Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994

SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL MASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA, ROLDAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X,
DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA, VICENTE CAÑEDA and THE HON. LEONARDO CRUZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge Regional Trial of Manila, Branch XXV, respondents.

Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.

Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:

Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al., instituted this petition for certiorari, prohibition, relief from judgment, as
well as declaratory relief, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, asking us to order the Metropolitan Trial
Court ("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to cease and desist from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 107203-CV.

This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by private respondent Vicente
Cañeda ("Cañeda"), then as plaintiffs, against herein petitioners, as defendants, with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila (Branch X). After trial, the MTC, on 01 July 1985, rendered judgment; thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all persons
claiming right under them to vacate the premises and to remove their house/apartment and
surrender possession of the subject land to the plaintiff; to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P100.00 a
month from January 1987 as the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises until the land is actually vacated, and the costs of suit. 1

No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. On 22 August 1985, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXXII) seeking the annulment of the
aforesaid decision in the ejectment case and to set aside an order of its execution. The petition was in due time
dismissed. Again, no appeal was taken therefrom.

On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was filed by
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XLI) asking, in main, for the nullification of the
judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. This time, petitioners
appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of execution was issued by the MTC for the
enforcement of its decision. The writ, however, was held in abeyance when petitioners deposited with the Court of
Appeals the sum of P3,000.00 in cash plus an amount of P100.00 to be paid every month beginning February 1987.
On 11 March 1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower court. Petitioners' recourse to
this Court was to be of no avail. The petition was denied, and an entry of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.

Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC for execution. When petitioners refused to remove their house
on the premises in question, upon motion of private respondent, an order of demolition was issued. Shortly
thereafter, the demolition began. Before the completion of the demolition, a restraining order was issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XIX) following a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction and
restraining order, filed by petitioners. On 23 February 1988, the trial court dismissed the petition.

Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their complaints and petitions, petitioners assailed anew the MTC decision in
a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction, and for declaratory relief (docketed Civil Case No. 88-43944)
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXV), which, again, issued a restraining order. 2

Private respondent then filed a motion for an alias writ of execution with the MTC. An ex-parte motion of petitioners
for the issuance of a second restraining order was this time denied by the RTC (Branch XXV). 3 On 23 August
1990, 4 the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners.

In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to enforce its decision,
dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No. 107203, when the property in question was proclaimed an area for priority
development by the National Housing Authority on 01 December 1987 by authority of Presidential Decree 2016.

The petition is totally without merit.

In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our resolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No. 98446, entitled,
"Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," to which this case is intimately related, where we
ruled:

. . . The singular question common to both cases submitted for resolution of this court is the
implication of Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as the "Urban Land Reform Law," and
its amendments or ramifications embodied in Proclamation No. 1893, as amended by Proclamation
No. 1967 and Presidential Decree No. 2016. All the above statutes are being implemented by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council, Office of the President.

There is a prejudicial issue the answer to which hangs the resolution of this case. On May 20, 1992,
this Court required the National Housing Authority to submit a Comment on the status of the
program of acquisition by the Government of the land area which includes the disputed property, as
part of the Areas for Priority Development (APD), under the aforementioned decrees and
proclamations.

In compliance with said order of this Court, Mr. Andres C. Lingan, Manager of the Metro Manila
Project Department of the National Housing Authority, submitted the following report on the status of
Lot 6-A, Block 1012, located at No. 1890 Obesis Street, Pandacan, Manila, known as the Carlos
Estate, an APD site. Pertinent portions of the report read:

Please be informed that Lot 6-A, Block 1012 located at No. 1890 Obesis St.,
Pandacan, Manila which is the subject matter of the case and located within the
Carlos Estate declared as APD site pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No.
1967, is not for acquisition by NHA.

The Carlos Estate is located outside of the NHA projects under the Zonal
Improvement Project (ZIP) and Community Mortgage Program (CMP). The site,
however, is under the administration of the Presidential Commission on Urban Poor
(PCUP) for acquisition and upgrading. (Emphasis Supplied.)

The above information answers the uncertainty concerning the status of the alleged negotiation for
the acquisition by the government of certain areas in Metro Manila. The NHA is definitely NOT
acquiring the said lot for its program.

It appearing that the purpose of this Petition for Review is to set aside the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower courts, in order to avoid eviction from the
disputed premises and to be allowed to acquire the same allegedly under the Community Mortgage
 Program of the National Housing Authority, we find the petition without merit and deny the same.
Consequently, the petition is DISMISSED. 5

What immediately catches one's attention to this case is the evident predilection of petitioners, through different
counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this Court has been spared. The utter lack of merit
of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitable
execution of a decision that has long become final and executory.

Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of counsel, try to nullify the same MTC decision before different
branches of the court, trifling with judicial processes. Never, again, should this practice be countenanced. 6

The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to the pursuit of
justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that we must uphold and keep inviolable.
Perhaps, it is time we are here reminded of that pledge; thus -

LAWYER'S OATH

I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly
or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will not delay any man's cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis supplied.)

We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which
visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for both
an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt power. 7

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly CENSURED and
WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt with most severely. Double costs
against petitioners.

This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 5624 January 20, 2004

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his
eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer "by manufacturing, flaunting
and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order." 1

In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent
Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from each other. They have two
children – namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old –
both of whom are in complainant’s custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile,
there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of
Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, "James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos,
et al."

Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant’s residence in Tanjay City, Negros
Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant
a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for
temporary child custody.2 Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any
motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.

Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but
respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two
dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their
children to respondent.

In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning Center in
Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him
the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he
claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation.

Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding policemen
subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the
police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the
NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate court’s resolution/order. 3 In order to diffuse the tension,
complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not take
them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito
Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the hotel where
respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took
the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the morning.

On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified
petition4 for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the
alleged Court of Appeals’ resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and
obtained a certification dated January 18, 20025 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering
complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.

At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear. Consequently, the
petition was dismissed.

Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorney’s oath by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals’ Resolution in and outside a court of law.
Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in
the country.

After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for
investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in his
disbarment.6 On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation
of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and
attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals
Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and
presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed
Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898,7 which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City
to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious
Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.

Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could
1âwphi1

not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is
expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client’s cause, it must never be at the expense of the
truth.8 Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states:

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and
her relatives. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate
and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. 9 The lawyer’s arguments whether written or oral should be
gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentlemen to another.10 By calling complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive congenital
prevaricator", hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the
sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh
a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense
committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years.

Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
of the country.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-93-781 November 16, 1993

EDUARDO R. SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, respondent.

Eduardo R. Santos for and in his own behalf.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The complainant herein is the lawyer for the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706, an action for unlawful detainer
commenced on 5 May 1990 with the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan while the respondent is the
presiding Judge of the said court. In his verified complaint filed through the Office of the Court Administrator on 18
March 1993, the complainant charges the respondent with gross ignorance of the law and gross incompetence. The
complainant supports his charge with the allegation that after the answer in the said case was filed and "without
notice and hearing," the latter rendered a decision on 28 June 1991, 1 the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, it is hereby respectfully prayed that
judgment be rendered in accordance with plaintiff's prayer in their Complaint in the above-entitled
case.

SO ORDERED.

He further alleges that Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, in its Order of 19 January 1993 in
Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-932 — a petition for certiorari filed by the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706 — had
already opined that the said decision is void upon its face because it:

. . . would be impossible to be implemented for the simple or obvious reason that the same cannot
be considered a decision at all. Instead of deciding or ordering something to be done, it merely prays
that judgment be rendered.

but despite this, the respondent still "changed and amended [his] final decision [of 28 June 1991] in order to nullify
the order of a superior Court, the RTC of Bulacan" via a new decision in Civil Case No. 90-17063 promulgated on 25
January 1993. The dispositive portion of this new decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff by:

1. Ordering defendants and persons claiming any rights under them to vacate the
premises occupied by them, more particularly the portion on which are erected their
respective dwelling structure/unit, at 117 Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan (or lot of
plaintiff aforementioned) and to remove said dwelling structure/units from said
subject premises of plaintiff;

2. Ordering defendants individually to pay the sum of P350.00 Philippine Currency,

per month by way of monthly rental commencing from May 16, 1990, and thereafter
until they shall have vacated the premises of the plaintiff;
 3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00,
Philippine currency, on account of plaintiff's attorney's fees (retainer) and P500.00,
Philippine Currency, for every hearing/trial attended by said attorney before this
Honorable Court; and

4. Ordering the defendants to pay costs.

SO ORDERED.

According to the complainant, the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision exhibits the respondent's gross
ignorance in "decision preparation," and that respondent's "haste to amend the same to favor plaintiff was both
appalling (sic) and downright improper." The complainant then prays that the respondent "be removed from office if
only to save the integrity of the judiciary."

In his Comment filed on 2 July 1993,4 the respondent denies the imputations and alleges, inter alia, that: (1) the
complainant was not the original counsel for the defendants but one Atty. Adriano Javier, Sr. who represented the
latter until the time that the parties were directed to file their respective position papers, specifically until 29
November 1991 when Atty. Javier filed a motion to withdraw his appearance and the complainant filed his notice of
appearance as counsel for the defendants; (2) the Decision of 28 June 1991 was rendered only after a preliminary
conference was held where the parties with their respective counsels discussed the possibility of an amicable
settlement and after the defendants failed to comply with the 16 November 1990 Order for the parties to submit in
writing their "respective position statements setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them and to submit the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidences in support thereof within fifteen (15) days from receipt" thereof,
prompting the plaintiff to file on 5 April 1991 an ex-parte motion praying that judgment be rendered in this case; (3)
the defendants did not appeal from the 28 June 1991 Decision, hence the plaintiff filed a motion for execution on 2
September 1991, which the defendants did not oppose; instead they filed a motion for reconsideration and to
declare the decision null and void on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trail brief and there was no valid
pre-trial order; (4) on 4 December 1991, the plaintiff's motion for execution was granted and a writ of execution was
issued, a copy of which was sent to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Malolos for service; (5) on 5 January 1991, 5 he
received an order from Branch 18 of the RTC of Bulacan directing him to desist from implementing the writ of
execution; (6) the presiding judge of said Branch 18, Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr., issued on 19 January 1993
its order disposing of Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93; (7) thereafter, he (respondent) handed down a new decision in
Civil Case No. 90-1706 on 25 January 1993 that contained "completely the missing sentences needed in the
dispositive portion" of its earlier decision; (8) instead of appealing therefrom, the defendants filed on 4 February
1993 a motion to set aside the decision, which the court set for its consideration and to which the plaintiff filed its
opposition on 8 February 1993 together with a motion for immediate execution; (9) on 22 March 1993, the
complainant filed a motion to inhibit the respondent by the former did not appear on the date it was set for
consideration. He finally contends that the issue regarding the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision was
rendered moot and academic by the corrections made in the Decision of 25 January 1993; that the charge of gross
ignorance is contemptuous and unfounded; and the complainant's sweeping conclusions show his disrespectful
attitude.

In his 17 June 1993 Rejoinder filed on 7 July 1993,6 the complainant reiterates his charge that the respondent is
incompetent because he lacks the "ability to prepare a sensible and credible decision," and maintains that the
respondent's attempt to convince this Court that the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision is permissible
and proper shows "gross ignorance." Further, that the respondent believes that "he could correct the decision after
its finality" and after the RTC of Bulacan had declared it to be null and void upon its face clearly manifests his
"patent ignorance of our laws and jurisprudence."

In his Sur-Rejoinder filed on 13 July 1993,7 the respondent argues that while the 28 June 1991 Decision "could
hardly be enforced for the reason that there is some sort of ambiguity or omission (sic) in its dispositive portion," he
was not prohibited from having the defect "timely corrected and clarified," which was what he had in fact done, and
that the "clarified decision" did not prejudice "the substantial rights of the parties" since they "were given their day in
court and passed through the usual course of the proceedings." Accordingly, he could not be guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and of lack of competence.

Wanting to have the last word, the complainant filed a Reply to Sur-rejoinder and Manifestation on 28 July
1993.8 Not to be outdone, the respondent filed a Manifestation to Reply on 9 August 1993. 9
The Court referred this to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.

On 31 August 1993, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its Memorandum containing its evaluation,
report and recommendation. After summarizing the antecedent facts, the said office submitted that the instant
complaint is meritorious, and made the following findings:

It is quite unbelievable, nay, impossible for respondent to have overlooked the missing dispositive
portion of his original decision which is considered the executory portion thereof. The only
ineluctable conclusion is that respondent never read said decision before he signed the same. If only
he devoted even only a little time to read the same, such a missing portion considered to be the
most important part of a decision could not have escaped his attention. The alleged dispositive
portion was a prayer. It did not have the effect of finally disposing the case. Presumably, this must
have been simply copied from plaintiff's complaint.

True, it was legally permissible for respondent to amend his original defective decision since the
RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari although Judge Perfecto Macapagal found that what was
rendered by Judge Paguio "can not be considered a decision at all." It took respondent Judge 1-1/2
years to discover and correct his error; the error could have easily been discovered at the time the
Motion for Execution was filed on September 2, 1991. But the writ was nonetheless issued on
December 4, 1991. Hence, the belated correction would not mitigate his liability. There is no denying
that the quality of a decision rendered by the judge such as herein respondent, is a reflection on the
integrity of the court in dispensing justice to whom it is due. Respondent was at the very least
careless in failing to read carefully the decision that he signed. In fact, both the original and
amended decisions still contained errors in grammar and syntax indicating that there was no
adequate editing of the decision that was signed by him. If he had been more careful, he would have
avoided such fractured phrases as:

1. Plaintiff on being opposed to this motion, countered as follows: (Page 5, Decision, June 28, 1991);

2. For a more vivid explanation showing the incidental facts (Ibid);

3. And defendants seems that they are not really sincere (Ibid);

4. But nothing has been done by the latter to renew such contract of lease of which right becomes
one of a detainer plain and simple (page 6, Ibid);

5. That being the case to allow them will mean ownership over the property (Ibid).

It is possible that this is not the usual language of the Judge, for their fractured constructions have
no place in a court decision. Careful editing and rewriting should have been done.

and recommends that:

. . . a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a warning that any repetition of the same
or similar infraction shall be meted with a more severe penalty of dismissal from the service. He is
also admonished to exhibit greater care in the writing of his decisions.

We find the above observations of the Office of the Court Administrator to be sufficiently supported by the pleadings
submitted by the parties in this case.

After a careful examination of the respondent's "Decision" of 28 June 1991, we do find its body to be flawed with
grammatical and syntactic errors. Its "dispositive portion" disposes of, resolves or decrees nothing. It cannot even
be called a dispositive or decretal portion at all. It is obviously a prayer lifted from a pleading of the plaintiff, such as
the Memorandum or the ex-parte manifestation and motion praying that judgment be rendered filed after the
defendants failed to file their position paper, although not from the complaint as suspected by the Court
Administrator. How it gained entry into what should have been the fallo is an arcanum. Any attempt to unravel the
mystery may only complicate the matter against the respondent who is only charged herein with gross ignorance or
incompetence.

There can, however, be no dispute behind the errors of grammar and syntax and the fatally infirmed "dispositive
portion" is the inefficiency, neglect of duty or carelessness on the part of the respondent betraying the absence of
due care, diligence, conscientiousness and thoroughness — qualities which Judges must, among others, possess.
Respondent could have easily avoided the errors and defects had he taken a little more time and effort to at least
read its original copy before he finally affixed his signature thereon. While this Court cannot expect every Judge to
be an expert on the English language or an authority in grammar, he must, however, do everything he can, through
constant study, extraordinary diligence, and passion for excellence, to produce a decision which fosters respect for
and encourages obedience to it and enhances the prestige of the court.

As we see it then, the respondent failed to comply with two standard of conduct prescribed by the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, namely: that "[h]e should exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon
him" 10 and that he should be conscientious, studious and thorough. 11

Moreover, the respondent did not only issue a manifestly infirmed "decision," he even granted the motion for its
execution and issued the corresponding writ with full knowledge that there was nothing to execute. He could not
have feigned ignorance of such nothingness for it is embarrassingly self-evident. He nevertheless ordered its
execution, exhibiting once more his inefficiency, carelessness, negligence, or even his incompetence.

We must add, however, that it is not the respondent alone who must be blamed for such unmitigated faux pas. The
counsel for the parties in the case knew or ought to have known the fatal defect of the dispositive portion and the
obvious inefficacy of any writ of execution, yet, the plaintiff's counsel still filed a motion for execution, while the
counsel for the defendants — the complainant herein — merely filed a motion for reconsideration based solely on
the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trial brief and that there was no valid pre-trial order. Obviously, the
complainant initially believed in the completeness of the decision. As a matter of fact, when he assailed the 25
January 1993 Decision, he alleged that what was amended was a " final decision," a position totally inconsistent
with his claim that the latter was void as declared by the RTC of Bulacan. As officers of the court who owe to it
candor, fairness and good faith, 12 both attorneys should have called the court's attention to the glaring defect of the
"dispositive portion" of the 28 June 1991 Decision.

We thus conclude that the respondent Judge is guilty of, in the very least, inefficiency, neglect of duty and the
violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He could not, however, be liable for ignorance of law
and jurisprudence or for incompetence when he handed down a new decision on 25 January 1993. The 28 June
1991 Decision was "incomplete" since, for all legal intents and purposes, it had no fallo and could not attain finality,
hence the respondent had the power to amend it to make it conformable to law and
justice. 13 It is not therefore correct to say, as the complainant suggested, that the order of the RTC of Bulacan in Sp.
Civil Action No. 03-M-93 stating that the respondent's Decision of 28 June 1991 is "void upon its face" forever bars
the respondent from rendering a new or amended decision in the ejectment case.

We take this opportunity to stress once again that the administration of justice is a sacred task and all those involved
in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the Constitution that a
public office is a public trust and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and act with patriotism and justice and lead
modest lives. 14 Every Judge should never forget that he is the visible representation of the law and, more
importantly, of justice. 15 Therefore, he must constantly be the embodiment of competence, diligence,
conscientiousness, thoroughness, efficiency, and integrity so as to preserve, promote and enhance the people's
confidence in the Judiciary.

A few words must also be made of record regarding the complainant. We note that in his complaint in this case he
alleged under oath that after the defendants filed their answer, the respondent "without any hearing, or at least this
counsel was never notified of any such hearing," rendered the 28 June 1991 Decision. This is of course inaccurate,
if not outright false. What the complainant conveniently left out in his complaint was that, as disclosed in the
Comment which he did not refute, after the defendants' answer with counterclaim was admitted by the court, the
case was set for preliminary conference and thereafter the parties were required to submit their position papers and
the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence. We find that the case was properly placed and considered
under the Rule on Summary Procedure and, accordingly, the court could decide the case on the basis of the
submitted position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence. Complainant further suppressed the fact that he
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants only after the court had conducted the preliminary conference
and issued the order for the submission of the foregoing pleadings and documents. He was not, therefore, entitled to
any notice before then.

The failure to divulge the foregoing facts may have been intended by the complainant to give his complaint a
strong prima facie case against the respondent. While he was entitled to adopt certain strategies in his pleadings, he
forgot that he owes to this Court absolute candor, fairness and good faith. This Court can neither condone nor
tolerate attempts to mislead it through suppression of important facts which would have a bearing on its initial action.
Complainant should, therefore, be admonished to faithfully adhere to the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, for inefficiency and neglect of duty amounting to a violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, respondent Judge ORLANDO C. PAGUIO is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00). He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar infractions shall be dealt with more
severely.

Complainant is hereby ADMONISHED to be more careful in the drafting of pleadings, always keeping in mind his
duty under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 2837 October 7, 1994

ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A. UMALI, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro Cutingting, plaintiff versus Alfredo
Tan, defendant", the Honorable Presiding Judge Domingo Panis issued the following order:

The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is hereby ordered to conduct an
investigation with the end in view of determining the author of the Sheriff's Return which appears to
have been falsified and to institute such criminal action as the evidence will warrant. (p. 1, Final
Report.)

After conducting the necessary investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through herein
complainant, charged respondents as follows:

That sometime in May 1984 in the City of Manila, at the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLI, Manila,
Philippines, the above-named Respondents, as Counsels for PEDRO CUTINGTING in Civil Case
No. 84-24144, entitled PEDRO CUTINGTING, Plaintiff vs. ALFREDO TAN, Defendant, did then and
there, knowingly, willfully introduced/presented in evidence before the aforesaid Regional Trial
Court, a falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons during the hearing of the aforesaid Civil Case thereby
impending and/or obstructing the speedy administration and/or dispensation of Justice. (p. 2, Final
Report, ff. p. 69, Record.)

Respondents in their respective answers denied having any hand in the falsification of the said sheriff's return.

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En Banc of April 12, 1988, the case
was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.

In view, however, of the report of the National Bureau of Investigation to the effect that the signature above the
typewritten name Florando Umali on the last page of the complaint in said civil case is not his signature,
complainant, through counsel, agreed to the dismissal of the case with respect to Atty. Umali.

With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP submitted the following report and recommendation:

There is ample evidence extant in the records to prove that

Atty. Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's Return on the Summons in said
Civil Case No. 84-24144.

The oral and documentary evidence of the complainant strongly tend to show the following: (1) The
Sheriff's Return of the Summon in the said civil case was falsified as it was not signed by Deputy
 Sheriff Rodolfo Torella (Exh. "J" — Sworn Statement of Rodolfo Torella dated February 1, 1985, and
Exh. "S", which is the falsified Sheriff's Return); (2) The summons was received from the clerk of the
Court of the Manila
RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero, a messenger in the law office of Attys. Umali and Oliva and
said messenger brought the summons to the law office of the respondents (Exh. "H" — Sinumpaang
Salaysay ni Ronaldo Romero, and Exh. "G", Exh. "I" — Sworn Statement dated February 28, 1985
of Mariano Villanueva, Chief Staff Asst. 2, RTC, Manila; (3) On the basis of the falsified Sheriff's
Return on the Summons, Atty. Oliva, counsel for the defendant [should be plaintiff] in said civil case,
filed a typewritten Motion to Declare Defendant in Default (Exh.) "R" — Motion to Declare Defendant
In Default in said civil case signed and filed by Atty. Oliva);
(4) On March 29, 1984, Atty. Oliva, in his capacity as Operations Manager of Judge Pio R. Marcos
Law Office, sent a final demand letter on Alfredo Tan, the defendant in said Civil case, for payment
of the sum of P70,174.00 (Exh. "T" — Demand Letter dated March 28, 1984 of Atty. Oliva addressed
to Alfredo Tan); (5) The demand letter of Atty. Oliva (Exh. "T"), the complaint in said civil case (Exh.
"Q", "Q-1", and "Q-2"), the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons (Exh. "S"), the Motion To
Declare Defendant In Default dated October 30, 1984 signed and filed by
Atty. Oliva (Exh. "R" and "R-1") were typed on one and the same typewriter, as shown in the
Questioned Document Report No. 198-585 dated 19 June 1985 (Exh. "Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2"; Exh. "V",
"V-1" and
"V-2").

After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP, the Court finds that
respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of its
disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondent's
failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance
the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions
against the other party.

At this juncture, it is well to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It can not be
gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice.
Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before
them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. It is essential that lawyers
bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all court
officers sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of
the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196 SCRA 10 [1991].

In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he shall not
do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His
license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name
from the Roll of Attorneys.

The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando Umali.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Per Rec. Nos. 3527, 3408 August 23, 1935

JUSTA MONTEREY, complainant,

vs.
EUSTAQUIO V. ARAYATA and TERESO MA. MONTOYA, respondents.

Eustaquio V. Arayata in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.

IMPERIAL, J.:

It is alleged in the charges filed against Attorney Eustaquio V. Arayata (1) that on August 27, 1931, while practicing
his profession, he prepared and drew up in his favor a deed of sale of the land described in transfer certificate of title
No. 7591, for the sum of P4,000, stating therein that the person who executed the document and sold the land to
him was his father, Arcadio Arayata, when he knew positively that this alleged vendor had already died on
November 5, 1916; that knowing the document to be fictitious, he appeared before notary public Tereso Ma.
Montoya and made the latter legalize said document and state that Arcadio Arayata personally appeared before
him, although said fact was not true; and he later succeeded in having the register of deeds cancel the transfer
certificate of title issued to Arcadio Arayata and issue transfer certificate of title No. 8370 in his favor; and (2) that on
June 5, 1933, being legally married to Aurora L. Saguil, he filed an application to marry Engracia F. Ortega, stating
therein under oath that he was single when in fact he was married, said marriage not having been dissolved.

The charge filed against attorney and notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya consists in having ratified the deed of sale
and having stated that Arcadio Arayata personally appeared before him and confirmed the sale, knowing fully well
that said person is already dead and therefore could do neither the one nor the other.

The investigation was finally conducted by the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cavite, who
recommended that a disciplinary action be taken against Arayata and that Montoya be exonerated, it having been
clearly established that the latter, in ratifying the document, acted in good faith and relied on Arayata's assurance
that the old man then with him was really the vendor Arcadio Arayata who ratified all the contents of the instrument.
We concur in the appreciation of the facts and we are of the opinion that said notary public and attorney should
really be exonerated and held innocent.

The established facts show that the respondent Arayata is the son of Arcadio Arayata who died on November 5,
1916, leaving a widow and five children; that Arcadio Arayata in life, purchased from the Bureau of Lands lot No.
3448 of the Hacienda de Santa Cruz de Malabon, for which transfer certificate of title No. 7591 was issued to him;
that on August 27, 1931, many years after Arcadio Arayata's death, the respondent attorney prepared the deed,
Exhibit A, stating therein that his father sold the land in question to him for the sum of P4,000; that after affixing the
names of the alleged vendor and the two witnesses, the respondent brought an old man and the two witnesses
before notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya and requested the latter to ratify said document, assuring him that the old
man was the grantor and vendor and the other two were the instrumental witnesses thereto; that the notary honestly
believing said information, legalized and registered the document after verifying from the old man that he ratified the
contents thereof; that the transfer was invalid and the document not genuine because another, not Arcadio Arayata,
signed it; that the respondent later applied for and obtained transfer certificate of title No. 8370 of said land from the
registry of deeds of Cavite after the former title was cancelled; that sometime later, or on April 11, 1933, the
respondent sold a portion of said land having an area of two and one-half (2 ½) hectares to Sinforosa Torres,
married to Basilio Sorosoro, for the sum of P500.

With regard to the second charge, it likewise appears established that on June 5, 1933, the respondent, being
legally married to Aurora L. Saguil and said marriage not having been dissolved, signed under oath an application to
marry Engracia F. Ortega stating therein that he was single, he being in fact married; the application was registered
and duly considered and on September 25, 1933, the register of the Province of Cavite issued the corresponding
license upon payment by the respondent of the sum of P2; for some unknown reasons the marriage applied for was
not solemnized; the respondent's wife, nevertheless, filed a complaint for bigamy against the former, which is now
pending in the justice of the peace court of Santa Rosa, Laguna, for which reason the investigator is of the opinion,
and so recommends, that no action should be taken on the second charge. The recommendation is well founded
and has our approval.

In his first answer, respondent Arayata admitted that the sale had been made by his father who was his true
predecessor in interest, but alleged that nobody, including the complainant, could complain of the transfer because
none was prejudiced, he being the true and only heir. In his second answer, however, and in the course of the
investigation, he set up another defense alleging that the person who had really sold him the land was his uncle
Januario Arayata who, in the deed and relative to the land, assumed the name of Arcadio Arayata. He further
alleged that it was his said uncle who signed the deed of transfer and ratified it before notary Montoya. We find this
second new defense improbable and unestablished.

The acts committed by the respondent Arayata relative to the deed of sale Exhibit A, and his statements to notary
Montoya with regard to said document, constitute malpractice and unprofessional conduct under the provisions of
section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, meriting for him a disciplinary action mitigated in this case by the
circumstance that he was apparently the heir entitled to the ownership of the land and that the complainant has
neither real nor direct interest in the transaction complained of by her.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold Attorney Eustaquio V. Arayata guilty of malpractice and suspend him from the
practice of his profession for one (1) month, hereby reprimanding him for having prepared and executed the deed of
sale in question. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987

ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners,

vs.
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON. CIPRIANO
VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch III).

CRUZ, J.:

It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9,
1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This
was followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on
March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The
petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14,
1972. 1 The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge. 2

These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are errors of law and lawyers.

The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had
been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners. 3

The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute
had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one
year from the issuance of the decree of registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents
who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto.4

For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after
30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty
one years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged
predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit
to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited another twelve years, or until 195 7,
to file their petition for review. 5

While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not yet become final and executory
because the land subject thereof had not yet been registered, the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is
allowed the remedy of re-opening the case within one year after the issuance of the decree, why should the same
party be denied this remedy before the decree is issued? 6

Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now pretend that they have all the
time in the world because the land has not yet been registered and the one-year reglementary period has not yet
expired?

Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v. Moran 7 where it was held:

... It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land
Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be
filed "within one year after entry of the decree." Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may
first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has been
entered. But on further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the intention of the
 Legislature and that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating that such petitioners
must be presented before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be
given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining
party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud. We therefore hold that
a petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time the rendition of the court's
decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration.
(Emphasissupplied).

A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have
delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches
bars their petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.

This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:

"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end
to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them."8

There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more
so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to
evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case,
the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable. 9

This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any
persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v.
Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of
a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed
to accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for
which they are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so again. 10

Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an
opposition thereto had been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the petition. 11 Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the
hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were the parties asking for relief, and it was the private
respondents who were in possession of the land in dispute.

One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the
point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at
the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say
that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this
Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or
violate it.

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not
discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court,
which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such
as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts.

This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is immediately executory. It is so
ordered.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa and Paras, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.