of the
proceedings. It is evident from the foregoing that petitioner did not
raise in issue before said court the issue which she has raised before
the appellate court and which is not the subject of this petition
for certiorari, namely, whether or not the order of the trial court of
June 20, 1969, and all the proceedings taken by said court
thereafter, are all null and void because no stenographic notes were
taken of the proceedings on June 20, 1969. Well settled is the rule
that questions which were not raised in the lower court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal, except questions on jurisdiction
over the subject matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Be that as it may, as between petitioner's assertion that according to
her former counsel he did not waive the presentation of evidence for
said party, and the trial court's positive statement that the former
counsel of petitioner had on June 20, 1969 manifested that "he has
no evidence to present and that after the plaintiffs had presented
their evidence he will submit the case to the court for judgment," We
must accept the veracity of the latter. As heretofore stated, this
statement made in the trial court's order of June 20, 1969 and in the
judgment of August 30, 1969, must prevail over petitioner's
assertion, undoubtedly hearsay in character because of the
presumption accorded by law to the actions of the judicial
tribunal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This Court has held in the Banco Espanol-Filipino case that: "There
is no principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has
once been acquired, every act of a court of general jurisdiction shall
be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every
judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the
4
proceedings from their initiation to their completion." Unless the
contrary appears or is shown, it will be presumed that the
proceedings of a judicial tribunal are regular and valid, and that
judicial acts and duties have been, and will be, duly and regularly
5
performed. chanrobles virtual law library
Earlier, this principle was elucidated in United States v. Labial, et al 6
where this Court, citing with approval Elliott's Appellate Procedure in
section 710 thereof, said:
... "The rule that all reasonable presumptions and intendments will be
made in favor of the rulings of the trial court is one of the best settled
and most frequently applied rules in appellate procedure. The rule
rests on a firm foundation. It is supported by the elementary principle
that official acts are presumed to be rightfully performed. But when it
is brought to mind that a court acts impartially, upon full information
of the rule stated will at once be perceived to be broader and
stronger than that which underlines the rule supporting the acts of
ministerial or executive officers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The doctrine, supported by many citations of authority, is thus stated
in the Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice, volume 2, page 420:
"The general assumption obtains in all legal proceedings that judicial
tribunals and officials act according to law. On appeal accordingly
from the decision of an inferior judicial tribunal an appellate court will
presume in review that it has complied with all the requirements of
law, and that its determination rested on facts sufficient to sustain
them. The burden rests upon the appellants to rebut this presumption
of regularity." (Emphasis supplied.)
This presumption, rooted as it is on sound reasons of public policy
and the requirements of an orderly administration of justice, can only
be overcome by strong and convincing proof to the
7
contrary. chanrobles virtual law library
In the circumstances of the case at bar, We must, therefore,
presume that the recitals contained in the order of the court a quo of
8
June 20, 1969 are true and in accord with the facts. chanrobles
virtual law library
4. Petitioner also assails as erroneous the holding of respondent PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals that "[t]he petition for review suffers from the legal appealed from are affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
defect that the plaintiffs in the ejectment case were not joined as
parties respondents." Respondent Court of Appeals made that
statement because, after the Court of First Instance of Manila had
rendered judgment adverse to petitioner and denied her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals against "The Honorable Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XXIII," as respondent, without impleading therein the
plaintiffs in the ejectment case, namely, herein private respondents
Manuel de Jesus and Luz Miranda de
Jesus.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is argued by petitioner that her failure to implead the plaintiffs is

excusable because the Revised Rules of Court provides that "these
rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and
to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
9
determination of every action and proceeding," and that, moreover,
what was being sought to be nullified in the Court of Appeals was an
order of the court and not that of a private
party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As the parties in whose favor reliefs were granted by the court of

First Instance of Manila in its decision, there is no question that
private respondents were indispensable parties. They had such an
interest in the controversy that a final decree could not proceed
without their presence. True it is that it was an order of the court
which was being assailed in the petition for review, but that
circumstance did not dispense with the need for private respondents'
inclusion in the proceedings. This requirement is explicit from the
express provision of section 5, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court. In various cases We held that where the party interested in
sustaining the order complained of has not been included as a co-
respondent in the proceeding contrary to section 5, Rule 65 of the
10
Rules, the petition for writ of certiorari is defective. And it must
have been with this realization that in the present petition for review
by certiorarifiled with this Court, petitioner has now included the
plaintiffs in the ejectment case as party respondents. We find no
error, therefore, in this holding of respondent Court of
Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

[G.R. No. 150798. March 31, 2005]
RUDECON MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. SISENANDO S. SINGSON, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, petitioner Rudecon Management Corporation seeks the
[1]
reversal of the two (2) Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 64281. The first resolution denied petitioners omnibus
motion to dismiss CA-G.R. CV No. 64281, while the second denied
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
The spouses Pablo and Ma. Theresa P. Tolentino were the
owners of a condominium unit (Room 302) in the Tempus Place I
Condominium located at Matalino St., Diliman, Quezon City, covered
by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 8876. In 1993,
Rudecon Management Corporation (RMC) executed a Deed of
[2]
Absolute Sale in favor of the spouses Tolentino over its
condominium unit, Room 404, at the same Tempus Place I
Condominium covered by CCT No. 3295 for P600,000.00.
Sisenando S. Singson, on the other hand, was the owner of two
condominium units in the Tempus Place II Condominium, Unit A
covered by CCT No. 5013, and Unit B covered by CCT No. 5014.
On April 18, 1997, the spouses Tolentino and Sisenando
[3]
Singson executed a Deed of Exchange in which the latter deeded
his condominium units (Units A and B) to the spouses Tolentino in
exchange for Rooms 302 and 404, which the spouses Tolentino
deeded to Singson.
On or about September 15, 1987, RMC filed a complaint against
Ramon Veluz for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City (MeTC), Branch 41. RMC sought the eviction of
Ramon Veluz from Room 404, which the latter leased from Singson
on August 7, 1995. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
18436.
The decision of the MeTC was appealed to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 35326.
On September 3, 1998, Singson filed a complaint against the
RMC for the reconveyance of Room 404 covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 3295 with damages. Singson
alleged, inter alia, that Pablo Tolentino acquired ownership over the
unit based on the deed of absolute sale executed by RMC covering
the said unit; he acquired ownership over the same based on the
unit-swapping arrangement between him and the spouses Tolentino;
he later leased the unit to Veluz; despite its knowledge of his
ownership over the unit and that he had leased the same to Veluz,
RMC, nevertheless, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against his
lessee; and despite demands, RMC refused to turn over to him CCT
No. 3295 to enable him to register the title over the unit in his name.
Singson prayed that judgment be rendered in his favor for
damages and that
the Defendant be ordered to reconvey to the Plaintiff Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 3295 over the subject property issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of the Defendant in
order that the Plaintiff may register the same under his name and for
this purpose, that the Defendant be ordered to execute the duly
notarized deed of absolute sale thereover in favor of Pablo C.
Tolentino and/or the Plaintiff by virtue of the swapping arrangement
[4]
between the latter.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-35444. Singson
appended to his complaint the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
RMC in favor of the spouses Tolentino.
Singson, thereafter, filed an amended complaint wherein he
alleged the following:
3. That the Plaintiff is the actual owner of a condominium unit
designated as Unit 404, with an area of sixty point two square meters
(60.2 sq. m.) in the Tempus I Condominium located at 21 Matalino
Street, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, by virtue of a unit-
swapping arrangement between the latter and one Pablo C.
Tolentino; That on April 18, 1997, a deed of exchange, hereto
marked Annex A, was executed by the parties to formalize the
swapping arrangement previously entered by the parties; of which
swapping arrangement, defendant Rudecon Management
Corporation, through its president Rudegelio Tacorda has full
knowledge per its letter dated March 5, 1997 advising Pablo
Tolentino and Petitioner to formalize the same, copy of which letter is
marked as Annex B; That said Pablo C. Tolentino was the owner of
said Unit 404 as his share in the joint construction venture with
defendant, under an unnotarized deed of absolute sale, valid
between the parties, executed by the Defendant Rudecon
Management Corporation in his favor dated February 1993, a copy of
which is attached and made an integral part hereof as Annexes C
and C-1; That the subject unit is covered by one Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 3295 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City in the name of the Defendant, a copy of which is
attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex D, and
that said condominium certificate of title was never transferred by the
Defendant to Pablo C. Tolentino and to this day still remains in the
name of Defendant despite the latters execution of a deed of
absolute sale in favor of the former;
8. That it likewise appears that defendant through its president
Rudegelio Tacorda maliciously and falsely claiming ownership over
subject condominium unit mortgaged the same to Allied Banking
Corporation for a reported sum of not less than P2,000,000.00 as per
attached letter dated February 14, 1997 marked Annex H to the great
prejudice and damage, representing actual, moral and exemplary
damages, of herein plaintiff in the sum of not less
than P2,000,000.00.
[5]
Singson prayed that judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:
Upon the additional cause of action alleged in paragraph 8 of this
Amended Complaint, it is further prayed that defendant be adjudged
to pay the plaintiff the sum of not less [than] P2,000,000.00 by way of
actual, moral and exemplary damages.
It is also respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the
Defendant be ordered to liquidate its mortgage indebtedness with the
Allied Banking Corporation upon subject unit and thereafter to
reconvey to the Plaintiff Condominium Certificate of Title No. 3295
over the subject property issued by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City in the name of the Defendant free from any liens or
encumbrances in order that the Plaintiff may register the same in his
name and for this purpose, that the Defendant be ordered to execute
the duly notarized deed of absolute sale over subject condominium
unit in favor of the Plaintiff as transferee from the former owner Pablo
Tolentino by virtue of the swapping arrangement and deed of
exchange between the parties.
Other relief as may be just and equitable under the circumstances
[6]
are likewise prayed for.
Singson also executed a Verification and Affidavit of Non-Forum
Shopping, wherein he stated that
That if I should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report such
[7]
fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable Court.
RMC filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the
following grounds:
I.
PLAINTIFFS AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION (SECTION 1[g], RULE 16) BECAUSE, UNDER ART. 1311
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IN RELATION TO SECTION 28, RULE
130, DEFENDANT IS NOT BOUND BY EITHER THE ALLEGED
DEED OF EXCHANGE (ANNEX A, COMPLAINT) OR THE
ALLEGED VERBAL SWAPPING AGREEMENT BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND PABLO TOLENTINO CONSIDERING THAT
DEFENDANT IS NOT A PARTY OR PRIVY TO SAID DEED OR
AGREEMENT AND FURTHER CONSIDERING THAT THE DEED
OF EXCHANGE IS SIMULATED AND FORGED.
II.
PLAINTIFFS AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF, NOT BEING A REAL PARTY- IN-
INTEREST, DOES NOT HAVE THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO
SUE FOR THE PERFORMANCE OR ENFORCEMENT OF THE
UNNOTARIZED DEED OF SALE (ANNEX C, COMPLAINT)
BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND PABLO TOLENTINO TO WHICH
PLAINTIFF IS ADMITTEDLY NOT A PARTY OR PRIVY.
III.
PLAINTIFFS AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS ADMITTEDLY NOT
TRANSFERRED OWNERSHIP OF CCT NOS. 1503 (SIC) AND
1504 (SIC) TO PABLO TOLENTINO AND INSTEAD PLAINTIFF
HOLDS ON TO SAID TITLES AND CONTINUES TO OCCUPY THE
CONDOMINIUM UNITS THEREOF THEREBY PRECLUDING AND
BELYING THE DAMAGE SUPPOSEDLY SUSTAINED BY
PLAINTIFF. MOREOVER, THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IS BUT
PLAINTIFFS MALICIOUS ATTEMPT AT UNJUST ENRICHMENT
AT DEFENDANTS EXPENSE.
IV.
PLAINTIFFS AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AS THE RELIEF OF RECONVEYANCE SOUGHT BY HIM
IS NOT A PROPER REMEDY AND CANNOT BE GRANTED BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT BECAUSE ADMITTEDLY CCT NO.
3295 IS VALID AND GENUINE AND THERE IS NO WRONGFUL
OR ERRONEOUS REGISTRATION THEREOF IN DEFENDANTS
NAME THAT WOULD WARRANT RECONVEYANCE AS A LEGAL
[8]
REMEDY.
RMC averred that it was not a party to the deed of exchange
executed by Singson and the spouses Tolentino; hence, it could not
be compelled to reconvey the subject unit to Singson. And since it
was not a party to the said deed of exchange, Singson had no right
to enforce the same against it. Hence, despite the deed of exchange,
Singson continued to occupy Units A and B and failed to transfer the
same to the spouses Tolentino.
RMC maintained that Singson was not entitled to the
reconveyance of the unit since there was no allegation in the
complaint that it had been erroneously or fraudulently registered in
[9]
the name of another person.
[10]
On April 7, 1999, the trial court issued an Order granting the
motion and dismissing the complaint. Singson then filed a motion for
the reconsideration of the Order and for the inhibition of the Presiding
Judge of the court. On June 30, 1999, the trial court issued an
[11]
Order denying the motion for reconsideration, but granted the
motion for inhibition. Hence, Singson appealed the April 7, 1999
Order of the trial court to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
64281.
In the meantime, Singson filed another complaint with the RTC
of Quezon City, this time against Allied Banking Corporation and the
Sheriffs Office of Quezon City, for the annulment of the Sheriffs Sale
at Public Auction of Room 302 (covered by CCT No. 8876) in favor of
the said bank. He alleged, inter alia, that as early as June 1995, he
became the owner of Room 302 and Room 404 based on his verbal
agreement with the spouses Tolentino which was
contextualized via their deed of exchange. Allied Banking
Corporation had been informed of his ownership and occupancy of
Room 302 as early as 1995. He then offered Unit A (covered by CCT
No. 5013) for Room 302, as substitute collateral for the payment of
the loan of Pablo Tolentino which the latter endorsed to the bank.
Singson also alleged that the extrajudicial sheriffs foreclosure of the
mortgage and the subsequent sale was illegal for want of notice and
publication, including for the following reasons:
[T]he defendant bank employed deceptive and fraudulent scheme to
consummate the Sheriffs Auction Sale to the prejudice of the plaintiff.
17. Defendant bank confused and misled the plaintiff by accepting
Condominium Unit No. 302 with CCT No. 8876 and allowed it to be
used as a collateral to secure a loan of P2 Million and the Bank is
fully aware that said condominium unit is owned and occupied by the
plaintiff and thereafter foreclosed it without notice to the plaintiff.
Defendant bank is fully aware that plaintiff exercises rights of
possession and ownership on the said property since defendant
bank was duly informed by plaintiffs about the physical possession
[12]
thereof and the Deed of Exchange.
Singson prayed that judgment be rendered in his favor as
follows:
ON THE ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
1. A temporary restraining Order be issued ex
parte restraining/preventing defendant or any of its agents to
consolidate/repossess the Real Estate property identified as Condo
Unit No. 302 with CCT No. 8876 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City and after due hearing, the Temporary Restraining Order be
made permanent.
ON THE MAIN CAUSE OF ACTION
2. An order be issued declaring the foreclosure sale and the Sheriffs
sale of condominium unit No. 302 with CCT No. 8876 as null and
void.
3. An Order be issued declaring defendant bank liable for moral
damages in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00),
exemplary damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and
ordering the defendant bank to pay the attorneys fees in the amount
of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) and appearance
fee of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) per hearing.
4. Plus cost of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise
[13]
prayed for.
Singson signed his Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping in this
manner:
VERIFICATION AND AFFIDAVIT
OF
NON-FORUM SHOPPING
I, SISENANDO S. SINGSON, subscribing under oath do hereby
depose and say that:
1. I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case;
2. I caused the preparation of the foregoing Complaint For
Annulment of Sheriffs Foreclosure/Certificate of Sale and Damages
with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction/Temporary
Restraining Order;
3. Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94, I
hereby certify that plaintiff has not therefore commenced any other
action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, and to
the best of my knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or
agency, and if I should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom;
4. I have read and understood the contents thereof and the
allegations contained therein are true and correct of my own
personal knowledge.
(Sg
d.)
SISENANDO
SINGSON
 AFFIA
[14]
NT
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39794.
Meanwhile, RMC filed an Omnibus Motion in CA-G.R. CV No.
64281 praying for the dismissal of Singsons appeal in Civil Case No.
Q-98-35444 on the ground of forum shopping. They also prayed that
Singson and his counsel be cited for indirect contempt for their failure
to comply with the undertaking in the Verification and Affidavit of
Non-Forum Shopping embodied in his amended complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-00-39794, that is, to inform the trial court of the filing of
the complaint within fifteen (15) days thereof. RMC averred that as
gleaned from the averments of the amended complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-98-35444, and the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-00-39794, the two cases involved the same issues. RMC
averred that Singson had also submitted a false certificate of non-
forum shopping in Civil Case No. Q-00-39794, where he stated that
he had not commenced any action or proceeding involving the same
issue.
On July 31, 2001, the CA issued a Resolution denying the
Omnibus Motion of RMC on the ground that:
1. There is no identity of parties and cause of action
between Civil Cases Nos. Q-98-35444 and Q-00-
39794;
2. The subject matter in the former is CCT No. 3295,
whereas that of the latter is CCT No. 8876;
3. The reliefs sought in the two actions are vastly
[15]
different.
Upon the appellate courts denial of its motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution, RMC filed the present petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
contending that:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN DENYING
PETITIONERS OMNIBUS MOTION (ANNEX K HEREOF),
RESOLVED SAID OMNIBUS MOTION NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO FORUM
SHOPPING HEREIN BECAUSE THE ELEMENTS OF RES
JUDICATA ARE NOT PRESENT IN PATENT ARBITRARY
DISREGARD OF, AND DESPITE, THE FACT THAT PETITIONER
NEVER INVOKED SAID SPECIE OF FORUM SHOPPING
GROUNDED ON RES JUDICATA AND HAS INSTEAD
SPECIFICALLY INVOKED IN SAID OMNIBUS MOTION TWO (2)
OTHER SPECIES OR FORMS OF FORUM SHOPPING, NAMELY,
(a.) RESPONDENTS DELIBERATE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH HIS
UNDERTAKING TO REPORT THE PENDENCY OF ANOTHER
SIMILAR ACTION INVOLVING THE SAME ISSUES; AND (b.)
RESPONDENTS [WILLFUL] SUBMISSION OF FALSE
CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING AS PENALIZED
UNDER PARAGRAPH 2, SC ADM. CIRCULAR NO. 04-94.
II.
COROLLARY TO THE ABOVE, WHETHER OR NOT THE
ANTECEDENT ISSUES OF VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF
HEREIN DEED OF EXCHANGE (ANNEX D HEREOF) EXPRESSLY
RAISED BY RESPONDENT IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-98-35444 (CA-
G.R. CV NO. 64281) AND ALSO IMPLICITLY POSITED BY
RESPONDENT IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-00-39794 CAN BE
CONSIDERED AS SIMILAR ISSUES AS CONTEMPLATED IN
PARAGRAPH 1, SC ADM. CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 THEREBY
OBLIGATING RESPONDENT: (a.) TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH
HIS UNDERTAKING TO REPORT IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-98-35444
(CA-G.R. CV NO. 64281) THE PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. Q-
00-39794, AND VICE-VERSA AND (b.) TO DISCLOSE IN HIS
CERTIFICATIONS ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING IN BOTH THE
ORIGINAL AND AMENDED COMPLAINTS IN THE LATTER CASE
THE PENDENCY OF THE FORMER CASE SUCH THAT THE
FAILURE OF RESPONDENT AND ATTY. CAMACHO TO SO
REPORT AND DISCLOSE ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF FORUM
SHOPPING UNDER SC ADM. CIRCULAR NO. 04-94.
 III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
AND DEPARTED FROM APPLICABLE LAWS AND SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO
IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION BETWEEN CIVIL CASE NO.
Q-98-35444 AND CIVIL CASE NO. Q-00-39794 IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF, AND DESPITE, THE FACT THAT THERE IS
SUCH IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION BECAUSE BOTH
AFORESAID CASES, EVEN IF DIFFERENT IN FORMS OR
NATURE, INVOLVED THE SAME ANTECEDENT FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SAME EVIDENCE AND ACTIONABLE
DOCUMENT, NAMELY, THE DEED OF EXCHANGE DATED APRIL
18, 1997 (ANNEX D HEREOF) WHOSE VALIDITY AND
ENFORCEABILITY MUST PRIORLY BE RESOLVED AS THE
RESOLUTION THEREOF IS DETERMINATIVE OF ANY FURTHER
ADJUDICATIONS IN SAID TWO (2) CASES (MANGOMA VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 241 SCRA 25; VDA. DE CRUZO VS.
CARRIAGA, 174 SCRA 330; BANGKO SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 1140480 [SIC],
JUNE 29, 2001)
IV.
COROLLARY TO ALL THE FOREGOING, WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED (a.) IN NOT DISMISSING
CA-G.R. CV NO. 62481 GROUNDED ON THE DELIBERATE AND
WILFUL (SIC) COMMISSION BY RESPONDENT SINGSON AND
ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO OF THE AFORESAID TWO (2)
SPECIES OF FORUM SHOPPING; AND (b.) IN NOT HOLDING
THAT RESPONDENT SINGSON AND ATTY. MANUEL CAMACHO
ARE GUILTY OF MULTIPLE AND DELIBERATE FORUM
SHOPPING AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE CITED IN CONTEMPT
UNDER SUPREME COURT ADM. CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 AND
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE (BUAN VS. LOPEZ, 145 SCRA
[16]
34).
In his comment on the petition, the respondent asserts that the
petitioners procedural recourse to this Court under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court is flawed. He argues that the resolutions of
the CA subject of this petition for review are interlocutory; hence, not
appealable under Section 1, Rule 45. He also argues that the Court
may not even treat the present recourse as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 since there is nary an allegation or proof
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion.
In its reply, the petitioner adamantly insists that the questioned
resolutions of the CA are final in character and, therefore,
appealable. It argues that a violation SC Adm. Cir. No. 04-94 is
unlike those grounds under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court,
where when a motion to dismiss is denied, the proper procedure to
be followed by the dissatisfied movant is not to appeal from the order
of denial but to answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse,
reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.
We agree with respondent that the mode of appeal resorted to
by the petitioner is improper.
Indubitably, the Resolution of the CA dated July 31, 2001
denying the petitioners omnibus motion is interlocutory in nature. The
word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the
commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or
[17]
matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. The
Court distinguished a final order or resolution from an interlocutory
[18]
one in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals as follows:
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g.,
an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a
judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for
instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of
the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining
the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more
remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next
move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and
ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it
becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term,
final and executory.
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and
does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties contentions
and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court,
is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file
a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying
applications for postponement, or production or inspection of
documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is
appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to
forestall useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the
appealing party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated
by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single
appeal.
The reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or
judgment, and not from interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which must necessarily
suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case during
the pendency of the appeal. If such appeal were allowed the trial on
the merits of the case should necessarily be delayed for a
considerable length of time, and compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses; for one of the parties may interpose as many
appeals as incidental questions may be raised by him and
[19]
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only
final judgments, orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals or
Sandiganbayan may be assailed therein. The remedy is a mode of
[20]
appeal on questions of law only.
In the case at bar, the CA merely denied the petitioners
omnibus motion to dismiss based on forum shopping, on its finding
that there was no litis pendentia between the parties. The motion is
only an incident in CA-G.R. CV No. 64281, which is a continuation of
Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 for damages and reconveyance instituted
by the respondent against the petitioner. The appellate court had yet
to resolve the appeal on its merits. Being interlocutory, the resolution
[21]
is not appealable but may be assailed in this Court only under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court grounded on grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction committed by
the CA. However, the petitioner opted to file a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Even on the merits, the petition must be denied.
The petitioner avers that there are three (3) species of forum
shopping: (1) forum shopping grounded either on res judicata or litis
pendentia; (2) forum shopping for non-compliance to report the
pendency of another action or proceeding involving the same issues;
and (3) forum shopping based on the submission of a false
certification on non-forum shopping by not disclosing the pendency
of another action or proceedings involving the same issues as
provided in paragraph 2 of SC Adm. Cir. No. 04-94. To violate SC
Adm. Cir. No. 04-94, it maintains, similarity of issues between the
first and the second case is enough.
The petitioner faults the CA for denying its omnibus motion
based on its so-called first species of forum shopping. It argues that
what it invoked therein were the other two (2) species, not the first
one. It avers that respondent and his counsel violated SC Adm. Cir.
No. 04-94 because:
a.) Respondent Singson and Atty. Camacho did not report in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64281 (Civil Case No. Q-98-35444) the
pendency of Civil Case No. Q-00-39794 filed by
respondent himself on January 26, 2000 and which case
involves the same principal issues of validity and
enforceability of the same deed of exchange dated April
18, 1997.
b.) Vice-versa, respondent and Atty. Camacho did not report in
Civil Case No. Q-00-39794 the pendency of CA-G.R. CV
No. 64281 (Civil Case No. Q-98-35444);
 c.) Respondent Singson submitted a false certification on non-
forum shopping in the original complaint in Civil Case Q-
00-39794 by wilful (sic) non-disclosure of the pendency of
CA-G.R. CV No. 64281 (Civil Case No. Q-98-35444);
d.) Corollary to the above, respondent Singson and Atty.
Camacho submitted a false certification on non-forum
shopping in the amended complaint in Civil Case No. Q-
00-39794 by wilful (sic) non-disclosure of the pendency of
[22]
CA-G.R. CV No. 64281 (Civil Case No. Q-98-35444).
We are not swayed.
The rule on forum shopping was first included in Section 17 of
the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11,
1983, which imposed a sanction in this wise: A violation of the rule
shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the
summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking
of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned.
Thereafter, the Court restated the rule in Revised Circular No. 28-91
and Adm. Cir. No. 04-94. The rule is now embodied in Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion
in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one
[23]
or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
What is pivotal in determining whether forum shopping exists or
not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party
who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on
the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs, in the process creating possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by the different courts and/or administrative
[24]
agencies upon the same issues.
[25]
In Ayala Land, Inc. v. Valisno, the Court explained the
concept of forum shopping, to wit
Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another (Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA
536, 554 [1998]; Philippine Womans Christian Temperance Union,
Inc. v. Abiertas House of Friendship, Inc., 292 SCRA 785, 794
[1998]). Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
representing the same interests in both actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and
 3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in
the two cases, such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res adjudicata in
the other case. (Philippine Womans Christian
Temperance Union, Inc. v. Abiertas House of
Friendship, Inc., supra, at 791; citations omitted.)
As explained by this Court in First Philippine International Bank v.
Court of Appeals (252 SCRA 259 [1996]), forum-shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Thus,
there is forum shopping when, between an action pending before this
Court and another one, there exist: a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts, and c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action,
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration; said requisites also constitutive of the
requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens. Another case
elucidates the consequence of forum shopping: [W]here a litigant
sues the same party against whom another action or actions for the
alleged violation of the same right and the enforcement of the same
relief is/are still pending, the defense of litis pendentia in one case is
a bar to the others; and, a final judgment in one would constitute res
judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest. (Prubankers
Association v. Prudential Bank & Trust Company, 302 SCRA 74, 83-
84 [1999].)
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that, under
Section 5, Rule 7, of the Revised Rules of Court, a complaint may be
dismissed for failure of the plaintiff therein to inform the court of the
filing of the same or similar complaint within five (5) days from such
filing. The same or similar complaint referred to in the rule refers to a
complaint wherein the parties, causes of action, issues and reliefs
prayed for, are identical to those in the first complaint. The plaintiff
may also be declared in indirect contempt of court if he submits a
false certification.
But the respondent cannot be faulted for stating in his Affidavit
of Non-Forum Shopping in Civil Case No. Q-00-39794 that he had
not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in the CA or in any other tribunal; nor can he be charged with
executing a falsified certification in Civil Case No. Q-00-39794 for
stating that he had not commenced before any other tribunal any
initiatory pleading involving the same issues.
The petitioner was not mandated to inform the trial court in Civil
Case No. Q-00-39794 and Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 and of CA-
G.R. CV No. 64281. This is so because, as admitted by the
petitioner, there is no identity of the causes of action, the parties,
issues and reliefs prayed for in the two complaints. The subject
matter of the suit in Civil Case No. Q-00-39794 is Room 302, while
that in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 is Room 404. The principal issue
raised in Civil Case No. Q-00-39794 is whether the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage over Room 404 and the sale
thereof to Allied Banking Corporation are null and void, while the
principal issue in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 is whether or not the
petitioner as defendant therein is obliged to convey to the
respondent Room 404.
While it is true that in his Amended Complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-98-35444, the respondent sought to compel the petitioner to
execute a deed of sale over Room 404 free from any liens or
encumbrances arising from the real estate mortgage over the said
unit as security for a loan of P2,000,000.00 secured by the petitioner
from Allied Banking Corporation, it cannot thereby be concluded that
the issues raised in the said case are the same or similar to those in
Civil Case No. Q-00-39794.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143312. August 12, 2005]
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., ESSES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, and TRI-STAR FARMS,
INC., petitioners, vs. FILIPINO BUSINESS
CONSULTANTS, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review of the Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XI, Balayan, Batangas
[1]
(RTC Balayan) dated 26 May 2000. The order suspended the
enforcement of the writ of possession that the RTC Balayan had
previously issued in favor of petitioners Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr.
(Silverio, Jr.), Esses Development Corporation (Esses) and Tri-Star
Farms, Inc. (Tri-Star). Filipino Business Consultants, Inc. (FBCI),
now Filipino Vastland Company, Inc. sought to suspend the writ of
possession on the ground of a supervening event. FBCI claimed that
it had just acquired all the stocks of Esses and Tri-Star. As the new
owner of Esses and Tri-Star, FBCI asserted its right of possession to
the disputed property. Petitioners Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star
question the RTC Balayans suspension of the writ of possession and
its jurisdiction to hold hearings on the supervening event.
The Antecedent Facts
The parties are wrangling over possession of a 62 hectare-land
in Calatagan, Batangas (Calatagan Property). Silverio, Jr. is the
President of Esses and Tri-Star. Esses and Tri-Star were in
possession of the Calatagan Property, covered by TCT No. T-55200
and registered in the names of Esses and Tri-Star.
On 22 September 1995, Esses and Tri-Star executed a Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor of FBCI. Esses and Tri-
Star failed to redeem the Calatagan Property.
On 27 May 1997, FBCI filed a Petition for Consolidation of Title
of the Calatagan Property with the RTC Balayan.
[2]
FBCI obtained a judgment by default. Subsequently, TCT No. T-
55200 in the names of Esses and Tri-Star was cancelled and TCT
No. T-77656 was issued in FBCIs name. On 20 April 1998, the RTC
Balayan issued a writ of possession in FBCIs favor. FBCI then
entered the Calatagan Property.
When Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star learned of the judgment
by default and writ of possession, they filed a petition for relief from
judgment and the recall of the writ of possession. Silverio, Jr., Esses
and Tri-Star alleged that the judgment by default is void because the
RTC Balayan did not acquire jurisdiction over them. FBCI allegedly
forged the service of summons on them.
On 28 December 1998, the RTC Balayan nullified and set aside
the judgment by default and the writ of possession. The RTC
Balayan found that the summons and the complaint were not served
on Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star. The RTC Balayan directed the
service of summons anew on Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star.
The RTC Balayan denied FBCIs motion for reconsideration of
the order. FBCI then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals questioning the RTC Balayans 28 December 1998
[3]
Order. On 28 April 2000, the Court of Appeals denied FBCIs
petition. The Court of Appeals also denied FBCIs motion for
reconsideration. On 13 August 2001, the Supreme Court denied
FBCIs petition.
On 14 April 1999, the RTC Balayan modified its 28 December
1998 Order by upholding FBCIs possession of the Calatagan
Property. The RTC Balayan ruled that FBCI could not be deprived of
possession of the Calatagan Property because FBCI made
substantial improvements on it. Possession could revert to Silverio,
Jr., Esses and Tri-Star only if they reimburse FBCI. The RTC
Balayan gave Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star 15 days to file their
responsive pleadings.
Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star moved for the partial
reconsideration of the 14 April 1999 Order. Silverio, Jr., Esses and
Tri-Star argued that since the judgment by default was nullified, they
should be restored to their possession of the Calatagan Property.
FBCI did not file any opposition to the motion.
On 9 November 1999, the RTC Balayan reversed its 14 April
1999 Order by holding that Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star had no
duty to reimburse FBCI. The RTC Balayan pointed out that FBCI
offered no evidence to substantiate its claim for expenses. The 9
November 1999 Order also restored possession of the Calatagan
Property to Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star pursuant to Rule 39,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This provision
provides for restitution in case of reversal of an executed judgment.
On 7 January 2000, the RTC Balayan denied FBCIs motion for
reconsideration.
On 8 May 2000, the RTC Balayan issued the writ of possession
to Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star.
On 12 May 2000, FBCI filed with the RTC Balayan a
Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of Possession on the ground
that the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56924
was not yet final and FBCIs motion for reconsideration was still
pending. The RTC Balayan set the hearing on 26 May 2000.
On 23 May 2000, FBCI filed with the RTC Balayan an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion to Suspend Enforcement of Writ of Possession.
FBCI pointed out that it is now the new owner of Esses and Tri-Star
having purchased the substantial and controlling shares of
[4]
stocks of the two corporations.
On the 26 May 2000 hearing, FBCI reiterated its claim of a
supervening event, its ownership of Esses and Tri-Star. FBCI
informed the RTC Balayan that a new board of directors for Esses
and Tri-Star had been convened following the resignation of the
members of the board of directors. The previous actions of the
former board of directors have been abandoned and the services of
Atty. Vicente B. Chuidian, the counsel of petitioners Silverio, Jr.,
Esses and Tri-Star, have been terminated.
On the same day, the RTC Balayan issued the order
suspending the writ of possession it had earlier issued to Silverio, Jr.,
Esses and Tri-Star. The RTC Balayan reasoned that it would violate
the law on forum shopping if it executed the writ while FBCIs motion
for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision and urgent
motion to suspend the issuance of the writ of possession remained
pending with the Court of Appeals. The RTC Balayan noted that
because of FBCIs strong resistance, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star
have still to take possession of the Calatagan Property. More than
ten days had already passed from the time that the RTC Balayan
had issued the writ of possession. FBCI had barricaded the
Calatagan Property, threatening bloodshed if possession will be
taken away from it. The RTC Balayan believed that if it would not
restrain Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star from taking possession of
the Calatagan Property, a violent confrontation between the parties
might erupt as reported in the Tempo newspaper in its 26 May 2000
issue. Without issuing a restraining order, the RTC Balayan
suspended the writ by requesting the counsel of Silverio, Jr., Esses
and Tri-Star to allow the court to study the voluminous records of the
case, which are to be presented at the hearing on 16 June 2000. The
hearing would determine the existence of a supervening event.
On 15 June 2000, the RTC Balayan issued an Order cancelling
the 16 June 2000 hearing so that the Court of Appeals could resolve
the issue regarding the existence of a supervening event. However,
the RTC Balayan declared that the suspension of the writ of
possession would be lifted on 17 June 2000.
On 8 August 2000, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star filed a
complaint for annulment of contracts with damages with the Regional
[5]
Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 275 (RTC Las Pias).
Issues
 Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star argue that:
I
An ex parte motion cannot legally constitute an initiatory basis for the
RTC Balayan to conduct additional hearings in order to validate
certain new allegations. Neither can said ex parte motion be the
basis for the suspension of a writ of possession being implemented.
II
When the RTC Balayan suspended the writ of possession, it was
barred from hearing intra-corporate disputes. And though Congress
has now amended our law on the matter, the RTC still cannot
proceed because of due process and res judicata reasons.
III
A final and executory judgment cannot be enjoined except by an
appropriate petition for relief, a direct attack in another action or a
collateral act in another action.
IV
Respondent FBCI is asking for a suspension of the writ of
possession while at the same time threatening violence if the writ of
possession were to be implemented. The RTC Balayan had no lawful
basis to suspend the writ under these admitted circumstances.
V
Respondent has not directly answered petitioners legal theory. The
petition is founded on admitted facts upon which relief is sought
under Rule 45. Respondent has altered these facts presenting its so
called counterstatements of facts and issues which involve questions
of fact that are still litis pendentia at the RTC Balayan. And which
even involve an attempt to vary res judicata.
VI
Contrary to respondents claims, that the RTC order of 15 June 2000
has rendered this case moot and academic quite on the contrary said
order calls upon the Supreme Court to decide whether or not, the
RTC Balayan may continue to conduct its hearings on suspending
the writ of possession.
VII
Respondents theory that an order suspending a writ of possession is
interlocutory in nature, and therefore inappealable, is not supported
by jurisprudence.
VIII
Respondents views on when suspending a writ of execution is
appropriate would make the exception as rule. And respondents
reliance on Flores vs. CA, et al. is totally misplaced. In
the Flores case, the party being dispossessed was a judgment
creditor, who was admitted by the adverse party to be the owner.
IX
The question of jus possessionis on the Calatagan Property is
already res judicata while the question of jus possidendi is still
under litis pendentia. For that reason, respondent has lost all his
legal options in retaining the property procured under a faked service
of summons.
X
Respondents arguments in his 11-06-01 Memo on (a) forum
shopping, (b) petitioners lack of capacity to sue, (c) service of
summons already served (d) no intra-corporate dispute and (e) the
relief herein preempted by events are ratiocinations of miniscule
weight, meriting only the slightest comment.
[6]
 FBCI raises the following issues:
1. Whether the present case has been rendered moot and
academic by the Order of the RTC Balayan dated 15 June
2000 and the filing of an action with the Regional Trial Court
of Las Pias City;
2. Whether the present appeal should be dismissed on the
ground of forum shopping;
3. Whether the RTC Balayan had the authority to suspend
enforcement of the writ of possession and to conduct
hearings on a new set of facts;
4. Whether the present case involves an intra-corporate
controversy;
5. Whether appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper
[7]
remedy under the given facts of the case.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
Procedural Issues
Before resolving the threshold issue, which is the existence of a
supervening event, we first address the following procedural issues:
(1) whether appeal is the proper remedy against an order
suspending the execution of a writ of possession; (2) whether the
issue of possession was mooted by the 15 June 2000 Order of the
RTC Balayan; and (3) whether the filing of a civil case with the RTC
Las Pias constitutes forum shopping.
First, interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental
matters that do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to
[8]
the proceedings. The proper remedy to question an improvident
interlocutory order is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not Rule
[9]
45. A petition for review under Rule 45 is the proper mode of
[10]
redress to question final judgments.
An order staying the execution of the writ of possession is an
[11]
interlocutory order. Clearly, this order cannot be appealed. A
petition for certiorari was therefore the correct remedy. Moreover,
Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star pointed out that the RTC Balayan
acted on an ex-parte motion to suspend the writ of possession, which
is a litigious matter, without complying with the rules on notice and
hearing. Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star also assail the RTC
Balayans impending move to accept FBCIs evidence on its
subsequent ownership of Esses and Tri-Star. In effect, Silverio, Jr.,
Esses and Tri-Star accuse the RTC Balayan of acting without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, which is
within the ambit of certiorari.
However, in the exercise of our judicial discretion, we will treat
[12]
the appeal as a petition under Rule 65. Technical rules must be
suspended whenever the purposes of justice warrant it, such as in
this case where substantial and important issues await resolution.
Second, the RTC Balayans 15 June 2000 Order lifting the
suspension of the writ of possession was issued to correct its action
on FBCIs ex-parte motion, which did not have the required notice
and hearing. This issue has thus become a fait accompli. However,
while the 15 June 2000 Order is supposed to have mooted the
suspension of the execution of the writ of possession by lifting the
suspension on 17 June 2000, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star claim
that the writ has not been executed in their favor. Thus, the issues in
this petition are far from being moot. Also, the existence of a
supervening event is another issue that must be resolved since the
RTC Balayan had instead submitted to the higher courts the
resolution of this issue.
Third, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star are not guilty of forum
shopping for filing another action against FBCI with the RTC Las
Pias during the pendency of this case with the RTC Balayan. Forum
shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
[13]
to obtain a favorable judgment.
The parties and cause of action in the present case before the
RTC Balayan and in the case before the RTC Las Pias are different.
The present case was filed by FBCI against Silverio, Jr., Esses and
Tri-Star for the consolidation of title over the Calatagan Property. On
the other hand, the case before the RTC Las Pias was filed by
Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star against FBCI and other defendants
for the annulment of contract with damages, tort and culpa
aquiliana (civil fraud).
In its complaint before the RTC Las Pias, Silverio, Jr., Esses
and Tri-Star informed the court that there is a pending case with the
[14]
RTC Balayan over the Calatagan Property. Silverio, Jr., Esses and
Tri-Star made it clear in the complaint that the case before the RTC
Las Pias will focus on the Makati Tuscany property and any
reference to the Calatagan Property is meant to serve only as proof
or evidence of the plan, system, scheme, habit, etc., lurking behind
defendants interlocking acts constituting interlocking tort and
[15]
interlocking fraud. Clearly, FBCIs claim of forum shopping against
Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star has no basis.
No Supervening Event in this Case
FBCI took possession of the Calatagan Property after the RTC
Balayan rendered a judgment by default in FBCIs favor. The
judgment by default was nullified after the RTC Balayan found out
that the service of summons on Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star was
procured fraudulently. The RTC Balayan thus recalled the writ of
possession it had issued to FBCI. Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star
were served anew with summons. The RTC Balayan restored
possession of the Calatagan Property to Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-
Star as restitution resulting from the annulment of the judgment by
default. The order restoring possession of the Calatagan Property to
Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star has attained finality. This case then
proceeded to pre-trial.
FBCI has resisted the enforcement of the writ of possession by
barricading the Calatagan Property and threatening violence if its
possession of the property is taken away from it. To avoid
bloodshed, as FBCI also claimed that Silverio, Jr. had armed civilians
[16]
threatening to shoot FBCIs representatives, the RTC Balayan
momentarily suspended the execution of the writ. The RTC Balayan
also had to rule on FBCIs claim of a supervening event that would
[17]
allegedly make the execution of the writ absurd, as FBCI alleges it
now owns the controlling interest in Esses and Tri-Star. The RTC
Balayan lifted the suspension of the writ but it cancelled the hearings
on the supervening event to give way to the Court of Appeals action
on this issue. The RTC Balayan decided to await the appellate courts
resolution because it did not want to violate the rule against forum
shopping.
Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star argue that the RTC Balayan has
no power to conduct hearings on the supervening event because res
judicata has set in on the issue. They also contend that the
supervening event is an intra-corporate controversy that is within the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission, not the trial
court. Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star point out that despite the lifting
of the suspension RTC Balayan has still to execute the writ of
possession in their favor. On the other hand, FBCI maintains that its
acquisition of Esses and Tri-Star is a supervening event, which the
RTC Balayan could hear and is sufficient ground to stay the
execution of the writ of possession.
We rule in favor of Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star.
The court may stay immediate execution of a judgment when
supervening events, occurring subsequent to the judgment, bring
[18]
about a material change in the situation of the parties. To justify
the stay of immediate execution, the supervening events must have
[19]
a direct effect on the matter already litigated and settled. Or, the
supervening events must create a substantial change in the rights or
relations of the parties which would render execution of a final
judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable making it imperative to
stay immediate execution in the interest of justice.
[20]
In this case, there is no judgment on the merits, only a judgment
on a technicality. Even then, the judgment of default rendered in
FBCIs favor was voided because the RTC Balayan did not acquire
jurisdiction over Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star due to a fraudulent
service of summons. The case for consolidation of title, from which
this petition stemmed, is in fact still being litigated before the RTC
Balayan.
The issuance of the writ of possession in favor of Silverio, Jr.,
[21]
Esses and Tri-Star is also not a judgment on the merits. A writ of
possession is an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a
[22]
person in possession of real or personal property. The issuance of
the writ of possession to Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star is but an
order of restitution a consequence of the nullification of the judgment
by default. The order of restitution placed the parties in the situation
prior to the RTC Balayans rendition of the void judgment by default.
Title to the Calatagan Property is still in the names of Esses and Tri-
Star. Possession of the Calatagan Property must revert to Esses and
Tri-Star as legal owners of the property.
However, with the reinstitution of the case for consolidation of
title with the RTC Balayan, possession of the Calatagan Property is
now subject to the outcome of the case. Nonetheless, while this case
is still under litigation it is only in the pre-trial stage Esses and Tri-
Star in whose names the Calatagan Property is titled and in whose
favor the order of restitution was issued, are the ones entitled to
possession of the property.
We do not agree with Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Stars assertion
that the RTC Balayan has no power to conduct a hearing on the
existence of a supervening event because of res judicata. Res
judicata does not set in where the court is without jurisdiction over
[23]
the subject or person, and therefore, the judgment is a nullity such
as the judgment by default in this case. The order that voided the
judgment by default and the order of restitution merely recognized
the nullity of the judgment by default. The orders did not adjudicate
on the merits of the case. Since res judicata had not set in, the case
was tried anew upon the proper service of summons on Silverio, Jr.,
Esses and Tri-Star.
Moreover, it is the court issuing the writ of possession that has
[24]
control and supervision over its processes. The RTC Balayan can
therefore hear the evidence on the existence of a supervening event,
provided the subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the court, as
this could affect the execution of the writ of possession.
We are, therefore, dismayed with the RTC Balayans referral of
the existence of the supervening event to the higher courts. Courts
must not shirk from their duty to rule on an issue. The duty of the
appellate or higher courts is to review the findings and rulings of the
lower courts, not to issue advisories. Courts must execute its
processes and should not succumb to threats by any of the parties to
resort to violence in case of such enforcement. Had the RTC
Balayan immediately passed upon FBCIs allegation of a supervening
event, it would have been apparent that this claim is without merit.
The RTC Balayan should have then enforced posthaste the writ of
possession in Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Stars favor.
FBCIs acquisition of the substantial and controlling shares of
[25]
stocks of Esses and Tri-Star does not create a substantial change
in the rights or relations of the parties that would entitle FBCI to
possession of the Calatagan Property, a corporate property of Esses
and Tri-Star. Esses and Tri-Star, just like FBCI, are corporations. A
corporation has a personality distinct from that of its stockholders. As
early as the case of Stockholders of F. Guanzon and Sons, Inc. v.
[26]
Register of Deeds of Manila, the Court explained the principle of
separate juridical personality in this wise:
A corporation is a juridical person distinct from the members
composing it. Properties registered in the name of the corporation
are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its
members. While shares of stock constitute personal property, they
do not represent property of the corporation. The corporation has
property of its own which consists chiefly of real estate (Nelson v.
Owen, 113 Ala., 372, 21 So. 75; Morrow v. Gould, 145 Iowa 1, 123
N.W. 743). A share of stock only typifies an aliquot part of the
corporation's property, or the right to share in its proceeds to that
extent when distributed according to law and equity (Hall & Faley v.
Alabama Terminal, 173 Ala 398, 56 So., 235), but its holder is not the
owner of any part of the capital of the corporation (Bradley v. Bauder,
36 Ohio St., 28). Nor is he entitled to the possession of any definite
portion of its property or assets (Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U.S., 521;
Jones v. Davis, 35 Ohio St., 474). The stockholder is not a co-owner
or tenant in common of the corporate property (Harton v. Hohnston,
166 Ala., 317, 51 So., 992).
 Thus, FBCIs alleged controlling shareholdings in Esses and Tri-
Star merely represent a proportionate or aliquot interest in the
properties of the two corporations. Such controlling shareholdings do
not vest FBCI with any legal right or title to any of Esses and Tri-
Stars corporate properties. As a stockholder, FBCI has an interest in
Esses and Tri-Stars corporate properties that is only equitable or
beneficial in nature.Even assuming that FBCI is the controlling
shareholder of Esses and Tri-Star, it does not legally make it the
owner of the Calatagan Property, which is legally owned by Esses
and Tri-Star as distinct juridical persons. As such, FBCI is not entitled
to the possession of any definite portion of the Calatagan Property or
any of Esses and Tri-Stars properties or assets. FBCI is not a co-
owner or tenant in common of the Calatagan Property or any of
Esses and Tri-Stars corporate properties.
We see no reason why the execution of the writ of possession
has been long delayed. Possession of the Calatagan Property must
be restored to Esses and Tri-Star through their representative,
Silverio, Jr. There is no proof on record that Silverio, Jr. has ceased
to be the representative of Esses and Tri-Star in this case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch XI, Balayan, Batangas is ordered to immediately
execute the writ of possession in Civil Case No. 3356 in favor of
Esses Development Corporation and Tri-Star Farms, Inc. through
their representative, Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81006 May 12, 1989
VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
An important constitutional question has been injected in this case
which started out as an ordinary complaint for a sum of money. The
question squarely presented to the Court is the validity of the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129
in the light of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the
private respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of
P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private
respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to
answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises
except when caused by reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985,
the private respondent vacated the property. He thereafter requested
the refund of his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing
the rental for the additional ten days of his occupancy after the
expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said
the lessee still owed him for other charges, including the electricity
and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the leased
1
premises to restore them to their original condition.
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati. After the submission of position papers by the parties, a
summary judgment was rendered on October 11, 1985, sustaining
the complainant and holding that the repainting was not chargeable
to him. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P7,750.00, representing the balance of the deposit after deducting
the water and electricity charges. The plaintiff was also awarded the
2
sum of P1,250.00 as attorney's fees, plus the Costs.
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and
was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987.
This was done in a memorandum decision reading in full as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the
records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and
finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.
3
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for
review was denied on September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion
4
for reconsideration, on December 1, 1987. He is now before us to
fault the respondent court, principally for sustaining the
memorandum decision of the regional trial court. His contention is
that it violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
This provision reads as follows:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
legal basis therefor.
Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the
present charter, Section 14 has been in force since the Constitution
of 1935. The provision was recast in affirmative terms in the 1973
Constitution but has been virtually restored to its original form in the
Constitution of 1987, to apply to all courts, including the municipal
courts. The purpose has always been the same, viz., to inform the
person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was
reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and
examination of the applicable laws.
The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only to
assure them that the court rendering the decision actually studied the
case before pronouncing its judgment. But there are more substantial
reasons. For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity
to analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he
may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For another,
the decision, if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the
losing party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good
grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal. A
third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and
the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the
Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that can
serve as useful references and even as precedents in the resolution
of future controversies. As the Court said in Rosales v. Court of First
5
Instance.
Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they are on all fours
or at least substantially Identical with previous
litigations. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Earlier decisions are
guideposts that can lead us in the right direction as we tread the
highways and byways of the law in the search for truth and justice.
These pronouncements represent the wisdom of the past. They are
the voice of vanished judges talking to the future. Except where there
is a need to reverse them because of an emergent viewpoint or an
altered situation, they urge us strongly that, indeed, the trodden path
is best.
According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision rendered by
the regional trial court should be revoked for non-compliance with the
above-quoted constitutional mandate. He asks that the case be
remanded to the regional trial court for a full blown hearing on the
merits, to be followed by a decision stating therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For his part, the
private respondent demurs. He justifies the memorandum decision
as authorized by B.P. Blg. 129 and invokes the ruling of this Court in
6
Romero v. Court of Appeals, Which sustained the said law.
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:
Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. — Every decision or
final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and
distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on
which it is based which may be contained in the decision or final
resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the
decision, order or resolution appealed from.
The above section was applied in the Romero case, together with a
similar rule embodied in Section 18 of P.D. No. 946, providing that:
All cases of the Court of Agrarian Relations now pending before the
Court of Appeals shall remain in the Division to which they have
been assigned, and shall be decided within sixty (60) days from the
effectivity of this Decree; Provided, however, That if the decision or
order be an affirmance in toto of the dispositive conclusion of the
judgment appealed from, then the Court of Appeals may, instead of
rendering an extended opinion, indicate clearly the trial court's
findings of fact and pronouncements of law which have been
adopted as basis for the affirmance.
In the said case, Justice Jose Y. Feria, speaking for a unanimous
Court, declared:
As previously stated, the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations
consisted of thirteen pages, single space. The above-quoted
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals consists of four pages,
three of which contains verbatim the dispositive portion of the
decision appealed from. The remaining page is devoted to an
explanation of why "for judicial convenience and expediency,
therefore, We hereby adopt, by way of reference, the findings of facts
and conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision, as integral
part of this Our decision." The said decision may be considered as
substantial compliance with the above-quoted provisions in Section
18 of P.D. No. 946 and Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129.
Nevertheless, he was quick to add a tenable misgiving and to
express the following reservation:
The authority given the appellate court to adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law from those set forth in the
appealed decisions should be exercised with caution and prudence,
because the tendency would be to follow the line of least resistance
by just adopting the findings and conclusions of the lower court
without thoroughly studying the appealed case.
This caveat was necessary because, as he correctly observed:
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as important as the
intrinsic validity of a decision is the perception by the parties-litigants
that they have been accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair
and responsible magistrate before judgment is rendered. It is this
perception, coupled with a clear conscience, which enables the
members of the judiciary to discharge the awesome responsibility of
sitting in judgment on their fellowmen.
There is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the
memorandum decision is to expedite the termination of litigations for
the benefit of the parties as well as the courts themselves.
Concerned with the mounting problem of delay in the administration
of justice, the Constitution now contains a number of provisions
aimed at correcting this serious difficulty that has caused much
disaffection among the people. Thus, Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
reiterates the original provision in the 1973 Constitution guaranteeing
to all persons "the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies." Section 14(2) of
the same Article III retains the rule that the accused shall be entitled
to a trial that shall not only be public and impartial but also speedy. In
Article VIII, Section 5(3), the Supreme Court is expressly permitted to
temporarily assign a judge from one station to another when the
public interest so requires, as when there is a necessity for less
occupied judge to help a busier colleague dispose of his cases. In
paragraph 5 of the same section, it is stressed that the rules of court
to be promulgated by the Supreme Court "shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." In
Section 15, of the same article, maximum periods are prescribed for
the decision or resolution of cases, to wit, twenty-four months in the
case of Supreme Court and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court,
twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all
other lower courts.
The courts of justice are really hard put at coping with the
tremendous number of cases in their dockets which, to make matters
worse, continues to grow by the day despite the efforts being taken
to reduce it. In the Supreme Court alone, an average of 400 cases is
received every month as against the average of 300 cases disposed
of during the same month, leaving a difference of 100 cases monthly
that is added to some 5,000 still unresolved cases that have
accumulated during the last two decades or so. At this rate, the
backlog will increase by 1,200 cases every year on top of the earlier
balance, much of which, despite its age, is still viable and have still to
be resolved. Considering that the Court spends four days of the
week for studying and deliberating on these cases in its en banc and
division sessions, one can appreciate the limited time allowed its
members for the actual writing of its decisions. (This particular
decision, while extended, happens fortunately to be less complicated
than many of the other cases submitted to it, which require more time
to write, not to mention the antecedent research that may have to be
made.)
Viewed in the light of these practical considerations, the
memorandum decision can be welcomed indeed as an acceptable
method of dealing expeditiously with the case load of the courts of
justice, But expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot
excuse non-compliance with the Constitution; or to put it more
familiarly, the end does not justify the means. It is plain that if Section
40 of B.P. Blg. 129 is unconstitutional, it must be struck down.
In the case at bar, we find that a judgment was made by the
metropolitan trial court in compliance with the rule on summary
procedure. The decision consisted of three typewritten pages, single
space, and stated clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it was based. It was a concise and well-written decision, and a
correct one to boot, for which Judge Paciano B. Balita is to be
commended.
The problem, though, as the petitioner sees it, is that in affirming this
judgment, the regional trial court of Makati rendered a mere
memorandum decision that simply adopted by reference the findings
of fact and law made by Judge Balita and then concluded, without
saying more, that "there was no cogent reason to disturb the same."
It is claimed that as Judge de la Rama did not make his own
statement of the facts and the law as required by the Constitution, his
memorandum decision was a total nullity. Worse, when the appeal
was taken to the respondent court, what it reviewed was not the
memorandum decision of the regional trial court but the decision
rendered by the metropolitan trial court which, legally speaking, was
not before the appellate court.
It is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals did not review
the memorandum decision of the regional trial court which was the
subject of the petition for review. A reading of its own decision will
show that it dealt extensively with the memorandum decision and
discussed it at some length in the light of the observations — and
reservations — of this Court in the Romero case. Moreover, in
reviewing the decision of the metropolitan trial court, the Court of
Appeals was actually reviewing the decision of the regional trial
court, which had incorporated by reference the earlier decision
rendered by Judge Balita.
The question, of course, is whether such incorporation by reference
was a valid act that effectively elevated the decision of the
metropolitan trial court for examination by the Court of Appeals.
To be fair, let it be said that when Judge dela Rama availed himself
of the convenience offered by Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, he was
only acting in accordance with the ruling announced
in Romero permitting the use of the memorandum decision. It must
also be observed that even if the respondent court appeared to be
partial to the reservation rather than the rule in the said case, it
nevertheless had the duty — which it discharged — to abide by the
doctrine announced therein by the highest tribunal of the land. The
respondent court could not have acted otherwise.
This Court is not hampered by such inhibitions. As we may re-
examine our own rulings and modify or reverse them whenever
warranted, we take a second look at the memorandum decision and
the Romero case and test them on the touchstone of the
Constitution.
The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply
suggests that the court may adopt by reference the findings of fact
and the conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or resolution
on appeal before it. No particular form is prescribed; the conditions
for its use are not indicated. In fact, B.P. Blg. 129 does not even
employ the term "memorandum decision" in Section 40 or elsewhere
in the rest of the statute. This phrase appears to have been
introduced in this jurisdiction not by that law but by Section 24 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines, reading as follows:
Sec. 24. Memorandum decisions. — -The judgment or final
resolution of a court in appealed cases may adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision or
final order appealed from.
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually
reproduces the findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court
below, it is not a memorandum decision as envisioned in the above
provision. The distinctive features of the memorandum decision are,
first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it incorporates
by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained
in the decision, order or ruling under review. Most likely, the purpose
is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the
approval of the findings of fact by the lower court may lead to a
different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any rate, the
reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to
avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower
court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. The
Idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the
findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being
approved or adopted anyway.
Parenthetically, the memorandum decision is also allowed in the
United States, but its form (at least) differs from the one under
consideration in this case. Such a decision is rendered in that
country upon a previous' determination by the judge that there is no
need for a published opinion and that it will have no precedential
effect. The judgment is usually limited to the dispositive portion but a
memorandum is attached containing a brief statement of the facts
and the law involved, mainly for the information of the parties to the
case.
When a law is questioned before the Court, we employ the
presumption in favor of its constitutionality. As we said in Peralta v.
Commission of Elections, "to justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
7
doubtful and argumentative implication." Courts will bend over
backward to sustain that presumption. In case of doubt, it is the duty
of the judiciary to exert every effort to prevent the invalidation of the
law and the nullification of the will of the legislature that enacted it
and the executive that approved it. This norm is based on a
becoming respect that the judiciary is expected to accord the political
departments of the government which, it must be assumed in
fairness, thoroughly studied the measure under challenge and
assured themselves of its constitutionality before agreeing to enact it.
The Court has deliberated extensively on the challenge posed
against the memorandum decision as now authorized by law. Taking
into account the salutary purpose for which it is allowed, and bearing
in mind the above-discussed restraint we must observe when a law
is challenged before us, we have come to the conclusion that Section
40 of B.P. Blg. 129, as we shall interpret it here, is not
unconstitutional.
What is questioned about the law is the permission it gives for the
appellate court to merely adopt by reference in its own decision the
judgment of the lower court on appeal. It is easy to understand that
this device may feed the suspicion feared by Justice Feria that the
court has not given the appeal the attention it deserved and thus
deprived the parties of due process. True or not, this impression is
likely to undermine popular faith in the judiciary as an impartial forum
which hears before it decides and bases its decision on the
established facts and the applicable law.
No less objectionable is the inconvenience involved in having to
search for the decision referred to, which, having been incorporated
by reference only, does not have to be attached to the memorandum
decision. The Court had occasion earlier to complain about this
8
difficulty in the case of Gindoy v. Tapucar, where we said:
. . . True it is that the Court of First Instance may adopt in toto either
expressly or impliedly the findings and conclusions of the inferior
court, and as a rule, such adoption would amount to a substantial
compliance with the constitutional mandate discussed herein, but
where, as in this case, the specific arguments presented against the
decision of the inferior court are of such nature that a blanket
affirmance of said decision does not in fact adequately dispose of the
strictures against it, it is but proper, if only to facilitate the action to be
taken by the appellate court on the petition for review, that the
concrete bases of the impugned decision should appear on its face,
instead of the appellate court having to dig into the records to find
out how the inferior court resolved the issues of the case.
As to this problem, the Solicitor General correctly points out that it
does not exist in the case at bar because the decision of the Court of
Appeals extensively quoted from the decision of the metropolitan trial
court. Although only incorporated by reference in the memorandum
decision of the regional trial court, Judge Balita's decision was
nevertheless available to the Court of Appeals. It is this
circumstance, or even happenstance, if you will, that has validated
the memorandum decision challenged in this case and spared it from
constitutional infirmity.
That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the
following requirement, as a condition for the proper application of
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to be valid,
cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of
the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the
challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the
person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by
reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts
and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a
statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129
should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of
the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable
part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no
study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its
decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the
facts and the law on which it was based. The proximity at least of the
annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has
been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision
being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section
14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum
decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse
for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for its validity that this
kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are
in the main accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the
judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will
require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The
memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only,
such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously
groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.
Despite the convenience afforded by the memorandum decision, it is
still desirable that the appellate judge exert some effort in restating in
his own words the findings of fact of the lower court and presenting
his own interpretation of the law instead of merely parroting the
language of the court a quo as if he cannot do any better. There
must be less intellectual indolence and more pride of authorship in
the writing of a decision, especially if it comes from an appellate
court.
It ill becomes an appellate judge to write his rulings with a pair of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
scissors and a pot of paste as if he were a mere researcher. He is an petitioner. This decision is immediately executory. It is so ordered.
innovator, not an echo. The case usually becomes progressively
simpler as it passes through the various levels of appeal and many
issues become unimportant or moot and drop along the way. The
appellate judge should prune the cluttered record to make the issues
clearer. He cannot usually do this by simply mimicking the lower
court. He must use his own perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo
and his own discernment in discovering the law. No less importantly,
he must use his own language in laying down his judgment. And in
doing so, he should also guard against torpidity lest his
pronouncements excite no more fascination than a technical tract on
the values of horse manure as a fertilizer. A little style will help liven
the opinion trapped in the tortuous lexicon of the law with all its
whereases and wherefores. A judicial decision does not have to be a
bore.

The interpretation we make today will not apply retroactively to the

memorandum decision rendered by the regional trial court in the
case at bar, or to the decision of the respondent court such decision
on the strength of Romero v. Court of Appeals. As earlier observed,
there was substancial compliance with Section 40 because of the
direct availability and actual review of the decision of Judge Balita
incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of Judge de
la Rama. The memorandum decision as then understood under the
Romero decision was a valid act at the time it was rendered by
Judge de la Rama and produced binding legal effect. We also affirm
the finding of the respondent court that the summary judgment
without a formal trial was in accord with the Rule on Summary
Procedure and that the award of attorney's fees is not improper.

Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the

requirements herein set forth both as to the form prescribed and the
occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon
the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution
and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113006. November 23, 2000]
ONG CHIU KWAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
What is before the Court for consideration is the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of accused Ong Chiu Kwan,
[1]
for unjust vexation.
On January 31, 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M.
Bayona of Bacolod filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bacolod City
an information charging petitioner with unjust vexation for cutting the
electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of Crazy Feet, a
[2]
business establishment owned and operated by Mildred Ong.
On April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the morning, Ong Chiu
Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to relocate the telephone, electric and
water lines of Crazy Feet, because said lines posed as a
[3]
disturbance. However, Ong Chiu Kwan failed to present a permit
from appropriate authorities allowing him to cut the electric wires,
[4]
water pipe and telephone lines of the business establishment.
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court
[5]
found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation, and sentenced him
[6]
to imprisonment for twenty days. The court also ordered him to pay
moral damages, finding that the wrongful act of abruptly cutting off
the electric, water pipe and telephone lines of Crazy Feet caused the
interruption of its business operations during peak hours, to the
detriment of its owner, Mildred Ong. The trial court also awarded
exemplary damages to complainant as a deterrent to the accused
[7]
not to follow similar act in the future and to pay attorneys fees. The
trial court disposed of the case as follows:
IN VIEW THEREOF, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of unjust vexation provided under
Article 287 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to
suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) days and to pay
private complainant the following:
P10,000.00 - moral damages
P 5,000.00 - exemplary damages
P 5,000.00 - attorneys fees and to pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
Bacolod City, Philippines, September 1, 1992.
(SGD.)RAFAEL O. PENUELA
[8]
Judge
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, the latter
court in a decision dated December 8, 1992, simplistically adopted
the decision of the lower court in toto, without stating the reasons for
[9]
doing so.
On April 22, 1993, by petition for review, Ong Chiu Kwan
[10]
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On August 16, 1993,
the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the
[11]
appeal, agreeing with the lower courts finding that petitioner was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of unjust vexation.
[12]
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court notes that in the decision of the Regional Trial Court
which the Court of Appeals affirmed peremptorily without noticing its
nullity, the Regional Trial Court merely quoted the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court in full and added two paragraphs, thus:
This Court, in accordance with the rules, required the parties to
submit their corresponding memorandum or brief. The prosecution
filed its memorandum, and also with the defense.
After a careful perusal of the record of the case and evaluating the
evidence thereto and exhibits thereof, this Court finds no ground to
modify, reverse or alter the above-stated decision and hereby affirms
[13]
the decision of the lower court in toto.
The Constitution requires that [N]o decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
[14]
and the law on which it is based. The 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, provides that [T]he judgment must be
written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by
the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law
[15]
upon which the judgment is based.
Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain
conditions, it cannot merely refer to the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law of the lower court. The court must make a full
[16]
findings of fact and conclusions of law of its own.
Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a
nullity. Very recently, speaking of a similarly worded decision of a
regional trial court, we said:
[I]t is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite
in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at
a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its
[17]
inadequacy speaks for itself.
Judges similarly disposed to pay lip service to their work must
rethink their place in the judiciary or seriously take refresher courses
on decision writing. We warn them of stiff sanctions for such
lackadaisical performance.
Consequently, the case may be remanded to the lower court for
compliance with the constitutional requirement of contents of a
decision. However, considering that this case has been pending for
sometime, the ends of justice will be fully served if we review the
evidence and decide the case.
Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric,
water and telephone lines of complainants business establishment
because these lines crossed his property line. He failed, however, to
show evidence that he had the necessary permit or authorization to
relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water
and telephone services during peak hours of the operation of
business of the complainant. Thus, petitioners act unjustly annoyed
or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan
is liable for unjust vexation.
Regarding damages, we find the award of moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees to be without basis. Moral damages
may be recovered if they were the proximate result of defendants
[18]
wrongful act or omission. An award of exemplary damages is
justified if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
[19]
circumstances. There is no evidence to support such
award. Hence, we delete the award of moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, accused Ong Chiu
Kwan is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00, and the
costs. The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees is hereby deleted.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17898 October 31, 1962
PASTOR D. AGO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MONTANO A. ORTIZ,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF SURIGAO and GRACE PARK
ENGINEERING, INC., respondents.
Jose M. Luison for petitioner.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent Grace Park Engineering, Inc.
The Provincial Fiscal of Surigao for respondent Sheriff of Surigao.
LABRABOR, J.:
Appeal by certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26723-R entitled "Pastor D. Ago vs. The
Provincial Sheriff of Surigao, et al." which in part reads:
In this case for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, it
appears from the records that the respondent Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Agusan rendered judgment (Annex "A") in open
court on January 28, 1959, basing said judgment on a compromise
agreement between the parties.
On August 15, 1959, upon petition, the Court of First Instance issued
a writ of execution.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated October 12, 1959
alleges that he, or his counsel, did not receive a formal and valid
notice of said decision, which motion for reconsideration was denied
by the court below in the order of November 14, 1959.
Petitioner now contends that the respondent Judge exceeded in his
jurisdiction in rendering the execution without valid and formal notice
of the decision.
A compromise agreement is binding between the parties and
becomes the law between them. (Gonzales vs. Gonzales G.R. No. L-
1254, May 21, 1948, 81 Phil. 38; Martin vs. Martin, G.R. No. L-
12439, May 22, 1959) .
It is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a judgment based on a
compromise agreement is not appealable and is immediately
executory, unless a motion is filed on the ground fraud, mistake or
duress. (De los Reyes vs. Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505; Lapena vs. Morfe,
G.R. No. L-10089, July 31, 1957)
Petitioner's claim that he was not notified or served notice of the
decision is untenable. The judgment on the compromise agreement
rendered by the court below dated January 28, 1959, was given in
open court. This alone is a substantial compliance as to notice. (De
los Reyes vs. Ugarte, supra)
IN VIEW THEREOF, we believe that the lower court did not exceed
nor abuse its jurisdiction in ordering the execution of the judgment.
The petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed and the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore dissolved, with costs against the
petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The facts of the case may be briefly stated as follows: In 1957,
petitioner Pastor D. Ago bought sawmill machineries and equipments
from respondent Grace Park Engineer domineering, Inc., executing a
chattel mortgage over said machineries and equipments to secure
the payment of balance of the price remaining unpaid of P32,000.00,
which petitioner agreed to pay on installment basis.
Petitioner Ago defaulted in his payment and so, in 1958 respondent
Grace Park Engineering, Inc. instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings of the mortgage. To enjoin said foreclosure, petitioner
herein instituted Special Civil Case No. 53 in the Court of First
Instance of Agusan. The parties to the case arrived at a compromise
agreement and submitted the same in court in writing, signed by
Pastor D. Ago and the Grace Park Engineering, Inc. The Hon.
Montano A. Ortiz, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan,
then presiding, dictated a decision in open court on January 28,
1959.
Petitioner continued to default in his payments as provided in the
judgment by compromise, so Grace Park Engineering, Inc. filed with
the lower court a motion for execution, which was granted by the
court on August 15, 1959. A writ of execution, dated September 23,
1959, later followed.
The herein respondent, Provincial Sheriff of Surigao, acting upon the
writ of execution issued by the lower court, levied upon and ordered
the sale of the sawmill machineries and equipments in question.
These machineries and equipments had been taken to and installed
in a sawmill building located in Lianga, Surigao del Sur, and owned
by the Golden Pacific Sawmill, Inc., to whom, petitioner alleges, he
had sold them on February 16, 1959 (a date after the decision of the
lower court but before levy by the Sheriff).
Having been advised by the sheriff that the public auction sale was
set for December 4, 1959, petitioner, on December 1, 1959, filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with
respondent Court of Appeals, alleging that a copy of the
aforementioned judgment given in open court on January 28, 1959
was served upon counsel for petitioner only on September 25, 1959
(writ of execution is dated September 23, 1959); that the order and
writ of execution having been issued by the lower court before
counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment, its resultant
last order that the "sheriff may now proceed with the sale of the
properties levied constituted a grave abuse of discretion and was in
excess of its jurisdiction; and that the respondent Provincial Sheriff of
Surigao was acting illegally upon the allegedly void writ of execution
by levying the same upon the sawmill machineries and equipments
which have become real properties of the Golden Pacific sawmill,
Inc., and is about to proceed in selling the same without prior
publication of the notice of sale thereof in some newspaper of
general circulation as required by the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals, on December 8, 1959, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against the sheriff but it turned out that the
latter had already sold at public auction the machineries in question,
on December 4, 1959, as scheduled. The respondent Grace Park
Engineering, Inc. was the only bidder for P15,000.00, although the
certificate sale was not yet executed. The Court of Appeals
constructed the sheriff to suspend the issuance of a certificate of sale
of the said sawmill machineries and equipment sold by him on
December 4, 1959 until the final decision of the case. On November
9, 1960 the Court of Appeals rendered the aforequoted decision.
Before this Court, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred
(1) in holding that the rendition of judgment on compromise in open
court on January 1959 was a sufficient notice; and (2) in not
resolving the other issues raised before it, namely, (a) the legality of
the public auction sale made by the sheriff, and (b) the nature of the
machineries in question, whether they are movables or immovables.
The Court of Appeals held that as a judgment was entered by the
court below in open court upon the submission of the compromise
agreement, the parties may be considered as having been notified of
said judgment and this fact constitutes due notice of said judgment.
This raises the following legal question: Is the order dictated in open
court of the judgment of the court, and is the fact the petitioner herein
was present in open court was the judgment was dictated, sufficient
notice thereof? The provisions of the Rules of Court decree
otherwise. Section 1 of Rule 35 describes the manner in which
judgment shall be rendered, thus:
SECTION 1. How judgment rendered. — All judgments determining
the merits of cases shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, and signed by him, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, filed with the
clerk of the court.
The court of first instance being a court of record, in order that a
judgment may be considered as rendered, must not only be in
writing, signed by the judge, but it must also be filed with the clerk of
court. The mere pronouncement of the judgment in open court with
the stenographer taking note thereof does not, therefore, constitute a
rendition of the judgment. It is the filing of the signed decision with
the clerk of court that constitutes rendition. While it is to be presumed
that the judgment that was dictated in open court will be the
judgment of the court, the court may still modify said order as the
same is being put into writing. And even if the order or judgment has
already been put into writing and signed, while it has not yet been
delivered to the clerk for filing it is still subject to amendment or
change by the judge. It is only when the judgment signed by the
judge is actually filed with the clerk of court that it becomes a valid
and binding judgment. Prior thereto, it could still be subject to
amendment and change and may not, therefore, constitute the real
judgment of the court.
Regarding the notice of judgment, the mere fact that a party heard
the judge dictating the judgment in open court, is not a valid notice of
said judgment. If rendition thereof is constituted by the filing with the
clerk of court of a signed copy (of the judgment), it is evident that the
fact that a party or an attorney heard the order or judgment being
dictated in court cannot be considered as notice of the real judgment.
No judgment can be notified to the parties unless it has previously
been rendered. The notice, therefore, that a party has of a judgment
that was being dictated is of no effect because at the time no
judgment has as yet been signed by the judge and filed with the
clerk.
Besides, the Rules expressly require that final orders or judgments
be served personally or by registered mail. Section 7 of Rule 27
provides as follows:
SEC. 7. Service of final orders or judgments. — Final orders or
judgments shall be served either personally or by registered mail.
In accordance with this provision, a party is not considered as having
been served with the judgment merely because he heard the
judgment dictating the said judgment in open court; it is necessary
that he be served with a copy of the signed judgment that has been
filed with the clerk in order that he may legally be considered as
having been served with the judgment.
For all the foregoing, the fact that the petitioner herein heard the trial
judge dictating the judgment in open court, is not sufficient to
constitute the service of judgement as required by the above-quoted
section 7 of Rule 2 the signed judgment not having been served
upon the petitioner, said judgment could not be effective upon him
(petitioner) who had not received it. It follows as a consequence that
the issuance of the writ of execution null and void, having been
issued before petitioner her was served, personally or by registered
mail, a copy of the decision.
The second question raised in this appeal, which has been passed
upon by the Court of Appeals, concerns the validity of the
proceedings of the sheriff in selling the sawmill machineries and
equipments at public auction with a notice of the sale having been
previously published.
The record shows that after petitioner herein Pastor D. Ago had
purchased the sawmill machineries and equipments he assigned the
same to the Golden Pacific Sawmill, Inc. in payment of his
subscription to the shares of stock of said corporation. Thereafter the
sawmill machinery and equipments were installed in a building and
permanently attached to the ground. By reason of such installment in
a building, the said sawmill machineries and equipment became real
estate properties in accordance with the provision of Art. 415 (5) of
the Civil Code, thus:
ART. 415. The following are immovable property:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements tended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried
on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet
the needs of the said industry or works;
(c) In case of real property, by posting a similar notice particularly
describing the property for twenty days in three public places in the
municipality or city where the property is situated, and also where the
property is to be sold, and, if the assessed value of the property
exceeds four hundred pesos, by publishing a copy of the notice once
a week, for the same period, in some newspaper published or having
general circulation in the province, if there be one. If there are
newspapers published in the province in both the English and
Spanish languages, then a like publication for a like period shall be
made in one newspaper published in the English language, and in
one published in the Spanish language.

This Court in interpreting a similar question raised before it in the the sale made by the sheriff must be declared null and void.
case of Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng e Hijos, 61 Phil. 683, held that
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be
the installation of the machine and equipment in the central of the
reviewed is hereby set aside and We declare that the issuance of the
Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc. for use in connection with the industry
writ of execution in this case against the sawmill machineries and
carried by the company, converted the said machinery and
equipments purchased by petitioner Pastor D. Ago from the Grace
equipment into real estate by reason of their purpose. Paraphrasing
Park Engineering, Inc., as well as the sale of the same by the Sheriff
language of said decision we hold that by the installment of the
of Surigao, are null and void. Costs shall be against the respondent
sawmill machineries in the building of the Gold Pacific Sawmill, Inc.,
Grace Park Engineering, Inc.
for use in the sawing of logs carried on in said building, the same
became a necessary and permanent part of the building or real
estate on which the same was constructed, converting the said
machineries and equipments into real estate within the meaning of
Article 415(5) above-quoted of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Considering that the machineries and equipments in question valued

at more than P15,000.00 appear to have been sold without the
necessary advertisement of sale by publication in a newspaper, as
required in Sec. 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is as
follows:

SEC. 16. Notice of sale of property on execution. — Before the sale

of property on execution, notice thereof must be given as follows:

xxx xxx xxx


FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. SCC-01-7. March 12, 2002]
HADJA THITTIE M. ARAP, complainant, vs. JUDGE AMIR
MUSTAFA, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint against Judge Amir Mustafa,
presiding judge of the First Sharia Circuit Court of Jolo, Sulu, for
gross neglect of duty, ignorance of the law, and conduct unbecoming
a judge.
In a letter-complaint received by the Office of the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court on March 17, 2000, complainant Hadja Thittie
M. Arap alleged that respondent judge committed gross neglect of
duty, ignorance of the law, and conduct unbecoming a judge for
[1]
failure to resolve Criminal Case No. 96-01, filed on April 15, 1996
and submitted for resolution in the same year, but which remains
[2]
unresolved despite the rarity of cases filed in his court. The
complaint was endorsed to the then Court Administrator Alfredo L.
[3]
Benipayo for appropriate action. The Court Administrator required
the respondent judge to file a Comment which was done on June 19,
2000.
In his Comment, the respondent judge denies the allegations in
the Complaint. He explains that Criminal Case No. 96-01 was filed
on April 15, 1996, but after he evaluated its allegations and referred
to P.D. 1083 and Islamic Law sources, i.e., the Quran and the Hadith
of the Holy Prophet, he found the allegations to be self-defeating,
and, motu proprio dismissed of the case on June 11,
[4]
1996. Complainant Hadja Arap filed an appeal with the Sharia
District Court (SDC) of Jolo, Sulu, which, in an Order dated
November 14, 1996, remanded the case to the respondent judges
court for preliminary investigation in accordance with Section 9 of
[5]
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. On August 4, 1997, Sisali Arap was
[6]
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial followed and both parties
presented their witnesses. The case was submitted for resolution in
October 1998.
The respondent judge admits that he came up with a Decision
on the case on January 25, 2000, and the same was promulgated on
[7]
March 1, 2000. To justify the delay, the respondent judge explains
that he found it difficult to reconcile the provisions of P.D. 1083 and
those of the Quran and the Hadith of the Holy Prophet, viz:
xxx The issues raised by both parties in this case calls for a
reconciliation of the provisions of PD 1083 as well as the express
provisions of the primary sources of Islamic Law, the Quran and the
Hadith of the Holy Prophet. As a judge of the Sharia Circuit Court, I
found it difficult to reconcile these two conflicting sources of
provisions viz--viz (sic) with (sic) my personal conviction and belief
as a religious follower of Quranic teachings. It took me a
considerable period of time to reflect, ponder, inquire and seek
assistance from Ulama or religious leaders who adhere to the basic
teachings of the Holy Quran, on the one hand, and fellow judges of
the Sharia Courts and regular courts who is (sic) more incline (sic) to
follow the dictates of PD 1083, on the other hand. Their advices (sic)
all the more confused me taking into consideration my conviction as
[8]
a Muslim and adherence of the Quranic injunctions.
He emphasizes that the delay in rendering a decision is not
meant to violate any Court Circular mandating the disposition of
cases within the prescribed reglementary period; neither is the same
caused by negligence nor by a criminal resolve to delay the
dispensation of justice; lastly, the delay is not an indication of a
conduct unbecoming of a judge. He likewise stresses that there is no
truth in the allegation that cases are rarely filed with his court. On the
contrary, his court has the highest number of caseload among the
three Sharia Circuit Courts, and has even more cases than the
Sharia District Court. In 1999 alone, his court had a total of 114
[9]
cases, 83 of which were terminated in the same year.
 The respondent judge further contends that the complainant has
been harboring ire against him since 1996 when he dismissed the
latters case. Such sentiment was allegedly aggravated when the
Decision was promulgated on March 1, 2000 when the complainant
[10]
made the remark, Iyon lang pala and desisyon, pinatagal pa.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report dated
October 16, 2001, found that there was undue delay in the rendering
of the decision by the respondent judge, and recommended the
[11]
imposition of a fine of P5,000.00.
We agree.
Lower courts are mandated by Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the
[12]
Constitution to resolve or decide cases within three (3) months
[13]
after they have been submitted for decision. However, an
extension of the period may be granted by this Court upon request
by the judge concerned on account of heavy caseload or by other
reasonable excuse. Without an extension granted by this Court, a
delay in the disposition of cases is tantamount to gross inefficiency
on the part of the judge.
We held in the case of Sanchez v. Vestil
[14]
and reiterated
[15]
in Bernardo v. Fabros that:
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide
cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that
justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases
undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence,
judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do
so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against them.
In this case, the respondent judge failed to inform this Court of
the alleged difficulty in deciding Criminal Case No. 96-01 within the
prescribed period. It is too late for him to justify such
nonfeasance. As pointed out by the Court Administrator:
The Court is mindful of and does realize the heavy case load that
confronts most courts; it is for the same reason precisely that it has
been most sympathetic in acting on requests for extension of time
submitted by judges as in the instant case. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The Court must still be informed by the judge of his difficulty in
meeting with (sic) the prescribed deadlines and the necessity of
having the periods thereof correspondingly extended. Almost
invariably, the Court responds favorably and grants a reasonable
time for compliance with the rules but it would be wrong for a judge,
[16]
on his own, to disregard a duty incumbent upon him.
Moreover, any delay in the resolution of cases by a judge is a
contravention of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which provides that A judge shall dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Accordingly, we adopt the recommendation of the Court
Administrator that the respondent judge be sanctioned. Since this is
his first offense during his almost nine (9) year service in the
judiciary, the imposition of fine in the amount of P5,000.00 is deemed
sufficient.
Again, we remind judges of the importance of high sense of duty
in the administration of justice. Judges should dispose of the courts
business within the prescribed period, as delay undermines peoples
faith in the judiciary and reinforces in their minds that the wheels of
[17]
justice grind ever so slowly.
WHEREFORE, Judge Amir Mustafa is found GUILTY of gross
inefficiency and is hereby ordered to PAY a fine of five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00). He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 95751-52. December 2, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME
TUMARU and ALEX MAUN, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Appeal interposed by Jaime Tumaru and Alex Maun from the
Decision of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court in Luna, Kalinga-
Apayao, finding them guilty of murder in Criminal Case Nos. 15-88
and 16-88 for the killing of Atty. Eduardo Madrid and Santiago
Umoso, and sentencing them accordingly.
Filed on September 13, 1988 by 1st Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Godofredo G. Guerrero, the Informations indicting appellants Jaime
Tumaru and Alex Maun, allege:
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 15-88
That on or about the afternoon of May 24, 1987 at Malubibit, Flora,
Kalinga-Apayao and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused armed with guns, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another with the attendance
of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot one EDUARDO
MADRID y FERNANDEZ, inflicting upon the latter gun shot wounds
thereby causing the direct and immediate death of said EDUARDO
MADRID.
That the offense is further attended with the aggravating
circumstance of ignominy.
[1]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 16-88
That on or about the afternoon of May 24, 1987 at Malubibit, Flora,
Kalinga- Apayao and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused armed with guns, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another with the attendance
of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot SANTIAGO
UMOSO inflicting upon the latter gun shot wounds thereby causing
the direct and immediate death of said SANTIAGO UMOSO.
[2]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
With the appellants entering negative pleas on November 29,
1988, upon arraignment with the assistance of Atty. Delfin Taala, as
counsel de parte, joint trial ensued with the prosecution presenting
Lorenzo Miguel, Zenaida Madrid, Dr. Ferdinand Nicolas, Jose
Limmayog, Francisco Balanban, Sergio Sabbun, Froilan Taberna,
Marcelo Lawat, Francisco Balanban, Nestor Ortega, Roy Umoso,
Warlito Montanez, Villamor Caluya, and Disederio Mamba, as its
witnesses.
For the defense, Florante Bariuan and appellants Jaime Tumaru
and Alex Maun took the witness stand.
For the prosecution, Lorenzo Miguel and its other witnesses
testified as follows:
Lorenzo Miguel is a native of Barangay 42, Apaya, Laoag City
but he spent his summer vacation in his brother Moises house in
Ginto, Flora, Kalinga-Apayao.
On May 24, 1987, he (Lorenzo Miguel) together with his brother
and two others were pasturing their carabaos in Papagan, Flora,
Kalinga-Apayao. They later brought the carabaos to the river for a
bath.
While his companions were still at the river and he was alone
pasturing the carabaos in the riceland of Moises, a man sitting on the
branch of a tree whistled and signaled him (Lorenzo Miguel) to go
away by waving his left hand forward and backward. He did not
accede and simply ignored such signal because he thought the man
was his brother when, in fact, Moises was still at the river. He did not
know the man. It was only during the trial that he came to know him
to be Alex Maun. The place is a second growth forest and the tree is
forty (40) meters away from the spot where he stood.
Meanwhile, two (2) persons riding on a motorcycle arrived. The
driver was Municipal Councilor Santiago Umoso while the other on
board was OIC Mayor Eduardo Madrid. Thereafter, he (Lorenzo
Miguel) heard a gun rapport coming from the long gun of the man
sitting on the branch of the tree. Atty. Madrid fell from the
motorcycle. He got down from the carabao but remained in the
place. Another person, later identified as Jaime Tumaru, who was at
the foot of the tree, fired a short gun at Umoso. Lorenzo knew that
Papagan is a critical area, having heard about it from his brother and
friends.
Maun was wearing a sleeveless white T-shirt and maong long
pants while Tumaru wore a T-shirt with short sleeves and blue
stripes and short maong pants. The motorcycle fell together with
Umoso. Frightened, Lorenzo ran to his brothers house but he did not
report the incident to the police or the authorities.
On May 25, 1987, Lorenzo left for Laoag together with his father
because his brother Moises told the father about what he (Lorenzo)
witnessed.
Under crossexamination on May 29, 1989, Lorenzo testified that
he was living with Mrs. Zenaida Madrid, widow of Atty. Madrid, in
Tondo, Manila, since December 17, 1988. She was supporting him
and even promised to send him to school. The police investigated
him four times, once in Quezon City, in Tuguegarao, in Laoag City
and at the office of JAGO on June 8, July 1,6 and 30, 1987,
respectively.
Mrs. Madrid sent a letter-request to the Chief of the Narcotics
Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and on July 30,
1987, the latter referred the matter to NBI Agents Jose Limmayog
and Francisco Balanban, who conferred with Cpl. Marcelo
Lawat. The latter furnished them with copies of the sworn statements
of Lorenzo Miguel, Moises Miguel and Eduardo Galvez. Lorenzo, in
the presence of Mrs. Madrid, Cpl. Lawat, Atty. Laygo, Atty. Francisco
Balonbon, Jr. and NBI Agent Danny Reyes, picked up the pictures of
Jaime Tumaru and Alex Maun and identified them as the
perpetrators of the crime.
Capt. Espia, Asst. Investigator Sergio Sabbun and Pat. Froilan
Taberna, all from INP, Flora, Kalinga-Apayao, conducted the initial
investigation. According to them, there was no danger in Flora
except for the goons of former Mayor de San Jose. Attys. Laygo and
Balonbon, together with Cpl. Lawat and Agent Reyes, proceeded to
Camp Adduru in Tuguegarao where Capt. Espia produced the
bodies of Tumaru and Maun. In two sets of line-up, Lorenzo Miguel
identified the culprits as Alex Maun and Jaime Tumaru. Pictures
were taken while the boy was identifying Maun and Tumaru. They
came to know later that Atty. Madrid and Mayor de San Jose were
political enemies.
Upon the order of Station Commander Roque Visitacion,
Sabbun finalized the sketch dictated by Pat. Taberna, son-in-law of
the deceased Umoso. Pat. Taberna was in the cockpit arena when
C1Cs Conyado and Datugan, the latter being the security guard of
Atty. Madrid, reported to him the incident. Together with Cesar Adsay
and Lorenzo Magpale he went to the crime scene to recover the
bodies of Atty. Madrid and Santiago Umoso. They saw Santiago
Umoso lying on the ground face down with several gunshot wounds
and clotted blood coming out from his mouth, between the junction
going to Malubibit Norte and Sta. Maria, Flora, Kalinga-Apayao. They
found the body of Atty. Madrid in the upper part of the mountain, left
side of the road proceeding to the Poblacion of Flora, Kalinga-
Apayao. There were gunshot wounds and Atty. Madrids head was
completely severed from the body. They were not able to recover his
head. They also saw the motorcycle, and brought the cadaver of
Atty. Madrid to the Poblacion on board his service car.
Dr. Ferdinand Nicolas, in his capacity as resident physician of
Flora District Hospital, conducted an autopsy on the cadavers of Atty.
Madrid and Santiago Umoso and submitted the following necropsy
report:
May 26, 1987
 Autopsy report on the body of Atty. Eduardo Madrid, 47 years
old, male, married, Filipino, Catholic, and presently residing at
Poblacion West, Flora, Kalinga-Apayao.
Name of incident-Gunshot wound
Day of Incident-May 24, 1987
Time of Incident-3:30 P.M.
Place of Incident-Sitio Papagan, Barangay Tamalunog, Flora,
Kalinga-Apayao.
Findings:
1. Complete avulsion of head and neck at level cervical vertebra
#2 neck stump is corrugated with protruding ships of the
bone.
2. Incised wound at about 1.5 cm., entrance at the middle 3rd of
clavicle anterior chest wall, right, penetrating with exit at the
back near the tip of the scapula.
3. Gunshot wound with smudging entrance left, enterior chest
wall at the area of the clavicle, middle 3rd measuring at
about 1.5 x 1 cm. directed downward penetrating, perforating
(?), with underlying complete fracture of the clavicle, and
4. Multiple semi-lenear abrasion with contusion, (sic) anterior
chest wall;
a) Lateral aspect of sternum, right #4 measuring at about 2.5 x 2 cm.
b) Lateral aspect of sterum, left #3 measuring about 2 x 2 cm. each.
Cause of death: Cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to shock,
[3]
secondary to hemorrhage.
The findings on the body of Santiago Umoso were:
1. Gunshot wound at the head with wound entrance at the left
nostril with laceration at about .5 cm directed upward and
forward with exit at occipitoparietal region measuring about 12
by 10 cm with underlying traumatised (sic) brain tissue.
2. Gunshot wound lateral aspect right anterior chest wall, level
of third rib measuring about 1.3 x 1 cm with smudging
directed downward, penetrating, perforating with exit at left
[4]
lumbar region measuring about 1x 1 cm.
Mrs. Madrid, together with her mother-in-law and sister-in-law,
were in their house in the Poblacion, Flora, Kalinga-Apayao, when
one Mr. Aguda informed them of the incident. She looked for their
drivers in order to confirm what happened but they left upon knowing
of the ambush. It was already 5:00 oclock in the afternoon when the
military and the bodyguards brought Atty. Madrids remains to their
house. He was beheaded. His body was embalmed and he lay in
state for fifteen (15) days at Funeraria Baquiran in Aguilar,
Pangasinan, for security reasons. She spent Sixty Thousand
(P60,000.00) Pesos during the six-day wake at Funeraria Carbonel,
Flora, Kalinga-Apayao. She also spent for the bringing of the body of
her husband to Kalinga-Apayao; Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos
for the funeral car; One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for gasoline,
and Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos for the tomb. She lost
everything when her husband died because he (Atty. Madrid) was
the breadwinner.
Mrs. Madrid narrated that her husband was involved in an
altercation with Mayor de San Jose. There was a case against Alex
Maun for which her husband acted as counsel for the complainants,
regarding the killing of Cacaho.Maun wanted to settle the case
amicably for the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos. But
the heirs of the victims would accede only to a settlement in the
amount of Thirty Seven Thousand (P37,000.00) Pesos. The heirs of
the victims were forced to consent for fear that they would be the
next victims.
 Roy Umoso, son of the deceased Santiago Umoso, borrowed
the motorcycle owned by Clemente Ortega from the latters son,
Nestor Ortega, at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of May 24, 1987, upon
the order of his father and Atty. Madrid. They used the motorcycle to
go to Malubibit Norte. At 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, he learned
from his mother that his father was ambushed. They went to the
crime scene and saw his father lying dead. His fathers wallet was
missing. Nestor Ortega found out that the motorcycle was not in
good running condition upon its return. It was loaded on the truck
owned by Atty. Madrid.
Warlito Montanes personally knew the accused in these
cases. Before the incident, Jaime Tumaru was the Detachment
Commander of Flora, Kalinga-Apayao. Jaime Tumaru, Alex Maun,
Rolando Maddela and PC Soldier Adbucol Jainal went to his house
near the cockpit arena at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of May 24,
1987. They brought beer and each of them drank one beer. Jaime
Tumaru went to the market thereafter to buy meat for his family,
while Alex Maun and Rolando Madella went to the latters house to
attend the birthday party of Madellas son. He (Montanes) went to the
cockpit arena. Police Ernesto Pascua asked him to give his sworn
statement, which was subscribed before Judge Martha Dugayon.
Villamor Caluya, OIC Municipal Councilor, and Sergio Putulan,
Municipal Secretary, used Atty. Madrids minibus in going to Flora to
prepare for the fiesta. They solicited trophies from Mayor Versola
and Atty. Barroga for the basketball games. They sought permission
from Judge Aquilizan if Atty. Madrids visitors can use the judges
house. Disederio Mamba, member of INP-Flora, rode on the same
minibus in Ayaga, Abulug, Cagayan. They saw Tumaru and Maun
unarmed while riding on a motorcycle at Sipa, Sta. Marcela, Kalinga-
Apayao, at 2:30 oclock in the afternoon. Caluya and Putulan
returned to Atty. Madrids house. However, his (Atty. Madrids) wife
informed them that Atty. Madrid was in the cockpit arena, so they
proceeded to the place. They met Maun and Tumaru in the cockpit
arena. Someone told them that the Mayor went to Malubibit
Norte. They tried to wait for them in the cockpit arena but they later
learned that they were ambushed. Mamba went to the Municipal
Building to verify the incident when he met Tumaru at the
crossing. Tumaru did not react when told that Atty. Madrid had been
ambushed. Tumaru neither spoke a word. Mamba went home to
inform his family that he had arrived from Luna, Kalinga-Apayao. He
went back to the Municipal Building and went to the house of Umoso
but his body had not arrived yet. Then, he passed by the group of
Tumaru in the house of Rolando Maddela. He even joined the group
in drinking. He went home because it was getting late.
Appellants Jaime Tumaru and Alex Maun relied on denial and
alibi for their defense.
Tumaru and Maun executed sworn statements vehemently
denying their participation in the murder. They claimed that the NPAs
were responsible for the killing. The statements were marked as
Exhibits J, J-1, J-2, J-3 and Exhibits K, K-1, K-2, respectively. They
theorized that they left Luna on May 24, 1987, at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon, for Flora, Kalinga-Apayao for an important mission. Upon
the verbal order of their commanding officer, Lt. Agbayani, they
conducted an intelligence mission regarding the National Peoples
Armys (NPA) activities. They took a Yamaha motor.
Gilberto Estomo also informed Maun through radio to go to
Flora in order to settle the double murder charge against him for
killing the ward of Tony and Juliana Cacacho pending before the
th
Fiscals Office in 114 PC in Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao. They
arrived in Flora at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon and went directly to
the cockpit arena. He met Rolando Maddela in the cockpit arena and
they went to Warlito Montanez house and drank one beer each
together with Maun. Tumaru went to the market while Maun and
Rolando Maddela went to the latters house for the birthday party of
Maddelas son. They stayed there for three (3) hours. They went to
the house of Santiago Umoso and played pusoy during the wake that
night and went home. Tumaru knew that his wife was not in the
boarding house in Flora because she, together with their two-month
old child took their vacation in Sanchez Mira a week before the
fateful incident. Tumaru went to the public market in order to buy
meat and looked for Maun in the house of Maddela. They had lunch
In Maddelas house and left Flora the following day, at 7:00 oclock in
the morning, and reported at Luna headquarters.
Florante Barioan testified on the conduct of the lineup and the
matter of identification by Lorenzo Miguel of the culprits. Maun
claimed that during the line-up, Captain Espia said that one Mr.
Bariwan was not the culprit but rather guided Lorenzo Miguel to point
at him as the culprit. He did not file a case against Captain Espia for
the said violation of his right. He was the personal security guard of
Mayor de San Jose for seven months.
On September 26, 1990, the Regional Trial Court a quo found
the evidence for the prosecution enough to convict and rendered
judgment disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15-88, the two accused Jaime
Tumaru and Alex Maun are hereby sentenced each to suffer an
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. The two accused are also
ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased
OIC Eduardo F. Madrid the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) for indemnity; the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS
(P6,000.00) for the hire of the funeral car; the sum of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) for the gasoline; the sum of SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) for the tomb; and the sum of
FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) for the expenses
incurred during the wake which lasted for fifteen (15) days in
Pangasinan and six (6) days in Flora, Kalinga-Apayao.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 16-88, the accused Jaime Tumaru
and Alex Maun are also hereby sentenced each to suffer an
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and
to pay the costs.
[5]
SO ORDERED.
Undaunted, appellants found their way to this Court via the
appeal at bar, theorizing that:
I the care of the victims family.
THE TRIAL JUDGE SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE SAME.
II
THE TRIAL JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN BLINDLY
BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF LORENZO MIGUEL NOT
WITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT THE ONE
WHO HEARD HIS TESTIMONY AND THE PRESENCE OF
EVIDENCE SHOWING THE BIAS CHARACTER OF THE
WITNESS, THE IMPROBABILITY OF HIS TESTIMONY IN THE
LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED SHOWING THE
CONTRARY.
III
THE TRIAL JUDGE SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RELYING ON
THE WEAKNESS OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE TO
CONVINCE HIM THAT THEY ARE GULTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
IV
THE TRIAL JUDGE SERRIOUSLY ERRED IN IMPUTING
MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS
[6]
OF THE MATTERS NOT ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE.
Was it proper for the trial court to base its judgment solely on
the testimony of the lone witness? May a judge render judgment in
the case entirely heard by another Judge? Was the trial court correct
in imputing motive on the part of the accused and did the trial court
err in not upholding the defenses of denial and alibi? These are the
pivotal issues for resolution in these consolidated cases.
Appellants question the credibility of witness Lorenzo Miguel,
branding him as a bias witness because for sometime he was under
Records show that the abovenamed witness was living in Mrs.
Zenaida Madrids house in Tondo when he was called to testify in the
case. The murder complained of happened on May 24, 1987, more
than one and a half years before subject witness started to stay in
the residence of Mrs. Madrid. On July 6, 1987 or barely one and a
half months after the commission of the crime sued upon, the said
witness gave a sworn statement. As stressed upon by the Solicitor
General, it was but natural for the bereaved family to be concerned
with the safety of their lone witness in order to vindicate the wrong
done against them. They simply wanted to protect the life of their
eyewitness from any risk. Such concern for his safety did not make
the said eyewitness bias and unreliable.
Anent the submission of appellants that there was delay in the
presentation of subject lone witness, the Court succinctly held
in People v. Untalasco, Jr., 125 SCRA 159, 170:
xxx xxx xxx
"xxx As stated in People v. Munoz (107 SCRA 313) and People v.
Delfin (2 SCRA 911) the initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer
information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be
involved in criminal investigations is common and has been declared
as not affecting their credibility."
Records disclose that the father of Lorenzo Miguel brought him
to Laoag City, as what he witnessed was not an ordinary case but a
gruesome murder. The parental instinct of protecting his son of
tender age is understandable.While it is true that forty-five (45) days
had elapsed from the time of commission of the crime when the
sworn statements were made, the said period was not used to
concoct a story.
The presence of powder burns in the bodies of the victims which
allegedly belie the testimony of the witnesses that the victims were
shot at a distance of about ten to fifteen meters from the assailants,
did not make the testimonial evidence for the prosecution incredible.
The medico legal officer opined that the muzzle of the gun might
have been inserted into the nostril of Umoso, when the latter was
shot. In the case of the gunshot wound in the body of Atty. Eduardo
F. Madrid, the same medico legal officer theorized that the victim
could have been in a siting position, with the assailant standing,
when he shot the said victim at point blank range.
"We have repeatedly held that the testimony of minors of tender age
will suffice to convict a person accused of a crime as long as it is
credible. Jimmy, then 12-years old, delivered a straightforward,
unshaken and convincing narrative. Indeed, the testimony of minor
children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than of
older persons, so that once established that they have fully
understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony
should be given full credence." (Marco v. Court of Appeals, 273
SCRA 276, 283, citing People v. Rodico, 249 SCRA 309 and People
v. Vitor, 245 SCRA 392)
It is not necessary that the judge who heard the case be the
same judge to pen the decision. The judge trying the case may die,
resign, be disabled, or transferred to another court while the case
was ripening for decision, and before he could decide it. In such an
eventuality, another judge has to continue and finish the
trial. Anyway, the succeeding judge can examine and evaluate the
evidence already presented by the simple expedient of going over
the transcripts of the testimonies of witnesses, in the same manner
as appellate courts review evidence on record.
"xxx the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not himself the
one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision constitutes
no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions, and
does not per se render his decision void. xxx" (People v. Espanola,
271 SCRA 689, 716)
With respect to the defense of alibi, this court has consistently
ruled:
xxx Well-entrenched is the doctrine that for alibi to prosper, the
defendant must prove not only (1) that he was somewhere else when
the crime was committed but (2) it must likewise be demonstrated
that he was so far away that he could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time
of its commission. xxx (People v. Baniel, 275 SCRA 472, 483 citing,
People v. Camat, 256 SCRA 52; People v. Alapan, et al., 315 Phil 39
and People v. Silong, 232 SCRA 487)
xxx Denial and alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence bearing no weight
in law. (People v. Arellano, 282 SCRA 500, 507, citing People v.
Apongan, 270 SCRA 713)

Maun was formerly with the 114th PC Co. stationed at Tabuk,

Kalinga-Apayao, while Tumaru was stationed at Luna, Kalinga-
Apayao. Their defense of denial and alibi had been effectively
refuted and rendered unsustainable by the positive identification by
witness Lorenzo Miguel that they (Maun and Tumaru) were the
perpetrators of the felonious killing in question.
Since the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt
the identity of the assailants, the question of motive need not be
delved into.

"xxx So settled is that proof of motive is not crucial where the identity
of the accused xxx has been amply established. xxx" (People v.
Quiamco, 268 SCRA 516, 530, citing People v. Lapura, 255 SCRA
85, citing People v. Flores, 237 SCRA 563)

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment rendered in Criminal

Cases Nos. 15-88 and 16-88 by Branch 26 of the Regional Trial
Court, in Luna, Kalinga-Apayao, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156132 October 12, 2006
CITIBANK, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) and
INVESTORS' FINANCE CORPORATION, doing business under
the name and style of FNCB Finance, petitioners,
vs.
MODESTA R. SABENIANO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule
2
45 of the Revised Rules of Court, of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, and the
3
Resolution, dated 20 November 2002, of the same court which,
although modifying its earlier Decision, still denied for the most part
the Motion for Reconsideration of herein petitioners.
Petitioner Citibank, N.A. (formerly known as the First National City
Bank) is a banking corporation duly authorized and existing under
the laws of the United States of America and licensed to do
commercial banking activities and perform trust functions in the
Philippines.
Petitioner Investor's Finance Corporation, which did business under
the name and style of FNCB Finance, was an affiliate company of
petitioner Citibank, specifically handling money market placements
for its clients. It is now, by virtue of a merger, doing business as part
of its successor-in-interest, BPI Card Finance Corporation. However,
so as to consistently establish its identity in the Petition at bar, the
4
said petitioner shall still be referred to herein as FNCB Finance.
Respondent Modesta R. Sabeniano was a client of both petitioners
Citibank and FNCB Finance. Regrettably, the business relations
among the parties subsequently went awry.
5
On 8 August 1985, respondent filed a Complaint against petitioners,
docketed as Civil Case No. 11336, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City. Respondent claimed to have substantial
deposits and money market placements with the petitioners, as well
as money market placements with the Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC), the proceeds of which were
supposedly deposited automatically and directly to respondent's
accounts with petitioner Citibank. Respondent alleged that petitioners
refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money market
placements despite her repeated demands, thus, compelling
respondent to file Civil Case No. 11336 against petitioners for
"Accounting, Sum of Money and Damages." Respondent eventually
6
filed an Amended Complaint on 9 October 1985 to include additional
claims to deposits and money market placements inadvertently left
out from her original Complaint.
7 8
In their joint Answer and Answer to Amended Complaint, filed on
12 September 1985 and 6 November 1985, respectively, petitioners
admitted that respondent had deposits and money market
placements with them, including dollar accounts in the Citibank
branch in Geneva, Switzerland (Citibank-Geneva). Petitioners further
alleged that the respondent later obtained several loans from
petitioner Citibank, for which she executed Promissory Notes (PNs),
and secured by (a) a Declaration of Pledge of her dollar accounts in
Citibank-Geneva, and (b) Deeds of Assignment of her money market
placements with petitioner FNCB Finance. When respondent failed to
pay her loans despite repeated demands by petitioner Citibank, the
latter exercised its right to off-set or compensate respondent's
outstanding loans with her deposits and money market placements,
pursuant to the Declaration of Pledge and the Deeds of Assignment
executed by respondent in its favor. Petitioner Citibank supposedly
informed respondent Sabeniano of the foregoing compensation
through letters, dated 28 September 1979 and 31 October 1979.
Petitioners were therefore surprised when six years later, in 1985,
respondent and her counsel made repeated requests for the
withdrawal of respondent's deposits and money market placements
with petitioner Citibank, including her dollar accounts with Citibank-
Geneva and her money market placements with petitioner FNCB
Finance. Thus, petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint
and for the award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.
When the parties failed to reach a compromise during the pre-trial
9
hearing, trial proper ensued and the parties proceeded with the
presentation of their respective evidence. Ten years after the filing of
10
the Complaint on 8 August 1985, a Decision was finally rendered in
11
Civil Case No. 11336 on 24 August 1995 by the fourth Judge who
handled the said case, Judge Manuel D. Victorio, the dispositive
portion of which reads –
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, decision is
hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring as illegal, null and void the setoff
effected by the defendant Bank [petitioner Citibank]
of plaintiff's [respondent Sabeniano] dollar deposit
with Citibank, Switzerland, in the amount of
US$149,632.99, and ordering the said defendant
[petitioner Citibank] to refund the said amount to the
plaintiff with legal interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, compounded yearly, from
31 October 1979 until fully paid, or its peso
equivalent at the time of payment;
(2) Declaring the plaintiff [respondent Sabeniano]
indebted to the defendant Bank [petitioner Citibank]
in the amount of ₱1,069,847.40 as of 5 September
1979 and ordering the plaintiff [respondent
Sabeniano] to pay said amount, however, there shall
be no interest and penalty charges from the time the
illegal setoff was effected on 31 October 1979;
(3) Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims
interposed by the parties against each other.
Costs against the defendant Bank.
All the parties appealed the foregoing Decision of the RTC to the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51930. Respondent
questioned the findings of the RTC that she was still indebted to
petitioner Citibank, as well as the failure of the RTC to order
petitioners to render an accounting of respondent's deposits and
money market placements with them. On the other hand, petitioners
argued that petitioner Citibank validly compensated respondent's
outstanding loans with her dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva, in
accordance with the Declaration of Pledge she executed in its favor.
Petitioners also alleged that the RTC erred in not declaring
respondent liable for damages and interest.
On 26 March 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its
12
Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision in Civil Case
No. 11336, dated 24 August 1995, and ruling entirely in favor of
respondent in this wise –
Wherefore, premises considered, the assailed 24 August
1995 Decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, as follows:
1. Declaring as illegal, null and void the set-off
effected by the defendant-appellant Bank of the
plaintiff-appellant's dollar deposit with Citibank,
Switzerland, in the amount of US$149,632.99, and
ordering defendant-appellant Citibank to refund the
said amount to the plaintiff-appellant with legal
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum, compounded yearly, from 31 October 1979
until fully paid, or its peso equivalent at the time of
payment;
2. As defendant-appellant Citibank failed to establish
by competent evidence the alleged indebtedness of
plaintiff-appellant, the set-off of ₱1,069,847.40 in the
account of Ms. Sabeniano is hereby declared as
without legal and factual basis;
3. As defendants-appellants failed to account the
following plaintiff-appellant's money market
placements, savings account and current accounts,
the former is hereby ordered to return the same, in
accordance with the terms and conditions agreed
upon by the contending parties as evidenced by the
certificates of investments, to wit:
(i) Citibank NNPN Serial No. 023356
(Cancels and Supersedes NNPN
No. 22526) issued on 17 March
1977, ₱318,897.34 with 14.50%
interest p.a.;
(ii) Citibank NNPN Serial No. 23357
(Cancels and Supersedes NNPN
No. 22528) issued on 17 March
1977, ₱203,150.00 with 14.50
interest p.a.;
(iii) FNCB NNPN Serial No. 05757
(Cancels and Supersedes NNPN
No. 04952), issued on 02 June
1977, ₱500,000.00 with 17%
interest p.a.;
(iv) FNCB NNPN Serial No. 05758
(Cancels and Supersedes NNPN
No. 04962), issued on 02 June
1977, ₱500,000.00 with 17%
interest per annum;
(v) The Two Million (₱2,000,000.00)
money market placements of Ms.
Sabeniano with the Ayala
Investment & Development
Corporation (AIDC) with legal
interest at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum compounded
yearly, from 30 September 1976
until fully paid;
4. Ordering defendants-appellants to jointly and
severally pay the plaintiff-appellant the sum of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00) by
way of moral damages, FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱100,000.00) as attorney's fees.
Apparently, the parties to the case, namely, the respondent, on one
hand, and the petitioners, on the other, made separate attempts to
bring the aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26
March 2002, before this Court for review.
G.R. No. 152985
Respondent no longer sought a reconsideration of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March
2002, and instead, filed immediately with this Court on 3 May 2002 a
13
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review, which,
after payment of the docket and other lawful fees, was assigned the
docket number G.R. No. 152985. In the said Motion, respondent
alleged that she received a copy of the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision on 18 April 2002 and, thus, had 15 days therefrom or until 3
May 2002 within which to file her Petition for Review. Since she
informed her counsel of her desire to pursue an appeal of the Court
of Appeals Decision only on 29 April 2002, her counsel neither had
enough time to file a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision
with the Court of Appeals, nor a Petition for Certiorari with this Court.
Yet, the Motion failed to state the exact extension period respondent
was requesting for.
Since this Court did not act upon respondent's Motion for Extension
of Time to file her Petition for Review, then the period for appeal
14
continued to run and still expired on 3 May 2002. Respondent
failed to file any Petition for Review within the prescribed period for
 15
appeal and, hence, this Court issued a Resolution, dated 13
November 2002, in which it pronounced that –
G.R. No. 152985 (Modesta R. Sabeniano vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.). – It appearing that petitioner failed to file
the intended petition for review on certiorari within the period
which expired on May 3, 2002, the Court Resolves
to DECLARE THIS CASE TERMINATED and DIRECT the
Division Clerk of Court to INFORM the parties that the
judgment sought to be reviewed has become final and
executory.
The said Resolution was duly recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments on 3 January 2003.
G.R. No. 156132
Meanwhile, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Reconsideration of its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26
March 2002. Acting upon the said Motion, the Court of Appeals
16
issued the Resolution, dated 20 November 2002, modifying its
Decision of 26 March 2002, as follows –
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for
Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED as Sub-
paragraph (V) paragraph 3 of the
assailed Decision's dispositive portion is hereby
ordered DELETED.
The challenged 26 March 2002 Decision of the Court
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002 and 20 November 2002,
respectively, petitioners filed the present Petition, docketed as G.R.
17
No. 156132. The Petition was initially denied by this Court for
failure of the petitioners to attach thereto a Certification against
Forum Shopping. However, upon petitioners' Motion and compliance
18
with the requirements, this Court resolved to reinstate the Petition.
The Petition presented fourteen (14) assignments of errors allegedly
committed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision, dated 26 March
2002, involving both questions of fact and questions of law which this
Court, for the sake of expediency, discusses jointly, whenever
possible, in the succeeding paragraphs.
I
The Resolution of this Court, dated 13 November 2002, in G.R.
No. 152985, declaring the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 26 March 2002, final and executory, pertains to
respondent Sabeniano alone.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the merits of the instant
Petition, this Court wishes to address first the argument, persistently
advanced by respondent in her pleadings on record, as well as her
numerous personal and unofficial letters to this Court which were no
longer made part of the record, that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, had
already become final and executory by virtue of the Resolution of this
Court in G.R. No. 152985, dated 13 November 2002.
G.R. No. 152985 was the docket number assigned by this Court to
respondent's Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for
Review. Respondent, though, did not file her supposed Petition.
Thus, after the lapse of the prescribed period for the filing of the
Petition, this Court issued the Resolution, dated 13 November 2002,
declaring the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002,
final and executory. It should be pointed out, however, that the
Resolution, dated 13 November 2002, referred only to G.R. No.
152985, respondent's appeal, which she failed to perfect through the
filing of a Petition for Review within the prescribed period. The
declaration of this Court in the same Resolution would bind
respondent solely, and not petitioners which filed their own separate
appeal before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 156132, the Petition
at bar. This would mean that respondent, on her part, should be
bound by the findings of fact and law of the Court of Appeals,
including the monetary amounts consequently awarded to her by the
appellate court in its Decision, dated 26 March 2002; and she can no
19
longer refute or assail any part thereof.
This Court already explained the matter to respondent when it issued
20
a Resolution in G.R. No. 156132, dated 2 February 2004, which
addressed her Urgent Motion for the Release of the Decision with the
Implementation of the Entry of Judgment in the following manner –
[A]cting on Citibank's and FNCB Finance's Motion for
Reconsideration, we resolved to grant the motion, reinstate
the petition and require Sabeniano to file a comment thereto
in our Resolution of June 23, 2003. Sabeniano filed
a Comment dated July 17, 2003 to which Citibank and FNCB
Finance filed a Reply dated August 20, 2003.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Sabeniano had knowledge
of, and in fact participated in, the proceedings in G.R. No.
156132. She cannot feign ignorance of the proceedings
therein and claim that the Decision of the Court of Appeals
has become final and executory. More precisely,
the Decision became final and executory only with regard
to Sabeniano in view of her failure to file a petition for
review within the extended period granted by the Court, and
not to Citibank and FNCB Finance whose Petition for
Review was duly reinstated and is now submitted for
decision.
Accordingly, the instant Urgent Motion is hereby DENIED.
(Emphasis supplied.)
To sustain the argument of respondent would result in an unjust and
incongruous situation wherein one party may frustrate the efforts of
the opposing party to appeal the case by merely filing with this Court
a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review, ahead of
the opposing party, then not actually filing the intended
21
Petition. The party who fails to file its intended Petition within the
reglementary or extended period should solely bear the
consequences of such failure.
Respondent Sabeniano did not commit forum shopping.
Another issue that does not directly involve the merits of the present
Petition, but raised by petitioners, is whether respondent should be
held liable for forum shopping.
Petitioners contend that respondent committed forum shopping on
the basis of the following facts:
While petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, was still pending before
the Court of Appeals, respondent already filed with this Court on 3
May 2002 her Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for
Review of the same Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G.R.
No. 152985. Thereafter, respondent continued to participate in the
proceedings before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930
by filing her Comment, dated 17 July 2002, to petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration; and a Rejoinder, dated 23 September 2002, to
petitioners' Reply. Thus, petitioners argue that by seeking relief
concurrently from this Court and the Court of Appeals, respondent is
undeniably guilty of forum shopping, if not indirect contempt.
This Court, however, finds no sufficient basis to hold respondent
liable for forum shopping.
Forum shopping has been defined as the filing of two or more suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
22
favorable judgment. The test for determining forum shopping is
whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is an identity of
23
parties, rights or causes of action, and relief sought. To guard
against this deplorable practice, Rule 7, Section 5 of the revised
Rules of Court imposes the following requirement –
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff
or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
 action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five
(5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not
be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as cause for
administrative sanctions.
Although it may seem at first glance that respondent was
simultaneously seeking recourse from the Court of Appeals and this
Court, a careful and closer scrutiny of the details of the case at bar
would reveal otherwise.
It should be recalled that respondent did nothing more in G.R. No.
152985 than to file with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time
within which to file her Petition for Review. For unexplained reasons,
respondent failed to submit to this Court her intended Petition within
the reglementary period. Consequently, this Court was prompted to
issue a Resolution, dated 13 November 2002, declaring G.R. No.
152985 terminated, and the therein assailed Court of Appeals
Decision final and executory. G.R. No. 152985, therefore, did not
progress and respondent's appeal was unperfected.
The Petition for Review would constitute the initiatory pleading before
this Court, upon the timely filing of which, the case before this Court
commences; much in the same way a case is initiated by the filing of
a Complaint before the trial court. The Petition for Review
establishes the identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and
relief sought from this Court, and without such a Petition, there is
technically no case before this Court. The Motion filed by respondent
seeking extension of time within which to file her Petition for Review
does not serve the same purpose as the Petition for Review itself.
Such a Motion merely presents the important dates and the
justification for the additional time requested for, but it does not go
into the details of the appealed case.
Without any particular idea as to the assignments of error or the relief
respondent intended to seek from this Court, in light of her failure to
file her Petition for Review, there is actually no second case involving
the same parties, rights or causes of action, and relief sought, as that
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930.
It should also be noted that the Certification against Forum Shopping
is required to be attached to the initiatory pleading, which, in G.R.
No. 152985, should have been respondent's Petition for Review. It is
in that Certification wherein respondent certifies, under oath, that: (a)
she has not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, that she is
presenting a complete statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, she shall report that fact within
five days therefrom to this Court. Without her Petition for Review,
respondent had no obligation to execute and submit the foregoing
Certification against Forum Shopping. Thus, respondent did not
violate Rule 7, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court; neither did
she mislead this Court as to the pendency of another similar case.
Lastly, the fact alone that the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
26 March 2002, essentially ruled in favor of respondent, does not
necessarily preclude her from appealing the same. Granted that such
a move is ostensibly irrational, nonetheless, it does not amount to
malice, bad faith or abuse of the court processes in the absence of
further proof. Again, it should be noted that the respondent did not
file her intended Petition for Review. The Petition for Review would
have presented before this Court the grounds for respondent's
appeal and her arguments in support thereof. Without said Petition,
any reason attributed to the respondent for appealing the 26 March
2002 Decision would be grounded on mere speculations, to which
this Court cannot give credence.
II
As an exception to the general rule, this Court takes cognizance
of questions of fact raised in the Petition at bar.
It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in
cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals by virtue of Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law.
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon this
Court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to the foregoing
rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the interference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
24
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Several of the enumerated exceptions pertain to the Petition at bar.
It is indubitable that the Court of Appeals made factual findings that
25
are contrary to those of the RTC, thus, resulting in its substantial
modification of the trial court's Decision, and a ruling entirely in favor
of the respondent. In addition, petitioners invoked in the instant
Petition for Review several exceptions that would justify this Court's
review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, i.e., the Court
of Appeals made conflicting findings of fact; findings of fact which
went beyond the issues raised on appeal before it; as well as
findings of fact premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
On the basis of the foregoing, this Court shall proceed to reviewing
and re-evaluating the evidence on record in order to settle questions
of fact raised in the Petition at bar.
The fact that the trial judge who rendered the RTC Decision in
Civil Case No. 11336, dated 24 August 1995, was not the same
judge who heard and tried the case, does not, by itself, render
the said Decision erroneous.
The Decision in Civil Case No. 11336 was rendered more than 10
years from the institution of the said case. In the course of its trial,
26
the case was presided over by four (4) different RTC judges. It was
Judge Victorio, the fourth judge assigned to the case, who wrote the
27
RTC Decision, dated 24 August 1995. In his Decision, Judge
Victorio made the following findings –
After carefully evaluating the mass of evidence adduced by
the parties, this Court is not inclined to believe the plaintiff's
assertion that the promissory notes as well as the deeds of
assignments of her FNCB Finance money market
placements were simulated. The evidence is overwhelming
that the plaintiff received the proceeds of the loans
evidenced by the various promissory notes she had signed.
What is more, there was not an iota of proof save the
plaintiff's bare testimony that she had indeed applied for loan
with the Development Bank of the Philippines.
More importantly, the two deeds of assignment were
notarized, hence they partake the nature of a public
document. It makes more than preponderant proof to
overturn the effect of a notarial attestation. Copies of the
 deeds of assignments were actually filed with the Records
Management and Archives Office.
Finally, there were sufficient evidence wherein the plaintiff
had admitted the existence of her loans with the defendant
Bank in the total amount of ₱1,920,000.00 exclusive of
interests and penalty charges (Exhibits "28", "31", "32", and
"33").
In fine, this Court hereby finds that the defendants had
established the genuineness and due execution of the
various promissory notes heretofore identified as well as the
two deeds of assignments of the plaintiff's money market
placements with defendant FNCB Finance, on the strength
of which the said money market placements were applied to
partially pay the plaintiff's past due obligation with the
defendant Bank. Thus, the total sum of ₱1,053,995.80 of the
plaintiff's past due obligation was partially offset by the said
money market placement leaving a balance of
₱1,069,847.40 as of 5 September 1979 (Exhibit "34").
Disagreeing in the foregoing findings, the Court of Appeals stressed,
in its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, "that
the ponente of the herein assailed Decision is not the Presiding
28
Judge who heard and tried the case." This brings us to the question
of whether the fact alone that the RTC Decision was rendered by a
judge other than the judge who actually heard and tried the case is
sufficient justification for the appellate court to disregard or set aside
the findings in the Decision of the court a quo?
This Court rules in the negative.
What deserves stressing is that, in this jurisdiction, there exists a
disputable presumption that the RTC Decision was rendered by the
judge in the regular performance of his official duties. While the said
presumption is only disputable, it is satisfactory unless contradicted
29
or overcame by other evidence. Encompassed in this presumption
of regularity is the presumption that the RTC judge, in resolving the
case and drafting his Decision, reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all
the evidence on record. That the said RTC judge is not the same
judge who heard the case and received the evidence is of little
consequence when the records and transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSNs) are complete and available for consideration by the former.
30
In People v. Gazmen, this Court already elucidated its position on
such an issue –
Accused-appellant makes an issue of the fact that the judge
who penned the decision was not the judge who heard and
tried the case and concludes therefrom that the findings of
the former are erroneous. Accused-appellant's argument
does not merit a lengthy discussion. It is well-settled that the
decision of a judge who did not try the case is not by that
reason alone erroneous.
It is true that the judge who ultimately decided the case had
not heard the controversy at all, the trial having been
conducted by then Judge Emilio L. Polig, who was
indefinitely suspended by this Court. Nonetheless, the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were
complete and were presumably examined and studied by
Judge Baguilat before he rendered his decision. It is not
unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on the
basis of the record. The fact that he did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during
the trial but merely relied on the transcript of their
testimonies does not for that reason alone render the
judgment erroneous.
(People vs. Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685, 692 [1992])
Although it is true that the judge who heard the witnesses
testify is in a better position to observe the witnesses on the
stand and determine by their demeanor whether they are
telling the truth or mouthing falsehood, it does not
necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during
the trial cannot render a valid decision since he can rely on
 the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial as
basis of his decision.
Accused-appellant's contention that the trial judge did not
have the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor
of the witnesses since he was not the same judge who
conducted the hearing is also untenable. While it is true that
the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a
better position to ascertain the truth and falsity of the
testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow
that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot
render a valid and just decision since the latter can also rely
on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial
as the basis of his decision.
(People vs. De Paz, 212 SCRA 56, 63 [1992])
This Court proceeds to making its own findings of fact.
Since the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51930, dated 26 March 2002, has become final and executory as to
the respondent, due to her failure to interpose an appeal therefrom
within the reglementary period, she is already bound by the factual
findings in the said Decision. Likewise, respondent's failure to file,
within the reglementary period, a Motion for Reconsideration or an
appeal of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the same case,
dated 20 November 2002, which modified its earlier Decision by
deleting paragraph 3(v) of its dispositive portion, ordering petitioners
to return to respondent the proceeds of her money market placement
with AIDC, shall already bar her from questioning such modification
before this Court. Thus, what is for review before this Court is the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, as modified
by the Resolution of the same court, dated 20 November 2002.

At any rate, the test to determine the value of the testimony Respondent alleged that she had several deposits and money
of the witness is whether or not such is in conformity with market placements with petitioners. These deposits and money
knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind market placements, as determined by the Court of Appeals in its
(People vs. Morre, 217 SCRA 219 [1993]). Further, the Decision, dated 26 March 2002, and as modified by its Resolution,
credibility of witnesses can also be assessed on the basis of dated 20 November 2002, are as follows –
the substance of their testimony and the surrounding
circumstances (People v. Gonzales, 210 SCRA 44 [1992]). A Deposit/Placement Amount
critical evaluation of the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses reveals that their testimony accords with theDollar deposit with Citibank-Geneva $
aforementioned tests, and carries with it the ring of truth end 149,632.99
perforce, must be given full weight and credit.
Money market placement with Citibank, evidenced by Promissory Note (PN) No. ₱
23356 (which cancels and supersedes PN No. 22526), earning 14.5% interest per 318,897.34
Irrefragably, by reason alone that the judge who penned the RTC annum (p.a.)
Decision was not the same judge who heard the case and received
the evidence therein would not render the findings in the said Money market placement with Citibank, evidenced by PN No. 23357 (which cancels ₱
Decision erroneous and unreliable. While the conduct and demeanor and supersedes PN No. 22528), earning 14.5% interest p.a. 203,150.00
of witnesses may sway a trial court judge in deciding a case, it is not,
and should not be, his only consideration. Even more vital for theMoney
trial market placement with FNCB Finance, evidenced by PN No. 5757 (which ₱
court judge's decision are the contents and substance of the cancels and supersedes PN No. 4952), earning 17% interest p.a. 500,000.00
witnesses' testimonies, as borne out by the TSNs, as well as the Money market placement with FNCB Finance, evidenced by PN No. 5758 (which ₱
object and documentary evidence submitted and made part ofcancels the and supersedes PN No. 2962), earning 17% interest p.a. 500,000.00
records of the case.
This Court is tasked to determine whether petitioners are indeed
liable to return the foregoing amounts, together with the appropriate
interests and penalties, to respondent. It shall trace respondent's
transactions with petitioners, from her money market placements
with petitioner Citibank and petitioner FNCB Finance, to her savings
and current accounts with petitioner Citibank, and to her dollar
accounts with Citibank-Geneva.
Money market placements with petitioner Citibank
The history of respondent's money market placements with petitioner
Citibank began on 6 December 1976, when she made a placement
of ₱500,000.00 as principal amount, which was supposed to earn an
interest of 16% p.a. and for which PN No. 20773 was issued.
Respondent did not yet claim the proceeds of her placement and,
instead, rolled-over or re-invested the principal and proceeds several
times in the succeeding years for which new PNs were issued by
petitioner Citibank to replace the ones which matured. Petitioner
Citibank accounted for respondent's original placement and the
subsequent roll-overs thereof, as follows –
Date
PN No. Cancels PN No.
(mm/dd/yyyy)
12/06/1976 20773 None
01/14/1977 21686 20773
22526 21686
02/09/1977
22528 21686
23356 22526
03/17/1977
23357 22528
Petitioner Citibank alleged that it had already paid to
respondent the principal amounts and proceeds of PNs No.
23356 and 23357, upon their maturity. Petitioner Citibank
further averred that respondent used the ₱500,000.00 from
the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357, plus ₱600,000.00
sourced from her other funds, to open two time deposit (TD)
accounts with petitioner Citibank, namely, TD Accounts No.
17783 and 17784.
Petitioner Citibank did not deny the existence nor questioned
the authenticity of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 it issued in
favor of respondent for her money market placements. In
fact, it admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
said PNs, but qualified that they were no longer
31 32
outstanding. In Hibberd v. Rohde and McMillian, this
Court delineated the consequences of such an admission –
By the admission of the genuineness and due
execution of an instrument, as provided in this
section, is meant that the party whose signature it
bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed
by another for him with his authority; that at the time
it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as
set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it;
that the document was delivered; and that any
formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks,
Maturity Date Amount Interest
are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that
(mm/dd/yyyy) (P) (p.a.)
the signature is a forgery (Puritan Mfg. Co. vs. Toti &
01/13/1977 Gradi, 14 N. M.,16%
500,000.00 425; Cox vs. Northwestern Stage
Co., 1 Idaho, 376; Woollen vs. Whitacre, 73 Ind.,
02/08/1977 508,444.44 15% 47 Wis., 479;
198; Smith vs. Ehnert,
Faelnar vs. Escaño, 11 Phil. Rep., 92); or that it was
03/16/1977 313,952.59 15-3/4%
unauthorized, as in the case of an agent signing for
03/16/1977 his principal, or
200,000.00 one signing in behalf of a partnership
15-3/4%
(Country Bank vs. Greenberg, 127 Cal., 26;
04/20/1977 318,897.34
Henshaw vs. 14-1/2%
Root, 60 Inc., 220; Naftzker vs. Lantz,
137 Mich., 441) or of a corporation
04/20/1977 203,150.00 14-1/2%
(Merchant vs. International Banking Corporation, 6
Phil Rep., 314; Wanita vs. Rollins, 75 Miss., 253;
Barnes vs. Spencer & Barnes Co., 162 Mich., 509);
or that, in the case of the latter, that the corporation
was authorized under its charter to sign the
instrument (Merchant vs. International Banking
Corporation, supra); or that the party charged signed
 the instrument in some other capacity than that
alleged in the pleading setting it out
(Payne vs. National Bank, 16 Kan., 147); or that it
was never delivered (Hunt vs. Weir, 29 Ill., 83;
Elbring vs. Mullen, 4 Idaho, 199; Thorp vs. Keokuk
Coal Co., 48 N.Y., 253; Fire Association of
Philadelphia vs. Ruby, 60 Neb., 216) are cut off by
the admission of its genuineness and due execution.
The effect of the admission is such that in the case
of a promissory note a prima facie case is made for
the plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of
evidence on his part and entitles him to a judgment
on the pleadings unless a special defense of new
matter, such as payment, is interposed by the
defendant (Papa vs. Martinez, 12 Phil. Rep., 613;
Chinese Chamber of Commerce vs. Pua To Ching,
14 Phil. Rep., 222; Banco Español-
Filipino vs. McKay & Zoeller, 27 Phil. Rep., 183). x x
x 35
Since the genuineness and due execution of PNs No. 23356
and 23357 are uncontested, respondent was able to
establish prima facie that petitioner Citibank is liable to her
for the amounts stated therein. The assertion of petitioner
Citibank of payment of the said PNs is an affirmative
allegation of a new matter, the burden of proof as to such
resting on petitioner Citibank. Respondent having proved the
existence of the obligation, the burden of proof was upon
33
petitioner Citibank to show that it had been discharged. It
has already been established by this Court that –
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the
burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must
allege non-payment, the general rule is that the
burden rests on the defendant to prove payment,
rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.
The debtor has the burden of showing with legal
certainty that the obligation has been discharged by
payment.
When the existence of a debt is fully established by
the evidence contained in the record, the burden of
proving that it has been extinguished by payment
devolves upon the debtor who offers such defense
to the claim of the creditor. Where the debtor
introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of
going forward with the evidence – as distinct from
the general burden of proof – shifts to the creditor,
who is then under the duty of producing some
34
evidence of non-payment.
Reviewing the evidence on record, this Court finds that
petitioner Citibank failed to satisfactorily prove that PNs No.
23356 and 23357 had already been paid, and that the
amount so paid was actually used to open one of
respondent's TD accounts with petitioner Citibank.
Petitioner Citibank presented the testimonies of two
witnesses to support its contention of payment: (1) That of
Mr. Herminio Pujeda, the officer-in-charge of loans and
placements at the time when the questioned transactions
36
took place; and (2) that of Mr. Francisco Tan, the former
Assistant Vice-President of Citibank, who directly dealt with
respondent with regard to her deposits and loans.
37
The relevant portion of Mr. Pujeda's testimony as to PNs
No. 23356 and 23357 (referred to therein as Exhibits No.
"47" and "48," respectively) is reproduced below –
Atty. Mabasa:
Okey [sic]. Now Mr. Witness, you were
asked to testify in this case and this case is
[sic] consist [sic] of several documents
involving transactions between the plaintiff
and the defendant. Now, were you able to
make your own memorandum regarding all
these transactions?
A Yes, based on my recollection of these facts, I did
come up of [sic] the outline of the chronological
sequence of events.
Court:
Are you trying to say that you have personal
knowledge or participation to these
transactions?
A Yes, your Honor, I was the officer-in charge of the
unit that was processing these transactions. Some of
the documents bear my signature.
Court:
And this resume or summary that you have
prepared is based on purely your
recollection or documents?
A Based on documents, your Honor.
Court:
Are these documents still available now?
A Yes, your honor.
Court:
Better present the documents.
Atty. Mabasa:
Yes, your Honor, that is why your Honor.
Atty. Mabasa:
Q Now, basing on the notes that you prepared, Mr.
Witness, and according to you basing also on your
personal recollection about all the transactions
involved between Modesta Sabeniano and
defendant City Bank [sic] in this case. Now, would
you tell us what happened to the money market
placements of Modesta Sabeniano that you have
earlier identified in Exhs. "47" and "48"?
A The transactions which I said earlier were
terminated and booked to time deposits.
Q And you are saying time deposits with what bank?
A With First National Citibank.
Q Is it the same bank as Citibank, N.A.?
A Yes, sir.
Q And how much was the amount booked as time
deposit with defendant Citibank?
A In the amount of ₱500,000.00.
Q And outside this ₱500,000.00 which you said was
booked out of the proceeds of Exhs. "47" and "48",
were there other time deposits opened by Mrs.
Modesta Sabeniano at that time.
A Yes, she also opened another time deposit for
₱600,000.00.
Q So all in all Mr. Witness, sometime in April of 1978
Mrs. Modesta Sabeneano [sic] had time deposit
placements with Citibank in the amount of
₱500,000.00 which is the proceeds of Exh. "47" and
"48" and another ₱600,000.00, is it not?
 A Yes, sir.
Q And would you know where did the other
₱600,000 placed by Mrs. Sabeneano [sic] in a time
deposit with Citibank, N.A. came [sic] from?
A She funded it directly.
Q What are you saying Mr. Witness is that the
₱600,000 is a [sic] fresh money coming from Mrs.
Modesta Sabeneano [sic]?
A That is right.
In his deposition in Hong Kong, Mr. Tan recounted what
happened to PNs No. 23356 and 23357 (referred to therein
as Exhibits "E" and "F," respectively), as follows –
Atty. Mabasa : Now from the Exhibits that you have
identified Mr. Tan from Exhibits "A" to "F", which are
Exhibits of the plaintiff. Now, do I understand from
you that the original amount is Five Hundred
Thousand and thereafter renewed in the succeeding
exhibits?
Mr. Tan : Yes, Sir.
Atty. Mabasa : Alright, after these Exhibits "E" and
"F" matured, what happened thereafter?
Mr. Tan : Split into two time deposits.
Atty. Mabasa : Exhibits "E" and "F"?
Before anything else, it should be noted that when Mr.
Pujeda's testimony before the RTC was made on 12 March
1990 and Mr. Tan's deposition in Hong Kong was conducted
on 3 September 1990, more than a decade had passed from
the time the transactions they were testifying on took place.
This Court had previously recognized the frailty and
unreliability of human memory with regards to figures after
38
the lapse of five years. Taking into consideration the
substantial length of time between the transactions and the
witnesses' testimonies, as well as the undeniable fact that
bank officers deal with multiple clients and process
numerous transactions during their tenure, this Court is
reluctant to give much weight to the testimonies of Mr.
Pujeda and Mr. Tan regarding the payment of PNs No.
23356 and 23357 and the use by respondent of the
proceeds thereof for opening TD accounts. This Court finds it
implausible that they should remember, after all these years,
this particular transaction with respondent involving her PNs
No. 23356 and 23357 and TD accounts. Both witnesses did
not give any reason as to why, from among all the clients
they had dealt with and all the transactions they had
processed as officers of petitioner Citibank, they specially
remembered respondent and her PNs No. 23356 and 23357.
Their testimonies likewise lacked details on the
circumstances surrounding the payment of the two PNs and
the opening of the time deposit accounts by respondent,
such as the date of payment of the two PNs, mode of
payment, and the manner and context by which respondent
relayed her instructions to the officers of petitioner Citibank
to use the proceeds of her two PNs in opening the TD
accounts.
Moreover, while there are documentary evidences to support
and trace respondent's money market placements with
petitioner Citibank, from the original PN No. 20773, rolled-
over several times to, finally, PNs No. 23356 and 23357,
there is an evident absence of any documentary evidence on
the payment of these last two PNs and the use of the
proceeds thereof by respondent for opening TD accounts.
The paper trail seems to have ended with the copies of PNs
No. 23356 and 23357. Although both Mr. Pujeda and Mr.
Tan said that they based their testimonies, not just on their
memories but also on the documents on file, the supposed
documents on which they based those portions of their
testimony on the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and
the opening of the TD accounts from the proceeds
thereof, were never presented before the courts nor
made part of the records of the case. Respondent's
money market placements were of substantial amounts –
consisting of the principal amount of ₱500,000.00, plus the
interest it should have earned during the years of placement
– and it is difficult for this Court to believe that petitioner
Citibank would not have had documented the payment
thereof.
When Mr. Pujeda testified before the RTC on 6 February
39
1990, petitioners' counsel attempted to present in evidence
a document that would supposedly support the claim of
petitioner Citibank that the proceeds of PNs No. 23356 and
23357 were used by respondent to open one of her two TD
accounts in the amount of ₱500,000.00. Respondent's
counsel objected to the presentation of the document since it
was a mere "xerox" copy, and was blurred and hardly
readable. Petitioners' counsel then asked for a continuance
of the hearing so that they can have time to produce a better
document, which was granted by the court. However, during
the next hearing and continuance of Mr. Pujeda's testimony
on 12 March 1990, petitioners' counsel no longer referred to
the said document.
As respondent had established a prima facie case that
petitioner Citibank is obligated to her for the amounts stated
in PNs No. 23356 and 23357, and as petitioner Citibank
failed to present sufficient proof of payment of the said PNs
and the use by the respondent of the proceeds thereof to
open her TD accounts, this Court finds that PNs No. 23356
and 23357 are still outstanding and petitioner Citibank is
still liable to respondent for the amounts stated therein.
The significance of this Court's declaration that PNs No.
23356 and 23357 are still outstanding becomes apparent in
the light of petitioners' next contentions – that respondent
used the proceeds of PNs No. 23356 and 23357, together
with additional money, to open TD Accounts No. 17783 and
17784 with petitioner Citibank; and, subsequently,
respondent pre-terminated these TD accounts and
transferred the proceeds thereof, amounting to
₱1,100,000.00, to petitioner FNCB Finance for money
market placements. While respondent's money market
placements with petitioner FNCB Finance may be traced
back with definiteness to TD Accounts No. 17783 and
17784, there is only flimsy and unsubstantiated connection
between the said TD accounts and the supposed proceeds
paid from PNs No. 23356 and 23357. With PNs No. 23356
and 23357 still unpaid, then they represent an obligation of
petitioner Citibank separate and distinct from the obligation
of petitioner FNCB Finance arising from respondent's money
market placements with the latter.
Money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance
According to petitioners, respondent's TD Accounts No.
17783 and 17784, in the total amount of ₱1,100,000.00,
were supposed to mature on 15 March 1978. However,
40
respondent, through a letter dated 28 April 1977, pre-
terminated the said TD accounts and transferred all the
proceeds thereof to petitioner FNCB Finance for money
market placement. Pursuant to her instructions, TD Accounts
No. 17783 and 17784 were pre-terminated and petitioner
Citibank (then still named First National City Bank) issued
41 42
Manager's Checks (MC) No. 199253 and 199251 for the
amounts of ₱500,000.00 and ₱600,00.00, respectively. Both
MCs were payable to Citifinance (which, according to Mr.
43
Pujeda, was one with and the same as petitioner FNCB
Finance), with the additional notation that "A/C MODESTA
R. SABENIANO." Typewritten on MC No. 199253 is the
phrase "Ref. Proceeds of TD 17783," and on MC No.
199251 is a similar phrase, "Ref. Proceeds of TD 17784."
These phrases purportedly established that the MCs were
paid from the proceeds of respondent's pre-terminated TD
accounts with petitioner Citibank. Upon receipt of the MCs,
petitioner FNCB Finance deposited the same to its account
with Feati Bank and Trust Co., as evidenced by the rubber
stamp mark of the latter found at the back of both MCs. In
 exchange, petitioner FNCB Finance booked the amounts
received as money market placements, and accordingly
issued PNs No. 4952 and 4962, for the amounts of
₱500,000.00 and ₱600,000.00, respectively, payable to
respondent's savings account with petitioner Citibank, S/A
No. 25-13703-4, upon their maturity on 1 June 1977. Once
again, respondent rolled-over several times the principal
amounts of her money market placements with petitioner
FNCB Finance, as follows –
when these were already canceled and superseded. It is now
incumbent upon this Court to determine what subsequently
happened to PNs No. 8167 and 8169.
Petitioner FNCB Finance presented four checks as proof of payment
of the principal amounts and interests of PNs No. 8167 and 8169
upon their maturity. All the checks were payable to respondent's
savings account with petitioner Citibank, with the following details –

Date of Check Amount Notation

Date
PN No. Cancels PN No.
Maturity Date Amount Interest Issuance No. (₱)
(mm/dd/yyyy) (mm/dd/yyyy) (₱) (p.a.)(mm/dd/yyyy)
4952 None 06/01/1977 500,000.00 17% 09/01/1978 76962 12,833.34 Interest payment on
04/29/1977 PN#08167
4962 None 06/01/1977 600,000.00 17%
09/01/1978 76961 12,833.34 Interest payment on
5757 4952 08/31/1977 500,000.00 17%
06/02/1977 PN#08169
5758 4962 08/31/1977 500,000.00 17%
09/05/1978 77035 500,000.00 Full payment of
8167 5757 08/25/1978 500,000.00 14% principal on PN#08167
08/31/1977 which is hereby
8169 5752 08/25/1978 500,000.00 14% cancelled
09/05/ 1978 77034 500,000.00 Full payment of
As presented by the petitioner FNCB Finance, respondent rolled- principal on PN#08169
over only the principal amounts of her money market placements as which is hereby
she chose to receive the interest income therefrom. Petitioner FNCB cancelled
Finance also pointed out that when PN No. 4962, with principal
amount of ₱600,000.00, matured on 1 June 1977, respondent
received a partial payment of the principal which, together with the Then again, Checks No. 77035 and 77034 were later returned to
47
interest, amounted to ₱102,633.33; thus, only the amount of
44
petitioner FNCB Finance together with a memo, dated 6 September
₱500,000.00 from PN No. 4962 was rolled-over to PN No. 5758. 1978, from Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, to a Mr. Bobby Mendoza of
petitioner FNCB Finance. According to the memo, the two checks, in
Based on the foregoing records, the principal amounts of PNs No. the total amount of ₱1,000,000.00, were to be returned to
5757 and 5758, upon their maturity, were rolled over to PNs No. respondent's account with instructions to book the said amount in
45
8167 and 8169, respectively. PN No. 8167 expressly canceled and money market placements for one more year. Pursuant to the said
46
superseded PN No. 5757, while PN No. 8169 also explicitly memo, Checks No. 77035 and 77034 were invested by petitioner
canceled and superseded PN No. 5758. Thus, it is patently FNCB Finance, on behalf of respondent, in money market
erroneous for the Court of Appeals to still award to respondent the placements for which it issued PNs No. 20138 and 20139. The PNs
principal amounts and interests covered by PNs No. 5757 and 5758
each covered ₱500,000.00, to earn 11% interest per annum, and to Since both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had consistently
mature on 3 September 1979. recognized only the ₱31,079.14 of respondent's savings account
with petitioner Citibank, and that respondent failed to move for
On 3 September 1979, petitioner FNCB Finance issued Check No. reconsideration or to appeal this particular finding of fact by the trial
100168, pay to the order of "Citibank N.A. A/C Modesta Sabeniano," and appellate courts, it is already binding upon this Court.
in the amount of ₱1,022,916.66, as full payment of the principal Respondent is already precluded from claiming any greater amount
amounts and interests of both PNs No. 20138 and 20139 and, in her savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank. Thus,
48
resultantly, canceling the said PNs. Respondent actually admitted this Court shall limit itself to determining whether or not respondent is
the issuance and existence of Check No. 100168, but with the entitled to the return of the amount of ₱31,079.14 should the off-set
qualification that the proceeds thereof were turned over to petitioner thereof by petitioner Citibank against her supposed loans be found
49
Citibank. Respondent did not clarify the circumstances attending invalid.
the supposed turn over, but on the basis of the allegations of
petitioner Citibank itself, the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139, Dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva
amounting to ₱1,022,916.66, was used by it to liquidate respondent's
outstanding loans. Therefore, the determination of whether or not Respondent made an effort of preparing and presenting before the
respondent is still entitled to the return of the proceeds of PNs No. RTC her own computations of her money market placements and
20138 and 20139 shall be dependent on the resolution of the issues dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva, purportedly amounting to a
raised as to the existence of the loans and the authority of petitioner 51
total of United States (US) $343,220.98, as of 23 June 1985. In her
Citibank to use the proceeds of the said PNs, together with Memorandum filed with the RTC, she claimed a much bigger amount
respondent's other deposits and money market placements, to pay of deposits and money market placements with Citibank-Geneva,
for the same. 52
totaling US$1,336,638.65. However, respondent herself also
submitted as part of her formal offer of evidence the computation of
Savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank her money market placements and dollar accounts with Citibank-
53
Geneva as determined by the latter. Citibank-Geneva accounted
Respondent presented and submitted before the RTC deposit slips for respondent's money market placements and dollar accounts as
and bank statements to prove deposits made to several of her follows –
accounts with petitioner Citibank, particularly, Accounts No.
00484202, 59091, and 472-751, which would have amounted to a MODESTA SABENIANO &/OR
total of ₱3,812,712.32, had there been no withdrawals or debits from ==================
the said accounts from the time the said deposits were made.
US$ 30'000.-- Principal Fid. Placement
Although the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not make any + US$ 339.06 Interest at 3,875% p.a. from 12.07. –
definitive findings as to the status of respondent's savings and 25.10.79
current accounts with petitioner Citibank, the Decisions of both the
trial and appellate courts effectively recognized only the ₱31,079.14 - US$ 95.-- Commission (minimum)
coming from respondent's savings account which was used to off-set
her alleged outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank.
50 US$ 30'244.06 Total proceeds on 25.10.1979
US$ 114'000.-- Principal Fid. Placement
 + US$ 1'358.50 since
Interest at 4,125% p.a. from 12.07. – she did not perfect an appeal of the Decision of the Court of
25.10.79 Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, which found that she is entitled only
to the return of the said amount, as far as her accounts with Citibank-
- US$ 41.17 Commission Geneva is concerned.
US$ 115'317.33 Total proceeds on 25.10.1979
III
US$ 145'561.39 Total proceeds of both placements on
25.10.1979 Petitioner Citibank was able to establish by preponderance of
evidence the existence of respondent's loans.
+ US$ 11'381.31 total of both current accounts
US$ 156'942.70 Total funds available Petitioners' version of events
- US$ 149'632.99 Transfer to Citibank Manila on 26.10.1979
In sum, the following amounts were used by petitioner Citibank to
(counter value of Pesos 1'102'944.78)
liquidate respondent's purported outstanding loans –
US$ 7'309.71 Balance in current accounts
- US$ 6'998.84 Transfer to Citibank Zuerich – ac no. 121359
Description Amount
on March 13, 1980
Principal and interests of PNs No. 20138 and 20139
US$ 310.87 various charges including closing charges (money market placements with petitioner FNCB
Finance) ₱ 1,022,9
According to the foregoing computation, by 25 October 1979, Savings account with petitioner Citibank 31,0
respondent had a total of US$156,942.70, from which,
US$149,632.99 was transferred by Citibank-Geneva to petitioner Dollar remittance from Citibank-Geneva (peso equivalent
Citibank in Manila, and was used by the latter to off-set respondent's of US$149,632.99) 1,102,9
outstanding loans. The balance of respondent's accounts with
Citibank-Geneva, after the remittance to petitioner Citibank in Manila, Total ₱ 2,156,9
amounted to US$7,309.71, which was subsequently expended by a
transfer to another account with Citibank-Zuerich, in the amount of
US$6,998.84, and by payment of various bank charges, including According to petitioner Citibank, respondent incurred her loans under
closing charges, in the amount of US$310.87. Rightly so, both the the circumstances narrated below.
RTC and the Court of Appeals gave more credence to the
computation of Citibank-Geneva as to the status of respondent's As early as 9 February 1978, respondent obtained her first loan from
accounts with the said bank, rather than the one prepared by petitioner Citibank in the principal amount of ₱200,000.00, for which
54
respondent herself, which was evidently self-serving. Once again, she executed PN No. 31504. Petitioner Citibank extended to her
this Court shall limit itself to determining whether or not respondent is several other loans in the succeeding months. Some of these loans
entitled to the return of the amount of US$149,632.99 should the off- were paid, while others were rolled-over or renewed. Significant to
set thereof by petitioner Citibank against her alleged outstanding the Petition at bar are the loans which respondent obtained from July
55
loans be found invalid. Respondent cannot claim any greater amount 1978 to January 1979, appropriately covered by PNs (first set). The
 aggregate principal amount of these loans was ₱1,920,000.00, which 34534 01/09/1979 03/09/1979
could be broken down as follows –
34612 01/19/1979 03/16/1979
Date of 34741 01/26/1979 03/12/1979
Date of Maturity Principal Date of Release
PN No. Issuance MC No.
(mm/dd/yyyy) Amount (mm/dd/yyyy) 35689 02/23/1979 05/29/1979
(mm/dd/yyyy)
32935 07/20/1978 09/18/1978 ₱ 400,000.00 07/20/1978 220701 35694 03/19/1979 05/29/1979

33751 10/13/1978 12/12/1978 100,000.00 Unrecovered 35695 03/19/1979 05/29/1979

33798 10/19/1978 11/03/1978 100,000.00 10/19/1978 226285 356946 03/20/1979 05/29/1979

34025 11/15/1978 01/15/1979 150,000.00 11/16/1978 226439 35697 03/30/1979 05/29/1979

34079 11/21/1978 01/19/1979 250,000.00 11/21/1978 226467 Total

34192 12/04/1978 01/18/1979 100,000.00 12/05/1978 228057

All the PNs stated that the purpose of the loans covered thereby is
34402 12/26/1978 02/23/1979 300,000.00 12/26/1978 "To liquidate existing obligation," except for PN No. 34534, which
228203
stated for its purpose "personal investment."
34534 01/09/1979 03/09/1979 150,000.00 01/09/1979 228270
34609 01/17/1979 03/19/1979 150,000.00 01/17/1979 Respondent secured her foregoing loans with petitioner Citibank by
228357
executing Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements
34740 01/30/1979 03/30/1979 220,000.00 01/30/1979 228400
with petitioner FNCB Finance. On 2 March 1978, respondent
57
executed in favor of petitioner Citibank a Deed of Assignment of PN
Total ₱ 1,920,000.00 No. 8169, which was issued by petitioner FNCB Finance, to secure
payment of the credit and banking facilities extended to her by
petitioner Citibank, in the aggregate principal amount of
When respondent was unable to pay the first set of PNs upon their ₱500,000.00. On 9 March 1978, respondent executed in favor of
58
maturity, these were rolled-over or renewed several times, petitioner Citibank another Deed of Assignment, this time, of PN
necessitating the execution by respondent of new PNs in favor of No. 8167, also issued by petitioner FNCB Finance, to secure
petitioner Citibank. As of 5 April 1979, respondent had the following payment of the credit and banking facilities extended to her by
56
outstanding PNs (second set), the principal amount of which petitioner Citibank, in the aggregate amount of ₱500,000.00. When
remained at ₱1,920,000.00 – PNs No. 8167 and 8169, representing respondent's money market
placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, matured and were rolled-
over to PNs No. 20138 and 20139, respondent executed new Deeds
Date of Issuance Date of Maturity 59
PN No. of Assignment, in Amount
Principal favor of petitioner Citibank, on 25 August 1978.
(mm/dd/yyyy) (mm/dd/yyyy)
According to the more recent Deeds, respondent assigned PNs No.
34510 01/01/1979 03/02/1979 20138 and 20139,Prepresenting
400,000.00 her rolled-over money market
placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, to petitioner Citibank as
34509 01/02/1979 03/02/1979 100,000.00
security for the banking and credit facilities it extended to her, in the
aggregate principal amount of ₱500,000.00 per Deed.
In addition to the Deeds of Assignment of her money market
placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, respondent also executed
60
a Declaration of Pledge, in which she supposedly pledged "[a]ll
present and future fiduciary placements held in my personal and/or
joint name with Citibank, Switzerland," to secure all claims the
petitioner Citibank may have or, in the future, acquire against
respondent. The petitioners' copy of the Declaration of Pledge is
undated, while that of the respondent, a copy certified by a Citibank-
61
Geneva officer, bore the date 24 September 1979.
When respondent failed to pay the second set of PNs upon their
maturity, an exchange of letters ensued between respondent and/or
her representatives, on one hand, and the representatives of
petitioners, on the other.
62
The first letter was dated 5 April 1979, addressed to respondent
and signed by Mr. Tan, as the manager of petitioner Citibank, which
stated, in part, that –
Despite our repeated requests and follow-up, we regret you
have not granted us with any response or payment.
We, therefore, have no alternative but to call your loan of
₱1,920,000.00 plus interests and other charges due and
demandable. If you still fail to settle this obligation by
4/27/79, we shall have no other alternative but to refer your
account to our lawyers for legal action to protect the interest
of the bank.
63
Respondent sent a reply letter dated 26 April 1979, printed on
paper bearing the letterhead of respondent's company, MC Adore
International Palace, the body of which reads –
This is in reply to your letter dated April 5, 1979 inviting my
attention to my loan which has become due. Pursuant to our
representation with you over the telephone through Mr. F. A.
Tan, you allow us to pay the interests due for the meantime.
Please accept our Comtrust Check in the amount of
₱62,683.33.
Please bear with us for a little while, at most ninety days. As
you know, we have a pending loan with the Development
Bank of the Philippines in the amount of ₱11-M. This loan
has already been recommended for approval and would be
submitted to the Board of Governors. In fact, to further
facilitate the early release of this loan, we have presented
and furnished Gov. J. Tengco a xerox copy of your letter.
You will be doing our corporation a very viable service,
should you grant us our request for a little more time.
A week later or on 3 May 1979, a certain C. N. Pugeda, designated
64
as "Executive Secretary," sent a letter to petitioner Citibank, on
behalf of respondent. The letter was again printed on paper bearing
the letterhead of MC Adore International Palace. The pertinent
paragraphs of the said letter are reproduced below –
Per instructions of Mrs. Modesta R. Sabeniano, we would
like to request for a re-computation of the interest and
penalty charges on her loan in the aggregate amount of
₱1,920,000.00 with maturity date of all promissory notes at
June 30, 1979. As she has personally discussed with you
yesterday, this date will more or less assure you of early
settlement.
In this regard, please entrust to bearer, our Comtrust check
for ₱62,683.33 to be replaced by another check with amount
resulting from the new computation. Also, to facilitate the
processing of the same, may we request for another set of
promissory notes for the signature of Mrs. Sabeniano and to
cancel the previous ones she has signed and forwarded to
you.
 65
This was followed by a telegram, dated 5 June 1979, and received
by petitioner Citibank the following day. The telegram was sent by a
Dewey G. Soriano, Legal Counsel. The telegram acknowledged
receipt of the telegram sent by petitioner Citibank regarding the "re-
past due obligation" of McAdore International Palace. However, it
reported that respondent, the President and Chairman of MC Adore
International Palace, was presently abroad negotiating for a big loan.
Thus, he was requesting for an extension of the due date of the
obligation until respondent's arrival on or before 31 July 1979.
66
The next letter, dated 21 June 1979, was signed by respondent
herself and addressed to Mr. Bobby Mendoza, a Manager of
petitioner FNCB Finance. Respondent wrote therein –
Re: PN No. 20138 for ₱500,000.00 & PN No. 20139
for ₱500,000.00 totalling ₱1 Million, both PNs will
mature on 9/3/1979.
This is to authorize you to release the accrued quarterly
interests payment from my captioned placements and
forward directly to Citibank, Manila Attention: Mr. F. A. Tan,
Manager, to apply to my interest payable on my outstanding
loan with Citibank.
Please note that the captioned two placements are
continuously pledged/hypothecated to Citibank, Manila to
support my personal outstanding loan. Therefore, please do
not release the captioned placements upon maturity until you
have received the instruction from Citibank, Manila.
67
On even date, respondent sent another letter to Mr. Tan of
petitioner Citibank, stating that –
Re: S/A No. 25-225928
and C/A No. 484-946
This letter serves as an authority to debit whatever the
outstanding balance from my captioned accounts and credit
the amount to my loan outstanding account with you.
Unlike respondent's earlier letters, both letters, dated 21 June 1979,
are printed on plain paper, without the letterhead of her company,
MC Adore International Palace.
By 5 September 1979, respondent's outstanding and past due
obligations to petitioner Citibank totaled ₱2,123,843.20, representing
the principal amounts plus interests. Relying on respondent's Deeds
of Assignment, petitioner Citibank applied the proceeds of
respondent's money market placements with petitioner FNCB
Finance, as well as her deposit account with petitioner Citibank, to
partly liquidate respondent's outstanding loan balance, as follows –
68
Respondent's outstanding obligation (principal and interest) ₱ 2,123,8
Less: Proceeds from respondent's money market placements
with petitioner FNCB Finance (principal and interest) (1,022,91
Deposits in respondent's bank accounts with petitioner
Citibank (31,07
Balance of respondent's obligation ₱ 1,069,8
69
Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank subsequently sent a letter, dated 28
September 1979, notifying respondent of the status of her loans and
the foregoing compensation which petitioner Citibank effected. In the
letter, Mr. Tan informed respondent that she still had a remaining
past-due obligation in the amount of ₱1,069,847.40, as of 5
September 1979, and should respondent fail to pay the amount by
15 October 1979, then petitioner Citibank shall proceed to off-set the
unpaid amount with respondent's other collateral, particularly, a
money market placement in Citibank-Hongkong.
On 5 October 1979, respondent wrote Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank,
on paper bearing the letterhead of MC Adore International Palace, as
regards the ₱1,920,000.00 loan account supposedly of MC Adore
Finance & Investment, Inc., and requested for a statement of account
covering the principal and interest of the loan as of 31 October 1979.
She stated therein that the loan obligation shall be paid within 60
days from receipt of the statement of account.
Almost three weeks later, or on 25 October 1979, a certain Atty.
Moises Tolentino dropped by the office of petitioner Citibank, with a
letter, dated 9 October 1979, and printed on paper with the
letterhead of MC Adore International Palace, which authorized the
bearer thereof to represent the respondent in settling the overdue
account, this time, purportedly, of MC Adore International Palace
Hotel. The letter was signed by respondent as the President and
Chairman of the Board.
Eventually, Atty. Antonio Agcaoili of Agcaoili & Associates, as
counsel of petitioner Citibank, sent a letter to respondent, dated 31
October 1979, informing her that petitioner Citibank had effected an
off-set using her account with Citibank-Geneva, in the amount of
US$149,632.99, against her "outstanding, overdue, demandable and
unpaid obligation" to petitioner Citibank. Atty. Agcaoili claimed
therein that the compensation or off-set was made pursuant to and in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 1278 through 1290 of the
Civil Code. He further declared that respondent's obligation to
petitioner Citibank was now fully paid and liquidated.
th
Unfortunately, on 7 October 1987, a fire gutted the 7 floor of
petitioner Citibank's building at Paseo de Roxas St., Makati, Metro
70
Manila. Petitioners submitted a Certification to this effect, dated 17
January 1991, issued by the Chief of the Arson Investigation Section,
Fire District III, Makati Fire Station, Metropolitan Police Force. The
th
7 floor of petitioner Citibank's building housed its Control Division,
which was in charge of keeping the necessary documents for cases
in which it was involved. After compiling the documentary evidence
for the present case, Atty. Renato J. Fernandez, internal legal
counsel of petitioner Citibank, forwarded them to the Control
Division. The original copies of the MCs, which supposedly represent
the proceeds of the first set of PNs, as well as that of other
documentary evidence related to the case, were among those
71
burned in the said fire.
Respondent's version of events
Respondent disputed petitioners' narration of the circumstances
surrounding her loans with petitioner Citibank and the alleged
authority she gave for the off-set or compensation of her money
market placements and deposit accounts with petitioners against her
loan obligation.
Respondent denied outright executing the first set of PNs, except for
one (PN No. 34534 in particular). Although she admitted that she
obtained several loans from petitioner Citibank, these only amounted
to ₱1,150,000.00, and she had already paid them. She secured from
petitioner Citibank two loans of ₱500,000.00 each. She executed in
favor of petitioner Citibank the corresponding PNs for the loans and
the Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with
72
petitioner FNCB Finance as security. To prove payment of these
loans, respondent presented two provisional receipts of petitioner
Citibank – No. 19471, dated 11 August 1978, and No.
73
12723, dated 10 November 1978 – both signed by Mr. Tan, and
74
acknowledging receipt from respondent of several checks in the total
amount of ₱500,744.00 and ₱500,000.00, respectively, for
"liquidation of loan."
She borrowed another ₱150,000.00 from petitioner Citibank for
personal investment, and for which she executed PN No. 34534, on
9 January 1979. Thus, she admitted to receiving the proceeds of this
loan via MC No. 228270. She invested the loan amount in another
money market placement with petitioner FNCB Finance. In turn, she
used the very same money market placement with petitioner FNCB
Finance as security for her ₱150,000.00 loan from petitioner
Citibank. When she failed to pay the loan when it became due,
petitioner Citibank allegedly forfeited her money market placement
75
with petitioner FNCB Finance and, thus, the loan was already paid.
Respondent likewise questioned the MCs presented by petitioners,
except for one (MC No. 228270 in particular), as proof that she
received the proceeds of the loans covered by the first set of PNs. As
recounted in the preceding paragraph, respondent admitted to
obtaining a loan of ₱150,000.00, covered by PN No. 34534, and
receiving MC No. 228270 representing the proceeds thereof, but
claimed that she already paid the same. She denied ever receiving
MCs No. 220701 (for the loan of ₱400,000.00, covered by PN No.
33935) and No. 226467 (for the loan of ₱250,000.00, covered by PN
No. 34079), and pointed out that the checks did not bear her
indorsements. She did not deny receiving all other checks but she
interposed that she received these checks, not as proceeds of loans,
but as payment of the principal amounts and/or interests from her
money market placements with petitioner Citibank. She also raised
doubts as to the notation on each of the checks that reads "RE:
Proceeds of PN#[corresponding PN No.]," saying that such notation
did not appear on the MCs when she originally received them and
that the notation appears to have been written by a typewriter
different from that used in writing all other information on the checks
76
(i.e., date, payee, and amount). She even testified that MCs were
not supposed to bear notations indicating the purpose for which they
were issued.
As to the second set of PNs, respondent acknowledged having
signed them all. However, she asserted that she only executed these
PNs as part of the simulated loans she and Mr. Tan of petitioner
Citibank concocted. Respondent explained that she had a pending
loan application for a big amount with the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), and when Mr. Tan found out about this, he
suggested that they could make it appear that the respondent had
outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank and the latter was already
demanding payment thereof; this might persuade DBP to approve
respondent's loan application. Mr. Tan made the respondent sign the
second set of PNs, so that he may have something to show the DBP
investigator who might inquire with petitioner Citibank as to
respondent's loans with the latter. On her own copies of the said
PNs, respondent wrote by hand the notation, "This isa (sic) simulated
non-negotiable note, signed copy given to Mr. Tan., (sic) per
agreement to be shown to DBP representative. itwill (sic) be returned
to me if the ₱11=M (sic) loan for MC Adore Palace Hotel is approved
by DBP."
77
Findings of this Court as to the existence of the loans
After going through the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by both sides to this case, it is this Court's assessment
that respondent did indeed have outstanding loans with petitioner
Citibank at the time it effected the off-set or compensation on 25 July
1979 (using respondent's savings deposit with petitioner Citibank), 5
September 1979 (using the proceeds of respondent's money market
placements with petitioner FNCB Finance) and 26 October 1979
(using respondent's dollar accounts remitted from Citibank-Geneva).
The totality of petitioners' evidence as to the existence of the said
loans preponderates over respondent's. Preponderant evidence
means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side
78
outweighs that of the adverse party.
Respondent's outstanding obligation for ₱1,920,000.00 had been
sufficiently documented by petitioner Citibank.
The second set of PNs is a mere renewal of the prior loans originally
covered by the first set of PNs, except for PN No. 34534. The first set
of PNs is supported, in turn, by the existence of the MCs that
represent the proceeds thereof received by the respondent.
It bears to emphasize that the proceeds of the loans were paid to
respondent in MCs, with the respondent specifically named as
payee. MCs checks are drawn by the bank's manager upon the bank
itself and regarded to be as good as the money it
79
represents. Moreover, the MCs were crossed checks, with the
words "Payee's Account Only."
In general, a crossed check cannot be presented to the drawee bank
for payment in cash. Instead, the check can only be deposited with
the payee's bank which, in turn, must present it for payment against
the drawee bank in the course of normal banking hours. The crossed
check cannot be presented for payment, but it can only be deposited
and the drawee bank may only pay to another bank in the payee's or
80
indorser's account. The effect of crossing a check was described
by this Court in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of
Appeals –
81
[T]he crossing of a check with the phrase "Payee's Account
Only" is a warning that the check should be deposited in the
account of the payee. Thus, it is the duty of the collecting
bank PCI Bank to ascertain that the check be deposited in
payee's account only. It is bound to scrutinize the check and
 to know its depositors before it can make the clearing
indorsement "all prior indorsements and/or lack of
indorsement guaranteed."
The crossed MCs presented by petitioner Bank were indeed
deposited in several different bank accounts and cleared by the
Clearing Office of the Central Bank of the Philippines, as evidenced
by the stamp marks and notations on the said checks. The crossed
MCs are already in the possession of petitioner Citibank, the drawee
bank, which was ultimately responsible for the payment of the
amount stated in the checks. Given that a check is more than just an
instrument of credit used in commercial transactions for it also serves
as a receipt or evidence for the drawee bank of the cancellation of
82
the said check due to payment, then, the possession by petitioner
Citibank of the said MCs, duly stamped "Paid" gives rise to the
presumption that the said MCs were already paid out to the intended
payee, who was in this case, the respondent.
This Court finds applicable herein the presumptions that private
83
transactions have been fair and regular, and that the ordinary
84
course of business has been followed. There is no question that
the loan transaction between petitioner Citibank and the respondent
is a private transaction. The transactions revolving around the
crossed MCs – from their issuance by petitioner Citibank to
respondent as payment of the proceeds of her loans; to its deposit in
respondent's accounts with several different banks; to the clearing of
the MCs by an independent clearing house; and finally, to the
payment of the MCs by petitioner Citibank as the drawee bank of the
said checks – are all private transactions which shall be presumed to
have been fair and regular to all the parties concerned. In addition,
the banks involved in the foregoing transactions are also presumed
to have followed the ordinary course of business in the acceptance of
the crossed MCs for deposit in respondent's accounts, submitting
them for clearing, and their eventual payment and cancellation.
The afore-stated presumptions are disputable, meaning, they are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome
85
by other evidence. Respondent, however, was unable to present
sufficient and credible evidence to dispute these presumptions.
It should be recalled that out of the nine MCs presented by petitioner
Citibank, respondent admitted to receiving one as proceeds of a loan
(MC No. 228270), denied receiving two (MCs No. 220701 and
226467), and admitted to receiving all the rest, but not as proceeds
of her loans, but as return on the principal amounts and interests
from her money market placements.
Respondent admitted receiving MC No. 228270 representing the
proceeds of her loan covered by PN No. 34534. Although the
principal amount of the loan is ₱150,000.00, respondent only
received ₱146,312.50, because the interest and handling fee on the
86
loan transaction were already deducted therefrom. Stamps and
notations at the back of MC No. 228270 reveal that it was deposited
at the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Cubao Branch, in Account
87
No. 0123-0572-28. The check also bore the signature of
88
respondent at the back. And, although respondent would later
admit that she did sign PN No. 34534 and received MC No. 228270
as proceeds of the loan extended to her by petitioner Citibank, she
contradicted herself when, in an earlier testimony, she claimed that
PN No. 34534 was among the PNs she executed as simulated loans
89
with petitioner Citibank.
Respondent denied ever receiving MCs No. 220701 and 226467.
However, considering that the said checks were crossed for payee's
account only, and that they were actually deposited, cleared, and
paid, then the presumption would be that the said checks were
properly deposited to the account of respondent, who was clearly
named the payee in the checks. Respondent's bare allegations that
she did not receive the two checks fail to convince this Court, for to
sustain her, would be for this Court to conclude that an irregularity
had occurred somewhere from the time of the issuance of the said
checks, to their deposit, clearance, and payment, and which would
have involved not only petitioner Citibank, but also BPI, which
accepted the checks for deposit, and the Central Bank of the
Philippines, which cleared the checks. It falls upon the respondent to
overcome or dispute the presumption that the crossed checks were
issued, accepted for deposit, cleared, and paid for by the banks
involved following the ordinary course of their business.
The mere fact that MCs No. 220701 and 226467 do not bear
respondent's signature at the back does not negate deposit thereof
in her account. The liability for the lack of indorsement on the MCs
no longer fall on petitioner Citibank, but on the bank who received
the same for deposit, in this case, BPI Cubao Branch. Once again, it
must be noted that the MCs were crossed, for payee's account only,
and the payee named in both checks was none other than
respondent. The crossing of the MCs was already a warning to BPI
to receive said checks for deposit only in respondent's account. It
was up to BPI to verify whether it was receiving the crossed MCs in
accordance with the instructions on the face thereof. If, indeed, the
MCs were deposited in accounts other than respondent's, then the
90
respondent would have a cause of action against BPI.
BPI further stamped its guarantee on the back of the checks to the
effect that, "All prior endorsement and/or Lack of endorsement
guaranteed." Thus, BPI became the indorser of the MCs, and
91
assumed all the warranties of an indorser, specifically, that the
checks were genuine and in all respects what they purported to be;
that it had a good title to the checks; that all prior parties had
capacity to contract; and that the checks were, at the time of their
92
indorsement, valid and subsisting. So even if the MCs deposited by
BPI's client, whether it be by respondent herself or some other
person, lacked the necessary indorsement, BPI, as the collecting
bank, is bound by its warranties as an indorser and cannot set up the
defense of lack of indorsement as against petitioner Citibank, the
93
drawee bank.
Furthermore, respondent's bare and unsubstantiated denial of
receipt of the MCs in question and their deposit in her account is
rendered suspect when MC No. 220701 was actually deposited in
Account No. 0123-0572-28 of BPI Cubao Branch, the very same
account in which MC No. 228270 (which respondent admitted to
receiving as proceeds of her loan from petitioner Citibank), and MCs
No. 228203, 228357, and 228400 (which respondent admitted to
receiving as proceeds from her money market placements) were
deposited. Likewise, MC No. 226467 was deposited in Account No.
0121-002-43 of BPI Cubao Branch, to which MCs No. 226285 and
226439 (which respondent admitted to receiving as proceeds from
her money market placements) were deposited. It is an apparent
contradiction for respondent to claim having received the proceeds of
checks deposited in an account, and then deny receiving the
proceeds of another check deposited in the very same account.
Another inconsistency in respondent's denial of receipt of MC No.
226467 and her deposit of the same in her account, is her
presentation of Exhibit "HHH," a provisional receipt which was
supposed to prove that respondent turned over ₱500,000.00 to Mr.
Tan of petitioner Citibank, that the said amount was split into three
money market placements, and that MC No. 226467 represented the
94
return on her investment from one of these placements. Because of
her Exhibit "HHH," respondent effectively admitted receipt of MC No.
226467, although for reasons other than as proceeds of a loan.
Neither can this Court give credence to respondent's contention that
the notations on the MCs, stating that they were the proceeds of
particular PNs, were not there when she received the checks and
that the notations appeared to be written by a typewriter different
from that used to write the other information on the checks. Once
more, respondent's allegations were uncorroborated by any other
evidence. Her and her counsel's observation that the notations on
the MCs appear to be written by a typewriter different from that used
to write the other information on the checks hardly convinces this
Court considering that it constitutes a mere opinion on the
appearance of the notation by a witness who does not possess the
necessary expertise on the matter. In addition, the notations on the
MCs were written using both capital and small letters, while the other
information on the checks were written using capital letters only,
such difference could easily confuse an untrained eye and lead to a
hasty conclusion that they were written by different typewriters.
Respondent's testimony, that based on her experience transacting
with banks, the MCs were not supposed to include notations on the
purpose for which the checks were issued, also deserves scant
consideration. While respondent may have extensive experience
dealing with banks, it still does not qualify her as a competent
witness on banking procedures and practices. Her testimony on this
matter is even belied by the fact that the other MCs issued by
petitioner Citibank (when it was still named First National City Bank)
and by petitioner FNCB Finance, the existence and validity of which
were not disputed by respondent, also bear similar notations that
state the reason for which they were issued.
Respondent presented several more pieces of evidence to
substantiate her claim that she received MCs No. 226285, 226439,
226467, 226057, 228357, and 228400, not as proceeds of her loans
from petitioner Citibank, but as the return of the principal amounts
and payment of interests from her money market placements with
petitioners. Part of respondent's exhibits were personal
95
checks drawn by respondent on her account with Feati Bank &
Trust Co., which she allegedly invested in separate money market
placements with both petitioners, the returns from which were paid to
her via MCs No. 226285 and 228400. Yet, to this Court, the personal
checks only managed to establish respondent's issuance thereof, but
there was nothing on the face of the checks that would reveal the
purpose for which they were issued and that they were actually
invested in money market placements as respondent claimed.
Respondent further submitted handwritten notes that purportedly
computed and presented the returns on her money market
placements, corresponding to the amount stated in the MCs she
96
received from petitioner Citibank. Exhibit "HHH-1" was a
handwritten note, which respondent attributed to Mr. Tan of petitioner
Citibank, showing the breakdown of her BPI Check for ₱500,000.00
into three different money market placements with petitioner
Citibank. This Court, however, noticed several factors which render
the note highly suspect. One, it was written on the reversed side of
Provisional Receipt No. 12724 of petitioner Citibank which bore the
initials of Mr. Tan acknowledging receipt of respondent's BPI Check
No. 120989 for ₱500,000.00; but the initials on the handwritten note
appeared to be that of Mr. Bobby Mendoza of petitioner FNCB
97
Finance. Second, according to Provisional Receipt No. 12724, BPI
Check No. 120989 for ₱500,000.00 was supposed to be invested in
three money market placements with petitioner Citibank for the
period of 60 days. Since all these money market placements were
made through one check deposited on the same day, 10 November
1978, it made no sense that the handwritten note at the back of
Provisional Receipt No. 12724 provided for different dates of maturity
for each of the money market placements (i.e., 16 November 1978,
17 January 1979, and 21 November 1978), and such dates did not
correspond to the 60 day placement period stated on the face of the
provisional receipt. And third, the principal amounts of the money
market placements as stated in the handwritten note – ₱145,000.00,
₱145,000.00 and ₱242,000.00 – totaled ₱532,000.00, and was
obviously in excess of the ₱500,000.00 acknowledged on the face of
Provisional Receipt No. 12724.
Exhibits "III" and "III-1," the front and bank pages of a handwritten
98
note of Mr. Bobby Mendoza of petitioner FNCB Finance, also did
not deserve much evidentiary weight, and this Court cannot rely on
the truth and accuracy of the computations presented therein. Mr.
Mendoza was not presented as a witness during the trial before the
RTC, so that the document was not properly authenticated nor its
contents sufficiently explained. No one was able to competently
identify whether the initials as appearing on the note were actually
Mr. Mendoza's.
Also, going by the information on the front page of the note, this
Court observes that payment of respondent's alleged money market
placements with petitioner FNCB Finance were made using Citytrust
Checks; the MCs in question, including MC No. 228057, were issued
by petitioner Citibank. Although Citytrust (formerly Feati Bank & Trust
Co.), petitioner FNCB Finance, and petitioner Citibank may be
affiliates of one another, they each remained separate and distinct
corporations, each having its own financial system and records.
Thus, this Court cannot simply assume that one corporation, such as
petitioner Citibank or Citytrust, can issue a check to discharge an
obligation of petitioner FNCB Finance. It should be recalled that
when petitioner FNCB Finance paid for respondent's money market
placements, covered by its PNs No. 8167 and 8169, as well as PNs
No. 20138 and 20139, petitioner FNCB Finance issued its own
checks.
As a last point on this matter, if respondent truly had money market
placements with petitioners, then these would have been evidenced
by PNs issued by either petitioner Citibank or petitioner FNCB
Finance, acknowledging the principal amounts of the investments,
and stating the applicable interest rates, as well as the dates of their
of issuance and maturity. After respondent had so meticulously
reconstructed her other money market placements with petitioners
and consolidated the documentary evidence thereon, she came
surprisingly short of offering similar details and substantiation for
these particular money market placements.
Since this Court is satisfied that respondent indeed received the
proceeds of the first set of PNs, then it proceeds to analyze her
evidence of payment thereof.
In support of respondent's assertion that she had already paid
whatever loans she may have had with petitioner Citibank, she
presented as evidence Provisional Receipts No. 19471, dated 11
August 1978, and No. 12723, dated 10 November 1978, both of
petitioner Citibank and signed by Mr. Tan, for the amounts of
₱500,744.00 and ₱500,000.00, respectively. While these provisional
receipts did state that Mr. Tan, on behalf of petitioner Citibank,
received respondent's checks as payment for her loans, they failed
to specifically identify which loans were actually paid. Petitioner
Citibank was able to present evidence that respondent had executed
several PNs in the years 1978 and 1979 to cover the loans she
secured from the said bank. Petitioner Citibank did admit that
respondent was able to pay for some of these PNs, and what it
identified as the first and second sets of PNs were only those which
remained unpaid. It thus became incumbent upon respondent to
prove that the checks received by Mr. Tan were actually applied to
the PNs in either the first or second set; a fact that, unfortunately,
cannot be determined from the provisional receipts submitted by
respondent since they only generally stated that the checks received
by Mr. Tan were payment for respondent's loans.
Mr. Tan, in his deposition, further explained that provisional receipts
were issued when payment to the bank was made using checks,
since the checks would still be subject to clearing. The purpose for
the provisional receipts was merely to acknowledge the delivery of
the checks to the possession of the bank, but not yet of
99
payment. This bank practice finds legitimacy in the pronouncement
of this Court that a check, whether an MC or an ordinary check, is
not legal tender and, therefore, cannot constitute valid tender of
100
payment. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court
elucidated that:
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money
and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not,
by itself, operate as payment (Sec. 189, Act 2031 on Negs.
Insts.; Art. 1249, Civil Code; Bryan Landon Co. v. American
Bank, 7 Phil. 255; Tan Sunco, v. Santos, 9 Phil. 44; 21
R.C.L. 60, 61). A check, whether a manager's check or
ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in
payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may
be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of
checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment.
The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended
until the payment by commercial document is actually
realized (Art. 1249, Civil Code, par. 3).
In the case at bar, the issuance of an official receipt by petitioner
Citibank would have been dependent on whether the checks
delivered by respondent were actually cleared and paid for by the
drawee banks.
As for PN No. 34534, respondent asserted payment thereof at two
separate instances by two different means. In her formal offer of
exhibits, respondent submitted a deposit slip of petitioner Citibank,
dated 11 August 1978, evidencing the deposit of BPI Check No.
5785 for ₱150,000.00. In her Formal Offer of Documentary
101
Exhibits, dated 7 July 1989, respondent stated that the purpose for
the presentation of the said deposit slip was to prove that she
102
already paid her loan covered by PN No. 34534. In her testimony
before the RTC three years later, on 28 November 1991, she
changed her story. This time she narrated that the loan covered by
PN No. 34534 was secured by her money market placement with
petitioner FNCB Finance, and when she failed to pay the said PN
when it became due, the security was applied to the loan, therefore,
103
the loan was considered paid. Given the foregoing, respondent's
assertion of payment of PN No. 34534 is extremely dubious.
According to petitioner Citibank, the PNs in the second set, except
for PN No. 34534, were mere renewals of the unpaid PNs in the first
set, which was why the PNs stated that they were for the purpose of
liquidating existing obligations. PN No. 34534, however, which was
part of the first set, was still valid and subsisting and so it was
included in the second set without need for its renewal, and it still
being the original PN for that particular loan, its stated purpose was
104
for personal investment. Respondent essentially admitted
executing the second set of PNs, but they were only meant to cover
simulated loans. Mr. Tan supposedly convinced her that her pending
loan application with DBP would have a greater chance of being
approved if they made it appear that respondent urgently needed the
money because petitioner Citibank was already demanding payment
for her simulated loans.
Respondent's defense of simulated loans to escape liability for the
second set of PNs is truly a novel one.1âwphi1 It is regrettable,
however, that she was unable to substantiate the same. Yet again,
respondent's version of events is totally based on her own
uncorroborated testimony. The notations on the second set of PNs,
that they were non-negotiable simulated notes, were admittedly
made by respondent herself and were, thus, self-serving. Equally
self-serving was respondent's letter, written on 7 October 1985, or
more than six years after the execution of the second set of PNs, in
which she demanded return of the simulated or fictitious PNs,
together with the letters relating thereto, which Mr. Tan purportedly
asked her to execute. Respondent further failed to present any proof
of her alleged loan application with the DBP, and of any
circumstance or correspondence wherein the simulated or fictitious
PNs were indeed used for their supposed purpose.
In contrast, petitioner Citibank, as supported by the testimonies of its
officers and available documentation, consistently treated the said
PNs as regular loans – accepted, approved, and paid in the ordinary
course of its business.
The PNs executed by the respondent in favor of petitioner Citibank to
cover her loans were duly-filled out and signed, including the
disclosure statement found at the back of the said PNs, in adherence
to the Central Bank requirement to disclose the full finance charges
to a loan granted to borrowers.
Mr. Tan, then an account officer with the Marketing Department of
petitioner Citibank, testified that he dealt directly with respondent; he
facilitated the loans; and the PNs, at least in the second set, were
105
signed by respondent in his presence.
Mr. Pujeda, the officer who was previously in charge of loans and
placements, confirmed that the signatures on the PNs were verified
against respondent's specimen signature with the bank.
106
Ms. Cristina Dondoyano, who worked at petitioner Citibank as a loan
processor, was responsible for booking respondent's loans. Booking
the loans means recording it in the General Ledger. She explained
the procedure for booking loans, as follows: The account officer, in
the Marketing Department, deals directly with the clients who wish to
borrow money from petitioner Citibank. The Marketing Department
will forward a loan booking checklist, together with the borrowing
client's PNs and other supporting documents, to the loan pre-
processor, who will check whether the details in the loan booking
checklist are the same as those in the PNs. The documents are then
sent to Signature Control for verification of the client's signature in
the PNs, after which, they are returned to the loan pre-processor, to
be forwarded finally to the loan processor. The loan processor shall
book the loan in the General Ledger, indicating therein the client
name, loan amount, interest rate, maturity date, and the
corresponding PN number. Since she booked respondent's loans
personally, Ms. Dondoyano testified that she saw the original PNs. In
1986, Atty. Fernandez of petitioner Citibank requested her to prepare
an accounting of respondent's loans, which she did, and which was
presented as Exhibit "120" for the petitioners. The figures from the
said exhibit were culled from the bookings in the General Ledger, a
107
fact which respondent's counsel was even willing to stipulate.
Ms. Teresita Glorioso was an Investigation and Reconcilement Clerk
at the Control Department of petitioner Citibank. She was presented
by petitioner Citibank to expound on the microfilming procedure at
the bank, since most of the copies of the PNs were retrieved from
microfilm. Microfilming of the documents are actually done by people
at the Operations Department. At the end of the day or during the
day, the original copies of all bank documents, not just those
pertaining to loans, are microfilmed. She refuted the possibility that
insertions could be made in the microfilm because the microfilm is
inserted in a cassette; the cassette is placed in the microfilm
machine for use; at the end of the day, the cassette is taken out of
the microfilm machine and put in a safe vault; and the cassette is
returned to the machine only the following day for use, until the spool
is full. This is the microfilming procedure followed everyday. When
the microfilm spool is already full, the microfilm is developed, then
sent to the Control Department, which double checks the contents of
the microfilms against the entries in the General Ledger. The Control
Department also conducts a random comparison of the contents of
the microfilms with the original documents; a random review of the
108
contents is done on every role of microfilm.
Ms. Renee Rubio worked for petitioner Citibank for 20 years. She
rose from the ranks, initially working as a secretary in the Personnel
Group; then as a secretary to the Personnel Group Head; a Service
Assistant with the Marketing Group, in 1972 to 1974, dealing directly
with corporate and individual clients who, among other things,
secured loans from petitioner Citibank; the Head of the Collection
Group of the Foreign Department in 1974 to 1976; the Head of the
Money Transfer Unit in 1976 to 1978; the Head of the Loans and
Placements Unit up to the early 1980s; and, thereafter, she
established operations training for petitioner Citibank in the Asia-
Pacific Region responsible for the training of the officers of the bank.
She testified on the standard loan application process at petitioner
Citibank. According to Ms. Rubio, the account officer or marketing
person submits a proposal to grant a loan to an individual or
corporation. Petitioner Citibank has a worldwide policy that requires a
credit committee, composed of a minimum of three people, which
would approve the loan and amount thereof. There can be no
instance when only one officer has the power to approve the loan
application. When the loan is approved, the account officer in charge
will obtain the corresponding PNs from the client. The PNs are sent
to the signature verifier who would validate the signatures therein
against those appearing in the signature cards previously submitted
by the client to the bank. The Operations Unit will check and review
the documents, including the PNs, if it is a clean loan, and securities
and deposits, if it is collateralized. The loan is then recorded in the
General Ledger. The Loans and Placements Department will not
book the loans without the PNs. When the PNs are liquidated,
whether they are paid or rolled-over, they are returned to the
109
client. Ms. Rubio further explained that she was familiar with
respondent's accounts since, while she was still the Head of the
Loan and Placements Unit, she was asked by Mr. Tan to prepare a
110
list of respondent's outstanding obligations. She thus calculated
respondent's outstanding loans, which was sent as an attachment to
Mr. Tan's letter to respondent, dated 28 September 1979, and
111
presented before the RTC as Exhibits "34-B" and "34-C."
Lastly, the exchange of letters between petitioner Citibank and
respondent, as well as the letters sent by other people working for
respondent, had consistently recognized that respondent owed
petitioner Citibank money.
In consideration of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
preponderance of evidence supports the existence of the
respondent's loans, in the principal sum of ₱1,920,000.00, as of 5
September 1979. While it is well-settled that the term
"preponderance of evidence" should not be wholly dependent on the
number of witnesses, there are certain instances when the number of
witnesses become the determining factor –
The preponderance of evidence may be determined, under
certain conditions, by the number of witnesses testifying to a
particular fact or state of facts. For instance, one or two
witnesses may testify to a given state of facts, and six or
seven witnesses of equal candor, fairness, intelligence, and
truthfulness, and equally well corroborated by all the
remaining evidence, who have no greater interest in the
result of the suit, testify against such state of facts. Then the
preponderance of evidence is determined by the number of
witnesses. (Wilcox vs. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524, 66 Am. St.
Rep., 761.)
112
Best evidence rule
This Court disagrees in the pronouncement made by the Court of
Appeals summarily dismissing the documentary evidence submitted
by petitioners based on its broad and indiscriminate application of the
best evidence rule.
In general, the best evidence rule requires that the highest available
degree of proof must be produced. Accordingly, for documentary
evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the
113
production of the document itself, to the exclusion of any
114
secondary or substitutionary evidence.
The best evidence rule has been made part of the revised Rules of
Court, Rule 130, Section 3, which reads –
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. –
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
In Estrada v. Desierto,
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts
or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought
to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.
As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies
only when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document.
The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus –
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best
evidence rule applies only when the content of such
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is
only as to whether such document was actually executed, or
exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-
66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary
evidence is likewise admissible without need for accounting
for the original.
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence
or condition it is offered not as documentary, but as real,
evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the
documents is allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath, etc., et
115
al., 91 Phil 565). x x x
this Court had occasion to rule that –
116
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only
copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did
not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his
book on evidence, states that:
"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial
court's discretion, whenever in the case in hand the
opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the
document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.24
"x x x x
"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability
has been abandoned, for certain documents in which
ordinarily no real dispute arised. This measure is a sensible
and progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post,
sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used
 unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an
opportunity to inspect it." (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered
and weighed in evidence the photocopies and microfilm copies of the
PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the
existence of respondent's loans. The terms or contents of these
documents were never the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It
was respondent's position that the PNs in the first set (with the
exception of PN No. 34534) never existed, while the PNs in the
second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534) were merely executed
to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the MCs representing the
proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied receipt of certain
MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose.
Respondent further admitted the letters she wrote personally or
through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank
acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters
were just meant to keep up the ruse of the simulated loans. Thus,
respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or
execution, or when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for
which the documents were executed, matters which are,
undoubtedly, external to the documents, and which had nothing to do
with the contents thereof.
Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should
apply to the evidence presented by petitioners regarding the
existence of respondent's loans, it should be borne in mind that the
rule admits of the following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of
the revised Rules of Court –
SEC. 5. When the original document is unavailable. – When
the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution
or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
The execution or existence of the original copies of the documents
was established through the testimonies of witnesses, such as Mr.
Tan, before whom most of the documents were personally executed
by respondent. The original PNs also went through the whole loan
booking system of petitioner Citibank – from the account officer in its
Marketing Department, to the pre-processor, to the signature verifier,
117
back to the pre-processor, then to the processor for booking. The
original PNs were seen by Ms. Dondoyano, the processor, who
recorded them in the General Ledger. Mr. Pujeda personally saw the
original MCs, proving respondent's receipt of the proceeds of her
loans from petitioner Citibank, when he helped Attys. Cleofe and
Fernandez, the bank's legal counsels, to reconstruct the records of
respondent's loans. The original MCs were presented to Atty. Cleofe
who used the same during the preliminary investigation of the case,
sometime in years 1986-1987. The original MCs were subsequently
turned over to the Control and Investigation Division of petitioner
118
Citibank.
It was only petitioner FNCB Finance who claimed that they lost the
original copies of the PNs when it moved to a new office. Citibank did
not make a similar contention; instead, it explained that the original
copies of the PNs were returned to the borrower upon liquidation of
the loan, either through payment or roll-over. Petitioner Citibank
proffered the excuse that they were still looking for the documents in
their storage or warehouse to explain the delay and difficulty in the
retrieval thereof, but not their absence or loss. The original
documents in this case, such as the MCs and letters, were destroyed
and, thus, unavailable for presentation before the RTC only on 7
th
October 1987, when a fire broke out on the 7 floor of the office
building of petitioner Citibank. There is no showing that the fire was
intentionally set. The fire destroyed relevant documents, not just of
th
the present case, but also of other cases, since the 7 floor housed
the Control and Investigation Division, in charge of keeping the
necessary documents for cases in which petitioner Citibank was
involved.
The foregoing would have been sufficient to allow the presentation of
photocopies or microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters by the
petitioners as secondary evidence to establish the existence of
respondent's loans, as an exception to the best evidence rule.
The impact of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Dy case
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals made the following
pronouncement –
Besides, We find the declaration and conclusions of this
Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 entitled Sps. Dr. Ricardo L.
Dy and Rosalind O. Dy vs. City Bank, N.A., et al,
promulgated on 15 January 1990, as disturbingtaking into
consideration the similarities of the fraud, machinations, and
deceits employed by the defendant-appellant Citibank and its
Account Manager Francisco Tan.
Worthy of note is the fact that Our declarations and
conclusions against Citibank and the person of Francisco
Tan in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 were affirmed in toto by the
Highest Magistrate in a Minute Resolution dated 22 August
1990 entitled Citibank, N.A., vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
93350.
As the factual milieu of the present appeal created
reasonable doubts as to whether the nine (9) Promissory
Notes were indeed executed with considerations, the doubts,
coupled by the findings and conclusions of this Court in CA-
G.R. CV No. 15934 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
93350. should be construed against herein defendants-
appellants Citibank and FNCB Finance.
What this Court truly finds disturbing is the significance given by the
119
Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision to the Decision of its
Third Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 (or the Dy case), when there
is an absolute lack of legal basis for doing such.
Although petitioner Citibank and its officer, Mr. Tan, were also
involved in the Dy case, that is about the only connection between
the Dy case and the one at bar. Not only did the Dy case tackle
transactions between parties other than the parties presently before
this Court, but the transactions are absolutely independent and
unrelated to those in the instant Petition.
In the Dy case, Severino Chua Caedo managed to obtain loans from
herein petitioner Citibank amounting to ₱7,000,000.00, secured to
the extent of ₱5,000,000.00 by a Third Party Real Estate Mortgage
of the properties of Caedo's aunt, Rosalind Dy. It turned out that
Rosalind Dy and her husband were unaware of the said loans and
the mortgage of their properties. The transactions were carried out
exclusively between Caedo and Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank. The
RTC found Mr. Tan guilty of fraud for his participation in the
questionable transactions, essentially because he allowed Caedo to
take out the signature cards, when these should have been signed
by the Dy spouses personally before him. Although the Dy spouses'
signatures in the PNs and Third Party Real Estate Mortgage were
forged, they were approved by the signature verifier since the
signature cards against which they were compared to were also
forged. Neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals, however,
categorically declared Mr. Tan personally responsible for the
forgeries, which, in the narration of the facts, were more likely
committed by Caedo.
In the Petition at bar, respondent dealt with Mr. Tan directly, there
was no third party involved who could have perpetrated any fraud or
forgery in her loan transactions. Although respondent attempted to
raise suspicion as to the authenticity of her signatures on certain
documents, these were nothing more than naked allegations with no
corroborating evidence; worse, even her own allegations were
replete with inconsistencies. She could not even establish in what
manner or under what circumstances the fraud or forgery was
committed, or how Mr. Tan could have been directly responsible for
the same.
While the Court of Appeals can take judicial notice of the Decision of
its Third Division in the Dy case, it should not have given the said
case much weight when it rendered the assailed Decision, since the
former does not constitute a precedent. The Court of Appeals, in the
challenged Decision, did not apply any legal argument or principle
established in the Dy case but, rather, adopted the findings therein of
wrongdoing or misconduct on the part of herein petitioner Citibank
and Mr. Tan. Any finding of wrongdoing or misconduct as against
herein petitioners should be made based on the factual background
and pieces of evidence submitted in this case, not those in another
case.
It is apparent that the Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the Dy
case not as a legal precedent for the present case, but rather as
evidence of similar acts committed by petitioner Citibank and Mr.
Tan. A basic rule of evidence,however, states that, "Evidence that
one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another
time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
like." The rationale for the rule is explained thus –
120
The rule is founded upon reason, public policy, justice and
judicial convenience. The fact that a person has committed
the same or similar acts at some prior time affords, as a
general rule, no logical guaranty that he committed the act in
question. This is so because, subjectively, a man's mind and
even his modes of life may change; and, objectively, the
conditions under which he may find himself at a given time
may likewise change and thus induce him to act in a different
way. Besides, if evidence of similar acts are to be invariably
admitted, they will give rise to a multiplicity of collateral
issues and will subject the defendant to surprise as well as
121
confuse the court and prolong the trial.
The factual backgrounds of the two cases are so different and
unrelated that the Dy case cannot be used to prove specific intent,
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage
on the part of petitioner Citibank or its officer, Mr. Tan, to defraud
respondent in the present case.
IV
The liquidation of respondent's outstanding loans were valid in
so far as petitioner Citibank used respondent's savings account
with the bank and her money market placements with petitioner
FNCB Finance; but illegal and void in so far as petitioner
Citibank used respondent's dollar accounts with Citibank-
Geneva.
Savings Account with petitioner Citibank
Compensation is a recognized mode of extinguishing obligations.
Relevant provisions of the Civil Code provides –
Art. 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons,
in their own right, are creditors and debtors of each other.
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is
necessary;
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound
principally, and that he be at the same time a
principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if
the things due are consumable, they be of the same
kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has
been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention
or controversy, commenced by third persons and
communicated in due time to the debtor.
There is little controversy when it comes to the right of petitioner
Citibank to compensate respondent's outstanding loans with her
deposit account. As already found by this Court, petitioner Citibank
was the creditor of respondent for her outstanding loans. At the same
time, respondent was the creditor of petitioner Citibank, as far as her
deposit account was concerned, since bank deposits, whether fixed,
savings, or current, should be considered as simple loan
 122
or mutuum by the depositor to the banking institution. Both debts
consist in sums of money. By June 1979, all of respondent's PNs in
the second set had matured and became demandable, while
respondent's savings account was demandable anytime. Neither was
there any retention or controversy over the PNs and the deposit
account commenced by a third person and communicated in due
time to the debtor concerned. Compensation takes place by
123
operation of law, therefore, even in the absence of an expressed
authority from respondent, petitioner Citibank had the right to effect,
on 25 June 1979, the partial compensation or off-set of respondent's
outstanding loans with her deposit account, amounting to
₱31,079.14.
Money market placements with FNCB Finance
Things though are not as simple and as straightforward as regards to
the money market placements and bank account used by petitioner
Citibank to complete the compensation or off-set of respondent's
outstanding loans, which came from persons other than petitioner
Citibank.
Respondent's money market placements were with petitioner FNCB
Finance, and after several roll-overs, they were ultimately covered by
PNs No. 20138 and 20139, which, by 3 September 1979, the date
the check for the proceeds of the said PNs were issued, amounted to
₱1,022,916.66, inclusive of the principal amounts and interests. As to
these money market placements, respondent was the creditor and
petitioner FNCB Finance the debtor; while, as to the outstanding
loans, petitioner Citibank was the creditor and respondent the debtor.
Consequently, legal compensation, under Article 1278 of the Civil
Code, would not apply since the first requirement for a valid
compensation, that each one of the obligors be bound principally,
and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other, was
not met.
What petitioner Citibank actually did was to exercise its rights to the
proceeds of respondent's money market placements with petitioner
FNCB Finance by virtue of the Deeds of Assignment executed by
respondent in its favor.
The Court of Appeals did not consider these Deeds of Assignment
because of petitioners' failure to produce the original copies thereof
in violation of the best evidence rule. This Court again finds itself in
disagreement in the application of the best evidence rule by the
appellate court.
To recall, the best evidence rule, in so far as documentary evidence
is concerned, requires the presentation of the original copy of the
document only when the context thereof is the subject of inquiry in
the case. Respondent does not question the contents of the Deeds
of Assignment. While she admitted the existence and execution of
the Deeds of Assignment, dated 2 March 1978 and 9 March 1978,
covering PNs No. 8169 and 8167 issued by petitioner FNCB
Finance, she claimed, as defense, that the loans for which the said
Deeds were executed as security, were already paid. She denied
ever executing both Deeds of Assignment, dated 25 August 1978,
covering PNs No. 20138 and 20139. These are again issues
collateral to the contents of the documents involved, which could be
proven by evidence other than the original copies of the said
documents.
Moreover, the Deeds of Assignment of the money market
placements with petitioner FNCB Finance were notarized
documents, thus, admissible in evidence. Rule 132, Section 30 of the
Rules of Court provides that –
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents. – Every instrument
duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by
law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgement being prima facie evidence of
the execution of the instrument or document involved.
Significant herein is this Court's elucidation in De Jesus v. Court of
Appeals, which reads –
124
On the evidentiary value of these documents, it should be
recalled that the notarization of a private document converts
it into a public one and renders it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity (Joson vs. Baltazar, 194
 SCRA 114 [1991]). This is so because a public document
duly executed and entered in the proper registry is presumed
to be valid and genuine until the contrary is shown by clear
and convincing proof (Asido vs. Guzman, 57 Phil. 652
[1918]; U.S. vs. Enriquez, 1 Phil 241 [1902]; Favor vs. Court
of Appeals, 194 SCRA 308 [1991]). As such, the party
challenging the recital of the document must prove his claim
with clear and convincing evidence (Diaz vs. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 346 [1986]).
The rule on the evidentiary weight that must be accorded a notarized
document is clear and unambiguous. The certificate of
acknowledgement in the notarized Deeds of Assignment
constituted prima facie evidence of the execution thereof. Thus, the
burden of refuting this presumption fell on respondent. She could
have presented evidence of any defect or irregularity in the execution
125
of the said documents or raised questions as to the verity of the
126
notary public's acknowledgment and certificate in the Deeds. But
again, respondent admitted executing the Deeds of Assignment,
dated 2 March 1978 and 9 March 1978, although claiming that the
loans for which they were executed as security were already paid.
And, she assailed the Deeds of Assignment, dated 25 August 1978,
with nothing more than her bare denial of execution thereof, hardly
the clear and convincing evidence required to trounce the
presumption of due execution of a notarized document.
Petitioners not only presented the notarized Deeds of Assignment,
but even secured certified literal copies thereof from the National
127
Archives. Mr. Renato Medua, an archivist, working at the Records
Management and Archives Office of the National Library, testified
that the copies of the Deeds presented before the RTC were certified
literal copies of those contained in the Notarial Registries of the
notary publics concerned, which were already in the possession of
the National Archives. He also explained that he could not bring to
the RTC the Notarial Registries containing the original copies of the
Deeds of Assignment, because the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Circular No. 97, dated 8 November 1968, prohibits the bringing of
original documents to the courts to prevent the loss of irreplaceable
128
and priceless documents.
Accordingly, this Court gives the Deeds of Assignment grave
importance in establishing the authority given by the respondent to
petitioner Citibank to use as security for her loans her money her
market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, represented by
PNs No. 8167 and 8169, later to be rolled-over as PNs No. 20138
and 20139. These Deeds of Assignment constitute the law between
the parties, and the obligations arising therefrom shall have the force
of law between the parties and should be complied with in good
faith. Standard clauses in all of the Deeds provide that –
129
The ASSIGNOR and the ASSIGNEE hereby further agree as
follows:
xxxx
2. In the event the OBLIGATIONS are not paid at
maturity or upon demand, as the case may be, the
ASSIGNEE is fully authorized and empowered to
collect and receive the PLACEMENT (or so much
thereof as may be necessary) and apply the same in
payment of the OBLIGATIONS. Furthermore, the
ASSIGNOR agrees that at any time, and from time
to time, upon request by the ASSIGNEE, the
ASSIGNOR will promptly execute and deliver any
and all such further instruments and documents as
may be necessary to effectuate this Assignment.
xxxx
5. This Assignment shall be considered as sufficient
authority to FNCB Finance to pay and deliver the
PLACEMENT or so much thereof as may be
necessary to liquidate the OBLIGATIONS, to the
ASSIGNEE in accordance with terms and provisions
130
hereof.
Petitioner Citibank was only acting upon the authority granted to it
under the foregoing Deeds when it finally used the proceeds of PNs
No. 20138 and 20139, paid by petitioner FNCB Finance, to partly pay
for respondent's outstanding loans. Strictly speaking, it did not effect
a legal compensation or off-set under Article 1278 of the Civil Code,
but rather, it partly extinguished respondent's obligations through the
application of the security given by the respondent for her loans.
Although the pertinent documents were entitled Deeds of
Assignment, they were, in reality, more of a pledge by respondent to
petitioner Citibank of her credit due from petitioner FNCB Finance by
virtue of her money market placements with the latter. According to
Article 2118 of the Civil Code –
ART. 2118. If a credit has been pledged becomes due
before it is redeemed, the pledgee may collect and receive
the amount due. He shall apply the same to the payment of
his claim, and deliver the surplus, should there be any, to the
pledgor.
PNs No. 20138 and 20139 matured on 3 September 1979, without
them being redeemed by respondent, so that petitioner Citibank
collected from petitioner FNCB Finance the proceeds thereof, which
included the principal amounts and interests earned by the money
market placements, amounting to ₱1,022,916.66, and applied the
same against respondent's outstanding loans, leaving no surplus to
be delivered to respondent.
Dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva
Despite the legal compensation of respondent's savings account and
the total application of the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 to
respondent's outstanding loans, there still remained a balance of
₱1,069,847.40. Petitioner Citibank then proceeded to applying
respondent's dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva against her
remaining loan balance, pursuant to a Declaration of Pledge
supposedly executed by respondent in its favor.
Certain principles of private international law should be considered
herein because the property pledged was in the possession of an
entity in a foreign country, namely, Citibank-Geneva. In the absence
of any allegation and evidence presented by petitioners of the
specific rules and laws governing the constitution of a pledge in
Geneva, Switzerland, they will be presumed to be the same as
Philippine local or domestic laws; this is known as processual
131
presumption.
Upon closer scrutiny of the Declaration of Pledge, this Court finds the
same exceedingly suspicious and irregular.
First of all, it escapes this Court why petitioner Citibank took care to
have the Deeds of Assignment of the PNs notarized, yet left the
Declaration of Pledge unnotarized. This Court would think that
petitioner Citibank would take greater cautionary measures with the
preparation and execution of the Declaration of Pledge because it
involved respondent's "all present and future fiduciary placements"
with a Citibank branch in another country, specifically, in Geneva,
Switzerland. While there is no express legal requirement that the
Declaration of Pledge had to be notarized to be effective, even so, it
could not enjoy the same prima facie presumption of due execution
that is extended to notarized documents, and petitioner Citibank
must discharge the burden of proving due execution and authenticity
of the Declaration of Pledge.
Second, petitioner Citibank was unable to establish the date when
the Declaration of Pledge was actually executed. The photocopy of
the Declaration of Pledge submitted by petitioner Citibank before the
132
RTC was undated. It presented only a photocopy of the pledge
because it already forwarded the original copy thereof to Citibank-
Geneva when it requested for the remittance of respondent's dollar
accounts pursuant thereto. Respondent, on the other hand, was able
to secure a copy of the Declaration of Pledge, certified by an officer
of Citibank-Geneva, which bore the date 24 September
133
1979. Respondent, however, presented her passport and plane
tickets to prove that she was out of the country on the said date and
could not have signed the pledge. Petitioner Citibank insisted that
the pledge was signed before 24 September 1979, but could not
provide an explanation as to how and why the said date was written
on the pledge. Although Mr. Tan testified that the Declaration of
Pledge was signed by respondent personally before him, he could
not give the exact date when the said signing took place. It is
important to note that the copy of the Declaration of Pledge
submitted by the respondent to the RTC was certified by an officer of
Citibank-Geneva, which had possession of the original copy of the
pledge. It is dated 24 September 1979, and this Court shall abide by
134
the presumption that the written document is truly dated. Since it is
undeniable that respondent was out of the country on 24 September
1979, then she could not have executed the pledge on the said date.
Third, the Declaration of Pledge was irregularly filled-out. The pledge
was in a standard printed form. It was constituted in favor of Citibank,
N.A., otherwise referred to therein as the Bank. It should be noted,
however, that in the space which should have named the pledgor,
the name of petitioner Citibank was typewritten, to wit –
The pledge right herewith constituted shall secure all claims
which the Bank now has or in the future acquires
against Citibank, N.A., Manila (full name and address of the
Debtor), regardless of the legal cause or the transaction (for
example current account, securities transactions, collections,
credits, payments, documentary credits and collections)
which gives rise thereto, and including principal, all
contractual and penalty interest, commissions, charges, and
costs.
The pledge, therefore, made no sense, the pledgor and pledgee
being the same entity. Was a mistake made by whoever filled-out the
form? Yes, it could be a possibility. Nonetheless, considering the
value of such a document, the mistake as to a significant detail in the
pledge could only be committed with gross carelessness on the part
of petitioner Citibank, and raised serious doubts as to the authenticity
and due execution of the same. The Declaration of Pledge had
passed through the hands of several bank officers in the country and
abroad, yet, surprisingly and implausibly, no one noticed such a
glaring mistake.
Lastly, respondent denied that it was her signature on the
Declaration of Pledge. She claimed that the signature was a forgery.
When a document is assailed on the basis of forgery, the best
evidence rule applies –
Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible
other than the original document itself except in the
instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Mere photocopies of documents are
inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule. This is
especially true when the issue is that of forgery.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved
by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of
proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of
a forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself
reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery
can only be established by a comparison between the
alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine
signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to
have been forged. Without the original document containing
the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive
comparison which would establish forgery. A comparison
based on a mere xerox copy or reproduction of the
document under controversy cannot produce reliable
135
results.
Respondent made several attempts to have the original copy of the
pledge produced before the RTC so as to have it examined by
136
experts. Yet, despite several Orders by the RTC, petitioner
Citibank failed to comply with the production of the original
Declaration of Pledge. It is admitted that Citibank-Geneva had
possession of the original copy of the pledge. While petitioner
Citibank in Manila and its branch in Geneva may be separate and
distinct entities, they are still incontestably related, and between
petitioner Citibank and respondent, the former had more influence
and resources to convince Citibank-Geneva to return, albeit
temporarily, the original Declaration of Pledge. Petitioner Citibank did
not present any evidence to convince this Court that it had exerted
diligent efforts to secure the original copy of the pledge, nor did it
proffer the reason why Citibank-Geneva obstinately refused to give it
back, when such document would have been very vital to the case of
petitioner Citibank. There is thus no justification to allow the
presentation of a mere photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge in lieu

of the original, and the photocopy of the pledge presented by
137
petitioner Citibank has nil probative value. In addition, even if this
Court cannot make a categorical finding that respondent's signature
on the original copy of the pledge was forged, it is persuaded that
petitioner Citibank willfully suppressed the presentation of the original
document, and takes into consideration the presumption that the
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse to petitioner Citibank
138
if produced.
Without the Declaration of Pledge, petitioner Citibank had no
authority to demand the remittance of respondent's dollar accounts
with Citibank-Geneva and to apply them to her outstanding loans. It
cannot effect legal compensation under Article 1278 of the Civil Code
since, petitioner Citibank itself admitted that Citibank-Geneva is a
distinct and separate entity. As for the dollar accounts, respondent
was the creditor and Citibank-Geneva is the debtor; and as for the
outstanding loans, petitioner Citibank was the creditor and
respondent was the debtor. The parties in these transactions were
evidently not the principal creditor of each other.
Therefore, this Court declares that the remittance of respondent's
dollar accounts from Citibank-Geneva and the application thereof to
her outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank was illegal, and null
and void. Resultantly, petitioner Citibank is obligated to return to
respondent the amount of US$149,632,99 from her Citibank-Geneva
accounts, or its present equivalent value in Philippine currency; and,
at the same time, respondent continues to be obligated to petitioner
Citibank for the balance of her outstanding loans which, as of 5
September 1979, amounted to ₱1,069,847.40.
V
The parties shall be liable for interests on their monetary
obligations to each other, as determined herein.
In summary, petitioner Citibank is ordered by this Court to pay
respondent the proceeds of her money market placements,
represented by PNs No. 23356 and 23357, amounting to
₱318,897.34 and ₱203,150.00, respectively, earning an interest of
139
14.5% per annum as stipulated in the PNs, beginning 17 March
1977, the date of the placements.
Petitioner Citibank is also ordered to refund to respondent the
amount of US$149,632.99, or its equivalent in Philippine currency,
which had been remitted from her Citibank-Geneva accounts. These
dollar accounts, consisting of two fiduciary placements and current
accounts with Citibank-Geneva shall continue earning their
respective stipulated interests from 26 October 1979, the date of
their remittance by Citibank-Geneva to petitioner Citibank in Manila
and applied against respondent's outstanding loans.
As for respondent, she is ordered to pay petitioner Citibank the
balance of her outstanding loans, which amounted to ₱1,069,847.40
as of 5 September 1979. These loans continue to earn interest, as
stipulated in the corresponding PNs, from the time of their respective
maturity dates, since the supposed payment thereof using
respondent's dollar accounts from Citibank-Geneva is deemed
illegal, null and void, and, thus, ineffective.
VI
Petitioner Citibank shall be liable for damages to respondent.
Petitioners protest the award by the Court of Appeals of moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees in favor of
respondent. They argued that the RTC did not award any damages,
and respondent, in her appeal before the Court of Appeals, did not
raise in issue the absence of such.
While it is true that the general rule is that only errors which have
been stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued in the
brief shall be considered, this Court has also recognized exceptions
to the general rule, wherein it authorized the review of matters, even
those not assigned as errors in the appeal, if the consideration
thereof is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, and
there is a close inter-relation between the omitted assignment of
error and those actually assigned and discussed by the
140
appellant. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding the
damages when it already made findings that would justify and
support the said award.
Although this Court appreciates the right of petitioner Citibank to
effect legal compensation of respondent's local deposits, as well as
its right to the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 by virtue of the
notarized Deeds of Assignment, to partly extinguish respondent's
outstanding loans, it finds that petitioner Citibank did commit wrong
when it failed to pay and properly account for the proceeds of
respondent's money market placements, evidenced by PNs No.
23356 and 23357, and when it sought the remittance of respondent's
dollar accounts from Citibank-Geneva by virtue of a highly-suspect
Declaration of Pledge to be applied to the remaining balance of
respondent's outstanding loans. It bears to emphasize that banking
is impressed with public interest and its fiduciary character requires
141
high standards of integrity and performance. A bank is under the
obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care
whether such accounts consist only of a few hundred pesos or of
142
millions of pesos. The bank must record every single transaction
accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as
143
possible. Petitioner Citibank evidently failed to exercise the
required degree of care and transparency in its transactions with
respondent, thus, resulting in the wrongful deprivation of her
property.
Respondent had been deprived of substantial amounts of her
investments and deposits for more than two decades. During this
span of years, respondent had found herself in desperate need of
144
the amounts wrongfully withheld from her. In her testimony before
the RTC, respondent narrated –
Q By the way Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell us again, you
said before that you are a businesswoman, will you tell us
again what are the businesses you are engaged into [sic]?
A I am engaged in real estate. I am the owner of the
Modesta Village 1 and 2 in San Mateo, Rizal. I am also the
President and Chairman of the Board of Macador [sic] Co.
and Business Inc. which operates the Macador [sic]
International Palace Hotel. I am also the President of the
Macador [sic] International Palace Hotel, and also the
Treasures Home Industries, Inc. which I am the Chairman
and president of the Board and also operating affiliated
company in the name of Treasures Motor Sales engaged in
car dealers [sic] like Delta Motors, we are the dealers of the
whole Northern Luzon and I am the president of the Disto
Company, Ltd., based in Hongkong licensed in Honkong [sic]
and now operating in Los Angeles, California.
Q What is the business of that Disto Company Ltd.?
A Disto Company, Ltd., is engaged in real estate and
construction.
Q Aside from those businesses are you a member of any
national or community organization for social and civil
activities?
A Yes sir.
Q What are those?
A I am the Vice-President of thes [sic] Subdivision
Association of the Philippines in 1976, I am also an officer of
the … Chamber of Real Estate Business Association; I am
also an officer of the Chatholic [sic] Women's League and I
am also a member of the CMLI, I forgot the definition.
Q How about any political affiliation or government position
held if any?
A I was also a candidate for Mayo last January 30, 1980.
Q Where?
A In Dagupan City, Pangasinan.
Q What else?
A I also ran as an Assemblywoman last May, 1984,
Independent party in Regional I, Pangasinan.
Q What happened to your businesses you mentioned as a
result of your failure to recover you [sic] investments and
bank deposits from the defendants?
A They are not all operating, in short, I was hampered to
push through the businesses that I have.
A [sic] Of all the businesses and enterprises that you
mentioned what are those that are paralyzed and what
remain inactive?
A Of all the company [sic] that I have, only the Disto
Company that is now operating in California.
Q How about your candidacy as Mayor of Dagupan, [sic]
City, and later as Assemblywoman of Region I, what
happened to this?
A I won by voting but when election comes on [sic] the
counting I lost and I protested this, it is still pending and
because I don't have financial resources I was not able to
push through the case. I just have it pending in the Comelec.
Q Now, do these things also affect your social and civic
activities?
A Yes sir, definitely.
Q How?
A I was embarrassed because being a businesswoman I
would like to inform the Honorable Court that I was awarded
as the most outstanding businesswoman of the year in 1976
but when this money was not given back to me I was not
able to comply with the commitments that I have promised to
these associations that I am engaged into [sic], sir.
For the mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
moral shock and social humiliation suffered by the respondent, the
award of moral damages is but proper. However, this Court reduces
the amount thereof to ₱300,000.00, for the award of moral damages
is meant to compensate for the actual injury suffered by the
145
respondent, not to enrich her.
Having failed to exercise more care and prudence than a private
individual in its dealings with respondent, petitioner Citibank should
be liable for exemplary damages, in the amount of ₱250,000.00, in
146 147
accordance with Article 2229 and 2234 of the Civil Code.
With the award of exemplary damages, then respondent shall also
148
be entitled to an award of attorney's fees. Additionally, attorney's
fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur
expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the
other party. In this case, an award of ₱200,000.00 attorney's fees
149
shall be satisfactory.
In contrast, this Court finds no sufficient basis to award damages to
petitioners.1âwphi1 Respondent was compelled to institute the
present case in the exercise of her rights and in the protection of her
interests. In fact, although her Complaint before the RTC was not
sustained in its entirety, it did raise meritorious points and on which
this Court rules in her favor. Any injury resulting from the exercise of
150
one's rights is damnum absque injuria.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, as already modified by its
Resolution, dated 20 November 2002, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION, as follows –
1. PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are DECLARED subsisting
and outstanding. Petitioner Citibank is ORDEREDto return to
 respondent the principal amounts of the said PNs,
amounting to Three Hundred Eighteen Thousand Eight
Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos and Thirty-Four Centavos
(₱318,897.34) and Two Hundred Three Thousand One
Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱203,150.00), respectively, plus the
stipulated interest of Fourteen and a half percent (14.5%) per
annum, beginning 17 March 1977;

2. The remittance of One Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Six

Hundred Thirty Two US Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents
(US$149,632.99) from respondent's Citibank-Geneva
accounts to petitioner Citibank in Manila, and the application
of the same against respondent's outstanding loans with the
latter, is DECLARED illegal, null and void. Petitioner Citibank
is ORDERED to refund to respondent the said amount, or its
equivalent in Philippine currency using the exchange rate at
the time of payment, plus the stipulated interest for each of
the fiduciary placements and current accounts involved,
beginning 26 October 1979;

3. Petitioner Citibank is ORDERED to pay respondent moral

damages in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱300,000.00); exemplary damages in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱250,000.00); and
attorney's fees in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱200,000.00); and

4. Respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner Citibank the

balance of her outstanding loans, which, from the respective
dates of their maturity to 5 September 1979, was computed
to be in the sum of One Million Sixty-Nine Thousand Eight
Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Forty Centavos
(₱1,069,847.40), inclusive of interest. These outstanding
loans shall continue to earn interest, at the rates stipulated in
the corresponding PNs, from 5 September 1979 until
payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-30158 January 17, 1974
LORENZO G. VALENTIN, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ANDRES
SANTA MARIA, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch II; YOLANDA MATIAS, being represented by
JOSE ARCILLAS, and LEOPOLDO C. PALAD, Ex-Officio
Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Respondent.
Dakila F. Castro and Associates for petitioner.
Rosendo J. Tansinsin for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
1
The invocation of People v. Soria, promulgated in 1968, did
suffice for this Court to entertain
this certiorari and mandamusproceeding filed on February 10,
1969. It was the ruling therein that a judge who had qualified
and assumed office in one district could not thereafter validly
issue an order of dismissal in a criminal case formerly heard by
him while holding such office in another. In this suit, petitioner's
contention that the decision of December 20, 1963 of the then
Judge Samuel F. Reyes at a time he had already qualified and
assumed office in the Rizal Court of First Instance disposing of
a civil case tried by him in Bulacan as well as the orders
subsequently issued by respondent Judge Andres Santa Maria
of Bulacan denying a motion to disregard such judgment
should be declared null and void in accordance with the Soria
holding. Whatever merit there might have been to a petition of
this character no longer attaches to it as of January 31, 1973,
2
when this Court, in People v. Donesa, declined in a decision
unanimously arrived at to give retroactive effect to Soria, thus
sustaining an order of dismissal of the then Judge Donesa
handed down after he had ceased to be such in Abra, having
taken over his new post in the Tagaytay Court of First Instance.
What poses an even greater obstacle to petitioner being
sustained is that in a concurring opinion by Justice Teehankee,
3
to which were affixed the votes of five other justices, he
categorically affirmed: "The present decision signifies the
abandonment and overturning of the contrary ruling in the case
of People v. Soria and other cases therein cited, ... which should
be so stated plainly for the guidance of the bench and bar as
4
well as of litigants in general." This Court, now sitting en banc,
after a thorough consideration of the matter, adopts such a
view. As a consequence, Soria is bereft of any authoritive force.
It is overruled. The petition must be, as it is hereby,
dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The relevant facts are beyond dispute. Petitioner Lorenzo G.
Valentin was the defendant in a civil case of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan with private respondent Yolanda Matias as
5
plaintiff. A decision was rendered on December 20, 1963 in
favor of the private respondent as plaintiff declaring null and
void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-32568 in the name of the
defendant, now petitioner, who was likewise considered as a
possessor in bad faith and thus must account for the fruits of
the property from May 2, 1961, in addition to paying private
respondent as plaintiff the amount of P1,000.00 as attorney's
fees and the cost of the proceedings. The Register of Deeds of
Bulacan was likewise thereby ordered to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-32568 of his office, reinstate Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15329 in the name of Petra Gatmaytan
and thereafter cancel it and issue a new one in favor of private
respondent after the payment of the corresponding fees. As
6
noted, it was a decision of Judge Samuel F. Reyes. It was duly
7
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed it in toto an
8
May 13, 1968. There was a motion for reconsideration by
petitioner as defendant-appellant therein, but it was denied by
9
the Court of Appeals on July 19, 1968. Subsequently, on
October 26, 1968, upon discovering that when Judge Samuel F.
Reyes promulgated the decision dated December 20, 1963, he
had already assumed office as District Judge for the Province of
Rizal and the Cities of Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan, Branch X,
and in view of the ruling in People of the Philippines v.
10
Simpliciano Soria, petitioner filed in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan with respondent Judge Santa Maria a
"Motion to Disregard Judgment of December 20, 1963 and to
11
Render Judgment Anew." There was on October 29, 1968, a
 12
pleading of private respondent in opposition. Respondent
13
Judge, on December 12, 1968, denied said motion. After a
denial of a motion for reconsideration, petitioner came to this
14
Court. chanrobles virtual law library
Had there been no Donesa decision of January 31, 1973, the
judicial path of duty is clear. Petitioner was on the right track,
the one indicated by Soria. That was so before. It no longer
holds true now. This petition, as earlier set forth, must be
dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
15
1. In People v. Donesa, the undisputed facts were culled from
the petition thus: " As shown in the petition: 'That on March 7,
1962, an information was filed charging the respondent, Lapaz
Tuanquin with Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries through
reckless imprudence for the death of the late Evaristo Bramaje
and hospitalization of Antonio Tejada on December 23, 1960,
said information docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 of the Court
of First Instance of Abra, then presided over by herein
respondent judge; That after presentation of its evidence, the
prosecution ... rested its case on October 15, 1963, whereupon,
the accused ... immediately made known her desire to file a
motion to dismiss; That on April 23, 1964, respondent Lapaz
Tuanquin through her lawyers, filed a motion to dismiss, and on
August 7, 1964, petitioner People of the Philippines, filed its
opposition to the motion to dismiss, and on August 12, 1964, a
motion to reopen the case for purposes of having some exhibits
translated from the Ilocano dialect to English was submitted, ...;
That while respondent judge was still the presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance of Abra, he was nominated to his present
position, which nomination was subsequently confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, and he qualified as District
Judge of Cavite to preside at Branch IV of the Court of Tagaytay
City on July 13, 1964, long before the opposition to the motion
to dismiss and motion to reopen the case were filed, ...; That on
January 12, 1965, respondent judge issued an order dismissing
Criminal Case No. 266 on the flimsy ground that the prosecution
failed to present one witness, a witness whose presentation was
made unnecessary in view of the admission of the accused-
respondent as evidenced by her sworn statement and submitted
during the course of presentation of evidence by the
prosecution. ... The order of dismissal is dated November 27,
16
1964." On the above facts, the petition for certiorari was
17
dismissed. It was admitted in the unanimous opinion of the
Court that a serious jurisdictional question would have arisen if
18
the doctrine in People v. Soria were deemed controlling." Why
it was not considered applicable was next taken up in that
portion of the opinion in these words: "There, this Court,
through J.B.L. Reyes, ruled: 'It may be noted therefrom that the
signing or writing of judgments outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court where the cases are pending, is allowed
when the judge leaves the province "by transfer or assignment
to another court of equal jurisdiction," or "expiration of his
temporary assignment." In other words, the rule contemplates
of a temporary occupancy by the judge of either the post he has
left or of the one he is going to assume.' Under such a doctrine,
respondent judge certainly would be devoid of jurisdiction to
issue the challenged order of dismissal. It should not, however,
be made to apply. The Soria decision was promulgated on
March 1, 1968. The two cases cited therein, Ong Siu v.
Paredes and Jimenez v. Republic, were respectively decided on
July 26, 1966 and January 31, 1968. The order of dismissal here
was issued on November 27, 1964. Since, realistically, a judicial
decision speaks as of the date it is handed down, Soria ought
not to be given retroactive force and effect. For to do so, in a
situation like the present, would amount to a deprivation of
constitutional right which certainly is objectionable and should
not be allowed. That is why, in whatever manner viewed, this
19
petition cannot prosper." chanrobles virtual law library
There was, as mentioned earlier, a separate concurrence by
Justice Teehankee which, again as previously stated, elicited
approval from the then Justice, now Chief Justice. Makalintal
20
and Justices Castro, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra. The
stand of Justice Teehankee was set forth thus: "I concur in the
result of the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando, but believe
that such result should not be reached on the principal ground
of double jeopardy as therein invoked but rather by meeting
frontally the fundamental issue of respondent judge's authority
and jurisdiction to still act on and grant the motion to dismiss
bearing on the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to
establish beyond reasonable doubt respondent's guilt
submitted to him in the Abra court after and notwithstanding his
appointment and assumption of the office of district judge of
the Cavite court (by virtue of said dismissal motion having been
submitted to him and his having "totally heard" the case before
his subsequent appointment and permanent transfer to the
21
Cavite court of first instance)." After mentioning Soria, the
concurrence was for what it characterized as "the contrary
interpretation now adopted by the court that a district judge
who has left the court of his original assignment or appointment
by permanent (not merely temporary) transfer or assignment to
another court of equal jurisdiction without having decided a
case totally heard by him and which was duly argued or
opportunity given for argument to the parties or their counsel
may lawfully prepare and sign his decision in said case
anywhere within the Philippines and send the same by
registered mail to the clerk of the court to be filed in the court as
of the date when the same was received by the clerk, in the
same manner as if the judge had been present in the court to
direct the filing of the judgment, as duly provided by section 51
of the Judicially Act above-
22
quoted." In its view, therefore, the Donesa decision "signifies
the abandonment and overturning, of the contrary ruling in the
23
case of People v. Soria and other cases therein cited ... ." The
purpose, according to Justice Teehankee, for stating the matter
thus plainly and unequivocally, is "for the guidance of the
24
bench and bar as well as of litigants in general." chanrobles
virtual law library
2. As made clear in the opening paragraph of this opinion, it is
the ruling of this Court en banc that for reasons to be more fully
set forth, Soria should be overruled. In the language of Justice
Laurel, it no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
25
principle." There should not be any doubt therefore that it
could no longer be relied upon. It has been stripped of any
authoritative force. This is not to deny that on purely conceptual
grounds, our ruling may raise some questions. It may be argued
that a decision speaks as of the moment of its promulgation.
Unless the judge then still is authorized to do so, he is legally
precluded from acting on such a case. His permanent transfer
to another district then poses such a barrier. Such a view finds
support from the standpoint of legal theory. Consistency in the
application of jural norms would require such a conclusion.
There is, as Cardozo did point out, a misuse of logic, "when its
26
methods and its ends are treated as supreme and final." For if
it were otherwise, law remains merely a closed self-contained
system of abstract rules independent of human needs and
values. It should not be thus. Nor may there be neglect and
indifference to things as they are. A court, no less than the
general public, must not close its eyes to the realities of the
situation. The law's efficacy then requires awareness of what
actually transpires. The social facts upon which it must be
grounded and to which it is applied cannot be ignored. The
important question is not so much a norm's conformity with
jural consistency, but how it functions. In the apt language of
27
Justice Tuazon, "we test a rule by its results." chanrobles
virtual law library
Why Soria cannot survive under such an approach is made
clear in the concurrence of Justice Teehankee thus:
"Compelling considerations support such abandonment of
Soria and a reversion to the old rulings cited in the main opinion
that the public interest and the speedy administration of justice
will be best served if the judge who heard the evidence
(although he may have been permanently transferred to another
province or station) renders the decision rather than to leave a
mountain of evidence and transcripts for the perusal and
appreciation of a new judge totally unfamiliar with the case and
who did not have the opportunity of hearing the witnesses and
observing their deportment for purposes of gauging their
28
credibility and appraising their testimony." Nor is there any
offense to the sense of right, nor any affront to the cause of
justice. More than the successor, the judge who heard the
witnesses testify, who presumably had pored over the
documentary evidence, certainly is in a much better position to
appraise the facts and thereafter to apply the statute or codal
provision involved. A litigant's expectation as to his suit being
adjudged with care and thoroughness has greater chances then
of being satisfied under such circumstances. This is so even on
the assumption that the one who succeeds him on the bench is
much more skillful and penetrating in his scrutiny of the proof
and much more proficient in the jurist's art. Independently then
of the social consideration involved, the notion of law as a
reflection of reason and given expression under conditions that
assure an impartial and thorough adjudicative process is more
likely to be served when the one who hears the case renders the
decision himself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
3. The members of this Court, who in Donesa, gave their
conformity to the concurring opinion, were not unaware of the
possibility that under the specific provision of the Judiciary
29
Act, it could happen that after a new incumbent had been
qualified to the position thus vacated, an abandonment of Soria
could result in a situation where two judges would be legally
competent to promulgated a decision. To avoid such an
undesirable state of affairs, they likewise were in full agreement
with what was said on the matter by Justice Teehankee: "The
only qualification that I would add - of purposes of avoiding any
unnecessary conflict in case another judge has already been
appointed to his former court and the same is no longer vacant
or unoccupied (although in the case at bar, it appears that
respondent judge's former court remained vacant) - is that in
line with the statutory provisotherein governing cases 'heard
only in part,' as well as with the first paragraph of the cited
section providing for detail of judges, the interested parties
should obtain from this Court the corresponding authorization
for the permanently transferred judge who heard in toto the
case and the evidence to render the decision thereon, in the
same manner as temporarily transferred or assigned judges on
30
detail." Such a view commends itself to the entire
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. If appears, therefore, that both from the standpoint of the
juristic process as justice and as social control, and with only
the slightest departure from the demands of strict logic, the
definitive abandonment of Soria has much to recommend it.
Insofar as this particular proceeding is concerned, then, it is
manifest that it is bereft of any support in
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is
dismissed. With costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar, J., concurs.
chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library
The main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando formally announces
the Court's abandonment and overturning of the doctrine
1 2
of People vs. Soria and other cases cited therein as urged in
the writer's concurring opinion with a majority of the Court
3
in People vs. Donesa which is generously quoted
therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The basic provision of law involved is the second paragraph of
4
section 51 of the Judiciary Act as amended, which provides:
Whenever a judge appointed or assigned in any province or
branch of a court in a province shall leave the province
by transfer or assignment to another court of equal
jurisdiction without having decided a case totally heard by
him and which was duly argued or opportunity given for
argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall be lawful for
him to prepare and sign his decision in said case anywhere
within the Philippines and send the same by registered mail to
the clerk of the Court to be filed in the court as of the date when
the same was received by the clerk, in the same manner as if
the judge had been present in the court to direct the filing of the
judgment: Provided, however, That if a case has been heard
only in part, the Supreme Court, upon petition of any of the
parties to the case and the recommendation of the respective
district judge, may also authorize the judge who had partly
heard the case to continue hearing and to decide said case
notwithstanding his transfer or appointment to another court of
5
equal jurisdiction. chanrobles virtual law library
Under Soria, the Court previously interpreted the law to mean that
"the signing or writing of judgments outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the court where the cases are pending, is allowed when the judge
leaves the province 'by transfer or assignment to another court of
6
equal jurisdiction 'or 'by expiration of his temporary assignment.' In
other words, the rulecontemplates of a temporary occupancy by the
judge of either the post he has left or of the one he is going to
assume," reiterating that "in similar cases, decisions
promulgated after the judge who penned the same had been
appointed and has qualified to another court were declared not
validand without any effect." (Supra, at pages 951-953).
Soria recognized, however, that where the case was not yet
submitted for decision but was heard only in part by the
same permanently transferred judge, he could be duly authorized by
this Court upon proper petition of any of the parties to the case and
the recommendation of the district judge, under the proviso in the
cited law, "to continue hearing and to decide said case
notwithstanding his [permanent] transfer or appointment to another
7
court of equal jurisdiction." chanrobles virtual law library
The Court now therefore over turns Soria in its ruling that the
samepermanently transferred judge may not decide cases totally
heard by him and that it is only where he has
been temporarily transferred or assigned to another court of equal
jurisdiction that he is authorized to decide such cases totally
heard by him. As was stressed in our concurrence in Donesa, "there
seems to be no valid reason to authorize a permanentlytransferred
judge who has heard the case only in part ... 'to continue hearing and
to decide said case notwithstanding his transfer or appointment to
another court of equal
jurisdiction' ... but to withhold such authorization to decide the case
from the same permanently transferred judge who has 'totally heard'
8
the case." chanrobles virtual law library
So, it is now definitely ruled that the factor of temporary occupancy
stressed in Soria is inconsequential and that under the first part of
section 51 of the Judiciary Act a judge who has left the court of his
original assignment by permanent transfer or appointment to another
court of equal jurisdiction without having decided a case totally
heard by him and which was duly argued or opportunity given for
argument to the parties or their counsel may lawfully "prepare and
sign his decision in said case anywhere within the Philippines and
send the same by registered mail to the clerk of the court to be filed
in the court as of the date when the same was received by the clerk,
in the same manner as if the judge had been present in court to
direct the filing of the judgment" - and is thus placed on an equal
footing as a permanently transferred judge who has heard a
case only in part who may be authorized under the proviso of the
cited law to continue hearing and to decide the case
thereafter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In Donesa, as stated in the main opinion, the writer suggested
adding the qualification in order to avoid conflicts in a situation where
two judges would be legally competent to promulgate a decision for
the same court or branch thereof (viz the permanently transferred
judge and his successor in the court vacated by him) that "the
interested parties should obtain from this Court the corresponding
authorization for the permanently transferred judge who heard in
toto the case and the evidence to render the decision thereon, in the
same manner as temporarily transferred or assigned judges on
9
detail." chanrobles virtual law library
Upon further deliberation of the Court on this question - in the light of
the text, policy and intent of the law as well as of the power of
administrative supervision over all courts transferred to the Supreme
Court under Article X, section 6 of the 1973
Constitution, - it is now believed that such qualification and
requirement of prior authorization from this Court for
the permanently transferred judge who heard in toto the case and
the evidence to render the decision, is not necessary,
because:chanrobles virtual law library
- The text of the law itself constitutes and grants such authorization,
when it provides that "it shall be lawful for [such transferred judge
who totally heard the case] to prepare and sign his decision in said
case anywhere within the Philippines and send the same by
registered mail to the clerk of the court to be filed in the court as of
the date when the same was received by the clerk, in the same
manner as if the judge had been present in the court to direct the
10
filing of the judgment"; chanrobles virtual law library
- As stressed by Justice Malcolm for the Court in the early case
11
of Delfino vs. Paredes, the policy and intent of such statutory
provisions dealing with detail, assignment and transfer of judges to
another district or province is to promote the public interest and the
interest of justice and "(O)bviously, the public interest and the
speedy administration of justice will be best served if the judge
who heard the evidence renders the decision" for "the law does not
mean to authorize a judge to try a case and then deprive him of the
power to render his decision after he has taken cognizance of it. The
legislative purpose was not to make the judge holding a special term
of court a mere referee for another judge." Surely these same
fundamental considerations equally apply to a judge who has totally
heard the case and is permanently transferred to another court of
equal jurisdiction - he should not be deemed deprived by the mere
fact of permanent transfer of the power to render his decision in a
case totally heard by him and which was "duly argued or opportunity
12
given for argument to the parties or their counsel"; andchanrobles
virtual law library
- Finally, it should be noted that any doubts whether the doctrine
hereinabove enunciated in overturning Soria comes clearly within the
language and intent of section 51 of the Judiciary Act, have been
totally set at rest with the express grant of power to the Supreme
Court in the 1973 Constitution under Article X, section 5, paragraph
(3) to "assign temporarily judges of inferior courts to their stations as
public interest may require." Such power of temporary assignment
and the Supreme Court's power of administrative supervision over all
inferior courts certainly envisage the Court's power to require a
permanently transferred judge to render the decision in the cases
totally heard by him and submitted for decision in the court left and
vacated by him, and to prepare and sign such decisions in his new
station and have them filed by the clerk of his old court in the manner
provided by the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Experience has shown that such undecided cases left by
permanently transferred judges who totally heard the cases have
been the bane of their successors who more often than not, appalled
by the voluminousness of the records and carried away by the
pressures of their daily work, have left such old cases unattended
and undecided to be handed down in turn to their successors. It will
indeed redound then to the public interest and the cause of a speedy
and efficient administration of justice will best be served by
eliminating such a bottleneck and now pronouncing that the above-
quoted basic provision of the second paragraph 1 of the Judiciary
13
Act authorizes and requires the permanently transferred judge who
totally heard the case and received the evidence (although he has
been appointed to another province or station) to "render the
decision rather than to leave a mountain of evidence and transcripts
for the perusal and appreciation of a new judge totally unfamiliar with
the case and who did not have the opportunity of hearing the
witnesses and observing their deportment for purposes of gauging
14
their credibility and apprasing their testimony." chanrobles virtual
law library
The mischief and harm of a contrary rule based on Soria is
exemplified by the case at bar where after the adverse judgment
rendered by Judge Samuel F. Reyes in a case totally heard by him
as judge of the Bulacan court of first instance on December 20, 1963
after he had already been permanently transferred and assumed
office as judge of the Rizal court of first instance at Pasig, had been
affirmed on appeal on its merits by the Court of Appeals in its
decision of May 13, 1968 and resolution denying reconsideration
on July 19, 1968, petitioner as the losing party would seek
on October 26, 1968 (upon discovering the incidental fact that Judge
Reyes had already assumed his Pasig station at the time of rendition
of the decision for the Bulacan court) to have Judge Reyes' decision
declared null and void, to have the new incumbent judge of the
Bulacan court of first instance who is totally unfamiliar with the case
and the evidence study the case and records and transcripts all over
again and render judgment anew, subject once more to the appeal
process.'chanrobles virtual law library
With the definite overturning and abandonment of the doctrine
of Soria, it should now be made clear for the guidance of the bench
and bar as well as of litigants in general that the judge who has left a
court by transfer or assignment (whether temporary or permanent) to
another court of equal jurisdiction without having decided a
case totally heard by him and which was duly argued or opportunity
given for argument to the parties or their counsel is the
judge authorized and required under the cited basic provision of the
Judiciary Act (and not his successor in the court vacated or left by
him) to prepare and render his decision in the case, signing his
decision in his new station or anywhere else within the Philippines
and filing the same by registered mail with the clerk of the court
(vacated or left by him) for release in due course to the parties in the
manner provided by the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Only when there exist countervailing circumstances and compelling
considerations against the rendition of decision by such transferred
judge who has totally heard the case - which must be submitted by
him by proper petition to and approved by the Supreme
Court - will such transferred judge be relieved from the obligation of
preparing and rendering the decision in the case, which the Supreme
Court may then assign to his successor in the court vacated or left by
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The transferred judge who totally heard the case or his successor if
assigned by the Supreme Court shall be bound by the same ninety-
day period from (submitted in the case of the former and from notice
of assignment in the case of the latter) within which to render the
decision.
Makalintal, C.J., Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernando, Muoz
Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library
I am in complete agreement with the judgment upholding the validity
of the decision of Judge Samuel F. Reyes of December 20, 1963
against herein private respondent, Yolanda Matias, which, it should
be mentioned, had already been affirmed by the Court of Appeals on
May 13, 1968, before said respondent tried to assail it on October
26, 1968 in her "Motion to Disregard Judgment etc.", rightly denied
by respondent Judge Andres Santa Maria in his order, subject of the
present petition. With all due respect to the able opinions of Justices
Fernando and Teehankee, however, I deem it necessary to elucidate
further on why the ruling laid down in People vs. Soria, G.R. No. L-
25175, March 1, 1968 (22 SCRA 948) should be abandoned: As will
be noted, that decision is a unanimous one, penned by no less than
Our eminent former colleague, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, and so, I
believe it behooves Us to be more explicit and elaborate in setting
forth Our reasons for holding now that said ruling is not justified by
the letter and spirit of the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary
Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The first point I would like to stress is that, to be sure, under the
juristic rationalization expounded by Justice Fernando in the main
opinion in People vs. Donesa, G.R. No. L-24162, January 31, 1973,
(49 SCRA 281) the instant case could perhaps be decided without
passing on the merits of Soria, since the facts herein are materially
parallel to those in Donesa. As in Donesa, the decision of Judge
Reyes aforementioned was rendered before Soria, hence, to apply
the Soria ruling thereto would give it the same "retroactive force and
effect" which, Justice Fernando held for the Court may not be done,
considering that "a judicial decision speaks as of the date it is
handed down" (id., p. 290). Of course, there is the difference that the
decision of Judge Reyes was rendered in a civil case whereas in
Donesa, the judgment in question was one of acquittal in a criminal
case which is infused with the element of jeopardy not
constitutionally permitted to be 'doubled". When it is considered,
however, that judgment in civil cases do also create vested rights
and that vested rights are not generally supposed to be affected
retroactively by subsequent related legal or juridical developments,
such distinction may not have importance, unless it is additionally
taken into account that the decision of Judge Reyes did not become
final until May 13,1968, that is, subsequent already to Soria (which
was on March 1, 1968), when it was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In any event, what I am trying to point out is that unless We make
Ourselves clear enough, We may give the impression that We are
actually overruling not only Soria but also the fundamental juristic
principle on which the main opinion in Donesa rests. To be more
specific, I am making it plainly understood as far as I am individually
concerned, the ratio decidendi in Donesa still stands as good law,
projecting as does the constitutional precept against double jeopardy
in correlation with the juristic principle of non-retroactive application
of posterior judgments, even if in reference to civil cases, the juristic
basis of the Donesa ruling which could comprehend all kinds of
vested rights, may not apply to judgments which have not yet
become final.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It, therefore, goes without saying that even if the separate opinion of
Justice Teehankee, which merited the concurrence of five other
1 it formerly exercised only upon initiative of the Secretary of
members of the Court, had been incorporated in the main opinion, it
could not have had more force than an obiter
dictum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the light of the basic considerations of the main opinion regarding
the non-retroactive applicability of Soria lest doing so might create
grave constitutional complications, I do not believe the occasion was
appropriate for the overturning of an existing doctrine related, strictly
speaking, to another aspect of the case. In other words, it may be
assumed that in acting as he did, Judge Donesa merely relied on
what was then the prevailing jurisprudence construing provisions of
2 can be reconciled with the spirit of the statutory provision. Hence, the
the Old Judiciary Act similar to Section 51, and since on the basis of
said construction, the acquittal of the accused could be validly
rendered by him, there was hardly any need for the Court to inquire
whether or not the subsequent ruling in Soria, which seemed to have
overlooked earlier jurisprudence, is correct. At least, Justice
3 substantive law. It must be read consistently with the latter, if it is to
Fernando saw it that way even then. Otherwise stated, my point is
that the task of uprooting a previous unanimous decision, granting it
is questionable, should not perhaps be done when after all it is
obvious that judgment with the same result may very well be
predicated on other grounds, probably more formidably, and there
are members of the Court who are not prepared to join the reversal
for one reason or another.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
It is thus in the present case, wherein the decision in question was
rendered in a civil case which had not yet become final before Soria,
that, without any risk of colliding with any vested rights principle, it is
fitting and proper to rule categorically that Soria must give way to a
more reasonable and realistic construction of Section 51 of the
Judiciary Act relative to the authority of judges of the courts of first
instance to continue acting in cases which they have started to hear
while holding court in one station, either permanently or temporarily,
after they are transferred or assigned therefrom to other stations,
whether permanently or temporarily. I might add that the need for
enlightenment on the subject has acquired more important relevance
in the light of the transfer by the New Constitution of the power of
administrative supervision of the lower courts from the Department of
Justice to the Supreme Court and of the exclusive power of the
Court, under said constitution, over the assignment of judges, which
Justice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is probably best to begin by making it clear that the controlling legal
provision is Section 51 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic
Acts 1186 and 1404, and that Section 9 of Rule 135, which is
discussed in Soria, and any other related provisions of the Rules of
Court are no more than of secondary significance. Inasmuch as We
are dealing with a point of authority or jurisdiction of judges, it should
be understandable that whatever is contained in any part of the
Rules of Court relative to the same subject is of no moment, unless it
decisive significance given by Soria to the phrase "by expiration of
his temporary assignment" found in said Section 9, but not appearing
in Section 51, is uncalled for. Surely, anything found in said rule
cannot, because of the Rule's adjective character, alter or modify the
have any effect. Anything in the Rules which goes against the spirit
of the substantive law must be
disregarded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Section 51 reads thus:
Detail of judge to another district or province. - Whenever a judge
stationed in any province or branch of a court in a province shall
certify to the Secretary of Justice that the condition of the docket in
his court is such as to require the assistance of an additional judge,
or when there is any vacancy in any court, or branch of a court in a
province, the Secretary of Justice may, in the interest of Justice, with
the approval of the Supreme Court and for a period of not more than
three months for each time, assign any judge of any court or
province whose docket permits his temporary absence from said
court, to hold sessions in the court needing such assistance or where
such vacancy exists. No judge so detailed shall take cognizance of
any case when any of the parties thereto objects and the objection is
sustained by the Supreme
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Whenever a judge appointed or assigned in any province or branch
of a court in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction without having
decided a case totally heard by him and which was duly argued or
opportunity given for argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall
be lawful for him to prepare and sign his decision in said case
anywhere within the Philippines and send the same by registered
mail to the clerk of the Court to be filed in the court as of the date
when the same was received by the clerk, in the same manner as if
the judge had been present in the court to direct the filing of the
judgment: Provided, however, That if a case has been heard only in
part, the Supreme Court, upon petition of any of the parties to the
case and the recommendation of the respective district judge, may
also authorize the judge who has partly heard the case to continue
hearing and to decide said case notwithstanding his transfer or
appointment to another court of equal jurisdiction.(RA Nos. 1186 and
1404.)
The issue in Soria that hinged on this provision was whether or not
the order of Judge Placido Ramos dated October 1, 1965 granting
the motion to quash the information against the accused for alleged
violation of Section 39 of Republic Act 1199 prohibiting pre-threshing
without the consent of the landowner was valid, considering that
while it was issued in a case which the Judge had heard and tried
when he was still Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
it was promulgated on October 19, 1965, after he had already
assumed the position of Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch III, on October 12, 1965 by virtue of an ad
interim appointment extended to him to by President on October 11,
1965. The People, thru the fiscal, impugned the order on the ground
that at the time it was promulgated, Judge Ramos had already
ceased to be judge of Nueva Ecija, hence, he had no more authority
to act in said case. Notwithstanding the contention of the Solicitor
General, who disagreed with the Fiscal in questioning the order, that
the same could be sustained under Section 9 of Rule 135, the Court
declared it invalid, reasoning out briefly as follows:
... . Evidently, therefore, while the order in question might have been
written by Judge Ramos prior to his assumption of office as Judge of
First Instance of Manila, the said order was promulgated after he had
ceased as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This
renders the promulgation of the dismissal order invalid, for it is not
the date of the writing of the decision or judgment that constitutes
rendition thereof and gives it validity and binding effect, but the filing
of such decision or judgment or order with the Clerk of Court, (Ago
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17898, October 31, 1962). And, if
the decision is sent by registered mail, it is considered filed in court,
not as of the date of posting, but as of its receipt by the Clerk (Sec.
51, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Acts 1186 and
1404). In similar cases, decisions promulgated after the judge who
penned the same had been appointed and had qualified to another
court were declared not valid and without any effect (Ong Siu vs.
Paredes, G.R. No. L-21638, July 26, 1966, and cases cited therein;
Jimenez vs. Republic, L-24529, January 31,
1968).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Solicitor General, however, advances the theory that,
notwithstanding Judge Ramos' appointment and qualification to the
Manila Court of First Instance, he did not cease "holding office" and
could have continued discharging the functions of Judge of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, because nobody was immediately
appointed to fill the latter position; and that the promulgation of the
order even after the assignment of the judge to another court is
allowed under Section 9 of Revised Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We cannot subscribe to this view. Under the law, after his
acceptance of the appointment to preside over Branch III of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Judge Ramos could sit and attend to
cases in any other court only upon proper authority of the Secretary
of Justice, with the previous approval of this Court, (Sec. 51,
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Acts 1186 and 1404)
of which there is none in the present case. Nor is the validity of the
questioned order of dismissal supported by Section 9 of Revised
Rule 135 of the Rules, which reads.
"SEC. 9. Signing judgments out of province. - Whenever a judge
appointed or assigned in any province or branch of a Court of First
Instance in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction, or by expiration of
his temporary assignment, without 'having decided a case totally
heard by him and which was argued or an opportunity given for
argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall be lawful for him to
prepare and sign his decision in said case anywhere within the
Philippines. He shall send the same by registered mail to the clerk of
the court where the case was heard or argued to be filed therein as
of the date when the same was received by the clerk, in the same
manner as if he had been present in court to direct the filing of the
judgment. ..."
The same provision appears in the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
"Whenever a judge appointed or assigned in any province or branch
of a court in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction without having
decided a case totally heard by him and which was duly argued or
opportunity given for argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall
be lawful for him to prepare and sign his decision in said case
anywhere within the Philippines and send the same by registered
mail to the clerk of the court to be filed in the court as of the date,
when the same was received by the clerk, in the same manner as if
the judge had been present in the court to direct the filing of the
judgment. ..."
It may be noted therefrom that the signing or writing of judgments
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the cases are
pending, is allowed when the judge leaves the province "by transfer
or assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction", or "by expiration
of his temporary assignment." In other words, the rule contemplates
of a temporary occupancy by the judge of either the post he has left
or of the one he is going to assume. This is fortified by the
appearance of the same provision in the Judiciary Act under the
heading "(D)etail of judge to another district or province," which
conveys the idea that the transfer or assignment of the judge treated
therein is merely a detail and not one of permanent character. That
cannot be said of the appointment of Judge Ramos from the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija to the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Having been extended by the President, it could not be the
temporary assignment or detail, from one court to another of equal
jurisdiction and effected by the Secretary of Justice, specified in the
above-quoted provisions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
As it has been repeatedly ruled, section 6 of Revised Rule 120 (Old
Rule 116) refers only to the physical absence of the judge, not to an
absence of the judge, not to an absence by reason of cessation or
removal from office (Ong Siu vs. Paredes, ante; People vs. So y
Ortega, L-8732, July 30, 1957; Jimenez vs. Republic, L-24529,
January 31, 1968). (22 SCRA, at pp. 950-953.)
As may be seen, the above-quoted rationalization is predicated on
three grounds. First, it holds that the questioned order could have
been validly issued under the law had Judge Ramos only secured
the proper authority therefor of the Secretary of Justice, with previous
approval of the Supreme Court. Second, it further holds that "the rule
(Section 9, Rule 135) contemplates of a temporary occupancy by the
judge of either the post he has left or of the one he is going to
assume." And third, it reiterates the ruling laid down in Ong Siu,
4
Ortega and Jimenez, citing them, that Section 6 of Rule 120 (Old
Rule 116) "refers only to the physical absence of the judge, not an
absence by reason of cessation or removal from office." I am afraid
that none of these three considerations can stand close
scrutiny.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To begin with, almost the entire rationalization is devoted to a
grammatical analysis of Section 9 of Rule 135 rather than of Section
51. And what is more lamentable, no effort whatsoever is made to
discover the intent and purpose of the law. Consequently, the
resulting construction of both the rule and the legal provision leaves
much to be desired.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
For instance, the conclusion therein that Section 9 "contemplates of
a temporary occupancy by the judge of either the post he has left or
of the one he is going to assume", is drawn from two premises: (1)
that the said rule allows the "signing or writing of judgments (by the
judge) outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the cases
are pending" only "when the judge leaves the province 'by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction' or 'by expiration of
his temporary assignment", and (2) the provision of the second
paragraph of Section 51 which is similar to Section 9 appears under
the heading "(D)etail of Judge to another district or
province."chanrobles virtual law library
Frankly, I cannot see the point in such reasoning. As can be seen
from a reading of Section 9 itself, the sentence therein from which
the clauses in quotes were picked out begins thus: "Whenever a
judge appointed or assigned in any province or a branch of the Court
of First Instance in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction, or by the expiration
of his temporary assignment etc." How such phraseology can be
understood as signifying that the law contemplates exclusively "the
temporary occupancy by the judge of either the post he leaves or of
the one he is going to assume" escapes me. To my mind, it is more
logical to maintain that the expression referring to a judge "who
leaves the province by transfer or assignment", when read in relation
to the other phrase in the provision regarding a judge who is
"appointed or assigned in any province or a branch of the Court of
First Instance in a province", readily connotes either a situation in
which a judge "appointed(permanently) in a province or a branch of
the Court of First Instance in a province" is "transferred" by
appointment to "another court of equal jurisdiction" as well as one in
which the judge who has been "assigned (by assignment, meaning
temporarily) in a province or branch of the Court of First Instance in a
province" is "assigned" by "assignment" (meaning again temporarily)
to "another court of equal jurisdiction." I am convinced that the words
"appointed" or "transfer" definitely mean permanent appointment and
permanent transfer, as contra-distinguished from the words
"assignment" and "assigned", also used in the statute, which
evidently imply temporariness. In the judiciary, the word "appointed"
can never have the connotation of "temporary", for the simple reason
that temporary appointments of judges is anathema in our judicial
system, in which independence of the judges is of the essence.
Thus, it is quite plain to me that the immediately discernible purpose
of the phraseology of the provision in question is to cover all
conceivable situations, such as: (1) that of a judge permanently
"appointed" to "a province or branch of the Court of First Instance in
a province" who shall "leave the province by transfer" permanently to
"another court of equal jurisdiction"; (2) that of a judge permanently
"appointed" to "a province etc." who "shall leave the province by
assignment" temporarily to "another court of equal jurisdiction"; (3)
that of a judge "assigned" temporarily to "a province etc." who "shall
leave the province by assignment" against to "another court of equal
jurisdiction"; and (4) that of a judge "assigned" temporarily to "a
province etc." who "shall leave the
province - by reason of the expiration of temporary assignment" and
has to return to his permanent station. This construction is so
patently practical and comprehensive that it is a wonder how the
element of temporariness imputed to the statute by Soria could have
been conceived, considering particularly, that the other construction
necessarily results, in difficulties and hardships in the functioning of
the courts and the administration of justice which the law must be
deemed to have precisely intended to
obviate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Anent the significance of the word "(D)etail" in the heading of Section
51 to which Soria gave much stress, it is likewise very clear to me
that logically, said word refers principally, if not exclusively, to the
first paragraph of the provision, the subject of which is the authority
of the Secretary of Justice, with the prior approval of the Supreme
Court, to "assign" judges "for period of not more than three months
for each time ... to hold sessions in (any) court needing ... assistance
or where (a) vacancy occurs." As can readily be noted, the second
paragraph deals with a different, if somewhat related, matter,
namely, the authority of a judge of "a province etc." who has been
either permanently transferred or temporarily assigned to "another
court of equal jurisdiction" to continue acting in cases heard by him
either wholly or partially in the previous "province etc." to which he
had been "appointed or assigned", which is precisely the subject of
this discussion. Indeed, the second paragraph could, as it should
have been made a separate section, in which event the word "detail"
would have been inappropriate in the heading thereof. Properly, the
heading of such separated section would have been "Authority of
judge to continue acting after detail in cases fully or partially heard
during detail" or other words of similar
import.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Truth to tell, Soria overlooked that rightly understood, neither the
second paragraph of Section 51 of the Judiciary Act nor Section 9 of
Rule 135 has modified the old law on the Point here in issue. There
is absolutely no evidence that there ever was any intention to that
effect. On the Contrary, as correctly observed by Justice Fernando in
his main opinion in Donesa, Section 9, and, for that matter, the
second paragraph of Section 51, are in essence mere reiterations of
the old law insofar as cases fully heard by a judge before his transfer
or assignment to another station are concerned. Thus, Section 13 of
Act 867 provided:
SEC. 13. Judges in certain cases authorized to sign judgment when
out of territorial jurisdiction of court. - Whenever a judge of a Court of
First Instance or a justice of Supreme Court shall hold a session,
special or regular, of the Court of First Instance of any province, and
shall thereafter leave the province in which the court was held
without having entered judgment in all the cases which were heard at
such session, it shall be lawful for him, if the case was heard and
duly argued or an opportunity given for argument to the parties or
their counsel in the proper province, to prepare his judgment after he
has left the province and to send the same back properly signed to
the clerk of the court, to be entered in the court as of the day when
the same was received by the clerk, in same manner as if the judge
had been present in court to direct the entry of the judgment:
Provided, however, That no judgment shall be valid unless the same
was signed by the judge while within the jurisdiction of the Philippine
Islands. Whenever a judge shall prepare and sign his judgment
beyond jurisdiction of the court of which it is to be a judgment, shall
inclose the same in an envelope and direct it to the clerk of the
proper court and send the same by registered mail.
The judicial construction of this provision was likewise noted by
Justice Fernando. Indeed, in Delfino vs. Paredes, 48 Phil. 645, the
separate statutes corresponding to the two paragraphs of Section
51, which, as I have explained, should have been the subject of
distinct sections, were discussed as follows:
Judge Filamor, prior to August 6, 1923, was Judge of the Court of
First Instance of the First Judicial District made up of the Provinces
of Cagayan and Batanes. On the date mentioned, he was authorized
and instructed by the Acting Secretary of Justice in an administrative
order "to hold a special term of court at the municipality of San
Pablo, Province of Laguna, beginning August 14, 1923, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, until further orders, for the purpose of trying
all kind of cases, excepting criminal and election cases, and to enter
final judgment therein." (Administrative Order No. 100, 21 Off. Gaz.,
1799.) On February 28, 1924, Judge Filamor was appointed Judge
for the Thirteenth Judicial District comprising the Provinces of
Batangas and Mindoro and took the oath of office and qualified as
such on the same date (22 Off. Gaz., 821). Before the trial of the
cases had been finished, the Acting Secretary of Justice issued
another administrative order on March 13, 1924, authorizing and
instructing Judge Filamor "to continue holding special term of court in
the municipality of San Pablo, Province of Laguna, beginning March
13, 1924, for the purpose of finishing the trial of such pending cases
and to enter final judgments therein." (Administrative Order No. 19,
22 Off. Gaz., 821.) Judge Filamor finished the trial of the cases
above referred to on or before April 30,
1924.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Dominador Delfino, the petitioner herein, was one of the applicants in
the land registration case No. 424 of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, G.L.R.O.R. No. 15052. The Director of Lands, one of the
respondents, and others were opponents. This case was one of the
many submitted to and duly taken cognizance of by Judge
Filamor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A decision in the case of Delfino vs. Director of Lands et al., was
rendered by Judge Filamor while he was Judge of the Thirteenth
Judicial District on August 6, 1925, that is, after the expiration of both
the original six months' period fixed by the Secretary of Justice and
its extension. The decision was favorable to Dominador Delfino and
other applicants who were declared owners of the land with the
exception of certain portions claimed by private
parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A copy of the decision was received on September 29, l925, by the
Director of Lands, a party to the land registration case. He made no
move to appeal from the decision. Instead, the Director of Lands filed
a motion on October 9, 1925, in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, presided over by Judge Paredes, to have the judgment of
Judge Filamor declared null and void. On October 29, 1925, Judge
Parades issued an order acceding to the motion of the Director of
Lands and declaring the decision of Judge Filamor as of no
effect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The law on the subject is found in section 155 of the Administrative
Code as amended by Act No. 3107 and in section 13 of Act No. 867.
The first mentioned provision of the Administrative Code provides as
follows:
"Detail of judge to another district or province. - If the public interest
and the speedy administration of justice so require, a Judge of First
Instance may be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary
duty, for a period which shall in no case exceed six months in a
district or province other than his own for the purpose of trying all
kinds of cases, excepting criminal and election cases."
Section 13 of Act No. 867 provides as follows:
Judges in certain cases authorized to sign final judgment when out of
territorial jurisdiction of court. - Whenever a Judge of a Court of First
Instance or a Justice of the Supreme Court shall hold a session,
special or regular, of the court of First Instance or any province, and
shall thereafter leave the province in which the court was held
without having entered judgment in all the cases which were heard at
such session, it shall belawful for him, if the case was heard and duly
argued or an opportunity given for argument to the parties or their
court in the proper province, to prepare his judgment after he left the
province and to send the same back properly signed the clerk of the
court, to be entered in the court as of the when the same was
received by the clerk, in the same manner as if the judge had been
present in court to direct the entry of the judgment: Provided,
however, That no judgment be valid unless the same was signed by
the judge while within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
Whenever a judge shall prepare and sign his judgment beyond the
jurisdiction the court of which it is to be a judgment, he shall inclose
same in an envelope and direct it to the clerk of the proper court and
send the same by registered
mail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Consideration should be given to the question at issue reference to
the admitted facts and the law, having in view the familiar canons of
statutory construction that effect be given to the intention of the
Legislature; that absurd and inequitable results be avoided; and that
all pertinent provisions of law construed as a whole and harmonized
if possible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The policy of the government is evidenced by the wording of the
amended section 155 of the Administrative Code. The detail of a
district judge to another district is permitted to advance "the public
interest and the speedy administration of justice." Obviously, the
public interest and the speedy administration of justice will be best
served if the judge who heard evidence renders the decision. It might
well happen that the full extent of the six months' period would be
used by the trial judge to receive the evidence, giving him no
opportunity promulgate decisions, with the result that all the
mountain of evidence would be left for the perusal of a judge who did
hear the
witnesses - a result which should be dodged, if it be legally
feasible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The law does not mean to authorize a judge to try a and then deprive
him of the power to render his decision after he has taken
cognizance of it. The legislative purpose was to make the judge
holding a special term of court a mere referee for another
judge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Section 155 as amended of the Administrative Code makes use of
the key word "trying." Not one of the words, "decision" "order,"
"decree," or "judgment," appears in the section. "Trying" would thus
seem to have the same meaning as "heard" found section 13 of Act
No. 867.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Section 13 of Act No. 867 permits a Judge of First Instance who shall
hold a session, special or regular, without having entered judgment
in all of the cases which were heard, to prepare and render his
judgment after he has left the province. It would be logical to
suppose that the Legislature in enacting Act No. 3107 amendatory of
section 155 of the Administrative Code had in mind section 13 of Act
No. 867 and desired both the new and the old provisions to
interblend.
Likewise, in Baguinguito vs. Rivera, 56 Phil. 423, also cited by
Justice Fernando, it was held:
An assignment of error common to the briefs of all of the appellants
is directed towards the supposed lack of authority, or jurisdiction, on
the part of the trial judge to sign the judgment in this case on the
date signed to the opinion. In this connection it appears that the trial
judge, Francisco Zandueta, was specially assigned by the Secretary
of Justice for duty in the Court of First Instance of Rizal during the
vacation period of April and May, 1930; and this case was heard and
finally submitted on May 28. Upon this occasion all the parties
concerned were present, in person or by attorney in the court; and
after the submission of proof had been completed, the court declared
the trial terminated. The attorney for the plaintiffs then requested that
a period of twenty-five days be allowed for the presentation of his
written argument, and a like period was asked by the attorney for the
appellees. The court, however, conceded a period of fifteen days
only to all. This announcement met the approval of all concerned,
except De Guia who was present in person and objected. Upon
these facts the point is now made that the hearing of the cause on
the date mentioned was incomplete and that, inasmuch as the
memorandums of the litigants were permitted to be filed after the
assignment of the trial judge to the Court of First Instance of Rizal
had lapsed, the court had no jurisdiction to prepare the judgment
later. The point, in our opinion, is not well taken. Section 13 also Act
No. 867 of the Philippine Commission authorizes the judge to
prepare his judgment after leaving the province where the case is
tried, 'if the case was heard and duly argued or an opportunity given
for argument to the parties or their counsel in the proper province.'
Under the facts above stated it must be considered that the parties
waived the opportunity to present an oral argument at the time the
cause was submitted; and the fact that they were permitted to file
written memorandums later did not render the hearing incomplete.
The submission of the memorandums was not, properly speaking, a
part of the hearing or trial as understood in the provision cited. It has
been held that memorandums of this sort form no necessary part of
the bill of exceptions (Alio vs. Villamor, 2 Phil., 234). It results that the
trial judge had authority to sign the judgment in this case.
In other words, until Soria came, there was no doubt whatsoever,
whether from the clear language of the law or from prevailing
jurisprudence, that what Judge Samuel F. Reyes did in the instant
case was perfectly right and valid. I do feel very strongly, that it is
high time We overturned Soria and followed instead the above-
quoted jurisprudence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Incidentally, Justice Teehankee points out that "Soria recognized,
however, that where the case was not yet submitted for decision but
was heard only in part, by the same permanently transferred judge,
he could be duly authorized by this Court upon proper petition of any
of the parties to the case and the recommendation of the district
judge, under theproviso in the cited law, "to continue hearing and to
decide said case notwithstanding his [permanent] transfer or
appointment to another court of equal jurisdiction." Not exactly, I
might say. As I see it, the point stressed in Soria was simply that
from the facts on record, it did not appear that Judge Ramos had
secured the requisite authority from the Secretary of Justice and the
Supreme Court. As the decision itself says, "Under the law, after his
acceptance of the appointment to preside over Branch III of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Judge Ramos could sit and attend to
cases in any other court only upon proper authority of the Secretary
of Justice, with previous approval of this Court, of which there is
none in the present case", thereby implying that if such authority
were present, the result would have been otherwise, specially if
account is taken of the subsequent arguments discussed in said
decision. Frankly, I cannot find therein the distinction which Justice
Teehankee refers to as having been drawn therein between cases
fully heard and those partially tried. And in this connection, it might
just as well be clarified that under the provision, the authority is
given, with respect to cases partially tried, not by the Secretary of
Justice, for he is not even mentioned therein, but by the Supreme
Court itself directly, "upon petition of any of the parties to the case
and the recommendation of the respective district judge."chanrobles
virtual law library
Also in connection with said authority or permission required, it is
quite obvious that, under the second paragraph of Section 51, there
is such express requirement only in instances when the judge
concerned has still to continue the trial of a case, which has not yet
been completed, but not when the case has already been fully heard.
Nothing is mentioned about such requirement in the latter instance
and I do not believe that permission or authority is needed
therefor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The reasons for the difference in the law for the two situations
appear to me to be readily understandable. Generally, a judge is
transferred or assigned to another station in order to decongest the
docket therein which must be in worse condition than the one from
where he is to come. To make the practice permissible as a matter of
course and leave it to the judge and/or the parties themselves to
determine whether or not he should continue hearing their case is to
defeat the very purpose for which the transfer or assignment is
made, since the judge would then have to utilize for such cases part
of the needed time and effort he is supposed to dedicate to the
cases in his new station.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Moreover, either the other party or any of the other parties involved
or even the judge himself may have their own well-grounded
objections to the petition, which the Court may deem weighty enough
to warrant denial thereof. On the other hand, none of these
considerations are present when all that the judge has to do is to
prepare the decision of a case he has fully heard, not only because
such preparation would be less complicated and time-consuming
than the work of continuing a trial, which would naturally necessitate
his going back physically to his former station, but also because, as a
rule, none of the parties should have any objection to their case
being decided by the same judge who has seen and heard the
witnesses testify and the respective counsel argue, and has,
accordingly, a more comprehensive grasp of the issues, whether of
fact or of law involved therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
In fact, I might say, parenthetically, that I do not share the view of
Justice Teehankee that, as a matter of good practice, permission of
the Court should also be required in the instances just referred to
(cases fully tried) in order to avoid the possibility, admitted by him to
be remote, that the judge who has left a station and his successor
may both make their respective decisions of the same case,
(conflicting or not), for the simple reason that I consider such
possibility not only remote but utterly improbable, granting as We
must, the good sense and proper realization of their responsibility in
the premises of the judges of this country and of the clerks of court
concerned. If We cannot concede this much to these officials in the
judiciary, what else can We assume they will be able to manage and
do properly? Are they so incompetent and unaware of what they are
supposed to do with the cases they are handling, such as to require
the Supreme Court to constantly and continuous overseer every
detail of their work, thus occupying its valuable time sorely needed
for more important, delicate and pressing matters, lest they might fail
to use their common sense in the circumstances contemplated,
perhaps the least complicated that can ever confront them? Proudly,
I have higher regard for Filipino judges, particularly in matters which
may well nigh involve their integrity, considering that the "remote
possibility" contemplated in Justice Teehankee's concurrence, might
amount to what in the current colloquialism is termed as "decision
grabbing". Withal the fact that during all the time that the law and the
courts have existed, not a single instance of such "remote possibility"
can be cited is, to my mind, more than sufficient assurance that the
good sense of responsibility of our judges can still be trusted in at
least the simple matter under
discussion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As indicated earlier above, the final argument in Soria is that "(a)s it
has repeatedly ruled, section 6 of Revised Rule 120 (old Rule 116)
refers only to the physical absence of the judge, not an absence by
reason of cessation or removal from office (Ong Siu vs. Paredes,
ante; People vs. So Ortega, L-24529 , January 31, 1968," which
implies that the Court considered permanent transfer of a judge from
one permanent station to another court of equal jurisdiction as
tantamount to either his cessation or removal from office. I gather
this inference from the fact that the decisions cited refer to instances
wherein the judges concerned were actually either promoted to a
higher court or had retired compulsorily after having reached the age
of seventy. For instance, Ong Siu vs. Paredes, supra, the facts and
the ruling were as follows:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
These four cases were jointly tried by Judge Andres Sta. Maria of
Branch II of the Municipal Court, and a single decision was rendered
under date of July 7, 1962, and before the decision could be
promulgated, Judge Sta. Maria was appointed to and assumed the
position of Judge of the court of First Instance of Mindoro. Judge
Milagros German succeeded him as Municipal Judge of Manila.
Charlie Fung and Benjamin Lu, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. F-
023477 and F-038478 petitioned the court that the unpromulgated
decision of Judge Sta. Maria be declared null and void. In her order
of August 14, 1962, Judge German granted the petition and the
unpromulgated decision of Judge Sta. Maria was declared nullity, as
if no trial was had before. But before a retrial of the cases could be
held, Judge German resigned from the position. Solicitor Lauro C.
Maiquez of the Solicitor General's Office, was temporarily assigned
to preside over Branch II of the Municipal
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Upon petition of herein appellants, the accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. F-038479 and F-038480, Acting Judge Maiquez in his order of
August 23, 1962, directed the promulgation of the decision of Judge
Sta. Maria, for August 29, 1962. However, on August 23, 1962,
respondent Judge Antonio P. Paredes was appointed to the vacant
position of Municipal Judge. In his order of even date, Judge
Paredes also scheduled the promulgation of the decision of Judge
Sta. Maria. This was done with respect to appellants, the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. F-038479 and F-038480, but not with regard to
Charlie Fung and Benjamin Lu who did not appear during the
promulgation if the judgment. Defendants Fung and Lu, who were
ordered arrested fir their non-appearance, thereupon
instituted certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to restrain the promulgation of the decision (Civ.
Case No. 51468).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In its decision of November 5, 1962, the Court of First stance of
Manila (Judge Jose N. Leuterio presiding) granted the writ, on the
ground that since Judge Sta. Maria was no longer a judge of the
Municipal Court, the decision written by him could no longer be
validly promulgated. Upon the decision of Judge Leuterio becoming
final, Judge Antonio Paredes of the Municipal Court ordered a retrial
of the four criminal cases ( F-038477, F-038477, F-038479, and F-
038480), which was for March 14, 1963. Herein appellants now in
turn went to Court of First Instance of Manila and applied for a writ to
restrain the Municipal Judge from retrying the four cases. It was
alleged that, as the decision acquitting them had air been
promulgated with respect to them, a retrial of the cases would
subject them to double jeopardy for the same
offenses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On June 20, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Manila (Judge
Arsenio Santos, presiding) dismissed the petition, the reason that the
decision of -Judge Sta. Maria being in because its promulgation was
effected when the judge ha ready ceased to be a municipal judge,
the same cannot place defendants twice in jeopardy for the same
offense. This is the decision that is the subject of the present
appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The appellants in effect contend that since the decision of Judge Sta.
Maria was signed by him while he was still the judge of the Municipal
Court of Manila where they were tried, its promulgation, although
made in his absence, was valid. In support of this contention, they
cite Section 6 of Rule 116 (now Rule 120) of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
"SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.- The judgment is promulgated
by reading the judgment or sentence in presence of the defendant
and any judge of the court which it was rendered. The defendant
must be personally present if the conviction is for a grave offense; if
light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of
his attorney or representative. And when the judge is absent or
outside of the province or city, his presence is not necessary and the
judgment may be promulgated or read to the defendant by the clerk
of court. ..."
Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions, the petitioner-appellants
argue, the decision of Judge Sta. Maria was promulgated in the
presence of Judge Paredes, another judge of the Municipal Court.
They claim that the absence of Judge Sta. Maria during the
promulgation does not render the decision he penned prior to his
appointment to the position of judge of the of first instance null and
void. Thus, it is alleged, the promulgation thereof, upon order of
Judge Paredes, was valid could be the basis of the defense of
double jeopardy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The above-quoted Section 6 of Rule 116 (how Rule 120) of the
Rules of Court, allowing the dispensability of the presence of the
judge in the reading of a sentence refers only to the physical
absence of the judge, and not to his inability to be present during the
promulgation of the judgment because of the cessation of or his
removal from office. This is clear from the use of the disjunctive
clause "absent or outside of the province or city" in the provision. In
other words, the decision of the judge may be promulgated even
without his presence, as long as he is still a judge of that court (Luna
V. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186; Garchitorena v. Crescini, 37 Phil. 675;
Barredo v. Commission on Elections, 45 O.G. 4457; People v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-9111-9113, Aug. 28, 1956; People vs. So,
101 Phil. 1257).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In the present case, what we have is not merely physical absence of
the judge who penned the decision, but the cessation or termination
of his incumbency as such judge. In the case of People v. Bonifacio
So y Ortega, (G.R. No. L-8732, supra) this Court ruled:
"It is well-settled that, to be binding a judgment must be duly signed,
and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, supra, Judge Barretto signed his
decision on January 14; two days later (January 16), he qualified as
Secretary of Finance thereby retiring from the judiciary; and on
January 17 his decision was promulgated. This Court held such
decision to be void, because at the time of the promulgation the
judge who prepared it was no longer a judicial
officer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"In criminal proceedings the Rules are more explicit. They require the
judgment to be promulgated' by leading the judgment or sentence in
the presence of the defendant and the judge of the court who has
rendered it" (Rule 116, sec. 6); and although it is true that it may be
read by the clerk "when the judge is absent or outside the province."
It is implied, that it may be read, provided he is still the judge
therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"It is contended that herein decision was promulgated, to all intents
and purposes, when it was delivered to the clerk for promulgation -
June 18. That contention was however, indirectly overruled in People
v. Court of Appeals, a case similar to this wherein we regarded
compliance with sec. 6 of Rule 116 as essential to promulgation, and
held that as the judgment was promulgated after the judge who
penned it had ceased to be judge, it was not legally
binding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"It is true that in Cea vs. Cinco (50 Off. Gaz. 52 this section was
interpreted to mean that where judgment one of acquittal, 'reading in
presence of the defendant' be substituted by giving a copy of the
decision to aim. declared that such act - delivery of copy - amounted
promulgation. In the case before us, notice that the decision would
be read (on June 30) was sent out, while J Encarnacion was still a
judge. Yet no copy of such decision was given the accused and he
was not informed the during said judge's incumbency. No judgment
was therefore validly entered. (Cf. Landicho v. Tan, 18 Off. 1007)."
Here, in the present case, when the notice for the promulgation of
the decision was sent out, the judge who signed the decision was no
longer the judge of the court, and no copy of the judgment of
acquittal was delivered to the appellants. With reasons, therefore, is
there no judgment validly entered in this case.
In So Ortega wherein the ruling was as quoted in the a excerpt from
Ong Siu, the facts were:
As a result of Republic Act No. 1186 which abolished positions of
Judges-at-large and cadastral judges, Judge Demetrio B.
Encarnacion presiding over Branch II of the Rizal Court of First
Instance ceased to be a member of the judiciary June 19,
1954.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
However he signed the decision dated June 4, 1954 Criminal Case
No. 4673 which had been tried before him in Pasig. Then he
delivered it on June 18, 1954 to Deputy Javillonar, who in turn on the
same day sent out to the parties notice that decision in the case
would be promulgated on June 30, 1954 at 8:30
a.m.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On the last mentioned date, as there was no judge for Branch II,
Deputy Clerk Javillonar transmitted the expediente to the First
Branch for the reading of the sentence; but a judge thereof
entertained some doubts, promulgation was
postponed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Thereafter, on October 6, 1954 Deputy Clerk Javillonar notified the
parties that promulgation of the decision would made on the 15th of
the same month. Forthwith the fiscal objected, contending that the
decision no longer be validly promulgated because Judge
Encarnacion had vacated his post on June 19, 1954. Such objection
was overruled, and the decision Judge Encarnacion absolving the
defendant was read to the I on November 12, 1954. The provincial
fiscal appealed, insisting on the nullity of the decision, for the reason
above indicated. (This decision is not reported but a syllabus thereof
may be found in 101 Phil. 1257.)
And in Jimenez, these were the facts on the basis of which the Court
applied the above ruling in Ong Siu:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Eduardo Jimenez, herein petitioner, together with others, was
charged with homicide in an information, dated May 13, 1960, before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Criminal case No. 9531, of said
court. The case was beard and tried before Judge Eulogio Mencias,
presiding one of the branches of the court. Admittedly, the decision
prepared and signed by Judge Mencias, was delivered to the clerk of
court on January 16, 1965. On the same date, the clerk of court
issued and served notice on the petitioner to appear in court on
January 21, 1965 for the promulgation of the sentence. In view that
January 21, was declared by the President a special holiday, the
promulgation of the decision could not be carried out on that day. On
January 21, 1965, Judge Eulogio Mencias had readied the age of 70
and was retired on that day from the bench. Respondent Judge
Pedro Navarro was immediately designated to take the place of
Judge Mencias. The former judge ordered that the sentence be
promulgated on January 29, 1965, but for some reason, it was
postponed on March 1, 1965.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On March 1, 1965, petitioner Jimenez filed a motion to set aside
decision and promulgation thereof, on the following grounds: (a)
"That the case was heard and tried by the Hon. Eulogio Mencias and
judgment was rendered by him before he retired on January 21,
1965, having reached the age of 70 years." 2nd (b) "That said
judgment cannot be validly promulgated since it is no longer the
official act of a judge, either de jure or de facto."chanrobles virtual
law library
The motion was opposed by the private
prosecutor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On April 2, 1965, the respondent Judge issued order, order denying
the motion, and ordered that the decision be promulgated.
Clearly then, the cases cited by Soria are not in point and irrelevant.
Surely, the transfer of a judge cannot by any stretch of reasoning be
equated with cessation or removal of a judge from his post because
he has already reached the of a compulsory retirement of he has
been already reached by compulsory retirement or he has been
promoted to a court of high jurisdiction. Of course, there can be no
doubt that in these cases, the judge loses entirely every bit of
authority power to act in any respect in cases he might have handled
or heard before his retirement or
promotion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In closing, I should perhaps cite, as Justice Teehankee does, the
advantages of the above construction of Section and, incidentally, of
Section 9, Rule 135, if only to em size that Soria failed to consider
the intrinsic merit of precedents before it which had convincingly
demonstrated the soundness of construing the law in such a way a
promote a system of administering justice that permits maximum
utilization of the available manpower in the judicial machinery and at
the same time assures the parties, as it is feasible to do so, of a
continued consideration decision of their case by the same judge,
regardless of w he might be transferred or assigned, with all the self-
evident advantages that such an arrangement entails. But sue
vantages are too obvious to require further elucidation. flee it to
state, therefore, that it must have been with above construction of the
existing law in mind that the Constitutional Convention of 1971 must
have found it fit and proper to ordain in the New Charter that the Sup
Court may " (a) ssign temporarily judges of inferior co to other
stations as public interest may require" (See 5 [3], Article X) and " (o)
rder a change of venue or p of trial to a-void a miscarriage of justice".
(Section 5 id.). Verily, Section 51 and Section 9 of Rule 135, as
construed now, go hand in hand with these constitutional precepts to
"provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases". (Section 5
[5] id.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, I vote to dismiss the
petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
The main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando formally announces the
Court's abandonment and overturning of the doctrine of People vs.
1 2
Soria and other cases cited therein as urged in the writer's
concurring opinion with a majority of the Court in People vs.
3
Donesa which is generously quoted therein.
The basic provision of law involved is the second paragraph of
4
section 51 of the Judiciary Act as amended, which provides:
Whenever a judge appointed or assigned in any province or branch
of a court in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdictionwithout having
decided a case totally heard by him and which was duly argued or
opportunity given for argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall
be lawful for him to prepare and sign his decision in said case
anywhere within the Philippines and send the same by registered
mail to the clerk of the Court to be filed in the court as of the date
when the same was received by the clerk, in the same manner as if
the judge had been present in the court to direct the filing of the
judgment: Provided, however, That if a case has been heard only in
part, the Supreme Court, upon petition of any of the parties to the
case and the recommendation of the respective district judge,
may also authorize the judge who had partly heard the case to
continue hearing and to decide said case notwithstanding his
5
transfer or appointment to another court of equal jurisdiction.
Under Soria, the Court previously interpreted the law to mean that
"the signing or writing of judgments outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the court where the cases are pending, is allowed when the judge
leaves the province 'by transfer or assignment to another court of
6
equal jurisdiction 'or 'by expiration of his temporary assignment.' In
other words, the rulecontemplates of a temporary occupancy by the
judge of either the post he has left or of the one he is going to
assume," reiterating that "in similar cases, decisions
promulgated after the judge who penned the same had been
appointed and has qualified to another court were declared not
validand without any effect." (Supra, at pages 951-953).
Soria recognized, however, that where the case was not yet
submitted for decision but was heard only in part by the
same permanently transferred judge, he could be duly authorized by
this Court upon proper petition of any of the parties to the case and
the recommendation of the district judge, under the proviso in the
cited law, "to continue hearing and to decide said case
notwithstanding his [permanent] transfer or appointment to another
7
court of equal jurisdiction."
The Court now therefore over turns Soria in its ruling that the
samepermanently transferred judge may not decide cases totally
heard by him and that it is only where he has
been temporarily transferred or assigned to another court of equal
jurisdiction that he is authorized to decide such cases totally
heard by him. As was stressed in our concurrence in Donesa, "there
seems to be no valid reason to authorize a permanentlytransferred
judge who has heard the case only in part ... 'to continue hearing and
to decide said case notwithstanding his transfer or appointment to
another court of equal
jurisdiction' ... but to withhold such authorization to decide the case
from the same permanently transferred judge who has 'totally heard'
8
the case."
So, it is now definitely ruled that the factor of temporary occupancy
stressed in Soria is inconsequential and that under the first part of
section 51 of the Judiciary Act a judge who has left the court of his
original assignment by permanent transfer or appointment to another
court of equal jurisdiction without having decided a case totally
heard by him and which was duly argued or opportunity given for
argument to the parties or their counsel may lawfully "prepare and
sign his decision in said case anywhere within the Philippines and
send the same by registered mail to the clerk of the court to be filed
in the court as of the date when the same was received by the clerk,
in the same manner as if the judge had been present in court to
direct the filing of the judgment" - and is thus placed on an equal
footing as a permanently transferred judge who has heard a
case only in part who may be authorized under the proviso of the
cited law to continue hearing and to decide the case thereafter.
In Donesa, as stated in the main opinion, the writer suggested
adding the qualification in order to avoid conflicts in a situation where
two judges would be legally competent to promulgate a decision for
the same court or branch thereof (viz the permanently transferred
judge and his successor in the court vacated by him) that "the
interested parties should obtain from this Court the corresponding
authorization for the permanently transferred judge who heard in
toto the case and the evidence to render the decision thereon, in the
same manner as temporarily transferred or assigned judges on
9
detail."
Upon further deliberation of the Court on this question - in the light of
the text, policy and intent of the law as well as of the power of
administrative supervision over all courts transferred to the Supreme
Court under Article X, section 6 of the 1973
Constitution, - it is now believed that such qualification and
requirement of prior authorization from this Court for
the permanently transferred judge who heard in toto the case and
the evidence to render the decision, is not necessary, because:
- The text of the law itself constitutes and grants such authorization,
when it provides that "it shall be lawful for [such transferred judge
who totally heard the case] to prepare and sign his decision in said
case anywhere within the Philippines and send the same by
registered mail to the clerk of the court to be filed in the court as of
the date when the same was received by the clerk, in the same
manner as if the judge had been present in the court to direct the
10
filing of the judgment";
 - As stressed by Justice Malcolm for the Court in the early case
11
of Delfino vs. Paredes, the policy and intent of such statutory
provisions dealing with detail, assignment and transfer of judges to
another district or province is to promote the public interest and the
interest of justice and "(O)bviously, the public interest and the
speedy administration of justice will be best served if the judge
who heard the evidence renders the decision" for "the law does not
mean to authorize a judge to try a case and then deprive him of the
power to render his decision after he has taken cognizance of it. The
legislative purpose was not to make the judge holding a special term
of court a mere referee for another judge." Surely these same
fundamental considerations equally apply to a judge who has totally
heard the case and is permanently transferred to another court of
equal jurisdiction - he should not be deemed deprived by the mere
fact of permanent transfer of the power to render his decision in a
case totally heard by him and which was "duly argued or opportunity
12
given for argument to the parties or their counsel"; and
- Finally, it should be noted that any doubts whether the doctrine
hereinabove enunciated in overturning Soria comes clearly within the
language and intent of section 51 of the Judiciary Act, have been
totally set at rest with the express grant of power to the Supreme
Court in the 1973 Constitution under Article X, section 5, paragraph
(3) to "assign temporarily judges of inferior courts to their stations as
public interest may require." Such power of temporary assignment
and the Supreme Court's power of administrative supervision over all
inferior courts certainly envisage the Court's power to require a
permanently transferred judge to render the decision in the cases
totally heard by him and submitted for decision in the court left and
vacated by him, and to prepare and sign such decisions in his new
station and have them filed by the clerk of his old court in the manner
provided by the law.
Experience has shown that such undecided cases left by
permanently transferred judges who totally heard the cases have
been the bane of their successors who more often than not, appalled
by the voluminousness of the records and carried away by the
pressures of their daily work, have left such old cases unattended
and undecided to be handed down in turn to their successors. It will
indeed redound then to the public interest and the cause of a speedy
and efficient administration of justice will best be served by
eliminating such a bottleneck and now pronouncing that the above-
quoted basic provision of the second paragraph 1 of the Judiciary
13
Act authorizes and requires the permanently transferred judge who
totally heard the case and received the evidence (although he has
been appointed to another province or station) to "render the
decision rather than to leave a mountain of evidence and transcripts
for the perusal and appreciation of a new judge totally unfamiliar with
the case and who did not have the opportunity of hearing the
witnesses and observing their deportment for purposes of gauging
14
their credibility and apprasing their testimony."
The mischief and harm of a contrary rule based on Soria is
exemplified by the case at bar where after the adverse judgment
rendered by Judge Samuel F. Reyes in a case totally heard by him
as judge of the Bulacan court of first instance on December 20, 1963
after he had already been permanently transferred and assumed
office as judge of the Rizal court of first instance at Pasig, had been
affirmed on appeal on its merits by the Court of Appeals in its
decision of May 13, 1968 and resolution denying reconsideration
on July 19, 1968, petitioner as the losing party would seek
on October 26, 1968 (upon discovering the incidental fact that Judge
Reyes had already assumed his Pasig station at the time of rendition
of the decision for the Bulacan court) to have Judge Reyes' decision
declared null and void, to have the new incumbent judge of the
Bulacan court of first instance who is totally unfamiliar with the case
and the evidence study the case and records and transcripts all over
again and render judgment anew, subject once more to the appeal
process.'
With the definite overturning and abandonment of the doctrine
of Soria, it should now be made clear for the guidance of the bench
and bar as well as of litigants in general that the judge who has left a
court by transfer or assignment (whether temporary or permanent) to
another court of equal jurisdiction without having decided a
case totally heard by him and which was duly argued or opportunity
given for argument to the parties or their counsel is the
judge authorized and required under the cited basic provision of the
Judiciary Act (and not his successor in the court vacated or left by
him) to prepare and render his decision in the case, signing his
 decision in his new station or anywhere else within the Philippines
and filing the same by registered mail with the clerk of the court
(vacated or left by him) for release in due course to the parties in the
manner provided by the law.
Only when there exist countervailing circumstances and compelling
considerations against the rendition of decision by such transferred
judge who has totally heard the case - which must be submitted by
him by proper petition to and approved by the Supreme
Court - will such transferred judge be relieved from the obligation of
preparing and rendering the decision in the case, which the Supreme
Court may then assign to his successor in the court vacated or left by
him.
The transferred judge who totally heard the case or his successor if
assigned by the Supreme Court shall be bound by the same ninety-
day period from (submitted in the case of the former and from notice
of assignment in the case of the latter) within which to render the
decision.
Makalintal, C.J., Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernando, Muoz
Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I am in complete agreement with the judgment upholding the validity
of the decision of Judge Samuel F. Reyes of December 20, 1963
against herein private respondent, Yolanda Matias, which, it should
be mentioned, had already been affirmed by the Court of Appeals on
May 13, 1968, before said respondent tried to assail it on October
26, 1968 in her "Motion to Disregard Judgment etc.", rightly denied
by respondent Judge Andres Santa Maria in his order, subject of the
present petition. With all due respect to the able opinions of Justices
Fernando and Teehankee, however, I deem it necessary to elucidate
further on why the ruling laid down in People vs. Soria, G.R. No. L-
25175, March 1, 1968 (22 SCRA 948) should be abandoned: As will
be noted, that decision is a unanimous one, penned by no less than
Our eminent former colleague, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, and so, I
believe it behooves Us to be more explicit and elaborate in setting
forth Our reasons for holding now that said ruling is not justified by
the letter and spirit of the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Act.
The first point I would like to stress is that, to be sure, under the
juristic rationalization expounded by Justice Fernando in the main
opinion in People vs. Donesa, G.R. No. L-24162, January 31, 1973,
(49 SCRA 281) the instant case could perhaps be decided without
passing on the merits of Soria, since the facts herein are materially
parallel to those in Donesa. As in Donesa, the decision of Judge
Reyes aforementioned was rendered before Soria, hence, to apply
the Soria ruling thereto would give it the same "retroactive force and
effect" which, Justice Fernando held for the Court may not be done,
considering that "a judicial decision speaks as of the date it is
handed down" (id., p. 290). Of course, there is the difference that the
decision of Judge Reyes was rendered in a civil case whereas in
Donesa, the judgment in question was one of acquittal in a criminal
case which is infused with the element of jeopardy not
constitutionally permitted to be 'doubled". When it is considered,
however, that judgment in civil cases do also create vested rights
and that vested rights are not generally supposed to be affected
retroactively by subsequent related legal or juridical developments,
such distinction may not have importance, unless it is additionally
taken into account that the decision of Judge Reyes did not become
final until May 13,1968, that is, subsequent already to Soria (which
was on March 1, 1968), when it was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
In any event, what I am trying to point out is that unless We make
Ourselves clear enough, We may give the impression that We are
actually overruling not only Soria but also the fundamental juristic
principle on which the main opinion in Donesa rests. To be more
specific, I am making it plainly understood as far as I am individually
concerned, the ratio decidendi in Donesa still stands as good law,
projecting as does the constitutional precept against double jeopardy
in correlation with the juristic principle of non-retroactive application
of posterior judgments, even if in reference to civil cases, the juristic
basis of the Donesa ruling which could comprehend all kinds of
vested rights, may not apply to judgments which have not yet
become final.
It, therefore, goes without saying that even if the separate opinion of
Justice Teehankee, which merited the concurrence of five other
1
members of the Court, had been incorporated in the main opinion, it
could not have had more force than an obiter dictum.
In the light of the basic considerations of the main opinion regarding
the non-retroactive applicability of Soria lest doing so might create
grave constitutional complications, I do not believe the occasion was
appropriate for the overturning of an existing doctrine related, strictly
speaking, to another aspect of the case. In other words, it may be
assumed that in acting as he did, Judge Donesa merely relied on
what was then the prevailing jurisprudence construing provisions of
2
the Old Judiciary Act similar to Section 51, and since on the basis of
said construction, the acquittal of the accused could be validly
rendered by him, there was hardly any need for the Court to inquire
whether or not the subsequent ruling in Soria, which seemed to have
overlooked earlier jurisprudence, is correct. At least, Justice
3
Fernando saw it that way even then. Otherwise stated, my point is
that the task of uprooting a previous unanimous decision, granting it
is questionable, should not perhaps be done when after all it is
obvious that judgment with the same result may very well be
predicated on other grounds, probably more formidably, and there
are members of the Court who are not prepared to join the reversal
for one reason or another.
It is thus in the present case, wherein the decision in question was
rendered in a civil case which had not yet become final before Soria,
that, without any risk of colliding with any vested rights principle, it is
fitting and proper to rule categorically that Soria must give way to a
more reasonable and realistic construction of Section 51 of the
Judiciary Act relative to the authority of judges of the courts of first
instance to continue acting in cases which they have started to hear
while holding court in one station, either permanently or temporarily,
after they are transferred or assigned therefrom to other stations,
whether permanently or temporarily. I might add that the need for
enlightenment on the subject has acquired more important relevance
in the light of the transfer by the New Constitution of the power of
administrative supervision of the lower courts from the Department of
Justice to the Supreme Court and of the exclusive power of the
Court, under said constitution, over the assignment of judges, which
it formerly exercised only upon initiative of the Secretary of Justice.
It is probably best to begin by making it clear that the controlling legal
provision is Section 51 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic
Acts 1186 and 1404, and that Section 9 of Rule 135, which is
discussed in Soria, and any other related provisions of the Rules of
Court are no more than of secondary significance. Inasmuch as We
are dealing with a point of authority or jurisdiction of judges, it should
be understandable that whatever is contained in any part of the
Rules of Court relative to the same subject is of no moment, unless it
can be reconciled with the spirit of the statutory provision. Hence, the
decisive significance given by Soria to the phrase "by expiration of
his temporary assignment" found in said Section 9, but not appearing
in Section 51, is uncalled for. Surely, anything found in said rule
cannot, because of the Rule's adjective character, alter or modify the
substantive law. It must be read consistently with the latter, if it is to
have any effect. Anything in the Rules which goes against the spirit
of the substantive law must be disregarded.
Section 51 reads thus:
Detail of judge to another district or province. - Whenever a judge
stationed in any province or branch of a court in a province shall
certify to the Secretary of Justice that the condition of the docket in
his court is such as to require the assistance of an additional judge,
or when there is any vacancy in any court, or branch of a court in a
province, the Secretary of Justice may, in the interest of Justice, with
the approval of the Supreme Court and for a period of not more than
three months for each time, assign any judge of any court or
province whose docket permits his temporary absence from said
court, to hold sessions in the court needing such assistance or where
such vacancy exists. No judge so detailed shall take cognizance of
any case when any of the parties thereto objects and the objection is
sustained by the Supreme Court.
Whenever a judge appointed or assigned in any province or branch
of a court in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction without having
 decided a case totally heard by him and which was duly argued or
opportunity given for argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall
be lawful for him to prepare and sign his decision in said case
anywhere within the Philippines and send the same by registered
mail to the clerk of the Court to be filed in the court as of the date
when the same was received by the clerk, in the same manner as if
the judge had been present in the court to direct the filing of the
judgment: Provided, however, That if a case has been heard only in
part, the Supreme Court, upon petition of any of the parties to the
case and the recommendation of the respective district judge, may
also authorize the judge who has partly heard the case to continue
hearing and to decide said case notwithstanding his transfer or
appointment to another court of equal jurisdiction.(RA Nos. 1186 and
1404.)
The issue in Soria that hinged on this provision was whether or not
the order of Judge Placido Ramos dated October 1, 1965 granting
the motion to quash the information against the accused for alleged
violation of Section 39 of Republic Act 1199 prohibiting pre-threshing
without the consent of the landowner was valid, considering that
while it was issued in a case which the Judge had heard and tried
when he was still Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
it was promulgated on October 19, 1965, after he had already
assumed the position of Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch III, on October 12, 1965 by virtue of an ad
interim appointment extended to him to by President on October 11,
1965. The People, thru the fiscal, impugned the order on the ground
that at the time it was promulgated, Judge Ramos had already
ceased to be judge of Nueva Ecija, hence, he had no more authority
to act in said case. Notwithstanding the contention of the Solicitor
General, who disagreed with the Fiscal in questioning the order, that
the same could be sustained under Section 9 of Rule 135, the Court
declared it invalid, reasoning out briefly as follows:
... . Evidently, therefore, while the order in question might have been
written by Judge Ramos prior to his assumption of office as Judge of
First Instance of Manila, the said order was promulgated after he had
ceased as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This
renders the promulgation of the dismissal order invalid, for it is not
the date of the writing of the decision or judgment that constitutes
rendition thereof and gives it validity and binding effect, but the filing
of such decision or judgment or order with the Clerk of Court, (Ago
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17898, October 31, 1962). And, if
the decision is sent by registered mail, it is considered filed in court,
not as of the date of posting, but as of its receipt by the Clerk (Sec.
51, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Acts 1186 and
1404). In similar cases, decisions promulgated after the judge who
penned the same had been appointed and had qualified to another
court were declared not valid and without any effect (Ong Siu vs.
Paredes, G.R. No. L-21638, July 26, 1966, and cases cited therein;
Jimenez vs. Republic, L-24529, January 31, 1968).
The Solicitor General, however, advances the theory that,
notwithstanding Judge Ramos' appointment and qualification to the
Manila Court of First Instance, he did not cease "holding office" and
could have continued discharging the functions of Judge of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, because nobody was immediately
appointed to fill the latter position; and that the promulgation of the
order even after the assignment of the judge to another court is
allowed under Section 9 of Revised Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.
We cannot subscribe to this view. Under the law, after his
acceptance of the appointment to preside over Branch III of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Judge Ramos could sit and attend to
cases in any other court only upon proper authority of the Secretary
of Justice, with the previous approval of this Court, (Sec. 51,
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Acts 1186 and 1404)
of which there is none in the present case. Nor is the validity of the
questioned order of dismissal supported by Section 9 of Revised
Rule 135 of the Rules, which reads.
"SEC. 9. Signing judgments out of province. - Whenever a judge
appointed or assigned in any province or branch of a Court of First
Instance in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction, or by expiration of
his temporary assignment, without 'having decided a case totally
heard by him and which was argued or an opportunity given for
argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall be lawful for him to
prepare and sign his decision in said case anywhere within the
Philippines. He shall send the same by registered mail to the clerk of
the court where the case was heard or argued to be filed therein as
of the date when the same was received by the clerk, in the same
manner as if he had been present in court to direct the filing of the
judgment. ..."
The same provision appears in the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"Whenever a judge appointed or assigned in any province or branch
of a court in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction without having
decided a case totally heard by him and which was duly argued or
opportunity given for argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall
be lawful for him to prepare and sign his decision in said case
anywhere within the Philippines and send the same by registered
mail to the clerk of the court to be filed in the court as of the date,
when the same was received by the clerk, in the same manner as if
the judge had been present in the court to direct the filing of the
judgment. ..."
It may be noted therefrom that the signing or writing of judgments
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the cases are
pending, is allowed when the judge leaves the province "by transfer
or assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction", or "by expiration
of his temporary assignment." In other words, the rule contemplates
of a temporary occupancy by the judge of either the post he has left
or of the one he is going to assume. This is fortified by the
appearance of the same provision in the Judiciary Act under the
heading "(D)etail of judge to another district or province," which
conveys the idea that the transfer or assignment of the judge treated
therein is merely a detail and not one of permanent character. That
cannot be said of the appointment of Judge Ramos from the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija to the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Having been extended by the President, it could not be the
temporary assignment or detail, from one court to another of equal
jurisdiction and effected by the Secretary of Justice, specified in the
above-quoted provisions.
As it has been repeatedly ruled, section 6 of Revised Rule 120 (Old
Rule 116) refers only to the physical absence of the judge, not to an
absence of the judge, not to an absence by reason of cessation or
removal from office (Ong Siu vs. Paredes, ante; People vs. So y
Ortega, L-8732, July 30, 1957; Jimenez vs. Republic, L-24529,
January 31, 1968). (22 SCRA, at pp. 950-953.)
As may be seen, the above-quoted rationalization is predicated on
three grounds. First, it holds that the questioned order could have
been validly issued under the law had Judge Ramos only secured
the proper authority therefor of the Secretary of Justice, with previous
approval of the Supreme Court. Second, it further holds that "the rule
(Section 9, Rule 135) contemplates of a temporary occupancy by the
judge of either the post he has left or of the one he is going to
assume." And third, it reiterates the ruling laid down in Ong Siu,
4
Ortega and Jimenez, citing them, that Section 6 of Rule 120 (Old
Rule 116) "refers only to the physical absence of the judge, not an
absence by reason of cessation or removal from office." I am afraid
that none of these three considerations can stand close scrutiny.
To begin with, almost the entire rationalization is devoted to a
grammatical analysis of Section 9 of Rule 135 rather than of Section
51. And what is more lamentable, no effort whatsoever is made to
discover the intent and purpose of the law. Consequently, the
resulting construction of both the rule and the legal provision leaves
much to be desired.
For instance, the conclusion therein that Section 9 "contemplates of
a temporary occupancy by the judge of either the post he has left or
of the one he is going to assume", is drawn from two premises: (1)
that the said rule allows the "signing or writing of judgments (by the
judge) outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the cases
are pending" only "when the judge leaves the province 'by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction' or 'by expiration of
his temporary assignment", and (2) the provision of the second
paragraph of Section 51 which is similar to Section 9 appears under
the heading "(D)etail of Judge to another district or province."
 Frankly, I cannot see the point in such reasoning. As can be seen
from a reading of Section 9 itself, the sentence therein from which
the clauses in quotes were picked out begins thus: "Whenever a
judge appointed or assigned in any province or a branch of the Court
of First Instance in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction, or by the expiration
of his temporary assignment etc." How such phraseology can be
understood as signifying that the law contemplates exclusively "the
temporary occupancy by the judge of either the post he leaves or of
the one he is going to assume" escapes me. To my mind, it is more
logical to maintain that the expression referring to a judge "who
leaves the province by transfer or assignment", when read in relation
to the other phrase in the provision regarding a judge who is
"appointed or assigned in any province or a branch of the Court of
First Instance in a province", readily connotes either a situation in
which a judge "appointed(permanently) in a province or a branch of
the Court of First Instance in a province" is "transferred" by
appointment to "another court of equal jurisdiction" as well as one in
which the judge who has been "assigned (by assignment, meaning
temporarily) in a province or branch of the Court of First Instance in a
province" is "assigned" by "assignment" (meaning again temporarily)
to "another court of equal jurisdiction." I am convinced that the words
"appointed" or "transfer" definitely mean permanent appointment and
permanent transfer, as contra-distinguished from the words
"assignment" and "assigned", also used in the statute, which
evidently imply temporariness. In the judiciary, the word "appointed"
can never have the connotation of "temporary", for the simple reason
that temporary appointments of judges is anathema in our judicial
system, in which independence of the judges is of the essence.
Thus, it is quite plain to me that the immediately discernible purpose
of the phraseology of the provision in question is to cover all
conceivable situations, such as: (1) that of a judge permanently
"appointed" to "a province or branch of the Court of First Instance in
a province" who shall "leave the province by transfer" permanently to
"another court of equal jurisdiction"; (2) that of a judge permanently
"appointed" to "a province etc." who "shall leave the province by
assignment" temporarily to "another court of equal jurisdiction"; (3)
that of a judge "assigned" temporarily to "a province etc." who "shall
leave the province by assignment" against to "another court of equal
jurisdiction"; and (4) that of a judge "assigned" temporarily to "a
province etc." who "shall leave the
province - by reason of the expiration of temporary assignment" and
has to return to his permanent station. This construction is so
patently practical and comprehensive that it is a wonder how the
element of temporariness imputed to the statute by Soria could have
been conceived, considering particularly, that the other construction
necessarily results, in difficulties and hardships in the functioning of
the courts and the administration of justice which the law must be
deemed to have precisely intended to obviate.
Anent the significance of the word "(D)etail" in the heading of Section
51 to which Soria gave much stress, it is likewise very clear to me
that logically, said word refers principally, if not exclusively, to the
first paragraph of the provision, the subject of which is the authority
of the Secretary of Justice, with the prior approval of the Supreme
Court, to "assign" judges "for period of not more than three months
for each time ... to hold sessions in (any) court needing ... assistance
or where (a) vacancy occurs." As can readily be noted, the second
paragraph deals with a different, if somewhat related, matter,
namely, the authority of a judge of "a province etc." who has been
either permanently transferred or temporarily assigned to "another
court of equal jurisdiction" to continue acting in cases heard by him
either wholly or partially in the previous "province etc." to which he
had been "appointed or assigned", which is precisely the subject of
this discussion. Indeed, the second paragraph could, as it should
have been made a separate section, in which event the word "detail"
would have been inappropriate in the heading thereof. Properly, the
heading of such separated section would have been "Authority of
judge to continue acting after detail in cases fully or partially heard
during detail" or other words of similar import.
Truth to tell, Soria overlooked that rightly understood, neither the
second paragraph of Section 51 of the Judiciary Act nor Section 9 of
Rule 135 has modified the old law on the Point here in issue. There
is absolutely no evidence that there ever was any intention to that
effect. On the Contrary, as correctly observed by Justice Fernando in
his main opinion in Donesa, Section 9, and, for that matter, the
second paragraph of Section 51, are in essence mere reiterations of
the old law insofar as cases fully heard by a judge before his transfer
or assignment to another station are concerned. Thus, Section 13 of
Act 867 provided:
SEC. 13. Judges in certain cases authorized to sign judgment when
out of territorial jurisdiction of court. - Whenever a judge of a Court of
First Instance or a justice of Supreme Court shall hold a session,
special or regular, of the Court of First Instance of any province, and
shall thereafter leave the province in which the court was held
without having entered judgment in all the cases which were heard at
such session, it shall be lawful for him, if the case was heard and
duly argued or an opportunity given for argument to the parties or
their counsel in the proper province, to prepare his judgment after he
has left the province and to send the same back properly signed to
the clerk of the court, to be entered in the court as of the day when
the same was received by the clerk, in same manner as if the judge
had been present in court to direct the entry of the judgment:
Provided, however, That no judgment shall be valid unless the same
was signed by the judge while within the jurisdiction of the Philippine
Islands. Whenever a judge shall prepare and sign his judgment
beyond jurisdiction of the court of which it is to be a judgment, shall
inclose the same in an envelope and direct it to the clerk of the
proper court and send the same by registered mail.
The judicial construction of this provision was likewise noted by
Justice Fernando. Indeed, in Delfino vs. Paredes, 48 Phil. 645, the
separate statutes corresponding to the two paragraphs of Section
51, which, as I have explained, should have been the subject of
distinct sections, were discussed as follows:
Judge Filamor, prior to August 6, 1923, was Judge of the Court of
First Instance of the First Judicial District made up of the Provinces
of Cagayan and Batanes. On the date mentioned, he was authorized
and instructed by the Acting Secretary of Justice in an administrative
order "to hold a special term of court at the municipality of San
Pablo, Province of Laguna, beginning August 14, 1923, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, until further orders, for the purpose of trying
all kind of cases, excepting criminal and election cases, and to enter
final judgment therein." (Administrative Order No. 100, 21 Off. Gaz.,
1799.) On February 28, 1924, Judge Filamor was appointed Judge
for the Thirteenth Judicial District comprising the Provinces of
Batangas and Mindoro and took the oath of office and qualified as
such on the same date (22 Off. Gaz., 821). Before the trial of the
cases had been finished, the Acting Secretary of Justice issued
another administrative order on March 13, 1924, authorizing and
instructing Judge Filamor "to continue holding special term of court in
the municipality of San Pablo, Province of Laguna, beginning March
13, 1924, for the purpose of finishing the trial of such pending cases
and to enter final judgments therein." (Administrative Order No. 19,
22 Off. Gaz., 821.) Judge Filamor finished the trial of the cases
above referred to on or before April 30, 1924.
Dominador Delfino, the petitioner herein, was one of the applicants in
the land registration case No. 424 of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, G.L.R.O.R. No. 15052. The Director of Lands, one of the
respondents, and others were opponents. This case was one of the
many submitted to and duly taken cognizance of by Judge Filamor.
A decision in the case of Delfino vs. Director of Lands et al., was
rendered by Judge Filamor while he was Judge of the Thirteenth
Judicial District on August 6, 1925, that is, after the expiration of both
the original six months' period fixed by the Secretary of Justice and
its extension. The decision was favorable to Dominador Delfino and
other applicants who were declared owners of the land with the
exception of certain portions claimed by private parties.
A copy of the decision was received on September 29, l925, by the
Director of Lands, a party to the land registration case. He made no
move to appeal from the decision. Instead, the Director of Lands filed
a motion on October 9, 1925, in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, presided over by Judge Paredes, to have the judgment of
Judge Filamor declared null and void. On October 29, 1925, Judge
Parades issued an order acceding to the motion of the Director of
Lands and declaring the decision of Judge Filamor as of no effect.
The law on the subject is found in section 155 of the Administrative
Code as amended by Act No. 3107 and in section 13 of Act No. 867.
The first mentioned provision of the Administrative Code provides as
follows:
"Detail of judge to another district or province. - If the public interest
and the speedy administration of justice so require, a Judge of First
Instance may be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary
duty, for a period which shall in no case exceed six months in a
district or province other than his own for the purpose of trying all
kinds of cases, excepting criminal and election cases."
Section 13 of Act No. 867 provides as follows:
Judges in certain cases authorized to sign final judgment when out of
territorial jurisdiction of court. - Whenever a Judge of a Court of First
Instance or a Justice of the Supreme Court shall hold a session,
special or regular, of the court of First Instance or any province, and
shall thereafter leave the province in which the court was held
without having entered judgment in all the cases which were heard at
such session, it shall belawful for him, if the case was heard and duly
argued or an opportunity given for argument to the parties or their
court in the proper province, to prepare his judgment after he left the
province and to send the same back properly signed the clerk of the
court, to be entered in the court as of the when the same was
received by the clerk, in the same manner as if the judge had been
present in court to direct the entry of the judgment: Provided,
however, That no judgment be valid unless the same was signed by
the judge while within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
Whenever a judge shall prepare and sign his judgment beyond the
jurisdiction the court of which it is to be a judgment, he shall inclose
same in an envelope and direct it to the clerk of the proper court and
send the same by registered mail.
Consideration should be given to the question at issue reference to
the admitted facts and the law, having in view the familiar canons of
statutory construction that effect be given to the intention of the
Legislature; that absurd and inequitable results be avoided; and that
all pertinent provisions of law construed as a whole and harmonized
if possible.
The policy of the government is evidenced by the wording of the
amended section 155 of the Administrative Code. The detail of a
district judge to another district is permitted to advance "the public
interest and the speedy administration of justice." Obviously, the
public interest and the speedy administration of justice will be best
served if the judge who heard evidence renders the decision. It might
well happen that the full extent of the six months' period would be
used by the trial judge to receive the evidence, giving him no
opportunity promulgate decisions, with the result that all the
mountain of evidence would be left for the perusal of a judge who did
hear the
witnesses - a result which should be dodged, if it be legally feasible.
The law does not mean to authorize a judge to try a and then deprive
him of the power to render his decision after he has taken
cognizance of it. The legislative purpose was to make the judge
holding a special term of court a mere referee for another judge.
Section 155 as amended of the Administrative Code makes use of
the key word "trying." Not one of the words, "decision" "order,"
"decree," or "judgment," appears in the section. "Trying" would thus
seem to have the same meaning as "heard" found section 13 of Act
No. 867.
Section 13 of Act No. 867 permits a Judge of First Instance who shall
hold a session, special or regular, without having entered judgment
in all of the cases which were heard, to prepare and render his
judgment after he has left the province. It would be logical to
suppose that the Legislature in enacting Act No. 3107 amendatory of
section 155 of the Administrative Code had in mind section 13 of Act
No. 867 and desired both the new and the old provisions to
interblend.
Likewise, in Baguinguito vs. Rivera, 56 Phil. 423, also cited by
Justice Fernando, it was held:
An assignment of error common to the briefs of all of the appellants
is directed towards the supposed lack of authority, or jurisdiction, on
the part of the trial judge to sign the judgment in this case on the
date signed to the opinion. In this connection it appears that the trial
judge, Francisco Zandueta, was specially assigned by the Secretary
of Justice for duty in the Court of First Instance of Rizal during the
vacation period of April and May, 1930; and this case was heard and
finally submitted on May 28. Upon this occasion all the parties
concerned were present, in person or by attorney in the court; and
after the submission of proof had been completed, the court declared
the trial terminated. The attorney for the plaintiffs then requested that
a period of twenty-five days be allowed for the presentation of his
written argument, and a like period was asked by the attorney for the
appellees. The court, however, conceded a period of fifteen days
only to all. This announcement met the approval of all concerned,
except De Guia who was present in person and objected. Upon
these facts the point is now made that the hearing of the cause on
the date mentioned was incomplete and that, inasmuch as the
memorandums of the litigants were permitted to be filed after the
assignment of the trial judge to the Court of First Instance of Rizal
had lapsed, the court had no jurisdiction to prepare the judgment
later. The point, in our opinion, is not well taken. Section 13 also Act
No. 867 of the Philippine Commission authorizes the judge to
prepare his judgment after leaving the province where the case is
tried, 'if the case was heard and duly argued or an opportunity given
for argument to the parties or their counsel in the proper province.'
Under the facts above stated it must be considered that the parties
waived the opportunity to present an oral argument at the time the
cause was submitted; and the fact that they were permitted to file
written memorandums later did not render the hearing incomplete.
The submission of the memorandums was not, properly speaking, a
part of the hearing or trial as understood in the provision cited. It has
been held that memorandums of this sort form no necessary part of
the bill of exceptions (Alio vs. Villamor, 2 Phil., 234). It results that the
trial judge had authority to sign the judgment in this case.
In other words, until Soria came, there was no doubt whatsoever,
whether from the clear language of the law or from prevailing
jurisprudence, that what Judge Samuel F. Reyes did in the instant
case was perfectly right and valid. I do feel very strongly, that it is
high time We overturned Soria and followed instead the above-
quoted jurisprudence.
Incidentally, Justice Teehankee points out that "Soria recognized,
however, that where the case was not yet submitted for decision but
was heard only in part, by the same permanently transferred judge,
he could be duly authorized by this Court upon proper petition of any
of the parties to the case and the recommendation of the district
judge, under theproviso in the cited law, "to continue hearing and to
decide said case notwithstanding his [permanent] transfer or
appointment to another court of equal jurisdiction." Not exactly, I
might say. As I see it, the point stressed in Soria was simply that
from the facts on record, it did not appear that Judge Ramos had
secured the requisite authority from the Secretary of Justice and the
Supreme Court. As the decision itself says, "Under the law, after his
acceptance of the appointment to preside over Branch III of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Judge Ramos could sit and attend to
cases in any other court only upon proper authority of the Secretary
of Justice, with previous approval of this Court, of which there is
none in the present case", thereby implying that if such authority
were present, the result would have been otherwise, specially if
account is taken of the subsequent arguments discussed in said
decision. Frankly, I cannot find therein the distinction which Justice
Teehankee refers to as having been drawn therein between cases
fully heard and those partially tried. And in this connection, it might
just as well be clarified that under the provision, the authority is
given, with respect to cases partially tried, not by the Secretary of
Justice, for he is not even mentioned therein, but by the Supreme
Court itself directly, "upon petition of any of the parties to the case
and the recommendation of the respective district judge."
Also in connection with said authority or permission required, it is
quite obvious that, under the second paragraph of Section 51, there
is such express requirement only in instances when the judge
concerned has still to continue the trial of a case, which has not yet
been completed, but not when the case has already been fully heard.
Nothing is mentioned about such requirement in the latter instance
and I do not believe that permission or authority is needed therefor.
The reasons for the difference in the law for the two situations
appear to me to be readily understandable. Generally, a judge is
transferred or assigned to another station in order to decongest the
docket therein which must be in worse condition than the one from
where he is to come. To make the practice permissible as a matter of
course and leave it to the judge and/or the parties themselves to
determine whether or not he should continue hearing their case is to
 defeat the very purpose for which the transfer or assignment is
made, since the judge would then have to utilize for such cases part
of the needed time and effort he is supposed to dedicate to the
cases in his new station.
Moreover, either the other party or any of the other parties involved
or even the judge himself may have their own well-grounded
objections to the petition, which the Court may deem weighty enough
to warrant denial thereof. On the other hand, none of these
considerations are present when all that the judge has to do is to
prepare the decision of a case he has fully heard, not only because
such preparation would be less complicated and time-consuming
than the work of continuing a trial, which would naturally necessitate
his going back physically to his former station, but also because, as a
rule, none of the parties should have any objection to their case
being decided by the same judge who has seen and heard the
witnesses testify and the respective counsel argue, and has,
accordingly, a more comprehensive grasp of the issues, whether of
fact or of law involved therein.
In fact, I might say, parenthetically, that I do not share the view of
Justice Teehankee that, as a matter of good practice, permission of
the Court should also be required in the instances just referred to
(cases fully tried) in order to avoid the possibility, admitted by him to
be remote, that the judge who has left a station and his successor
may both make their respective decisions of the same case,
(conflicting or not), for the simple reason that I consider such
possibility not only remote but utterly improbable, granting as We
must, the good sense and proper realization of their responsibility in
the premises of the judges of this country and of the clerks of court
concerned. If We cannot concede this much to these officials in the
judiciary, what else can We assume they will be able to manage and
do properly? Are they so incompetent and unaware of what they are
supposed to do with the cases they are handling, such as to require
the Supreme Court to constantly and continuous overseer every
detail of their work, thus occupying its valuable time sorely needed
for more important, delicate and pressing matters, lest they might fail
to use their common sense in the circumstances contemplated,
perhaps the least complicated that can ever confront them? Proudly,
I have higher regard for Filipino judges, particularly in matters which
may well nigh involve their integrity, considering that the "remote
possibility" contemplated in Justice Teehankee's concurrence, might
amount to what in the current colloquialism is termed as "decision
grabbing". Withal the fact that during all the time that the law and the
courts have existed, not a single instance of such "remote possibility"
can be cited is, to my mind, more than sufficient assurance that the
good sense of responsibility of our judges can still be trusted in at
least the simple matter under discussion.
As indicated earlier above, the final argument in Soria is that "(a)s it
has repeatedly ruled, section 6 of Revised Rule 120 (old Rule 116)
refers only to the physical absence of the judge, not an absence by
reason of cessation or removal from office (Ong Siu vs. Paredes,
ante; People vs. So Ortega, L-24529 , January 31, 1968," which
implies that the Court considered permanent transfer of a judge from
one permanent station to another court of equal jurisdiction as
tantamount to either his cessation or removal from office. I gather
this inference from the fact that the decisions cited refer to instances
wherein the judges concerned were actually either promoted to a
higher court or had retired compulsorily after having reached the age
of seventy. For instance, Ong Siu vs. Paredes, supra, the facts and
the ruling were as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
These four cases were jointly tried by Judge Andres Sta. Maria of
Branch II of the Municipal Court, and a single decision was rendered
under date of July 7, 1962, and before the decision could be
promulgated, Judge Sta. Maria was appointed to and assumed the
position of Judge of the court of First Instance of Mindoro. Judge
Milagros German succeeded him as Municipal Judge of Manila.
Charlie Fung and Benjamin Lu, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. F-
023477 and F-038478 petitioned the court that the unpromulgated
decision of Judge Sta. Maria be declared null and void. In her order
of August 14, 1962, Judge German granted the petition and the
unpromulgated decision of Judge Sta. Maria was declared nullity, as
if no trial was had before. But before a retrial of the cases could be
held, Judge German resigned from the position. Solicitor Lauro C.
Maiquez of the Solicitor General's Office, was temporarily assigned
to preside over Branch II of the Municipal Court.
 Upon petition of herein appellants, the accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. F-038479 and F-038480, Acting Judge Maiquez in his order of
August 23, 1962, directed the promulgation of the decision of Judge
Sta. Maria, for August 29, 1962. However, on August 23, 1962,
respondent Judge Antonio P. Paredes was appointed to the vacant
position of Municipal Judge. In his order of even date, Judge
Paredes also scheduled the promulgation of the decision of Judge
Sta. Maria. This was done with respect to appellants, the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. F-038479 and F-038480, but not with regard to
Charlie Fung and Benjamin Lu who did not appear during the
promulgation if the judgment. Defendants Fung and Lu, who were
ordered arrested fir their non-appearance, thereupon
instituted certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to restrain the promulgation of the decision (Civ.
Case No. 51468).
In its decision of November 5, 1962, the Court of First stance of
Manila (Judge Jose N. Leuterio presiding) granted the writ, on the
ground that since Judge Sta. Maria was no longer a judge of the
Municipal Court, the decision written by him could no longer be
validly promulgated. Upon the decision of Judge Leuterio becoming
final, Judge Antonio Paredes of the Municipal Court ordered a retrial
of the four criminal cases ( F-038477, F-038477, F-038479, and F-
038480), which was for March 14, 1963. Herein appellants now in
turn went to Court of First Instance of Manila and applied for a writ to
restrain the Municipal Judge from retrying the four cases. It was
alleged that, as the decision acquitting them had air been
promulgated with respect to them, a retrial of the cases would
subject them to double jeopardy for the same offenses.
On June 20, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Manila (Judge
Arsenio Santos, presiding) dismissed the petition, the reason that the
decision of -Judge Sta. Maria being in because its promulgation was
effected when the judge ha ready ceased to be a municipal judge,
the same cannot place defendants twice in jeopardy for the same
offense. This is the decision that is the subject of the present appeal.
The appellants in effect contend that since the decision of Judge Sta.
Maria was signed by him while he was still the judge of the Municipal
Court of Manila where they were tried, its promulgation, although
made in his absence, was valid. In support of this contention, they
cite Section 6 of Rule 116 (now Rule 120) of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
"SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.- The judgment is promulgated
by reading the judgment or sentence in presence of the defendant
and any judge of the court which it was rendered. The defendant
must be personally present if the conviction is for a grave offense; if
light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of
his attorney or representative. And when the judge is absent or
outside of the province or city, his presence is not necessary and the
judgment may be promulgated or read to the defendant by the clerk
of court. ..."
Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions, the petitioner-appellants
argue, the decision of Judge Sta. Maria was promulgated in the
presence of Judge Paredes, another judge of the Municipal Court.
They claim that the absence of Judge Sta. Maria during the
promulgation does not render the decision he penned prior to his
appointment to the position of judge of the of first instance null and
void. Thus, it is alleged, the promulgation thereof, upon order of
Judge Paredes, was valid could be the basis of the defense of
double jeopardy.
The above-quoted Section 6 of Rule 116 (how Rule 120) of the
Rules of Court, allowing the dispensability of the presence of the
judge in the reading of a sentence refers only to the physical
absence of the judge, and not to his inability to be present during the
promulgation of the judgment because of the cessation of or his
removal from office. This is clear from the use of the disjunctive
clause "absent or outside of the province or city" in the provision. In
other words, the decision of the judge may be promulgated even
without his presence, as long as he is still a judge of that court (Luna
V. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186; Garchitorena v. Crescini, 37 Phil. 675;
Barredo v. Commission on Elections, 45 O.G. 4457; People v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-9111-9113, Aug. 28, 1956; People vs. So,
101 Phil. 1257).
In the present case, what we have is not merely physical absence of
the judge who penned the decision, but the cessation or termination
of his incumbency as such judge. In the case of People v. Bonifacio
So y Ortega, (G.R. No. L-8732, supra) this Court ruled:
"It is well-settled that, to be binding a judgment must be duly signed,
and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it.
"In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, supra, Judge Barretto signed his
decision on January 14; two days later (January 16), he qualified as
Secretary of Finance thereby retiring from the judiciary; and on
January 17 his decision was promulgated. This Court held such
decision to be void, because at the time of the promulgation the
judge who prepared it was no longer a judicial officer.
"In criminal proceedings the Rules are more explicit. They require the
judgment to be promulgated' by leading the judgment or sentence in
the presence of the defendant and the judge of the court who has
rendered it" (Rule 116, sec. 6); and although it is true that it may be
read by the clerk "when the judge is absent or outside the province."
It is implied, that it may be read, provided he is still the judge therein.
"It is contended that herein decision was promulgated, to all intents
and purposes, when it was delivered to the clerk for promulgation -
June 18. That contention was however, indirectly overruled in People
v. Court of Appeals, a case similar to this wherein we regarded
compliance with sec. 6 of Rule 116 as essential to promulgation, and
held that as the judgment was promulgated after the judge who
penned it had ceased to be judge, it was not legally binding.
"It is true that in Cea vs. Cinco (50 Off. Gaz. 52 this section was
interpreted to mean that where judgment one of acquittal, 'reading in
presence of the defendant' be substituted by giving a copy of the
decision to aim. declared that such act - delivery of copy - amounted
promulgation. In the case before us, notice that the decision would
be read (on June 30) was sent out, while J Encarnacion was still a
judge. Yet no copy of such decision was given the accused and he
was not informed the during said judge's incumbency. No judgment
was therefore validly entered. (Cf. Landicho v. Tan, 18 Off. 1007)."
Here, in the present case, when the notice for the promulgation of
the decision was sent out, the judge who signed the decision was no
longer the judge of the court, and no copy of the judgment of
acquittal was delivered to the appellants. With reasons, therefore, is
there no judgment validly entered in this case.
In So Ortega wherein the ruling was as quoted in the a excerpt from
Ong Siu, the facts were:
As a result of Republic Act No. 1186 which abolished positions of
Judges-at-large and cadastral judges, Judge Demetrio B.
Encarnacion presiding over Branch II of the Rizal Court of First
Instance ceased to be a member of the judiciary June 19, 1954.
However he signed the decision dated June 4, 1954 Criminal Case
No. 4673 which had been tried before him in Pasig. Then he
delivered it on June 18, 1954 to Deputy Javillonar, who in turn on the
same day sent out to the parties notice that decision in the case
would be promulgated on June 30, 1954 at 8:30 a.m.
On the last mentioned date, as there was no judge for Branch II,
Deputy Clerk Javillonar transmitted the expediente to the First
Branch for the reading of the sentence; but a judge thereof
entertained some doubts, promulgation was postponed.
Thereafter, on October 6, 1954 Deputy Clerk Javillonar notified the
parties that promulgation of the decision would made on the 15th of
the same month. Forthwith the fiscal objected, contending that the
decision no longer be validly promulgated because Judge
Encarnacion had vacated his post on June 19, 1954. Such objection
was overruled, and the decision Judge Encarnacion absolving the
defendant was read to the I on November 12, 1954. The provincial
fiscal appealed, insisting on the nullity of the decision, for the reason
above indicated. (This decision is not reported but a syllabus thereof
may be found in 101 Phil. 1257.)
And in Jimenez, these were the facts on the basis of which the Court
applied the above ruling in Ong Siu:
 xxx xxx xxx
Eduardo Jimenez, herein petitioner, together with others, was
charged with homicide in an information, dated May 13, 1960, before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Criminal case No. 9531, of said
court. The case was beard and tried before Judge Eulogio Mencias,
presiding one of the branches of the court. Admittedly, the decision
prepared and signed by Judge Mencias, was delivered to the clerk of
court on January 16, 1965. On the same date, the clerk of court
issued and served notice on the petitioner to appear in court on
January 21, 1965 for the promulgation of the sentence. In view that
January 21, was declared by the President a special holiday, the
promulgation of the decision could not be carried out on that day. On
January 21, 1965, Judge Eulogio Mencias had readied the age of 70
and was retired on that day from the bench. Respondent Judge
Pedro Navarro was immediately designated to take the place of
Judge Mencias. The former judge ordered that the sentence be
promulgated on January 29, 1965, but for some reason, it was
postponed on March 1, 1965.
On March 1, 1965, petitioner Jimenez filed a motion to set aside
decision and promulgation thereof, on the following grounds: (a)
"That the case was heard and tried by the Hon. Eulogio Mencias and
judgment was rendered by him before he retired on January 21,
1965, having reached the age of 70 years." 2nd (b) "That said
judgment cannot be validly promulgated since it is no longer the
official act of a judge, either de jure or de facto."
The motion was opposed by the private prosecutor.
On April 2, 1965, the respondent Judge issued order, order denying
the motion, and ordered that the decision be promulgated.
Clearly then, the cases cited by Soria are not in point and irrelevant.
Surely, the transfer of a judge cannot by any stretch of reasoning be
equated with cessation or removal of a judge from his post because
he has already reached the of a compulsory retirement of he has
been already reached by compulsory retirement or he has been
promoted to a court of high jurisdiction. Of course, there can be no
doubt that in these cases, the judge loses entirely every bit of
authority power to act in any respect in cases he might have handled
or heard before his retirement or promotion.
In closing, I should perhaps cite, as Justice Teehankee does, the
advantages of the above construction of Section and, incidentally, of
Section 9, Rule 135, if only to em size that Soria failed to consider
the intrinsic merit of precedents before it which had convincingly
demonstrated the soundness of construing the law in such a way a
promote a system of administering justice that permits maximum
utilization of the available manpower in the judicial machinery and at
the same time assures the parties, as it is feasible to do so, of a
continued consideration decision of their case by the same judge,
regardless of w he might be transferred or assigned, with all the self-
evident advantages that such an arrangement entails. But sue
vantages are too obvious to require further elucidation. flee it to
state, therefore, that it must have been with above construction of the
existing law in mind that the Constitutional Convention of 1971 must
have found it fit and proper to ordain in the New Charter that the Sup
Court may " (a) ssign temporarily judges of inferior co to other
stations as public interest may require" (See 5 [3], Article X) and " (o)
rder a change of venue or p of trial to a-void a miscarriage of justice".
(Section 5 id.). Verily, Section 51 and Section 9 of Rule 135, as
construed now, go hand in hand with these constitutional precepts to
"provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases". (Section 5 [5] id.).
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, I vote to dismiss the petition.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151160. November 11, 2004]
SPOUSES JOSE and ESTER MARCHADESCH, FELIX
VILLAMOR, and REV. FR. MANUEL GOMEZ, petitioner,
vs. JUANITA CINCO VDA. DE YEPES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On January 30, 1984, respondent Juanita Cinco Vda. de Yepes
filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palo, Leyte,
against the petitioners, the Spouses Jose and Ester Marchadesch,
Felix Villamor and Fr. Manuel Gomez, for ownership, possession and
annulment of documents. She made the following allegations in her
complaint:
2. That plaintiff is the conjugal owner and administrator of a
parcel of land, located at Buri, Tanauan, Leyte,
described as follows:
A parcel of residential land, located at
Buri, Tanauan, Leyte, declared for
taxation purposes in the name of
Domingo Yepes (now deceased)
under Tax Dec. No. 13429. Bounded
on the North by Nueva St.; on the
East by Saturnino Villegas; on the
South by Canuto Creer & Julian
Encanio; and on the West by Hugo
Almaden; containing an area of 591
sq. m., more or less, and assessed
at P3,550.00.
3. That herein plaintiff acquired the above-described parcel
of land by sale sometime in 1966 with late husband,
Domingo Yepes, from one, Victor de Veyra, a xeroxed
copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as ANNEX
A;
4. That in 1977, a portion of said land, as well as a house
therein owned by plaintiffs mother, Felisa Cinco,
were (sic) utilized by spouses Jose and Ester
Marchadesch, up to 1980, with rentals being paid by
said spouses;
5. That from the month of July 1980, as Jose and Ester
Marchadesch failed to pay their monthly rentals, plaintiff
asked them to vacate from (sic) the premises but they
refused alleging that the land in question was owned by
one Felix Villamor, one of the defendants in this case;
6. That when plaintiff confronted Felix Villamor, he also
alleged his ownership over the said land and later sold
the same to Fr. Manuel Gomez, a co-defendant in this
case, who also sold a portion of the same to spouses
Jose and Ester Marchadesch;
7. That plaintiff requested the herein defendants to vacate
the land in issue and deliver the possession thereof to
her but the latter refused and still refuse to do so, to her
damage and prejudice;
8. That the claims of ownership by the defendants over the
aforesaid land is illegal, fraudulent and malicious, the
same being without any basis in law and equity and
prejudicial to the rights of plaintiff;
9. That plaintiff brought her controversy with respect to this
land before the Lupon Tagapayapa for arbitration but
the same proved futile as evidenced by a xeroxed
certification hereto attached as ANNEX B;
10. That because of the illegal and malicious acts of herein
defendants, plaintiff suffered moral damages due to
mental anguish, wounded feelings and other similar
 sufferings; plaintiff was forced to file this case incurring
[1]
litigation expenses.
The respondent prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment
be rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully
prayed that judgment be rendered by this Honorable Court in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants:
a) Declaring the herein plaintiff the true and absolute
owner of the land in question;
b) Declaring all documents or muniments of title in the
names of herein defendants over the land in question, if
any, as null and void;
c) Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiff moral
damages as well as litigation expenses; and
d) Ordering such other reliefs in favor of herein plaintiff
[2]
that may be just and equitable under the circumstances.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 6822 was raffled to
Branch 6 of the court presided by Judge Godofredo P. Quimsing, a
resident of Tacloban City.
In their Answer to the complaint, the petitioners interposed the
following affirmative defenses:
Defendants, thru counsel, by way of reference,
hereby incorporate the foregoing allegations as part hereof
and respectfully aver:
1. That defendant Fr. Manuel V. Gomez is a buyer
for value and in good faith of the property in litigation from
Felix Villamor and who later sold a portion of the same to
defendants, Spouses Jose and Ester Marchadesch;
2. That the acquisition by plaintiff of the land in
litigation is derived from an illegal source and, therefore, has
no basis in law and equity;
3. That the herein controversy between the party
litigants was not submitted to the Lupon
Tagapayapa of Barangay Canramos, Tanauan, Leyte, for
arbitration/conciliation as mandated by P.D. No. 1508 and,
therefore, said case is referrable to the Lupon
[3]
Tagapayapa concerned.
The petitioners also interposed counterclaims against the
respondent.
On October 6, 1986, the case was submitted for decision.
However, as an aftermath of the political upheaval in 1986, Judge
Quimsing submitted his resignation which was accepted by the
[4]
President of the Philippines on January 31, 1987.
Judge Getulio M. Francisco was appointed to replace Judge
Quimsing. On February 16, 1987, Judge Francisco issued a
[5]
Memorandum to all the stenographic reporters of the court directing
them to transcribe the stenographic notes taken during the trial of the
number of cases submitted for decision during the incumbency of
former Judge Godofredo P. Quimsing.
In the meantime, Judge Quimsing was appointed Presiding
Judge of Branch 33 of the RTC of Calbiga, Samar, on July 20,
[6]
1990.
Sometime in July 1991, the records of undecided cases pending
in Branch 6 of the RTC of Tacloban City were sent to Judge
Quimsing for decision. He was able to decide six or so cases, leaving
about seven civil cases still to be decided.
Per Administrative Order No. 105-91 of the Court Administrator,
dated October 2, 1991, Judge Quimsing was detailed as Assisting
Judge in the RTC of General Santos City. In a letter to the Deputy
Court Administrator dated November 12, 1991, he requested that he
be allowed to stay in Tacloban City to enable him to decide the
seven (7) of the cases heard by him during his incumbency as
Presiding Judge of Branch 6 of the RTC of Palo, Leyte.
 On December 12, 1991, Judge Quimsing rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. 6822 in favor of the respondent and against the
petitioners. The fallo of the decision reads:
In view thereof, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the herein
plaintiff Juanita Cinco Vda. de Yepes, against the herein defendants
spouses Jose and Ester Marchadesch, Felix Villamor and Fr. Manuel
Gomez; and, it is hereby declared:
(1) That the herein plaintiff is the true and absolute owner of the land
in question;
(2) That all documents or muniments of title or tax declarations in the
names of herein defendants over the land in question, if any, as null
and void; and for that matter let a copy of this decision be furnished
the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Leyte for his information,
guidance and corresponding action on the matter.
Further, the defendants are hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff, jointly
and severally, the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as
moral damages and One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos as litigation
expenses; as well as to pay the costs of this case.
[7]
SO ORDERED.
Judge Quimsing signed the decision as Presiding Judge of of
the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 6.
The petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA), which appeal was given due course by Judge Francisco on
January 15, 1992.
[8]
On January 21, 1992, Judge Quimsing wrote the Court
Administrator requesting that he be detailed in the RTC of Tacloban
City, Branch 6, instead of General Santos City, citing the cost and
inconvenience causing him and his family.
Acting on Judge Quimsings Letter dated November 12, 1991,
the Court issued a Resolution on January 23, 1992 granting the
request to remain in Branch 6, RTC, Tacloban City, for him to be
[9]
able to decide the seven (7) civil cases heard by him.
On October 5, 1992, the RTC records in Civil Case No. 6822
were received by the appellate court.
In their Brief in the CA, the petitioners, as appellants therein,
raised the following:
1. Lack of Authority or Jurisdiction on the part of
Judge Godofredo Quimsing to issue any decision
in the above-entitled case and to sign the said
questioned decision as Presiding Judge; hence,
the decision is null and void.
2. Suppression of evidence or facts when Judge
Godofredo Quimsing made statement of facts
totally contradictory to the statements in the
transcript of stenographic notes to suit his own
purpose in support of the questioned unauthorized
[10]
decision.
On July 13, 2001, the CA rendered judgment in favor of the
respondent and against the petitioners. On the petitioners first
assignment of error, the CA cited Section 9, Rule 135 of the Revised
Rules of Court, and ruled as follows:
In a Resolution dated February 10, 1983, the Supreme Court En
Banc laid down the guidelines in the distribution of cases in the
implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg.
129) as follows:
1. Cases already submitted for decision shall be decided by
the Judge to whom they were submitted, except cases
submitted for decision to judges who were promoted to
higher courts or to those who are no longer in the service.
Thus, said Resolution merely requires that the Judge who pens the
decision is still an incumbent judge, i.e., in this case, a judge of the
same court, albeit now assigned to a different branch, at the time the
decision is promulgated.
Admittedly, after the resignation of Judge Quimsing as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, was accepted by then
President Aquino in 1987, Judge Quimsing left several undecided
cases, one of which is the instant case which was totally heard by
him during his incumbency thereat. However, on July 20, 1990, then
President Aquino appointed Judge Quimsing as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Calbiga, Samar, a court of equal
jurisdiction as his former assignment. On the other hand, Judge
Getulio M. Francisco, who assumed the position of Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, on February 9, 1987,
does not appear to have taken any action in this case, except to give
due course to defendants-appellants notice of appeal in an Order
dated January 15, 1992. The fact that Judge Francisco gave due
course to defendants-appellants notice of appeal from the decision
penned by Judge Quimsing shows that the former had acquiesced to
the rendition of judgment by the latter.
It should be noted that the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated
January 23, 1992 merely granted Judge Quimsings request that he
be allowed to remain in Tacloban City in order for him to decide the
seven (7) cases heard by him in his former sala before proceeding to
General Santos City for his detail thereat as Assisting Judge. In other
words, the approval of the Supreme Court was only on Judge
Quimsings request to remain in Tacloban City before proceeding to
General Santos City, as the authority of Judge Quimsing to decide
the seven (7) cases totally heard by him in his former sala is
sanctioned under Section 9, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of
[11]
Court.
Upon the denial of the petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the decision, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari, insisting that:
A CASE WAS SUBMITTED TO A REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT JUDGE OF BRANCH 6, TACLOBAN CITY
FOR DECISION AND THE CASE COULD NOT BE
DECIDED SINCE THE JUDGE WAS
DISMISSED/TERMINATED/SEPARATED FROM THE
JUDICIARY BUT AFTER MORE THAN THREE (3) YEARS
FROM SUCH TERMINATION/SEPARATION/DISMISSAL
THE SAME JUDGE WAS RE-APPOINTED AS PRESIDING
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGE IN ANOTHER SALA OF
ANOTHER PROVINCE AND TOWN SPECIFICALLY AT
BRANCH 33, CALBIGA, SAMAR. CAN THIS NEWLY RE-
APPOINTED REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGE WITHOUT
AUTHORITY FROM THE SUPREME COURT NOR ANY
REQUEST FROM THE PARTIES NOR FROM THE
INCUMBENT PRESIDING REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
JUDGE OF BRANCH 6, TACLOBAN CITY WHERE THE
CASE IS PENDING DECISION, ON HIS OWN, VALIDLY
[12]
DECIDE THE PENDING UNDECIDED CASE?
The petition is denied due course.
Decisive of the issue at hand is Section 9, Rule 135 of the Rules
of Court, which reads:
Sec. 9. Signing Judgments out of the Province.-- Whenever a Judge
appointed or assigned in any province or branch of a Court of First
Instance in a province shall leave the province by transfer or
assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction or by expiration of
his temporary assignment without having decided a case totally
heard by him and which was argued or an opportunity given for
argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall be lawful for him to
prepare and sign his decision in said case anywhere in the
Philippines. He shall send the same by registered mail to the clerk of
court where the case was heard or argued to be filed therein as of
the date when the same was received by the clerk in the same
manner as if he had been present in court to direct the filing of the
judgment. If a case had been heard only in part, the Supreme Court
upon petition of any of the parties to the case and the
recommendation of the respective district judge may also authorize
the judge who has partly heard the case if another judge had heard
the case in part to continue hearing and to decide said case
notwithstanding his transfer or appointment to another court of equal
jurisdiction.
In relation to the aforequoted rule, the Court En Banc issued a
Resolution dated February 10, 1983, providing guidelines in the
distribution and decision of cases in the implementation of B.P. Blg.
129, the pertinent provision of which reads as follows:
1. Cases already submitted for decision shall be decided by the
Judge to whom they were submitted, except cases submitted for
decision to judges who were promoted to higher courts or to those
who are no longer in the service. Such cases shall be included in the
[13]
raffle;
In fine then, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
Judge Godofredo Quimsing had the authority to decide Civil Case
No. 6822 on December 12, 1991.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Under the Courts Resolution of 10 February 1983, Rule 135 of

the Rules of Court and Section 9 thereof, what is essential is that the
Judge who pens the decision of a case heard by him before he was
assigned or transferred to another district or branch of the court of
equal jurisdiction is an incumbent Judge, i.e., in this case, a Judge of
the same court (Regional Trial Court), albeit assigned to a different
[14]
branch at the time the decision was promulgated. There is no
reason why the rule and Resolution of the Court should not apply to
a case where a Presiding Judge who resigned after a case tried by
him had already been submitted for decision, and was, thereafter, re-
appointed as Presiding Judge of another regional district and branch
of the RTC.
In the present case, Judge Quimsing heard Civil Case No. 6822
after which it was submitted for decision. Although he resigned, he
was, however, re-appointed as Presiding Judge of the RTC in
Calbiga, Samar. t was then that he decided said case. He was an
incumbent Judge when he rendered the decision. His authority to
decide the said case under said Rule and Resolution of the Court
was affirmed by the Court, per its Resolution in A.M. No. 91-11-2014-
RTC, which reads:

A.M. No. 91-11-2014-RTC.- Re: Request of Judge Godofredo P.

Quimsing. Acting on the letter of Judge Godofredo P. Quimsing,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Calbiga, Samar, dated November
12, 1991, requesting that he first be allowed to remain in Tacloban
City, in order for him to decide seven (7) cases heard by him in his
previous sala (Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City) before
proceeding to General Santos City for his detail as Assisting Judge,
the Court Resolved to GRANT the aforesaid request of Judge
Quimsing.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117029. March 19, 1997]
PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES,
EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO,
[1]
LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA
E. CASAL and ALICE E. SOTTO, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO Q. REY and JUAN B.
ARAUJO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action, should the Court of Appeals invoke a Supreme Court decision
promulgated after such motion was filed by defendants and ruled
upon by the trial court? Is such invocation violative of the rule that
motions to dismiss based on lack of cause of action should be ruled
upon only on the basis of the allegations of the complaint? Who are
the real parties-in-interest in an action to cancel a Torrens certificate
of title?
[2] [3]
Petitioners challenge the Decision of public respondent in
CA-G.R. CV No. 28244 promulgated on June 29, 1994, which ruled
[4]
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed order dated August 22, 1989 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to try the
case on plaintiffs (herein private respondents) complaint/amended
complaint against all defendants (herein petitioners).
Let the original record of the case be returned to the court of origin.
[5]
In a Resolution promulgated on September 2, 1994,
Respondent Court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The order reversed by public respondent had been issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, in Civil Case No.
[6]
LP-8852-P. The order in part ruled:
Considering the arguments and counter-arguments urged by the
parties in this case, particularly on the nature and effect of the action
filed by plaintiffs, the Court is inclined to grant the Motion to Dismiss
filed by defendant Peltan Development Corporation on the basis of
the Supreme Court ruling in Gabila vs. Barriga, 41 SCRA 131. The
ultimate result of the cancellation prayed for by the plaintiffs, if
granted by this Court, would be to revert the property in question to
the public domain. Therefore, the ultimate beneficiary of such
cancellation would be the Government. Since the Government can
only be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, which has
repeatedly refused to institute or join an action for cancellation of
defendants titles, then, the real party in interest cannot be said to
have instituted the present action. It is the Government, not the
plaintiffs which is the real party in interest. Plaintiffs not being the real
party in interest, they have no cause of action against the
defendants.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted and this
case is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to plaintiffs pursuing
administrative relief in the proper government agencies concerned.
The Facts
The facts, as found by public respondent, are undisputed by the
[7]
parties, to wit:
On February 20, 1981 plaintiffs (herein private respondents) filed
against eleven (11) defendants (herein petitioners) a complaint
captioned for Cancellation of Titles and Damages. On December 15,
1981, the complaint was amended by including or impleading as the
twelfth defendant the City Townhouse Development Corporation.
Omitting the jurisdictional facts, the allegations in the amended
complaint are quoted hereunder:
II
Plaintiffs are applicants for a free patent over a parcel of land
comprising an area of 197,527 square meters, more or less, situated
in Barrio Tindig na Manga, Las Pias, Metro Manila.
III
Prior to the filing of their petition for free patent, plaintiffs had for
many years been occupying and cultivating the aforestated piece of
land until their crops, houses and other improvements they
introduced thereon were illegally bulldozed and destroyed by
persons led by defendant Edgardo Espinosa x x x Thereafter, the
same persons forcibly and physically drove out plaintiffs therefrom.
IV
Plaintiffs filed their petition for issuance of free patent covering the
aforesaid property with the Bureau of Lands in May 1976, as a result
of which they were issued by the Lands Bureau Survey Authority No.
54 (IV-1) on December 16, 1976.
V Spouses Lorenzo Gana and Juliana Carlos whence all the transfer
Accordingly, and on the strength of the aforesaid authority to survey,
plaintiffs had the property surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Regino L.
Sobrerinas, Jr. on December 20-21, 1976.
VI
During the years that plaintiffs were occupying, cultivating, planting
and staying on the aforestated parcel of land, neither x x x one of the
defendants was in possession thereof.
VII
The processing and eventual approval of plaintiffs free patent
application or petition over the subject piece of land have, however,
been obstructed and/or held in abeyance, despite the absence of
any opposition thereto, because of the alleged existence of several
supposed certificates of title thereon, x x x of the defendants,
namely:
Peltan Development, Inc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-17992
xxx xxx xxx
VIII
The aforestated transfer certificates of title of the abovenamed
defendants, plaintiffs discovered, and therefore they hereby allege,
were all derived from an alleged Original Certificate of Title No. 4216
supposedly issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal and registered
in the name of the Spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos
in 1929 allegedly pursuant to Decree No. 351823 issued by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in Land Registration Case (LRC) No.
672.
IX
Plaintiffs, however, subsequently discovered, after a thorough
research, that the alleged Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 of the
certificates of title of the x x x abovenamed defendants originated
and/or were derived from was FICTITIOUS and/or SPURIOUS x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Being, thus, derived and/or having originated from a FICTITIOUS
and/or SPURIOUS original certificate of title (OCT No. 4216), as
herein above shown, ALL the aforestated transfer certificates of title
of the x x x abovenamed defendants are, logically and imperatively,
FAKE, SPURIOUS and/or NULL AND VOID as well. Hence, they all
must and should be CANCELED.
 xxx xxx xxx
XIV
Before they decided to institute this action, plaintiffs informed, indeed
they warned, the defendants that their so-called titles over the
parcels of land or portions thereof covered by plaintiffs free patent
application and/or petition are either fake, spurious or void for
reasons aforestated. But the defendants simply ignored plaintiffs
admonitions.
XV
Accordingly, plaintiffs were compelled to retain the services of the
undersigned counsel to file this complaint not only because they
have been materially and substantially prejudiced by the existence of
defendants spurious titles, but also because as citizens and
taxpayers of this country they have a legitimate interest in the
disposition of alienable lands of the State, as well as the right to
question any illegitimate, unlawful or spurious award, disposition or
registration thereof to protect not just their interest but also the
public.
XVI
Because of the defendants illegal titling of the parcel of land or
portions thereof covered by plaintiffs free patent application, and
particularly by the unlawful disturbance of plaintiffs possession
thereof and destruction of plaintiffs plants and dwellings thereon,
which was caused and/or directed by the defendants Edgardo
Espinosa and Pat C. Margolles, said defendants should be ordered
to pay plaintiffs actual or compensatory damages in such amount as
may be proven during the trial of this case. (Original Records, Vol. I,
pp. 202-214)
On the basis of the foregoing allegations, the prayer in the amended
complaint states:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing,
judgment (should) be rendered:
1. Canceling the transfer certificates of titles of the defendants as
specified in par. VII hereof and/or declaring them null and void for
having originated or being derived from a fictitious, spurious or void
original certificates of title.
2. Ordering defendants Edgardo Espinosa and Pat C. Margolles to
pay plaintiffs actual or compensatory damages as may be proven
during the trial of this case. And
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs appropriate amount of
exemplary damages and reasonable amount of attorneys fees, as
well as to pay the costs.
Plaintiffs further respectfully pray for such other reliefs just and
equitable in the premises. (Original Records, Vol. I, p. 215)
xxx xxx xxx
On April 3, 1985, defendant Peltan Development Corporation
(Peltan, for brevity) filed a Motion For Preliminary Hearing on
Affirmative Defenses mainly on the ground that the complaint states
no cause of action against defendant Peltan. It is alleged in the
motion that plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest in the action
as they do not assert any present and subsisting title of ownership
over the property in question. Invoking the case of Gabila vs. Barriga,
L-28917, promulgated on September 30, 1971, the defendant Peltan
contends that the action being one for cancellation of the certificates
of title the Government, through the Solicitor General not a private
individual like plaintiff Gabila was the real party in interest.
On April 27, 1989 plaintiffs filed their opposition to defendant Peltans
aforesaid motion in which plaintiffs reasserted their cause of action
as set forth in their complaint, and pointed to the trial court the
pertinent averments in their action showing their rights and interests
or claims that had been violated which thus placed them in the status
of a real party in interest. Subsequently, defendant Peltan filed its
reply to plaintiffs opposition, with plaintiffs submitting their rejoinder
thereto. Then finally defendant Peltan filed its comment on the
rejoinder.
On August 22, 1989, the trial court dismissed the complaint.
Holding that the plaintiffs were not the real parties-in-interest, the
RTC ruled that they had no cause of action against the defendants.
The order was reversed by public respondent. Hence, this petition for
review.
In a motion filed before this Court on March 8, 1996, petitioners
prayed for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on
their titles under Entry No. 210060/T-12473-A. The notice was
caused by Private Respondent Alejandro Rey because of the
pendency of Civil Case No. LP-8852-P, the dismissal of which is the
[8]
issue at bench.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, holding that the two
elements of a cause of action were present in the complaint, to wit:
1) the plaintiffs primary right and 2) the delict or wrongful act of the
defendant violative of that right. The CA held that private
respondents had a right over the property as shown by the allegation
that they had been occupying the landholding in question and that
they had applied for a free patent thereon; and that petitioners
committed a delict against private respondents by forcibly driving
them out of the property, and delaying the processing and approval
of their application for free patent because of the existence of
petitioners transfer certificates of title derived from OCT No.
[9]
4126. The CA further held that the RTC should have treated the
case as an accion publiciana to determine who as between the
[10]
parties plaintiffs and defendants have a better right of possession.
Stressing that only the facts alleged in the complaint should
have been considered in resolving the motion to dismiss,
Respondent CA held that the trial court had erred in accepting the
allegations of herein petitioners that private respondents requests for
the Solicitor General to file an action to annul OCT No. 4216 had
been repeatedly denied.
Public respondent also rejected the application of
[11]
the Gabila ruling to the case at bar. It reasoned:
[12]
True, plaintiffs in their complaint prayed inter alia for the cancellation
of the transfer certificates of title of the defendants for being derived
from a spurious or false original certificate of title. Relying on the
case of Gabila vs. Barriga, supra, defendants argued that the
ultimate result of a favorable decision on complaints of such nature is
for the lands to revert back to the ownership of the state, and hence,
such actions may only be instituted by the Government through the
Solicitor Generel (sic). This argument is misplaced. Firstly, unlike the
Gabila case, the herein plaintiffs in their complaint did not assert and
pray for reversion. Secondly, the prayer for cancellation of the
defendants Torrens titles does not negate nor eliminate the presence
of the elements of plaintiffs cause of action on the basis of the
allegations in the complaint, as already discussed. Thirdly, the prayer
of a complaint is not a material factor in determining the relief
grantable, which rests upon the facts proved (Lacson vs. Diaz, 47
O.G. No. 12 Supp. 377, Aug. 4, 1950, No. L-2839). Precisely, as a
matter of practice, complaints filed in court usually contain a general
prayer for other relief which may be just and equitable in the
premises like the complaint in the case at bar. Fourthly, in the Gabila
case, the Supreme Court did not affirm the trial courts dismissal
order. Instead, per dispositive portion of the decision, it ordered the
setting aside of the appealed dismissal order and directing the return
of the records of the case to the trial court with admonition to the
party interested to formally implead the Bureau of Lands with notice
to the Solicitor General. Obviously, the posture of defendants Peltan
is not entirely supported by the Gabila case.
The Issues
Petitioners assign the following errors committed by public
respondent:
[13]
a. Ordering the trial court to proceed on private respondents cause of
action for the nullification of OCT No. 4216 on the ground that it is
fake/spurious when the Supreme Court had already ruled in G.R. No.
109490 and in G.R. No. 112038 that OCT No. 4216 is genuine and
valid -- and in disregarding and refusing to pass upon the said
squarely applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
b. Ordering the trial court to proceed on private respondents cause of
action for damages for the supposed acts of the private respondents
Margolles and Espinosa despite non-payment of the jurisdictional
docket fees when this cause of action had already prescribed -- and
in disregarding and refusing to pass upon the squarely applicable
Manchester ruling;
c. In not applying the Gabila ruling to dismiss the subject complaint
considering that respondents do not even pretend to have any title or
right to the subject property to authorize them to ask for a free patent
thereon since it is already (a) private property covered by petitioners
torrens title derived from OCT No. 4216 issued in 1929.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition and reverse the public respondent.
What Determines Cause of Action?
It is a well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action is
[14]
determined by the allegations in the complaint. In the resolution of
a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only
the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test in
cases like these is whether a court can render a valid judgment on
the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the
[15]
prayer therein. Hence, it has been held that a motion to dismiss
generally partakes of the nature of a demurrer which hypothetically
[16]
admits the truth of the factual allegations made in a complaint.
It is axiomatic nonetheless that a court has a mandate to apply
relevant statutes and jurisprudence in determining whether the
allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action. While it
focuses on the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions
material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In
resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance of
decisions this Court has rendered because they are proper subjects
of mandatory judicial notice as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines,
laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The said decisions, more importantly, form part of the legal
[17]
system, and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute an
abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and
shall be a ground for administrative action against an inferior court
magistrate.
In resolving the present complaint, therefore, the Court is well
[18]
aware that a decision in Margolles vs. CA, rendered on 14
February 1994, upheld the validity of OCT No. 4216 (and the
certificates of title derived therefrom), the same OCT that the present
complaint seeks to nullify for being fictitious and spurious.
Respondent CA, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 1994, failed
to consider Margolles vs. CA. This we cannot countenance.
In finding that the complaint stated a cause of action, Public
Respondent CA recognized that private respondent had a valid right
over the property in question, based on their actual possession
thereof and their pending application for a free patent thereon. The
linchpin of this right, however, is the validity of OCT No. 4216. In
other words, private respondents right is premised on the allegation
that the title of herein petitioners originated merely from the fictitious
and/or spurious OCT No. 4216.
Because it had failed to take cognizance of Margolles vs. CA,
the CA was unable to consider that the legality of OCT No. 4216. As
adverted to earlier, Margolles vs. CA upheld the validity of this title
and the titles derived therefrom by, among others, Petitioner Peltan
Corporation. Clearly, private respondents possession of the land,
and their pending application for a free patent thereon, did not not
vest in them a right superior to the valid title of petitioner originating
from OCT No. 4216. Indeed, private respondents can invoke no right
at all against the petitioners. Accordingly, the first element of a cause
of action, i.e., plaintiffs right, is not present in the instant case.
In this light, the CAs treatment of the present suit as an accion
publiciana to determine which one among the parties had a better
right over the property is but an exercise in redundancy. As
discussed above, the same issue has been foreclosed by the
Supreme Court in Margolles.
The Supreme Court promulgated Margolles ahead of the
assailed CA decision. It was incumbent upon Respondent CA to take
judicial notice thereof and apply it in resolving this case. That the CA
did not is clearly a reversible error.
Furthermore, allowing repeated suits seeking to nullify OCT No.
4216, like the present case, will bring to naught the principle of
indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system of land
[19] [20]
registration. Thus, in a resolution dated 10 August 1994, the First
Division of this Court, applying the Margolles ruling, dismissed a
petition for review involving herein petitioner Peltan Corporation
which had raised as issue the validity of OCT No. 4216. The Court, in
the case at bench, can do no less. Subjecting OCT No. 4216 to
further scrutiny, as proposed in the amended complaint, is no longer
an available option.
Are Private Respondents the Real Parties-in-Interest?
The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper
parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did for
the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the
ground that they were derived from a spurious OCT No. 4216,
assailed in effect the validity of said title. While private respondents
did not pray for the reversion of the land to the government, we
agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will have
the same result of reverting the land to the government under the
[21]
Regalian doctrine. Gabila vs. Barriga ruled that only the
government is entitled to this relief. The Court in that case held:
The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated on Section 1(g),
Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, i.e., failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action, for it alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that the
plaintiff admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or
amendment of the defendants title, because, even if the said title
were canceled or amended, the ownership of the land embraced
therein, or of the portion thereof affected by the amendment, would
revert to the public domain. In his amended complaint the plaintiff
makes no pretense at all that any part of the land covered by the
defendants title was privately owned by him or by his predecessors-
in-interest. Indeed, it is admitted therein that the said land was at all
times a part of the public domain until December 18, 1964, when the
government issued a title thereon in favor of defendant. Thus, if there
is any person or entity to relief, it can only be the government.
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs own averments negate the existence
of such right, for it would appear therefrom that whatever right might
have been violated by the defendant belonged to the government,
not to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant argues that although his
complaint is captioned as one for cancellation of title, he has
nevertheless stated therein several causes of action based on his
alleged rights of possession and ownership over the improvements,
on defendant-appellees alleged fraudulent acquisition of the land,
and on the damages allegedly incurred by him (plaintiff-appellant) in
relation to the improvements. These matters are merely ancillary to
the central issue of whether or not defendant-appellees title should
be canceled or amended, and they may not be leaned upon in an
effort to make out a cause of action in relation to the said focal issue.
Indeed, the principal relief prayed for in the amended complaint is the
[22]
cancellation or amendment of defendant-appellees title.

Nonpayment of Docket Fees

As we have already ruled that the private respondents are not

the real parties in interest, we find no more need to pass upon the
question of nonpayment of filing fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of private
respondents in Civil Case No. LP-8852-P is DISMISSED. The notice
of lis pendens, annotated in the titles of petitioners because of Civil
Case No. LP-8852-P, is ordered CANCELED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the court hereby
THIRD DIVISION decrees: amending in part the partial judgment:

1.) Allowing the plaintiff to redeem the mortgaged properties by

paying the amount of the purchase price with interest thereon at the
[G.R. No. 119184. July 21, 1997]
rate of one per centum per month up to the date of her deposit of the
redemption price and ordering the defendant to accept payment from
the plaintiff;
THE HEIRS OF FELICIDAD CANQUE namely: SURVIVING [5]
2.) Dismissing all the claims and counterclaims that the parties may
SPOUSE MARCELINO and children MARIANO,
have against each other in connection with this case.
LEONILO, PERFECTA, MEXIQUELA, EMILIO,
MARCELINO JR., ALEJANDRO, the Heirs of JESUS and
ADRIANO, all surnamed CANQUE, petitioners, vs. SO ORDERED.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE RURAL BANK OF MATANAO
(DAVAO DEL SUR), INC, and/or CONRADO
ANTONIO, respondents. The Antecedent Facts

DECISION
The facts as found by the Respondent Court of Appeals appear
PANGANIBAN, J.: undisputed. They are as follows:

In deciding this appeal, this Court reiterates the dictum that the
mortgagor of titled real estate acquired under the Public Land Act but
foreclosed by a rural bank, may redeem said property within two (2)
years from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale; and if the
said mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still
repurchase the land within five years from the expiration of the two-
year redemption period. It also finds occasion to remind lower courts
to keep abreast of decisions of this Court and apply them in resolving
identical cases before them.
Statement of the Case
Spouses Marcelino Canque and Felicidad Canque were the
registered owners of a parcel of land under Original Certificate of
Title No. P-(20559)-3409, of the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur
issued by virtue of Free Patent No. 40336, with an area of 2
hectares, 43 ares, and 58 centares. On May 21, 1976, said spouses
sold a portion of the parcel of land to the Iglesia ni Kristo Church to
the extent of 750 square meters. A new Transfer of Title No. T-8730
was issued to said spouses by the Register of Deeds of Davao del
Sur. On October 12, 1977, said spouses obtained a loan of Fifteen
Thousand (P15,000.00) from defendant bank secured by a real
estate mortgage over the parcel of land under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-8730 with an area of 23, 608 square meters.

The spouses loan of P15,000.00 with the defendant bank was duly
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking annulment of paid.
[1] [2]
the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 25,
1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 39807, reversing the trial On February 2, 1980, Felicidad Canque passed away. More than a
[3] [4]
courts decision. The latter tribunal disposed: month later, on March 7, 1980, widower Marcelino Canque obtained
by himself, another loan with defendant bank in the amount
of P25,000.00 with the same conjugal property under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-8730 as collateral. The defendant bank
allegedly considered this second loan as an extension of the first
loan as the real estate mortgage of the first loan had remained
uncancelled, despite the earlier payment of the first loan by the said
spouses.
For failure of Marcelino Canque to pay the second loan, defendant
bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage and sold the
property to itself as the highest bidder in a public sale.
On September 9, 1983, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was
registered. On October 18, 1985, defendants executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership and deed of absolute sale. On December
23, 1985, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18357 was issued in the
name of defendant bank by the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur.
After seven years from the registration of the Sheriffs Certificate of
Sale, plaintiffs Marcelino Canque and his children offered to redeem
the property in question but defendant bank refused. Hence, the
complaint filed before the lower court on September 7, 1990.
After hearing on the merits, the lower court first issued a partial
judgment on January 8, 1992, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, partial judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the real estate mortgage between the plaintiffs and
defendants valid; and
2. Allowing the plaintiffs to exercise their right of redemption and/or
repurchase pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 119, of
Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
(p. 5, Partial Dec.;p. 74, Orig. Rec.)
On August 24, 1992, the lower court issued the earlier stated
amended decision.
Dissatisfied with the verdict of the lower court plaintiffs appealed to
the Court [of Appeals].
The principal issue posed in this appeal is whether or not the lower
court erred in ruling that plaintiff Mario Canques right of redemption
as well as that of the other plaintiffs-appellees, heirs of Felicidad
Canque, has not prescribed.
In the case of Achuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434, the Supreme Court
reiterated the express provision of law as follows:
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 states:
Every reconveyance of land acquired under the free patent
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase
by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five
years from the date of conveyance.
In the case of Eastman Chemical Industries, Inc. v. C.A., 174 SCRA
619, the Supreme Court made the following pronouncement:
In the case of Reyes vs. Noblejas and Santos (G.R. No. L-23691,
November 25, 1967, 21 SCRA 1027 at pp. 1029-1030) the Supreme
Court upheld the contention of the Land Registration Commission, as
follows:
x x x Section 6 of Act 3135 should be applied to the present case
together with: (1) Sections 30 to 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court with regard to redemption; (2) Section 27, Rule 39 of the
said Rules and Section 71 of Act 496 with regard to the filing
(registration) of the sheriffs certificate of sale; and (3) Section 50 of
Act 496, with regard to the registration of the certificate of sale so as
to consider the land conveyed and affected under the Land
Registration Act.
and that:
x x x. Section 27, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
that the certificate of sale executed by the sheriff in a public auction
sale must be filed (registered) in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of the province where the land is situated. This is mandatory
requirement. Failure to register the certificate of sale violates the said
provision of law and, construed in relation with Section 50 of the
Land Registration Law (Act 496), shall not take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land covered by a torrens title because the
act of registration is the operative act to convey and effect the
land. So the redemption period, for purposes of determining the time
when a final deed of sale may be executed or issued and the
ownership of the registered land consolidated in the purchaser at an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale under Act 3135, should be reckoned
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the office of
the register of deeds concerned and not from the date of the public
[6]
auction sale. x x x. (Emphasis Supplied)
The respondent appellate court disagreed with the trial courts
decision, viz.:
Clearly, the lower court erred in ruling that plaintiffs-appellees
redemption period commenced on October 18, 1985, date of
defendants-appellants execution of an affidavit of consolidation of
ownership and deed of absolute sale.The correct date to reckon with
the start of the plaintiffs-appellees prescriptive period of five years is
September 9, 1983, the date of the registration of the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale. Plaintiffs-appellees instant suit to compel
defendants-appellees to allow them to redeem the property was only
filed on September 7, 1990, or almost seven (7) years from the
registration of the Sheriffs certificate of sale, or beyond the five-year
prescriptive period as provided under Sec. 119 of Commonwealth
Act 141. Thus, plaintiffs-appellees right of redemption had already
prescribed.
All is not lost, however for the plaintiffs-appellees as heirs of
Felicidad Canque for the lost right of redemption of the parcel of land
in question only applies to the conjugal share of 50% of plaintiff
Marcelino Canque considering that at the time the second loan
of P25,000.00 was entered by said plaintiff with defendant bank, his
spouse Felicidad Canque, who had a share of the other 50% of the
conjugal property, had already passed away (Art. 185, New Civil
Code). Thus, when plaintiff Mario Canque entered into the said loan
agreement with defendant bank giving the parcel of land in question
as security in the form of real estate mortgage, it was only valid
insofar as his 50% of the conjugal property share from the said
parcel of land is concerned. Defendant-appellant bank had acquired,
therefore, no right over the other 50% of the conjugal property
pertaining to the late Felicidad Canque which share of 50%
automatically passed to her heirs, herein plaintiffs-appellees from the
moment of her (Felicidad Canque) death (Art. 777, New Civil
[7]
Code).
Hence, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court in Civil Case
No. 2688 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new judgment
is hereby entered by the Court as follows:
1. Plaintiff-appellee Mario Canques right of redemption insofar as
50% of the property in question has already prescribed, and
defendant-appellant banks title and ownership of the said 50% of the
property are declared incontrovertible by the Court (of Appeals).
2. Declaring the second deed of real estate mortgage over the parcel
of land in question insofar as 50% of it is concerned as void as it
pertained to the conjugal share of the late Felicidad Canque which
share of 50% should rightfully pass to her heirs, herein plaintiffs-
appellees.
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the province of Davao Del Sur
to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18357 and to issue two
new Transfer Certificates of Title, one to plaintiffs-appellees under
the name Heirs of Felicidad Canque, and another one to the Rural
Bank of Matanao, Inc. at 50% each of the property in question
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18357.

4. Dismissing all claims and counterclaims of the parties against
each other in this case.
5. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[8]
Not satisfied with the above, petitioner filed this recourse to this
Court.
The Issues
Petitioners submit the following assignment of errors:
I --The Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law in
holding that the period to repurchase of foreclosed
lands issued thru free patent by Rural Banks is only
five (5) years.
II --The Court of Appeals erred in not passing upon the
issue of whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage is a
continuing mortgage so as to also secure future loans
[9]
by the husband after the death of the wife.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Prescriptive Period to Repurchase
[10]
In Rural Bank of Davao City vs. Court of Appeals, this Court,
through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., explicitly and cogently
ruled:
x x x If the land is mortgaged to a rural bank under R. A. No.
720, as amended, the mortgagor may redeem the property
within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure or from the
registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale at such foreclosure
if the property is not covered or is covered, respectively, by a
Torrens title. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or
his heirs may still repurchase the property within five (5) years
from the expiration of the two (2) year redemption period
pursuant to Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141). If
the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the
mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from
the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No.
3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the
property within five (5) years from the expiration of the
redemption period also pursuant to Sec. 119 of the Public Land
Act.
In the case at bar, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered
on September 9, 1983. Thus, based on the foregoing dictum, the
petitioners, whose land was mortgaged to and foreclosed by a rural
bank, had a period of two years or until September 9, 1985 to
exercise their right of redemption. And in line with the mandate of
Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act, they had an additional period of five
years from the latter date or until September 9, 1990 to exercise their
right to repurchase. Thus, the petitioners right to redeem their land
had not expired on September 7, 1990 when they filed suit against
private respondent to compel the latter to allow the former to
repurchase their land.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
because it palpably failed to consider in its August 25, 1994 Decision
the aforementioned ruling of the Supreme Court promulgated twenty
months earlier on January 27, 1993. Unfortunately, this is not the first
time for this Court to come upon such a slip. Peltan Development vs.
[11]
Court of Appeals ruled that every court must take cognizance of
decisions this Court has rendered because they are proper subjects
of mandatory judicial notice xxx [and] more importantly form part of
the legal system. We stress that members of the bench have a
responsibility to know and to apply the latest holdings of the
Supreme Court. The nature of their calling requires no less.
Second Issue: Factual Finding of Continuing Mortgage
Whether the mortgage which the Canque spouses contracted
with private respondent bank was intended by the parties to be a
continuing one, a factual issue passed upon sub-silencio by the
Court of Appeals, had been threshed out by the trial court. Finding
that the parties did contemplate a continuing credit arrangement, the
trial court aptly reasoned:
If it were not indeed the intention of the parties that (the property)
mortgaged shall serve as a continuing security not only for the first
loan of P15,000.00 but also for subsequent loans, the natural thing
for the mortgagor to have done under the premises was to ask for
the return of the title covering the property mortgaged to the
defendant and consequently ask for the discharge and/or
cancellation of the annotation on the title.
These the plaintiff did not do, as then, it was their intention to avail of
subsequent loans from defendants. Besides, the alleged full payment
of the first loan of P15,000.00 was not clearly shown to have caused
the discharge and/or cancellation of the real estate mortgage
constituted therefor. The (trial court) believes that the full payment
alleged is a situation obtaining in a continuing credit secured by
mortgage whereby the payment on a particular day equalled the
amount of the mortgage. In such a situation, the mortgage is not
discharged as long as subsequent loans and/or advancements may
be demanded, as plaintiff actually did in this case by obtaining the
second loan of P25,000.00.
The argument of plaintiffs that the surviving spouse, Marcelino
Canque cannot mortgage the property to secure the loan
of P25,000.00 because his wife had died and therefore he was not
the absolute owner of the mortgaged property, must fall as it was not
convincingly shown that the defendants had knowledge of the wifes
death at the time the loan of P25,000.00 was obtained.
Lastly, it is indeed absurd for the defendant bank, considering the
nature of its business, not to require collateral for the loan
of P25,000.00 when it did for the lesser loan of P15,000.00.
The fact is, and this the (trial court) believes, plaintiffs and
defendants had agreed to have a continuing credit arrangement
secured by a real estate mortgage. With this arrangement, plaintiffs
first secured the loan of P15,000.00 and after liquidation thereof,
they obtained another loan of P25,000.00 with the same property as
[12]
collateral.
In this issue, we defer to the well entrenched doctrine that
factual findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed on appeal
unless the trial court has overlooked or ignored some fact or
circumstance of sufficient weight or significance which, if considered,
[13]
would alter the situation. After a thorough review of this case, the
Court finds both lower courts did not overlook any such fact or
circumstance. Hence, their factual finding as to the parties intention
in entering into a real mortgage under a continuing credit/mortgage
arrangement is binding upon this Court. In any event, this issue is
really academic in view of our holding on the first question.
In sum, we rule that the disposition of the Regional Trial Court
allowing the redemption is correct although for a different reason,
and that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to add the two-year
redemption period to the five-year repurchase right granted by the
Public Land Act.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The dispositive portion of the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur in Civil
Case No. 2688 allowing petitioner to redeem the subject property is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 106615. January 15, 2004]
SPOUSES ELIGIO P. MALLARI and MARCELINA I.
MALLARI, petitioners, vs. IGNACIO ARCEGA,
PERCASIO CATACUTAN, BEN GARCIA, ALFREDO DE
GUZMAN, MARIETA JACINTO, CELESTINO MAGAT,
VICENTE MALLARI, RAFAEL MANALO, LORENZO
MANARANG, EMILIO DE MESA, JUAN PANGILINAN,
TOROBIA SERRANO, CELESTINA TORNO, and JUANITO
VITAL, respondents.
[G.R. No. 108591. January 15, 2004]
IGNACIO ARCEGA, PERCASIO CATACUTAN, BEN GARCIA,
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, MARIETA JACINTO,
CELESTINO MAGAT, VICENTE MALLARI, RAFAEL
MANALO, LORENZO MANARANG, EMILIO DE MESA,
JUAN PANGILINAN, TOROBIA SERRANO, CELESTINA
TORNO, and JUANITO VITAL, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE NORBERTO C. PONCE, Regional Trial
Court Judge, Branch XLVI, San Fernando, Pampanga,
and SPOUSES ELIGIO MALLARI and MARCELINA
MALLARI, respondents.
[G.R. No. 109452. January 15, 2004]
SPOUSES ELIGIO P. MALLARI and MARCELINA I.
MALLARI, petitioners, vs. IGNACIO ARCEGA, ALFREDO
DE GUZMAN, PERCASIO CATACUTAN, RAFAEL
MANALO, EMILIO DE MESA, JUANITO VITAL, TOROBIA
SERRANO, CELESTINO MAGAT, VICENTE MALLARI,
LORENZO MANARANG, MARIETA JACINTO, BEN
GARCIA, CELESTINA TORNO,
and JUAN PANGILINAN, respondents.
[G.R. No. 109978. January 15, 2004]
SPOUSES ELIGIO P. MALLARI and MARCELINA I.
MALLARI, petitioners, vs. IGNACIO ARCEGA,
PERCASIO CATACUTAN, BEN GARCIA, ALFREDO DE
GUZMAN, MARIETA JACINTO, CELESTINO MAGAT,
VICENTE MALLARI, RAFAEL MANALO, LORENZO
MANARANG, EMILIO DE MESA, JUAN PANGILINAN,
TOROBIA SERRANO, CELESTINA TORNO, and JUANITO
VITAL, respondents.
[G.R. No. 139379. January 15, 2004]
SPOUSES ELIGIO P. MALLARI and MARCELINA I.
MALLARI, petitioners, vs. IGNACIO ARCEGA,
PERCASIO CATACUTAN, BEN GARCIA, ALFREDO DE
GUZMAN, MARIETA JACINTO, CELESTINO MAGAT,
VICENTE MALLARI, RAFAEL MANALO, LORENZO
MANARANG, EMILIO DE MESA, JUAN PANGILINAN,
TOROBIA SERRANO, CELESTINA TORNO, and JUANITO
VITAL, respondents.
 RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
[1]
At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision filed by
spouses Eligio and Marcelina Mallari (petitioners in G.R. Nos.
106615, 109452, 109978 & 139379 and respondents in G.R. No.
108591).
The instant consolidated petitions involve a parcel of agricultural
land over which Ignacio Arcega, et al. (the 14 tenants who are
petitioners in G.R. No. 108591 and respondents in G.R. Nos.
106615, 109452, 109978 & 139379) vigorously assert their right of
redemption. The resolution of the issues raised in all these petitions
hinges on the determination of the issue in G.R. No. 106615, i.e.,
whether Arcega, et al. have validly tendered or consigned payment
of the redemption price for the purpose of exercising their right of
redemption under Section 12, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended,
through their presentation of a document entitled Certification To
Finance Redemption of Estate Under R.A. No. 3844, As Amended,
dated January 15, 1982 issued by Mr. Basilio Estanislao, then
president of the Land Bank of the Philippines.
A recapitulation of the essential facts relative to the instant
motion for reconsideration shows that:
Arcega, et al. are agricultural lessees of landholdings planted to
sugarcane, described as Lot 3364 of the San Fernando Cadastre,
located at Maimpis, San Fernando, Pampanga. This lot is the subject
of these cases.
Lot 3364 was originally owned by spouses Roberto and
Asuncion Wijangco under T.C.T. No. 27507-R of the Registry of
Deeds of Pampanga. They mortgaged the lot and their other lots to
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan. Eventually, for
their failure to pay their loan, the PNB foreclosed the mortgage. In
the auction sale that followed, the PNB, being the highest bidder,
acquired the lots and was issued a Certificate of Sale. Upon failure of
the Wijangcos to redeem the lots, ownership thereof was transferred
to the PNB. Several land titles were then issued to it by the Register
of Deeds. Among those titles is T.C.T. No. 154516-R covering Lot
No. 3664.
On July 10, 1980, spouses Eligio and Marcelina Mallari
purchased two lots from the PNB, one of which is the subject Lot No.
[2]
3664, without any indication that the same is tenanted. Pursuant to
their agreement, the spouses paid PNB the sum of P473,000.00, or
20% of the purchase price of P2,365,000.00, as down-payment, and
the balance to be paid in three equal annual installments.
On July 22, 1981, Arcega, et al., who are occupying portions of
the lot, filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations, San Fernando,
Pampanga, a petition for redemption against the Wijangco spouses
(as original owners), the PNB (as the mortgagee-transferee and
vendor) and the Mallari spouses (as the subsequent vendees),
docketed as Agrarian Case No. 1908. Upon the abolition of the CAR,
the case was automatically absorbed by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 46, also at San Fernando, Pampanga. Arcega, et al. alleged
in their petition that in April, 1981, Eligio Mallari informed them that
he purchased Lot No. 3664 from the PNB; that they tried to redeem
their respective landholdings at P5,000.00 per hectare but spouses
Mallari rejected the offer considering that the latter bought the lot
from the PNB at P18,000.00 per hectare; and that they were
compelled to institute the petition for redemption pursuant to Section
[3]
12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended
[4]
by R.A. 6389, which provides:
Sec. 12. Lessees right of redemption. In case the landholding is sold
to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the
latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price
and consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption
only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of
redemption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred
eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the
vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian
Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over
any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the
reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.
Upon the filing of the corresponding petition or request with the
Department or corresponding case in court by the agricultural lessee
or lessees, the said period of one hundred and eighty days shall
cease to run.
xxx
The Department of Agrarian Reform shall initiate, while the Land
Bank shall finance, said redemption as in the case of pre-emption.
On November 18, 1981, before the pre-trial of the case,
Arcega, et al. filed with the trial court a motion praying that the Land
Bank be ordered to issue a certification that it shall finance the
redemption of their landholdings. The trial court, in its Order dated
December 24, 1981, denied their motion and required them to show
cause at the next hearing why their petition should not be dismissed
for their failure to make a tender of payment and/or consignation of
the redemption price.
Arcega, et al. then moved for a reconsideration of the December
24, 1981 Order on the ground that the requirement of tender of
payment and/or consignation is not necessary as a Land Bank
certification to finance such redemption is sufficient.
On January 20, 1982, during the hearing of their motion for
reconsideration, Arcega, et al. presented a certification entitled
Certification To Finance Redemption of Estate Under R.A. No. 3844,
As Amended, dated January 15, 1982 issued by Mr. Basilio
Estanislao, then president of the Land Bank of the Philippines.
In its Order dated January 27, 1982, the trial court dismissed the
petition for redemption because: (1) Arcega, et al. failed to exercise
their right of redemption within the prescribed 180-day period; and
(2) the Land Bank certification they presented does not constitute a
tender of payment and/or consignation of the redemption price.
Arcega, et al. interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-13807-CAR. On May 31, 1982, the
appellate court rendered a Decision, reversing and setting aside the
trial courts Order of January 27, 1982. It mainly ruled that: (a)
Arcega, et al. have timely exercised their right of redemption under
Section 12, R.A. No. 3844, as amended; and (b) a certification from
the Land Bank that it will finance the redemption is sufficient tender
of payment and consignation of the redemption price. Thus, the
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Aggrieved, the Mallari spouses filed a petition for review
[5]
on certiorari with this Court, docketed as No. L-61093. In a
Decision dated May 25, 1988, we dismissed the spouses petition,
holding that (1) the right of Arcega, et al. to redeem the property has
not yet prescribed because no notice in writing of the sale was ever
given by the vendee upon (them) as agricultural lessees of the land,
[6]
as required by law; and (2) it is not necessary for tenants-
redemptioners to make a tender and/or consignation of the
redemption price since a certification of the Land Bank to finance the
[7]
redemption when presented will suffice.
The trial court then proceeded with the pre-trial of the case and,
[8]
after a full-blown hearing, rendered a Decision dated November 8,
1990, dismissing for the second time the petition for redemption, on
the following grounds:
1. The action for redemption by Arcega, et al. has prescribed;
2. Arcega, et al. did not even present any witness from the Land
Bank to identify this document (the questioned certification) and to
attest to its due execution, genuineness and authenticity x x x,
thereby losing entirely its probative value and bolstering the fact, as
[9]
established, that indeed it was an accommodation certification only;
3. The Land Bank did not join Arcega, et al. as a plaintiff or
petitioner in the redemption case, neither was it impleaded as a co-
defendant. Hence, no judgment is binding and enforceable against
the bank since the court has not acquired jurisdiction over it;
4. The questioned Land Bank certification dated January 15,
1982 is void ab initio since it is conditional and is not in accordance
with the law and Land Bank Circular Letter No. 3 dated February 25,
1980 and, therefore, the same cannot be considered as equivalent to
tender of payment and consignation of the redemption price;
5. The Land Bank itself, in its letter dated October 16, 1989
(Exhibit 35), stated that it will not enforce the January 15, 1982
certification because it is not the certification required by law and
Land Bank Circular No. 3 dated February 25, 1980. Also, the Land
Bank, in another letter dated October 23, 1981 signed by Mr. Danilo
R. Cueto, Manager, PIO (Exhibit 22), stated that the bank is not
acquiring/financing sugar lands, thus: (1) The Land Bank of the
Philippines is not acquiring sugar lands. Rather, it is the financing
arm of the government in the implementation of the agrarian reform
program in pursuance of PD 27. At present, Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) covers only rice and corn lands; (2) As to its legal justification,
the existing law on agrarian reform OLT does not cover sugar
[10]
lands; and
6. Arcega, et al. failed to establish by competent and
satisfactory evidence the reasonable amount of the redemption price
of their landholdings. Their witness, Rafael Manalo admitted in open
court that he and his co-plaintiffs could afford to pay only P5,000.00
per hectare which is definitely way below the price per hectare at
which PNB sold the lot to the defendants-spouses in 1980 at the
price of P18,000.00 per hectare. On this score alone, plaintiffs
[11]
petition must necessarily fail.
Arcega, et al. again appealed from the trial courts Decision to
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP CAR 25209. In its
Decision dated June 9, 1992, the appellate court reversed the trial
courts Decision, holding that the issue of whether the Land Bank
certification is equivalent to a valid tender of payment and/or
consignation of the redemption price was already passed upon by
this Court in No. L-61093; and that what the trial court should have
done was to resolve the question on the reasonable amount of the
redemption price, nothing more.
Expectedly, spouses Mallari elevated the matter to this
Court via the present petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 106615. Pending our resolution of this case, four other
petitions were filed with this Court involving the trial courts various
Orders issued in the same agrarian case and a DARABs Decision
concerning the same disputed landholding:
In G.R. No. 108591, Arcega, et al. assail the validity of the trial
courts Orders dated November 3, 1992, November 12, 1992,
December 2, 1992 and January 14, 1993 which recognize spouses
Mallari's right to demand payment of back rentals from Arcega, et al.
for the agricultural crop year 1991-1992. In effect, the said Orders
held that they failed to exercise their right of redemption.
In G.R. No. 109452, spouses Mallari challenge the Court of
Appeals Decision dated March 10, 1993 affirming the Decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region III,
suspending the proceedings in DARAB Case Nos. 144-P '89 to 160-
P '89 (for dissolution of Arcega, et al.s tenancy relationship and their
payment of annual rentals corresponding to six agricultural crop
years 1983-1984 to 1988-1989) until such time that the petition for
redemption shall have been finally resolved by this Court in G.R. No.
106615.
In G.R. No. 109978, spouses Mallari impugn the April 30, 1993
Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the trial
courts Order dated February 5, 1992 requiring Arcega, et al. to
render an accounting on the sugarcane produced from their
landholdings for the crop year 1991-1992; and the Order dated May
14, 1992 directing them to deliver to spouses Mallari their shares
corresponding to the agricultural crop year 1991-1992. Both Orders
are based on the trial courts finding that Arcega, et al. did not
exercise their right of redemption.
In G.R. No. 139379, spouses Mallari question the validity of the
Court of Appeals Decision dated July 9, 1999 setting aside the trial
courts Order of November 4, 1994 requiring Arcega, et al. to pay the
spouses back rentals for the agricultural years 1982-1983 to 1989-
1990.
As we have stated at the outset, the resolution of these four
other petitions hinges on the determination of the issue in G.R. No.
106615, i. e., whether Arcega, et al. have validly tendered or
consigned the redemption price for the purpose of exercising their
right of redemption under Section 12, Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended, through their presentation of a Certification To Finance
Redemption of Estate Under R.A. No. 3844, As Amended, dated
January 15, 1982 issued by Mr. Basilio Estanislao, then president of
the Land Bank of the Philippines.
Going back to the Mallari spouses petition in G.R. No. 106615,
on March 20, 2002, we rendered a Decision affirming the June 9,
1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals. We reiterated our ruling in
No. L-61093 that since the Land Bank has issued a certification that
it will finance the redemption, it is not necessary for Arcega, et al. to
tender payment and/or consign the redemption price. The dispositive
portion of our Decision reads:
WHEREFORE:
1. The petitions of spouses Mallari in G.R. Nos. 106615, 109452,
109978 and 139379 are DENIED and the assailed Decisions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP CAR No. 25209, CA-G.R. SP CAR
No. 30085, CA-G.R. SP CAR No. 30887 and CA-G.R. SP CAR No.
36100 are AFFIRMED;
2. The petition of Arcega, et al. in G.R. No. 108591 is GRANTED and
the appealed RTC Orders dated November 3, 1992, November 12,
1992, December 2, 1992 and January 14, 1993 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE;
3. The RTC is ORDERED to implead the LBP in Agrarian Case No.
1908;
4. Agrarian Case No. 1908 is REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 46,
San Fernando, Pampanga for further proceedings with dispatch; and
5. The RTC is further ORDERED to submit to this Court a progress
report of the status of Agrarian Case No. 1908 every 3 months until
this Courts Decision is fully implemented.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Mallari now seek a reconsideration of our Decision.
Basically, spouses Mallari contend that the questioned Land
Bank certification, as held by the trial court in its November 8, 1990
Decision, is void ab initio for being merely conditional in character
and not in accordance with the pertinent law and Land Bank Circular
No. 3 dated February 25, 1980. Moreover, the Land Bank, in its letter
dated October 16, 1989, signed by Augusto M. Aquino, addressed to
Eligio Mallari, which the latter presented as Exhibit 35 during the trial
of the agrarian case, states that the subject certification cannot be
enforced against the bank, thus:
x x x the certification (in question) cannot be enforced against
Land Bank, whether or not it is a party to the pending case for
redemption.
The implementing rules and regulations outlined under LBP
Circular Letter No. 3 speak of a certification from the Bank as to
availability of funds, certifying that a certain amount in cash or/and
bond had already been set aside for the purpose, whereas Annex
A (the questioned certification presented by Arcega, et al.) of
your letter is a mere conditional commitment on the part of the
Bank to finance the redemption, which means that said
financing must be in accordance with law and existing
[12]
policies.
Spouses Mallari maintain that the above-quoted letter effectively
cancelled the questioned certification. Thus, Arcega, et al. have not
properly tendered or consigned the redemption price and, therefore,
cannot exercise their right of redemption.
In their comment, Arcega, et al. countered by simply stating that
the matter raised in the instant motion was already passed upon by
this Court in No. L-61093 holding that the Land Bank certification will
suffice.
The essential questions raised in spouses Mallaris instant
motion is (1) whether the subject Land Bank Certification to Finance
Redemption of Estate Under R.A. No. 3844, As Amended, dated
January 15, 1982, is void ab initio for being conditional and contrary
to law and Land Bank Circular Letter No. 3, dated February 25, 1980,
as held by the trial court; and (2) whether the said certification may
still be enforced despite its cancellation by the Land Bank.
The motion is impressed with merit.
The first issue certainly involves a scrutiny of the intrinsic or
inherent validity of the Land Bank certification. The resolution of this
issue is crucial because if the certification is indeed void, then
respondents Arcega, et al. can no longer exercise their right of
redemption under Section 12 of R.A. 3844, as amended, quoted
earlier.
 Contrary to the claim of Arcega, et al., this Court in its Decision
in No. L-61093 (penned by the late Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap) did
not pass upon the matter being raised by spouses Mallari in their
instant motion for reconsideration, i.e., whether the Land Bank
certification is void ab initio, or has become ineffective when it was
cancelled by the Land Bank. It must be stressed that pursuant to that
same Decision, the trial court conducted hearing in Agrarian Case
No. 1908. After a full-blown hearing, the trial court rendered its
Decision on November 8, 1990 dismissing the petition for redemption
of Arcega, et al. on the grounds that, among others, the questioned
Land Bank certification to finance redemption is void ab
initio for being conditional in nature and not in accordance with Land
Bank Circular No. 3 of February 25, 1980. We reiterate that the
correctness of this particular ruling by the trial court was not passed
upon by this Court in its Decision in No. L-61093. What it resolved is
that A certification of the Land Bank to finance the redemption when
[13]
presented will suffice, not whether it is valid. Surely, these two
phrases connote different meanings.
It is significant to stress further that after this Court rendered its
May 25, 1988 Decision in No. L-61093, the Land Bank declared in its
letter of October 16, 1989 to Eligio Mallari (Exhibit 35) that the
questioned certification cannot be enforced due to its serious legal
defects.
We shall now make a definite ruling on the validity of the Land
Bank certification in question.
The law governing redemption cases by agricultural lessees is
R.A. 3844, as amended, Section 12 (last paragraph) of which
mandates:
Sec. 12. Lessees right of redemption. x x x.
The Department of Agrarian Reform shall initiate, while the Land
Bank shall finance, said redemption as in the case of pre-emption.
Pursuant to the above provision, Land Bank Circular Letter No.
3, dated February 25, 1980, entitled Rules and Regulations on the
Financing by Land Bank of Acquisition of Land-holdings by
Agricultural Lessees Through Pre-emption or Redemption under R.A.
3844, as amended, was issued. The pertinent provisions of the said
Circular state:
xxx
2. All proposals for Land Bank financing of land acquisition
through pre-emption or redemption must carry the favorable
endorsement of the Minister of Agrarian Reform.
xxx
5. Upon direction of the Court of Agrarian Relations, or upon
recommendation of the Minister of Agrarian Relations, the Land
Bank may issue appropriate certification as to the availability of funds
in lieu of cash and bond deposits to finance the acquisition of
landholding subject of pre-emption or redemption. The certification
shall be patterned after the attached form which is made an
integral part of these rules and regulations:
CERTIFICATION AS TO AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS
Pursuant to Section 11/12 of RA No. 3844, as amended by RA No.
6389, I hereby certify that the Land Bank has today, ________,
19__, set aside the amount of P _________, of which 10% is in
cash and 90% in Land Bank bonds as compensation for the
landholding of ________________ situated at
__________________ and covered by OCT/TCT No. ___________
of the Registry of Deeds of ______________, which is the subject of
pre-emption/redemption, to be made payable to said
_____________________ in accordance with Section 80 of RA No.
3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251, subject to the
rules and regulations of the Land Bank on pre-
emption/redemption cases.
This certification is being issued pursuant to a letter-request dated
________, 19__, of the Minister of Agrarian Reform to the Land
Bank of the Philippines.
Issued at Manila, this _____ day of ________, 19__.
 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
By:
______________________
_____
[14]
(Underscoring supplied)
However, the Land Bank certification dated January 15, 1982
which Arcega, et al. presented is contrary to the document of
financing guaranty prescribed in Land Bank Circular Letter No. 3
quoted above.We reproduce in full the challenged certification:
CERTIFICATION TO FINANCE REDEMPTION OF
ESTATE UNDER R.A. NO. 3844, AS AMENDED
This is to certify that the Land Bank of the Philippines shall finance
the acquisition of the landholding situated in Barrio Maimpis, San
Fernando, Pampanga, subject matter of a Redemption Case x x x
docketed as CAR Case No. 1908-P 81, if found in
consonance with the provisions of Section 12, Republic Act No.
3844, as amended, and with the relevant policies and
procedures laid down by the Land Bank Board of Directors.
Corresponding funds shall be set aside upon receipt of the
order or directive from the honorable court and payment
therefor shall be effected upon compliance with the banks
guidelines and policies on the matter.
Issued at Manila, this 15th day of January, 1982.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
By:
(sgd.) BASILIO
ESTANISLAO
[15]
President
(Underscoring supplied)
First and foremost, paragraph 2 of Land Bank Circular Letter
No. 3 has made it a mandatory requirement that all proposals for
Land Bank financing of land acquisition through pre-emption or
redemption must carry the favorable endorsement of the Minister
(now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform. It is likewise required that the
prescribed form must indicate that the certification has been issued
pursuant to a letter-request from the (DAR Secretary) to the Land
Bank of the Philippines.
It bears emphasis that such favorable endorsement from the
DAR Secretary is a vital part of the redemption process since, under
Section 12 of R.A. 3844, as amended, it is the duty of the DAR to
initiate pre-emption/redemption proceedings. It is the DAR which
evaluates proposals/applications for Land Bank financing. Thus, it is
within the discretion of the DAR Secretary whether or not to set aside
certain amounts as compensation of the landholdings subject of pre-
emption or redemption.
It follows that without such favorable endorsement from the
DAR Secretary, the Land Bank has no authority to finance pre-
emption or redemption. This is so because under the same Section
12 of R.A. 3844, as amended, the Land Banks role is limited only to
financing the redemption/acquisition of the landholding for the
agricultural-lessee.
Here, the Land Bank certification presented by Arcega, et al.,
the validity of which is vigorously questioned by spouses Mallari, is
not supported by any favorable endorsement from the DAR
Secretary. This plainly violates Section 12 of R.A. 3844, as
amended, and Land Bank Circular Letter No. 3, dated February 25,
1980. As elucidated earlier, absent such DAR Secretarys favorable
endorsement, the Land Bank has no authority to finance the
redemption of the property for Arcega, et al. Clearly, the disputed
Land Bank certification is void. On this ground alone, spouses
Mallaris instant motion should be granted.
Secondly, the questioned certification itself declares that the
Land Banks undertaking to finance the redemption is
conditional. The financing will push through if found in consonance
with the provisions of Section 12, Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended, and with the relevant policies and procedures laid down
by the Land Bank Board of Directors. Certainly, this is contrary to the
certification (reproduced above) prescribed by Land Bank Circular March 20, 2002 in these consolidated cases is RECONSIDERED
Letter No. 3, dated February 25, 1980. Moreover, the challenged and SET ASIDE. The Certification To Finance Redemption Of Estate
certification does not set aside the specific compensation for the Under R.A. No. 3844, As Amended, dated January 15, 1982 issued
redemption of the landholding. Hence, the Mallari spouses are not by the Land Bank of the Philippines is declared VOID, being in
assured of the corresponding amount and its payment by Arcega, et violation of Section 12, R.A. 3844, as amended, and Land Bank
al. Circular Letter No. 3 dated February 25, 1980. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando, Pampanga (acting
Indeed, under the terms of the assailed certification, there is no as an Agrarian Court) in Agrarian Case No. 1908 dismissing the
assurance or undertaking at all from the Land Bank that it will finance petition for redemption filed by Ignacio Arcega, et al. is AFFIRMED.
the redemption.
SO ORDERED.
Equally compelling in our consideration of this case is the letter
from the Land Bank dated October 16, 1989 (Exhibit 35) presented
by spouses Mallari to the trial court which categorically states that
the challenged certification cannot be enforced against the Land
Bank for being in violation of LBP Circular Letter No. 3 on availability
of funds and endorsement of the Minister (now Secretary) of
Agrarian Reform.
Considering that the disputed Land Bank certification is void, it
follows that Ignacio Arcega, et al. have failed to tender payment of
the redemption price or its due consignation in court. Such tender or
consignation is an indispensable requirement to the proper exercise
[16]
of the right of redemption by the agricultural-lessees.
Absent the requisite tender and consignation of the redemption
price, we hold that under R.A. No. 3844, as amended, Ignacio
Arcega, et al. cannot redeem the subject landholdings.
The right of redemption under R.A. No. 3844, as amended, is an
essential mandate of the agrarian reform legislation to implement the
States policy of owner-cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified, self-
[17]
reliant existence for small farmers. Unfortunately, such laudable
policy could not be effected in favor of Ignacio Arcega, et al. since
they failed to tender or consign payment of the redemption
price. Thus, spouses Mallari should be allowed to continue enjoying
their right over the subject property as purchasers thereof, for the
States commendable agrarian reform policy is never intended to
unduly transgress the rights of innocent purchasers of land.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration filed by
spouses Mallari is GRANTED and our assailed Decision dated