ETHNICITY AND COMMUNAL CONFLICT IN NORTH CENTRAL

NIGERIA: A STUDY OF THE NASARAWA AND PLATEAU STATES

INTRODUCTION

The study argues that divisive, conflict-ridden and often violent politics in
Nigeria, especially the communal conflicts in the North-Central region of the country,
on which the study focuses, have two basic foundations: (i) persisting, deep and
complex traditional social divisions of ethnno-religious nature, and (ii) elite political
‘use’ – that is manipulation, mobilization and exacerbation – of these divisions and
conflicts in highly clientelistic ‘ethnic politics’ by local political leaders. The study is
organized into seven chapters. Chapter one 1 is the general introduction, capturing the
problematic, context, objectives, rationale, scope, and structure of the study. Chapter
two 2 presents the general historical background and discusses the major political
developments in Nigeria. It highlights the key aspects of Nigeria’s political history, as
well as outlines some elements of what we call the ‘ethnology and ethnography of
Nigeria’ – a general picture of the social (ethno-religious and ethno-communal)
composition of the country, in a bid to cast the setting of the study. Chapter 3 has three
parts. It starts with the review of the ke controversies around the issues of ethnic
conflicts and ethnic politics; part two presents, discusses and merges into one the two
theoretical frameworks that guide the analysis; and (in part 3) deals with the reviews the
relevantof literature and in the context of the theoretical framework of the study. The
essence of the chapter is toIt situates the research problematic within the right
theoretical epistemological foundationframework. Among others, tThe chapter engages
thealso prevailing scholarly perspectives on ethnic politicscomments critically on and
attempts a theoretical interrogation of such phenomenon using insights fromcurrent
theories of ethnic division and conflict, as well as suggests the supplementation of these
theories with some elements of and from contemporary elite theory. Chapter three
presents the contextual and historical background to the thesis by highlighting the
political history as well as ethnology of Nigeria, in a bid to cast the setting of the study.
Chapter four 4 highlights discusses the methodology of the study, describesing its
protocols, procedures, techniques and constraints. Chapter five 5 explores the nature,
patterns, trajectories and dynamics of ethno-communal politics and crises in Nigeria

1
from the ancient to contemporary times. Chapter six 6 establishes analyses the nexus
between ethnic divisions,ity ethno-communaland (often violent) communal conflict and
elite-driven ‘ethnic politics’ violence in Nigeria. It uses case studies of such conflicts
from the vantage standpoint oinf the Nasarawa and Plateau experiences-the case
studiesregions of Nigeria. Chapter seven 7 sums up the key findings (claims and
conclusions) of the study by way of a summary , conclusion, and some practical
recommendations, the later derived from the key findings.

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 CHAPTER 1

GENERAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Social and political background

Nigeria is a large, diverse and complex society, and a relatively new polity. As a
political unit, Nigeria was created – by the colonial fiat – only in 1914; it gained
independence and became a sovereign polity (independent state) only in 1960; and
within a decade of gaining independence was torn by bloody secessional war, followed
by series of local upheavals. It is characterized by immense heterogeneity in terms of
ethno-cultural composition and complexity. Hosting multiple cultural, religious,
linguistic-territorial and sectional formations (Ngare, 2012) and over two hundred and
fifty ethnic nationalities, Nigeria represents a typical instance of a highly segmented,
plural, poly-ethnic, and multi-religious society (Diamond, 1983; Barth, 1998; Smith,
1969; J.S. Furnival; Ademoyega, 1962; Okoli and Iortyer, 2014). It was formed as a
single polity only in 1914; its colonial past militated against a nation-formation; and its
relatively recent and rapid (resource-based) economic development contributed to
further fractioning of interests and identities along ethno-territorial, religious and urban-
rural lines (Fukuyama 2014). The ethnic groups that make up the country are not
monolithic in themselves. In effect, each of the ethnic nationality is internally
fragmented, that is as well characterized by marked divergences differences in terms of
religion, language, and other aspects of culture (Laitin, 1986; Okoli, 2003). This
complex (‘hyper-heterogenous’) heritage-legacy of Nigeria’s short but complex history,
has providesd the basis for ethno-political mobilizing conflicts and elite-driven ‘ethnic
politics’ (Ngare, 2012).
In addition to its multifarious socio-demographic mix, Nigeria is also
characterized by deep-seated, fractious and primordial political culture (Coleman in
Geertz, 1963; Okoye, 1996; Fukuyama 2014). The various ethno-territorial groups in
the country tend to express primordial-tribal ties based on local culture, language,
religion and nationalitylocal identities. While these in-group ties are strong and
persisting, the national (all-Nigerian) identities, and the accompanied national ties and
identities loyalties – promoted mainly by the central state apparata and its national
political elites – are often typically underdeveloped and weak. This is one of the
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legacies of short and often ineffective nation-building processes – typical, one may add,
for many post-colonial nation-states and ‘newly formed’ societies in Africa and Asia.
This configuration was has to be seen as partly the a legacy of colonial rule, and partly
the outcome of short nation-building process , often interrupted by internal divisions
and conflicts.
Such a configutarion, to repeat, – makes Nigeria politically fragile and fractious
– vulnerable to politically driven local mobilisations: protests, assertions of rights,
defences of interests, and affirmation of local statuses. This creates a dangerously
fractious social background-framework: sSub-national identities are strong and easily
mobilized in political contests, while the unifying national (all-Nigerian) identities, ties
and loyalties remain weak. Thisand this vulnerability for sub-national ethno-religious
and local-regional mobilizations and contestations (by local and national political
leaders and elites seeking influence and recognition) makes Nigerian politics
unpredictable, fractious and potentially volatile.
This fragility and vulnerability has been diagnosed by most African and Western
observers. While analyzing the polititical structure, political developments and elites in
contemporary Nigeria, Fukuyama (2014:220) observesd:
[The Nigerian political] elite centers around a series of ogas, or
Big Man, and their patronage networks. Some ogas are
descendants of traditional elite that ruled prior to the arrival of
British colonialism, but others are self-made men – former
military officers, businessmen, or politicians who succeeded in
using the political system to enrich themselves. ….Politics is the
general route to riches in Nigeria…

This quote, while accurate, is incomplete and needs some supplementation. It As

our research shows, this is only partly accurate picture – the result of exclusive focuses
too much on the national level, and too little on the local level, especially on the social
context within which the local traditional elites, like ogas, operate.. Local elites do share
some characteristics of the ogas, such as strong entrenchment in the local ethno-
religious structure and informal, unregulated and all-encompassing powers, but they are
less wealthy (often attempting to claim wider resources), more recognition- and status-
oriented, more parochial, and, above all, more intransingent and radical in their political

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dealings – a feature that makes inter-ethnic conflicts more ‘sectarian’, ‘fundamental’
and violent.
To Coleman, Nigerians display five different modes of nationalism at the same
time-’‘Africa’, ‘Nigeria’,’ ‘Regional’, ‘group’ and ‘cultural’ (Coleman, cited in Geertz,
1963:29). They often perceive and relate with one another with mutual mistrust and
suspicion (Nnoli, 1986). As Furnival noted, Nigerians ‘mix but do not combine. Each
group holds its religion, its culture and language, its own ways’ (cited in Joseph,
1987:33). The unhealthy relations among these groups are often complicated by the
machinations of local political elites who mobilise ethno-religious and regional
identities, sharpen antagonisms and fan conflicts in their struggle for recognition and
power (Okoli and Orinya, 2014). According to Fukuyama (2014) a relatively young and
weak state, lack of traditions in sustaining rule of law, and economic divisions created
by oil extraction-based economy, all added to the fragility of national bonds and weak
national identity.
The mobilisation of ethnicity to advance local sub-national economic and
political causes has been an important attribute of national political life in Nigeria in the
entire post-independence period. This phenomenon otherwise we referred to as ‘ethnic
politics’ – a systematic use of ethno-religious divisions and identities in pursuit of
political recognition and power by local and national political leaders – has resulted in
mobilization and politicization of ethnicity and ‘ethnicisation’ of politics in the country
(Nnoli, 78; Okoli, 2003; Fukuyama 2014). More crucially, this ‘ethnic politics’ has,
over the years, engendered inter-communal conflicts – often violent and destructive
territorial divisions and antagonisms – which jeopardize the prospect of sustainable
national integration and stability in Nigeria.
This thesis investigates the origins and nature of this ‘ethnic politics’ and
politicized ethnicity in Nigeria mainly on the local level using a series of case studies of
. It also analyses the accethno-religious ompanied inter-communal conflicts in the
North-Central region of the country, the region that is most vulnerable to ethnic
divisions and strife. The approach adopted here combines a historical-political analysis
with case-study analysis. It is guided mainly with theby insights and theoretical models
developed by students of ethnicity and national development, as well as contemporary
elite theorists, the later pointing who point to the importance of elite actions in shaping
the local and national uniting and fractioning national communities‘ethnic politics’.

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.1 Historical background

What is today known as Nigeria could be traced to the existence of numerous

communities and indigenous ethnic groups in the precolonial time. There were many
minor socio-ethnic kingdoms, but the three major indigenous political system
/organization that stood pronounced are: the old Oyo Empire, the Sokoto Caliphate, the
acephalous political culture, for the Yorubas, the Hausas and the Ibos respectively. Out
of these entities, in 1906, the British created the southern protectorate constituting the
Ibos and Yoruba, and the Northern protectorate for Hausas and ruled the two
protectorates separately. In 1914 the two protectorates were amalgamated or merged by
Fredrick Lord Lugard as colony and protectorate of Nigeria. Thus, Nigeria was created
and Lord Lugard became the first governor general of Nigeria.
Nigeria is a young polity, territorially vast, complex and heterogeneous. It is also
a relatively young and rapidly growing nation. The population of the country has been
estimated at c. 190 million, with one of the highest rates of population increase in the
world. One distinctive feature of the Nigerian society is its immense complexity;
another is a very short history of unification under the colonial rule, and even shorter
history of independence and nation-building.
The immensely ethnically complex and religiously diverse territory of Nigeria
was transformed into a single polity only in 1914 and indirect rule or Native Authority
system as the system of governing through traditional institutions was administered in a
very arbitrary fashion, with little regard for traditional ethno-religious differentiation.
Similarly, the process of independence-granting in 1960 took a form of a simple
‘transfer’ of political sovereignty onto the post-colonial entity, thus preserving – and in
many ways exacerbating – the divisions, and weakening the process of nation-building,
that is the creation of an over-arching state-based political identity of Nigerians (as
citizens of a single state).
The creation of urban Centers such as Lagos by the colonial powers encouraged
rural-urban migration, and this urban area was the domain of urban intelligentsia such
as Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Ibo), Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Yoruba). These elites reached
out to their ethnic communities via indigenous religious institutions which the colonial
powers allowed in 1914 to coexist with the native authority system on the condition that
the former will support the later which was the true colonial organ of government. It
was from these indigenous religious institutions that cultural associations were formed
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which later transmuted into political parties when the colonial master allowed the
nationalists to form political parties: Egbe Omo Oduduwa, a cultural association formed
by chief Awolowo(Yoruba) to represent the interest of the Yorubas against other tribes
later metamorphosed into a political Party: Action Group(AG). Ibo union formed by
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Ibo) to represent the interest of the Ibos for political competition
against the Yorubas metamorphosed into a political party: National council of Nigeria
and Cameroons (NCNC). Jamiyya Mutari formed by Sarduana of Sokoto (Hausa) as a
cultural association to represent the interest of the Hausa turned into a political party as
Northern peoples’ congress (NPC). It was on these three ethnic-oriented political parties
that poised to participate in the December 1959 general election sequel to
Independence. Nigerian politics from her first republic at independence in 1960 to date
is characterized by ethno-religious politics and conflict and ethnic divisions
demonstrated in the formation of ethnic political parties and struggle for economic and
state power in a zero sum manner as illustrated in the below:

Ethnic political parties during the first republic (1960-1966)

At independence, in 1960, ethnicity challenged the national unity of Nigeria as the

political parties of the first republic (1960-1966) that assumed leadership were formed
by the indigenous post-colonial elites on ethnic basis and identity. Nigeria had three
dominant political parties that ushered in the new government in her first republic
following the 1959 federal election prior to Independence. These parties were formed
on ethnic affiliation and each of the parties drew support from its ethnic groups which
affected national unity. The National council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) was
formed by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Ibo nationalists whose party was seen as Ibo party
(eastern region) The Action Group was formed by Chief .Obafemi Awolowo that drew
support from the Yorubas (western region) and the Northern people congress formed by
Saduana of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, who drew support from the Hausas (Northern
region). The result of December, 1959 election demonstrated the ethnic centeredness of
each of the parties: A total of 312 seats were contested out of which NPC won 134 seats
all in its regions, the North. NCNC won 89 seat seats out of which 58 came from its
regional base, the east; and 31 from the minority ethnic regions in the north and west.

7
AG won 73 seats out of which 33 came from its regional base, the west, and 1 from
Lagos, 25 and 14 from the minority ethnic groups in the North and east respectively.
Though, NPC got the highest number of elected federal legislators in the
election, but it failed to get an absolute majority which was needed to form a
government based on British parliamentary model. Consequently, NPC and Azikiwe’s
party, NCNC formed a coalition while Awolowo’s AG refused to join the coalition and
remained the leader of the opposition in the federal house; and relinquished his
premiership in the western region to his deputy, S. L. Akintola with the hope of
consolidating the regions for subsequent victory for central power as he would not like
to play the second fiddle in coalition government. Akintola later disappointed him on
ideological split by cooperating with the coalition government. Tafewa Belewa of NPC
became the prime minister while Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe became the senate president.
Moreover, the support given by the Awolowo’s AG to the minority ethnic groups in
Northern and Eastern region made imperative the coalition of NCNC and NPC who
used the central executive power to undermine Awolowo’s regional political base. This
was achieved with the ‘collaboration between Balewa and Akintola to disrupt
parliamentary process in the Awolowo’s western region with the declaration of a state
of Emergency and subsequent trial and imprisonment of Awolowo and some of his
associates for treason resulting to the imposition of an Akintola government in the west’
(Richard 1987:34).
This political game plan of exclusion paid off as it led to intense political
instability in the western region in May 1962. The coalition seized the opportunity to
impose a state of emergency in the western region. Akintola formed a new political
party, UNDP and was instituted to power, Awolowo was convicted and imprisoned for
treasonable felony, western region was dismembered and a mid-western region carved
out of it thereby bringing the influence of AG and Awolowo in Western regional and
national politics to a lull.
Each of the dominant ethnic groups and its leaders were distrustful of other
ethnic group that they hardly combine or arrive at harmonious political decisions. In the
negotiation for the type of constitution to be operated in Nigeria, the Nigerian political
leaders, after rigorous debate, chose to operate a federation. However, the choice for a
federation was borne out of mutual suspicion of the political elites on the other-
Obafemi Awolowo was afraid that the Ibo would dominate a unitary state. The Hausas
supported a federation because they reasoned that their numerical strength would be a
8
source of political leverage in a federation as against a unitary which could subordinate
them to domination given their backwardness in education. In fact, the three major
ethnic groups feared the dominance of the other. The Yorubas and the Ibo who
constituted the southern geopolitical region suspected each other and were as well
feared by the Northern region (the Hausas).
It was not a surprise that the coalition government of NPC and NCNC was
marred by ideological differences, internal disagreement and disconsensus on some
important political issues bordering on disagreement over census figure of 1962 which
would determine the delimitation of constituencies in the forth-coming 1964/1965
federal election. This disagreement intensified mutual rivalry and instability among the
coalition that resulted to the formation of two major alliances: United progressive Grand
Alliance, UPGA (Coalition of NCNC, AG and some minority parties in the North) and
Nigeria National Alliance, NNA (for NPC). It was on the platform of these two
alliances that the federal election of 1964/65 was contested. The elections were marred
by irregularities, manipulation and violence that led UPGA to boycott the election.
NNA was declared the winner and Azikiwe (UPGA) refused to acknowledge the
validity of the election and refused to called on Tafewa Belewa (NNA) to form a new
government. .This buttresses the position observation of many students of elites and
politics that coalitions that were are not rooted in strongbacked by united elites, that do
not develop a shared norms of political competition, elite unity, consensus and
cohesion are bound to collapse ‘in the face of inevitablea political crisesis’ (Higley and
Burton 1989:29).
The consequence of this political imbroglio was prolonged political instability.
Such instability, one may stress, was the result and the cause of ethno-religious
fragmentation – the legacy of colonial and post-colonial developments – and the
persisting divisions within political elites. Against the widespread belief that democratic
elections may ‘fix the problem’ – that is, overcome social fragmentation, strengthen the
national unity, unite political elites, and provide these elites with firm and wide
legitimacy – the elections proved more divisive and destabilising than uniting and
stabilizing. The and the result of 1965 western regional election that was equally
characterized by rigging, electoral violence, disenfranchisement and violation of
electoral norms with reckless abandon which were so apparent that one would not
hesitate to say that the political elites had failed to play the political game by the rules -
a negation of ‘leader democracy’ which according Pakulski (2013:106,137,148)
9
‘encourages democratic representation… anchored on leaders action in which leaders
actively represent by securing trust and confidence of their electorates, by winning
electoral support, electoral authorization and mass consent…through regular, open,
,free and fair electoral contests’. It was in the heat of this political turmoil, democratic
failure and the failure of the political elites to provide political security, economic
prosperity and stability that the second republic came to an abrupt end with the intrusion
of the military (bloody coup) in 1966 that were equally divided on ethnic lines.
The military instead of unifying the country further intensified ethnicity as the
unification decree and unitary constitution it introduced and its targeted killing of
prominent Hausa politicians and top military officers in the course of the coup was
interpreted by them (Hausas) as a political game plan of 1bo domination and
elimination of Hausas because the coup was led by an Ibo military officer, Major
Aguiyi Ironsi. De Nevers maintains that in ethno-primordial societies with ethno
religious complexities and divisions ‘if the military is loyal to a single ethnic group,
rather than the state ,then the prospect for managing ethnic conflict are not good’ (in
Montserrat and Rex,1997:86). Thus the counter coup of July, 1966 led by an Hausa
military officer, General Murtala Mohammed, was a retaliatory coup that targeted the
Ibos, the pogrom and the crisis that followed and declaration of republic of Biafra by
the Ibos led to the Nigerian Civil war of 1967-1970, a near genocide that decimated the
population of the Ibos claiming over one million lives, a war that bothered on ethnic and
religious differences cum diversity.
The Nigerian civil war was an bitter outcome of deep and persisting social
divisions and elite conflicts. It also further aggrevated these divisions and conflicts by
raising mutual hostilities and suspicions. Mbanefo noted that the Civil war was
attributed to ‘inter-ethnic perceptions which generated negative attitude, prejudice and
discrimination; traditional loyalty and ethnic identity’ (in journal of political .sc .vol.
48). Till today Ibos hated the Yoruba for betraying the Biafra cause and still feel that
their defeat in the war placed them on a subjugated position in Nigeria. Onoh, an Ibo
elite aired this widely accepted notion to his fellow 1bos ,while discouraging
Dr.Azikiwe (Ibo) from vying for a presidential post in Nigeria that ‘those who
conquered them in the civil war could not now be expected to be ruled by them’
(Richard 1987:94). This notion is still held by the Ibos till today and they see it as
axiomatic as since the civil war till date no Ibo man has emerged as Nigerian president
hence the agitation of the Ibo against marginalization at the present time. The military
10
ruled for thirteen years before handing power over to a civilian government in 1979
which was Nigeria’s second republic.

Ethnic conflicts and elites political strife during the second republic (1979-1983)

Both the 1979 and 1983 election indicated that Nigerian political elites have not learnt
their lesson as political parties and alliances were nothing but old wines in new bottles:
ethnic political parties of the first republic metamorphosed into the new parties of the
second republic. Each of these dominant parties devised a zoning arrangement that
zoned presidential candidate to its ethnic group. Richard noted ‘the Nigerian political
parties, campaign and elections were merely tribally based’ (cited in journal of opinion
p.20). The unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) was regarded as the Yoruba party and Chief.
Obafemi Awolowo (a Yoruba) became its presidential candidate in 1979 election.
Nigerian peoples’ party (NPP) was regarded as Ibo party, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (an Ibo
man) ran as its presidential candidate; while the National party of Nigeria (NPN)
produced Alhaji shehu Shagari, a one time NPC political big wig (Hausa) as its
presidential candidate. Two minority Northern (Hausa) parties, Great Nigeria peoples’
party (GNPP) and Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) featured and were led by candidates
from the North (Hausa). However, NPN was the mirror of Northern political elites, the
main party for the Hausas.
Shehu Shagari of NPN (Hausa) was declared winner and Awolowo (Yoruba)
initiated a legal battle protesting that Shagari did not win the election as he failed to win
25 percent of votes cast in thirteen states of the federation. Moreover, in the election,
electoral malpractices: ghost polling booth, electoral officers traded on ballot papers.
One journalist from the account of Federal electoral commission noted that ’polling
agents had thumb-printed ballots for those who paid them; ballot boxes stuffed with pre-
marked ballots were substituted for real ones on the way to counting centers’ (Richard
1987:155).
The 1983 election did not get better as the campaigns and election proper were
characterized by ‘increasing violence and lawlessness’ (ibid 154). Even the exaggerated
number of registered voters during this period indicated that false polling booth, ghost
voters and exaggerated constituencies were apace.

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 The result of these historical legacies – as well as bloody ethno-religious and
communal conflicts that erupted in the immediately post-independence decades – has
been the persisting ethno-religious complexity and fragility to the present day Nigeria as
would be shown in the subsequent chapters.
Different accounts have come up with different figures regarding the number of
ethnic groups in Nigeria. Some of these accounts suggest that Nigeria has as much as
400 ethnic groups while some claim that there exist only less than a hundred ethnic
groups in the country (Ademoyega, 1962; Okoli and Iortyer, 2014). Generally, ethnic
groups in Nigeria have been classified as either majority or minority. The ‘majority’
ethnic groups refer to the dominant ethnic nationalities that are easily recognized in the
geo-regional politics of Nigeria. On the other hand, the ethnic ‘minorities’ refer to
pockets of other ethnic and sub-ethnic nationalities that are scattered across the different
parts of the country. They are largely found in the central axis of Nigeria, otherwise
referred to as the North-central region (Tenuche, 2002).
The North-Central region of Nigeria is characterized by immense ethnic
diversity. In fact, it is second to the North-East region in terms of ethno-religious
diversity. Prominent ethnic nationalities that are found in the region are Tiv, ldoma,
lgede, Birom, Katang, Hausa, Egbira, Yoruba, lgala, Eggon, Kambari, Alago, Migili,
Mada, Fulani, Nupe, Gwari, and Gbagi (Gwari). In terms of cultural characteristics, the
North-Central region is also equally diverse. It has a balanced distribution of adherents
of lslam, Christianity and traditional beliefs. It is also characterized by wide and
complex communal and linguistic divergences (Ngare, 2012). As such, no fewer than
fifty languages are spoken in the region.
The North-Central region has been notorious for conflictual inter-group
relations. Despite long-standing inter-mingling among the various groups in the region,
there have been inter-group tensions often resulting in ethno-religious or
communal/sectarian conflicts and violence. The states of Plateau and Nasarawa have
been particularly notorious in this regard.

Statement of the problem

Nigeria’s ethno-religious complexity and diversity, unabated during the colonial and
postcolonial rule, has increased the nation’s vulnerability to ethno-relitious, ethno-

12
communal divisions and fracturing. This diversity has been further complicated by
economic divisions that deepened with the discoveries of oil and with the rapid and
unbalanced economic growth. On top of this, Nigerias elites have never united in the
proper sense, that is, they never developed strong and all-encompassing normative
agreement, shared ‘cementing’ loyalties, let alone shared and respected norms of
political competition. All these factors Both provided pretexts forformed fertile grounds
for persisting destabilizing conflicts, especially for divisive elite-driven ‘ethnic
politics’,’ – that is, a systematic political use of ethnic differences in pursuit of political
goals by local and national leaders. This persistent ‘ethnic politics’ – that has become a
key part of what one may call a ‘vicious cycle’ of political instability and conflict. Elite
conflicts further exacerbatesd inter-group divisions , conflicts and violent contestations,
especially when strong material interests enter the stage (Ngare, 2012). The discoveries
of oil proved the economic blessing – but also a political curse – for Nigeria. The oil-
rich regions grew very fast; those with no oil revenues remained underdeveloped. The
redistribution of oil revenues was weak and chaotic – typically the outcome of complex
(and clientelistic) elite deals. This, in turn, provided political fuel for local conflicts over
economic ‘spoils’.

The African and Western analyses

The indigenous analyses of these political divisions and conflicts tend to emphasize the
importance of traditional informalism, tribal divisions, primordial ethno-religious
identities and the role of colonial powers and local leaders in mobilizing divisive ethnic
politics (e.g., Ngare 2012). The Western accounts tend to stress the role of post-colonial
under-development combined with weakness of the major political institutions, such as
the state, rule of law and electoral system, and – importantly – the structure and unity of
political elites. Thus Fukuyama (2014, 323) observes:
Like many developing countries, Nigeria was never a historical
nation. But it was also never the object of a serious nation-building
project, either on the part of the colonial authorities, or by the new
national leadership after independence. When the British took over
Nigeria, they did not conquer a large, well-established centralized
state…The indigenous people were loyal primarily to very small tribal-
level units. The territory now called Nigeria was consolidated into a
single political unit on 1 January 1914, by Frederic Lugard, codifier of
13
 indirect rule, who was serving as governor. … These territories had little
in common since they were divided by religion, ethnicity, and wealth,
especially between the Muslim North and the South that was being
steadily converted to Christianity through the work of European
missionaries. The merger had been undertaken for reasons of
administrative convenience – the poorer North kept running a fiscal
deficit, which would be easier to subsidize in a united colony… By the
time they got to Nigeria, however, the British were in the sense
exhausted by the burdens of the global empire… So they deliberately
decided not to try to implant a strong state structure, or do much to
develop the economy. The British had very little interest in creating a
class of educated Nigerians.
These two perspectives are not incompatible, and they should be combined
within a single theoretical framework and research perspective. That would allow for
providing better solutions to tThe key ‘puzzles’ the study addresses: why do we find
such deep and persistent ethnic-communal divisions and conflicts in Nigeria, especially
in her most fragile and volatile is the persistence in Nigeria, especially its North-
Central region? What are the key social-political ‘propellants’ of these seemingly
endemic divisions and conflicts? , of Why endemic communal conflict, typically based
on ‘politicised’ ethno-religious divisions. This conflictare these conflicts so violent, so
difficult to settle, let alone prevent and eliminate often takes violent forms?
.
The key argument
We try to shed more light on the social and political sources/causes of these persisting,
deep divisions and conflicts. The argument presented here is that the communal
conflicts have many sources: the traditional ethno-religious complexity, only partly
attenuated by nation-building, economic ‘reinforcements’ (struggle for economic
advantages, mainly oil revenues) and perhaps most importantly, political ‘uses’ of
ethno-religious divisions by local and national power elites striving for recognition and
political power. Therefore the study explores, first, the relationship between ethnicity
and communal conflict, and then looks at the impact of oil extraction, and, finally, the
role of political elites in triggering and fanning such conflicts in Nigeria’s North-Central
region. This is against the backdrop of the high incidence and prevalence of ethno-

14
communal hostilities among the various groups in this region. These hostilities have
often engendered violence and undermined national stability and security.
The theoretical and empirical relationship between ethnicity, ethnic groups,
political elites and conflict has received appreciable scholarly attention (Smythe and
Smythe 1960; Barth, 1998; Nnoli, 1978; Diamond, 1983; Rex, 1996; Carmeli and
Eriksen, 1998; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005; Gyuse and Ajane, 2006; Alubo, 2008; Daloz
2016). These extant studies have variously problematized the phenomenon of ethnicity
and its persistence across time and space; and its tendency toward ethnic divide and
dichotomy especially in a culturally heterogeneous society and under the condition of
intra-elite conflicts and divisions (Cole 1975; Eriksen, 1993; Fukuyama 2014).
However, there is an important dimension of the contemporary trend in
the subject that has scarcely been interrogated in the academic literature. While the
issues of ethnic politics and communal conflicts have been studied before, often in the
context of ‘weak’ or ‘underdeveloped’ political institutions such as the state, rule of
law, and democratic mechanisms (e.g. Fukuyama 2014), none of them tackled ethnicity
and communal conflicts as generated and managed by key political actors or political
elites (Cole 1975; Smythe and Smythe 1960; Higley and Burton 2006). These key
political actors include national and local leaders and key influential persons who
exploit the fault lines of primordial cleavages and play the dominant role in shaping and
politicizing ethnic identities which often engender intergroup tension and conflict.
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no recent organized work has been
done to systematically explore and situate the contemporary trends of the ethnic
politicking and visa-a-vis communal conflagrations in the study area. This study, among
other things, seeks to put the role of political actors – leaders and elites - firmly into
focus while exploring the nexus between ethnicity and communal conflict in the North-
Central Nigeria.
The empirical focus is placed on the core States of Nasarawa and Plateau.
Besides their marked similarities in terms of socio-cultural and political mix, Plateau
and Nasarawa States fall within Nigeria’s volatile central region characterized by
widespread ethno-religious and communal conflict often violent. The region has been
ranked the second deadliest conflict zone in contemporary Nigeria, following the lead of
the North-eastern region ravaged by Boko Haram insurgency. Understanding the critical
drivers, condition of occurance, contours and trajectories of the prevailing inter-
communal conflict in North-Central Nigeria requires a systematic investigation. By
15
combining the key elements of these approaches – the one focusing on ‘grass roots’
ethnic divisions with the one focusing on political elites – we gain a broader perspective
on ethnic conflict and strife, as well as a better theoretical foundation for the analysis of
these persisting communal conflicts.

Research questions
The study attempts to answeraddresses the following questions:
i. How do ethno-cultural diversity and primordial (traditional, well-
established, entrenched, old) cleavages affect communal political
conflicts in Nigeria, especially in the North-Central region?
ii. How are these ethnic conflicts in North-Central Nigeria related to, and
‘used in’ elite ‘ethnic politics’, that is mobilization of ethnicity in
political struggles for recognition and power?
iii. What are the effects of ethnic conflicts and ‘ethnic politics’ on the social
and political relations in Nigeria particularly in North-Central Nigeria?
iv.
Basic assumptions

The analysis presupposes that:is based on some theoretical assumptions that need to be
spelled out:
(i) The problem of ethnicity in Nigeria is rooted in the country’s history,
especially in the changes in social-historical patterns of ethno-cultural diversity. The
traditional ‘intra-national’ divisions in Nigeria remain strong and easily mobilizable.
They have not been significantly weakened by the post-colonial ‘all-Nigerian’ identity.
This national identity remains superimposed on very robust supra-national identities
anchored in complex ethno-religious divisions and ties.
(ii) Ethnic conflicts in Nigeria is to a large extent generated and sustained by
actions of political elites, that is the key political actors – on the national level and on
the local- level holding power and capable of affecting (national and local) political
outcomes in a regular way.
(iii) Elite-fanned conflicts in North-Central Nigeria lead to inter-communal
divisions, conflicts and occasional violent confrontations. Elites seldom create the
(sources of) conflicts, but they are the key political managers of these conflicts.
16
The aAims and objectives and objectives oof the study

Specifically, tThe study aims at explaining the forms and persistence of disruptive and
destabilizing ‘ethnic politics’ in Nigeria, especially the ethno-communal conflicts. It has
the following set of objectives:empirical, theoretical and practical-political objectives:
(i) To examine the nature and saliency of ethnicity in the contemporary
Nigerian politics, especially local politics in the North-Central region of the country.
(ii) To analyze the factors underpinning the incidence of ethnicity and
communal conflict in contemporary Nigeria with particular reference to North-Central
Nigeria.
(iii) To suggest test the theoretically suggested causal links between
ethnicity, elite manipulation of ethnic divisions (‘ethnic politics’) and communal
conflict – often with violent outcomes – in the North-Central region of Nigeria. And,
finally,
(iv) To comment on the ‘practical’ implications of the study, especially the
possible strategies that can be used in defusing and preventing ethno-communal
conflicts for political (in) stability and (in) security in Nigeria, in general, and in North-
Central Nigeria in particular.

Significance of the study

The study is interdisciplinary: it combines the insights (concepts and theoretical

constructs) of political science and sociology (political sociology, in particular). The
key concepts of ethnicity, ethnic identity, power, authority, political elites and ethnic
politics belong to the analytical toolbox of political sociology.
i. The study enhances our knowledge and understanding of ethnic conflicts and
communal strife in general, as well as particular conflicts found in Nigeria. It combines
theoretitical perspectives developed by theorists of ethnicity, ethnic identity and identity
politics, with the contemporary elite theory, that stresses the importance of key political
actors in mobilizing ethnicity and deepening cleavages for reasons of power
competition. As argued in the next chapter, the existing studies of ethnic conflicts in
Nigeria have largely failed to properly situate the ethnic politics and the accompanied
communal conflicts within such broad threoretical-explanatory framework.
17
 ii. Methodologically, it is expected that the combination of primary and
secondary data would give substance to the analysis, leading to a more valid research
outcomes.
iii. Empirically, it provides new empirical insights into the trends, dynamics and
impacts of ethnic politics and crises in North-central Nigeria. It is expected that the
work would establish the relationship between ethnicity and communal conflict, often
violent, in a manner that demonstrates their import as critical threat to national security
in Nigeria.
iv. The results of the research would be useful not only for Nigerian government
in dealing with ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, but also to other African countries
and governments that face similar challenges. This would also be of help to government
and non-governmental organizations in conflict management and enhancing national
integration in Nigeria and beyond.

The sScope of the study

The study would consider its subject matter within the ambit of the contemporary
Nigerian federation. Within this context, the primary focus of the study would be on the
North-Central region of Nigeria. This comprises six (6) states namely: Kogi, Benue,
Plateau, Nasarawa, Kwara and Niger. Two of these six states, namely Nasarawa and
Plateau, would constitute the case study for the dissertation. The study covers the period
of 1996 to date, which coincides with the on-going democratic dispensation in Nigeria.

Methodology

The study used qualitative methodologies; and it utilized both primary and secondary
sources. Primary data are generated through Key Informants Interview (KII) and
Focused Group Discussions (FGD), complemented with study chat; while secondary
data was derived from library and documentary sources, including books, journals,
dailies and periodicals, internet resources, government official records and/or
publications, etc. A technique of document-based content analysis of elite
pronouncement was also incorprated.

18
 Details concerning the methodological approach will be presented in chapter
four.

Conceptual clarification

A number of basic concepts are implicit in the subject matter of the dissertation:
(i) Ethnicity: Subjective consciousness of belonging to and identifying with an
ethnic group, that is, with certain ‘people’ who share a distinctive culture and identity.
Most sociologists treat ethnicity as an inherited status derived from the society of origin.
(ii) Ethnic group: ‘ethnic group is a category of people who identify with each
other based on similarities such as common ancestry, language, history, society, culture
or nation.’ (Wikipedia; see also Ericksen 1993:4; Cole 1975:5). Where ethnic divisions
and identities combine with religious divisions and identities we refer to ethno-religious
groups (and conflicts).
(iii) Ethnic conflict: a type of conflict that involves, as key adversaries, ethnic
groups. Ethnic conflicts implicate ethnic identities, loyalties, interests and ideologies.
Communal conflict: Social conflict involving established territorially
circumscribed communities. The dividing line in local conflict is between ‘original’
inhabitants of an area and settlers. This is taken as a communal conflict because people
strongly identify themselves visa-vis the other along these lines.
(iv) Ethnic conflict: Conflict involving ethnic groups. The disagreement
arises from claims and contestations over competitive stakes, interests, and values
among ethnic groups. All ethnic conflicts engender communal conflicts.
(v) Identity: A sense of belonging and accompanied self-definition. We all carry
numerous (plural) identities, though some of them can be more important and prominent
in different circumstances. Some identities are ‘primordial’, while others are ‘new, but
all of them are subject to elite management, construction and manipulation.
(vi).Power and Authority: Power is the general capacity to make other act in
accordance with the wishes of power-wielders; it is the capacity to shape the conduct of
others. Authority refers to legitimate power, which is power that is backed by
generalized normative approval. Modern forms of authority are legitimated by laws.
Political (vii) Elites: The terms ‘elites’, ‘political elites’ and ‘power elites’ are
used here interchangingly, as synonyms. They refer to groups holding most power, and

19
therefore playing the role of key political actors. Accordingly, political elites include
pPeople with most power, ruling minorities, the key political actors-players, the most
powerful groups monopolizing important decisions (see Higley and Burton 2006: 2-4).
Elites differ in their ‘levels’ (national, local, regional, tribal, etc), as well as structure
and orientations. Elites in our context also manifest their influence within ethnic groups.
Structure/organization of the dissertation

Chapter two overviews the literature on the topic and summarises briefly the
theoretical frameworks used in the study. Chapter three discusses in more details
the key aspects of the historical background. It involves the political history as well
as ethnology of Nigeria, with the emphasis on the late colonial and postcolonial
period; also situates the setting of the study for more detailed analysis of the
conflicts in the North-Central region. Chapter four discusses briefly the
methodology adopted in the study: the protocols, procedures, techniques and
constraints. Chapter five analyses the nature, patterns, trajectories and dynamics
of ethnic divisions and communal politics and conflicts in Nigeria and with the
emphasis on North-Central Nigeria. Chapter six discusses the relations between
ethnicity and communal conflict, as well as elite-focused ethnic politics, using as a
focus the conflicts in the Nasarawa and Plateau. Finally, chapter seven summarises
the results of the study and comments on the implications of its findings.

20
 CHAPTER 32

ETHNICITY, ETHNIC DIVISION, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND ELITES:

CONCEPTUALCONCEPTUAL DEBATES AND THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK AND –

THE LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The first part, tThis chapter introduces, clarifies and explores discusses the various key
concepts that are used in the analyses. The second part contains and aspects of the
subject matter with a view to situating the dissertation in a distincta brief overview of
the key theoretical perspectives that guide the analyses in chapters five and six. These
theories combines insights intoprovide explanations of the sources and types of ethnic
(including ethno-religious) division and conflict, especially those relevant in the African
context, with the key tenets of contemporary elite theoas well as the role of political
elites in fomenting and shaping such conflicts and conducting volatile ‘ethnic
politics’ry. The third part is devoted to a review of the relevant literature that covers
ethnic conflicts in the context of African societies in general, and Nigeria, in particular.
It conceptualizes ethnicity and communal conflict, explores the prevailing perspectives
on the subject of ethnicity and ethnic conflictsThis review is a stepping stone to
formulating the research questions that direct the empirical part of the study: a case
study of ehno-communal conflicts in Northern Nigeria. both in the core literature on the
of subject, as well as more narrowly, in research conducted within Africa and
specifically in Nigeria, and, finally, introduces the concept of political elites seen here
as the key political actors-managers of social order. In the second part, the chapter
highlights the incidence of ethnic conflict in Africa, Nigeria and the North-Central
region with the intent to build a theoretical framework for the study.

Part 1.
2.1. Debates around the concept of ‘ethnicity’

21
The word ‘ethnie’ is older than the word ‘ethnicity’. To Nathan and Glazer (in Eriksen,
1993:4), ‘ethnicity’ appears to be a new term which came to the dictionary in 1972,
however, the word ‘ethnicity’ was first used by David Riesman, an American
Sociologists in 1953. The word ‘ethnie’ being much older was borrowed from the the
Greek word ‘ethnos’ meaning originally ‘heathen’ or’ pagan’ (Williams cited in
Eriksen, 1993). It was in this sense that the meaning of the world was conveyed in
English beginning ‘from the mid fourteenth century until the mid nineteenth century,
when it gradually began to refer to racial characteristics especially in U.S where the
world ‘ethnic’ was used during the second world war as a polite world when refering to
inferior groups like Jews, Italians, Irish who were seen as inferior by the dorminant
group mainly of British descent’ (Eriksen, 1993:3-5).
From seemingly similar narative, the concept of ‘ethnicity’ is derived from the
Greek root word ‘ethnos’, which translates usually as ‘tribe’ or ‘nation’ (Mclean and
Mcmillan, 2003:177). The notion of ‘tribe’ in this context refers to racial or national
origin. This conception also aligns with position of Horowitz who sees ethnicity as
embracing groups that are differentiated by color, religion, language, ‘tribes’, ‘races’,
‘castes and ‘nationalities’ (1985:53).
According to Eriksen (1993:4) , different related approaches to ethnicity, though
could account for different purposes, are in accord that ethnicity is linked with ‘group
classification’ as well as ‘group relations’. To him, ‘minority issues’ and ‘race relations’
are the connotations of ethnicity; which in Anthroplogy has something to do with ‘
aspects of relationships between people which consider themselves, and are regarded by
others as being culturally distinctive’ (ibid). As such, ethnicity could be understood as
‘the common consciousness of shared origin or traditions’ (Mclean and McMillan,
2003).
In the same light, according to Imobighe (2003), ethnicity refers to ‘the feeling
of belonging to a distinctive cultural or linguistic group; or a manifestation of ethnic
consciousness in relation to other groups’ (as cited in Asiyanbola, 2010:61) In the same
vein, as a sense of ethic identity, ethnicity is seen by De vos as involving ‘subjective,
symbolic, or emblematic use by a group… of any aspect of culture, in order to
differentiate themselves from other groups’ (cited in Brass. 1991:19). To Brass,
‘ethnicity is to ethnic group what class consciousness is to class’ (1991:19). This
presupposes that Ethnicity defines and distinguishes one ethnic group from others. It is
characterized by group consciousness and identity, primordial sentiment and
22
attachment, and the feeling of cultural differentiation based on sense of group
exclusiveness (Otite, 1990).
As a mode of social consciousness, ethnicity can be latent or active. It can also
be negatively or positively expressed. Latent ethnicity refers to mere feeling and/or
recognition of belonging to a particular ethnic group while active ethnicity refers to the
manifestation of ethnic behavior particularly within the contexts of inter-group relations
(Nnoli, 1978). Latent ethnicity is an objective consciousness of ethnic belonging or
identity whereby one recognizes oneself as a member of a particular ethnic group. Here,
inter-ethnic relationships cum interactons are symbiotic in which there is the
acknowledgement of group cultural differences in a manner that does not depict ‘US-
THEM’ but rather in a WE-YOU relationship in what could be termed unity in diversity
that has elements of ‘complementarisation’ in which cultural pluralism or diversities are
appreciated, and not regarded as a condition of disadvantage, weakness or dissensus
(Eriksen, 1993:27).
Active ethnicity commences when such recognition begets
discriminatory behaviours in the fashion of ‘them’ versus ‘we’ (Uduma, 2013:33).
When this situation prevails, inter-ethnic relationships lack symbiosis and integration
(Barth, 1959); and group exclusiveness or loyalty affirmed in a manner that yield to
unhealthy competition and mutual conflict that further result to ‘dichotomisaton’
(Eriksen, 1993:27).
Active ethnicity more often than not gives rise to negative manifestations of
inter-ethnic relations. At this level, ethnicity takes the form of contextual discrimination
whereby members of an ethnic group divide against other ethnic groups on the basis
differentiated system of socio-cultural symbols and affinities (Otite, 1990). It is this
dimension of ethnicity that has posed a challenge to governance and nation building in
many parts of the contemporary world.
Ethnicity is embodied by some active ingredients that define its essence and
accord it substance and vitality. These active ingredients include clan, region, race,
religion, nationality (Okoli, 2013). These modes of identity can provide the enabling
social capital, solidarity and consciousness that create the variable framework for ethnic
action. In effect, ethnicity can be activated by forces emanating from the
aforementioned social categories (Mclean and McMillan, 2003).
Some primordialists allude to ‘myths, memories, values and symbols’ as key
foundations of ethnicity and ethnic group cohesion (Smith, 1986:15), while others lay
23
emphsis on affinity by ‘blood, speech and custom’(Geertz, 1963, 109). This offers
personal attachment and establishes moral obligation and loyalty to groups which could
differ in proportion based on context and time and from one community to another.
One feature of ethnicity implied here is its emotional aspect which is considered by the
primordialist as a given providing the basis for ethnic solidarity and consciousness
which is inevitable in societies with ethno-religious cum cultural diversities.
Gagnon (1994) challenged the primordialist notion of ethnicity when he argued
that ethnonationalist feelings or consciousness are the product of the creation and
mobilization of threatened elites. Balch (2008) takes ethnicity as a construction by a
particular group of people who are driven into competition for socio-economic
advanges , interests and purposes. It is a strategic political instrument directed to make
for a particular purpose and to serve as a ‘convenient basis for mobilization’(Seo,
2008:345). According to Zagefka (2009:230), there is nothing ‘primordial’ about ethnic
demarcation lines; ethnic cleavages are socially constructed by a practice that can be
analyzed and deconstructed’. To Eriksen (1993:20) ‘for all claims to primordiality and
cultural roots, ethnic identities can be consciously manipulated’. In effect, the kind of
ethnic orientation ‘which gives rise to ethnic conflict depends on the context in which
people form or frame their consciousness and, particularly, on the other ethnic groups
which they recognize as existing in that context’ (Mclean and McMillan, 2003:117).
This is to say that it is the consciousness of ethnic identity in inter-ethnic relations that
give impetus to ethnicity and the accompanying ethnic conflicts (Geertz, 1993; Brass,
1991; Tenuche, 2002; Cohen, 2004; 1989; Asiyambola, 2010; Montserrat, 1997;
Stavenhagen, 1996). In essence, the implication of this situates ethnicity as a situational
phenomenon and ethnicity does not exist if no contact exists; and the differences among
ethnic groups are not made socially and politically relevant. Table 2.2 (below)
highlights the differences between thrusts of these schools of thought.

Table 2.1 Essentialists versus Constructivist Conceptions of Ethnicity compared

Essentialist/primodialist Conception
Ethnicity is pre-ordained by nature
It is determinate and fixed
It is objective
It is universal
It is indifferent to manipulation
It is inherently primordial
Source: Researcher, 2015.
Constructivist Conception
Ethnicity is constructed by society
It is constantly modified
It is subjective
It is contextual/ situational
It is prone to manipulation
It is inherently political

24
 As indicated in table 2.2, ethnicity has been understood principally in two more
or less contradictory senses. What can be taken there-from is the fact that ethnicity has
both biological and social essences (Cocodia, n.d.). The social essence of ethnicity
presupposes that it is relative, variable, dynamic, subjective, constructed, contingent,
and constantly modified (Zagefka, 2009; Brass 1991). The implication of this is that
ethnicity tends to assume varying patterns, manifestations and nuances over time in its
social contexts (Nnoli, 1978). Hence, any meaningful conception of ethnicity must seek
to come to terms with its social and historical context and character as a situational
phenomenon that takes on meaning, substance, vitality and salience in the context of
societal relations (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). It is in this sense that ethnicity is
understood in this dissertation.

2.2 Controversies around the concept of ‘ethnic group’

The conception of ethnicity in the forgoing section necessarily calls into question the
meaning and nature of ‘ethnic group’ – another controversial and contested concept.
Smith (1991:20) sees ethnic groups as ‘a type of cultural collectivity, one that
recognizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognized
by one or more cultutural differences like religion, customs, language, or institution’.
For Said (1976:33), ‘An ethnic group is a collectivity based on presummed common
origin, which shapes to some extent the attitudes and behaviour of those who share that
origin, and with which certain people may freely choose to identify at certain times of
their lives’. According to Horowitz (1998:16-17), ‘the most important of these qualities
is a strong sense of similarity, or in any case, of cues that signal similiarity: appearance,
custom, gesture, language, clothing, tastes, and habits with roots in perceived genetic
affinity or early socialization or both’ .
To Quaker–Dokubo (2001:44), ethnic group refers to ‘persons linked by a
consciousness of a special identity who jointly seek to maximize their corporate
political, economic and social interest’. For Heeger, ethnic group has to do with
‘cultural nations which are bound together in the first place by a common culture and
which lack the internationally recognized organization of a sovereign state’ (cited in
Willingenbury, 1995:13). In the same line of thought, based on the distinctiveness of
ethnic, language or cultural group in constituting a nation, Anthony Smith pinpointed
25
the salience of the ‘ethnic core’ central to the construction of a nation (Smith cited in
Suzman, 1999:11), while Gellner in the same vein strongly stressed the unity of ‘the
cultural and political components of nationalism’ which is based on ‘prenational ethnic
identity’ embodying ‘ myth of common origin, collective name, shared historical
tradition, shared system of cultural norms and values, an association with specific
territory, a sense of solidarity’ (Gellner cited in Mach, 1993:100-101). This is not far
from the position of Mach who conceives nation as ‘a cultural entity’ (1993:97). This
conception underpins the position of ethnic groups as cultural nations. The implication
of the above definitions is that ethnic groups are cultural communities that share a sense
of common ancestry, tradition, regional/territory, religious, clannish or national origins
and/or heritage.
Ethnic groups have been classified by Gurr (1993:17) into three groups based on
some manifest attributes, namely: ethno-nationals, indigenous peoples, and communal
contenders. Table 2.1 hereunder is instructive in this regard.

26
Table 2.1 Categories of Ethnic Groups
TYPE OF ETHNIC GROUP DESCRIPTION
Ethno-nationals Historically autonomous and
regionally dominant groups, often aspiring
to self determination/statehood
Indigenous peoples Endangered groups representing the
surviving aboriginal inhabitants of a region
Communal contenders Culturally distnict groups in a
heterogeneous societies wherein no single
group predominates
Source: Adapted from Cocodia (n.d:11-12).

The above categories of ethnic groups conform to some kinds of ethnic groups
portrayed by Eriksen based on some manifest characteristics and empirical studies such
as: i) Indigeneous people ii) proto-nations iii) Ethnic groups in ‘plural societies’
(1993:13). Indigeneous people are seen as representing the aboriginal inhabitants of a
territory who are dominated, emasculated politically and are poorly integrated compared
to other dominant groups in the nation state. Proto-nations could also be called
‘ethnonationalist movements’ agitating for their own nation state, insisting on statehood
or independence from the rulership of others; while ethnic groups in plual
societies’represent a plural society with heterogeneous population which came into
existence by imperial or colonial fiat. These groups could only participate in political
and economic activities in domination of others, and may not combine in other areas of
lives as they condsider themselves and are considered by others as different.
In table 2.1, the category of ‘communal contenders’ typifies the dominant ethnic
affiliation in Africa, also similar to ethnic groups in ‘plural societies’ portrayed by
Eriksen. As in the case of Nigeria, there exists a multiplicity of ethnic groupings in the
country which are engaged in intense socio-political struggles/competitions that often
precipitate crises.
There are two contending conceptual paradigms of ethnicity in the prevailing
extant academic literature. These are the essentialist or primordialist (Geertz 1963,
Smith 1991) and the constructivist perspectives (Zagefka, 2009; Gagnon, 1994). The
former takes a genetic standpoint and conceives ethnicity as ‘one of the givens’ of

27
humanity ‘which exists in nature, outside times’ (Smith 1991:20). With emphasis on
common descent and a sense of collective self-consciousness as the basis of ethnicity
(Kobler and Schiel, 1995; Geertz 1963; Connor 1993; Aghemalo and Okebugwu, 2014),
while the latter takes on social position and stresses ethnicity as a social construct
(Eriksen, 1993; Zagefka, 2009; Gagnon, 1994; Asoyanbola, 2010; Brass, 1991; Bates,
1983; William& Koffman, 1989). Some primordialists allude to ‘myths, memories,
values and symbols’(Smith, 1986:15), while others lay emphsis on affinity by ‘blood,
speech and custom’(Geertz, 1963, 109). This offers personal attachment and establishes
moral obligation and loyalty to groups which could differ in proportion based on
context and time and from one community to another. One feature of ethnicity implied
here is its emotional aspect which is considered by the primordialist as a given
providing the basis for ethnic solidarity and consciousness which is inevitable in
societies with ethno-religious cum cultural diversities.
Gagnon (1994) challenged the primordialist notion of ethnic violence when he
argued that ethnonationalist feelings or consciousness are the product of the creation
and mobilization of threatened elites. Balch (2008) takes ethnicity as a construction by a
particular group of people who are driven into competition for socio-economic
advanges , interests and purposes. It is a strategic political instrument directed to make
for a particular purpose and to serve as a ‘convenient basis for mobilization’(Seo,
2008:345). According to Zagefka (2009:230), there is nothing ‘primordial’ about ethnic
demarcation lines; ethnic cleavages are socially constructed by a practice that can be
analyzed and deconstructed’. To Eriksen (1993:20) ‘for all claims to primordiality and
cultural roots, ethnic identities can be consciously manipulated’. In effect, the kind of
ethnic orientation ‘which gives rise to ethnic conflict depends on the context in which
people form or frame their consciousness and, particularly, on the other ethnic groups
which they recognize as existing in that context’ (Mclean and McMillan, 2003:117).
This is to say that it is the consciousness of ethnic identity in inter-ethnic relations that
give impetus to ethnicity and the accompanying ethnic conflicts (Geertz, 1993; Brass,
1991; Tenuche, 2002; Cohen, 2004; 1989; Asiyambola, 2010; Montserrat, 1997;
Stavenhagen, 1996). In essence, the implication of this situates ethnicity as a situational
phenomenon and ethnicity does not exist if no contact exists; and the differences among
ethnic groups are not made socially and politically relevant. Table 2.2 highlights the
differences between thrusts of these schools of thought.

28
Table 2.2 Essentialists versus Constructivist Conceptions of Ethnicity compared

Essentialist/primodialist Conception Constructivist Conception

Ethnicity is pre-ordained by nature Ethnicity is constructed by society

It is determinate and fixed It is constantly modified

It is objective It is subjective

It is universal It is contextual/ situational

It is indifferent to manipulation It is prone to manipulation

It is inherently primordial It is inherently political

29
Source: Researcher, 2015.

As indicated in table 2.2, ethnicity has been understood principally in two more or
less contradictory senses. What can be taken there-from is the fact that ethnicity
has both biological and social essences (Cocodia, n.d.). The social essence of
ethnicity presupposes that it is relative, variable, dynamic, subjective, constructed,
contingent, and constantly modified (Zagefka, 2009; Brass 1991). The implication
of this is that ethnicity tends to assume varying patterns, manifestations and
nuances over time in its social contexts (Nnoli, 1978). Hence, any meaningful
conception of ethnicity must seek to come to terms with its social and historical
context and character as a situational phenomenon that takes on meaning,
substance, vitality and salience in the context of societal relations (Osaghae and
Suberu, 2005). It is in this sense that ethnicity is understood in this dissertation.

Ethnicity and Ethnic conflict: seeing through the synthesis of the primordialist,
instrumentalists cum contructivistsa synthetic view

The primordialist, constructivists cum instrumentalists perspectives highlighted in the

foregoing are useful in understanding the complex and multimentional nature of
ethnicity and ethnic conflict. They draw on the strenghth of each other to present a
holistic view of this phenomenon. While the position of the instrumentalist perspective
is plausible, the primordialist theory is also useful in understanding the emotive side of
ethnic conflicts which also draws awareness to behavoir of ethnic groups that is
passion-driven and why ethnic groups could be easily and effectively mobilized, or not,
on ethnic lines. The power of ethnicity flows from its fervour to generate passion and
commitment (Cornel and Hartman, 1998:151) which results to violent conflict when
political elites unduely take adventage of it by recognising it and appealing to it ( Ruane
and Todd, 2004). This lagely explains why groups are turned on when appeals are
made on durable cultural values by the elites for particular political ends. Insofar as
elites are able to manipulate ethnic values or cultural symbols should also underpin the
importance of those cultural values and how they matter to the community in
question .If the cultural values do not matter to a community, elites would not succeed
easily in using them as political resources to create political identity. Some
constructivists opined that it is practicable to ‘deconstruct’ certain ideas, stereotypes,
concepts, even history to create room for trust and understanding among ethnic groups
that are in conflict. In conrast to primordialiism, constructivists do not see ethnicity to

30
be conflict-ridden/ladden, rather, that ethnicity originates from social relationship
between agents, structures as well as institutions, They conceieve that shared history of
ethnic groups is a myth or could be invented and reinvented (Kaufman, 2001), to the
extent that constructed identities could become internalized or institutionalized to make
meaning to groups and evoke similar emotions as would primordial identities (Smith,
1993).
This could be a useful instrumental force toward reinventing ethnicity and ethnic
identity in positive ways that could promote common history and diffuse sterotypes,
biases, mutual fear and suspicion and diminish negative ethnicity especially in deeply
divided societies with cultural and ethno-religious differences: differences that could be
managed and harnessed for socio-political development.

2.2. Ethnic conflict politics and communal conflicts

As suggested in Chapter 1, eEthnic cConflict is a social phenomenon arisinginvolves

ethnic group adversaties and arises from incompatible group interests (Mclean and
McMillan, 2003). It arises from claims and contestations regarding competitive
resources, statuses and value in society (Okoli, 2013). Causes of ethnic conflict are
diverse and varied. Esman (1977) pointed some of the factors that induced Scottish
nationalism which could also account for the escalation of ethnic conflict and
grievances in the western world; which also could condition the inducement of ethnic
consciousness in other places of the world. To him Ethnic conflict results from
Grievances emanating from perceived political deprivation, economic and cultural
deprivation compared to other ethnic groups in the country as well as the waning
effectiveness and authority of the political centre owing to its failure to deliver public
goods to the citizens. Okoli (2013) and Renwick and Swinburn (1980) pinpointed
ecological, cultural, political and/or ideological factors as causes of ethnic conflict.
Communal conflict is a social conflict that relates to a group in a society
(Alimba, 2014:183). It is a community-based conflict principally arising from
competition, claim and contestations over communal values (e.g, Azoonwu, 2002; Oboh
and Hyande, 2006). The community in this context could be a clan, a town, a sect, or an
ethnic group (Alimba, 2014). Values in contention may be land, territorial water for

31
fishing or farmland (Alimba, 2014). More elaborately, communal conflict can be
referred to:
…a state of incompatibility that emanates from a commonly
shared or used property or resources by a group or groups in a
society. It occurs within or between groups that are defined by
some form of social ties over resources that are jointly owned or
shared on a community. Communal conflict arises when two
distinct groups in a community disagree over jointly shared
resources due to possibility of inequitable distribution or the
problem of domination by a group (Alimba, 2014:184).
The bone of contention in any communal conflict can be real or imaginary. In
this regard, communal contenders may be fighting merely over claims that have no
tangible existence, only in prospect of future stake-holding (Okoli, 2013). The scope
and dimension of communal conflict varies depending on the loans of the conflict. In
this regard, it can be inter-community or intra-community (Almba, 2014). Communal
conflicts can manifest in the forms of ethnic, ethno religious, sectarian, or clannish
conflagrations (Ngare, 2012).
In Nigeria, common patterns of communal conflict include inter-ethnic conflict,
inter-community (village) conflict, indigene/settler (host/strange) conflict, herder/farmer
conflict, sectarian conflicts based on religious affiliation or caste systems, to mention
but the most prominent one’s (cf. Okoli and Alelhe, 2014). The contradictions of
communal conflicts in Nigeria has over the years given rise to internecine violence,
leading to catastrophic humanitarian consequences and complications (Okoli and
Atelhe, 2014).

2.3. Ethnicity, nationalism and identity politics

Ethnicity is a socio-political consciousness that acquires its saliency in the context of

inter-group competition, especially in polities that are inclined towards primordial
politicking. In a typical primordial polity, especially in the global south, ethnicity has
become a veritable factor of identity politics (Esman, 1977); and to Mach (1993), ethnic
identity in its nationalistic expression, can no longer be neglected or ignored. In this
context, ‘ethnic identity has become a source of pride rather than shame to members of

32
minority groups. Consequently, ethno-regional interests have been politicized to the
point that ‘statesmen can no longer afford to neglect them’ (Esman, 1977: 389).
Ethnic identity from the point of view of its nationalistic expression, to Mach,
‘does not have a pejorative meaning which it often acquires in common language’
(1993:101).This expression acquires meaning when groups seek to enhance or preserve
its socio-cultural identity and well-being in the face of subjugation which could lead to
negative ethnic consciousness and identity politics. It also requires effective ‘managers
of identity’, that is local or national leaders who harness ethnic identities to their
political interests.
Moreover, identity politics arises where the boundaries of ethnic and civic
identification/or loyalty fail to coincide (Glazer, n.d) .In this regard, groups may
capitalize on the existing primordial particularities and solidarities to forge a sub-
national cleavage that negate national allegiance (Nash 1989). This often begets a
tendency toward sub-nationalism, marked by obvious contradiction between civic and
primordial ties (Geertz, 1963). In the words of Geertz ‘it is this crystallization of a direct
conflict between primordial and civil sentiments - this longing not to belong to any
other group- that gives rise to the problem variously called tribalism (ethnicism),
parochialism, communalism, and so on…’ (1963:32).
As a sub-national identity, ethnicity erodes inclusive nationalism and negates the
prospect of sustainable national integration in the developing nations (Eriksen 1993).
Much as being a veritable catalyst for identity politics, ethnicity has also been a critical
driver and ‘complicator’ of identity-based or communal conflict in less developed
countries. But the problem of ethnicity is not entirely peculiar to the developing nations.
According to Esman (1977:387):
Ethnic particularism never died nor was it ever entirely dormant in the modern
industrialized world. Flemish protest divided the Belgium polity during the
interwar years. Basque and Catalan demands for autonomy were features of
Spanish republican politics in the 1990’s. French Canadian nationalist
maintained their defensive struggle for autonomy on their Quebec homeland. At
the apogee of empire, the United Kingdom was preoccupied with Irish
nationalism, and an insurrection culminated in the separation of most Ireland.
Although ethnicity, as a socio-political problem, has been evident even in the
developed world, its pattern of manifestation has significantly varied between the
developed and developing nations (Esman, 1977). In effect, whereas the manifestation
33
of ethnicity follows the logic of self-determination in the advanced countries, it has
more or less betrayed the pattern of elite manipulation in the developing nations (Laitin,
1986). In this context, ethnicity becomes an instrument of selfish political mobilization
by the desperate political entrepreneurs who often ‘found it cheaper to organize people
on the basis of their ethnic identities than on the basis of their class identities’ (Laitin,
1986:100).
So, while the problematic of ethnicity in the west might be understood from the
perspective of theories of nationalism (Gellner, 1994; Mach, 1993), the ethnic question,
in the Global South, particularly in Africa and parts of Asia, can best be conjectured
from the prism of communo-primordial construction and manipulation. According to
Nash (1989:4-5):
Whatever the subjective utility of ties may be, the cold social fact is that
primordial ties are like any other set of bonds, forged in the process of
historical time (and space), subject to shifts in men, ambiguities of
reference political manipulation, and vicissitudes of honour and
obloquy. The reality of ethnic identity, its content, and its boundary lines
– being a historical product and thus subject to change, redefinition, and
varied salience in the lives of members of the group – does not overcome
the insight that the binding blocks of ethnicity, defined as the self-
conscious group within a nation-stated, are virtually the same over time.
The fact that ethnic identity, and of course all forms of social identity, are
constructed (by political leaders) is a settled matter in the literature. For instance,
McDonald (1993:228) opines that ‘any question of identity is clearly dependent on the
social and political maps of the time, on the categories available for the making of
self/other or us/them boundaries, and on the particular salience of any one set of these
categories’. Elsewhere, McDonald (1993:6-7) more succinctly observes that:
Identities do not exist outside their making. Rather, they are socially
created in specific historical circumstances; though they may be reified
and perpetrated through all kinds of essentialist models.
The implication of the above citation is that ethnic identity is constructed and re-
constructed within specific historical time and space, and under varying socio-
ecological and material circumstances (cf. Nnoli, 1986). This further implies that any
meaningful attempt to understand the phenomenon of ethnicity, as a socio-political
problematic must recognize its putative, mutative and epiphenomenal character. In this
34
regard, it is possible to conjecture the roots and contours of ethnic crisis in Africa in
terms of contradictions of identity formation and transformation in the socio-political
context of elite opportunism. It is in this sense that the politicization of ethnicity and
ethnicization of politics in countries like Nigeria could be more meaningfully
understood.

2.4. Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa

The experience of ethnic conflict in Africa varies from one country to another. Yet
certain regular and irregular patterns could be discerned in respect of the occurrence of
ethnic conflict across these countries as noted by Horowitz that ‘ethnic conflicts
embody regularities and recurrent patterns that are, in principle, discoverable’ (1985:
xii). This sub-section briefly reviews a number of cases in Africa with a view to
decipher patterns of manifestation of ethnic conflict in those contexts.
Uganda: Uganda is composed of fairly diverse ethnicities which are separated
by historical and cultural experiences. Some of the important ethnic affiliations in
Uganda are Buganda, Banyoro, Acholi and Lango. The nationalist struggle for
independence brought to fore the differences between these groups. This state of affairs
was complicated by the power struggle between Milton Obote (a Lango leader) and
Mutesa (a.k.a Kabaka, a Buganda King) in the early 1960s. The former was elected
prime minister in 1962 while the latter was elected president in 1963 (Cocodia, n.d).
The power tussle between these two national leaders culminated in the sack of
Kabaka in 1966 by forces loyal to Obote. Kabaka was accused of being an ethnic
champion who sought the autonomy of the Buganda nationality during his reign. In
1971, Obote was overthrown by Idi Amin who was a great sympathizer of the Buganda
cause. Amin thus pursued tactical retribution against the Lango and Acholi groups in a
bid to entrench the hegemony of his ethnic nationality in Ugandan politics. This move
found expression in the selective extermination of non-Bugandans and antagonists of Idi
Amin in the famous Ugandan genocide of 1971-1979 (Sadowski, 1989).
South Africa: The ethnic composition of South Africa is skewed in favour of
the blacks who constitute over seventy percent (70%) of the population (Cocodia, n.d).
The rest of the ethnic/racial groups are whites, the coloured and the Asians (mainly
Indians). Among the black, the Zulu ethnicity constitutes the dominant stock. The

35
nationalist struggle for independence in that country saw the birth of Inkatha Freedom
party which represented the ethnic Zulus. The more dominant black party, the African
National Congress (ANC) however, maintained a clear lead. A clash occurred between
these two black parties in 1991, leading to inter-communal conflict confrontation that
followed party lines. This was a case of intra-ethnic conflict occasioned by the dialetics
of elite competition and manipulation (cf Kruger, 1993; Osahae and Suberu, 2005).
Cote d’Ivoire: Cote d’Ivoire is a typical instance of a multi-ethnic state in
Africa, having over sixty (60) ethnic nationalities (Cocodia, n.d). For three decades after
independence the country was led by a charismatic leader, Houphouet Boigny, who
through his personal charisma, ensured that the various ethnicities of the country were
carried along in the process of governance. Upon his death in 1993, Boigny left behind
a country critically exposed to ethnic tension and primordial pressures. Through ethnic
grand-standing and politicking the political elites that succeeded Boigny plunged Cote
d’Ivoire into morass of ethnic violence that culminated in civil unrest in the country in
the late 1990s.
Sudan: The Republic of Sudan has had a peculiar experience of ethnic conflict.
The Sudan’s experience of ethnic conflict was as a result of the dynamics of ethno-
racial polarization. The conflict was principally between the northward Arabs who are
predominantly Muslim and the Southward ‘Native African’ who are largely Christians
(Okeke, 1999). The conflict situation was complicated by ecological dynamics of the
country whose mainstay occupation is agriculture. The situation degenerated into
intense armed conflict wherein organized rebels and militants (some of which acted at
the instance of the state) confronted one another, leading to massive human casualties.
Ethnicity is the foremost bane of political stability and national integration in
Africa (Okoli, 2003). This assertion is better appreciated against the backdrop of the
scale and dimensions of ethnic conflict/violence in contemporary African states,
especially in the Sub-Saharan region. The crisis of ethnicity or ethno-nationalism
(Uduma, 2013) has manifested differently in different African states. In Uganda,
complications of ethnic conflict plunged the nation into a genocidal war that pitted the
ethnic groups against each other (Sadowski, 1998). The Ugandan incident (1971-1979)
resulted in selective ethno-massacre (ethnic cleansing) wherein about 500 persons were
killed. Similar incidents happened between the ethnic Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi
(1993-1998) and Rwanda (1994), also leading to high human causalities (Sadowski,
1998). In Somalia, the pattern of ethnic conflict was more pertinently parochial. It
36
started as inter-communal conflicts between different clans in the country (Tenuche,
2002). The situation later degenerated into intense arms bearing and arms struggle that
culminated in the dismemberment of Somalia nation and the collapse of its state
structures in the 1990s (Tenuche, 2002). In the case of Somalia, ethnicity and ethnic
conflict assumed the nature of clannishness. This was orchestrated by the parochially
oriented national elites who were motivated by sectarian designs.
Elsewhere in Africa, ethnic politics has manifested in the form of violent identity
politics/conflict. Cases in point include Ethiopia, Sudan and, to a reasonable extent
Nigeria (Ayokhai, 2013). The issue of identity becomes salient and politically potent
when it is used to advance group interests in the context of competitive struggles
(Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). In such contexts ethnicity has often inter-mixed with other
salient forms of social identity to provide pretexts for inter-communal
conflicts/violence.
Contemporary trends in ethnic conflicts in Africa suggest that ethnic violence
has tended to be occurring more rapidly and more profusely within ethnic groups
(Osinubi and Osinubi, 2006). In Nigeria for instance, there is a litany of such conflicts,
namely: Agulueri/Umuuleri conflict (Anambra State), Ezira/Mgbo conflict (Ebonyi
State), Ife/Modakeke conflict (Osun State), Zango-Kataf conflict (Kaduna State)
Hausa/Birom conflict (Plateau State), and so on (Osinubi and Osiunbi, 2006). One
significant attributes of intra-ethnic conflict is the fact that it tends to be more brutal and
violent (Asiyanbola, 2010). Secondly, such pattern of conflict appears to have the
tendency to last longer than inter-ethnic conflicts. This observation has been empirically
verified in Nigeria where most of the intra-ethnic conflicts in various parts of the
country have proven to be age-long and intractable. The prevalence of intra-ethnic
conflict in some states of Africa points to the fact that ethnic consciousness and divide
are constantly modified and reconstructed (Zagefka, 2009).
In Nigeria, ethnic conflict has also been complicated by religious divisions and
the fragility of national polity, the latter exacerbated by secessional conflicts and
religious-sectarian strife (Ngare, 2012). Consequently, ethnic conflict in this context has
often taken the form of regional-local ethno-religious or ethno-communal
conflagrations. Manifestations of this crisis include Christian/Muslim conflicts in the
North, as well as indigene/setter (host/strangers) conflicts in other regions analysed
below (Okoli and Atelhe, 2014).

37
 It is clear that seemingly endemic ethnic conflict in developing African societies
has many causes: the (still strong) legacies of traditional social divisions and identities;
the legacies of colonial past, especially the divisions created by the formation of
colonial political domains; strong legacies of post-colonial divisions and conflicts
fomented in the process of independence and nation-building; and finally, the internal
power struggles during which the divisive ‘ethnic politics’ was used by local and
national elites in their bids for recognition, power and economic resources. As
suggested above, these causal factors can be summarized in four points: (i) ethno-
religious identities belong to the traditional repertoires of identities that survived the
process of independence and nation-building; (ii) these identities – widely understood
and popular –are mobilized and managed by local and national elites – the key leaders
of parties, factions and/or social movements that conduct ‘ethnic politics’; (iii) the key
motivations of these leaders-managers is political advantage or, as it is often said,
desperation of the political elites for power and resources. There is also an important
fourth point that emerges from this short and admittedly superficial comparison: (iv)
where political elites manage to achieve consensus – as it happened in South Africa as a
result of the political ‘pact’ between Mandela and De Klerk in 1994 – the ethnic conflict
is effectively ‘contained’. It is no longer a threat to political order; it is effectively
managed by political elites, and it loses its disruptive impact.

Part 2.

2.5. Theoretical dDebates on ethnicity elites and ethnic conflict

The phenomena of ethnicity, ethnic division and ethnic conflict have been interrogated
by scholars in the contesxt of numerous theories, and in research involving political
elites in developed and developing societies
over the years. The developed/indudtrialized and developing societies have seen
the intensification of grievances and demands expressed in ethnic terms and generating
‘politicised ethnicity’ (Esman 1977:372, Horowitz 1985: 97). This has given rise to an
avalanche of views and perspectives that treat ethnicity as a topic relevant to studies in
both developed and developing societies, and as an aspect of social division that lends
itself to both ‘primordial’ and ‘constructivist interpretations. All these approaches

38
emphasise the importance of collective identities and self-definitions of social actors,
but they differ in the views on how these identities and self definitions are generated
and maintained.
To begin with, it is pertinent to state that ethnicity, is a cultural consciousness
(Nnabuihe, Aghemalo and Okebugwu, 2014), as well as a social construct (Zagefka,
2009). According to Zagefka (2009:230), there is nothing ‘primordial’ about ethnic
demarcation lines; ethnic cleavages are socially constructed by a practice that can be
analysed and deconstructed’. Arguing from the point of view of social construction,
Mach (1977:106) maintained that ‘social reality is constructed by those who have power
in order to secure and maintain their position’.
To appreciate the essence of ethnicity and ethnic conflict as realities that
are socially constructed, an understanding of social construction is germane. In this
respect, Gergen (1999) observes that social constructionism imply:
… a range of dialogues centred on social genesis of what we take to be
knowledge, reason and virtue on the one hand and the enormous range
of social practice born and/sustained by these discourses on the other. In
its critical moment social constructionism is a means of bracketing or
suggesting any pronouncement of the real, the reasonable, or the right;
in its generative moment, constructionism offers any orientation toward
creating new futures, an impetus to societal transformation.
Thus, the kind of ethnic orientation ‘which gives rise to ethnic conflict can
depend on the context in which people form their consciousness and, particularly, on the
other ethnic groups which they recognize as existing in that context’ (Mclean and
McMillan, 2003:117). The consciousness of ethno-identity in the context of inter-ethnic
relations is therefore, what gives rise to ethnicity and ethnic conflict (Asiyambola, 2010;
Tenuche, 2002). The implication of this is that ethnicity is essentially a situational
phenomenon. In the view of Stavehaje (cited in Ake, 2000:97):
Conflicts between ethnic groups are not inevitable nor are they
eternal. They arise out of specific historical situations, are
molded by particular and unique circumstances , and they are
constructed to some certain interests by idealists and ideologies,
visionaries and opportunists, political leaders and ethnic power
brokers of various kinds.

39
 The circumstantial essence of ethnicity implies that ‘It is neither absolute nor
immutable, nor is it inherently destructive’ (Osinubi and Osinubi, 2006:102). It also
implies that ethnicity derives its substance and saliency in the context of the historical
and political experiences of the people (Nnoli, 1978; Cornell, 2001; Mark Suzman,
1999; Gellner Ernest, 1983; Osinubi and Osinubi, 2006). In a seminal work by Osaghae
and Suberu, the contexts for ethnicity and ethnic conflicts include the following:
i. Sharp and often overlapping cultural cleavages;
ii. Historical pre-colonial and colonial conflict legacies;
iii. Competition for highly valued, but relatively scarce, resources, including
land, new administrative boundaries and headquarters, bureaucratic and
political placement, infrastructures trading opportunities, and other
goods.
iv. Actual and perceived horizontal inequalities in access to diverse
resources.
v. State failure or mismanagement of inter-ethnic relations (Osaghae and
Suberu, 2005:15).
In the light of the above observations by Osaghae and Suberu, ethnic conflict
can be understood as political competition for power and resources in the context of
deep-seated inter-ethnic cleavages un-mediated by the state (Aapenguo, 2010; Bates,
1983). Underscoring the political essence of ethnic conflicts in African Aapengnuo
succinctly observes:
In fact, ethnicity is typically not the driving force of African
conflicts but the lever used by politicians to mobilize supporters
in pursuit of power, wealth, and resources. Ethnic thinking and
mobilization generally emerge from inequitable access to power
and resources and not from an intrinsic hatred’ arising from
inter-ethnic prejudices, the later often manipulated by the key
political actors (2010:1).
The thinking in this regard is that politicization of ethnicity and ethnicization of
politics in some African politics hasve been the basis of the prevalence of ethnic
conflicts in those contexts (Okoli and Okpaleke, 2013).

2.6. Ethnic conflict and ethnic politics

40
The dominant understanding of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in the literature suggest that
these phenomena seldom have independence existence and substance (Nnoli, 1978;
1994; Jega, 2003; Tenuche, 2002). They only take their meaning and salience in the
context of societal relations and are largely defined and redefined by forces of history
and social existence (Jega, 2003). In other words, the problematique of ethnicity is a
socio-historical construct that derives its salience in the political dynamics of a plural
society (Cornell, 2001; Diamond, 1983; Brass, 1991; Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Gagnon,
1994; Gur, 1994). In other words, ethnicity and ethnic conflict are to be understood as a
product of elite politicking (Snyder, 2000; Okoli and Orinya, 2013).
The political saliency of ethnicity derives from its premium value as an
instrumentality of civil mobilization, primordial politicking, elite management and
manipulation, and regime maintenance. These essences of ethnicity must be properly
contextualized in order to appreciate the political significance of ethnicity, as well as the
‘uses’ of ethnic divisions in elite power struggles.
The subjective and instrumental nature of ethnicity has been adequately
emphasized in the leading Western literature (Cohen, 1974; Rex, 1986; Hutchinson and
Smith, 1996; Eriksen, 2010; Horowitz, 1998). What could be taken away from these
literature is the fact that ethnicity is an identity question whose essence and import have
been largely situationally determined. In effect, ethnicity has been both constructed and
deconstructed to suit varying political exigencies in keeping with the dynamics of
political expediency in the context of elite’s political relations.This has been the case in
contemporary Nigeria where ethnicity has been a veritable instrument of elite
politicking and manipulation (Noli, 1978).

2.6. Ethnic politics and democracy

The link between democracy and ‘ethnic politics’ has also been established in the
academic literature. The thinking in this direction is that democracy or democratization
tends to promote conditions for the activation of ethnic politicking and crisis. According
to Ukiwo:
The interface between ethnicity and democratization is found in
absence of effective citizenship and good governance in post
transition societies. In the circumstance that democracy does not
41
 go beyond the conduct of multiparty elections to include
improvement in the quality of life of the people, there is
frustration and people who already feel alienated from the state
are vulnerable and likely to be mobilized around counter-elites
who exploit extant popular alienation from the state by whipping
up sectarian sentiments (2003:120).
The significance of the above citation is that lack of effective democracy
facilitates ethnicity and ethnic conflict by prompting the culture of recourse to civil
mobilization. In the course of such mobilization, therefore, ethnic consciousness is
activated and utilized to advance politico-partisan purposes (Cocodia. n.d; Nnoli, 1978).
In this circumstance, conflicts arising from inter-ethnic differences are likely to occur.
This has been the experience in many African states where ethnicity has been the bane
of sustainable democratization (Nnoli, 1994).

2.7. Ethnic politics and political elites

Another important link identified by contemporary students of ‘ethnic politics’ is

between the characteristics of political elites and such important political outcomes as
social-political stability and/or regime type (e.g. Higley and Burton 2006). Deeply
divided elites, which form the majority of political elites and almost all elites in
developing societies, it is suggested, form unstable political regimes that oscillate
between being repressive and chaotic. Conflicts in such societies often involve elite-
fuelled and elite-mobilised ‘ethnic politics’. Elites that achieve a degree of ideological-
programmatic unity, mainly by excluding and suppressing opposition, form dictatorial
regimes: stable but repressive. They can contain ethnic conflicts and direct ‘ethnic
politics’ into more peaceful and controlled path. Only a minority of elites manages to
achieve a procedural consensus – an agreement about the norms of political competition
and rules of political rivalry – and only such elites are capable of forming stable
democratic regimes, in which ‘ethnic politics’ is largely regulated and superceded by
interest-based politics (some call it ‘class politics’). Consensual elites, in other words,
elites are capable of managing major ethno-religious divisions and conflicts in the way
that does not threaten the social fabric and national unity.

42
 Most of developing societies have divided political elites. Such elites can
occasionally stabilize social and political order by various political deals and temporary
‘political truces’ that allow them to sustain their domination and maintain political
order. If they manage to build effective organizational domination – which is equivalent
to having the effective and ‘deep reaching’ state administration – they manage ethnic-
religious conflict with minimum violence. If not, violent conflicts and supressions are
frequent and expected. So are communal conflicts fomented by local elites seeking
recognition (inclusion into elite ranks), political influence, as well as economic and
political privileges (their ‘cut’ of resources). In such a situation the lines of political
divisions and conflicts become extraordinarily complex. We comment on these aspects
of ethnic division and communal conflicts in the next chapter.
Ethnic activation and contestation in the conflict of civil mobilization often take
the form of proto-nations/ethno-nationalist movements (Eriksen, 1993), or ethno-
nationalism (Uduma, 2013). From the standpoint of its nationalistic expression,
ethnicity does not and should not convey a perjortive sense when an ethnic group seeks
to ‘preserve or enhance a peoples’s national or cultural identity when that identity is
threatened’ (Mach, 1977:101), and this should not be understood as repression or
dormination of other groups. The implication of the citation is that ethnicity can be
positive or negative. It is positive when it emphasizes ‘love and trust for ones ethnic
group’, emotional tie to one’s ethnic group’ and obligation and responsibilities’ relating
to membership to an ethnic group with which a person identifies (Jega, 2003:11-23).
But it is negative when it is used to promote parochial divisiveness, hatred, distrust,
animosity and group closure, (in the form of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ divide) (Uduma,
2013:33). Suffice it to note that ethnicity in Africa has largely generally manifested as a
negative phenomenon (Nnoli, 1978). According to Uduma (2013:33), ‘it generally
presents a scenario where people identify with and see themselves first as a member of a
particular nationality before identifying themselves with the ‘nation’ (in the sense of
state). This gives rise to the untoward trend of centrifugal nationalism based on
primordial sentiments and attachment (Tamuno, 1970).
A dominant perspective in the extant academic literature holds that ethnicity and
ethnic conflict are manifestation of the contradictions of ‘ethnic politics’ or ‘identity
politics’ in Africa (Rex, 1996; Coleman in Geertz, 1963; Jega, 2003; Iwara, 2004;
Duruji 2010; Uduma, 2013; Ayokhai, 2013). This results in the ‘complex web of
politically salient identities and a deeply divided state in which major political issues are
43
vigorously- some would say violently- contested along the lines of the complex, ethnic,
religious and regional divisions’ (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005:4). In this regard, ethnicity
becomes an important avenue for the mobilization and politicization of primordial
identities in such a manner that precipitates crisis (Ayokai, 2013; Uduma, 2013; Geertz,
1973).
From the standpoint of the Nigerian experience, Coleman observed that
Nigerians display five different types of identities simultaneously for they are seen as
Nigerians, African, regional, cultural and group(Coleman in Geertz, 1963:29) This
divided loyalties makes the country abnormally given to ‘serious disaffection based on
primordial attachment’ (Geetrtz, 1963:30). Similarly, Duruji (2010) observes that
identity politics has been one of the most critical impediments of national integration
and stability in the country. According to him ‘since Nigeria’s return to democracy in
1999, there has been growing concern about the rise of identity politics, especially
negative forms of identity politics and pressures for de-nationalization of the state’
(cited in Uduma, 2013:33). Ethnicity in this context assumes immense vitality and
salience as an instrument of primordial politicking and mobilizing. This shifts the
people’s allegiance from the state and circumvents popular identification thereby
creating the basis for centrifugal nationalism in the country (Okoli, 2003; Nnoli, 1978).
The experience is more or less common across Africa where ethnicity tends to have
become more salient than national civic mode of consciousness (Osaghae and Suberu,
2005).
Identity politics has always been a key issue in analyses of Africal politics
(Tamuno, 1970; Cocodia, n.d). According to Cocodia (n.d:12) ‘analysis of ethnic
conflicts in Africa (should) revolve around the largely heterogeneous states comprised
of communal contenders, with each group seeking power, control, and importance over
the other’. In effect, social and political diversities in the context of heterogeneous
polities often lead to contradictory claims and contestations among socio-political
groups in a manner that engenders conflict (Thomson, 2000). This explains most of the
ethnic conflict situations in contemporary Africa. This perspective on ethnic conflict
becomes more plausible when it is considered in the developing states (Okoli and
Okpaleke, 2014). In respect of Nigeria, Tamuno (1970:564) attributes the incidence and
prevalence of ethnic crisis to:
The country’s heterogeneous ethnic composition, cultural
diversity, vast size, difficulties of transport and communications,
44
 varied administrative practices and constitutional arrangements,
besides all the problems connected with the introduction of
federalism, personality clashes between Nigerian leaders before
and after independence, and the absence of a strong ideological
magnet.
The scenario painted in the above citation exists in many Africa states. The
picture is complicated by the fact that most states in Africa lack the virtue of relative
autonomy that could enable them moderate the contradictions arising from the
characteristic political diversity of their polities (Nnoli, 1994). This makes ethnic
politicking – the domain of elite power contestation – extremely important in such
contexts.
There is a debate in the literature regarding the origin of ethnicity and ethnic
conflict in the developing countries. The thrust of the debate has given rise to what we
may term the ‘imperialist’ and ‘nationalist’ perspectives (see Sadowski, 1998; Osinubi
and Osinubi, 2006). The nationalist perspective holds that ethnicity and ethnic conflict
are the creations of colonialism. According to this perspectives, various ethnic groups in
the pre-colonial era co-existed harmoniously with little or no pronounced conflicts;
these ethnic groups were historically divided and polarized in the course of colonialism
in such a manner that has made their relations both contradictory and conflictual (cf.
Cocodia, n.d). On the other hand, the imperialist perspective attributes the incidence of
ethnic conflict in post–colonial societies to their pre-colonial heritage of inter-ethnic
strife. The argument in this regard is that most of these societies had a long history of
inter-group hatred and strife prior to the advent of colonialism. The colonialists tried ‘to
make a nation-state out of a hotchpotch of antagonistic and uncivilized African peoples
but failed in their mission’ (Cocodia, n.d. 13). Consequently as soon as the colonial
power left, these societies plunged into barbarism: an inter-ethnic vendetta that is
reminiscent of the primitive state.
It is important to note that some of the instances of long-standing ethnic conflicts
in contemporary world have strong colonial nexus. They have been inspired by the
commissions and omissions of the colonial masters who only paid lip-service to the
issue of national integration in those colonies. Yet, it is also important to note that the
political elites in the post-colonial era have complicated situation through their political
excesses. In the light of this, Sadowski (1998:13) observes that ‘most ethnic conflicts
are expressions of ‘modern hate’ and largely products of the twentieth century’.
45
 Ethnic conflict in contemporary polities has also been seen in the literature as
something that has to do with strategic statecraft nd nation building. A work by Brown
(1985) sees ethnicity and ethnic crisis as a means of generating what he termed ‘siege
legitimacy’ in plural societies. According to him, ‘One well-known strategy is for the
government leaders to invoke externally based threats or crisis of internal subversion,
furthering their own political dominance and enhancing their legitimacy by promoting a
sense of siege’ (Brown, 1985: 988). Ethnic manipulation, therefore, becomes a means to
an end in this context. The strategic utility of this venture is to foster political legitimacy
for a regime by playing on siege mentality. As Brown succinctly remarked:
Having linked external and internal elements so as to generate a
specter of social disaster, a government leader can then hope to
convince the populace that the society is a garrison under siege,
which must now rally behind its leader if it is to survive. The
proclamation of such a crisis like this justifies the argument that
criticism of the regime must now be suspended. Commitment to
the society and its survival are thereby equated with support for
the government (1985:989).
The implication of the above citation is that a political leaders bent on regime
preservation can create a sense of ethic crisis among the populace with a view to
capitalize on that to galvanize popular goodwill and support for his government. When
this is achieved, they would have gained ‘siege legitimacy’ for their regime by utilizing
ethnicity and ethnic crisis as a strategic tool. This observation affirms the position of
Aapenguo (2010:1) to the effect that ethnicity is a ‘tool’ of strategic politicking. It also
affirms the instrumentalist view that ethnicity is merely a means to an end. As opined
by Diamond (1983:460), we must understand the emergent class forces that expressed
ethnicity in political terms and used it for class ends’.

2.8. Political elites – a theoretical view

Political elites, sometimes referred to as ‘ruling minorities’, ‘ruling classes’ ‘political

elites’ or ‘power elites’, as Putnam (1976:ch.1), as well as Higley and Burton
(2006:ch.1) remind us, are not only the most powerful groups forming in all organized
societies, dominating societies, and safeguarding their privileges, but also the key social
and political actors managing conflicts and competitions for key resources and
46
sustaining hierarchical social order (from which they benefit). Because they are
dominant groups, elites manage social conflicts and competitions in the way that benefit
them and that serve their vital power interests. Elite power is anchored in wealth as well
as major organisations, especially the state, its key instrumentalities, major political
organisations and movements, and major corporations. Elites use the power resources of
these organisations, their status/prestige (often referred to as ‘cultural capital’ and
‘distinction’), as well as their intrernal (intra-elite) cohesion and consciousness. From
our point of view, the key role of elites is the management of multiple social conflicts
that ‘naturally’ appear in complex societies. Mobilisation, containment and – generally
– ‘management’ of ethnic conflicts is thus the important part of elite activities. Before
we elaborate on this view, let us cast a glance on the classical and contemporary elite
theory, especially these theoretical tenets that are relevant to explaining the nexus
between elite types and the key political outcomes, such as political stability and
instability, political harmony and political (including ethnic) conflict.

2.9. Elite theory, elite perspective and elite-centred research

The ‘classical elite theory’ was the brain child of the early twentieth century critics of
‘democratic illusions’, especially believes in the rule ‘by the people’. It emerged as a
reaction to the crises that engulfed and shook the foundation of Europe’s socio-political
formation and order, and as the critical rebuttal of Marxist socialism. Unlike Marxism,
elite theory is critical of economic determinism and skeptical of promises of egalitarian
end point in human development. Its originators, Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941); Vilfredo
Pareto (1848-1923); Robert Michels (1876-1941) and Max Weber (1876-1920),
preferred the term ‘leadership groups’. The early elite theorists emphasized that in every
complex society power is always concentrated in the hand of a tiny minority who
determine political, economic and social outcomes and stresses the inevitability of elites
as elaborated by Mosca, Pareto, Michels and also Max Weber who attributed the
inevitability of elites to the ‘law of small numbers: that organized minorities were better
placed in power competition and rational decision-making.
The concept of elite(s), contrasted with non-elites, appears in many semantic
forms: ‘power elite’, ‘political elite’, ‘ruling class’ ‘ruling minority’ leadership group’.
The term ‘elite’ originally connoted ‘choice goods’ and ‘the cream of society’ To J.S.
Mill, ‘elites’ constituted the most influential parliamentarians and party leaders. The
47
concept gained its current meaning – as synonym of the main decision-makers, the most
powerful groups, the key (mainly national) political actors in the late 19th and early
20th century It gained wide popularity through the works of some Europeans liberals
such as Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels, Max Weber and Joseph
Schumperter. It was further promoted by C.W.Mills, whose book on American ‘Power
Elite’ gained enormous popularity.
Robert Michels (1911/1962) portrayed the modern elites as ‘ruling oligarchies’
that is inevitable. Michel maintains that every social organization is characterized by a
law which he called the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ and by this he means that behind every
organized social structure lay the tendency for the emergency of elites. To him
organization and oligarchy are two sides of the coins that go together. All organizations
both in terms of political parties and the state are guarded by the oligarchic logic formed
in a pyramid structure. The majority that constitutes the masses are at the base while
minority oligarchs at the top take the lead. In the same vein, Max Weber (1978:1393-
1462) emphasized the small number of ‘leaders’ by describing them as the ‘ruling
minority’ that control the top executive positions both in political parties and the state.
He situated the elites at the political and administrative cadre of modern state. Such
‘neutral terms’ as ‘ruling minority’ and ‘leadership group’ were used by Weber to
designate the ‘state-based elites’ described as network of bureaucratic officials, party
leaders, and influential parliamentarians.
Schumpeter extended the meaning of the term to ‘captains of the industry’ and
leading entrepreneurs. He also made elite/leadership competition the basis of modern
elite democracy Contemporary power elites lwere analysed by Robert Putnam, (1976)
who saw them as the ‘power apex’, the key incumbents on the ‘pyramid of power’. This
apex included the top executive (power) positions in state-political, military, business,
media, and other powerful organizations. By virtue of their power positions, internal
cohesion, and high status, elite members are able not only to defend their power
interests, but also to ‘affect major political outcomes usually at the level of national
states, regularly and substantially’ (Higley and Burton, 2006:7) .
The elite formation in any society is characterized by what has been designated
by James Meisel as the ‘three C’s’: cohesion, conspiracy and (group) consciousness
(Meisel, 1962:4). Other characteristics of elites have been well highlighted by
‘classical’ elite theorists and political sociologists (see Pareto, 1935; Mosca, 1939;
Mills, 1956; Bottomore, 1995). They stress that political elites gradually turn into
48
‘organisational elits’ in the sense of using organizational power resources and
organizing themselves into relatively cohesive ‘power networks’.
Our attention is restricted to ‘political elites’ or ‘power elites’ in a narrower
sense of the word: to state-based political elites, in line with the general academic usage
and political research. Moreover, we refer throughout to political elites on national and
sub-national levels, in the way such elites have been studied in the context of sub-
saharan Africa (e.g., Smythe and Smythe, 1960; Cole, 1975; and in particular
Fukuyama, 2014; and Daloz, 2016). The new studies of African elites stress their
diverse organizational basis (often ‘ethno-tribal’), informalism, and strong clientelism in
relations with ‘non-elites’.
Contemporary elite researchers and theorists, especially those dealing with
African societies (like Daloz 2016), adopt what they call an ‘elite perspective’ or ‘elitist
paradigm’. It can be presented as four assumptions: (i) that power in all complex and
highly organized societies is highly centralized; (ii) that this centralization results in the
formation in all complex societies of political elites, that is distinct and relatively
cohesive ‘power minorities’ (including, as mentioned before, the top political power
holders, land-holders, business leaders, and other plutocrats); (iii) that political power is
exercised predominantly in a ‘top down’ manner; and (iv) that elites rule by using force,
manipulation and persuasion. That means that all political elites, even the most
autocratic ones, have to build effective ‘power coalitions’ with some non-elite
‘constituencies of support’, be it ethnic, religious, class, territorial, etc. This point is
strongly emphasized by contemporary students of African elites (e.g., Daloz 2016), who
point out that the highly ‘patrimonial’ and ‘clientelistic’ (patronage-based) African
elites remain in the fragile condition of ‘mutual dependency’ with their ‘client
constituencies’. Their political legitimacy and effectiveness depends on the regularly
‘delivering’ political patronage – a key factor in widespread and endemic corruption.
One can apply this ‘paradigmatic perspective’ to studies of the role played by
political elites in shaping social and political change. Thus Max Weber’s (1976) famous
studies of elite-directed ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ political modernization as directed and
managed by distinct ‘leadership groups’, can be extended to African politics and social
change. Weber’s studies also point to important aspects of change in elite composition,
structure and outlook during the process of modernization, in particular, state formation.
We must also mention here frequent misunderstandings and misconceptions
surrounding the concept of ‘elite’ and the elite-centered paradigmatic perspective. The
49
concept of ‘elites’ does NOT mean or imply arrogant exclusivism (as it happens in
populist rhetoric). Elitism does NOT exclude from the study the ‘non-elites’ – their
support for elites is always seen as a key condition of elite power and effectiveness.
Finally, studying of elites, and adopting the elitite perspective, does NOT imply
approval of elite domination or apologetic view of power elites (often brutal, corrupt
and dictatorial). In fact, most contemporary elite studies are critical of political elites:
their manipulative ruling, destructive conflict-fomenting, and their poor political
qualities (e.g., Daloz 2016; Pakulski 2016). Elite perspective simply means that
sociological research adopting the concept, and using the elite-theoretical framework,
pays attention to power elites and their dominant role, and that this research sees elites
as inevitable, dominant, and either effective (sustaining flexible social and political
order) or ineffective, political actors. The elite actors – the key incumbents of the
national and local power networks – determine the key political outcomes, including
private business and public policy decisions (Putnam, 1976; Agbo, 2010). They also
dominate the processes of political mobilization and all facets of politico-partisan
engineering, giving them definite characterization as the key political actors of society
(Agbo, 2010).
The elite concept is better understood by looking at this peculiar character of the
dominant power of elites in the developing nation visa-vis those of the advanced
political systems of the West. The elite formation in western political culture is
characterized by common ideology based on shared values and aspirations, on mutual
respect and respect for the key laws and conventions (Mclean and McMillan, 2003;
Fukuyama, 2016; Higley and Burton, 2006). Western elites historically managed to
achieve a high level of institutionalization (versus informalism), strong organizational
bases (versus weak institutions, high degree of professionalization (vs dilettantism), and
high level of consensual unity (versus divisions).
Contemporary elite theorists stress the importance of elite cohesion and unity.
Both are seen as variable. United elites are more capable of stable and effective
domination. Divided elites created unstable polities. Higley and Burton argue that ‘far
from stipulating the form that elites take, the inevitability contention stood simply as an
orientating proposition for theory and research: in all modern societies, political power
is necessarily concentrated in a few persons, but the configuration these persons form
vary importantly among societies and within them over time’ (2006:chs 1-2).

50
 Higley and Burton also ventured to build various typologies of contemporary
elites, as well as modify the key tenets of classical elite theory.
Two typologies that are prominently used by the 20 th century elite scholars to
typify dimension of elite variation is structural integration and the extent of value
consensus. The former involves the extent of symbiotic inclusiveness of both the formal
and informal communication networks and influence resources existing among the
different factions and persons constituting the political elite while the later relates to the
extent to which agreement on norms of political behavior and relative importance of
existing institutions of government is regarded by the different factions and persons
constituting the political elites. Most of these typologies make a distinction between
united and disunited (divided) elites. United elites are characterized by the existence of
well-connected networks of communication and influence resources that cohere with
core value agreement and existing code of political behavior among elite persons. The
contrary situation suffices when ‘persons and factions forming disunited elites are
clearly divided and separated from each other, they disagree fundamentally about
political norms and institution, and they adhere to no single code of political behavior’
(Higley and Burton, 2006:9). Unity of elites may have consensual character or it may be
imposed by one faction over the others. If it is consensual, elites are capable of building
liberal-democratic regimes. Elite consensus, in other words, is seen by Higley and his
collaborators as a sine-qua-non condition of liberal democracy.
The nexus between effective consensual elites and liberal democracy has
received appreciable attention by contemporary elite theorists such as Robert Dahl,
Giovanni Sartori, Juan Linz, Afred Stepan, Robert Putnam, Larry Diamond, Heinrich
Best and Jan Pakulski, Higley and Burton. Similarly, the claim that intra-elite divisions
and conflicts lead to unstable politics or non-democraic regimes has been widely
accepted. These points are important in the context of analyses of African countries, like
Nigeria, where political elites do not seem to have any semblance of group consensus.
Elite divisions in such countries can be temporarily bridged by elite pacts and ‘truces’,
but such stabilization lasts only as long as the leaders respects those pacts and deals. In
most countries, these respects for norms of political rivalry – and the accompanied
stability – are rare and short.
It is worth stressing some other tenets of contemporary elite theory. Elites not
only claim political power, but also excellence and distinction (Okoli, 2007). They are
also internally stratified. At the ‘core’ one finds the state-managing segment of political
51
elites that include the top executives in the state apparata, leaders of the major political
parties and movements (regional, religious, etc.), and – frequently – the top military
leaders. Around this ‘core’ form the power network consisting of top land- and
resource-holders, top wealth-holders, and leaders of all important and influential
organisations (whose resources the leaders command). All other members of society are
seen as ‘non-elites’. They are also stratified, but the major division remains between
elite and ‘the rest’. Elites use force and persuasion in order to maintain their
domination. They control entry to elite ranks, though occasionally they lose control over
their ‘social reproduction’, decay in their political qualities, and are replaced by
challenging ‘counter-elites’ who take their place.
Contemporary elite theory is interested in the nature, patterns and dynamics of
elite relations/politics in contemporary polities. It is also concerned with understanding
the conditions under which relations and circulations obtain. An important feature of the
theory is its aspectual and context specific approach to elite conception and analysis
(Higley, 2018). This perspective is evident in the manner that exponents have conceived
of allied concepts, such as elite relations and/or politics. Patterns of elite relations, and
of course, elite politics “vary considerably” across the political systems of the world
(Henry, 2018:181). Depending on how united or disunited national elites are, the
outcome of elite relations/politics tends to either centripetalism or centrifugalism. A
united national elite formation is characterized by ideological and consensual unity
(Higley and Burton, 2006). Table 2.1 puts these patterns of unity in perspective.

Table 2.3 Consensual Vs. Ideological Elite Unity

Consensual Unity Ideological Unity
 In spite of their ideological  There is a high level of ideological
differences, elite factions accord each conformity among the elites.
other significant level of trust and  Partisan differences are mediated by
solidarity. cross cutting ideological sodarity.
 Politics is positive sum.
Source: Adapted from Higley and Burton (2006:14).

In a disunited elite system, ‘structural integretation and value consensus are

minimal’ among the elites (Higley and Burton, 2006:14). To adapt from Higley and
Burton (2006:34), ‘these elites are clearly disunited in the sense that wide and deep

52
struggles for political ascendancy (typifies) their relations’. As aptly observed by Higley
and Pakulski (n.d:5), the struggles could be ‘Machiavellian’ or ‘Hobbessian’, depending
on the character of elite circulation in place. It is apparent that the pattern that prevails
in most states of Africa in the post-colonial era is Hobbessian elitism.
Contemporary thinking in elite theory recognizes the vital role of the political
elites in influencing the character of political regimes. According to Higley (2018:27),
the dynamics of elite relations and politics affect ‘the basic stability and instability of
political regimes’ as well determine ‘the forms and workings of political institutions and
the main policies of government’. The implication of this is that both development and
stability of a nation is to a large extent dependent on the character and dialectics of elite
politics.

2.10. Political elites in Nigeria

With reference to the issue of ethnic politics and conflict in Africa, it is to be observed
that such pacts or agreements among political elites are rare. More typical are divided
elites and conflictual relations among their members (factions). Divided elites, in turn,
inflame social and political conflicts by mobilizing factional support by using ethno-
religious appeals and by discriminating in distribution of resources, and by exerting
ethno-specific patronage. Elite divisions, in other words, exacerbate social and political
divisions.
The African elites differ dramatically from their Western counterparts (Daloz
2016). They are divided politically and ideologically, and therefore form unstable
political regimes. Nigerian state-based central political elite also belong to the ‘divided’
elite type, but with the specific characteristic: they periodically and temporarily manage
to settle or overlook their conflict and stabilize politics through peaceful – though not
trustful – collaboration. In Nigeria access to political power is limited and the different
segments and factions are excluded from ruling and do not have regular and reasonable
access to decision making and more often than not presents ideologically disunited
elites with its attendant conflicts and breakdown of regimes/political system. Inclusion
policies in Nigeria lacks responsible government behavior and inclusivity which to a
good extent generate authority structure that are amenable to coercion, corruption,
patronage, in-formalism as well as chaotic application of rule of law which has
inexorably widened ethno-regious division and diversity. This goes to say that while
accepting the inevitability of elites, elitism subject elites to the crucibles of
53
effectiveness, efficiency and excellence test and ask why elites fail and succeed across
societies in different time.

How does the contemporary elite theory apply to the analysis of Nigeria’s elite
formation and elite-driven politics? Basically, the divisions within the Nigeria’s national
elite(s) extend also to local elites. These local elites are fractured along multiple lines
(discussed earlier).. Nonetheless, they are bound by some sort of pragmatic solidarity
which is fragile, partisan than ideological (Okoli, 2003). Beyond being nominally
conscious of elite identity and being bound by conspiratorial quest for power, Nigerian
political elites feel insecure, and this insecurity, typical for all divided elites, make them
defensive in political realm. They are ready to defend their (constantly challenged and
threatened) power interests by mobilizing ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’, regional and communal
politics. Thus, in Nigeria, frequent ‘breakdowns of democratic regimes result from
uncontainable ethnoregional conflicts; but in most the breakdown, this was a direct
consequence of unrestrained power struggles among disunted elites’( Higley and
Burton, 2006: 50).
This statement paves the way for our synthetic view that brings together the
ethic and elite theoretical tenets. In this view, political elites – national and local – use
‘ethnic politics’ to secure and prop-up their power. ‘Ethnic politics is thus seen not only
as an articulation of persisting ethno-religious divisions, and as a symptom of weak
‘nation-formation’, but also as a tool of elite power competition, as a means for dealing
with the key problem of uncertainty and political insecurity.
To conclude this (theoretical) part: The elite manipulation of ethnic conflict is
widely recognized in the contemporary political sociology. (Putnam, 1976; Diamond,
1985; Higley and Burton 2006). In this context, ethnicity and ethnic conflict are to be
understood as a product of elite ‘politicking’, that is, ‘normal’ and routine management
of social divisions and accompanied conflicts by the key power-holders. This
management can be successful in the sense of producing stable order and minimizing
violent repression, or it can be unsuccessful: result in endemic instability, open conflicts
and frequent violence (Etzioni-Haley, 1989; Okoli and Orinya, 2014; Snyder, 2000;
Cornell, 2001; Diamond, 1983; Brass, 1991; Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Gagnon, 1994;
Gur, 1994).
Some Marxist scholars, especially those following the ‘capitalist world system’
perspective (Wallerstein 1974), often embrace a slightly different view, sometimes
54
referred to as a ‘hegemonic theory’. It sees power as generated by structural
arrangements within the world system’, see the large ‘ruling classes’ (rather than
smaller organizational elites) as key ‘repositories of political power, and treat conflict
within and between societies as reflection of internal structural contradictions. These
contradictions pitch against themselves various coalitions of developed (‘core’)
countries against the developing (‘peripheral’) countries and regions. Internally, the
contradictions generate inter-ethnic and inter-class conflicts that tend to be endemic
among the developing societies in the peripheral regions of the world. The hegemonic
theory looks at the prevalence of ethnic conflict from the standpoint of contradictions of
democracy and civil order (Cocodia, nod). The thinking in this theory is that ethnic
conflicts are better managed by one-party systems wherein the hegemonic state in place
uses its coercive power to freeze inter-ethnic conflicts (Nkwi, 2001). In such hegemonic
situations, untoward expression of ethnicity is brought to a controllable magnitude. The
hegemonic ‘world system perspective’ lost its gloss and popularity following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, success of the Chinese state-capitalist path to prosperity,
and the success in unifying European states.
One may also mention two other broad theoretical perspectives that compete for
attention of scholars dealing with ethnic division and conflict: the S.C. ‘globalization
theory’ (or rather a broad analytic framework, a paradigmatic view of social processes
as increasingly inter-connected), and the equally broad family of ‘nation-building
theories’. The scholars embracing the framework of globalization point to the upsurge
of civilizational conflicts in the new world order following the demise of global
communism (Cocodia, n.d). This era of intense globalization – the growth of
interconnections of the economic, political, cultural-informational, and social nature –
has been characterized by rise in cultural movement and activism that often find
expression in ‘local’ ethnic conflicts. The latter are often seen as a ‘backlash’ against
intensifying globalization. The high incidence of ethnic conflict in Africa since the turn
of the 20th century is explained by a backlash against gradual drawing of various regions
into a ‘global network’ of trade, investment, labour movements and informational
circulation.
The ‘nation-building theories of ethnic division and conflict see these conflicts
as a part of the process whereby new states reinforce and spread national identities,
consciousness and political loyalties (e.g. Fukuyama 2014). Some see these processes in
Africa as a creation of colonialism (Nnoli, 1998). The argument is that the colonialists
55
created artificial boundaries and lumped together culturally diverse entities in the form
of arbitrarily drawn state boundaries. These entities were not properly integrated into a
pre-existing ethno-religious framework existing prior to independence. Moreover, the
newly created post-colonial states were weak, with ‘shallow’ administrative apparata
incapable of imposing effectively new national identities, incapable of creating new
state-national loyalties. Consequently, at independence, most African states were
plunged into the morass of ethnic struggles and violence (cf. Avugma, 2000). Such
perspective plays down the role of ‘primordial’ (traditional and entrenched) identities
and loyalties, and it stresses the importance of colonial domination and its political
legacies. The ‘primordialists’, by contrast, hold that ethnic conflict is a consequence of
political under-development and the accompanied tribal divisiveness among the pre-
colonial peoples of Africa (Avugma, 2000). The current ethnic conflicts are seen by
‘primordialists’ as legacies of pre-colonial past, as the result of unsuccessful (or
incomplete) modernizing development (Cocodia, n.d).
As mentioned earlier – and as elaborated in the next chapter – we see ethnic
identities, divisions and conflicts as fundamental aspects of political culture in all
developing states (Nnoli, 1978; Rex, 1996). They are old, but they are constantly
‘reproduced’ in the political realm, and they change their form in the process of elite
‘management’ of social and political divisions and conflicts. Thus we see no
contradiction between those theoretical perspectives that see ethnicity as a universal and
old aspect of social division, and those theories that treat ethnic identities and divisions
as ‘constructed’. Ethnicity is constantly socially constructed and reconstructed – mainly
by cultural segments of political elites. It is a phenomenon that derives its saliency from
competitive inter-group relations (Barth, 1998; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).
Manifestation and dynamics of ethnicity varies significantly from one country to
another depending on their national character and heritage (Geertz, 1993; Carmeli and
Eriksen, 1998).
This brief overview above suggest a synthesis between the mainstream theories
of ethnicity and ethnic identity, on one hand, and broadly viewed elite theory and
perspective. Before we apply this synthetic view to our analysis, though, we must look
at the most relevant literature on the topic, partly because some elements of such ethnic-
elitist perspective have already been present, and they need to be duly acknowledged.

Part 3.
56
2.11. Political elites and ethnic conflicts – a synthetic view

As suggested by some African political observers (e.g., Nnoli 1978), uUnderstanding

ethnic conflict in terms of political competition between the key political actors raises
critical issues regarding the character role of the state and the state-based political elites
in fomenting, prosecuting and settling ethnic conflicts. (Nnoli, 1978). Ethnic politics
appears in a different light: as an idiom of elite-spurred political mobilization. Such a
perspective has been already suggested by some students of politics, including African
students of African politics. Political elites, sometimes referred to as ‘ruling classes’ or
‘dominant groups’, as Putnam (1976:ch.1), as well as Higley and Burton (2006:ch.1)
remind us, are not only the most powerful groups forming in all organized societies,
dominating societies, and safeguarding their privileges, but also the key social and
political actors managing conflicts and competitions for key resources and sustaining
hierarchical social order (from which they benefit). Because they are dominant groups,
elites manage social conflicts and competitions in the way that benefit them and that
serve their vital power interests. Elite power is anchored in wealth as well as major
organisations, especially the state, its key instrumentalities, major political organisations
and movements, and major corporations. Elites use the power resources of these
organisations, their status/prestige (often referred to as ‘cultural capital’ and
‘distinction’), as well as their intrernal (intra-elite) cohesion and consciousness. From
our point of view, the key role of elites is the management of multiple social conflicts
that ‘naturally’ appear in complex societies. Mobilisation, containment and – generally
– ‘management’ of ethnic conflicts is thus the important part of elite activities. As
Ehnicity is said to be employed by political elites as an instrument of political
mobilization as well as a means of entrenching their political dominance (Putnam, 1976;
Diamond, 1983; Osinubi and Osinubi, 2006; Higley and Burton, 2006). As opined by
Nnabuihe et al (2014:161-162) note, ‘Ethnicity is the conversion of cultural differences
into the basis for political differentiation between people particularly in the context of
elite competition’. This includee elite management of ethnic conflict in Africa has been
elaborately underscored in the following lines:
ethnic consciousness and conflict occur when groups feel
threatened with loss of previously acquired privilege… the
present manifestation of ethnicity in Africa is an elite and class
57
 phenomenon where the community’s elites feel excluded by
another from control of economic and political power. They then
indoctrinate members of their ethnicity to believe that this is a
conspiracy by the whole community against another, which
should be violently resisted (Osinubi and Osinubi, 2000:104).

The attitude of the state has been also implicated as a factor in the incidence of
ethnic conflicts in many states. According to Aapengnuo (2010:2), ‘in many cases, the
political choices made by the states lay foundation for ethnic mobilization’. In other
words, ethnic conflicts often emerge when the bahaviour of the state is perceived as
dominated by a particular group or community within it, when communities feel
threatened with marginalization, or when no recourse for addressing grievances exists.
In this circumstance the state rather than be an arbiter, becomes an instigator or
promoter of ethnic conflicts and/or violence. This has been evidenced in some parts of
Africa where the state has helped in orchestrating ethnic conflicts by its commissions
and omissions (Osinubi and Osinubi, 2006; Howsbawn, 2013).
Emphasizing further the complicity of the state in promoting ethnic conflicts,
Aapengnuo (2010:2) righty observes:
In many cases, the political choices made by states lay the
foundation for ethnic mobilization. the other words ‘ethnic
conflicts often emerge in multi-ethnic, under-developed societies
when the behaviours of the state is perceived as dominated by a
particular group or community within it, when communities feel
threatened with marginalization (in that context as a result), or
when no recourse for redressing grievances exists (corroborating
Azor and Haddad, 1986
The implication of the above citation is that ethnicity and ethnic conflicts tend to
thrive in polities where state institutions and structures do not reflect and respect ethno-
religious diversity and inclusion, where ethnicity is ignored by state elites, where
minority right are not respected, and where there are no ample avenues for expressing
and addressing local grievances to national elites (Aapenguo, 2010; Esman, 1977). In a
context like this, the perception of injustice, insecurity and exclusion that often fuel
ethnicity and ethnic mobilization is appreciably heightened – and directed by local

58
agents (local elites) against the more central political agents, the top leaders and
‘managers’ of the state (national political elites).
More importantlyAccording to some political observers, sub-national ethnic
consciousness prevails in polities where the central state institutions are either weak, or
have collapsed, and therefore cannot fulfill their purpose, leading to the rise of ethnic
nationalism and the emergence of mini-states formed around dominant ethnic groupings
(Esmam, 1977; Osinubi and Osunibi, 2006; Howsbawn, 2013). As observed by Osaghae
and Suberu (2005:10) ethnic conflict prevails in the context of:
Shrinking state resources and the attendant recourse by groups to
communal resources on the one hand, and on the other hand, to a
number of state policies, interventions and omissions including
neglect and abuse of police and security bodies that are
supportive of discriminatory practices (2005:10).
The role of the state and the state-based political elites in promoting ethnicity
andfomenting ethnic conflict has been analysed mainly by political scientists, mainly
from the institutional perspective. in many African statItes has often been attributed to
structural imperfections of the African states, most of which are portrayed as
underdeveloped and ineffective, lacking the requisite neutrality and objectivity to
moderate and mediate inter-group grievances effectivelyor conflict (Ibrahim, 1995;
Nnoli, 1994). This is complicated by the apparent ethnicization of the state structures
and politicization of ethnicity in those contexts owing to the desperation of the political
elites for power (Ake, 1992; Agbu, 2000).
The structural dimension of ethnicity and ethnic conflict goes beyond the
question of ‘state failure’ or ‘neglect’ (Osinubi and Osinubi, 2006). It also refers to the
sustentative mechanisms for inter-governmental relations and power sharing in a state,
such as federalism and other forms of consociational arrangements (cf. Aapanguo,
2010, Lijphard Arend, 1968). According to Esman (1977), Federal system has the
strenghth of reducing inter-ethnic crises by regulating flow of relations with the central
government and mitigating ethnoregional conflicts through concessional and structural
adjustments. In this way, the contestation arising from ethnic economic deprivation and
regional autonomy is managed. The bulk of the ethnic crises that has been witnessed in
Africa tend to have arisen from the contradictions of federalism in many states that are
characterized by centrifugal tendencies (Tamuna, 1970). This is also to a large extent
true of ethnic conflicts in Nigerian (Tamuno, 1970; Aapenguo, 2010).
59
 2.7.
The link between democracy and ethnic activation has been established in the academic
literature. The thinking in this direction is that democracy or democratization tends to
promote conditions for the activation of ethnic politicking and crisis. According to
Ukiwo:
The interface between ethnicity and democratization is found in
absence of effective citizenship and good governance in post
transition societies. In the circumstance that democracy does not
go beyond the conduct of multiparty elections to include
improvement in the quality of life of the people, there is
frustration and people who already feel alienated from the state
are vulnerable and likely to be mobilized around counter-elites
who exploit extant popular alienation from the state by whipping
up sectarian sentiments (2003:120).
The significance of the above citation is that lack of effective democracy facilitates
ethnicity and ethnic conflict by prompting the culture of recourse to civil
mobilization. In the course of such mobilization, therefore, ethnic consciousness is
activated and utilized to advance politico-partisan purposes (Cocodia. n.d; Nnoli,
1978). In this circumstance, conflicts arising from inter-ethnic differences are likely
to occur. This has been the experience in many African states where ethnicity has
been the bane of sustainable democratization (Nnoli, 1994).
Another important link identified by contemporary students of political elites is between
social stability and regime type, on the one side, and national elite structure/consensus
(the type of elite) on the other (Higley and Burton, 2006). Deeply divided elites, which
form the majority of political elites and almost all elites in developing societies, form
unstable political regimes that oscillate between being repressive and chaotic. Elites that
achieve a degree of ideological-programmatic unity, mainly by excluding and
suppressing opposition, form dictatorial regimes: stable but repressive. Only a minority
of elites manages to achieve a procedural consensus – an agreement about the norms of
political competition and rules of political rivalry – and only such elites are capable of
forming stable democratic regimes. Needless to add, such elites are also capable of
managing major ethno-religious divisions and conflicts in the way that does not threaten
the social fabric and national unity.
60
 Most of developing societies have divided elites. Such elites can occasionally
stabilize social and political order by various political deals and temporary ‘political
truces’ that allow them to sustain their domination and maintain political order. If they
manage to build effective organizational domination – which is equivalent to having the
effective and ‘deep reaching’ state administration – they manage ethnic-religious
conflict with minimum violence. If not, violent conflicts and supressions are frequent
and expected. So are communal conflicts fomented by local elites seeking recognition
(inclusion into elite ranks), political influence, as well as economic and political
privileges (their ‘cut’ of resources). In such a situation the lines of political divisions
and conflicts become extraordinarily complex. We comment on these aspects of ethnic
division and communal conflicts in the next chapter.
Ethnic activation and contestation in the conflict of civil mobilization often take
the form of proto-nations/ethno-nationalist movements (Eriksen, 1993), or ethno-
nationalism (Uduma, 2013). From the standpoint of its nationalistic expression,
ethnicity does not and should not convey a perjortive sense when an ethnic group seeks
to ‘preserve or enhance a peoples’s national or cultural identity when that identity is
threatened’ (Mach, 1977:101), and this should not be understood as repression or
dormination of other groups. The implication of the citation is that ethnicity can be
positive or negative. It is positive when it emphasizes ‘love and trust for ones ethnic
group’, emotional tie to one’s ethnic group’ and obligation and responsibilities’ relating
to membership to an ethnic group with which a person identifies (Jega, 2003:11-23).
But it is negative when it is used to promote parochial divisiveness, hatred, distrust,
animosity and group closure, (in the form of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ divide) (Uduma,
2013:33). Suffice it to note that ethnicity in Africa has largely generally manifested as a
negative phenomenon (Nnoli, 1978). According to Uduma (2013:33), ‘it generally
presents a scenario where people identify with and see themselves first as a member of a
particular nationality before identifying themselves with the ‘nation’ (in the sense of
state). This gives rise to the untoward trend of centrifugal nationalism based on
primordial sentiments and attachment (Tamuno, 1970).
A dominant perspective in the extant academic literature holds that ethnicity and
ethnic conflict are manifestation of the contradictions of ‘ethnic politics’ or ‘identity
politics’ in Africa (Rex, 1996; Coleman in Geertz, 1963; Jega, 2003; Iwara, 2004;
Duruji 2010; Uduma, 2013; Ayokhai, 2013). This results in the ‘complex web of
politically salient identities and a deeply divided state in which major political issues are
61
vigorously- some would say violently- contested along the lines of the complex, ethnic,
religious and regional divisions’ (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005:4). In this regard, ethnicity
becomes an important avenue for the mobilization and politicization of primordial
identities in such a manner that precipitates crisis (Ayokai, 2013; Uduma, 2013; Geertz,
1973).
From the standpoint of the Nigerian experience, Coleman observed that
Nigerians display five different types of identities simultaneously for they are seen as
Nigerians, African, regional, cultural and group(Coleman in Geertz, 1963:29) This
divided loyalties makes the country abnormally given to ‘serious disaffection based on
primordial attachment’ (Geetrtz, 1963:30). Similarly, Duruji (2010) observes that
identity politics has been one of the most critical impediments of national integration
and stability in the country. According to him ‘since Nigeria’s return to democracy in
1999, there has been growing concern about the rise of identity politics, especially
negative forms of identity politics and pressures for de-nationalization of the state’
(cited in Uduma, 2013:33). Ethnicity in this context assumes immense vitality and
salience as an instrument of primordial politicking and mobilizing. This shifts the
people’s allegiance from the state and circumvents popular identification thereby
creating the basis for centrifugal nationalism in the country (Okoli, 2003; Nnoli, 1978).
The experience is more or less common across Africa where ethnicity tends to have
become more salient than national civic mode of consciousness (Osaghae and Suberu,
2005).
Identity politics has always been a key issue in analyses of Africal politics
(Tamuno, 1970; Cocodia, n.d). According to Cocodia (n.d:12) ‘analysis of ethnic
conflicts in Africa (should) revolve around the largely heterogeneous states comprised
of communal contenders, with each group seeking power, control, and importance over
the other’. In effect, social and political diversities in the context of heterogeneous
polities often lead to contradictory claims and contestations among socio-political
groups in a manner that engenders conflict (Thomson, 2000). This explains most of the
ethnic conflict situations in contemporary Africa. This perspective on ethnic conflict
becomes more plausible when it is considered in the developing states (Okoli and
Okpaleke, 2014). In respect of Nigeria, Tamuno (1970:564) attributes the incidence and
prevalence of ethnic crisis to:
The country’s heterogeneous ethnic composition, cultural
diversity, vast size, difficulties of transport and communications,
62
 varied administrative practices and constitutional arrangements,
besides all the problems connected with the introduction of
federalism, personality clashes between Nigerian leaders before
and after independence, and the absence of a strong ideological
magnet.
The scenario painted in the above citation exists in many Africa states. The
picture is complicated by the fact that most states in Africa lack the virtue of relative
autonomy that could enable them moderate the contradictions arising from the
characteristic political diversity of their polities (Nnoli, 1994). This makes ethnic
politicking – the domain of elite power contestation – extremely important in such
contexts.
There is a debate in the literature regarding the origin of ethnicity and ethnic
conflict in the developing countries. The thrust of the debate has given rise to what we
may term the ‘imperialist’ and ‘nationalist’ perspectives (see Sadowski, 1998; Osinubi
and Osinubi, 2006). The nationalist perspective holds that ethnicity and ethnic conflict
are the creations of colonialism. According to this perspectives, various ethnic groups in
the pre-colonial era co-existed harmoniously with little or no pronounced conflicts;
these ethnic groups were historically divided and polarized in the course of colonialism
in such a manner that has made their relations both contradictory and conflictual (cf.
Cocodia, n.d). On the other hand, the imperialist perspective attributes the incidence of
ethnic conflict in post–colonial societies to their pre-colonial heritage of inter-ethnic
strife. The argument in this regard is that most of these societies had a long history of
inter-group hatred and strife prior to the advent of colonialism. The colonialists tried ‘to
make a nation-state out of a hotchpotch of antagonistic and uncivilized African peoples
but failed in their mission’ (Cocodia, n.d. 13). Consequently as soon as the colonial
power left, these societies plunged into barbarism: an inter-ethnic vendetta that is
reminiscent of the primitive state.
It is important to note that some of the instances of long-standing ethnic conflicts
in contemporary world have strong colonial nexus. They have been inspired by the
commissions and omissions of the colonial masters who only paid lip-service to the
issue of national integration in those colonies. Yet, it is also important to note that the
political elites in the post-colonial era have complicated situation through their political
excesses. In the light of this, Sadowski (1998:13) observes that ‘most ethnic conflicts
are expressions of ‘modern hate’ and largely products of the twentieth century’.
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 Ethnic conflict in contemporary polities has also been seen in the literature as
something that has to do with strategic statecraft nd nation building. A work by Brown
(1985) sees ethnicity and ethnic crisis as a means of generating what he termed ‘siege
legitimacy’ in plural societies. According to him, ‘One well-known strategy is for the
government leaders to invoke externally based threats or crisis of internal subversion,
furthering their own political dominance and enhancing their legitimacy by promoting a
sense of siege’ (Brown, 1985: 988). Ethnic manipulation, therefore, becomes a means to
an end in this context. The strategic utility of this venture is to foster political legitimacy
for a regime by playing on siege mentality. As Brown succinctly remarked:
Having linked external and internal elements so as to generate a
specter of social disaster, a government leader can then hope to
convince the populace that the society is a garrison under siege,
which must now rally behind its leader if it is to survive. The
proclamation of such a crisis like this justifies the argument that
criticism of the regime must now be suspended. Commitment to
the society and its survival are thereby equated with support for
the government (1985:989).
The implication of the above citation is that a political leaders bent on regime
preservation can create a sense of ethic crisis among the populace with a view to
capitalize on that to galvanize popular goodwill and support for his government. When
this is achieved, they would have gained ‘siege legitimacy’ for their regime by utilizing
ethnicity and ethnic crisis as a strategic tool. This observation affirms the position of
Aapenguo (2010:1) to the effect that ethnicity is a ‘tool’ of strategic politicking. It also
affirms the instrumentalist view that ethnicity is merely a means to an end. As opined
by Diamond (1983:460), we must understand the emergent class forces that expressed
ethnicity in political terms and used it for class ends’.
The dominant understanding of ethnicity and ethnic conflict/crisis in the
literature suggest that these phenomena seldom have independence existence and
substance (Nnoli, 1978; 1994; Jega, 2003; Tenuche, 2002). They only take their
meaning and salience in the context of societal relations and are largely defined and
redefined by forces of history and social existence (Jega, 2003). In other words, the
problematique of ethnicity is a socio-historical construct that derives its salience in the
political dynamics of a plural society (Cornell, 2001; Diamond, 1983; Brass, 1991;
Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Gagnon, 1994; Gur, 1994). In other words, ethnicity and
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ethnic conflict are to be understood as a product of elite politicking (Snyder, 2000;
Okoli and Orinya, 2013).
The political saliency of ethnicity derives from its premium value as an
instrumentality of civil mobilization, primordial politicking, elite management and
manipulation, and regime maintenance. These essences of ethnicity must be properly
contextualized in order to appreciate the political significance of ethnicity, as well as the
‘uses’ of ethnic divisions in elite power struggles.
The subjective and instrumental nature of ethnicity has been adequately
emphasized in the leading Western literature (Cohen, 1974; Rex, 1986; Hutchinson and
Smith, 1996; Eriksen, 2010; Horowitz, 1998). What could be taken away from these
literature is the fact that ethnicity is an identity question whose essence and import have
been largely situationally determined. In effect, ethnicity has been both constructed and
deconstructed to suit varying political exigencies in keeping with the dynamics of
political expediency in the context of elite’s political relations.This has been the case in
contemporary Nigeria where ethnicity has been a veritable instrument of elite
politicking and manipulation (Noli, 1978).

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 2.11. The elite manipulation of ethnic conflict is widely recognized
in the contemporary political sociology. (Putnam, 1976; Diamond,
1985; Higley and Burton 2006). In this context, ethnicity and ethnic
conflict are to be understood as a product of elite ‘politicking’, that is,
‘normal’ and routine management of social divisions and
accompanied conflicts by the key power-holders. This management
can be successful in the sense of producing stable order and
minimizing violent repression, or it can be unsuccessful: result in
endemic instability, open conflicts and frequent violence (Etzioni-
Haley, 1989; Okoli and Orinya, 2014; Snyder, 2000; Cornell, 2001;
Diamond, 1983; Brass, 1991; Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Gagnon, 1994;
Gur, 1994).

Some Marxist scholars, especially those following the ‘capitalist world system’
perspective (Wallerstein 1974), often embrace a slightly different view, sometimes
referred to as a ‘hegemonic theory’. It sees power as generated by structural
arrangements within the world system’, see the large ‘ruling classes’ (rather than
smaller organizational elites) as key ‘repositories of political power, and treat
conflict within and between societies as reflection of internal structural
contradictions. These contradictions pitch against themselves various coalitions of
developed (‘core’) countries against the developing (‘peripheral’) countries and
regions. Internally, the contradictions generate inter-ethnic and inter-class
conflicts that tend to be endemic among the developing societies in the peripheral
regions of the world. The hegemonic theory looks at the prevalence of ethnic
conflict from the standpoint of contradictions of democracy and civil order
(Cocodia, nod). The thinking in this theory is that ethnic conflicts are better
managed by one-party systems wherein the hegemonic state in place uses its
coercive power to freeze inter-ethnic conflicts (Nkwi, 2001). In such hegemonic
situations, untoward expression of ethnicity is brought to a controllable
magnitude. The hegemonic ‘world system perspective’ lost its gloss and popularity
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, success of the Chinese state-capitalist
path to prosperity, and the success in unifying European states.

One may also mention two other broad theoretical perspectives that compete for
attention of scholars dealing with ethnic division and conflict: the S.C.
‘globalization theory’ (or rather a broad analytic framework, a paradigmatic view
of social processes as increasingly inter-connected), and the equally broad family
of ‘nation-building theories’. The scholars embracing the framework of
globalization point to the upsurge of civilizational conflicts in the new world order
following the demise of global communism (Cocodia, n.d). This era of intense
globalization – the growth of interconnections of the economic, political, cultural-
informational, and social nature – has been characterized by rise in cultural
movement and activism that often find expression in ‘local’ ethnic conflicts. The
latter are often seen as a ‘backlash’ against intensifying globalization. The high
incidence of ethnic conflict in Africa since the turn of the 20 th century is explained
by a backlash against gradual drawing of various regions into a ‘global network’
of trade, investment, labour movements and informational circulation.

66
The ‘nation-building theories of ethnic division and conflict see these conflicts as a
part of the process whereby new states reinforce and spread national identities,
consciousness and political loyalties (e.g. Fukuyama 2014). Some see these
processes in Africa as a creation of colonialism (Nnoli, 1998). The argument is that
the colonialists created artificial boundaries and lumped together culturally
diverse entities in the form of arbitrarily drawn state boundaries. These entities
were not properly integrated into a pre-existing ethno-religious framework
existing prior to independence. Moreover, the newly created post-colonial states
were weak, with ‘shallow’ administrative apparata incapable of imposing
effectively new national identities, incapable of creating new state-national
loyalties. Consequently, at independence, most African states were plunged into
the morass of ethnic struggles and violence (cf. Avugma, 2000). Such perspective
plays down the role of ‘primordial’ (traditional and entrenched) identities and
loyalties, and it stresses the importance of colonial domination and its political
legacies. The ‘primordialists’, by contrast, hold that ethnic conflict is a
consequence of political under-development and the accompanied tribal
divisiveness among the pre-colonial peoples of Africa (Avugma, 2000). The current
ethnic conflicts are seen by ‘primordialists’ as legacies of pre-colonial past, as the
result of unsuccessful (or incomplete) modernizing development (Cocodia, n.d).

As mentioned earlier – and as elaborated in the next chapter – we see ethnic

identities, divisions and conflicts as fundamental aspects of political culture in all
developing states (Nnoli, 1978; Rex, 1996). They are old, but they are constantly
‘reproduced’ in the political realm, and they change their form in the process of
elite ‘management’ of social and political divisions and conflicts. Thus we see no
contradiction between those theoretical perspectives that see ethnicity as a
universal and old aspect of social division, and those theories that treat ethnic
identities and divisions as ‘constructed’. Ethnicity is constantly socially
constructed and reconstructed – mainly by cultural segments of political elites. It is
a phenomenon that derives its saliency from competitive inter-group relations
(Barth, 1998; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Manifestation and dynamics of ethnicity
varies significantly from one country to another depending on their national
character and heritage (Geertz, 1993; Carmeli and Eriksen, 1998).

This brings us back to the important issue of ‘construction’ and ‘reconstruction’ of

ethnic identities and divisions by political elites – the key actors on political stage,
the key shapers of social and political change.

Political eElites and ethnic conflict in Africa

The role of the political elites as the key ‘managers’ (mobilizers and de-mobilisers) in
Africa has been captured in the conceptual frames of elite competition, manipulation
and domination. The elite competition concept is concerned with the struggles by the

67
various contending ethnic affiliations towards competitive socio-political advantage
(Cocodia,n.d).This is a reality that takes on its essence and salience in heterogeneous
societal contexts characterized by inter-group dynamics and dialetics (Okoli, 2007). The
elite ‘management and manipulation’ is a derivate of the general elite theory which
seeks to explain the character of the political elites in parochial political cultures
wherein elite’s exploitation and instrumentalization of primordial cleavages pose a
fundamental political problematique (Agbo, 2010). The argument holds that the
political elites in such contexts generate, exploit and manipulate primordial identities
such as ethnicity, religion, sectionalism, and the like in an attempt to consolidate their
stake in the societal political relations (Kreba, 2009).
As mentioned before, in most African countries political elites are widely
divided, and societies are deeply fractured. Such configuration is found where the elite
formation is incoherent (no established pathways, no regular recruitment) and
sectionalized (Nnoli, 1978; 1996). In absence of any meaningful ‘ruling consensus’,
shared ideological vision, and sense of national solidarity, the elite circles in most
African (and other developing) societies are sustained by mobilizing primordial
sentiments and building solidarity based on sub-national affiliations – the phenomenon
referred to as ‘identity politics’ (Okoli and Orinya, 2009). In seeking to establish
political dominance, in other words, African elites typically resort to manipulation of
ethnicity and religion. What plays out of the scenario is politicization of sub-national
consciousness in a manner that may precipitate divisive and identity-based ‘ethnic
politics’ and exacerbate social conflicts. This tendency has been the root causes of
ethnic conflagrations in countries like Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, Kenya,
to mention but a few (Cocodia, n.d).
The centrality of the elite factor in explaining the phenomenon of ethnic conflict
in developing nations is predicated on the fact that ethnic consciousness acquires its
political force, vitality and salience in the context of elite politicking and manipulation
(Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). This observation is supported by both historical and
empirical evidence. In respect of Nigeria, historical insights readily reveal that ethnicity
has been veritable tools of political mobilization by political elites in the context of
national political competition.

Elite Theory

68
The s.c. ‘classical elite theory’ was the brain child of the early twentieth century
critics of ‘democratic illusions’, especially believes in the rule ‘by the people’. It
emerged as a reaction to the crises that engulfed and shook the foundation of
Europe’s socio-political formation and order, and as the critical rebuttal of
Marxist socialism. Unlike Marxism, elite theory is critical of economic
determinism and skeptical of promises of egalitarian end point in human
development. Its originators, Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941); Vilfredo Pareto (1848-
1923); Robert Michels (1876-1941) and Max Weber (1876-1920), preferred the
term ‘leadership groups’.

The early elite theorists emphasized that in every complex society power is always
concentrated in the hand of a tiny minority who determine political, economic and
social outcomes and stresses the inevitability of elites as elaborated by Mosca,
Pareto, Michels and also Max Weber who attributed the inevitability of elites to
the ‘law of small numbers: that organized minorities were better placed in power
competition and rational decision-making.

The concept of elite(s) often compared with non-elites is used both in singular or
plural tense and has the same connotation with the concept of ‘power elite’,
‘political elite’ and ‘ruling class’ ‘ruling minority’ leadership group’. The concept
gained momentum in social and political sciences at the last lap 19th century and
early 20th century in response to the assumptions of Marxism and early
democratic theory . It gained popularity through the works of some Europeans
liberals such as Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels and Ortegay
Gasset, and other subseqent theorists like Max Weber and Joseph Schumperter,
J.S mill who stressed the place of elite concept as a descriptive yardstick to
describe wielders of top executive position in big organizations who also constitute
players both in complex societies and modern democracies(Pakulski on Elite(s) or
power elite). The import of elite theory is that change in society lies heavily on the
distinguished few in society.

The term ‘elite’ for Pareto was used in its etymological sense constituting
the highest stratum in society. The term originally connotes ‘choice goods’ and ‘the
cream of society’ which has relationship with power and distinction at the highest
hierarchies in society (Sartori 1987). To J.S Mill, elites constitute the most
influential. He used this attribute in 1860’s to describe the British
parliamentarians. Pareto’s elites are those distiguished and capable in all aspect of
life. Mosca stratified the society into two classes: those who rule and the ruled.
Mosca refers to elites as the ruling class, the minority which constitutes the class
that rules and are in government, enjoy the monopoly of power and its perquisites,
while the majority constitute the class that are ruled.

69
 Michels (1911/1962) portrayed the modern elites as ‘ruling oligarchies’ that
is inevitable. Michel maintains that every social organization is characterized by a
law which he called the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ and by this he means that behind
every organized social structure lay the tendency for the emergency of elites. To
him organization and oligarchy are two sides of the coins that go together. All
organizations both in terms of political parties and the state are guarded by the
oligarchic logic formed in a pyramid structure. The majority that constitutes the
masses are at the base while minority oligarchs at the top take the lead. In the
same vein, Max Weber(1978:1393-1462) emphasized the small number of elite by
describing them as the ‘ruling minority’ that control the top executive positions
both in Major political parties and the German state. He situated the elites at the
political and administrative cadre of modern state. Such ‘neutral terms’ as ‘ruling
minority’ and ‘leadership group’ were used by Weber to designate the ‘state-based
elites’ described as network of bureaucratic ‘mandrain’, directorate of major
political parties, leading parliamentarians and political leaders (in pakulski, Elite
or power elite).

Schumpeter on his own part and in his model of leadership competition as the
basis of modern elite democracy pinpointed the vantage position and ascendancy
of leaders both in the political and economic spheres as gladiators. Ortega (1932)
highlighted quality and excellence as one the distinguishing features of elites and
warmed about the corruption of these qualities. C. Wright (1956:4-11) and other
contemporary power elites like (Putnam, 1976: 14) located the position of the elites
at the ‘pyramid of power’ or apex of power structure in political, military,
business, media, powerful organization (tiny group in number) who in their
effective leadership qualities and by virtue of their internal cohesion, solidarity
and organization are able not only to defend their power interest, but also to
‘affect political outcomes usually at the level of national states, regularly and
substantially’ (Higlay and Burton, 2006:7) .

The elite formation in any society is characterized by what has been designated by
James Meisel as the ‘three C’s’: cohesion, conspiracy and (group) consciousness
(Meisel, 1962:4). Other characteristics of elites have been well highlighted by
‘classical’ elite theorists and political sociologists (see Pareto, 1935; Mosca, 1939;
Mills, 1956; Bottomore, 1995). They stress that political elites gradually turn into
‘organisational elits’ in the sense of using organizational power resources and
organizing themselves into relatively cohesive ‘power networks’.

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Our conception of the elites in this discourse is restricted to its political
application, as ‘political elites’ or ‘power elites’, in line with its general academic
usage and political research. Moreover, we refer throughout to political elites on
national and sub-national levels, in the way such elites have been studied in the
context of sub-saharan Africa (e.g., Smythe and Smythe, 1960; Cole, 1975; and in
particular Fukuyama, 2014; and Daloz, 2016). The new studies of African elites
stress their diverse organizational basis (often ‘ethno-tribal’), informalism, and
strong clientelism in relations with ‘non-elites’.

Elitism

Contemporary elite researchers and theorists, especially those dealing with

African societies (like Daloz 2016) adopt what they call an ‘elite perspective’ or
‘elitist paradigm’. It can be presented as four assumptions: (i) that power in all
complex and highly organized societies is highly centralized; (ii) that this
centralization results in the formation in all complex societies of political elites,
that is distinct and relatively cohesive ‘power minorities’ (including, as mentioned
before, the top political power holders, land-holders, business leaders, and other
plutocrats); (iii) that political power is exercised predominantly in a ‘top down’
manner; and (iv) that elites rule by using force, manipulation and persuasion. That
means that all political elites, even the most autocratic ones, have to build effective
‘power coalitions’ with some non-elite ‘constituencies of support’, be it ethnic,
religious, class, territorial ,etc. This point is strongly emphasized by contemporary
students of African elites (e.g., Daloz 2016), who point out that the highly
‘patrimonial’ and ‘clientelistic’ (patronage-based) African elites remain in the
fragile condition of ‘mutual dependency’ with their ‘client constituencies’. Their
political legitimacy and effectiveness depends on the regularly ‘delivering’ political
patronage – a key factor in widespread and endemic corruption.

One can apply this ‘paradigm’, that recognizes a key role played by elites in
shaping social and political change. Thus Max Weber’s famous studies of ‘Western’
political modernization as directed and managed by distinct ‘leadership groups’,
including the Reformation-era ascetic Protestants and the early commercial business
elites in Western Europe (Weber 1976). Weber’s studies illustrate well the key elements
of the ‘elitist perspective’. They place at the center of attention the ‘top leadership
groups’ or elites (religious, cultural and business) as the key shapers of peculiar
Western rationalism or – in the cases of studies of other ‘civilisations’ – traditional
elites constrained by considerations of the ‘sacred duties’.
We must also mention here frequent misunderstandings and misconceptions
surrounding the concept of ‘elite’ and the elite-centered paradigm. The concept of

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‘elites’ does NOT mean or imply arrogant exclusivism (as it happens in populist
rhetoric). Elitism does NOT exclude from the study the ‘non-elites’ – their support for
elites is always seen as a key condition of elite power and effectiveness. Finally,
studying of elites, and adopting the elitist perspective, does NOT imply approval of elite
domination or apologetic view of elite (often bloody, corrupt and dictatorial) power. In
fact, most elite studies are critical of political elites and their political effectiveness
(e.g., Daloz 2016; Pakulski 2016). Elitism simply means that sociological research
adopting it pays attention to power elites and their dominant role, and that this research
sees elites as inevitable, dominant, and either effective (sustaining flexible social and
political order) or ineffective, the latter leading to conflicts and instability.
In the context of the present study, the meaning of elitism is restricted to the
manifestations of elite’s dominance in politics: on the national, regional and local
levels. This means that we see elites as important ‘managers of the social and political
order’, as key political actors and decision-makers in all major arenas of society. The
elite actors – the key incumbents of the national and local power networks – determine
the key political outcomes, including private business and public policy decisions
(Putnam, 1976; Agbo, 2010). They also dominate the processes of political mobilization
and all facets of politico-partisan engineering, giving them definite characterization as
the political gladiators of society (Agbo, 2010).
Elitism is the outlook that recognizes the inevitability of power hierarchies in
complex societies, and therefore the inevitability of power concentration, domination
and existence of elites. It also stresses the central place of elites in shaping the social
and political order. Elitism does not rely on dogmatic appeals in defense of the actions
of existing elites, class appeals or dogmatic ideology, but it pontificates the inevitability
of elite that at the same time begs the question of the reason behind the success and
failure of elites. In the time of Pareto and Weber, the German and Italian elites were
vehemently impugned and the duo theorists questioned the status quo of their time.
Elitism has no single and generally accepted meaning; however, among the
numerous meanings it implies is the ‘belief in the inevitability of rule by elites, which
implies focusing on elites as key political and social actors’ (Higley and Best 2015:20-
30). Moreover, it emphasizes ‘respect for or deference toward leadership, esteem for
accomplishments, a reverence for heritage, or an insistence that some idea or
contribution is better than all others’ (ibid). What it means is that, from the elitist
perspective, in all hierarchically structured societies elites constitute the key political
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actors. Highlighting the importance of excellence as a characteristic claimed by all elites
(rightly or wrongly), Sartori argues that any research on elites has to face the question
of whether the powerful represent authentic (that is powerful and excellent) or
apocryphal (that is usurpatory) elites (1987:168). Most of elites, as Mosca often
stressed, fall short of ‘elite qualities’ that they themselves claimed to have. Mosca and
Pareto alluded to this when they argue that elites differ enormously in their quality and
behavior across societies and within them over time and most often than not display
qualities that are illiberal and antithetical to democratic ethos in some ways
(Higlay&Burton, 2006`)
The elite concept is better understood by looking at this peculiar character of the
dominant power of elites in the developing nation visa-vis those of the advanced
political systems of the West. The elite formation in western political culture is
characterized by common ideology based on shared values and aspirations, on mutual
respect and respect for the key laws and conventions (Mclean and McMillan, 2003;
Fukuyama, 2016; Higley and Burton, 2006). Western elites historically managed to
achieve a high level of institutionalization (versus informalism), strong organizational
bases (versus weak institutions, high degree of professionalization (vs dilettantism), and
high level of consensual unity (versus divisions). The African elites differ dramatically
from their Western counterparts in all these respects (Daloz 2016).
Nigeria situation represent a divided case where access to political power is
limited and the different segments and factions are excluded from ruling and do not
have regular and reasonable access to decision making and more often than not presents
ideologically disunited elites with its attendant conflicts and breakdown of
regimes/political system. Inclusion policies in Nigeria lacks responsible government
behavior and inclusivity which to a good extent generate authority structure that are
amenable to coercion, corruption, patronage, in-formalism as well as chaotic application
of rule of law which has inexorably widened ethno-regious division and diversity. This
goes to say that while accepting the inevitability of elites, elitism subject elites to the
crucibles of effectiveness, efficiency and excellence test and ask why elites fail and
succeed across societies in different time

2.8. Contemporary elite theory

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 Contemporary elite theorists stress the importance of elite cohesion and unity.
Both are seen as variable. United elites are more capable of stable and effective
domination. Divided elites created unstable polities. Higley and Burton argue that ‘far
from stipulating the form that elites take, the inevitability contention stood simply as an
orientating proposition for theory and research: in all modern societies, political power
is necessarily concentrated in a few persons, but the configuration these persons form
vary importantly among societies and within them over time’ (2006:chs 1-2).
Higley and Burton also ventured to build various typologies of contemporary
elites, as well as modify the key tenets of classical elite theory.
Two typologies that are prominently used by the 20 th century elite scholars to
typify dimension of elite variation is structural integration and the extent of value
consensus. The former involves the extent of symbiotic inclusiveness of both the formal
and informal communication networks and influence resources existing among the
different factions and persons constituting the political elite while the later relates to the
extent to which agreement on norms of political behavior and relative importance of
existing institutions of government is regarded by the different factions and persons
constituting the political elites. Most of these typologies make a distinction between
united and disunited (divided) elites. United elites are characterized by the existence of
well-connected networks of communication and influence resources that cohere with
core value agreement and existing code of political behavior among elite persons. The
contrary situation suffices when ‘persons and factions forming disunited elites are
clearly divided and separated from each other, they disagree fundamentally about
political norms and institution, and they adhere to no single code of political behavior’
(Higley and Burton, 2006:9). Unity of elites may have consensual character or it may be
imposed by one faction over the others. If it is consensual, elites are capable of building
liberal-democratic regimes. Elite consensus, in other words, is seen by Higley and his
collaborators as a sine-qua-non condition of liberal democracy.
The nexus between effective consensual elites and liberal democracy has
received appreciable attention by contemporary elite theorists such as Robert Dahl,
Giovanni Sartori, Juan Linz, Afred Stepan, Robert Putnam, Larry Diamond, Heinrich
Best and Jan Pakulski, Higley and Burton. Similarly, the claim that intra-elite divisions
and conflicts lead to unstable politics or non-democraic regimes has been widely
accepted. These points are important in the context of analyses of African countries, like
Nigeria, where political elites do not seem to have any semblance of group consensus.
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Elite divisions in such countries can be temporarily bridged by elite pacts and ‘truces’,
but such stabilization lasts only as long as the leaders respects those pacts and deals. In
most countries, these respects for norms of political rivalry – and the accompanied
stability – are rare and short.
It is worth stressing some other tenets of contemporary elite theory. Elites not
only claim political power, but also excellence and distinction (Okoli, 2007). They are
also internally stratified. At the ‘core’ one finds the state-managing segment of political
elites that include the top executives in the state apparata, leaders of the major political
parties and movements (regional, religious, etc.), and – frequently – the top military
leaders. Around this ‘core’ form the power network consisting of top land- and
resource-holders, top wealth-holders, and leaders of all important and influential
organisations (whose resources the leaders command). All other members of society are
seen as ‘non-elites’. They are also stratified, but the major division remains between
elite and ‘the rest’. Elites use force and persuasion in order to maintain their
domination. They control entry to elite ranks, though occasionally they lose control over
their ‘social reproduction’, decay in their political qualities, and are replaced by
challenging ‘counter-elites’ who take their place.
Contemporary elite theory is interested in the nature, patterns and dynamics of
elite relations/politics in contemporary polities. It is also concerned with understanding
the conditions under which relations and circulations obtain. An important feature of the
theory is its aspectual and context specific approach to elite conception and analysis
(Higley, 2018). This perspective is evident in the manner that exponents have conceived
of allied concepts, such as elite relations and/or politics. Patterns of elite relations, and
of course, elite politics “vary considerably” across the political systems of the world
(Henry, 2018:181). Depending on how united or disunited national elites are, the
outcome of elite relations/politics tends to either centripetalism or centrifugalism. A
united national elite formation is characterized by ideological and consensual unity
(Higley and Burton, 2006). Table 2.1 puts these patterns of unity in perspective.
Table 2.3 Consensual Vs. Ideological Elite Unity
Consensual Unity Ideological Unity

 In spite of their ideological  There is a high level of ideological

differences, elite factions accord each conformity among the elites.
other significant level of trust and  Partisan differences are mediated by

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 solidarity. cross cutting ideological sodarity.
 Politics is positive sum.
Source: Adapted from Higley and Bruton (2006:14).

In a disunited elite system, ‘structural integretation and value consensus are

minimal’ among the elites (Higley and Burton, 2006:14). To adapt from Higley and
Burton (2006:34), ‘these elites are clearly disunited in the sense that wide and deep
struggles for political ascendancy (typifies) their relations’. As aptly observed by Higley
and Pakulski (n.d:5), the struggles could be ‘Machiavellian’ or ‘Hobbessian’, depending
on the character of elite circulation in place. It is apparent that the pattern that prevails
in most states of Africa in the post-colonial era is Hobbessian elitism.
Contemporary thinking in elite theory recognizes the vital role of the political
elites in influencing the character of political regimes. According to Higley (2018:27),
the dynamics of elite relations and politics affect ‘the basic stability and instability of
political regimes’ as well determine ‘the forms and workings of political institutions and
the main policies of government’. The implication of this is that both development and
stability of a nation is to a large extent dependent on the character and dialectics of elite
politics.
With reference to the issue of ethnic politics and conflict in Africa, it is to be
observed that such pacts or agreements among political elites are rare. More typical are
divided elites and conflictual relations among their members (factions). Divided elites,
in turn, inflame social and political conflicts by mobilizing factional support by using
ethno-religious appeals and by discriminating in distribution of resources, and by
exerting ethno-specific patronage. Elite divisions, in other words, exacerbate social and
political divisions.
How does the foregoing apply to the analysis of Nigeria’s elite formation?
Basically, Nigeria’s national elite(s) lack the ‘quality and excellence’ adverted to in
traditional elitism (cf. Pakulski, n.d:2). Essentially, they lack the virtues of consensual
and ideological unity (cf. Higley and Burton, 2006). Nonetheless, they are bound by
some sort of solidarity which is more partisan than ideological (Okoli, 2003). Beyond
being nominally conscious of elite identity and being bound by conspiratorial quest for
power, Nigerian political elites, to a large extent, lacks the organic cohesion and unity
required to bring about sustainable national stability as maintained by Burton that in
Nigeria ‘breakdown of democratic regimes resulted from uncontainable ethnoregional

76
conflicts; but in most the breakdown was a faily direct consequence of unrestrained
power struggles among disunted elites’( Higley and Burton, 2006: 50).
2.9. Elites and ethnic conflicts
In the current study three important tenets of contemporary elite theory are employed.
First, following Higley and Burton (2006) we claim that there is a strong relationship
between elite unity, especially ‘consensual unity’ (about the rules of the political game)
and political stability, which is the effective management of social and political
conflicts. Second, elites that are divided – especially in regards to the key values and
rules of the political competition – exacerbate social divisions, be it ethno-religious or
otherwise, in order to enhance their political influence. The resulting conflict coincides
with intensifying patronage (appointments of loyal supporters). Third, political elites
may reduce internal divisions – at least temporarily – by political pacts, agreements or
‘truces’ between the major competing factions. Such pacts, differ in their
comprehensiveness and therefore in their effectiveness in reducing intra-elite conflict
and broader social-political confrontations. This intra-elite peaceful rivalry (‘power
games’) lasts only as long as the pacts-agreements are honoured and respected by the
key elite actors. Since the key norms of political competition are usually articulated in
constitutional laws (and some uncodified conventions), elite peaceful ‘power games’ (as
distinct from ‘elite warfare’) often coincide with what institutionalists (e.g., Fukuyama
2014) call ‘rule of law’. From elite perspective, ‘rule of law’ means elite respect for the
key rules of political competition.
As noted by Brass (1991:75), ‘the study of ethnicity and nationality is in large
part the study of politically-induced cultural change…it is the study of the process by
which elites and counter elites within ethnics groups select aspects of group’s culture ,
attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group’.
To be sure, ethnic consciousness is bound to remain non-political and non-violent
unless and until it is mobilised by the political machination of the elites (Agbo, 2010).
As Kruger (1993:11) states:
ethnicity and nationalism…are the creations of elites who draw
upon, distort and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures
of the group they wish to represent in order to project their well-
being or existence, or to gain political and economic advantage.
Mach (1977:106) sees such mobilization of nationalism as ‘constructed by those
who have power in other to secure and maintain their position’ (1977:106). Ethnic
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conflicts in Africa have been largely caused by the activities of the political elites who
are in most cases desperate for political power. The nexus between elitism and ethnic
conflict is such that the former presents the latter with the opportunity and impetus of
occurrence. This has been the case in Nigeria where ethnic grand-standing and
mobilizing by the political elites have often precipitated crisis.

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2.12. 2.10. Ethnicity, nationalism and identity politics

Ethnicity is a socio-political consciousness that acquires its saliency in the context

of inter-group competition, especially in polities that are inclined towards
primordial politicking. In a typical primordial polity, especially in the global south,
ethnicity has become a veritable factor of identity politics (Esman, 1977); and to
Mach (1993), ethnic identity in its nationalistic expression, can no longer be
neglected or ignored. In this context, ‘ethnic identity has become a source of pride
rather than shame to members of minority groups. Consequently, ethno-regional
interests have been politicized to the point that ‘statesmen can no longer afford to
neglect them’ (Esman, 1977: 389).

Ethnic identity from the point of view of its nationalistic expression, to Mach, ‘does
not have a pejorative meaning which it often acquires in common language’
(1993:101).This expression acquires meaning when groups seek to enhance or
preserve its socio-cultural identity and well-being in the face of subjugation which
could lead to negative ethnic consciousness and identity politics. It also requires
effective ‘managers of identity’, that is local or national leaders who harness ethnic
identities to their political interests.

Moreover, identity politics arises where the boundaries of ethnic and civic
identification/or loyalty fail to coincide (Glazer, n.d) .In this regard, groups may
capitalize on the existing primordial particularities and solidarities to forge a sub-
national cleavage that negate national allegiance (Nash 1989). This often begets a
tendency toward sub-nationalism, marked by obvious contradiction between civic
and primordial ties (Geertz, 1963). In the words of Geertz ‘it is this crystallization
of a direct conflict between primordial and civil sentiments - this longing not to
belong to any other group- that gives rise to the problem variously called tribalism
(ethnicism), parochialism, communalism, and so on…’ (1963:32).

As a sub-national identity, ethnicity erodes inclusive nationalism and negates the

prospect of sustainable national integration in the developing nations (Eriksen
1993). Much as being a veritable catalyst for identity politics, ethnicity has also
been a critical driver and ‘complicator’ of identity-based or communal conflict in
less developed countries. But the problem of ethnicity is not entirely peculiar to the
developing nations.

According to Esman (1977:387):

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 Ethnic particularism never died nor was it ever entirely dormant in the
modern industrialized world. Flemish protest divided the Belgium polity
during the interwar years. Basque and Catalan demands for autonomy
were features of Spanish republican politics in the 1990’s. French Canadian
nationalist maintained their defensive struggle for autonomy on their
Quebec homeland. At the apogee of empire, the United Kingdom was
preoccupied with Irish nationalism, and an insurrection culminated in the
separation of most Ireland.

Although ethnicity, as a socio-political problem, has been evident even in the

developed world, its pattern of manifestation has significantly varied between the
developed and developing nations (Esman, 1977). In effect, whereas the
manifestation of ethnicity follows the logic of self-determination in the advanced
countries, it has more or less betrayed the pattern of elite manipulation in the
developing nations (Laitin, 1986). In this context, ethnicity becomes an instrument
of selfish political mobilization by the desperate political entrepreneurs who often
‘found it cheaper to organize people on the basis of their ethnic identities than on
the basis of their class identities’ (Laitin, 1986:100).

So, while the problematic of ethnicity in the west might be understood from
the perspective of theories of nationalism (Gellner, 1994; Mach, 1993), the ethnic
question, in the Global South, particularly in Africa and parts of Asia, can best be
conjectured from the prism of communo-primordial construction and
manipulation. According to Nash (1989:4-5):

Whatever the subjective utility of ties may be, the cold social fact is
that primordial ties are like any other set of bonds, forged in the
process of historical time (and space), subject to shifts in men,
ambiguities of reference political manipulation, and vicissitudes of
honour and obloquy. The reality of ethnic identity, its content, and
its boundary lines – being a historical product and thus subject to
change, redefinition, and varied salience in the lives of members of
the group – does not overcome the insight that the binding blocks of
ethnicity, defined as the self-conscious group within a nation-stated,
are virtually the same over time.

The fact that ethnic identity, and of course all forms of social identity, are
constructed (by political leaders) is a settled matter in the literature. For instance,
McDonald (1993:228) opines that ‘any question of identity is clearly dependent on
the social and political maps of the time, on the categories available for the making
of self/other or us/them boundaries, and on the particular salience of any one set of
these categories’. Elsewhere, McDonald (1993:6-7) more succinctly observes that:

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 Identities do not exist outside their making. Rather, they are socially
created in specific historical circumstances; though they may be
reified and perpetrated through all kinds of essentialist models.

The implication of the above citation is that ethnic identity is constructed and re-
constructed within specific historical time and space, and under varying socio-
ecological and material circumstances (cf. Nnoli, 1986). This further implies that
any meaningful attempt to understand the phenomenon of ethnicity, as a socio-
political problematic must recognize its putative, mutative and epiphenomenal
character. In this regard, it is possible to conjecture the roots and contours of
ethnic crisis in Africa in terms of contradictions of identity formation and
transformation in the socio-political context of elite opportunism. It is in this sense
that the politicization of ethnicity and ethnicization of politics in countries like
Nigeria could be more meaningfully understood.

2.11. Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa

The experience of ethnic conflict in Africa varies from one country to another. Yet
certain regular and irregular patterns could be discerned in respect of the
occurrence of ethnic conflict across these countries as noted by Horowitz that
‘ethnic conflicts embody regularities and recurrent patterns that are, in principle,
discoverable’ (1985: xii). This sub-section briefly reviews a number of cases in
Africa with a view to decipher patterns of manifestation of ethnic conflict in those
contexts.

Uganda: Uganda is composed of fairly diverse ethnicities which are separated by

historical and cultural experiences. Some of the important ethnic affiliations in
Uganda are Buganda, Banyoro, Acholi and Lango. The nationalist struggle for
independence brought to fore the differences between these groups. This state of
affairs was complicated by the power struggle between Milton Obote (a Lango
leader) and Mutesa (a.k.a Kabaka, a Buganda King) in the early 1960s. The
former was elected prime minister in 1962 while the latter was elected president in
1963 (Cocodia, n.d).

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The power tussle between these two national leaders culminated in the sack of
Kabaka in 1966 by forces loyal to Obote. Kabaka was accused of being an ethnic
champion who sought the autonomy of the Buganda nationality during his reign.
In 1971, Obote was overthrown by Idi Amin who was a great sympathizer of the
Buganda cause. Amin thus pursued tactical retribution against the Lango and
Acholi groups in a bid to entrench the hegemony of his ethnic nationality in
Ugandan politics. This move found expression in the selective extermination of
non-Bugandans and antagonists of Idi Amin in the famous Ugandan genocide of
1971-1979 (Sadowski, 1989).

South Africa: The ethnic composition of South Africa is skewed in favour of the
blacks who constitute over seventy percent (70%) of the population (Cocodia, n.d).
The rest of the ethnic/racial groups are whites, the coloured and the Asians
(mainly Indians). Among the black, the Zulu ethnicity constitutes the dominant
stock. The nationalist struggle for independence in that country saw the birth of
Inkatha Freedom party which represented the ethnic Zulus. The more dominant
black party, the African National Congress (ANC) however, maintained a clear
lead. A clash occurred between these two black parties in 1991, leading to inter-
communal conflict confrontation that followed party lines. This was a case of intra-
ethnic conflict occasioned by the dialetics of elite competition and manipulation (cf
Kruger, 1993; Osahae and Suberu, 2005).

Cote d’Ivoire: Cote d’Ivoire is a typical instance of a multi-ethnic state in Africa,

having over sixty (60) ethnic nationalities (Cocodia, n.d). For three decades after
independence the country was led by a charismatic leader, Houphouet Boigny, who
through his personal charisma, ensured that the various ethnicities of the country
were carried along in the process of governance. Upon his death in 1993, Boigny
left behind a country critically exposed to ethnic tension and primordial pressures.
Through ethnic grand-standing and politicking the political elites that succeeded
Boigny plunged Cote d’Ivoire into morass of ethnic violence that culminated in
civil unrest in the country in the late 1990s.

Sudan: The Republic of Sudan has had a peculiar experience of ethnic conflict.
The Sudan’s experience of ethnic conflict was as a result of the dynamics of ethno-
racial polarization. The conflict was principally between the northward Arabs who
are predominantly Muslim and the Southward ‘Native African’ who are largely
Christians (Okeke, 1999). The conflict situation was complicated by ecological
dynamics of the country whose mainstay occupation is agriculture. The situation
degenerated into intense armed conflict wherein organized rebels and militants
(some of which acted at the instance of the state) confronted one another, leading
to massive human casualties.

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Ethnicity is the foremost bane of political stability and national integration in
Africa (Okoli, 2003). This assertion is better appreciated against the backdrop of
the scale and dimensions of ethnic conflict/violence in contemporary African states,
especially in the Sub-Saharan region. The crisis of ethnicity or ethno-nationalism
(Uduma, 2013) has manifested differently in different African states. In Uganda,
complications of ethnic conflict plunged the nation into a genocidal war that pitted
the ethnic groups against each other (Sadowski, 1998). The Ugandan incident
(1971-1979) resulted in selective ethno-massacre (ethnic cleansing) wherein about
500 persons were killed. Similar incidents happened between the ethnic Hutus and
Tutsis in Burundi (1993-1998) and Rwanda (1994), also leading to high human
causalities (Sadowski, 1998). In Somalia, the pattern of ethnic conflict was more
pertinently parochial. It started as inter-communal conflicts between different
clans in the country (Tenuche, 2002). The situation later degenerated into intense
arms bearing and arms struggle that culminated in the dismemberment of Somalia
nation and the collapse of its state structures in the 1990s (Tenuche, 2002). In the
case of Somalia, ethnicity and ethnic conflict assumed the nature of clannishness.
This was orchestrated by the parochially oriented national elites who were
motivated by sectarian designs.

Elsewhere in Africa, ethnic politics has manifested in the form of violent identity
politics/conflict. Cases in point include Ethiopia, Sudan and, to a reasonable extent
Nigeria (Ayokhai, 2013). The issue of identity becomes salient and politically
potent when it is used to advance group interests in the context of competitive
struggles (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). In such contexts ethnicity has often inter-
mixed with other salient forms of social identity to provide pretexts for inter-
communal conflicts/violence.

Contemporary trends in ethnic conflicts in Africa suggest that ethnic violence has
tended to be occurring more rapidly and more profusely within ethnic groups
(Osinubi and Osinubi, 2006). In Nigeria for instance, there is a litany of such
conflicts, namely: Agulueri/Umuuleri conflict (Anambra State), Ezira/Mgbo
conflict (Ebonyi State), Ife/Modakeke conflict (Osun State), Zango-Kataf conflict
(Kaduna State) Hausa/Birom conflict (Plateau State), and so on (Osinubi and
Osiunbi, 2006). One significant attributes of intra-ethnic conflict is the fact that it
tends to be more brutal and violent (Asiyanbola, 2010). Secondly, such pattern of
conflict appears to have the tendency to last longer than inter-ethnic conflicts. This
observation has been empirically verified in Nigeria where most of the intra-ethnic
conflicts in various parts of the country have proven to be age-long and
intractable. The prevalence of intra-ethnic conflict in some states of Africa points
to the fact that ethnic consciousness and divide are constantly modified and
reconstructed (Zagefka, 2009).

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In Nigeria, ethnic conflict has also been complicated by religious divisions and the
fragility of national polity, the latter exacerbated by secessional conflicts and
religious-sectarian strife (Ngare, 2012). Consequently, ethnic conflict in this
context has often taken the form of regional-local ethno-religious or ethno-
communal conflagrations. Manifestations of this crisis include Christian/Muslim
conflicts in the North, as well as indigene/setter (host/strangers) conflicts in other
regions analysed below (Okoli and Atelhe, 2014).

It is clear that seemingly endemic ethnic conflict in developing African societies

has many causes: the (still strong) legacies of traditional social divisions and
identities; the legacies of colonial past, especially the divisions created by the
formation of colonial political domains; strong legacies of post-colonial divisions
and conflicts fomented in the process of independence and nation-building; and
finally, the internal power struggles during which the divisive ‘ethnic politics’ was
used by local and national elites in their bids for recognition, power and economic
resources. As suggested above, these causal factors can be summarized in four
points: (i) ethno-religious identities belong to the traditional repertoires of
identities that survived the process of independence and nation-building; (ii) these
identities – widely understood and popular –are mobilized and managed by local
and national elites – the key leaders of parties, factions and/or social movements
that conduct ‘ethnic politics’; (iii) the key motivations of these leaders-managers is
political advantage or, as it is often said, desperation of the political elites for
power and resources. There is also an important fourth point that emerges from
this short and admittedly superficial comparison: (iv) where political elites manage
to achieve consensus – as it happened in South Africa as a result of the political
‘pact’ between Mandela and De Klerk in 1994 – the ethnic conflict is effectively
‘contained’. It is no longer a threat to political order; it is effectively managed by
political elites, and it loses its disruptive impact.

2.12. Ethnic conflict and elite theory

As suggested above, we see the main bodies of ‘theories of ethnic division’ and
‘contemporary elite theories’ as not only mutually compatible, but also as
complementary: as shedding light on two different sides or aspects of ethnic conflict.
The theories of ethnicity mentioned above explain the durability of traditional divisions
anchored in peoples’ identities, self-definitions and the accompanied ties of recognition
and loyalty. Different versions of contemporary elite theory, in turn, shed light on the
way in which these traditional identities could be mobilized and manipulated by
political leaders and elites struggling for political recognition, power and economic
spoils. Before we comment more extensively on this complementarity, however, we

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must cast a glance on some other (competing) theoretical accounts of ethnic and
communal strife, especially those deployed by African scholars in this field.
There exist quite a number of theoretical constructs similar to contemporary elite
theory – not always clearly articulated and seldom well-confirmed – seeking to
explicate the nature, causes and character of ethno-religious conflicts in Africa,
including ethnic-communal conflicts, such as those seen in Nigeria. They can be
categorized into three important streams: the political sociology, political ecology, and
political economy (cf. Ogaghae and Suberu, 2005; Bowd and Chikwanha, 2010).
The political sociology perspective emphasizes the socio-cultural cum historical
dynamics of ethno-religious conflicts. Representing this perspective is the primordialist
theory which holds that African conflicts are ‘a mere internal issue based on atavistic
confrontations or old tribal suspicions and, all in all, on actors who are unable to deal
with differences by using dialogue (Mateos, 2010:25). This standpoint to African
conflict has been criticized as being too simplistic, reductionist and imperialist
(Cocodia, n.d). It has failed to underscore the critical economic and political dimensions
to African conflicts such as livelihood, resource and power struggles. It has also failed
to implicate external factors such as colonialism, dependency and foreign interventions
as veritable causes or facilitators of conflicts in Africa.
The political ecology perspective looks at the interaction of political and
ecological forces in precipitating conflicts in Africa. This perspective has given rise to
the ‘resource-conflict’ paradigm which holds African conflicts are fuelled by inter-
group struggles for natural resources (diamond, gold, oil and gas, coltan, etc) ‘where
international actors consciously plan interventions according to their interests’ (Mateos,
2010:26). The resource-conflict theory has been flawed on the premise that it tends to
have wished away the fundamental historical, political, socio-economic, ecological and
sociological dimensions to conflict prevalent in Africa.
The political economy perspective on African conflicts attempts to offer a
holistic conception of the subject matter:
While one steam emphasizes internal factors, such as the
increase of poverty, environmental degradation, the rise of social
exclusion and marginality, elite corruption and militarization of
societies, a second stream focuses on external factors such as the
legacy of colonialism, external dependence, the impact of
structural adjustment programme (SAP) and external debt, or the
85
 growing marginalization of Africa in the global economy
(Mateos, 2010:30).
The political economy approach is often coloured by the ‘greed and grievance’
paradigm (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004:563). It holds that the crisis of accumulation in the
context of the post-Cold War political economy plunged African elites into a struggle
for new sources of authority, privileges and material benefits: control of natural
resources, arms dealing, manipulation of humanitarian aid, etc (Mateos, 2010). In this
regard, the greed (desire for personal enrichment) of the elites as well as their
perception of historical, political and socio-economic injustices (grievance) in the
context of competitive political relations has often engendered ethnic conflicts (see
Clamphan, 2004).
These theoretical insights can easily be incorporated into, or combined with, the
key tenets of contemporary elite theory (Putnam, 1976; Higley and Burton, 2006;
Daloz, 2016). They highlight the importance of ethnic identities in local politics, the
vulnerability of those identities to political manipulation by the key political actors; and
they stress the dialectics of elite management of divisions and conflicts in ethnically
diverse societies. A good study of ethnicity, according to Eriksen (1993:20), should
show that ‘ethnic relations are fluid and negotiable; and their importance varies
situationally; and for all claims to primordiality and cultural roots, ethnic indentities can
be consciously manipulated and invested in economic competition in modern societies’.
In fact, it endorses the view that ethnic politics and the accompanied communal
conflicts are to a large extent products of elite competition in ethno-heterogeneous
context (cf. O’Brien, 1993).
This is only partly compatible with the ethno-primordial views, especially the
view of ‘polyarchy’ (Dahl 1971). The ‘polyarchic’ theory sees the coexistence and
competition of rival groups and their leaders as the political essence of every complex
society (McLean and McMillan, 2003); this is because ‘as a system becomes more
competitive or more inclusive, politicians seek the support of groups that can now
participate more easily in political life’ (Dahl, 1971:23)> Moreover, such a view sees
elites as the main participant in decision making. Applied to analysis to conflicts, the
polyarchical perspective holds that claims and contestations of competing/contending
social groups in society create contradictory social relations that engender conflict
(Okoli, 2013); and organization or social groups ‘reinforce solidarity among members
and conflict with nonmembers’ (Dahl, 1982:44). Moreso, it holds that ethnicity and
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conflict mirror the contradictions of heterogeneity in a ethnically diverse society
whereby various social and political groups are engaged in claims and contestations
over competitive resources and values (Tenuche, 2002). The claims and contestations
refer to stakes and struggles for power, values, and scarce resources of which groups
and their leaders hold incompatible interests (Okoli, 2013). some pluralists has it that
value homogeneity which underpins social order can suffice as political systems
undergo transformation overtime by learning and adaptation. In this way, socially
heterogeneous, ethno-religious and divided societies such as Nigeria could through
power sharing understading, cooperation and elite compromises solve the problems
associated with ethno-religious diversities and its attendant conflicts and where lack of
trust and division excerbate social disorder in Nigeria(Liphart, 1975, 1977)
With reference to ethnic conflicts, the struggles occur among the contending
ethnic groups in a plural societal contest characterized by intense primordialism and
elite politicking that drives ethnic polarization. In such contexts, ethnic identities are
widened and mobilized into competition for scarce and similarly valued resources and
opportunities (Horowitz, 1975). As observed by Diamond:
This ethnic competition – fierce, often violent, and inevitably
political – has in turn been widely viewed as a fundamental
cause of political disorder and decay in the multi-ethnic states of
Asia and especially sub-saharan African (1983:458).
The point being stressed in the foregoing is that elite competition based on
ethnicity is key driver of change in many developing states that are multi-ethnic in
character; and also a fundamental challenge to peace and stability in most African
countries with ethnic pluralism. But ethnic diversity – in the sense of coexistence of
diverse ethnic groups – carries also the seeds of division, conflict and violence. Peaceful
‘poyarchic’ competition is possible ONLY if ‘competing’ elites respect their interests
and domains of power, if they agree on the key norms regulating their peaceful
competition (e.g., respecting the outcomes of popular elections, not using the army,
etc.), and if they respect these norms and transform them into the institutionalized legal
framework (i.e. practice ‘rule of law’). Such elite conditions of ‘polyarchy’ are very rare
in Africa – and they do not exist in Nigeria.
Nigeria has social (ethno-religious) diversity, but also deeply divided elites that
may enter short-term power/ruling arrangements, but have not yet developed enough
consensual unity to sustain long-term stability, lasting elite consensus and firm ‘rule of
87
law’. In respect of Nigeria, ‘this acquires more significance because of the struggle for
access to a variety of limited resources which could include chieftaincy position, power,
status, grassland, markets, water spots for animal, rival claims to land, governmental
policies (and projects) and leadership of political parties among others’ (Tenuche,
2002:3).
The polyarchical perspective and its specific ‘competiting ethnic elites’ version
was pioneered by Robert Dahl, and Nelson Polsby in opposition to ‘single power elite’
position that sees power as cohesive and concentrated and power struggle as limited to
intra-elite affair (Prewitt K, Stone A, 1993; Mills, 1956; McLean and McMillan, 2003).
It is opposed to Marxism – class divisions do not play central roles in pluralist schemes
– and focuses on social grouping as the most fundamental forces of societal dynamics
(Putnam, 1976); and sees the existence of power dispersion and the possibility of
changes taking place over time within the elite persons and legitimacy seen as arising
from electoral democracy. When juxtaposed with elite theory the polyarchical
perspectives provide one valuable corrective: elite cohesion and consensus that allow
mitigating violent conflicts have to encompass a broad range of elite positions,
including the most important economic, religious and the main local community
leaders. In such a form, elite theory may be seen as ‘elite management/manipulation
theory’ that links ethnicity and ethnic conflict to political machinations by the key
leaders-elites who mobilize ethnic sentiments in advancing their power interests (Fearon
and Laitin, 2000; Brass, 1991; Cornell, 2001; Diamond, 1983; Gagnon, 1994; Gur,
1994).
The ‘elite manipulation theory’ is highly evaluative and ideological. It is
concerned with the influence of the political elite in the context of high-stake inter-
group political relations (Putman, 1976). According to Etzioni-Halevy (1989: 215), it
looks at ‘the manner in which power is used, and frequently abused’ by the ruling elites
often in advancement of vested interests that are primordial. The theory thus explains
ethnic conflicts as elite driven clashes and contestations (Nationalism Studies, 2008).
Being elite-driven, ethnic conflicts result from political manipulation of subjective
ethnic consciousness in a manner that passes for politicization of ethnicity (Putnam,
1976).
Other theorists, in similar conception, maintain that elite competitions as well as the
actitivies of ethnic entrepreneurs drive ethnic conflict (Brass 1991, 1996, 1997; Vail
1991). Ethnic identities are manipulated by the elites in their quest for power, influence
88
and money. To Brass, it is elites that ‘construct’ ethnic conflict and manipulate cultural
forms, values, and practices of ethnic groups as political resources for power and
economic leverage (Brass 1997:26, 1991:15). The elite manipulation of ethnicity has
been made possible, particularity in Nigeria as a culturally heterogeneous entity. The
existence of a multiplicity of ethno-communal groups Nigeria has created faul-tlines
that are often exploited and manipulated by the power-desperate elites in the arenas of
competitive politics and partisan relations (Llobera, 1999; Williams, 2015).
This theory further explains ethnic conflict/violence as a purposeful design of
political elites for acquiring and consolidating political power. It argues that the elites
instigate ethnic conflict as a means of gaining advantage for political support. This
narative largely explains how ‘ethnic boundaries’ and antagonism arising therefrom
emanate from the strategic action of political elites in their bid to seek power or subvert
other competitors (Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Gagnon, 1994). Synder (2000) pinpointed
the instrumental use of ethnic divisions for political gains which make nationalist/ethnic
conflict inevitable during democratization. Moreover, elites find it expedient to
construct ethnic identities so as to get appreciable voting blocs (Bates, 1983; Horowitz,
1985; Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Munene, 2010; Lynch, 2011). In this process,
discriminatory behaviors which create US versus THEM divide are established which
more often than not generate ethnic conflict with violent outcomes.
The process of manipulation includes political mobilization of primordial
identities in polities where ethno-communal ties and cleavages play a crucial role in
conditioning the political processes. These processes rely on a contextual appreciation
of issues at stake alongside the variables at play. Hence, the use and management of
ethnicity may take so many forms – they reflect the multiplicity of available ‘repertoirs
(traditional ethnicities), as well as the diversity of elite interests such mobilisations may
serve (Nnoli, 1978)
Such processes of ethnic manipulation are complex. They start with strategic
‘othering’ based on ethno-communal differentiation whereby the elites divide their
followership among the populace along real or affected ethnic cleavages and closures
for effective partisan mobilization (Okoli, 2003). This process is often associated with
improvised narratives designed to propagate inter-ethnic antipathies and prejudices.
When these sentiments are cultivated through a variety of populist machinations and
grand designs, the masses would begin to fell or imagine some differences between
their in-groups and others’ out-groups. This presents a veritable pretext for elites’
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manipulation and mobilization (cf. Etzion-Haley, 1989). The point being underscored
here is that ethnicity lacks innate political saliency. It is usually constructed, activated,
mobilized, and manipulated in advancement of the interests of the political elite who
resort to that as a means of engendering socio-political capital for the purpose of
ensuring competitive political advantage. It is this politicization of ethnicity that
accounts for its saliency in the context of inter-group political relations.
2.13. Situating the Theoretical Framework: Insights from Contemporary Elite Theory
So, in spite of their conspiracy and solidarity towards presenting and
perpetrating their hold on power,The literature reviewed above portrays the Nigerian
political elites characteristically representas a discordant coalition, divided by
primordial ethnic and modern interest cleavages, and .held together by a fragile
pragmatic consensus. Ethnic politics forms one of the way of asserting political power,
claiming and signaling political influence, and defending sectional interests. Instead of
working for a national consensus through politics of consociation, fractions of the
national elite formation have often pandered towards parochial and sectionalist pursuits
in their desperate struggles for power. As this thesis is inclined to posit, this tendency
has brought about outcomes that negate national stability in Nigeria, as in the case of
ethno-communal conflicts. This line of argument is further explored with historical and
contemporary evidences in the subsequent chapters.

2.14. Conclusion

We adopt a position that ethnic conflict is basically an outcome of existing the old and
well-established ethnic/identificational divisions repertoires, as well as elite-conducted
‘ethnic politics’ that takes the form of mobilization of ethno-religious identities and
loyalties in political competition for power and resources. As mentioned above, other
prevailing perspectives on the subject have emphasized other crucial sources and
aspects of ethnic conflict, such as traditionalism, colonial legacies, identity clash,
cultural hate, and the like. Some of these conceptions have failed to situate the essence
of the phenomenon and to underscore the material sociological condition under which
ethnic conflict takes on its salience: the context of political competition. In the light of
the above, our review affirms the standpoint to the effect that ethnic conflict is
inherently political. The political essence of ethnic conflict is to be appreciated with

90
reference to elite manipulation of ethnicity in which context politicization of ethnicity
occurs, making ethnic conflict inevitable.
Further, we maintain that Tthis elite-managed ethnic politics have resulted in
dire consequences in Nigeria and in entire African continent. The high incidence and
prevalence of ethnic conflict in contemporary Africa is indicative of the fact that
political elites find it easy and opportune to pursue their power interests through
political mobilization of ethno-religious segments of populations. They can also
maintain loyalties of such ethno-religious segments by ‘coupling’ themselves with their
leaders, and by delivering patronage and privilege in exchange of political support. To
put it in the language of elite theory: African elites are deeply and widely divided along
‘primordial’ lines: tribal, ethnic, religious, etc. The processes of nation-building have
proven too weak/short to develop alternative manageable (e.g., functional and
territorial-regional) identities. Processes of elite interaction and integration have proven
too restricted to develop sufficiently broad elite consensus about the rules of political
game. Therefore the politics of Nigeria – and the entire sub-Saharan region – resembles
warfare more than normatively regulated game. Where some elite agreements have been
made – like in South Africa in 1994 – the fractious ethno-religious (and other) conflicts
have been contained, at least for a while. So, we see in the next Chapter, how the
Nigerian elites seem to be in a state of a temporary truce, an armistice, rather than a
lasting pact.When this truce lasts, the ‘ethnic politics’ is largely contained or suppressed
by force.

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 CHAPTER 23

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

Introduction

This chapter deals withoutlines the historical and political context for the study.
contextual cum historical background to the ethnic and communal conflict. It traces the
evolution of Nigeria as from colonial times, when it formed an occupied ‘region’,
through the formation of a single polity and independent state, to the conflict-ridden
development over the last half a century. It highlights describes the ethnic composition
of Nigeria – extremely complex, diverse and dynamic – and situates the setting forof the
study for more detailed analysis of theof ‘ethnic politics’ and communal conflicts
conflicts in the North-Central region.

Colonialism and Political Change in Nigeria

What is today known as Nigeria was a British imperial creation (Okoli, 2003). The
history of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Nigeria could be traced to deeds of
colonialism. The different ethnic groups or even ethnic nations were brought together
by British colonization under a single administration in 1914 that saw the northern and
southern provinces being amalgamated into a nation called Nigeria as alluded in
previous sections. Colonialism failed to build the different nations into a united entity
thereby generating ethnocentrism, nepotism, tribalism, hatred, division and conflict
among the divergent ethic groups that make up the country which has persisted till date.
Most scholars argued that the system not only intensified ethnic divisions, but ‘it has
complicated the task of welding diverse elements into a Nigerian nation’ (Coleman,
1958:194; Nnoli, 1978:113) see section 5.5 for a detailed analysis of colonial legacy in
Nigeria.
Prior to colonial influence, the various lands and peoples of Nigeria were under
different patterns of traditional socio-political organization and administration. This
92
ranged from native republicanism to tribal monarchism. For instance, the acephalous
communities of the South-Eastern Nigeria were organized as autonomous village
democracies with built-in mechanisms that guaranteed popular sovereignty
(Ademoyega, 1962).
On the other hand, the centralized systems of western and northern Nigeria
practiced varying patterns of traditional monarchy. The advent of Islam in parts of
Northern Nigeria in the 17th Century introduced the emirate system of administration in
that context. Meanwhile, the native Hausa states practice what is often referred to as
city-state model of native administration. Elsewhere, there were pockets of organized
chiefdoms and empires which represent different concepts of monarchism.

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Table 3.3 Pattern of Political Organization in Pre-colonial Nigeria
TYPES OF ORGANIZATION EXAMPLES
Household chiefdoms/fiefdoms The various household sovereignties of the
Oil Rivers region.
Village democracies The republican villages (communities of the
Igbo-speaking Eastern Nigeria)
City-states The pre-colonial Hausa communities of
Northern Nigeria
Traditional Monarchies The Oyo empire, the Benin empire/kingdom,
the Kwararafa kingdom, the Kanem-Bornu
empire, etc
Emirate system The Sokoto caliphate, the Zazzau emirate, the
Duara Emirate, etc

Full-blown colonialism started in Nigeria in 1900. Hitherto, the British imperial

powers had craftly established their stronghold over the land and peoples of Nigeria
through sundry political, economic, social and military tactics. Between 1900 and 1959,
Nigeria remained under the colonial tutelage of Britain.This was amidst the dynamics of
nationalist pressures that metamorphosed in her attainment of independence on October
1st, 1960. Upon independence, the political evolution of Nigeria assumed a dramatic
turn and dimension, depicting a chequered journey to nationhood. Table 3.2 highlights
some of the milestone events that have characterized the evolution of Nigeria as a
modern state.

Table 3.2 Milestone in the Evolution of Nigeria

Pre-1800 Foremost European contacts with the indigenous peoples of
Nigeria in the form of explorations, expeditions, missionary
activities, slave trade, and coastal trade.
1804–06 Usman Dan Fodio led a jihad that led to the islamization of
large parts of Northern and Western Nigeria.
1844-45 The Berlin Conference partitioned the Niger area to the
British Empire as an exclusive sphere of influence
1849 Appointment of John Beecroft as an imperial consul for the
Bights of Benin and Biafra
1851 Lagos was invaded by British imperial forces
1861 Lagos was made a colony of the British empire.
1879 The beginning of company rule, with Sir Goildie’s United

94
 African Company (UAC) at the saddle
1900 Formal commencement of direct colonialism in Nigeria
1906 The colony of Lagos was joined to the Protectorate of
Southern Nigeria
1914 The southern Protectorate (alongside Lagos) was merged
with the Northern Protectorate (the Amalgamation) by Lord
Lugard.
1922 The first political party known as Nigerian National
Democratic Party (NNDP) was formed.
1930s-1950s More political parties were born in Nigeria alongside
increasing nationalism and constitutional reforms.
1960 Nigeria attained political independence
1963 Nigeria assumed her first republican status
1966 Nigeria’s First Republic failed in a military coup d’état
1967-1970 The Nigeria Biafran Civil war was fought
1979 Nigeria’s Second Republic began
1983 Nigeria’s Second Republic failed in a military coup d’état
1989-1993 Nigeria’s abortive Third Republic lasted, ending in transition
crisis (June 12 crisis).
1999 Nigeria’s Fourth Republic began
2015- Nigeria’s Fifth Republic on course

Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has operated a federal system of

government. Federalism recommends itself as the best and surest model of political
organization in Nigeria in view of the country’s characteristic heterogeneous national
attribute (Okoli, 2003; Okoli and Okpaleke, 2013). Consequently, federalism has been
adopted in Nigeria as a mechanism of harmonizing the country’s centrifugal and
centripetal tendencies with a view to achieving unity in diversity. While federalism has
consistently remained the organizing principle of Nigeria polity, the structure of the
Nigerian federation has significantly changed over the years in keeping with the trend of
federal engineering and (re-)structuring (Okoli and Okpaleke, 2013). Table 3.3
highlights the structure of Nigeria federalism over the years.

Table 3.3 Structure of Nigerian Federalism (1960 – 2015)

Period Federal Structure Federating Units
1960-1963 3 Regions plus Lagos as East, West, and North
Federal capital territory-FCT
1963-1967 3 regions plus Lagos as FCT East, West, Mid-West, and
North

95
1967-1976 12 States plus Lagos as FCT Cross-River, East Central,
Rivers, Mid-Western, Lagos,
Western, Benue-Plateau,
Kano, Kwara, North-Central,
North Western, and North
Eastern states.
1976-1987 19 States plus Lagos as FCT Cross-River, Anambra, Imo,
Rivers, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo,
Oyo, Benue, Bendel, Plateau,
Kano, Kwara, Kaduna,
Sokoto, Bauchi, Borno,
Niger, and Gongola states.
1987-1991 21 States plus Lagos as FCT Cross-River, Anambra, Imo,
Rivers, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo,
Oyo, Benue, Bendel, Plateau,
Kano, Kwara, Kaduna,
Sokoto, Bauchi, Borno,
Niger, Gongola, Akwa-Ibom,
and Katsina states.
1991-1996 30 States plus Abuja as FCT Cross-River, Anambra, Imo,
Rivers, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo,
Oyo, Benue, Bendel, Plateau,
Kano, Kwara, Kaduna,
Sokoto, Bauchi, Borno,
Niger, Gongola State, Akwa-
Ibom, Katsina, Jigawa, Kogi,
Kebbi, Yobe, Adamawa,
Taraba, Abia, Osun, Deltaand
Enugu States
1996-2015 36 States plus Abuja as FCT Cross-River, Anambra, Imo,
Rivers, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo,
Oyo, Benue, Bendel, Plateau,
Kano, Kwara, Kaduna,
Sokoto, Bauchi, Borno,
Niger, Gongola State, Akwa-

96
 Ibom, Katsina, Jigawa, Kogi,
Kebbi, Yobe, Adamawa,
Taraba, Abia, Osun, Delta,
Enugu, Ebonyi, Ekiti,
Bayelsa, Zamfara, Gombe
and Nasarawa states.

In their march towards nationhood, Nigerians have demonstrated immense

resolve for democracy and civil order. In spite of the bloody civil war in the 1960s and
incessant military interventions that trailed the initial attempts towards civil rule and
democratization, Nigeria is currently acclaimed globally as one of the emerging (albeit
fragile and still merely ‘electoral’) democracies in Africa. Nigeria’s resolve for stability
and democracy has been overtly affirmed in her 2015 general elections experience. The
success of the election – the absence of widespread violence or attempts at military
coups that may herald some form of elite agreement – had paved the way for a
successful democratic transition for the first time in Nigeria. More significantly, the
experience had broken the jinx of virtual inconclusive electioneering and transition
programme in Nigeria’s fifty years of political existence. Table 3.4 hereunder is
instructive in this regard.

Table 3.4 History of Political Transitions in Nigeria (1960 – 2015)

Period No of Mode of Take- off Mode of Exit
Years
First Republic 1963-1966 3 years Civil transition Military take over
Second Republic 4 years Military guided Military take over
1979-1983 civil transition
Third (abortive)Republic 1989-1993 Civil-Military Transition
diarchy crisis/failure
Fourth Republic 1999 – 16 years Military guided Civil transition
2015 civil transition
Fifth Republic ? Civil transition ?

Table 3.4 indicates that out of the five republican experiences of Nigeria, only
two has been a product of civil democratic process. The rest has been the outcome of
military intervention in politics, leading often to an emasculated democratic transition.

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Table 3.5 Nigeria’s Profile
Item Highlights(s)
Official designation Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN)
Regime type Constitutional democracy
Governmental system, Presidential federalism
Colonial Master The Great Britain
Year of Independence 1960, October 1
Official language English
National currency Naira (One Naira = apprx. 190 as of Mid 2015
USD)
Federal Capital Territory Abuja
Major cities Abuja, Kano, Lagos, Kaduna, Port-Harcourt,
Benin City, Calabar, Enugu etc
Main commercial hubs Lagos, Kano, Port-Harcourt
Major Ethnic groups Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba, Ijaw, Tiv, Fulani
Climate Equatorial in the south; tropical in the Central;
and arid in the North
Provinces/States 36 States and 1 (one) Federal Capital
Territory
Area (Total surface) 923,768km2 (coastline 853km)
Population 170 million people (by recent NBS estimate,
2012)
Religion Islam (about 50%); Christianity (about 40%);
Indigenous beliefs (about 10%)
Prime endowment Oil and gas, solid minerals, livestock, arable
crops
Political economy Bourgeoning macro-economic superficies
with mono-cultural, rentier and weak
industrial base

3.1 Ethnic composition of Nigeria

Nigeria is an ethnically diverse country with a total population of c. 190 million

and as much as 400 different ethnic groups. Some claim that there is only less than 100
ethnic groups in the country, but these differences result from somewhat unclear
definitions of ethnicity an ethnic group (Ademoyega, 1962; Okoli and Iortyer, 2014).
The criteria for distinguishing and classifying ethnic groups in Nigeria remain
problematic. Most accounts emphasize common language and ancestry as the bases of

98
classification, while others stress other ethnological considerations. The use of language
(linguistic identity) as the basis of classifying ethnic groups in Nigeria, however, is at
best problematic. According to Anugwom:
…while language may be one of the important factors for the
defining an ethnic group, some groups in Nigeria may have lost
their original linguistic roots while retaining their identity, as a
result of intense interaction with larger ethnic groups. And in the
same vein, many ethnic groups may use the same language to
ease communication, as in the case of smaller ethnic groups in
the North of Nigeria, where Hausa has become more or less a
lingua franca. Therefore, there is no direct relationship between
language and ethnic grouping in Nigeria (2000:66).
Generally, ethnic groups in Nigeria have been classified as either ‘majority’ or
‘minority’. The ‘majority’ ethnic groups refer to the dominant ethnic nationalities that
are easily recognized in the geo-regional politics of Nigeria. On the other hand, the
ethnic ‘minorities’ refer to pockets of other ethnic and sub-ethnic nationalities that are
scattered across the different parts of the country. Table 3.6 highlights the majority
ethnic nationalities in Nigeria.

Table 3.6 Ethnic Majorities in Nigeria

GROUP COMPARATIVE STRENGHT
Hausa-Fulani 29%
Yoruba 21%
Ibo (Igbo) 18%
Ijaw 10%
Kanuri 4%
Ibibio 3.5%
Tiv 2.5%
Source: WHO, 2012; see also Okoli and Iortyer (2014:21)

Table 3.6 indicates that the Hausa-Fulani is the most dominant ethnic group in
Nigeria. The group consists of the ethnic Hausas and Fulani’s who have successfully
cross-bred into a single ethnology by dint of prolonged mutual association, inter-
marriage and cross-civilization. They are predominantly Muslims and use Hausa
language as a lingua franca. The group is largely found in most parts of Northern
Nigeria. In addition to the ethnic majorities highlighted in Table 3.6, there exists a

99
multiplicity of minority ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. Most of these minority ethnic
groups are found in the North-Eastern and North-Central parts of the country. Some of
these ethnic groups share some linguistic and cultural affinities while some are
characteristically distinct from each other. Table 3.7 highlights some of the minority
ethnic groups in Nigeria alongside their regional distribution in contemporary Nigeria.

Table 3.7 (a) some minority Ethnic Groups in Nigeria

s/n Ethnic group Location
1 Bachama South-West
2 Ora South-West
3 Yekhee South-West
4 Edo South-West
5 Bassawa North-Central
6 Igala North –Central
7 Idoma North-Central
8 Mbula North-East
9 Ijo South-South
10 Isoko South-South
11 Urhobo South-South
12 Itshekiri South-South
13 Boatonum South-West
14 Kambari North-Central, North East
15 Bulawa North-east
16 Kamaku North-Central
17 Ebira North-Central
18 Nupe North West
19 Gwani North-Central
20 Tiv North-Central
21 Jukun North-East; North-Central
22 Chomo-Karim North-East
23 Jarawa North-East
24 Angas North-Central; North-East
25 Haggi (Kamwe) North-East
26 Kerekare South-West
27 Eloyi South-West
28 Bade North-East
29 Buri North-East
30 Balta North-East
31 Kanuri North-East
32 Margi North-East
33 Delta Minorities South-South
34 Gwandara North-Central
35 Chamba-Deka North-East
36 Katang North-Central
37 Berom North-Central
38 Kadara North-West, North-Central
100
 39 Kurama North-East
40 Mada North-Central
41 Alago Norh-Central
42 Migili North-Central
43 Eggon North-Central
44 Bokyi South-South
45 Ekoni South-South
46 Agoi South-South
47 Efik South-South
48 Ibibio South-South
49 Annang South-South
50 Mumuye North-East
51 Waja North-East
52 Busa North-East
53 Dandi North-East
54 Buduma North-East
55 Shuwa North-East
Source: Adapted from Iwaloye and Ibeanu 1997 (cf. Anugwom, 2000:67).

Among other things, Table 3.7 indicates that the North-East and North-Central
areas of Nigeria have the highest concentration of ethnic nationalities. It is within this
zone that the bulk of the ethnic and communal skirmishes and violence in contemporary
Nigeria has occurred.

Figure 3.1 Distribution of Ethnic Groups per Region

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 Key:
N.E = North-East
N.W = North-West
N.C = North-Central
S.E = South-East
S.W = South-West
S. S = South- South
Source: Field Work, May-June, 2015

Figure 3.2 Incidence of Ethnic Crisis in Nigeria per Region

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 Figure 3.2 among other things, indicates that the incidence of ethnic crisis is
highest in the North-Central but lowest in the North-East. The spate of ethnic crisis in
the North-Central and North Eastern parts of the country is traceable to the
preponderance of ethnic groups in the region. Likewise, the marginal occurrence of
such crisis in the South-East is as a result of its relative homogeneity. Futhermore, the
figure, suggests that North-Central region was characterized by high incidence of ethnic
crisis to the tune of 30%. The region is followed by the North East and South-South that
recorded 25% incidence of ethnic crisis respectively. The prevalence of sundry ethno-
communal conflicts in the North-Central within the time under investigation largely
explained the leading position of the region in the ranking chart. The figures reflected
on the chart are relative to other forms of social crisis prevalent in the era.

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Table 3.7 (b) Location of Ethnic Groups in Nigeria
STATE BY ZONE DOMINANT ETHNIC NO. OF MINORITY
GROUP ETHNIC GROUP
NORTH WEST 54
Sokoto,Kebbi+ Zamfara Hausa 12
Katsina Hausa 1
Kano+Jigawa Hausa 9
Kaduna Hausa 32
NORTH-EAST 205
Borno+ Yobe Kanuri 29
Adamawa+ Taraba Fulain, Hausa 112
Bauchi+Gombe Hausa 64
NORTH- CENTRAL 123
Old Kwara (+some part of Yoruba, Ebira, Igala 20
Kogi)
Old Niger Hausa, Gwari 19
Old Benue(+some parts of Tiv, Idoma, Igala 12
Kogi)
Plateau + Nasarawa Birom, Angas, Yergam, Hausa 72
South-West 4
Oyo + Osun Yoruba Nil
Ekiti + Ondo Yoruba 2
Ogun Yoruba Nil
Lagos Yoruba 2
South East 1
Anambra, Enugu+Ebonyi Igbo 1
Imo + Abia Igbo Nil
South- South 59
Edo+Delta Bini (Edo),Urhobo, Ijaw, 13
Itsekiri, Igbo
Rivers + Bayelsa Ijeior, Ogoni, Andoni, Igbo 10
Akwa Ibom Ibibio 7
Cross River Efik 29
Source: Adapted from Mustapha (2004:14)

3.2 Study setting: North-Central Nigeria

The setting of the study is the North-Central region of Nigeria. The notion of
geo-political division in Nigeria is a political construct designed to zone the federation
of Nigeria into geo-regional blocs for the purpose of administration convenience. The
idea was first muted in a presentation made by the former Nigeria vice president, Dr.
104
Alex Ekwueme, at the 1989 National Political Bureau. The thrust of the idea was that
Nigeria was to be divided into six geo–regional zones, namely North East, North West,
North-central, South-East, South-West, and South-South. This initiative was adopted by
the government of the late Sani Abacha (1993-1998) as an administrative principle of
federal engineering in Nigeria. Table 3.8 shows the six geo-regional division of Nigeria
alongside their constituent states.

Table 3.8 Nigerian Six Geo-regional Division

DIVISION/ZONE CONSTITUENT STATES
North-Central Kwara, Nasarawa, Plateau, Kogi, Benue, Niger
North- East Burno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, Taraba,
Jigawa
North-West Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kaduna
South-East lmo, Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, Abia
South-South Rivers, Bayelsa, Edo, Akwa-lbom, Cross River, Delta
South-West Ogun, Osun, Oyo, Ekiti, Lagos, Ondo
Source: Researcher, 2015

The focus of this study is on the North-Central division of Nigeria. This

comprises Plateau, Nasarawa, Kogi, Benue, Niger and Kwara states. It also
encompasses the Abuja Federal Capital Territory, the administrative headquarters of
Nigeria. The need to concentrate on this region was principally informed by the fact that
it constitutes the most volatile zone in terms of incidence and prevalence of ethnic
conflicts and communal violence on contemporary Nigeria. Virtually all the states in the
region have had pockets of ethnic and communal disturbances over the years.
Within the North-Central region, the study takes its research case from two
particular states, namely Nasarawa and Plateau. The choice of these states was
predicated on the fact that they have hosted more than 70% of the ethnic conflicts in the
region. This makes them veritable destinations for an inquiry on ethnic communal
conflict in Nigeria. Besides, the states share a number of commonalities in term of
political history, ethnic composition and social diversity, which makes it possible to
establish common and comparable trends and patterns in respect of their experiences of
ethnic-communal crises.
It is important to note that the area already referred to as the North-Central
Nigeria in the foregoing is not unanimously acknowledged as such. In effect, the area
has been variously designated by various sources as the Middle-Belt of Nigeria, Central

105
Nigeria, or the Lower Savannah Basin of Nigeria (Alubo, 2008; Blench, 2005). It is also
noteworthy that the geographical conception and denotation of North-Central Nigeria
extends beyond the confines of the six states listed in Table.3.6 in this particular
understanding, The region encompasses parts of Southern Kaduna and Niger States in
the North-West as well as Southern Taraba in the North East.
For the purpose of the study, however, the conception of North-Central Nigeria
has been further restricted to its conventional geo-regional understanding, presupposing
the land and peoples of the six states listed on the first low of Table 3.8. The North-
Central Nigeria is characterized by immense ethnic diversity. In fact, it is second to the
North- East zone in terms of ethnic spread and diversity. Prominent ethnic nationalities
that are found in the region are highlighted in table 3.9

Table 3.9 Ethnic Distribution in North-Central Nigeria

STATE MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS
Benue Tiv, ldoma, lgede
Plateau Birom, Katang, Hausa
Kogi Egbira, Yoruba, lgala
Nasarawa Eggon, Kambari, Alago, Migili, Mada
Kwara Yoruba, Fulani, Nupe
Abuja FCT Gwari, Hausa
Niger Nupe, Hausa, Gbagi (Gwari)
Source: Researcher, 2015

The people of North-Central Nigeria are predominantly farmers. They explore

the vast arable lands in the region for varying scales of subsistence and semi-
commercial agriculture. They are also involved in other forms of land-use occupation
such as hunting, mining of solid minerals and the like. In terms of cultural
characteristics, the North-Central region is also equally diverse. It has a fair distribution
of adherents of lslam, Christianity and traditional beliefs. It is also characterized by
complex communal and linguistic divergences. As such, no fewer than fifty languages
are spoken in the region.
North-Central Nigeria has been notorious for conflictual inter-group relations.
Barth noted that ‘cultural differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and
interdependence’ (1998: 199). This assertion seems correct in that despite long-standing
inter-mingling and mutual association among the various groups in the region, there has
been high incidence and prevalence of inter-group crisis often resulting in ethno-

106
religious or communal/sectarian violence. The states of Plateau and Nasarawa have
been particularly notorious in this regard. Demographically, the North-Central Nigeria
represents a microcosm of the Nigerian federation. It is populated by an avalanche of
ethnic and sub-ethnic nationalities, some of which appear to be on the verge of cultural
extinction. The human population of the region represents approximately one-eighth
(1/8) of the national population figures (NPC, 2006). Table 3.10 presents the human
population figure of the North central states based on the Nigeria’s 2006 national census
data.

Table 3.10 Population of the North-Central Region

STATE POPULATION (IN MILLION)
Benue 4,219,244
Kogi 3,278,487
Plateau 3,178,712
Kwara 2,371,089
Nasarawa 1,863,275
Abuja FCT 1,405,201
Niger 3, 950,249
TOTAL 19,067,049
Source: National Population commission NPC, Nigeria

Figure 3.3 Political Map of Nigeria and the map of North-central Nigeria.

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https://www.researchgate.net/figure/275350414_fig3_Figure-3-Map-of-Nigeria-showing-the-36-
states-and-the-Federal-Capital-Territory-Abuja. Accessed on 1-04-2017

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 CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 The Research Design

The study is a qualitative and exploratory. It makes use of combination of primary and
secondary sources of data. The creative application of primary and secondary data in
this context makes for methodological hybridization, which ensures that the limitations
of both data sources are moderated in such a manner that enhances research validity and
reliability (Royce, A. etal 1998; Uwe, F. 2009). In presenting the analysis proper, the
study adopts a thematic approach whereby salient issues pertaining to the objectives of
the study are schematically laid out under a number of themes and sub-themes.

4.2 Research concepts, focus and location

The main research concepts were discussed in the previous chapter. The notion of
ethnic conflict is understood in this chapter as an outcome elite management and
manipulation of ethnic identities. It is used in this study as corollary of communal
conflict in view of the fact that most communal conflict in the area of study have ended
up in socio-political antagonisms and violent confrontations. The focus of study,
therefore, is the relationship between ethnic identities, their political managers-local and
national elites-and the resulting patterns of social antagonisms and political conflicts
Within the wider location of the study – the North-Central region of Nigeria –
the research focuses on two focal states namely Plateau and Nasarawa. The Plateau state
is a member of the thirty-six federating units of the Nigeria federation. It was created in
1976 from the old Benue-Plateau state. Plateau state is situated in the highlands of
Central Nigeria, otherwise referred for as the Middle Belt. It possesses a number of
features which makes it attractive for residential and commercial/economic purposes.
Describing the economic importance of Plateau state, Sokoto (n.d:1) aptly opines:
The discovery of tin and columbite on the Plateau by the British
led to the conscription of labourers from all the provinces of
Northern Nigeria to work in the tin mines. The availability of
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 fertile agricultural land attracted farmers from distant places to
engage in the production of various crops. The climate situation
of the Plateau, which is near template along with abundant water
and pasture led to the flocking of livestock rearers to the area.
The absence of diseases which are detrimental to livestock
rearing led to heavy concentration of livestock usually reared by
the Fulani on the Plateau. The temperate climate of the Jos
Plateau coupled with its natural tourist resources attracted
Nigerians and Foreigners alike to the Plateau for vacation,
permanent settlement or retirement.
Jos is the capital city of the Plateau state. The city of Jos prior to the internecine
conflict in the state was a flourishing urban enclave with a cosmopolitan outlook. It
played host to a variety of local, national and international settlers. It was also reputed
as a veritable destination for tourism, hospitality and commerce. Plateau state is
composed of 17 local government areas. They are: Barkin Ladin, Bassa, Bokkos, Jos
East, Jos North, Jos South, Kanam, Kanke, Langtang North, Langtang South, Mangu,
Mikang, Pankshin, Qu’an-pan, Riyon, Shendam, and Wase. According to the 2006
Nigeria census figures, Plateau state has a total human population of 3,178,712.
The Plateau state is home to many ethnic groups, the prominent among which
are Berom, Anaguta, Afrisere, Hausa/Fulani, and the host of other settler-ethnic groups.
The state is reputed to be the second most ethnically diverse state in Nigeria (Alubo,
2006). The social heterogeneity and diversity of Plateau state is akin to that of Nigeria.
The diverse population is seen as bearing two identities: indigenes and settlers. There
are also prominent presence of Islam, Christianity and animism in the state (Osaretin
and Akor, 2013). Once fondly reported as ‘Home of Peace and Tourism’, Plateau state
has over the years degenerated into the morass of identity conflict. Examples of such
conflicts include the Mangu-Fier border conflicts in 1984, the indigene/settler conflicts
in Bukuru and Jos that culminated in the 1994 mass violence, the Mangu-Bukkas
conflicts of 1992 and 1995, the Bukuru Gyero Road conflicts of 1997 between the
Birom and Hausa communities, the Mangu-Chagal conflicts of 1997, as well as the
ethno-religious conflagration of the 2000s (cf. Ambe-Uva, 2010).
The Nasarawa state was carved out of the old Plateau state in1996. The capital
of the state is Lafia. Akwanga, Keff, and Karu are other important cities in the state.

110
Nasarawa state is popularly known as the home of solid minerals in view of the
abundant deposits of assorted solid minerals in the state.
Nasarawa state is populated by a diverse range of ethnic and sub-ethnic
nationalities, the prominent among which are Eggon, Kanuri(Kamberi), Alago, Mada,
Migili, Tiv, Wamba, Jukun, etc. According to 2006 population census, Nasarawa state
has a total human population of 1,863,275 persons. The state is composed of thirteen
(13) Local Government Areas (LGAs) namely: Akwanga, Awe, Doma, Karu, Keana,
Keffi, Kokona, Lafia, Nasrawa, Nasarawa Eggon, Obi, Toto, and Wamba (Ayih, 2003).
The Nasarawa state is richly endowed with solid minerals and agricultural
resources. Some of the solid minerals found in commercial quantities in the state are
assorted precious stones, potash, and salt, to mention but a few. The state is also famous
for the production of a variety of agricultural produces such root and tuber crops, fruits,
grains, legumes and vegetables. It is a heterogeneous state with many of languages,
religions and ethnic groups. There are about 29 indigenous languages being spoken in
the various parts of the state. Over the years, the Nasarawa state has been a field for
different dimensions of inter-communal conflicts with far reaching destructive
implications.

4.3 Population and selection of respondents (informants)

The target population of the study is the inclusive human population of the states under
study. Based on the 2006 Nigeria national census figures, the two states combined have
a total population of 5,041,987million people. This figure is distributed among the state
thus:

Table 4.1 Population Distribution of the Focal States

STATE POPULATION(in million)
Nasarawa 1,863,275
Plateau 3,178,712
TOTAL 5,041,987
Source: National Population Commission, 2006

It will be practically impossible to cover the whole of the afore-stated population

in this study. Consequently a sample population of four hundred and twenty (420) key

111
informants and field discussants (herein also referred to as respondents) was resorted to.
This sample size was purposively determined based on the researcher’s judgment and
discretion as informed by the convenience of the research. To ensure that the sample
was fairly representative and valid, care was taken by the researcher to ensure that all
the local governments in the two focal states were covered in terms of selection of
respondents. However, more numbers of respondents were selected from the urban
areas of Lafia (in Nasarawa state) and Jos (in Plateau state) in view of the relative
accessibility and hospitability of these areas in the course of the research
(fieldwork/study). Table 4.2 sheds general insights on the aforestated.

Table 4.2 Location and Distribution of Field Interviews/Discussions

Location State Number of Respondents
Lafia* Nasarawa 87
Obi Nasarawa 59
Awe Nasarawa 38
Shendam Plateau 66
Jos* Plateau 85
Yelwa Plateau 34
Lantan Plateau 51
*State capital

4.4 Data collection

The study makes use of primary and secondary data. The application of primary and
secondary data facilitates methodological triangulation, which ensures that the
limitations of both data sources are moderated in such a manner that would enhance
research reliability and validity (Royce, A. Etal, 1998; Uwe, Flick, 2009). In presenting
the analysis proper, the study adopted a qualitative descriptive approach based on
thematic consideration of salient issues.
Primary sources included Key Informant Interview (KIIs) and Focused Group
Discussions (FGDs) complemented with a Study Chats (SCs). The KIIs was in form of
semi-structured interview whereby views of selected respondents on the causes, nature ,
character, dimensions of ethnicity and triggers of ethno-communal crisis and its impact
were solicited based on both scheduled and ‘chance’ contacts. The FGDs Were
conducted in series of rounds. It took the form of group conversation whereby the

112
researcher interfaced with a selected number of groups deemed to be knowledgeable on
the various aspects of the study. The SC was designed to elicit anecdotal information on
the subject matter based on ‘chance conversations’ with a number of persons whom the
researcher came in passing contact with in the course of the field research.
Field interviews and discussions targeted selected individuals and groups drawn
from the population under investigation based on purposive and non-probabilistic
sampling. Field research activities were systematically guided so as to ensure that the
sampled population was reflective and representative of the socio-demographical
characteristics of the focal areas. The field study covered the period of 1999 to 2015.
This period encompasses the era of the current democratic dispensation in Nigeria
which many analysts have characterized as being marred by incessant communal
conflict, particularly in the North-Central Nigeria (Kwaja, 2013; Okoli, 2014).
Field investigations were conducted with the aid of ad-hoc research assistants
recruited and trained for that purpose. Proceedings of the field interviews (oral) and
discussions were recorded by means of audio digital recorders for onward transcription.
Interviews and group discussions focused on sundry themes, namely: origins, nature,
patterns, trends, dynamics, drivers, triggers, and impact of communal conflict in the
focal areas.
The elite data – official statements, interviews, pronouncements of national and
local leaders - came mainly from documentary and library sources. Documentary
sources included official gazettes, reports/documents elicited from various public
establishments in the focal states. On the other hand, library sources included books,
journals, dailies and periodicals, internet resources, as well as unpublished scholarly
works on the relevant aspect of the study

Table 4.3 Names/Positions of Some Elites and Others** Interacted with in the Course of the Study.
Name Designation/Position Location
Anonymous Civil Defence personnel Lafia, Nasarawa State
Anonymous Police officer Obi-Lafia. Nasarawa State
Anonymous State Security personnel Jos, Plateau State
Anonymous Military personnel on internal security Jos, Plateau State
operations (special taskforce)
Anonymous Prison warder Lafia, Nasarawa State
Anonymous Police officer Doma, Nasarawa State
Anonymous Civil Defence personnel Barikin Ladi, Plateau State
Mr Hassa Gius Independent researcher Bokkos, Near Jos, Plateau

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 State
Prof. O. Alubo Lecturer/Researcher University of Jos
Dr.Suchi Lecturer Birmingham University,
Planshak Karu, near Abuja
Mr. Nkem Okorie Student Researcher Federal University Lafia,
Nasarawa State
Mr. Sadiq Student Researcher Lafia
Mohammed
Dr. Chukwuma Lecturer/Researcher Federal University Lafia,
Okoli Nasarawa State
Mr Tormusa Lecturer/Researcher Federal University Lafia,
Daniel Nasarawa State
Mr Com Bagu Journalist/Independent Researcher Abuja, Nigeria
Mr Philip Iortyer Lecturer Federal University Lafia,
Nasarawa State
Dr. Isaac Otegwu Lecturer VERITAS University,
Abuja
Mr Solomon Fagi Student-researcher Nasarawa State University,
Keffi
Mr Uhembe Lecturer, community leader Federal University Lafia,
Clement Nasarawa State
Mr Saleh M. Independent Researcher Jos, Plateau State
*Anonymous Fulani Paramount ruler Lafia, Nasarawa State
*Anonymous Christian cleric Obi, Nasarawa State
*Anonymous Moslem cleric Lafia, Nasarawa State
*Anonymous Youth leader Jos, Plateau State
*Anonymous Vigilante commander Awe, Nasarawa State
*Anonymous Vigilante commander Lantang, Plateau State
*Anonymous Youth leader Doma, Nasarawa State
*Anonymous Women leader Lafia, Nasarawa State
*Anonymous Women leader Jos, Plateau State
*Anonymous Islamic scholar Nasarawa Eggon,
Nasarawa State
*Anonymous NGO activist Lafia, Nasarawa State
*Anonymous Local Government Chairman Lafia, Nasarawa State
*Anonymous Peace worker Abuja, Nigeria
*Anonymous District head Keana, Nasarawa State
*Anonymous Leader of Miyetti Allah Cattle Makurdi, Benue State
Breeders Association
*Anonymous Leader of All Farmers Association of Lafia, Nasarawa State
Nigeria
*Anonymous Leader of All Farmers Association of Jos, Plateau State
Nigeria
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*Anonymous Leader of Miyetti Allah Cattle Keffi, Nasarawa State
Breeders Association
*Anonymous Market leader Akwanga, Nasarawa State
*Anonymous Party Chieftain, PDP Bokkos, Plateau State
*Anonymous Village teacher Lantang, Plateau State
*Anonymous Paramount/Traditional ruler Nasara Eggon, Nasarawa
State
*Anonymous Commissioner for Lands Lafia, Nasarawa State
**Only selected categories are highlighted above. *Most of the interviewees were
interviewed based on the condition of anonymity.
The primary research (KIIs and FGDs) was carried out by the researcher.
However, a few research assistants, acting principaly as links-persons for the fieldwork,
were used in the course of the research. The library/desk research was also carried out
by the researcher through exploration of relevant sources at public and private libraries,
as well as relevant government establishments.
The FGDs were held only in the capitals of Plateau and Nasarawa States. Four
rounds of FGDs were held in each of these places with each round comprising a total of
twenty five persons capturing both male and female adults and male and female youths.
In all, a total of one hundred persons were used for FGDS while one hundred and fifty
were for SCs. The rest of the respondents, numbering one hundred and seventy, were
interviewed through the KII technique. Hence, the actual sampled population for the
field research amounted to four hundred and twenty (420). Details of the fieldwork are
highlighted in tables 4.4-4.6 below.

Table 4.4 Field Discussion Schedule (May-July, 2015)

Date May- July, 2015
(Duration)
Location Lafia, Jos, Obi, Awe, Yelwa, Shendam, Lantan
Contacts Four (4) contact; 25 persons per contact
Thematic 1. Perception of ethno-communal diversity
Focus 2. Perception of ethno-communal differences
3. Incidence of ethno-communal conflict
4. Causes and effects of ethno-communal conflict
5. Complications and implications of ethno-communal conflict
6. Elites and ethno-communal conflict
7. Politics and ethno-communal conflict
8. Mitigating the ethno-communal conflict
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 9. Transformation of the ethno-communal conflict
10. Courtesies

Table 4.5 Interview Schedule (May-July, 2015)

Date Location Interviewees Remark(s)
20th May Lafia 4 security personnel; 5 Nasarawa State
academics/researchers; 10 capital
community leaders
25th May Awe 11 farmers; 5 herders; 2 vigilantes
31st May Obi 5 farmers; 5 herders; 5 vigilantes
5th June Jos 3 security personnel; 8 Plateau State capital
academics/researchers; 15
community leaders
10th June Yelwa 7 farmers; 5 herders; 5 vigilantes
11th June Shendam 5 farmers; 5 herders, 5 vigilantes
12th June Lantan 4 farmers; 4 herders; 2 vigilantes

Table 4.6 Key Informant Interview (KII) Guides (Mode: semi-structured, oral and recorded)
Sn. Question
1. What is the nature of inter-ethnic relations in your area?
2. Do different ethnic groups in your area dispute of coexist?
3. What is the nature of ethno-communal crisis in your area?
4. What are the sources/causes of ethno-communal crisis in your area?
5. What are the effects of ethno-communal crisis in your area?
6. What are the allied complications and implications of ethno-communal crisis
in your area?
7. What is the place of politics in the prevalence of ethno-communal crisis in
your area?
8. What is the role of the elites in conducing for ethno-communal crisis in your
area?
9. What has been done by the governments and relevant stakeholders to mitigate
ethno-communal crisis in your area?
10. What is the way forward?

The combination of primary and secondary methods of data collection enabled

the researcher to cross-examine data in order to establish their accuracy and tenability.
This would help in boosting the validity of the research. Questionable primary data was
confronted and confounded with ‘hard’ documentary records so as to ascertain their
veracity, and vice versa. The sampled population for the study was purposively chosen
from relevant community, public/government, and civil society stakeholders.

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4.5 Data analysis

 Method of data analysis follows the principle and logic of qualitative descriptive-
analysis, predicated on theories of ethnic division’ and ‘contemporary elite theories.
This triangulates the outcome of the field study with textual insights from content
analysis of literature reviewed/ documents-based content-analysis of elite
statements/pronouncements of their political intentions and strategies. The thrust of
analysis was laid out under select themes and sub-themes carefully designed to answer
the basic research question in fulfillment of the research objectives. Conclusions were
reached at the end of the analysis in the light of the assumptions of study.

4.6 Limitation of the research

The study was constrained by issue relating to accessibility (some sources were
unavailable), conflict sensitivity, ethical consideration and research hazards. The
research was carried out at a period during which some of the communities in the focal
states were boiling with live conflicts. In the light of the prevailing sentiments, some of
the respondents were full of passion and caution-minded in their responses. The
researcher was also very conscious in order to avoid provoking untoward sentiments.
Most of the people approached for oblige apparently out of fear or anger. Some simply
sentimentalized the discussions in such a manner that betrayed subjectivity.
More importantly, the security scares and politically volatile atmosphere in the
focal states at the time of the research posed the challenge of safe access. In a few
instances, the researcher faced hostile reaction from locals who took him for spy or an
adversary ethics. For instance, the researcher was asked to pay a token in order to obtain
important facts by some locals.

4.7 Recapitulation

The chapter detailed the forms of analysis, the data sources, the location and population
characteristics – some summarised in the table below ( See also table 4.3)

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Table 4.7 Occupational Distribution of Interviewees/Discussants
S/n Category Number
1. Security personel 7
2. Academics/researchers 13
3. Farmers 41
4. Herders 33
5. Vigilantes 20
6. Community leaders 25
7. Others 126
* Total 420

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 CHAPTER 5

ETHNICITY, ETHNIC POLITICS AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of the chapter is to describe ethnic conflicts and analyse the significance of
ethnicity as a veritable political problematique in contemporary Nigeria. The chapter
starts by looking at the various dimensions of ethnicity, ‘ethnic politics’ and ethnic
conflict in Nigeria, and suggests the key role of political elites as the main political
managers of conflict. It highlights the role of political elites in fanning ethnic conflict in
an attempt to gain or enhance their power and influence. It is argued that ethnicity
acquires political saliency in the context of elite struggle for power and attempts to
maximize partisan influence.

5.2 Dimentions of Ethnicity in Ngeria

Ethnicity in Nigeria has been seen from three important dimensions, namely: cultural
differentiation, social divide or discrimination, and political struggles/contestations
(Okoye, 1996; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). As cultural differentiation, ethnicity
emphasizes the socio-cultural differences between one cultural group and another. It
makes people to perceive themselves as belonging to different sub-national identifies to
which they owe their civic allegiance. This parochial inclination has engendered
primordial mode of political culture and/or participation in Nigeria over the years
(Okoye, 1996).
As political struggle or contestation, ethnicity becomes an instrument of identity
mobilization and politicking. At this level, ethnicity goes with immense political
momentum and salience (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Politicization of ethnicity has
been an abiding facet of elite competition and politicking in Nigeria. In this context,
ethnicity is mobilized and manipulated by the political elites to ensure the advancement
of their politico-partisan interests.

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5.2.1 Ethnicity, elites and party politics in Nigeria

The character of ethnicity and party politics in both pre-independence and post-
independence Nigeria has betrayed ethnic politicking as a dominant trend. As remarked
before, Party politics in Nigeria in the First Republic was so sectionalized in keeping
with the logic and imperative of ethno-regionalism. The NCNC was dominant among
the people of the East, the NPC held sway in the North, while the AG swept the polls in
the west. The pattern of party affiliation and identification was largely determined by
ethno-regional considerations. For instance, the leader of NCNC was an Igboman from
the East, the leader of NPC was a Hausa-Fulani from the North, and the AG Leader was
a Yoruba from the west. Expectedly, politico-partisan mobilization was largely based on
ethno-regional appeal and parochial sensitization (Okoye, 1996).
Besides, there was the emergence of tribal (ethnic-based) parties to represent the
interests of the minority tribes. These tribal (ethnic) parties are identified in table 5.1.
Table 5.1 List of Tribal/Ethnic Association and Parties in Nigeria’s First Republic
ACRONYM FULL NAME
BYM Borno Youth Movement
IU Igala Union
ITU Igbira Tribal Union
MDF Mid-Western Democratic Forum
NDC Niger Delta Congress
UMBC United Middle Belt Congress
ZCP Zamfara Commoners Party
EGBE OMO ODUDUWA
IBO UNION
JAMIYYA MUTAR
Source: Researcher, 2015

Apart from ethnic orientation of political leaders and parties, party affiliation
and identification followed ethno-regional lines. The outcome of the 1959 general
elections revealed this tendency. In this regard, information in table 5.2 is instructive.

Table 5.2 Ethnic Voting in 1959 General Elections in Nigeria.

PARTY REGION
East North West Total
AG (and allies) 14 25 34 73
NCNC/NEPU 58 08 23 89
NPC - 134 - 134
Others 01 07 08 16

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Total 73 174 65 312
Source: Kurfi (1983)

The table 5.2 indicates that each party clearly out-performed others in its
regional sphere of dominance. The NPC won landslide in the North; the AG led in the
West; and the NCNC/NEPU took the lead in the East. This reflected the logic of ethno-
regional politicking. In the politics of the Second Republic, the trend replicated itself as
table below suggests.
Table 5.3 Ethnic Voting in Nigeria’s 1979 Senatorial Elections.
PARTY REGION
EAST NORTH WEST TOTAL
UPN - 04 24 28
NPP 12 04 - 16
NPN 06 29 01 36
PRP - 07 - 07
GNPP 02 06 - 08
Total 20 50 25 95
Source: Kurfi (1983)

Also the table 5.3 above clearly indicates that voting was largely done in
keeping with ethno-regional considerations. All the parties took a landslide lead in their
respective regions of dominance. The implication is that none of these parties had the
virtue of national spread.
The issue of ethnic voting has been a prevalent trend in Nigeria’s party politics.
Where the political parties have strong regional or ethnic appeal, the tendency is for the
people to vote the parties that represent their ethno-regional affiliation. But when the
parties are not clearly regionally or ethnically based, people tend to vote for candidates
that represent their ethno-regional blocs. This tendency manifested even in the 2015
general elections as we shall see in subsequent section

5.2.2 Ethno-religion politics and political instability of the present republic

Elite consensus is the basis upon which other socio-economic relations take their
meanings. The effectiveness of any governmental decision or policy is premised on elite
choices, understanding and unity. Giving the ethno-religious diversity cum complexity
of Nigeria, the principle of federal character and power sharing/rotational presidency as

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state ideology was instituted since 1970s to address sectional domination, give a sense
belonging to each of the diverse ethnic and power blocs that make up the nation.
However, this has not achieved its purpose as it further deepened ethnic divide- elite
power struggle- it was created to abridge; and no one would expect the opposite in a
divided society and with divided elites like Nigeria. This was demonstrated in the failed
transition politics of the third republic and the political instability of the fourth republic.
From 1983 to 1993, the military continued to ruled Nigeria until in 12 th June,
1993 when the military president, commenced a transition to hand power over to a
civilian government. The transition was initially fraught with intra party reckless
squabble and the independence of the electoral commission was also questioned.
However, the contest took place between Moshood Abiola (Yoruba) of social
Democratic Party (SDP), a philanthropist and wealthy business man who was also a
media magnet and Alhaji Bashir Tofa (Hausa) of National Republican convention
(NRC). There were popular expectations that the military will not cede power to a
Yoruba president. The result of the election indicated that Abiola (Yoruba) won the
election, adjudged one of the fairest and freest elections in Nigeria by the international
monitors, and this election was annulled as inconclusive. The Inability of the political
elites to negotiate internally generated socio-political and economic upheaval in the
country. The efforts of Abiola to reclaim his mandate through international lobbying
earned him imprisonment and he subsequently died in the prison by poisoning; and his
wife, Kudirat, was assassinated.
The Northern elites (Hausa) has held the hegemony of the Nation presidency and
had the notion that the region was destined to rule the country and would not relinquish
the position to any other ethnic group. This is confirmed by the statement of a
Northerner, Maitama Sule (Hausa) that attributed leadership qualities to the Hausas;
commerce and trade to the Ibos; and diplomatic qualities to Yorubas. In other to placate
the Yorubas for annulling the election clearly won Abiola (Yoruba), an interim
government was formed and headed by Shonekan (Yoruba)
The annulment of the transition and the political manipulation of the military to
perpetuate northern hegemony brought Gen. Sani Abacha (Hausa) to power who
overthrew an interim government of Shonekan within its 6 months in office setting the
nation for another 6 years of military dictatorship. The incessant regime break down and
coup d’état in Nigeria could be traced to the disunity of the Nigerian political leaders

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and failure to offer stability, progress, security and protect the dignity of the mass public
through a ‘democratic-mandate authorization’ (Pakulski 2013:137).
General Sani Abacha’s death in office brought General AbdulsalamiAbubakar
(Hausa) to power that subsequently ushered the nation into her fourth republic with the
election of a former military head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo (Yoruba) in 1999 as
president. Obasanjo’s regime (1999-2007) drew politicians from Alliance for
Democracy (AD) and All peoples party (APP) that lost in contest with him in election
into his party, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), for a broad based government of
national unity. The party’s membership cut across ethnic lines. This is part of elite
coalition/consensus that to an extent gave political stability to his regime for a while,
though his regime was characterized by predatory patronage cum primitive patron-client
relationship that resulted to contradictions among PDP states governors and their
patrons resulting to leadership failures to deliver quality of life and democracy to the
mass public.
Obasanjo ruled for eight years, and handed over power to Musa Yaradua
(Hausa) in a democratic election in 2007. Yaradua died in office on May 2010. His
death brought to question, the commitment of Nigerian Elites to unity, power sharing
and playing the political game by the rules. By the constitution, the vice president, Good
luck Jonathan, a Christian from a minority ethnic group should succeed the deceased
president pending an election, but the succession squabbles almost tore the country
apart as some cabal of ethnocentric and religious bigots of Northern elites tried to
maneuver him out of the power equation. His government was devoid of peace, security
of lives and properties arising from the activities of Bokoharam insurgency, a terrorist
Muslim sect presently in Nigeria that has wasted thousands of lives and properties.
Still on going is the crises in Niger Delta region(minority oil producing areas),
the ijaw crisis which centers on the struggle between the Nigerian state and the restive
youths of the ijaw nation over political restructuring of the Nigerian federation, and the
movement for the survival of Ogoni people(MOSOP) complaining how the leadership
of the major ethnic groups, Ibo, Hausa, and Yoruba have shared and controlled both
political offices and resources of the country among themselves, as well the current
agitation of the Ibos against her marginalization and political exlusion in Nigeria
currently pioneered by the Indeigeneous people of Biafra (IPOP); and many othe
splinter minority groups agitating for autonomy owing to feelings of marginalization
and exploitation. Brass noted that ‘many theories of the politicization of ethnicity or of
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development of nationalism in ethnic groups stress the importance of inequality in the
distribution of available resources, social benefits, and opportunities among distinct
ethnic groups’ (1991:41).
The 2015 general election was not spared by the wind of ethnicity in Nigeria as
cases of division along ethnic fault lines abound in which candidates were chosen by the
political elites and party big wigs on ethnic consideration; and the electorates also voted
on the basis ethno-religious calculations where the ruling PDP won most of the States in
the southern part of Nigerian because the then incumbent president and aspirant,
GoodLuck Jonathan came from that region while the opposition party led by a Northern
Muslim, the present president, Muhammadu Buhari won landslide in most the northern
States being his region. Apart from the fact that the ruling party lost to the opposition
party, it also showed to that ethnicity still has a pride of place in the voting pattern and
behavior of Nigerians.
Sequel to 2015 general election, Northern elites voiced that it was the turn of the
North (Hausa’s) to produce the next president of Nigeria. Arewa Consultative
Forum(ACF), a political umbrella representing the Hausas, encouraged Northern
politician and Northners to rally around for Buhari (Hausa) which they heeded and
voted unanimously for him as their son, Buhari having made three consecutive failed
attempts to clinch the presidency-2003, 2007, 2011 before winning the 2015 general
election.
Following the defeat of Buhari in 2011 presidential election by Goodluck
Jonathan, there were pockets of protests in the North by the supporters of Buhari which
turned into violent riot and sectarian killings mostly in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno,
Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kastina, Niger, Sokoto, Tobe, zamfara, all in the
Northern states. The communal conflict that followed claimed more than 800 lives
(Human Rights Watch, 2011). Following the violence that accompanied his defeat,
Buhari threatened, as reported by a newspaper:
Buhari spoke in Hausa while addressing members of CPC
(Congress for progressive change) (his party) from Niger state
who paid him a courtesy visit in Kaduna. He also warned that
2015 would be bloody if the elections were not transparent…
Buhari who painted a gory picture of Nigeria as that of a hound
and a monkey engaged in a battle for survival said: ‘God willing,
by 2015 something will happen. They either conduct a free or fair
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 election, or in 2011(alleged rigging) should happen in 2015, by
the grace of God, the dog and baboon would all be soaked in
blood’ (Vanguard Newspaper, May 15, 2012).
Buhari won the 2015 general election. He contested on the platform of
APC polling 15, 416, 22 votes and defeating Goodluck Jonathan the then incumbent
president who scored 12, 853, and 162 (INEC, 2015). Buhari won swiftly in almost all
the Northern states. In the same way, Goodluck Jonathan got all the votes in south and
south east which were his geopolitical zone and dominantly Christians too.
The implication of this is that mobilization of votes based on ethno-religious
considerations has remained a reoccurring phenomenon in Nigeria value system and
political culture which does not portend well for national development. The divisions in
Nigeria have deepened since Buhari came to Power in 2015, Bokoharam insurgency,
ethno communal conflict in farmer herder conflict in many states have increased in
leaps and bounds and have become the order of the day. Separatist groups such as
Movement for the Emancipation of Biafra (MASSOB) Indgeneous people of Biafra
(IPOP), Arewa Youth Movement, Movement for the emancipation of Niger Delta
(MEND), Niger Delta Avengers (NDV) etc have intensified their agitations. The
political elites are not making any concerted effort toward consensual unity to address
those problems, but have instead widened the North-south divide/dichotomy by their
actions. This has posed serious threat to Nigeria’s unity with elites that have largely
failed to offer effective leadership and prosperity to the mass public. Power struggles
within the degenerate Nigerian elites has caused the nation superior leadership, political
stability, democracy and has fanned the embers of ethnic consciousness and disunity.

5.3 Changing character of ethnicity in Nigeria

Ethnicity in Nigeria has been seen from three important dimensions, namely: cultural
differentiation, social divide or discrimination, and political struggles/contestations
(Okoye, 1996; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). As cultural differentiation, ethnicity
emphasizes the socio-cultural differences between one cultural group and another. It
makes people to perceive themselves as belonging to different sub-national identifies to
which they owe their civic allegiance. This parochial inclination has engendered
primordial mode of political culture and/or participation in Nigeria over the years

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(Okoye, 1996). As social discrimination, ethnicity manifests as a divisive factor that
emphasizes ‘we against them’ dichotomy (Uduma, 2013). In this regard, members of
different ethnic groups do not merely see themselves as different, but also treat
themselves subjectively as estranged fellows in the context of social relations (Okoli,
2003). This has often given rise to the issue of indigene/settler or host/stranger
dichotomy in Nigeria.
As political struggle or contestation, ethnicity becomes an instrument of identity
mobilization and manipulation by political elites. At this level, ethnicity goes with
immense political momentum and salience (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Politicization
of ethnicity has been an abiding facet of elite competition and politicking in Nigeria. In
this context, ethnicity is mobilized and manipulated by the political elites to ensure the
advancement of their politico-partisan interests. In effect, ethnic consciousness has been
constructed variously along linguistic, communal, regional and religious lines.
Linguistically, people who speak the same language consider themselves as members of
one ethno-linguistic bloc. For instance, the Hausa-speaking peoples of Northern Nigeria
at some levels see themselves as belonging to on mega-ethnicity, their multiple socio-
cultural and political differences notwithstanding.
At the level of community affiliation, ethnicity has narrowly manifested in
Nigeria in the form of parochial divisiveness based on clannish, sectarian or caste
differentiation. The tendency has often given rise to the phenomenon of intra-ethnic
conflict to violence. Cases of such conflict in contemporary Nigeria abound, including:
Ife-Modakeke crisis, Tiv-Jukun crisis, Aguleri-Umuleri crisis, Bassa-Egbura crisis, Tiv-
Chamba-Kuteb crisis, Zango-Kataf crisis, to mention but a prominent few (Ojo, 2006).
Regionalism or sectionalism has also provided a pretext for ethnic construction
and mobilization in Nigeria. The regionalization of Nigeria into three units in 1946
entrenched the dominance of Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba on the political scenes of eastern,
northern and western regions of Nigeria respectively. In this context, ethnicity coincided
so organically with regionalism in such a manner that gave rise to ethno-regional
political mobilizing (Ademoyega, 1962). This became a dominant pattern of political
relations in Nigeria during the nationalist and pre-independence era.
Nowadays, the regional heritage of Nigeria politics has manifested in the form of
‘geo-political’ sectionalism, whereby people recourse to their various ‘geo-political’
zones as the basis of political identification (Okoli, 2003). There are six (6) ‘geo-
political’ zones in the contemporary Nigerian federation namely: South-East (for the
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Igbos), South-South (for the Ijaws, Urhobos, Itshekiri’s, etc), South-West (for the
Yorubas), North Central (for the non-Hausa/Fulani minorities), North-West (for the
Hausa, Fulani, and the rest) and North-East (for the Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, and the rest).
In effct, since the 1990s, there has been a curious dimension to inter-ethnic
relations in Nigeria. This is exemplified by the emergence of militant wings of ethnic
ethno-communal associations, such as, the O’dua Peoples’ Congress (for Yoruba), the
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (for Ibo); Egbesu Boys
(for Ijaw); Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Arewa
People’s Congress (APC, for Hausa/Fulani), etc. These violent formations have been
used to terrorize opponents even beyond their ethnic domains in service of the
primordial interests of their leaders. Their operations have generated national concern as
national government often detained their leaders – Chief Uwazurike of MASSOB, Dr.
Fredrick Fasheun and Chief Ganiyu Adams of the OPC and Alhaji Asari Dokubo of
MEND ‘on different charges ranging from subversion of the national interest to treason’
(Nwabueze, 2014: 13). Box 5.1 highlights the origins and activities of OPC to put the
foregoing observations on the rise of ethno-communal militias in proper perspective.

Box 5.1 The Example of O’odua People’s Congress (OPC)

The origin of the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) could be traced to 1995,
when Fredrick Fasehun, a medical doctor and politician along with other Yoruba
activists, such as late Beko
Ransome-Kuti (also a medical doctor) and human rights activist founded the
body, becoming its pioneer national chairman and national treasurer respectively. On
March 1, 1999, following internal skirmishes, the organization was factionalized. The
then substantive secretary, 29-year old secondary school drop-out and furniture maker,
Ganiyu Adams expelled Fasehun from the OPC based on the allegation that he was
collecting bribes from candidates and their patrons so as to support them during the
1999 general elections. One of the major objectives of the OPC was ‘to give an
organizational and militant thrust to the struggle to actualize the June 12 mandate’
given to late Chief M.K.O Abiola, a Yoruba, the acclaimed winner of the June 12,
1993 election on the ticket of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The election was
annulled by Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, a Gwari, from Niger State, northern Nigeria as
Military President in 1993. General Abacha later imprisoned Chief Abiola for
declaring himself not only the winner of that election but also the president of Nigeria

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 in1994. Another important objective of the group was ‘to oppose the self-succession
bid of the military dictator, Gen. Sani Abacha, who wanted to return himself as a
civilian president. By and large, the primary mission of the OPC was to ‘seek self-
determination for the Yoruba and protect their interests in the context of the Nigerian
federation.
In pursuit of its primordial nationalist interests, the OPC unleashed violence
against perceived threats to the Yoruba nation. Cases in point in this regard abound. In
July 1999, the OPC fought on the side of their Yoruba kinsmen who were at war with
the Hausa settlers in Sagamu (Sagamu (Yoruba domain), killing over 50 persons. In a
swift reprisal, the Hausa retaliated by killing over 100 Yorubas in Kano (Hausa
domain). In August 1999, OPC militants invaded Apapa Wharf (situated in Yoruba
land) in protest of the perceived domination of leading positions by the Igbos.
Following this, the arrest of an Ijaw youth for an alleged armed robbery in Ajegunle
area of Lagos prompted a confrontation between members of the OPC and those of the
Ijaw Youth Congress. Hundreds of lives were lost and several properties destroyed in
this episode of ethno-communal conflict. There was also the Ketu–Mile12 disturbance
of the year 2000, where more than 114 persons were killed and property worth several
millions of naira destroyed. This was a reaction to the OPC’s allegation to the effect
that the market was being dominated and controlled by Hausas in spite of its location
in Yoruba land.
In October 2000, OPC was involved in another incident involving the Hausas.
This was triggered by the killing of an Hausaman accused of patronizing stolen goods
from robbers. The violence that attended to the crisis quickly spread to Ajegunle, Ojo,
Alaba-Suru, Orile, Ijora, Mile 2, Oko-Oba, Cele, Ogba, Agege and Idi-Araba, lasting
for about four days. Then, members of OPC took control of major streets in Lagos,
molesting persons and looting as well as vandalizing property perceived to belong to
members of other ethnic groups. This episode of violence claimed over 60 lives, while
several vehicles and public assets were destroyed.
Source: Nwabueze, N. (2014). ‘Ethnic and Sub-Nationalist Agitations and
the State of the Nigerian Project’. International Journal of Modern Social Sciences,
3(1): 9-35.

The ethno-religious dimension of ethnicity has been a disturbing trend in Nigeria

(Ngare, 2012). The peculiar socio-cultural mix in Nigeria makes it possible for people

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to define and differentiate themselves along ethno-religious lines. For instance, the
Hausa-Fulani people of northern Nigeria are largely Moslems and the people of
southern Nigeria are predominantly Christians. The differences between these groups of
people have the tendency to assume religious or ethnic (as the case may be)
characterization. In this respect, Ikenga-Metuh has observed that ‘Most inter-religious
disturbances usually develop into inter-ethnic conflict even where they began as purely
religious disagreement’. This has been the situation in most parts of northern Nigeria
where ethnic conflict often switches into religious, or vice versa. Cases in point include
the perennial Jos crisis between the Hausa-Fulani and the ethnic Birom people of
Plateau State (Ngare, 2012). This conflict which was originally ethnic has over time
assumed ethno-religious dimensions, pitching the Christians against the Muslims.
Contemporary manifestations of ethnicity in Nigeria have tended towards negativity.
According to Okoli:
In Nigeria, the existence of a multiplicity of ethnic (tribal)
groupings has engendered a lot of problems, ranging from
antagonisms to open clashes. Apart from this, different ethnic
formations in Nigeria have always contended with the authority
of the nation-state by skewing the people’s political orientation
and loyalty towards themselves. For instance, many people in
Nigeria today cherish their ethnic/tribal descents more than their
citizenship or nationality. This is a problem to the country indeed
(2003:17).
It is important to note that ethnicity is not inherently negative. It only assumes
negative essence and import in the context of elite politicking wherein it serves divisive
and contradictory purposes. More importantly, ethnicity becomes a problem when it is
mobilized against the purposes and interests of the nation state. Hence, unless it is
positively harnessed, ethnic consciousness in Nigeria is bound to produce anti-national
sentiments that often find expression in inter-ethnic chauvinism and parochialism
(Okoli, 2003).
The political history of Nigeria is fraught with instances of ethnic crises and
conflagrations. The impacts and complications of these crises have posed an immense
threat to sustainable national integration and stability in Nigeria. In the sub-sections that
follow, attempt is made to x-ray important scenario that indicates the prevalence of
ethnic crisis in Nigeria over the years.
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5.4 Causes of local conflicts

As suggested earlierin Chapter 2 and 3, many factors account for the high incidence and
prevalence of ethnic conflict in Nigeria. The first factor is historical and structural. It
refers to how colonialism yoked together culturally different peoples together into an
artificial nation. This ‘yoking together’ was done without recourse to cultural
differences among these peoples. The spate of ethnic crises in contemporary Nigeria
mirrors the contradictions of this artificial creation (Tamuno, 1970).
The second factor relates to the issue of competition for land and landed
resources, such as farmland, freshwater sources, etc. When these assets are contested by
groups that are culturally differentiated, the tendency of the contest to assume ethnic
dimension is inevitable. The ethno-communal conflicts between Aguleri and Umuleri in
Anambra State as well as that of Bass and Egbura in Nasarawa State are cases in point.
Thirdly, an ethnic crisis in Nigeria has a clear political dimension related to the
struggle for power among the national and local elites. It has always been shaped, in
other words, by struggles for traditional ruler-ship. Disputes over the jurisdiction of the
Zazzau emirate, for instance, were implicated in the Zango-Kataf conflicts in Kaduna
State. Similarly, the Jukun-Chamba crisis in Taraba State was largely caused by issues
pertaining to jurisdiction and succession of traditional rulership in the area (Achimugu,
Ata-Agboni and Abdullahi, 2013).
Fourthly, the issue of cultural intolerance and prejudice has also precipitated
ethnic crises in Nigeria. Nigeria is a highly primordial society. In this context inter-
ethnic prejudices, stereotypes and indifferences have often provided the basis for ethnic
clashes. A case in point is the conflict between Yorubas and Hausas in the sub-urban
enclaves of Lagos State in the early 2000s.
Furthermore, ethnic crises in Nigeria have equally been engendered by the issue
of political marginalization or domination of one group of ethnicity by another. The
perception of relative disadvantage or deprivation of one ethnic group in the context of
competitive inter-ethnic political relations is at issue in this regard. This to some extent
explains the inter-ethnic conflicts between the Itshekiris, Urhobos and the Ijaws in Delta
State in the 1990s–2000s (Ayokhai, 2013).
Lastly, the phenomenon of indigenes/settler syndrome has been a veritable cause
of ethnic conflict in Nigeria. The crises between the Hausa-Fulani and the Birom people
in Jos, Plateau State reflects the logic of indigenes/settlers syndrome. The perception of
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an ethnic group as ‘a stranger community in the context of urban political struggles
encourages inter-ethnic polarization; it also plants the seed of ethnic discordance
(Egwu, 2002). See box 5.2 below for an instance of such a conflict.

Box 5.2 The Jukun-Tiv Example of Communal Conflict based on Indigene-Settler Dichotomy. See
also table 6.1 - 6.4 for more instances of such conflict.
Jukun and Tivs constitute the population of Wukari Local Government in
Taraba State. They had been living peacefully together since the pre-colonial days with
the Tiv (the migrants to Wukari areas). Tivs are predominantly rural farmers who did
not interfere with Jukun (who traced their ancestral origin to Wukari) administration.
Although the Tiv had arrived in the region far back as the 1840s when the present
Wukari was established, political and social relations began to change for the worse in
the early Twentieth Century. The reasons for the change include the introduction of
party politics and the increase in the population of the Tiv. In fact, by the 1940s, the
Tiv were not only the largest ethnic group in the Middle Belt, but they were also three
times more numerous than the Jukun in the Wukari Division, which the Jukun
considered their ancestral home.
Consequently, the Jukun started asserting their political supremacy and marked
the beginning of settlers-indigene dichotomy in Taraba State. Despite all the efforts
made by the colonial government to recognise the Tiv as part of the society where they
lived, the Jukun continued to see them as settlers. More importantly, the political
reversals suffered by the Jukun at different times, especially in the context of party
politics and civic relations, made them reactionary towards the Tiv; they thus became
more rigid in marginalizing the Tiv access to political entitlements on the ground that
they were settlers. Overtime, this has led to violent clashes in Taraba State.
Examples of such crises are Tiv riot of 1959-60, the 1964 ‘head breaking’, the
1979-83 fracas, the local government election crisis of 1987, 1990-92 local government
election crisis, the 2001-2002 clash, and August 2010 riot. The bone of contention has
always been the reservation of rights or privileges almost exclusively for the Jukun
who can rightly claim indigeneity to Wukari and the exclusion of the Tiv. The
statement credited to the paramount ruler of Wukari, Dr Shekarau Angyu Masa-Ibi
Kuvyo II, vividly represents the sentiment of almost every Jukunman and woman:
‘They (the Tiv) came here to farm; we (the Jukun) allowed them, gave them chieftaincy
titles...Now that their population has increased, they believe they are many enough to

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colonise us’ (cited in Asuni, 1990). The Tiv, like many settler groups in different parts
of the country, have consistently maintained that having settled in a place for a long
period, it is not proper to refer to them as settlers, but rather as indigenes
Source: Akintola, O. E. and Yabayanze, A.J. (2017). ‘Settlers-Indigenes
Question in Nigeria: Much Rhetoric, No Answers’. European Scientific Journal,
13(10), 365-375. doi: 10.19044/esj.2017.v13n10p365;
URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2017.v13

Over all, ethnic crises in Nigeria invariably occur as a result of politicization

(Aapenuo, 2006). The idea of politicization in this context refers to the machinations of
the political elite who play on primordial subjectivities of the people in service of self-
regarding political purposes. It is this very factor that activates divisive ethnic
consciousness and makes it antithetical to intergroup cohesion and harmony. So,
whatever is the apparent and manifest cause of ethnic crises in Nigeria, the underlying
motivation and impetus has been politics.

5.5 Colonial legacies

It is widely acknowledged in the academic literature that colonialism was the root cause
of ethnic crisis in Nigeria. The culpability of colonialism in sowing the seed of ethnicity
and ethnic crisis in Nigeria is understood in two principal senses. First, colonialism led
to the creation of artificial nation-States from divergent ethnic nationalities without
recourse to their socio-cultural differences (Okoye, 1996). This has laid the foundation
for crisis of national integration, as these peoples have increasingly failed to see
themselves as one.
Secondly and more importantly, in the course of colonial penetration and
administration, the colonial administrations did not make significant effort to ensure
proper integration of the various peoples of Nigeria. They rather aided divisive
tendencies among them by way of ‘divide and rule polices’ (Okoli, 2003). For instance,
up till 1940s, the northern and southern segments of Nigeria were under dual legislative
dispensation (Okoye, 1996). The northern region was governed by Governor General’s
proclamations while the southern parts were largely governed by acts of parliament.

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 More importantly, colonial administrators helped in propagating parochial
nationalism with the introduction of regionalization policy in 1946 (Ademoyega, 1962).
The policy of regionalization divided Nigeria into three administrative regions that
coincided with spheres of influence of the three dominant ethnic groups: Igbos, Hausa
and Yoruba. As observed by Adebisi:
Prior to independence from Britain into 1960, Nigeria as a
nation was already divided along ethno-regional lines, paving
the way for inter-ethnic rivalries and bickering. This can be
traced to British colonial policy that was based on the belief that
the satisfaction of the yearnings and aspirations of the three
dominant tribes: Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani and Igbo in the West,
North and East, respectively, could ensure political stability in
Nigeria (Adebisi, 2002:22).
Apart from the policy of regionalization, colonialism also encouraged social
segregation in terms of urban settlement practices. In the northern Nigeria, for instance,
the indigenes and settlers were encouraged to stay apart by dint of the prevailing
colonial settlement policy. Hence, three enclaves of urban settlement were created to
accommodate different categories of people in a manner that depicted ‘caste settlement’
(Okoli, 2014). Table 5.4 makes reference to this practice.

Table 5.4 Colonial Segregation Settlement Policy in Northern Nigerian

Settlement Social Category
Wall city Indigenous Hausa-Fulani
Tudun Wada Non-indigenous northerners
Sabon Gari Stranger-settlers, principally Christians from southern
parts of Nigeria
Source: Researcher, 2015

The colonial policy of divide-and-rule was not an accidental measure. It was a

strategic measure so deliberately introduced by the colonial overlords to ensure
effective colonial penetration and control (Okoye, 1996). So, by their policies and
actions, the colonial government in Nigeria laid a solid foundation for inter-ethnic
differentiation and polarization. Contradictions associated with this trend were vividly
evident in the pre-independence nationalist and party politics in Nigeria as was alluded
in introductory chapter which we shall see in detail in the subsequent sections, the

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divisive tendencies that characterized elites’ relations during pre-independence and post
independence party politics was a clear manifestation of the historical development
under review.

5.6 Ethnicity and nationalism in Nigeria

The nationalist struggles in Nigeria manifested some aspects of ethnic conflicts. Some
of the frontline nationalists saw their ethnic origins as their primary constituency and
remained apologetic to their cause. According to Richard, ‘following hard on the heels
of the introduction of mass electoral politics in many parts of Africa ,was the
appearance of political alignments along sectional and ethnic lines…many of the ethnic
categories in Nigeria, Ibo ,Hausa, Yoruba emerged pari- pasu with modern electoral
politics’ (1987:47). In this way, struggle for the monopoly of economic and state power
became a zero sum game and appeals to ethnic solidarity and sectional identities
became means of political bargaining which has affected national integration and
political stability in Nigeria.The following statements made by the leaders of each of the
ethnic group underpin their division and disunity:
Dr. Azikiwe in one of his ethnocentric political statements presented the Ibos as
a superior, strong and chosen race “to lead the children of Africa from the Bondage of
the ages” (Adeoti and Olaniyan (2014:110). Dr. Azikiwe, the founder of NCNC in full
stated:
It would appear that the God of Africa has created the Ibo nation
to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of ages… The
martial prowess of the Ibo nation at all stages of human history
has enabled them not only to conquer other but also to adapt
themselves to the role of preserver…the Ibo cannot shirk its
responsibility from its manifest destiny. (Azikiwe, 1982:35;
international journal of management p. 109
In another occasion, Azikiwe while demonstrating how Ibos were marginalized
in Nigeria addressed a group of Ibos in grand standing eloquence as ‘Ibo giant
awakening from his stupor’ (Schwarz Water, 1966:462). The above assertion goes with
an air of ethnic jingoism and is certainly unbecoming of a nationalist of Azikiwe’s
stature. But Azikiwe was not alone in this apparent ‘misdeed’.

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 Consequently, in 1960, sequel to independence, Chief. Awolowo, a prominent
nationalist from the western Nigeria understood these utterances as designating the Ibos
as a super race and voiced ‘it seemed clear to me that Azikiwe’s policy was to corrode
the self-respect of Yoruba as a group to build up the Ibo as a master race’(Adeoti and
Olaniyan ibid). Appealing to sub-ethnic consciousness, one politician remarked
‘remember that Chief Richard Akinjide is your own son, so you must all vote for him as
the Governor of Oyo state’ (Richard 1987:115). Chief Obafemi Awolowo, once
described Nigeria as a ‘mere geographical expression’ (cited in Richard, 1987:33;
Okoye, 1996). This most uncharitable remark is worrisome because it reposed no hope
and confidence in the Nigerian national project. It is all the more worrisome in that it
was coming from a prominent Nigerian sage-nationalist.
The Northern leaders were not left out in politics of ethnic and religious
acrimony. Tafawa Belewa, the Northern leader (Hausas) stated ‘I was a terrible man
when I was all out to fight the south, I did not understand why I was fighting them so
hard’ (ibid). Sir Tafewa Belewa maintained that ‘Nigeria has existed as one country
only on paper, and that it was far from being considered as one country much less think
of it as being united’ (international journal of management p.110). Northern leaders
fanned ethnic and religious consciousness of the Hausas and presented the southerners
(Ibo and Yoruba Christian) as infidels out to dominate the Hausas.
The point being emphasized in the foregoing is that the Nigerian pioneer
nationalist did not have much sense of national unity as may be inclined to assume. The
following statement credited to Tafawa Balewa, the first Nigeria Prime Minister, speak
volume of the tendency under review:
Many Nigerians speak of unity. They are well too loose about it.
Many of them deceive themselves by thinking that Nigeria is one.
This is wrong, particularly some of the press people with chance
of writing in papers to tell the whole world that this is one
country. When they give lectures, they shout it out that Nigerians
are one people. This is wrong. When I look around me in the
council, I see Honourable members of all, parts of Nigeria sitting
together and am bound to feel some presence of unity is artificial
and it ends outside this Chamber (Balewa, 1948:227 as cited in
Okoli, 2003:24).

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 By and large, the civic orientation of most of the nationalist elites was more or
less towards their respective regions. In their partisan dealings and endeavours, these
nationalist-leaders constituted themselves invariably into ethnic champions who utilized
their ethnic platforms to advance their political pursuits. As was highlighted in the
previous chapters precisely subsection 1.2 and 5.2.1, this tendency coloured the
character of party politics in the era of nationalism, finding expression in separatist
tendencies. As observed by Ademoyega (1962:130), ‘To put it properly, separatism
betrayed itself and adumbrated the ugly fact that in the approaching struggle for
independence, nothing could wield the heterogeneous masses of Nigeria into one solid
block’. Ademoyega further noted:
Henceforth nationalism centred on the group that constituted the
majority in each region. There arose a Hausa-Fulani leadership
in the North, an Ibo leadership in the East, and a Yoruba
leadership in the West – a populite (ethnic) nationalism (1962:
139).

5.7 Ethnicity and Nigerian federalism

The evolution of Federalism in Nigeria reflected the logic of ethnicity and elite
management cum manipulation. According to Ademoyega:
The ‘federal’ idea, which came about in the later forties, caused
some cultural organizations to turn into political ‘mouth-organs’.
For instance, at its conference in Aba, in 1948, the Ibo Federal
Union changed its name to the Ibo State Union, to enable it to
speak for the people. In the same year, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa,
founded three years earlier by Awolowo in London, developed in
Nigeria to speak for the Yoruba. Others, such as the Ibibio State
Union and the Tiv Central Council, also strove to accomplish
similar ends (1962:146).
In effect, by `1947, Chief Obafemi Awolowo has written a plea to the
government wherein he advocated for ‘federal union’ in which each ethnic group would
constitute a State (Ademoyega, 1962:146). So while the Northern Peoples Congress
(NPC) favoured a federation based on the extant regional (or provincial) boundaries, the

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Action Group (AG) preferred federalism structured alongside ethnic boundaries. The
emergence of a regionally based federalism at the end of the day did not completely
resolve the federalist question. In fact what emerged ultimately was an ostensibly
regionalized federalism with manifest ethno-parochial orientation (Okoli, 2003).
The three federating regions – the East, West and North – literally coincided
with the dominant ethnic formations in the country. These ethno-regional blocs were
also politically differentiated in terms of party affiliation. For instance, the Northern
Peoples’ Congress (NPC) was dominant in the North while Action Group (AG) was
holding absolute sway in the West. In the East, it was the National Council for Nigeria
Citizens (NCNC) that held sheer sway. The political relations between these ethno-
regional blocs engendered contradictions that betrayed crisis of ethnic politicking in
Nigeria’s pre-independence party politics (Nnoli, 1978).

5.8 Ethnicity and elite power struggles in Nigeria

A lot has been said in this study concerning the role of the political elites in fanning the
embers of ethnicity in Nigeria (Nnoli, 1978). The character of the Nigerian political
class is such that makes ethnic manipulation by the elites possible. According to Bienen
(1985:5), ‘Class is weakly defined in Nigeria and elites are fragmented by ethnic-
languages group membership, place of origin and institutional identity’. The implication
of this is that rather than having a sense of unity and group consciousness, Nigerian
elites are polarized alongside ethnic and communal lines.
In the context of party politics, therefore, the elites resort to whipping up of
primordial sentiments and social capital to make good their politico-partisan ambitions.
In this regard, such variables as religion, clan, ethnicity and other modes of identities
are instrumentalized as veritable political/partisan capital. It is in this circumstance that
politicization of ethnicity and mobilization of same becomes a political necessity.
Indicators of elite mobilization and manipulation of ethnicity has been highlighted in
the previous sections. For instance, the capitalization of the nationalities on ethnic
solidarity and social capital thereof in furthering their political endeavour depicted an
exercise in ethnic mobilizing.

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5.9 Ethnicity and Political Crises in Nigeria

Nigeria has witnessed different forms of political crises over the years. Most of these
crises have been attributed to ethnicity as either the source or the cause (Nzekwe, 2005).
The foremost of such crises is the 1962–1963 census crises. Two rounds of national
census were conducted in Nigeria between 1962 an 1963 with controversial results.
Table 5.5 shows the outcome of the census.

Table 5.5 Result of 1962/1963 National Census in Nigeria

1962 census 1963 census
Region Figure/Result Region Figure/Result
North 30,200,000 North 29,777,986
East 12,500,000 East 12,388,646
West 10,500,000 West 11,033,852
- - Mid-West
TOTAL 53,200,000 Total 55,653,821
Source: National Population Commission (NPC)

The Eastern and Mid-Western regions rejected the outcome of the 1963 census
claiming that it was not credible and acceptable (Ezeadi and Asiegbu, 1990) They
alleged gross irregularities and inflation of figures by the Federal government in favour
of the northern region (Ezeadi and Asiegbu, 1990). The matter ended in the Supreme
Court which validated the census result amidst raging controversies.
The misgivings that attended the outcome of the census had a lot to do with the
popular fear of domination or ethno-hegemony by one section of the country over the
rest. It was feared by the Eastern and Mid-Western peoples that the census results had
been rigged by the NPC government at the Centre in perpetration of the northern agenda
expressed in terms of Hausa-Fulani political hegemony.
The Nigeria Civil War, also known as the Nigerian-Biafran War (1967–1970),
was also, to a large extent caused by ethnicity. The three major ethnic groups – the
Igbos in the East, Yoruba in the West and the Hausa/Fulani in the North – dominated
other ethnic groups (the so called ethnic minorities) in their respective regions (Ezeadi
and Asiegbu, 1990). Voices of dissent were suppressed. With ethnically based political
parties in place, the political terrain became so tense and opposition arose along ethnic
lines. By 1966, the level of distrust among the political leaders of the regions had
peaked. This found expression in the internal structures and hierarchy of the country’s

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Armed Forces in the form of systemic sectionalism. It was this circumstances that
provided the pretext for the onset of the civil war.
Furthermore, most of the election crises in Nigeria have been caused by ethnic
prejudices. The 1979, 1983, and 1993 general elections crises had elements of ethnic
undertones. More precisely, the post-election crises in the country in 2007 and 2011
clearly exposed the ethnic character of electoral crises in Nigeria. The outcome of the
elections were accepted among the southern people of Nigeria, but were largely rejected
by some northern people. In effect, the spate of violence that followed the aftermath of
the elections occurred only in the northern parts of the country. The reason for the
violence was not unconnected with the defeat of General Mohammed Buhari on whom
the Hausa-Fulani North has reposed much confidence to win the elections. Indeed, what
was really at issue was the desperation of one ethno-regional bloc to wrest power from
the incumbent regime at all cost (Okoli, 2014).
Akin to the issue of election crises is the June 12, 1993 transition crisis in
Nigeria. The Genesis of this crisis was the annulment of that year’s general elections
outcome by a military regime that was seen as representing the interest of the Hausa-
Fulani establishment in northern Nigeria. The elections saw a Yoruba from the southern
part of Nigeria emerged as the winner. But in a twist of sort, the elections were annulled
in a heavily controversial circumstance that triggered the worst-ethno-political and
ethno-religious violence ever witnessed in Nigeria (Okoli, 2014).

5.10 Complexities of local ethno-comunalic conflicts

Ethnic conflicts and the accompanied political crises have to be seen in all their
complexity caused by specific local circustances. The first of these is popularly known
as indigene/settler syndrome, otherwise referred to as host/stranger dichotomy which
manifests itself as a dichotomous citizenship system. This means that people are
segregated on the basis of indigene-ship status. The indigenes are people of original
descent in a community while settlers are migrated residents. In practice, the so-called
indigenes are accorded the full rights and privileges of citizenship while the settlers are
treated as ‘second class’ citizens in their place of settlement. This schismic citizenship
has given rise to violent confrontations by the two groups in Nigeria. A case in point is
the perennial violence between the Hausa/Fulani and the Birom people of Plateau State

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in the North Central Nigeria. This conflict has been on in Jos, Plateau State, for more
than three decades now. In its later manifestations, the conflict has assumed ethno-
religious characterization in keeping with its apparent dynamics of degeneration (Egwu,
2001).
The second complication is due to the intersection of ethnicity and religion. It
takes a form of a Christian versus Muslim conflict. The line between ethnicity and
religion in Nigeria is complicated. For instance, most Hausa-Fulani people are Muslim
while most Igbos are Christian. Conflict between these groups of ethnicity has the
tendency to become religious conflict because of the more or less clear-cut religious
differentiation between the two groups. This has been the case in respect of the conflict
between the southern and northern peoples of Kaduna State whose ethnic background
largely coincides with their religious affiliations – the North (Hausa-Fulani) for Islam
and the south (ethnic minorities) for Christianity.
The third complication is occupational in nature; it is the outcome of herder
versus farmer conflicts. This has one of the old/traditional divisions in the Nigerian
society. The division often transforms into violent conflict in the North-Central region
of Nigeria. Most herders are adherents of Islam while most farmers are Christians or
native worshippers. The conflict between these two occupational groups has often
turned into ethno-religious conflagrations in view of the ethno-cultural mix of the
people.
The fourth complication is the result of the majority versus minority divide.
Where there exists a dominant ethnic group in a particular region or state, the tendency
is that the minority ethnic groups would feel emasculated within the set-up.This has
often given rise to political divide based on majority/minority sentiments in Nigeria. A
case in point is the loggerheads between the dominant Hausa/Fulani and the Zurus
(minority tribe) in Kebbi State of Nigeria (Danjibo, 2006).
The fifth complication has to do with the deep and entrenched North versus
South divide. This thrives on political polarization predicated on sectional
considerations (Ademoyega, 1962). The North in this context is equated with the
Hausa/Fulani bloc while the south is seen in term of Igbo-Yoruba dual ethno-hegemonic
bloc. The political relations between these two blocs have often been fraught with
competition and confrontation. The notion of ‘power shift’ whereby political power is
deliberately zoned to any of these blocs in predictable turn has been devised as a means
of dealing with the situation.
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 As a result of all these complications – the overlapping and cross-cutting
divisions that persist in the society and are subject to elite manipulations – various
elements of ethnicity are most times present, openly or in a hidden way, in most conflict
situations in contemporary Nigeria. Disentangling these complex conflict lines is a
challenging endeavour.

5.11 Impacts of ethnic conflict on Nigeria’s development

Ethnic conflicts cause political crises, and these crises threaten political stability and
national security in Nigeria. They trigger violent clashes and provoke military
interventions that perpetuate violence. They accompany systematic social
discrimination and widen political polarization that makes attainment of national
cohesion and integration problematic. Conflicts exacerbate distrust and acrimony
among the different ethnic groups in the country thus making reconciliations more
difficult. In most cases, the trend has also led to secessionist tendencies as exemplified
in the Nigeria-Biafran War (1967–1970).
The tendency to perceive one another in terms of ‘we’ versus ‘them’ closed
categories (Uduma, 2013) has been an abiding pattern of inter-ethnic relations in
Nigeria. The implication of this to national integration and stability is such that different
ethnic groups tend to see themselves first as ‘ethnic commons’ (Okoli, 2003) than
Nigerian nationalities. This is one of the greatest impediments to national unity in
Nigeria.
Ethnic conflicts and the accompanied political crises in Nigeria have also led to
perpetuation of violence. The Nigeria Civil war led to the death of over 1,000,000 one
million people with unrecorded human injuries (Okoye, 1996). This is also true of other
instances of violent clashes in Nigeria that have been associated with ethnic
manipulation. The implications of this scenario for national security have been far
reaching. Table 5.6 chronicles some important instances of ethno-religious violence in
Nigeria alongside the human fatalities.

Table 5.6 Some Notable Ethno-Religious Crises since the Birth of the Third Republic
2000 Thousands killed in northern Nigeria as non-Muslims opposed
to the introduction of Islamic Sharia law fight Muslim who

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 demand it
September 2001 Christian-Muslim violence flares after Muslim prayers in Jos
with churches and mosques set on fire. At least 1,000 people
are killed, according to a September 2002 report by a panel set
up by the Plateau State government.
November 2002 Nigerian abandons the Miss World Contest in Abuja. The
decision follows the death of at least 216 people in rioting in
the northern city of Kaduna after a newspaper published an
article which was considered blasphemous to the Islamic faith
May 2004 Hundreds of people, mostly Muslims Fulanis, are killed by
Christian militia in the Central Nigerian town of Yelwa.
Plateau State, Survivors say they buried 630 corpses. Police say
hundreds were killed. Muslims and Christian militants fight
street battles later the same month in the northern city of Kano.
Christian community leaders say 500 – 600 people, mostly
Christians were killed in two days of violence.

February 2006 At least 157 people die in a week of rioting by Muslim and
Christian mobs. The violence begins in the northeastern city of
Maiduguri when a Muslim protest against Danish cartoons of
the Prophet Mohammed runs out of control. Revenge attacks
follow in the south.
November 2008 Clashes between Muslim and Christian gangs triggered by a
disputed local government election killed at least 700 people in
the central city of Jos, according to U.S based Human Rights
Watch.
February 2009 Bauchi State governor imposes night curfew on Bauchi city on
February 22, a day after clashes in which at least 11 people
died and churches and mosques were burned down.
July 2009 Boko Haram, an organization which demands the adoption of
Sharia in all Nigeria, stages attacks in the northeastern city of
Bauchi after the arrest of some of its members. More than 50
people were killed and over 100 arrested.
- Police in Maiduguri, home of Boko Haram’s leader,
Mohammed Yusuf, says security forces killed 90 sect members
on July 27. In neighboring Yobe State, police recover the

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 bodies of 33 sect members after a gun battle near the town of
Potiskum on July 29.
- Yusuf is shot dead while in police detention in Maiduguri on
July 30.
- Red cross and defence officials say more than 700 people
were killed during the five-day Boko Haram uprising.
December 2009 At least 40 people are killed in clashes between security forces
and members of an Islamic sect armed with machetes in
Bauchi.
January 2010 Hundreds are reported killed after clashes between Muslim and
Christian gangs in Jos, most by gunfire. Police estimate the
death toll at 326, although some community leaders put figure
at more than 400.
March 2010 Hundreds of people are killed in clashes between Islamic
pastoralists and Christian villagers in the mostly Christian
villages of Dogo Nahawa, Zot, and Ratsat, just south of Jos.
Plateau State commissioner for information, Gregory Yenlong,
said more than 300 people had died.

December 2010 At least 80 people are killed in December 24 bombing as well

as in clashes two days later between Muslim and Christian
youths in the central Nigerian city of Jos. As of December 27,
at least 101 people were being treated for injuries.
January 2011 More than 200 people killed in violence in attacks on villages
and reprisal killings in Plateau State.
April 2011 Post election violence in some Northern State in which
hundreds were massacred by pro Buhari fundamentalists.
August 2011 At least 70 people killed in clashes in central Plateau State.
This violence started when Christian youths attacked Muslims
as they gathered to celebrate end of Ramadan in Jos.
November 2011 Over 165 police killed in northeast of Damaturu when Islamic
insurgents bombed churches, mosques and police stations.
Boko Haram militant sect claimed responsibility.

January 2018 Clashes in Benue state between herders and farmers that led to
the dead of 71 people

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Source: Ngare (2012:149-150)

Other effects of ethnicity, ethnic politics and ethnic crisis in Nigeria are
considered in this chapter under ‘complications’ and ‘implications’ of ethnicity. Suffice
it to note that the phenomenon of ethnicity has been a veritable bane of national unity,
integration and stability. By implication, the phenomenon has been one of the greatest
impediments to sustainable national development and security in Nigeria. The political
implications of this reality, and the negative impact on the Nigerian economy, have
transformed these conflicts into the core ‘national problem’ in contemporary Nigeria
(Egwu, 2001).

5.12 Implications for Nigeria’s social and political development

One of the legacies of multiple deep and elite-manipulated ethnic conflicts is the
notoriously fractious politics and widespread deficits of ‘social capital’ (trust and
networks). The mutual distrust and rivalry that often exist among local political leaders
and ethnic groups helped to promote discrimination in Nigeria’s public domain. For
instance, a Hausa land-lord may prefer to rent his houses only to his fellow Hausa
kinsmen in the belief that members of other ethnic groups are not trustworthy or are
difficult to deal with (Okoli, 2014). With reference to public civil service, ethnicity has
led to the prevalence of nepotism in terms of staff recruitment (employment),
placement, promotion or dismissal. This has led to the compromise of merit on the altar
of subjective considerations. The implication of this for staff productivity and general
performances has been quite negative.
In the area of politics, ethnicity manifests in the form of patronage syndrome
based on primordial loyalty, attachment and solidarity. At the national level of political
leadership, ethnic champions among the political elites compete for the state patronage
at the instance of their ethnic constituencies and support groups. This has encouraged
corruption in public service in Nigeria. It has also provided cover for abuse of office
and misappropriation of public funds and/or assets (Nwoye, 2000). Furthermore,
ethnicity in Nigeria has provided veritable pretexts for social unrest and conflict in
Nigeria. This is evident in the incidents of political, electoral and religious violence,
some of which have been mentioned in the foregoing chapter. The place of ethnicity as

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a harbinger of major crises in Nigeria is evident in the nexus between the ethnic factor
and other forms of conflicts/violence in Nigeria. For instance, electoral violence,
religious riots, as well as communal skirmishes in Nigeria have often assumed ethnic
dimensions with far-reaching consequences.
More importantly, ethnicity has led to crisis of citizenship in Nigeria (Alubo,
2008). Most Nigerians see themselves rather as ethnic indigenes and not national
citizens. By default, the workings of Nigerian Federalism have tended to promote
indigene-ship over the ideals of citizenship and civic culture. This has produced
inevitable contradictions, such as the issue of indigene/settler (host/stranger) dichotomy
(Egwu, 2001).
Over all, ethnicity in Nigeria has led to skewed mode of civic allegiance and
identification in the country. The fact that most Nigerians - the elites and masses alike -
are ethnic players presupposes that they are more inclined to their ethnic (sub-national)
political structures and symbols than to the nation-state. The implication of this is that
the prevailing pattern of political culture and participation in the country is limited and
parochial. In terms of civic allegiance and identification, therefore, most Nigerians
prefer to identify with their respective ethnicities rather than the nation. This holds
critical implications for national development and stability.

5.13 Emergence of new ethno-political movements in Nigeria

Since the return of democratic rule elections in Nigeria in 1999, there has been a
dramatic explosion of ethnic consciousness and identity – and also of divisive ‘ethnic
politics’ – among the various segments of the population. This trend has been vividly
exemplified in the rise of ethno-political movements, mobilized by local political
leaders, championing different causes for their respective support groups (Ojo, 2006).
Democratisation, however fragile and temporary, has encouraged local political
entrepreneurs – political activists and movement leaders – to seek influence over the
distribution of political privilege and material resources, principally a share of oil
revenues. Ethnic-local idiom of mobilization has proven very effective in mobilizing
mass support, and the democratic ‘thaw’, that followed the election, reduced the risks
related to political activism. Some of these movements take the form of civil

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organizations while some are overly militant in character. The table 5.7 highlights the
prominent instances of such movements.

Table 5.7 Prominent Ethno-political Movements in Nigeria

Civil Groups Militant Groups

Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) Od’ua People’s Congress (OPC)

Ohaneze Nd’Igbo Movement for the Survival of Ogoni

People (MOSOP)
Afenifere Movement of the Emancipation of Niger
Delta (MEND)
South-South Forum Movement for the Actualization of the
Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB);
Indigeneous People of Biafra(IPOP); and
Indigeneous People of Biafra(IPOP).

Source: Researcher, 2015

The Arewa Consultative Forum is a Pan-Northern Nigeria political vanguard

(pressure cum interest group) that purports to speak for the people of Northern Nigeria.
The Ohaneze Nd’Igbo is a Pan-Igbo political front that claims to provide collective
voice and platform for the ethnic Igbos in the political arena of Nigeria. The Afenifere
is a Yoruba identity forum that seeks to project the interest of the Yorubas in the
national politics. Same is also true of the South-South forum that provides an umbrella
for common political actions among the people of the Niger Delta.
The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was founded in
1990 as a mass-based democratic social movement to represent the Ogoni people
agitating for equitable treatment in the context of Nigeria petro-federalism. The
Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) arose as a militant group
seeking to champion the welfare of the Niger Delta people in the face of perceived
exploitation and marginalization by the Nigerian petro-state. The Movement for the
Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSSOB); and the Indigeneous People of
Biafra (IPOP) are militant groups that pursue the cause of self-determination for the
Igbo people of the south-eastern Nigeria. Similarly, the Od’ua People’s Congress (OPC)
is a militant vanguard that seeks the socio-political emancipation of the Yoruba people.

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The OPC is the dissident arm (faction) of the pan-Yoruba cultural forum – the
Afenifere.
The aforementioned ethno-political organizations have been involved in stiff
competition for civil space in Nigeria’s political dispensation of influence and
resources. Their activities have provided platforms for civic activism which has
contributed to the formation of new local political elites thus intensifying political
mobility and strengthening representative-democratic practices in Nigeria. But their
competition has often contradicted the democratic norms of peaceful competition. In
fact, many of these groups have contributed to the sharpening of inter-ethnic rivalries.
This has led to many conflicts, including hostile and violent clashes that precipitate
political crisis, rather than democratic game-like political competition. For instance, the
role of the OPC in escalating the June 12 (1993) civil unrest in Nigeria is instructive
(Ojo, 2006). The role of IPOP in ‘heating up’ the polity in 2017 during the disruptive
agitation for regional self determination is also instructive.

5.14 Mitigating ethnic and communal conflicts in Nigeria

In the absence of prolonged and systematic nation-building, the ethnic diversity of

Nigeria has made the country vulneralble to ethno-communal contestations and
conflicts, and increased deep divisions within the political elites. As suggested earlier,
these divisions were exacerbated (that is deepened and widened) due to a number of
factors, including not only the wide availability and ‘mobilizability’ of ethno-religious
identities, but also the sudden appearance of oil revenues (to a large extent controlled by
the state elites and widely used in distributing political patronage to political clientele),
and the rapid increase in political mobility: the appearance on the political scene of new
leaders-political entrepreneurs, who headed the new social movements. It became clear
that democratization plus oil revenues have increased the fragility of the national polity.
It made the country fracious, vulnerable to local divisions and secessions led by a new
breed of ambitious local political leaders.
Over the years, the government has sought to address this challenge through a
number of structural, institutional, or policy measures designed to leverage national
integration. These measures are hereunder discussed alongside their challenges and
prospects.

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 i Reviewing federalism: Nigeria adopted the practice of federalism in 1951
following the Lytteton constitution of that year. The essence of this arrangement is to
foster ‘unity in diversity’ (Ademoyega, 1962). The Practice of federalism seeks to
assuage centrifugal tendencies by encouraging local framework of a Federal Union.
Nigeria’ experience with federalism has spanned over sixty years amidst structural
restructuring and historical dialectics. By and large, federalism in Nigeria appears to
have been more or less counterproductive in bringing about the desired end – unity in
diversity. The abusive influence and impact of military rule in Nigeria compromised the
principles of federalism and entrenched a queer federalist order that is largely Unitarian.
This arrangement has promoted divisive tendencies rather than national integration.
ii Federal restructuring: The federation of Nigeria has been variously
restructured over the years through state and local government creations. In creating
these political units, political cum partisan expediency based on regime interest have
been prided over national interest. In effect, rather than furthering the purpose of true
federalism, such creations have been used to serve the vested interest of political
regimes and their support groups. The tendency to lump peoples of different ethnic
background together in the process of state/local government creation has succeeded in
creating localized domains of inter-ethnic struggles and rivalry (Okoli and Okpaleke).
This has been a critical dimension of crisis of national integration in Nigeria.
iii. Federal principles: The Federal Character Principles is a document
formulated for in the Nigeria constitution. It aimes at ensuring ‘proper balance’ in the
distribution of State benefits across the various sections of Nigeria in a manner that
promotes equity and justice. The idea recommends the allotment of dedicated quotas
(quota system) to the various states and ‘geo-political’ areas of the country in terms of
political appointment, federal recruitments, admissions into the Nigerian federal
universities, and so on. Over the years, this ideal has been so abused and compromised
to the extent that it has become an avenue for political patronage and patrimonialism.
The self serving political elites have often high-jacked the mechanism in furtherance of
their self-regarding purposes. This defines the essence of the principle and tends to
sacrifice merit at the altar of politics.
iv Inter-elite, inter-ethnic and inter-faith dialogue: There has been series of
inter-faith dialogue meetings between the two dominant religions in Nigeria – Islam and
Christianity. The essence of the dialogue is to mainstream inter-faith tolerance and
harmonious co-existence among the adherents to these religions. It is not certain
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whether this drive is paying off. Realities on the ground tend to suggest that inter-
religious prejudices, particularly among the Muslim and Christian faithful, are
escalating. This is evident in the spate of religious riots and brigandage in contemporary
Nigeria. Most conscientious efforts are required on the part of the religious leaders and
faith groups to make these leader- and group-meetings effective. Like all meetings of
this ‘integrative type’, some of them work well in promoting interaction, mutual
understanding, and mutual respect, and some exacerbate conflicts by demonstrating
political intransingence, and fundamental rigidity. It became clear that the most
effective way in building integration and understanding was to be located in the
meetings of leaders.
v. Enhancing civic orientation: Nigeria has also sought to promote inter-ethnic
harmony and national integration through institutionalized civil orientation mechanism.
The National Orientation Agency (NOA) has been in the forefront of mainstreaming
patriotic and nationalistic values that promote national integration. The effort is being
replicated by the various State governments in an attempt to localize the civil campaign
for greater results. More commitment is required in this direction to boost success. This
process can also be seen as a somewhat delayed attempt at building national unity and
integration ‘above the ethno-religious divides’.
vi. Media advocacy: The mass media has been an indispensable stakeholder in
the task of national integration in Nigeria. Both public and private media outfits in the
country have contributed in sensitizing the populace to the ideals of peace, unity,
harmonious co-existence and inter-ethnic harmony. Unfortunately, the media has also
been guilty of formenting sentiments that negate the purposes of national integration
through partisan coverage or reportage of events. By so doing, the media has often
promoted consciousness that bring about inter-ethnic or inter-communal disharmony.
There is a need for the media to ensure that the imperative of national interest takes the
centre stage in their endeavors.
vii. National integration schemes: The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC)
was created to advance the course of national integration by presenting a platform for
cross cultural orientation among the Nigeria youths. In this scheme, fresh graduate of
tertiary institutions are mobilized and posted to states/localities other than theirs in an
attempt to give them an opportunity to cross- socialize for effective citizenship. The
concept of ‘Unity Schools’ also seeks to achieve the same purpose. The operation of
those schemes in Nigeria over the years has been significantly successful. Yet there has
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been the nagging issue of administrative corruption in the running of the schemes as
exemplified in lobbied posting for NYSC, lobbied admission for the unity schools, and
the host of other systemic abuses that negate the operational efficiency of the schemes.
viii. Public inquiry: A number of inquiries, panels or commissions of inquiry
have been put in place in Nigeria over the years to address the issue of national
integration, minority issues and the like. Cases in point include the Willinks
Commission of 1951 and the more recent Oputa Panel of the early 2000. The problem
with these initiatives is that their recommendations are hardly implemented. This
implicates lack of sincerity of purpose and political will on the part of the government.
ix. Constitutional/national conferences: Many national conferences have been
held in Nigeria with a view to discussing and finding solutions to the nagging ‘national
question’. A critical aspect of the ‘national question’ is the rising incidence of ethno-
communal polarization and conflict in the country. Just like the national inquisitions
considered shortly above, the outcomes of these conferences have not been
implemented. The 2014 National Conference made far-reaching recommendations on
constitutional review, federal restructuring, fiscal federalism, and governance. Again,
these recommendations have been relegated to the sidelines of national archives owing
to non-implementation. It is imperative for the current administration to re-consider
some of these documents with a view of exploring prospects of their implementation.
x. Military/police intervention: The government of Nigeria has often resorted
to the use of military power to quell communal disturbances. Cases in point include the
Odi crisis (1999), Zaki-Ibiam crises (2001), Jos crisis (2001, 2004, and 2010), etc. This
approach has largely proved counter-productive owing to the collateral abuses
perpetuated by the military in such assignments (cf. Okoli and Orinya 2013). The
tendency of the military to become arbitrary or selective in the course of the assignment
has been one of the banes of this approach to internal security.
xi. Emergency rule: The imposition of emergency rule in an attempt to deal
with the exigencies of communal disturbances was evidenced in the declaration of ‘state
of emergency’ in Plateau state by the Obasanjo’s administration in early 2000s. This
paved way for full-scale military intervention in the crisis situation with a view of
finding an urgent solution. The Plateau experience of emergency rule does not seem to
affirm the efficacy of military approach in dealing with civic conflict situation.
xii. Non-governmental intervention: The civic society stakeholders such as
Faith-Based Organization (FBOs), Community-Based Organization (CBOs), and other
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NGOs have played important roles in the resolution and management of communal
disturbances in Nigeria. The roles of these organizations have been most felt in the areas
of humanitarianism and volunteerism. Religious organization and community groups
(vigilantes, churches, etc) have contributed in attenuating or escalating conflict in some
cases. The activities of these stakeholders should be creatively harmonized and co-
ordinate to bring about desired outcome.
There are two obvious comments this list of measures trigger. First, many of
these measures proved only partly successful or unsuccessful. Possibly the main reasons
for this limited success was that they used ‘too much thumbs, and not enough fingers’,
that is they were too force-oriented and authoritarian. Moreover, they often were
directed at the effects, rather than causes of ethnic conflict and communal violence.
This leads us to a second comment. One is struck by the absence among these
measures of possibly the most effective method of building national unity and
mitigating intra-national conflicts: elite-uniting meetings and negotiation forums. The
example of South Africa (in 1994) shows that such elite-led negotiations may lead to
elite ‘pacts’ and ‘agreements’ that proved very effective in providing a degree of
political restraint and moderation. Such elite pacts, as we should stress again, do NOT
eliminate divisions and conflicts, but can develop rules of competition that transform
political struggle (that breeds violence) into political game, that is a normatively-
regulated and peaceful rivalry (cf. Higley and Burtom 2006). There are a number of
conditions for such ‘integrative’ meetings to work – that is generating effective elite
pacts. First of all, the key conflicting factions have to convince themselves that such
meetings and pacts are better than the persisting political crisis: confrontation and
warfare. Second, the meetings of this type rely on external ‘sponsors’, like the
international agencies that may play the role of ‘arbiters’ and ‘honest brokers’. Thirdly,
effective elite meetings require wide inclusion: all important elite members, including
the leaders of oppositional and secessional movements, have to take part in the
negotiations. And finally, the purpose of these negotiations – creating of the normative
framework (rules of political game) – has to be clearly stated. Alas, the Nigerian leaders
have never attempted to organize such a nation-wide, entire elite-wide, integrative
meeting – perhaps for good reasons: a prevalent fear that such a meeting would fail and
further exacerbate ethno-religious conflicts.
The endeavors of the successive Nigerian political leaders to mitigate ethno-
communal conflicts through a variety of approach and measures as highlighted above
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have here been constrained by situational and structural factors such as lack of political
will and commitment on the part of the political leadership, inefficiency of the law
enforcement agencies, politicization of conflict and conflict management, as well as
vested regime or partisan interests. The structural impediments include the nature and
structure of Nigerian federation that has promoted centrifugation and primodialism, the
constitutional twist of citizenship/indigeneship question, as well as the more nagging
issues of ethnic politics and elite manipulation. These situational and structural issues
have played out in the context of the conflict situations in Nasarawa and plateau States.
Consequently, inspite of the various mechanisms put in place to bring about a lasting
solution of the conflicts; lasting peace and stability have continued to elude the states.
Incidentally, the conflict situations have continued to submit with apparent trajectories
to degeneration .Other strategies for national integration in Nigeria over the years
include the war against indiscipline, the national rebirth, national orientation
programmes and so on. Table 4.7 highlights the prominent policies of programmes of
national integration in the country alongside the initiation regime.

Table 5.8 Policies and Programmes of National Integration

REGIME ATTEMPT AT INTEGRATED STATEHOOD
Gowon, 1966-75 (i) Program for reconciliation, reconstruction
and rehabilitation.
(ii) Establishment of unity schools.
(iii) Establishment of National Youth
Service Corp.
(iv)Creation of 12 states.
Murtala/Obasanjo, 1975-79 (i) Creation of additional 7 states
(ii) Ethnical revolution.
Shagari, 1979-83 (i) Green revolution
Buhari/Idiagbon, 1984-85 (i) War against Indiscipline (WAI)
Babangida, 1985-93 (i) Mass Mobilization Program, MAMSER
(ii) National Directorate for Employment,
NDE
(iii) Directorate for Food, Roads and
Rural Infrastructure, DFFRI
(iv)Better Life Program
(v) State Creation
Shonekan, 1993 -----------------------------------
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 Abacha, 1993-98 (i) War against Indiscipline and Corruption,
WAIC
(ii) NationalReconciliationCommittee,
NARECOM
(iii) National Orientation Agency, NOA
(iv)Family Support Program
(v) State Creation
(vi)Vision 2010
Abubakar, 1998-99 (i) National Reconciliation
Obansanjo, 1999-2007 (i) National Rebirth
(ii) Human Rights Abuse Investigation
committee
(iii) Poverty Alleviation Program
(iv)Constitutional Review
Yar’Adua 2007-2010 Amnesty Program for the Niger Delta militants
Source: Ngare (2012:140)

5.15 Summary

The chapter highlighted a number of issues pertaining to the manifestation of ethnicity

and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. The key factors exacerbating ethno-religious divisions
and conflicts were analysed, with the emphasis placed on both the ‘mass factors’ – the
wide availability and ‘mobilizability’ of ethno-religious identities, and the ‘elite
factors’, mainly the emergence of local leaders who ‘played’ the ethno-religious factors
in their attempts to get access to political privilege and power resources (including oil
revenues). The chapter also referred the effort of the successive government in Nigeria
towards dealing with the challenge of fractious ‘ethnic politics’ – the politics that
undermine national unity, integration, stability, development and security in the
country. It highlights the absence of one important strategy that may mitigate such
conflictual ‘ethnic politics’, namely the elite agreements, elite pacts (called in Europe
‘round table agreements’), that allow to negotiate and implement normative frameworks
for political struggles. Such normative frameworks – like the one developed during the
1994 ‘peace and reconcilliation agreement’ in South Africa, can tame insecure and

153
violent politics, and transform it into secure and non-violent political game – a peaceful
and normatively regulated rivalry.

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 CHAPTER 6

ETHNICITY AND COMMUNAL CONFLICT IN NORTH CENTRAL

NIGERIA: PLATEAU AND NASARAWA STATE CASES

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the nexus between ethnicity and communal conflict in North-
central Nigeria with particular reference to the Nasarawa and Plateau states. The focus
on these states is justified by their centrality and political importance. Firstly, the two
states form the core of what is known today in Nigeria as the north central geo-political
zone. Secondly the two states have played host to high prevalence of sectarian and inter
communal conflicts over the years, in which ethnicity appears to be a culpable factor. In
considering the two states as the cases study, the chapter intends to interrogate the
incidence, patterns, trends, dynamics, as well as impacts and implications of communal
conflicts in that context. More importantly, the chapter intends to situate the relationship
between ethnicity and communal conflict in the state from the standpoint of historical,
anecdotal and empirical evidences. But before delving into the case studies proper, it is
pertinent to present a general overview of the incidence and prevalence of communal
conflict in north central Nigeria in an attempt to cast the contextual background to the
case studies.

6.2 Ethnic and communal conflict in North-Central Nigeria

The north central Nigeria has a number of essential attributes which makes it
vulnerable to communal strife and contestations. According to the National Orientation
Agency (NOA), these features include:
(i) The zone is home to over 50% of ethnic groups in Nigeria;
(ii) Christianity, Islam and Tradition African Religion [TAR] all command
considerable influence in the religion;
(iii) In addition to rich mineral resources; the zone is also endowed with
massive land and grazing fields;
(iv)In terms of development, the zone is one of the least developed in Nigeria;
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 (v) The zone has a very large pool of ex-serviceman, some of whom are not
gainfully employed, etc (see Ambe-Uva, 2010:43).
It is important to highlight, at the very outset, the implication of these specific
attributes of the North-Central zone for conflict and inter-group crisis. Firstly, the fact
that the zone hosts over 50% of Nigeria’s ethnic groups implies that it is
characteristically diverse and segmented. These characteristics make the region very
particularly prone to inter-communal and sectionalist conflicts, especially when elite
manipulation and politicization set in.
Secondly, the fact that Christianity, Islam and Tradition African Religion [TAR]
all command considerable influence in the region means that the region is characterized
by immense religious and cultural diversity. Although there is ‘unity in diversity’,
Nigeria’s experience tends to suggest that diversity has been the bane of inter-group
harmony. Expectedly, such diversity has often created the pretext for ethno-religious
bias and divides in the zone, with volatile outcomes.
Thirdly, the availability of minerals and agricultural resort in the zone has made
the zone a haven for ecological struggles and/or competition. This has been exemplified
in high incidence of farmer/herder conflicts, boundary disputes as well as other form of
livelihood conflicts in the zone. This trend has been accentuated in the era of climate,
characterized by environmental scarcities and competition.
Fourthly, the fact that the north central zone is one of the least developed in
Nigeria implies that there is high incidence of poverty in the area. There is a correlation
social-economic malaise, as exemplified in poverty, and conflict (Mustapha, 2014).
issue of poverty and conflict has for some times attracted the attention of many scholars
as Burton (1997) who agrees to the relationship between poverty and conflict as a result
of human needs that are left unsatisfied which is expressed through conflict. The poor
material condition of people in the zone therefore makes them prone to restiveness and
conflict. Lastly, the fact that the north central Nigeria has a pool of ex-servicemen who
are hardly gainfully employed poses the danger of militancy and violent crime.
According to key informant, ‘involvement of such men in the planning and execution of
communal violence has been one of the worst complications of security crisis in the
zone’ (KII Jos, June 2015) [1].
Generally, the North central Nigeria has been quite notorious for communal
conflict/violence over the years. The crises have been variously motivated by struggles
over land, boundary, chieftaincy, natural resources, and political power. There have also
156
been rising waves of ethnic and religious contestations in the zone. Conflict in the
North-central zone has been more obviously pronounced along the Benue-Nasarawa-
Plateau axis. Regarding the nature and pattern of conflict in this zone, Mustapha
(2014:4) succinctly puts it:
Conflict in this zone is largely inter-communal, frequently
involving the struggles for land by different ethnic and clan
groups. There is also a cleavage between nomadic pastoral
Fulani herdsman, increasingly pushed southwards by
desertification in the Sahel, and local sedentary farming
communities in these states.
Although conflicts in this zone appear to have a lot in common, they are
nonetheless different in many ways. For instance, whereas livelihood struggle feature
quite prominently across the zone, the dynamics of conflict across the states of the zone
tend to differ significantly. For example, while the conflict in Nasarawa state have been
much more diffused and inter communal, the situation in Plateau state has been
remarkably polarized and sectarian, finding expression in a wave of ethno-religions
conflagration (Mustapha, 2014).
The character and the key aspets of communal conflicts in the North-central
zone can be summarized in seven points:
(i) It is organized (locally), ethnic in nature and inter-communal in its form;
(ii) It is both diffused and polarized, subject to periodic radicalisation;
(iii) It has been strengthened by prolonged struggles for power, resources,
and livelihood;
(iv)It has often assumed sectarian dimensions – the leaders and members have
been isolated and mal-integrated politically;
(v) It is dynamic, variously taking the form of resource conflict, political
conflict, livelihood conflict, ethnic conflict, as well as ethno-religious
conflict;
(vi)It is characterized by use of force, arms bearing and militancy in its
contemporary manifestation;
(vii) It has often been politicized by the local elites, as well as the federal
(national) interventions.

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6.3 The Nasarawa communal conflicts

‘In early hours of June 26, a gang of young ‘warrriors’ of tiv ethnic group crept
into the village of Tudun Abadu, in central Nigeria, armed with ageing guns, matchets,
spears, and bows and arrows. Firing their guns in the air, they broke into the house of
the local chief, let him out into the open and beheaded him…in one house, five people,
including children, were killed; their blood is now splattered across the
walls’(Fissiparous Folk Jan 13th 2000).
This buttreses the fact that Nasarawa state has been a field of various kinds and
dimensions of communal conflicts and violence since its creation. Shortly after its
creation in 1996, the state was plunged into a wave of communal conflict particularly in
its southern axis, where the emergent groups and movements have been better
organised. A prominent instance of such conflict occurred between the Bassa and
Egbura (also designated lgbirra) communities in Toto local Government of the state in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. This conflict was ignited by contestation pertaining to
lands and boundary disputes. Also in the 2000s, there were other incidents of communal
conflict between the Tiv and Kwala peoples of the state, which had a lot to do with
contestation over land resources and/or ecological space. Another example was the
incident between the Tivs and the Fulani in Doma, Awe, and Keana Local Government
Areas of the state. These sets of conflict were principally driven by land and livelihood
struggles, which were accentuated by the dynamics of climate and demographic changes
in the contemporary world (Okoli and Atelhe, 2014). In 2010 and 2011, there were
violent clashes between the organized groups emerging in farming and herding
communities on the border lines of Doma and Keana local Government Areas. These
waves of conflict particularly affected a couple of communities in the area, namely
Akpanaja, Rukubi, Doka, Kadarko, and Kwarra. These set of conflict had a lot of
similarities with those that had occurred in the same areas in the late 2000s, even though
the social dynamics and dialectics tend to differ quite significantly. A key informant in
the area opined that ‘these conflicts were characteristically vicious and violent’ (KII,
Obi, June, 2015) [2].
In April 2012, there were violent clashes between the Fulani herdsmen and local
farming tribes in Gidinye, Duduguru, Baba, and Yelwa areas of the state leading to a
spiral of inter-communal tension. According to a key informant in the area, ‘this turn of
conflict involved a great deal of rural violence and destruction’(KII, Yelwa, June,
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2015) [3].The conflict also involved a great deal of arms bearing and militancy by the
feuding parties, resulting in pervasive and massive collateral damages on both sides.
The conflict situation in Nasarawa state assumed a dramatic turn in mid and late
2012. In May 2012, for instance, there was a brutal – well organized and planned –
attack on the Alago ethnic community in Assakio by a militia group that claimed to be
the military vanguard of the Eggon tribe- the Ombatse. This incident was followed by
another attack by the Ombatse on the Migilis in Agyaragu area of the State. The
Ombatse uprising of 2012 introduced a militia dimension to the communal disturbances
in the State. The Ombatse is composed of bands of violent youths that have been
involved in acts of ethnic brigandage throughout the State (Okoli and Uhembe, 2014).
The organization, widely believed to be fetish and diabolical, has been orchestrating
massive violence and militancy in the State since 2012.
In early 2013, the Ombatse carried out lethal attacks against different non-Eggon
communities in the State, namely Iggah in Nasarawa Eggon LGA, namely Burum-
Burum in Doma LGA, Yelwa Bassa in Kokona LGA, and Kwandere in Lafia LGA. In
May 2013, the group attacked a crop of public security operatives (comprising the
Police and Department of State Security personnel) in Alakyo village, leading to the
death of scores of the personnel. Also in September, 2013 the Ombatse attacked Odobu
and Obi in Obi LGA, as well as Assakio in Lafia LGA. These very attacks sparked off
a wave of tension in the State, leading to mass exodus from the affected areas.
The Fulani-farmer conflicts continued unabatedly throughout the State up to late
2014 amidst the rising incidence of the Ombatse militancy. The events came to a head
between September and December, 2014 when there was a sort of implosion of inter-
communal conflagration in the State. In these clashes, the Fulani and Kambari (a sub-
type of Kanuri) tribe rose in counter-militancy against the ethnic Eggons. Consequently,
there ensued a violent confrontation between the Ombatse representing the Eggons) and
the various bands of arsonists and militias fighting for the Fulani/Kambari groups. The
outcome of this episode of communal conflict in the State was pertinently horrifying.
As an eye witness-informant put it:
Bloodletting was widespread and ‘wholesale’. The gangs of
fighters exhibited the worst of brigandage and brutal efficiency.
The lines of violence and killings were clearly drawn - people
were isolated and killed based on perceived ethnic identity. The

159
 whole scenario was quite chaotic and maddening… (Kll, Lafia,
June 2015) [4].
It is evident from the foregoing that the security atmosphere in Nasarawa State
over the years has been significantly volatile. The spate of communal conflict and
violence in the State created an ambience of perpetual siege and crisis that negated
peaceful co-existence and cordial intergroup relations in the State, leading to a vicious
cycle of insecurity and instability. The conflict scenario in the state has equally been
associated with a variety of stakes and groups. In all these, the ethnic factor has been the
most dominant and most critical factor. Normally, the communal conflicts were framed
and prosecuted in ethnic terms. Even the perennial farmer/herder conflicts have always
been expressed in ethnic terms. The reason for this twist is simple. According to a
researcher-informant, who was engaged in a study in Lafia:
There is a marked occupational divide between the natives and
the nomads (Fulani). The former are largely farmers while the
latter are mainly herders. The conflict between them tends to be
executed in ethnic terms in the sense that the Fulani nomad
would ordinarily think that the attack on them by the native
farmers is an ethnic agenda. Consequently a conflict that was
principally motivated by ecological struggles would naturally
end up in ethnic fighting. This has complicated our situation in
the State (FGDS/Study Chat, Lafia; June, 2015) [5].
Even the Ombatse militancy has been widely perceived by the locals as a typical
instance of ethic agenda. Some of our FGDs participants opined that the Ombatse
militia was being used by the ethnic Eggons to intimidate and dominate other ethnic
minorities in an attempt to ‘assert’ and ‘establish’ their hegemony throughout the State
(Different FGDs in Jos and Lafia, May-June, 2015 and July, 2016) [6]. The framing of
conflict in ethnic and primordial terms has been the most critical complication of
communal conflict in the Nasarawa State.
The dynamics of conflict in the Nasarawa State over the years have found
expression in crises of public security in the State. This is exemplified by the spate of
violent confrontations:
Farmer-herder confrontation: Farmer herder-conflict is a prevalent
phenomenon in Nasarawa state. This dimension of communal conflict is as old as the
State itself. It has occurred in virtually all parts of the State with greater incidence in the
160
rural areas of Lafia, Obi, Keana and Awe Local government Areas. The conflict is
usually ignited by the herder’s encroachment on farmlands, or farmers’ encroachment
on traditional/dedicated grazing fields or routes. Farm-herder conflict in the Nasarawa
State has assumed a terrifying dimension over the years. According to a key informant
in Obi area of the State:
There used to be pockets of milder incidents in the 1990s, which were
easily resolved by local authorities. The situation has degenerated since
the 2000 when much violence has been introduced into the crisis.
Nowadays, the situation is certainly getting out of hand. (KII, June
2015) [7]
The degeneration of farmer-herder strife in the Nasarawa State has been marked
by immense arms bearing and confrontation. Sometimes weapons such as AK-47 and
automatic rifles were used by the feuding parties in prosecuting the fight. There have
also been claims and counter-claims of the use of mercenary fighters. According to a
key informant respondent in Lafia:
The Fulani nomads go as far as hiring mercenary militants to
help them fight the farmers. The mercenary fighters have been
identified by our local vigilantes as foreign elements who must
have come from other parts of Africa. These militants often
operate in military uniforms for strategic reasons…. (KII June,
2015) [8]
The incidence of farmer-herder conflict has been accentuated in the Nasarawa
State owing to poor regulation of farming and grazing activities in that context. For
instance, the government approved grazing routes and reserves have been trespassed
over the years by land grabbers, particularly commercial farmers and land developers
(Okoli and Atelhe, 2014). The available grazing reserves in the State are bereft of basic
infrastructure, and so are not functional. They are also not clearly delineated and
gazetted. In the same vein, the activities of local small scale farmers and commercial
crop growers have been so poorly regulated by the government. The consequences of
this scenario are the incessant farmland or graze-land encroachments that often
precipitated conflict.
Farmer herder-conflict in the Nasarawa State has resulted in dire social, socio-
economic and humanitarian consequences. These include human deaths and injuries,
population displacement, rural-urban out-migration, volatile inter-group relations,
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decline in rural productivity, livelihood crisis among farmers and herders, and so on.
The table 6.1 below chronicles important instances of farmer herder conflict in the State
over the years.
Ethnic militancy: Another crucial dimension of communal conflict in the
Nasarawa State is the rising wave of ethnic violence and/or militancy. This is evident in
the emergence of organized ethnic militia groups in the State. A case in point is the
Sojan Patari group, which was formed by the ethnic Tivs to enable them counter the
growing excesses of the Fulani nomads (Okoli and Uhembe, 2014). There is also the
Ombatse group, a violent militant movement led by a radical local leader that maintains
affiliation with the ethnic Eggons. The Ombatse and their leaders have been responsible
for the spate of ethnic violence in the State since 2012. ‘It was principally formed to
enable the Eggon ethnic group protect itself against the onslaught of the Fulani Nomads,
who are getting more militant than ever nowadays’ (KII June, 2015) [9]
The phenomenon of ethnic militancy has militarized the farmer- herder conflicts
in the State. It has also compounded and complicated the communal conflict situation in
the State. The spate of arms bearing and brigandage associated with this trend has been
one of the worst undoing of public safety and security in Nasarawa State. The activities
of ethnic militia – and their easily radicalized leaders – have also been complicated in
the rising wave of arms proliferation and violence in the State. The implication of this
trend for sustainable peace and security has been pertinently dire.
Rural and urban banditry: There has been a rising incidence of banditry in both
rural and urban parts of Nasarawa State. For instance, the phenomenon of cattle rustling
has been quite prevalent in the hinterlands of the State. Similarly, there have been
incessant occurrences of over-night and highway robbery in the urban areas of Karu,
Keffi, Akwanga, and Lafia. These incidents are linked to the incidence of arms
proliferation and armed conflicts in the State. As a key informant put it:
The spate of robbery and armed violence in the State is not
unconnected with the issue of arms proliferation in the context of
the pervasive communal conflicts in the State. Arms used in
prosecuting the violent struggles in various parts of the State
have been used by criminal gangs to foment trouble. These
robbery cases everywhere are the consequences… (KII July,
2015) [10].

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 With particular reference to the rural areas, there has been an obvious rise in the
incidence of cattle raids and rustling in Nasarawa State. The Fulani nomads are inclined
to hold the natives responsible for these incidents. The natives on the other hand
contend that crimes are ‘perpetrated by the organized syndicate of criminal nomads who
come from the far North’ (KII June, 2015) [11]. This blame game holds critical
implications for inter-group relations among the natives and the Fulani herdsmen. Table
6.1 below highlights incidents of cattle rustling in Nigeria over the years with emphasis
on Nasarawa State.

Table 6.1 Instances of Major Herder/Farmer Conflict in Nasarawa State (2011-2014)

DATE CONFLCT IMMIDIATE OUTCOME
LOCATION CAUSE
20/1/2011 Akpanja, Ondori Rukubi Trespass into Agatu, 4 persons killed;
in Doma Local Tiv and other farms houses and farm
Government Area by Fulani herders produce destroyed;
population
displaced.
17/4/2011 Border communities Killing of a Fulani 30 persons killed;
between Doma LGA of herder by Tivs human injuries
Nasarawa State and farmers sustained;
Guma LGA in Benue population
State displaced.
13/1/2012 Doka, Kwara and Ugwan Fulani herders 10 persons killed;
Yaran Mada in Keana alleged stealing and household and farm
and Doma LGAs killing of their cows assets destroyed;
by Tiv/Mada/Migili population
communities displaced.
24/7/2012 Kotsona village in Tunga, Encroachment of About 35 killed;
Awe LGA Tiv farmlands by property destroyed
Fulani herders
5/1/2013 Agbashi town in Doma Maiming of an 5 Fulani killed;
LGA Agatu man; rapping Fulani camps raided;
of Agatu women and population displaced
girls by Fulani
6/1/2013 Agbashi town in Doma Reprisal attack by 16 Agatu killed;
LGA Fulani herders over property destroyed
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 the killing of their
men
Jan – Various parts of the State: Sundry factors Loss of life and
November, Obi, Awe, Doma, Keana pertaining to property; mass
2014 and Lafia suburbs resource conflict, population
livelihood struggles displacement; inter-
and their ethno- communal
communal conflagrations
complications
Sources: Okoli and Atelhe (2014: 87); Nasarawa National Orientation Agency’s Pulse
Report 2011-2013; Author’s updates and modifications apply.

Indigene/settler divide: Indigene/settler confrontation is another critical

dimension of communal conflict in the Nasarawa State. The indigenes see themselves as
the ‘owners of the land’ who are vested with the full rights and privileges of citizenship
while the settlers are considered as ‘stranger’ with little citizenship rights. Sentiments
emanating from this scenario have often precipitated conflict in the Nasarawa State, and
these conflicts gave rise to local (typically ethno-tribal) organization, and prompted the
emergence of radicalized leadership. For instance native tribes in the State in the early
2000s were principally motivated by indigene-ship question. Similarly, the long-
standing feud between the ethnic Eggons and the politically assertive Hausa/Kanuri
(Kambari)/Fulani group of ethnicities was also borne out indigene-ship tussle.
The indigene-ship crisis in the Nasarawa State bears the tendency to polarize the
state into divides and closures of identity. It breeds the divisive consciousness of ‘we
versus them’ or ‘us against they’ which has been at the root of identity conflicts in the
State. The indigene-ship crisis has been worsened by the issue of political exclusion and
minority fears. The tendency for the so-called indigenous groups and their leaders to
marginalize the non-indigenes in the scheme of politics and socio-economic relations
tend to have led to increased inter-group tension/crisis in the State. The outcome of this
has been the volatile ambience of inter-group relations.
Communal conflicts in the Nasarawa State have been more concentrated in the
southern region of the State. Although there have been sporadic and isolated cases of
such conflicts in both northern and central zones, the southern axis was found to have
been the worst hit area in terms of incidence, prevalence and vicious impacts of the

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conflicts. Within the southern region, the critical flashpoints of the conflicts include
Lafia, Obi, Awe, Keana, and Doma Local Government Areas. In terms of degree or
frequency of occurrence, the conflicts have been most pronounced in Obi Local
Government Area. But in terms of degree of collateral impact and destructiveness, the
conflicts have been most damaging in the Lafia Local Government Area.
It must be noted, however, that in the afore-mentioned critical flash-points,
communal conflicts have largely been a rural phenomenon. In other words, it has more
or less occurred in the hinterlands of the affected LGAs, with occasional spill-over
effects on the urban suburbs of the areas. The reason for this pattern of occurrence is
traceable to the specifics and dynamics of the conflicts. For instance, the conflicts have
been largely driven by land and livelihood based contestations between the farming and
herding (nomadic) communities alongside their ethnic religious leadership, affiliates
and allies. The context of these struggles is essentially rural areas of the State. The
escalation of the crisis to the non-rural areas has often been reinforced by the social
dynamics of the conflict, especially when complicated by the ethnic, religious or
sectionalist mobilizing, and by the local organisation.

6.4 The Plateau communal conflicts

There have been two major patterns of communal conflicts in Plateau State over
the years. The first is the conflict between and among the various settler communities.
These include the Hausa, the Igbos, the Yorubas, and the rest of other settler ethnic
communities (Onoja, 2010). The second is the conflict between the indigenous
communities (ethnic Birom, Anaguate and Afrisare) and the settler communities.
The first pattern of conflict had to do with struggles over the control of
economic resources in the state, especially in the Jos town and environs. The flourishing
mining and commercial activities in the area during colonialism necessitated the influx
of settler from various parts of the country into Jos to work and trade around Jos. The
competition for economic space and resources, as well as livelihood struggles among
the settlers over time became critical drivers of conflict among the settler communities.
It must be noted, however that the pattern of conflict that played out in this era was
more restricted in scope and less violent.

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 The first incident of violent and widespread conflict in Plateau State occurred in
the mid 1960s. It was motivated by the anti-Igbo pogrom in the wake of the political
upheaval in the country at that time. The killing of prominent northern politicians in the
1966 military coup d’etat – a coup believed to be masterminded by the Igbos – stirred
massive revolt by the northerners against Igbo residents in the North. This led to the
massacre of many Igbos in Jos during the period.
After the end of the Nigeria Civil War, Jos and its environs became every
peaceful and stable. It remained so through the 1970s and 1980s. The state of affairs in
Plateau State, however, assumed a dramatic turn in the 1990s with the sudden
recrudescence of violent conflict in the State. This marked the beginning of the critical
and volatile era of the second pattern of communal conflict in Plateau State. Such
pattern of conflict has been between the autochthonous communities and the settlers in
the State.
This dimension of conflict has been episodic and sporadic in occurrence over the
year. In 1994, there was a violent confrontation between the Hausa/Fulani and the
indigenous communities, following the appointment of an Hausa Fulani as the chairman
of Jos North Local Government Transition Committee. This appointment was rejected
by the indigenous, who interpreted it as an assertion of Hausa-Fulani hegemony on the
indigenous population. The conflict that ensured led to sectarian violence wherein a few
people were killed, in addition to destruction of property (Osaretin and Akor, 2103).
In 1996, there was an electoral violence in Angwar Rogo. This was caused by
the alleged plan to rig election by the Hausa/Fulani through the use of hired voters. The
indigenes alleged that the Hausa-Fulani were planning to rig election by smuggling fake
voters into the polls. This prompted the electoral officers to screen out ‘the unknown
faces’ thereby sparking off riot among the Hausa-Fulani youths (Osaretin and Akor,
2010: 353). This episode of violence resulted in human death, arson, and public
vandalism.
Since year 2000, communal conflicts in Plateau State have assumed prevalent
and pervasive dimensions. Cases in point include the Tarok-Hausa/Fulani crisis in
2004 , the Geomal-Hausa/Fulani crisis in Shendam LGA in 2002, the Quan- Pan crises
in Quan’pan LGA in 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008 and 2010, and the spate of farmer herder-
conflict in parts of the State since 2010. Since the 2000s, conflicts in Plateau State have
been particularly violent and vindictive. It has also involved the deployment of

166
sophisticated weaponry and strategy. More importantly, it has been more pervasive,
more prevalent and much more destructive.
The contemporary dynamics of communal conflicts in Plateau Suggest that
violence has been more or less sectarian in form, organized and led by local leaders
many of whom had clear visions of grievances, demands and political ambitions.
Fighting and violence have been along ethno-religious lines. This is consistent with the
socio cultural characteristics of the State. The State is fragmented along ethnic and
religious lines with incidental coincidences of identities. For instance, most indigenous
peoples are Christians while most Hausa/Fulani settlers are Muslims. This makes it
possible for the conflict between these groups to be framed in religious terms (Egwu,
2004).
At another level, other coincidences of identity may occur, and these
coincidences were frequently ‘constructed’ by the local leaders seeking political
advantages of wide coalitions. For example, most herdsmen in the state are Muslims
while most farmers are Christians. Consequently, the conflict between these two groups
have often be framed or constructed in religious and ethnic terms because most of the
herders are Hausa/Fulani while greater chunk of the farming communities are non-
Hausa/Fulani. This scenario has created an identity twist that has complicated the
communal conflict situation in the State. The Hausa/Fulani have developed an identity
consciousness depicted in the concept of Jasawa, which refers loosely to the Muslim
Hausa/Fulani indigene of the state.
The peculiar characteristics of the Plateau crisis as indicated in the foregoing has
led to the description of the situation as ethno-religious or ethno-communal conflict.
Some features of this conflicts need to be reminded again. It was a conflict involving
ethno-religious, often ‘tribal’ identities; it was highly organized, with well drawn plans
and strategies; and it was led by local leaders who emerged in the processes of
confrontation, and who got subsequently radicalized due, at least partly, to their
‘sectarian’ isolation. This can be seen as a convergence of religious and ethnic
interests/identities in the process of struggle and deepening crisis. The ethno-religious
coloration of communal conflict in Plateau State reflects the dialectics of identity
politics in contemporary Nigeria, as well as the weakness of state-based elites (and
growing influence of emergent local elites). Students of political development and
modernization would also characterize this situation as ‘political decay’ – organizational
weakness of the state, rule of law, and mechanisms of democratic representation
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(accountability) (e.g., Fukuyama 2014). This study shows that the picture ‘on the
ground’ has been much more complicated. In the Plateau State ethno religious identities
continue to be widely available for political mobilization, political and economic
disputes often prompt such mobilisations, and local leaders organize disputes into often
violent conflicts. This has continued to be a dominant tendency in the State. Table 6.2
chronicles important instances of conflict in Plateau State since year 2000.

Table 6.2 Communal conflicts in Plateau State (2000–2012)

Year Episode Impact
2001 Ethno-religious conflict over the More than 2000 people were
appointment of an Hausa Fulani killed; Hundreds of people
Muslim as the Jos North LGA co- were displaced; public and
ordinator of the Federal private properly were
Government’s Poverty Alleviation destroyed.
programme
2004 Religious violence in Yelwa area Over 1,000 persons were
between Christians and Muslims killed, many villages were
sacked, churches and
mosques were destroyed,
and over 100,000 persons
were displaced.
2008 Ethno-Communal violence between 800 persons were estimated
the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulani to have died, public and
on the outcome of the November 27 private properties were
Local Government election vandalized.

2010 (January) Violent clashes between Christian Over 1000 persons were
and Muslims youth occasioned by killed, properties were
an attempt by a Muslim to destroyed
reconstruct a building in a Christian
dominated area – Dutse Uku
2010 (March) Attack by herdsmen against About 500 perosns were
indigenous villagers at Dogo killed, scores of villagers
Nahauwa were dislodged leading to
population displacement
2011 Farmer-herder confrontations in Over 100 persons were

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 various parts of the Plateau killed on both sides,
hinterlands property were destroyed
Land-related conflicts between the Killing of over 300 persons
natives and Hausa-Fulani herdsmen including a serving Senator
and State Assembly member
Source; Research: Fieldwork May- July, 2015; July, 2016[12].

There have been two main critical zones of communal conflict in the Plateau
State. The zones are the highlands, encompassing the Jos axis and environs and the
lowland plains beneath the Plateau escarpment (Higazi, 2010). The central zone has also
recorded incidents of conflicts, such as in Pankshin and Amper (2010). The incidence of
conflict has varied across the different zones. Nonetheless, the scope of the conflict in
the recent times (since 2010) has appeared to be more or less state-wide. As a
respondent in Jos put it:
No place is safe in the State. We live in fear in the city because of
religious differences. The villages are not safer. The militant Fulani
herders are making trouble in virtually all the places. It is, in fact, a
state-wide thing (KII June 2015) [13].
Communal conflicts have been more prevalent in the northern and southern
zones of Plateau State. The central part of the State has also often witnessed pockets of
crisis owing to its spatial proximity to, and social affinity (Kinship ties) with, the
primary zones of the conflict (Small Arms Survey, 2005)

Table 6.3 Incidence of conflict across the three Zones of Plateau State.
Zone Constituents Incidence
Northern Zone Jos North, Jos South, Jos East, Barkin Ladi, Endemic and
Riyom , and Bassa protracted
Southern Zone Wase, Langtan North, Lantang South, Endemic and
Shendam, Qua’an Pan, and Mikang protracted
Central Zone Pankshin, kanke, Kanan. Bokkos, and mangu Sporadic
Source; Researcher: Fieldwork June-July, 2015 [14].

In terms of scope and frequency of occurrence, the northern zone has been much
more affected by communal conflicts than other zones. But in terms of collateral impact
and vicious complications, the conflicts have been equally destructive in both the
northern and southern zones. The central zone has been more or less enmeshed in

169
contagious or spill-over effects of the conflicts in the northern and southern zones. This
is principally in view of its proximity to the primary zones of fighting in other zones, as
well as its kinship ties with the peoples of that zones, which have often motivated sort
of ‘irredentist’ attacks and violence. In all, the most critical flash-points in the Plateau
conflicts have been Jos North, Jos South, Jos East, Barkin Ladi, and Riyon areas of the
State.
By all indications, Jos-the state’s administrative capital-has been the epi-center
of the communal conflict in Plateau state. Within the urban Jos enclave, there is huge
concentration of settler communities and population. The ethnic mix of the settlers is
widely varied but the ratio of settler to indigene population is certainly skewed in favour
of the former. In other words, while the indigenes populations are more numerous
elsewhere in the state, the population of settler outnumbers that of the indigenes in Jos
town. Within the core of Jos town –Jos North LGA –the Hausa/Fulani ‘settler’ is in
dominance. This situation has complicated the hegemonic struggles between the native
Population and settler–communities, particularly between the Biroms and Hausa/Fulani.
It is the dialectics of these struggles that explains the spate of crisis in Jos over the
years.

6.5 Patterns of conflict cum violence in the focal states

We have charted the complex patterns of conflict across the focal states. These
conflicts include not only organized political clashes accompanying disputes over land
and other resources, but also less organized mutual vendettas, silent and selective
killings, mass killing, mercenary fighting, arms bearing and militancy, and sporadic
village raids.
Mutual vendetta: The communal violence in the focal state mirrors the
characteristic of a mutual vendetta. There were attacks and counter attacks. Usually, one
turn of attack would lead to spiral trend in the dynamics of violence in the focal states.
For instance, the attacks by the Ombatse militia on selected Fulani communities in
Nasarawa state in 2012-2013 triggered a spiral of violent reprisal that threw the entire
state into chaotic situation. It is this tendency that explains the spate of communal
violence in the focal states.

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 Silent and selective killings: In the focal states, killings have been silent and
selective in the recent times. Apart from the episodes of open confrontations that often
left scores of people dead, there have been regular disappearances of persons in the
communities affected by crisis. In some cases, people get missing for a while after
which their remains were found in the neighborhood forests or abandoned wells. This
pattern of violence was a feature of communal violence in the hinterlands of Obi, Awe,
Keana, and Lafia Local Government Areas of Nasarawa State from 2012-2013.
Mass killings: Mass killings have been perpetrated across the focal states by the
feuding parties. This has taken the form of organized attack on people in public
gatherings. Cases in point included attacks on worshippers in churches and mosques,
attacks on amassed sympathizers in public funerals, as well as targeted open-market
place. This pattern of violence has led to mass killings in the focal states. For instance,
in 2010 a group of armed Fulani militants attacked a funeral congregation in Plateau
State, leading to the killing of a serving Senator and a House of Assembly member,
among the most others.
Over-night village raids: This is a form of violence whereby hamlets or rural
villages are invaded at nights, leading to mass killings. This pattern of violence has been
regular in the hinterlands of Plateau State since 2010. It has also featured quite
prominently in parts of rural Nasarawa State over the Years, particularly since the
escalations of inter-communal conflicts in that context in 2012/2013. In one of such
attacks in 2010, an estimated number of 500 persons were massacred by persons
believed to be Fulani fighters in a night raid in a village settlement near Riyom. This
sparked local and global outrage in view of the apparent genocidal character of the
incident.
Mercenary fighting: The communal violence in the focal sates has borne
element of mercenary fighting. The mercenaries are recruited both locally and
internationally. Local mercenaries are hired from militant groups in the neighboring
states while international mercenaries are hired from countries such as Niger, Chad, and
Mali. Local vigilantes in Nasarawa State claimed to have arrested a number of
mercenary fighters in an encounter with them in parts of Obi Local Government Area.
These mercenaries were identified as foreigners, most likely to come from Chad or
Niger in view of their physical and linguistic attributes. Similar incidents have also
occurred in Plateau states. According to a security operative in the state:

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 …we have made a number of arrests confirming the involvement of
foreign mercenaries in the violence, there was this one in particular
whose identity has been authoritatively traced to Mali. He has made a
few confessions confirming this claim himself. As a matter of fact the
involvement of hired fighters from home and abroad by parties in the
conflict is real… (KII July, 2016 [15]
Armed intimidation and militancy: Communal violence in the focal states has
been manifestly militarized. This is evident in the extent of arms bearing and militancy
that has characterized it. In both the Nasarawa and Plateau States, fighting has involved
the use of modern and sophisticated arms and ammunition. This level of militarization
has given the conflict in the state a semblance of a theatre of war. Consequently, the
opposing armed groups have often confronted each other’s side with immense brutal
efficiency. This has led to far reaching consequences in the focal states. As one of the
FGD’s discussants put it:
It has been a harvest of terror. The guns and bullets do the fight and won
the battle. We the people on both sides of the divide are the losers. With
the guns at work, the end of the violent is not in sight. it is hopeless
here….. (FGD/Study chats, July, 2015; July, 2016) [16].

6.6 Drivers, triggers and catalysts of communal conflict

The incidence of communal conflict in the focal states has been associated with
a number of factors, including some powerful ‘elite factors’. For convenience of
discussion, these factors have been categorized as drivers, triggers, and catalysts. The
drivers are predisposing factors, both structural and related to elite actions. Poverty,
illiteracy, inequality, unemployment, and the like belong to a standard list of structural
factors. Triggers refer to the proximate causes of communal conflict and they often
involve local leaders and other power-holders. They are the situational factors that
interact with the structural factors to provoke conflict. They include election
manipulation and its accompanying crises, religious mobilisations that often result in
riots, land disputes provoked by landlords and challengers, chieftaincy tussle, and so on.
Catalysts are factors that give impetus to a conflict situation in order to escalate it. In the
context of communal conflict in the focal state, such factors include arms proliferation,

172
ineffective or counter-productive conflict management, militia or mercenary fighting,
etc.
The research found that the causal factors aiding the communal conflicts in the
focal states are both historical and contemporary. Historical factors include the issues of
colonialism, military rule, and other historical incidents that have had implications for
identity politics in Nigeria. Among the contemporary drivers to the conflicts are the
prevailing social, political, ecological, and socio- cultural factors that have in one way
or another influenced the gestation, fertilization and maturation of such conflicts. These
include poverty, unemployment, political exclusion, and illiteracy, to mention but a
few.To have a general grasp of the factors responsible for the incidence and prevalence
of communal conflict in the areas under investigation, it is pertinent to attempt a
discursive over-view of the various factors adverted to in the foregoing. This forms the
purpose of the subsequent sub-themes.
Land and boundary disputes: Disputes pertaining to land and boundary was
found by the research as a culpable factor in the prevalence of communal conflict in the
focal states. For instance, the conflict between the Alagos and the Eggons in Lafia Local
Government Area of Nasarawa State (2012-Date) has a lot to do with land
contestations. The culpability of Land related issues in communal conflicts in the focal
states has been affirmed in the existing academic literature. For example, Dunmoye
cited in Mohammed (n.d:3) suggests:
A major factor of communal conflicts in the zone is land or
boundary disputes. This shows that Land is becoming a very
scarce factor of production either due to population pressure,
land alienation or concentration of land in a few hands.
Ethnic cleavage: The peculiar ethnic diversity of the focal states has made that a
veritable destination for identity politics based on ethno-primordial cleavages.
According to Adamu, the zone is home to nearly all the ethnic groups in the country.
Indeed, the major Tribes- Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba are found here; and numerous
minority groups, numbering about 50, the largest of whom being the Tiv are found in
Four States Benue, Taraba, Plateau and Nasarawa. No other zone in the country can
boast of this degree of ethnic diversity as the North-central zone (N.d:2).
One of the critical outcomes of the peculiar ethno-cultural heterogeneity of the
North-central Nigeria is ethnic cleavages and contestations. The Nasarawa and Plateau

173
States are situated within the core of this zone. Expectedly, the bulk of the communal
conflicts witnessed in the states have been driven by sentiments relating to ethnicism.
Ethnic militia and its militant leadership: The phenomenon of ethnic
militia/militancy has been a trigger as well as catalyst of communal conflict in the focal
states. The emergence of the Ombatse militia in the Nasarawa State, and the
radicalization process among the leaders during the confrontations, introduced a great
measure of militancy in the annals of communal conflict in the state. It has also
contributed to its apparent degeneration and intractability over the recent years (post–
2012).
Indigene/settler divide: The polarization of the society into indigene-settler
blocs has been one of the most critical motivator of communal conflicts in the focal
States (Onoja, 2010; Egwu 2004). The Urban dimension to communal conflict in Jos,
Plateau State has to a significant extent thrived on such divide. The outcome of the
research in the Nasarawa State also revealed this tendency. In effect, the prevailing
communal conflict in these states has often found a premise on the lost stranger
‘apartheid’ syndrome whereby the parties engage each other in a zero-sum citizenship
struggle. These contradictory notions of citizenship have given rise to the indigene-
settler syndrome in plateau and Nasarawa States. In these contexts, non-indigenes are
discriminated in the process of political appointment and admission into public schools.
This has created a feeling of political exclusion in the States, leading to stiff
confrontation between the so-called indigenes and settlers.
Mercenary fighting: The study found that mercenary fighters have often been
hired by parties in an attempt to gain competitive advantage in the course of the
communal conflicts in the focal states. The mercenaries were recruited from within and
outside the country. Their involvement in the Conflict has introduced a great deal of
brutality and bloodletting thereto. In effect, it has often escalated the situation in such a
manner that makes conflict management quite problematic.
Socio-economic malaise: The North central Nigeria constitutes one of the major
axes of poverty in Nigeria. In terms of literacy and employment indicators, the zone is
equally disadvantaged. The location of Plateau and Nasarawa State within the North
central Nigeria, among others, presuppose that the states are significantly backward in
the terms of socio economic indices. The implication of this is that the populations of
the states are insecure and vulnerable. Their vulnerability makes them susceptible to

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restiveness and violence, and more importantly to elite manipulation (Osaretin and
Akor, 2013).
Political motivators and escalators: Political factors such as election crisis,
politics of exclusion, and power struggles among the amities have also been implicated
in the communal conflicts under review. The 1994 and 2004 episodes in Plateau State
were related to elections and partisan struggles/competition. When Political interests
coincide with other socially salient interests, what results is conflagrations wherein elite
manipulation plays a very important role.
Religious fundamentalism: The factor of religion has been closely related with
the communal conflict situation in the focal states, particularly in Plateau state. The
problem is not religion per se; it is religious intolerance, bigotry, and fundamentalism
that is at issue (Higazi, 2010). For instance, the fanatical orientation of some Moslem
and Christian faithful in the urban areas of Jos in Plateau State has often led to clashes
between the adherents of these religions. The 1996 conflict in this area was largely
motivated by this tendency. Also the issue of evangelism and proselytization has
become quite competitive and conflictive. The attempt for both religions to seek
converts from each other has equally led to volatile and antagonistic relations in parts of
Jos and environs, thereby contributing to fuelling communal conflicts.
Elite mobilisations: The conflict situations in Plateau and Nasarawa States
have generally betrayed the tendency of ethno-elite politicking. Usually, the vested
interests of the political elites have been the principal impetus to the conflicts. In effect,
in virtually all the conflicts, the role of ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize ethnic
grievances or differences to advance their self regarding interests have been particularly
decisive. As Ambe-Uva (2010:47) puts it: ‘politicos, businessmen and youth leaders
have been implicated in virtually all the conflicts. Usually, the aim has been to mobilize
ethnic grievances to achieve personal individual objectives, which are often times even
subversive of collective communal interest’. This observation was to a reasonable
extent affirmed in the course of the research in the focal states.
Weak and ineffective state: The response of the state to the conflict situations
in the focal state has not been effective. In some instance, it has often produced
contradictory or counter-productive ends. A report of the International Crisis Group
(2012:1) puts it this way:
Thus far, responses from local and national authorities have
proven mostly ineffective. They have come in three ways. First,
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 several judicial commissions of inquiry have been appointed to
‘get to the root of the crisis’. But authorities have been slow in
publishing reports and acting on their recommendations. Such
public speeches have not been translated into tangible political
action against instigators and perpetrators: none of the suspects
named by the various commissions has been prosecuted, and
impunity continues to feed violence.
Ethnic-religious competition: Ethnicity and religion have been the most critical
factors explaining the prevalence of communal conflicts in the focal states. But in terms
of salience, ethnicity was found to be more pertinent in the Nasarawa case, while
religion is the paramount factor in the case of Plateau. In respect of the later, it has been
aptly observed:
Because the settlers are almost entirely Muslim and the indigenous
people are predominantly Christian, struggle over land ownership,
economic resources and political control tends to be expressed not just
in ethnic but also religious terms. The dispute is compounded by the fact
that, of the settler groups, only the Hausa-Fulani lay proprietary claim
to Jos. As violence recurs, spatial polarization and segregation accurate
social and political divisions; people become more conscious of their
sub-national solidarity and allegiances and more forthcoming about
expressing them (International Crises Group, 2012:1).
Mobilisation of Boko Haram: The disputes over the application of Sharia Law
in early 2000 in some parts of Northern Nigeria led to some ripples in the North-central
zone. For instance, there have been agitations for the implementations of Sharia Law in
Jos by a section of the Moslem community there. This position has met with stiff
opposition by the non-Muslim population, leading to volatile relationships between the
groups. Similarly the sporadic Boko Haram attacks in Plateau State since 2012 have
further escalated mutual distrust and suspicion among the two religions. In this regard,
the Christians have always thought that the Boko Haram attacks were orchestrated by
the Muslims in an attempt to annihilate the Christian population.
Use of land and farmer-herder clashes: Skirmishes between farmers and
herders have been perennial in the focal states. They are usually ignited by farmland or
rangeland encroachments. The farmers and herders hold competitive and contradictory
stakes over land tenure and use. The sporadic trespasses of farmers upon herders’
176
grazing routes, or herd’s encroachment on farmers’ farmland have culminated in violent
confrontations. This situation has been worsened by the inability of the state authorities
to ensure effective resource use, regulation and governance. The bulk of the inter-
communal violence in the hinterlands of Nasarawa and Plateau States since 2010 has
been associated with farmer-herder disturbances.
Weak communication: rumors and gossips: Misperceptions and
misconceptions have also played a role in generating and sustaining the communal
crises in the focal States. For instance, some Christians suspect that the rising Fulani
militancy in the area has been driven by a tacit agenda to Islamize that part of the
Country through forced conversion. This manner of thinking has, indeed, been one of
the bases of Muslim-Christianity cataclysms in Plateau States over the years.

6.7 Elites and communal conflicts

As mentioned above, there is a clear – but quite complex – nexus between

ethnicity, elites and communal conflicts in the focal States. The struggles for power
among the various ethnically based elites have led to politicization of ethnicity, or
ethnicization of politics. In this regard, ethnic sentiments are often mobilized by the
elites to advance their political cause. The tendency is most aptly captured by Egwu
(2004: xii) in respect of the Jos-Plateau crisis:
The tension and conflicts in intergroup relations are a
consequence, not of ‘natural’ division between ethnic and
cultural groups in the city. Rather, they are direct results of
competition for power and resources in which the elites of the
various ethnic groups engage in deliberate mobilization of ethnic
and related primordial identities. It is in this context that the
indigenous ethnic communities who feel historically
disadvantaged invoke ‘indigeneity’ as a strategy to reposition
themselves for advantage.
The Jos crisis as referred to in the above citation constitutes the fulcrum of the
inter-communal conflicts in the state since the 1990. The crisis situation has been
episodic in occurrence with prominent instances being the 1994, 1998, 1998, 2004, and

177
2012 episodes. The context of these series of conflict is the changing dynamics of
power relations in the state (Egwu, 2004).
The groups involved in the conflict are the indigenous ethnic groups (Birom,
Anaguta and Afizere) and the settler ethnic groups (Hausa/Fulani). The indigenous
peoples are largely Christians while the Hausa/Fulani are predominantly Muslims. Right
from the colonial era, the power equation had favored the Hausa/Fulani, who were
empowered and used as agents of the colonial native authority and indirect rule (Joshua,
2004).This skewed power relations in favor of the Hausa/Fulani continued in the post-
colonial era but was upturned by the successive military administrations in the country.
The trend has been captured thus:
There has been a steady shift in power from Northern Hausa Muslims to
local Christian’s across central Nigeria. In Northern region, the
colonial system of indirect rule favored the Muslim Hausa/Fulani sarafa
(tittle holders) class over Muslim talakawa(commoners) and minority
non-Muslim groups (the indigenes), most of whom are now Christians.
The breakup of the then four regions into states and local government
areas in1967, and the multiplication of these political units since then,
has accentuated ethnic and sub-ethnic political demands. The changed
political configuration of the federation changed minority–majority
relations and generated inter-communal conflicts (Higazi, 2011: 14-15).
The return to democratic dispensation in Nigeria in 1999 consolidated the hold
of the indigenous group to power. In effect, ‘an indigenous’ (FGD/Study chat, June,
2015) [17] Christian elite has consolidated its power since 1999 at the expense of
northern Muslims, except in a few wards, as in parts of Jos North, and LGAs like
Kanam and Wase-which also have the two emirates in Plateau state, where Muslims are
sufficient in member to have retained political power in the Local Government Councils
(Higazi, 2011:15). This dramatic turn of event did not go down well with the northern
Hausa/Fulani political elites. It was their response to this scenario through counter
ethno-elite politicking and mobilizing that engenders the crisis in the following years.
The dynamics of communal conflict in Plateau state since the 1990s bear
important political and ethnic under-currents wherein the roles of the political elite in
instigating and championing conflicts have been implicated. As the crisis lasted, the
elite formation representing the feuding parties mobilized for confrontation and show
down. As an interviewee in Jos put it:
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 Apart from provoking the crisis by way of their political ambition
and excesses, the elite actually mobilized people and resources to
prosecute the fight. The funding, logistics, and planning of the
conflict were all masterminded by elements of the elite (KII July,
2015) [18].
The Joshua Dariye-led civilian administration in the state (1999-2007)
complicated the crisis by showing unbridled favoritism to the indigenous population in
terms of political patronage. The coming of Jonah Jang (a Biron man, indigene) as the
state governor with effect from May 29, 2007 appeared to have worsened the situation.
Political appointment in Jang’s government was done in such a manner that betrayed
ethnic favouritism. This scenario led to the escalation of minority fears among the
Hausa/Fulani who interpreted that as a calculated attempt at political exclusion in their
disfavor. It is the attempt by the Hausa/Fulani to redress this situation that occasioned
the wave of sectarian conflagrations in the state between 2004 and 2012.
The conflict situation in Nasarawa state also bears immense characterization of
ethno-elitist phenomenon. In this context, there is a deep-seated animosity between the
various ethno-elite block in the state. The animosity has to do with control of political
power and state machinery. Since the return of civil rule in 1999, control of political
power has been in hands of the Hausa/Kanuri (Kambari) group of ethnicity. All along,
the dominant ethnic Eggons have been struggling to wrest power from the former. The
Eggon political elites have been working to break the apparent political hegemony of
the Hausa/Kanuri group through a conscious effort at ethnic mobilizing and ground
designs. Prominent Eggon political elites have been in the forefront of this ethno-elitist
agenda.

Table 6.4 Gladiators of the Eggon Elite Politics

S/N NAME DESIGNATION
1 Solomon Ewuga Member, National House of Representative
2 Labaran Maku Minister, Federal Republic of Nigeria

3 Joseph Kigbu Member, Nasarawa State House of Assembly

Source: Research. Fieldwork June, 2015 [19]

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 The Eggon elites have also tried to mobilize other native tribes of the state into
their political movement in pursuit of their ethno-political ambition. This mobilization
has been done through primordial suasion based on religious identity. Most of these
native tribes are Christians by faith. The ethnic Eggons are also to a large extent
Christian, although Islam has over the years gained currency among them. The
aspiration of the Eggon elites to political prominence and dominance in the state has
been counteracted by the Hausa/Kanuri elites. The current Governor of the state
survived series of impeachment plots designed to remove him from power in first tenure
of office (2011-2015 May). The impeachment plots were believed to have been
masterminded by elements of the Eggon elites. In the run-up to the 2015 general
elections, the state was plunged into a sort of civil anomie. There was a serious break
down of peace and security in most parts of the state’s hinterlands. The traditional
communal conflicts in the state escalated, assuming a rather violent proportion.
In the course of the crisis in the state, ethno-elite grand-standing was well
pronounced. Cultural platforms transited to political movements. A case in point is the
Eggon Cultural Movement (ECM), which all of a sudden metamorphosed into an ethno-
political vanguard with partisan agenda. There were also attempts by the desperate
political elites to raise thugs in advancement of their political ambitions. This trend
introduces a great measure of military and armed violence in the state. It was in this
concept that the Ombatse group was transformed from a trado-spiritual movement for
the ethnic Eggon into a political militia (Okoli and Uhembe, 2014).
The Ombatse was said to have been armed by the Eggon elites with a view to
use them as an instrument of political thuggery. According to an interviewee in Lafia:
The Ombatse we used to know operated with crude weapons
(machetes, arrows, amulets, etc). Nowadays, the guys brandish
sophisticated guns and ammunition. Some of their boys have no
serious means of living. How could they have got the resources to
purchase such weapons? We know what’s up here: They have
been armed by their tribal politicians to challenge the rest of us.
(KII June, 2015) [20]
The official mantra (motto) of the Ombaste translates to ‘time has come’ or ‘it is
time now’ or ‘the time is now’. The reference to time in the phraseology has to do with
the 2015 general elections whence they insisted on wrestling power for the Eggon
kingdom. The Ombatse operated a cult-like system premised on fetish mystification.
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The group was believed to be sponsored by the Eggon political elites. It has been
implicated in much communal violence in the State since 2012.

6.8 Impact of communal conflict in the Plateau and Nasarawa State

The communal conflicts in Nasarawa and plateau States have led to critical
outcomes that threaten peace and security in the States. Based on the findings of the
study, a cross-section of these outcomes is highlighted in the subsequent sub-themes.
Human death and injury: The conflicts have resulted in high mortalities and
morbidities. Causality figures concerning death toll and human injury are not readily
available owing to poor or non-documentation. It is estimated that the conflict situation
in Nasarawa State has led to more than ten thousand (10,000) deaths since year 2000
(Okoli and Atelhe, 2014; Nasarawa State Government, 2014). In respect of the situation
in Plateau, there have been conflicting records ranging from ten thousand (10,000) to
fifty thousand (50,000). Most available extant records from the Plateau state
government estimate deaths toll as a result of the different episodes of conflict in the
State over the years to be around 30,000 to 50,000. It has been observed by some
scholars and commentators that the figures are most probably exaggerated or
manipulated (Higazi, 2011; KII: Fieldwork, June 2015) [21].
The number of persons injured in the course of the conflicts appears to be much
more un-documented. Anecdotal sources claim that the conflicts in plateau alone must
have caused over 1,000 human injuries (KII, FGD; Fieldwork, June 2015)[22]. In
respect of Nasarawa State, a key informant in Lafia Opined:
The records are not available. I can only estimate based on hear-say and
informed generalizations. The conflict situation has led to over 500 human injuries. It
has caused victims varying degrees of injury and disability… (KII July, 2015) [23]
Population displacement: The conflicts in both States have enormous degree of
population displacements, estimated at over 1,000,000 persons cumulatively (FGDs:
Jos, Lafia, June-July, 2015) [24] In Nasarawa State, the waves of inter-communal
conflict in 2013 and 2014 led to the displacement of households and communities from
the end of 2014. There were over 100 camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in
the various parts of the capital – Lafia during the time of this research. The attendant
humanitarian crisis overwhelmed the state government’s capacity to mitigate, leading to

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the intervention of local and transformational NGOs. The IDPs situation in plateau state
was chaotic, especially in the aftermath of the 2001, 2004 and 2010 episodes of conflict.
According to key informant:
Schools and church grounds in safer areas were turned into
emergency camps for IDPs. These ‘make-shift’ camps hosted
thousands of IDPs, especially women and children. These camps
were bereft of governments care and attention. The inmates lived
in abject material conditions. It was such a hopeless situation…
(KII July, 2015) [25]
Emergency out–migration: The conflicts in Nasarawa and Plateau States have
occasioned exodus of people from some parts of the affected State to other parts of the
State that were considered safer as well as to other neighboring States. In Nasarawa
State, many persons have been compelled by the conflict situation to relocate to Lafia,
Keffi, Akwanga, or other parts of the State that were less affected by the conflict. Some
persons, particularly in the southern region have been forced to migrate to Benue and
Taraba States in search of asylum.
In Plateau State, there has been a trend of out-migration from Jos city to places
like Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba by people fleeing the communal conflicts. This
development has given rise to what could be describe as an internal ‘asylum syndrome’
in the States. For most of the victims, having been displaced from their normal places
and sources of livelihood, life in their new places of residence is bound to be
challenging. As a victim in Lafia affirmed:
I left my flourishing livestock business in Obi at the heat of the
crisis. I have been in Lafia since the middle of the year. I have
tried my hands on many menial jobs in the city just to make ends
meet. From the time being, I have resorted to riding okada
(commercial motorcycle) for a friend of mine in order to survive.
It has not been easy at all… (KII July, 2015) [26].

Decline in rural productivity: In view of the rising wave of communal

violence in the focal states, there has been a noticeable decline in economic activities in
their rural areas. Both Nasarawa and Plateau States are largely agrarian, particularly in
their rural areas. The mass displacement of rural farmers and herders in the states has
reduced the level of agricultural productivity in that context. Local industries and
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commerce have been also so adversely affected. The researcher’s observations in rural
communities in Plateau and Nasarawa revealed that some local markets had been closed
down for a couple of months in the conflicts-prone areas. The decline in rural economic
productivity has affected the market situation in the urban areas of the state. For
instance, there has been a significant rise in the price of farm produce in Lafia since the
turn of 2013. This has been attributed to the sudden drop in the quantity of produce-
supplies from the rural areas since the escalation of communal strife in the hinterlands
in 2013.
Ethnic militancy: One of the most critical dimensions to the communal
conflicts in the focal states is the issue of ethnic militancy. For example the advent of
the Ombatse militia and on the arena of communal conflict in Nasarawa State has since
introduced immense militancy and armed confrontation to the conflict. In Plateau state,
there are many bands of youth militia that have played various roles in escalating
tension and civil strife in the State. The brigandage and armed bearing associated with
the operations of the militia groups have been one of the biggest challenges to
sustainable peace building in the affected states.
Arms proliferation: The militarization of communal conflicts in the focal states
has been evident in the emergence of organized militias on the forefront of the conflicts.
Associated with this is the use of sophisticated modern weaponry in executing the
conflicts. Our research revealed that automatic rifles and AK-47 guns were massively
deployed by the various militant groups in the course of the conflicts. This proliferation
of arms is, in turn, related to increased oil moneys siphoned off the state, the widespread
military conflicts in Africa, which is in part a legacy of armed struggles in the past
decades, and partly a new phenomenon related to the proliferation of armed radical
groups, such as the Islamists (Al Shebab, Boko Haram, etc.). The free flow of armed
and ammunition in this context has led to the problem of proliferation of arm trade and
exchange between radical groups, corruption in the military, and weakness of state
administration. The outcome of this scenario is the worsening incidence of armed
violence and crime in the states.
Sectarian polarization: One of the necessary outcomes of years of communal
conflicts in plateau state is the increased social segregation. In Jos urban, there exists a
sort of apartheid settlement/residential pattern, whereby the Christians and Muslims
tend to live apart on the corridors of the conflict fault-lines. This tendency has

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entrenched sectarian polarization in the area, inhibiting the prospect of social integration
in the State.
In Nasarawa state, there is a growing emphasis on ethnic identity and
nationalism among the various people of the state. The widening differences between
the ethnic Eggon and other competitive tribe in the state have been a product of the new
ethnic consciousness. The contradictions of this development are at the root of the
contemporary waves of inter-communal schism in the state.
Urban and rural poverty and violence: The crisis situation in the focal states
has a lot to do with the rising poverty and the accompanied wave of armed violence and
criminality. In the Nasarawa state, one of the poorest regions, for instance, there has
been a high incidence of rural banditry as exemplified in cattle rustling and market raids
(Okoli and Okpaleke, 2014; Okoli, 2015). In the urban areas of the state, over-night and
highway robberies were on the rise. The Lafia town, for example, has been at the mercy
of armed hoodlums who rob households at night. The situation appears to be the same
in Plateau state. As a FGD participant observed:
Even when the conflict subsides, life is not yet safe for us.
Criminal gangs have proliferated alongside the crisis in the state.
Most of our nights are spent in fear and tension. Armed robbery
at night is incessant here. May God help… (FGD, July 2016)
[27].

All these factors add up to a complex vicious cycle of deeply rooted and self
perpetuating communal conflicts. We highlighted two crucial sets of factors responsible
for this self-perpetuation. One set of factors relates to the deeply entrenched ethno-
religious identities that are easily accessible and easily mobilizable by local and regional
elites in pursuit of multiple grievances, as well as in pursuit of political and economic
advantage. These identities form a ready-made repertoire for sectional – and highly
emotionally loaded – politicization and mobilization. Because they are traditional and
entrenched, they do not lend themselves to easy ‘rational elaboration’ and compromise
solutions. The second set of factors relates to the specific power structure and elite
structure in Nigeria. Both are highly segmented and fragmented, most probably also
deeply divided (in the sense elite theorists use) on the national and local levels. The
communal conflict in the focal states, in turn, has resulted in social, economic, political
and cultural consequences that negate sustainable peace and stability in the states. The
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implication of this for national security of Nigeria cannot be over emphasized. In the
light of its dire impacts and complications, therefore, it is evident that a communal
conflict poses a serious threat to national security in Nigeria.

Table 6.5 Driver, Triggers and Impacts of Communal Conflicts in Nasarawa and Plateau States.
Drivers Triggers Impacts and Complication
Ethnic diversity Election crisis Human fatality and injury
Identity politics Religious crisis Population displacement
Governance failure Power struggle Rural destitution
Climate change Farmer/herder Loss of livelihood
confrontation
Demographic changes Indigene/Settler clash Arms proliferation
Livelihood competition Chieftaincy dispute Ethnic militancy
Political exclusion Land dispute Electoral violence
Cultural resentment Boundary dispute Rural/urban restiveness
Ethnic militancy Decline in economic
productivity
Youth unemployment Emergency out-migration
Arms proliferation Sectarianism
Cattle rustling Social polarization
Illiteracy Youth restiveness
Poverty
Elite Manipulation Inter-group distrust/schism
Government failure Rural/urban banditry
Religious fundamentalism Societal instability
Source: Researcher: Fieldwork June-July, 2015 [28].

6.9 Resolving communal conflicts: issues and prospects

Many measures have been taken by the State government to address the menace
of inter-communal crisis in the focal states. The measures include public sensitization
against ethnic violence, constitution of commissions of inquiries, creation of grazing
reserves and routes for herders, and military/police intervention.
The idea of commission of inquiry has been common among the focal state. This
approach at conflict resolution has been fraught with contradictions in practice. This is
largely because of lack of objectivity and sincerity of purpose on the part of the
government of the day. In Plateau State for instance, the various commissions set up to
look into the communal conflicts in the State have not been accorded ‘popular

185
acceptance and credibility’ (FGD, July, 2016) [29]. They have been appointed by
governors ‘who were held to be sympathetic to the cause of the indigenous ethnic
groups’ (FGD, July 2016) [30]. Expectedly, the outcomes of these commissions have
always indicted the Hausa/Fulani and their support groups (such as the herders). No
wonder that the reports of these commissions have always been rejected by the
Hausa/Fulani group.
In Nasarawa State, the State governors have been produced by the Hausa/Kanuri
(Kambari) group. The constitution of commissions of inquiry by the governor over the
years has been seen by the ethnic Eggons as ‘political exercise’ (KII, FGD, July 2016)
[31]. The perception of the Eggons is that the governors are interested parties in the
conflict and can afford to be partisan in constituting the commissions. Consequently, the
outcomes of such commission have always ended up in stiff controversy. In some cases,
court actions have been taken to stall the proceeding of such commission or to rubbish
their outcomes.
The use of military and police to mitigate the communal conflicts in the focal
states have equally been controversial and counter-productive. They have been
allegations of side-taking against military and police personnel in both states. According
to KII respondent in Obi area of Nasarawa State:
The Military and Police are taking sides. They watched our households
being ravaged in a broad day light by the militant Fulani and their
mercenaries. I guess there must be a sort of connivance. Perhaps, they
have been deployed by the governor to come and oversee the onslaught
against us. Let God judge us! (KII June, 2015) [32].
Apart from the issue of taking sides, some military and police personnel
involved in internal security operations in the States during the conflicts contend that
their operational efficiency is often marred as a result of lack of sufficient weaponry and
logistics. According to military personnel interviewed in Shendam area of Plateau State:
Sometimes you realize that you only have a couple of bullets on you. So
if you can’t help it, you simply stay safe and look on. If this is what is
seen as taking sides, so be it? Who is to blame by the way: the
government, the fighting parties, or the innocent me? (KII, June, 2015)
[33]
Generally, the government has done a lot in seeking to resolve the communal
crises in the focal State, all to no avail. The crises have persisted over the years,
186
assuming a rather horrendous dimension. The prospect of a lasting solution to the crises
does not lie in any piecemeal and adhoc governmental interventions. Instead, it lies on
the evolution of a pragmatic and holistic strategy that is capable of addressing the root
causes and drivers of the problem. This must entail dealing with the fundamental
concern of ecological security, resource governance, social citizenship, socio-economic
security, constitutional reform, and true federalism. In other words, there is a need to
creatively understand what the underlying motivations of the conflicts are in a bid to
come up with a practical and workable solution.

6.10 Recapitulating the analysis

The North-Central Nigeria is a microcosmic Nigeria in terms of ethnic

composition and mix. The region is characterized by high level of socio-cultural
diversity as evident in the existence of a multiplicity of ethnic nationalities in the area.
The region is also characterized by a great deal of religious and communal cleavages.
These attributes typify the North-Central Nigeria as a good instance of pluralist setting
with complex and delicate inter-group dynamics.
The socio-cultural heterogeneity and diversity of North-Central Nigeria holds
critical implications for inter-groups in the area. This is important considering the
abiding primordial political culture in Nigeria, whereby sub-national sentiments such as
ethnicity and religion are used as instruments of political mobilizing by the political
elite. As we have seen in respect of Nasarawa and Plateau States, ethnic, religious and
clannish sentiments have been the bane of inter-group relations in the States.
With particular reference to ethnicity, which constitutes the focus of this study, it
was observed that the primordial character of politics in the focal states has made ethnic
politicking necessary and inevitable. Hence, ethnicity has become an object of
politicization and manipulation in these States. The politicization and manipulation of
ethnicity obtains in the wider context of identity and elite politics. In this context, ethnic
consciousness, sentiment and social capital are misappropriated in advancement of
parochial political ends. The contradictions of this practice create an atmosphere of
inter-group divides and closures. It, more importantly, ossifies inter-group boundaries
and vitiates positive inter-group relations. This culminates in conflictual inter-group
relations that often result in inter-communal conflicts and violence.

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 Historical, anecdotal and empirical evidence arising from our field study point to
the fact that ethnicity is a culpable factor in the wave of inter-communal crisis in
Nasarawa and Plateau States. In each of these States, however, ethnicity was found not
to be a primary cause of inter-communal conflicts. The outcome of the study revealed
that ethnicity acquired its political saliency in the context of inter-group struggles and
contestations. It has been used in the focal states to frame struggles that were primarily
political, economic, ecological, or partisan in motivation. In these states, the traditional
and state elites have resorted to ethnicity to confer legitimacy and populism to their self-
regarding partisan agenda. In this regard, ethnicity becomes a harbinger of communal
conflict and a veritable threat to peace, unity, and stability in Nigeria.
The other set of factors analysed here relates to political elites. The
national/federal elites – which are treated here as a ‘background factor’ – are divided
along ethno-religious, urban-rural, regional and sector-economic interest (e.g., oil
extraction, industry, agriculture) lines, and therefore incapable of sustaining social and
political order in any other than highly authoritarian way, with the central role played by
the army. There are few signs of the common and civilian political culture.
The local elites – which our study analyses as local organisers of fractious
‘ethnic politics – mirror the characteristics of the national elites. They are highly
fragmented, segmented and poorly integrated, often described as ‘insulated’, ‘parochial’
and ‘sectarian’. Their ‘politicking’ – that is mobilization of ethno-religious support in
the struggle for recognition and privilege (including access to economic resources),
make politics in Nigeria highly volatile. In spite of many attempts at building a network
of contacts and cooperation, and in spite of the persistent attempts at inter-group
dialogue, the local elites remain locked into insular, parochial and intransigent politics
of claims and confrontations.
The point we are making here is NOT about denying the importance of such
factors as political underdevelopment, persistence of colonial legacies, institutional
weakness and ‘decay’, and entrenched corruption (e.g., Fukuyama 2014:217-41). These
are all important factors – acknowledged in the analyses above. But these
‘developmental’ and ‘social-structural’ factors cannot be seen as the key determinants
of Nigeria’s volatile politics and pervasive communal conflicts. They operate, so to
speak, through the immediate ‘filtering conditions’ created by the key political actors
and their strategies. We see these filtering conditions as best summarized in the two key
causal factors highlighted throughout: the persistence, reinforcement and wide
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availability of deeply entrenched ‘ascriptive’ factors of identity, and a specific highly
fragmented/segmented (if not divided) elite structure on the national and local levels.
We further elaborate on these two sets of factors below, when we look once
more on political elites and their pursuit of fractious and violent ‘ethnic politics’. It is
enough to mention here that societies with similar ‘developmental’ challenges, like
South Africa, were able to overcome these problems and challenges through elite
‘unification’ and ‘reconcilliation’ meetings, negotiations, and, ultimately, elite pacts that
tamed politics of violent confrontations, even though the ethno-religious divisions and
conflicts persists there.
The Nigerian elites have not attempted to pursue such a politics of unification
‘from above’, integration of elites, including the local ones. As a consequence, they
continue to suffer from uncertainty and endemic communal conflict.
Communal conflicts in the focal states have resulted in varying dimensions of
vicious impacts and complications. These impacts and complications have been
identified by the study to include loss of life, human injury, loss of livelihood, arms
proliferation, ethnic militancy, youth restiveness and violence, population displacement,
ethno-religious discrimination and polarization, decline of rural and urban productivity,
rural and urban banditry, and so on. These collateral impacts have complicated the
material conditions of the people, created a general ambience of crisis and violence, as
well as promoted an atmosphere of insecurity and instability in the focal states and
environs. The worst complication of the conflict situations is the ossification of
sectarian distrust and polarization. This tendency has vitiated cordial inter-group
relations in that context and made the search for sustainable peace and security
problematic.

Table 6.6 Pattern of Communal Conflict in Plateau State and Nasarawa compared.
S/n Nasarawa Plateau
1 It is more or less diffused It is more or less polarized
2 It is inter-communal It is ethno-religious
3 It centres on resources It centres on power and indigenship
struggles
4 It is largely a rural phenomenon It is largely an urban occurrence
5 It is driven by primordial sentiments it is driven by sectarian sentiments
6 It is pervasive and endermic Same
7 The incidents are episodic and sporadic Same
8 It is internecine and vindictive Same
9 It is vicious and violent Same

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 10 It has been intractable Same
Source; Researcher: Field work, June-July, 2015 [29].

The afore-stated differences do not imply that the conflict situations in the focal
states are fundamentally a-typical. The outcomes of our research indicate that the both
cases of conflict are significantly closely related. In terms of logic and dynamic of
occurrence, the conflict situations in these states have exhibited a lot of marked
commonalities. For instance, the conflict drivers, triggers and escalators in those
contexts have been to a reasonable extent similar. More importantly, the impacts and
complications of communal conflicts in both states have also been closely related. It is
therefore plausible to characterize the conflict situations in both states as reasonably
similar and reasonably dis-similar. The point of convergence in these conflicts is further
highlighted in box 6.7.

Box 6.2 Betwixt the Plateau and Nasarawa cases: The parallel

 Both have implication for citizenship and constitutionalism

 Both have been perennial, spanning over 10 years
 Both have political cum partisan dimensions
 Both have been vicious and vindictive
 Both have led to dire humanitarian outcomes
 Both reflect the logic of elite politicking
 Both have elements of resource struggle
 Both are inter-communal to a large extent
 Both have often tended toward sectarianism
 Both have involved arm violence and militancy
 Both reflect the dialectics of identify politics
 Both reflect the contradictions of pluralism
 Both implicate governance failure on the part of the State
 Both have created a vicious cycle of armed violence / criminality
 Both thrive on primordial nationalism and populism
 Both have developed complex social dynamics
 Both appear to have degenerated over time
 Both have been pervasive, protracted and intractable.

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  Both have social structural, political, ecological and economic dimensions
Source: Researcher; Field work July, 2015 [30].

It is important to emphasis that there is a fundamental point of difference

between the two conflict cases. As the field study revealed, the situation in Plateau has
over time tilted towards a religious dimension. Hence it is often referred to as ethno-
religious conflict (Egwu, 2004; Osaretin and Akov, 2013). The gravitation of the
Plateau crisis towards a religious phenomenon is traceable to the existing pattern of
religious affiliation in the State. Both Christianity and Islam are dominant in the State.
However, whereas Christianity is the dominant religion among the indigenes, Islam
holds sway among the Hausa/Fulani settlers. In this regard, there is ready ‘fault-line’ of
religions divide for exploitation and manipulation. Therefore, the political and
economic struggles between the Hausa/Fulani and the indigenous groups readily assume
religious colourations and are framed in that wise. Once the conflict is framed in
religious terms, the dynamics of confrontation change accordingly. Hence it becomes a
fight between all Muslims and all Christians, not necessarily between the Christian
indigenes and Muslim settlers.
The situation is different in the Nasarawa State. In this context, communal
conflict has tended to be more ethnically oriented. The reason for this scenario is not
far-fetched. Islam and Christianity are fairly evenly practiced among the two most
dominant ethnic blocs on the State – the Eggons and the Hausa/Kambari (Kanuri)
group. In view of this, neither Christianity not Islam can afford to assert dominance
among the peoples. Consequently, religion does not have much political salience in that
context. But ethnicity does. So, the focus of identity politics in the State has been on
ethnic affiliation, not religion. Little wonder then, that the bulk of the incidents of
communal conflict in the State have assumed ethno-communal characterization and
dimensions.
It could therefore be said that the conflict in Plateau State is ethno-religious
while that of the Nasarawa State is more ostensibly ethno-communal. Beyond these
appearances, politico-elite factors have been the underlying motivator of conflict in both
cases. The politico-elite factors in this sense refer to the contestations for power, state
patronage, and political advantage among the elite representatives of the various ethnic
groups in the States. This is the crux of the findings of that dissertation.

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 CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTED REMEDIAL POLICY

MEASURES

7.1 Introduction

This study set out to examine the relationship between ethnicity, elites and the
rising wave of communal conflict in North-central Nigeria with particular focus in
plateau and Nasarawa States. The final chapter summarises the findings and formulates
some recommendations – most of them derived from elite theory – concerning
prevention and mitigation of ethnic and communal conflicts. The study took off on a
generic discursive level where the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the study
were cast in an attempt to properly situate the general analytical premise of the study.
This was followed by a contextual discourse where issues pertaining to the historical
background of the study were presented. The last section of the study dwelt on the
empirical aspect of the study whereby an attempt was made to rigorously explore the
subject matter by way of case studies.

7.2 Summary

The outcome of the study revealed that Nigeria is a typical instance of a diverse
country with immense degree of heterogeneity in terms of ethnic diversity and mix.
There exist hundreds of ethnic groups that are significantly broadly polarized on
cultural, geo-political and religious grounds in such a manner that precipitates
sectionalism, sectarianism, and primordialism. With her primordial orientation, Nigeria
presents a veritable contests and contestations, particularly in the area of competitive
political relations. In this context, ethnicity becomes both politically pertinent and
sailient
The study found that the North-Central region of Nigeria represents a microcosm
of the entire country in terms of ethnic heterogeneity and diversity, as well as a good
example of the political ‘use’ of this diversity by federal and local elites. A multiplicity
of ethnic nationalities is concentrated in this region, which makes it a ‘fault-line’ in
192
terms of potential for ethnic conflict and violence. With particular reference to the focal
states of the Plateau region, the study revealed that ethnicity is manifested in culpable
factor in the rising incident of communal conflagrations in the area. Although the
patterns and dynamics of communal conflict in both states have varied quite
significantly, ethnicity was found to be a common driver of those conflicts.
In the Plateau state, the tussle is between the so-called indigenous ethnic group
and the rest of the settler ethnicities, particularly the Hausa-Fulani. The bone of
contention is central to land, power and resources. Overtime, the conflict has
degenerated into ethno—religious dimension that has significantly polarized the State
into closures of Christian-Moslem divide. In the case of Nasarawa State, what is at issue
is ecological and political struggles waged along ethno-communal lines. This conflict
has largely manifested in the fashion of farmer/herder and indigene-settler conflicts with
immense inter-communal complications.
In both the Nasarawa and Plateau States, ethnicity has played a vital role in
driving the incidence of communal conflicts. Both of the conflict situations bear out
significant element of indigene/settler syndrome, even though this has been more
manifest in the case of Plateau State. However, while the conflict in the Plateau state
has resulted in ethno-religious polarization, the situation in the Nasarawa State has
crystallized in ethno-communal closures and divides. In the two States, the role of
identity politics in fueling the conflicts is commonly evident. The mobilization and
manipulation of ethno-communal identity in these states by the political and traditional
elites is, by and large, at the roots of communal conflicts in those contexts.
Over all, the study found that there is a high incidence of identity politics in the
focal area. There are different communally organized groups in the area, ranging from
ethnic to religious groupings. As the various identity groups engage one another in a
typical competitive struggle for power and resources, they tend to precipitate conflictive
outcomes that negate peaceful and sustainable inter-group relations. While the contours
of the communal conflicts in the focal areas have been identity-based, it is noteworthy
to note that the material bases for such conflict has a lot to do with political and
economic contestations. In this regard, differences arising from quest for local power,
land, chieftaincy position, and the like have constituted critical drivers of communal
conflict in the area. In the light of the above, it could be said that the contemporary
manifestations of communal conflict in focal areas reflect the contradictions of identity
politics in the socio-ecological context of stiff contestations for power and resources.
193
Ethnicity is, therefore, one of the critical fault-lines under which pretext the
contradictions of identity politics are made manifest and salient, usually through the
machinations of the elites.
Ethnicity also provides a useful and very accessible repertoire or idiom of
mobilization by the local elites. These elites are relatively new. They emerged on the
wave of political contestation and competitive struggles for resources, especially after
the oil boom in the 1980s-2000s. They used ethnic identities in forging group political
loyalties and in mobilizing these loyalties in their struggles for political recognition,
sectional advantage and access to political (including economic) resources enabling
patronage. These elites, as stressed above, were very segmented, parochial and
‘sectarian’. They proved difficult to suppress, and even more difficult to bring to the
negotiating table. Their gradual radicalization (in the sense of rising demands and using
violence) was not prevented by the central authorities, the latter also deeply fragmented
along similar ethno-religious lines.

7.3 Conclusion

Ethnicity – in its ‘primordial’ and highly segmented form – represents a very

potent political force in Nigeria. It acquired its disruptive significance in the context of
inter-ethnic competition for recognition, power and resources, the latter necessary to
practice the widespread patron-client relations. In this context, ethnicity becomes a
veritable instrument of identity politics and patronage politics. It is thus used as a tool
for primordial political mobilization within the wider context of inter-group elite
politicking. This ethnic politicking – the systematic use of ethnicity for mobilizing
political support – in turn, exacerbates ethnic divisions and conflict thus creating vicious
circles of violence-ridden ethno-communal conflict.
The resort to ethnicity as an instrument of political mobilization in Nigeria has
been determined – and facilitated – by the country’s pre-colonial and colonial past, as
well as by the post-independence developments that reinforced the peculiarly strong
ethnic diversity and heterogeneity. With hundreds of ethnic nationalities, Nigeria
illustrates a good example of an ethno diverse – or one can say ‘ethnically fragmented
and divided’ country. This particular national attribute of Nigeria has made the country
a playground for political elites practicing a divisive ethnic politics. In effect, identity

194
politics, based on ethnic mobilizing, has over the years been an important feature of
national political life.
The North-Central region of Nigeria, which is by design the focus of this thesis,
is a microcosm of ethnic diversity, complexity and divisive ethnic politics. The region
hosts over one hundred ethnic groups. The ethnic heterogeneity of the region, combined
with the emergence of new and radical local leaders (political entrepreneurs) has
accounted for the volatile nature of politics among the various states located in the
region. With reference to the focal states of Plateau and Nasarawa, ethnicity has been a
veritable culpable factor in the orgy of inter-communal conflagrations in the states. As
the outcome of the study revealed, ethnicity has been mobilized by the political elites in
the state to form the embers of disunity, violence and instability.
It is important to reiterate that ethnicity on its own is an objective social force
thatmay not necessarily bring about conflict and violence on its own. The problem with
ethnicity in the state under review is its susceptibility to politicization and manipulation
by the local ‘sectarian’ elites, who are desperate for recognition (which violent
contestation gives them), for power and economic advantage, the latter typically related
to access to resource revenues. It is this tendency that has turned ethnicity into a
harbinger of inter-communal conflicts and violence in Nigeria. The destructive
implications of ethnic politics in Nigeria have made it a serious threat to national
security.
It should be reiterated that the problem with ethnicity in Nigeria does not
necessarily lay with its essential import as a mode of consciousness or identity. Rather,
it lies with its wide availability, popularity and therefore ‘mobilizability’which is
significance as an instrument of divisive politicking and primordial socio-political
mobilization. In this regard, ethnic sentiments or consciousness has often been
mobilized by desperate members of national and local elites to advance parochial
partisan interest. It is this peculiar politicization and instrumentalization of ethnicity that
have often precipitated ethnic crisis in Nigeria.
The Nasarawa and Plateau states illustrate well the key aspects and mechanisms
of what has often been called the ‘ethnic crisis’ in Nigeria. This crisis derives from
conflicts that prominently include indigene identities and ethno-communal division.
Both derive from the historical legacies and poor institutionalisation. The Nigeria
constitution, for example, makes nonsense of the idea of inclusive citizenship by
limiting citizenship entitlement to ones place of ancestral decent rather than place of
195
nativity. This has given rise to the phenomenon of native/indigene –settler dichotomy in
Nigeria.
In the case of Plateau State, the contradictions of indigene-settler phenomenon
have often found expression in violent confrontations between the native Birom people
and the settler Hausa/Fulani extraction. The confrontations have been most manifest in
the arena of power and resource allocation and/or sharing within the wider context of
civic relations. This has been the root cause of most of the civil unrest and strife in the
State over the years.
In most instances, the ethnic conflict/crisis has involved and exploited the fault-
lines of religion and sectionalism in its apparent dynamics of complication and
degeneration. For instance, the conflict between the Birom and Hausa/Fulani groups in
Jos, the Plateau State, has more often than not assumed the character religious violence.
In each episode of this conflict, people have been selectively killed based on perceived
religious identity and/or persuasion. In effect, the worst victims of such conflict have
largely been people of faith across the Christian and Islamic divides. This is in addition
to formal places or symbols of worship, such as churches and mosques.
Even the native-settler conflict has also often followed the fault-lines of ethno-
communal identity. For instance, the various episodes of farmer-herder conflict in
Nasarawa State have traditionally pitched the native (settled) farmers against the
migrant Fulani herders. The reason is simple. The nomadic Fulani who constituted over
eighty percent of the herding community in the State are predominantly Muslim while
the majority of the settled farmers in the hinterlands are either Christians or native
worshippers. So, the farmer-herder conflict, beyond anything else, has also been
associated with inter-religious hostilities.
As a matter of fact, people have been so discreetly selected and killed in the
various instances of this conflict in the focal States based on perceived religious
identification. This has informed the prevailing anecdotal narrative among the non-
Muslim populations of Central Nigeria that the incessant attacks on the native
communities by Fulani assailants must have been a neo-jihadist agenda to further the
Islamization of the wider region.
Violent conflagrations arising from ethno-communal conflict in the focal areas
have resulted to manifold human and material casualties. It has led to loss of lives and
property. It has also led to population displacements and human injury. The impact of
the crisis on human population has been vividly evident on the incidence of
196
humanitarian crisis in focal areas. This is in addition to high level of livelihood and civil
insecurity. The atmosphere of crisis creates a regime of societal instability exemplified
in the prevalence of crime, violence, fear and mistrust. This has made sustainable
development and security a problematic aspiration.

7.4 Suggested policies

Every theoretical construct, and every research-based diagnosis, imply or apply

certain remedies and solutions to the diagnosed problems – in this case the endemic,
disruptive and elite-generated ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. The virtues of the
present study in suggesting such remedies could be presented more convincingly when
compared with alternative (not always contradictory) theoretical approaches. Let us start
with a short summary of solutions presented by two such ‘rival’ approaches and
theoretical options.
Perhaps the most popular and best known in the Western academic circles is the
‘development-modernisation’ approach. It sees the problems of developing societies,
like Nigeria, in underdevelopment (social, economic, political, cultural) and the
accompanied‘re-modern legacies’ in the social structure, as well as the weakness of the
core institutions, including the state, rule of law, and the electoral-democratic
institutions (e.g., Huntington, 1967; Fukuyama, 2014). The remedies proposed by
development-modernisation theorists are attractive, but largely unrealistic. In short, they
suggest that the problems of developing societies wither away in/through intensified
social and political development, through the strategies of accelerated social and
political modernization, usually pursued ‘from above’ by ‘modernising elites’. This is
unrealistic – like telling the ill patient that he should return to healthy life. Problem is
that most of the developing societies – as we see especially in the Sub-Saharan region of
Africa – cannot break the cycles of instability and underdevelopment. They suffer not
only from the problems of weak institutionalization, disunity and endemic corruption,
but also – and above all – from the absence of capable political actors – the talented
modernizing and nation-building leaders and elites, as well as the divided elites and
intense intra-elite conflicts. Such divided elites usually perpetuate the conditions of
underdevelopment by promoting patronage-based corrupt politics and transforming the
state into predatory state.

197
 The equally popular (more in the 20th century than now) Marxist dependency
theories contain a good critique of the ‘development-modernisation’ theories and their
remedial strategies, but themselves suffer from many problems. They tend to blame for
developmental problems the ‘core-periphery’ relations in which the developing
countries have been ‘locked’ within the capitalist market-based ‘world system’. The
core-periphery relations disadvantage the dependent society, and they settle them with
political elites that represent and pursue – according to the dependency theorists – the
interests of core societies and the dominant global ruling class (e.g., Wallerstein 1974).
The remedies suggested by dependency theorists also sound attractive, but they have
proven false. They propose nothing less than a revolutionary ‘detachment’ of
developing (peripheral) countries from the allegedly exploitative and development-
constraining world marked relations. In politics, they suggest radical challenge to
capitalist-nationalist elites and pursuit of ‘independent’ development, probably a la ex-
Soviet Union or today’s North Korea. These suggestions face obvious criticisms – they
have not worked. Against the dependency theorists’ expectations, the most
rapid/successful development and the most effective modernization has been achieved
NOT by societies that broke the dependency (global production and trade) links, but by
those who plugged themselves well into such ‘globalist’ and ‘world system’ links:
China, India, South Africa, South Korea, etc. This is why the gloss of the dependency
theories – and the appeal of remedies they have suggested – have largely withered
away.
The theoretical framework embraced here (base mainly on Higley and Burton,
2006) is less evaluative, less remedy-oriented than its rivals. It is limited to the domain
of politics, sees as the key actors and ‘social managers’ political elites (the key power
networks), and diagnoses as the key problems of political instability and fragility. The
key ‘independent variables’ thus relate to elite structure and unity; the key ‘dependent
variables’ relate to political stability – but, as we argue below, also to overall
developmental ‘success’: the capacity to satisfy the major popular expectations of
prosperity for many, security, stability, honesty and ‘dignity for all’. The key factors of
such success, the elite theorists seem to suggest, are elites that are characterized as
‘consensually united’ that is sharing the norms of peaceful and restrained political
competition. Such elites are very rare. They developed in the few mostly Western
societies as a result of complex and fortuitious political developments leading to ‘elite
settlement’ of major conflicts (e.g., Great Britain, Scandinaviad countries, the Benelux),
198
post-colonial institutional continuation (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia,
Singapore), or political adjustments through gradual elite accommodation (e.g., France,
Italy). Most of existing societies has divided or fragmented elites, conducting the
politics of fight, often ‘mutual destruction’, and such elites are incapable of sustaining
stability and achieving development in any other way than through authoritarian
imposition or predatory dictatorships (Higley and Burton, 2006). However, the degree
(width and depth) of elite division, and the degree of mutual isolation, and the degree of
hostility between the fighting fractions differ significantly – and with them differ also
the prospects for stabilization, reforms and development. Here the elite theory suggests
an interesting prospect – that may become a basis for socio-political remedies. Under
certain conditions, the divided and unstable political elites may achieve unity through
contacts, talks, broad negotiations and, finally, some compromise agreement – elite
pact. Such elite pacts, achieved over the
last 30 years in over 20 societies (including Spain, most East European
societies, South Korea, Taiwan and South Africa), develop the all-elite rules of
competition, which – when accepted – open the way for political stabilization, national
unification, effective institution-building, and, consequently, more rapid social and
political development.
When applied to Nigeria, such a ‘remedy’ would mean three things. First, the
enhancement of confidence- and trust-building contacts between elites that lead towards
a negotiated agreement about the ‘rules of political game’ or norms of political
competition (‘elite settlement’ in Higley and Burton’s terms). The most durable
agreements are coded into national and regional constitutions. The Second, the creation
of a more integrated power structure and elite network. Such more integrated elite
networks form when regular interaction, communication and cooperation are facilitated
along political administrative hierarchies (from national to local elites). The Third,
building a broad public understanding cum trust – parallel to intra elite stabilization.
Such a broad public understanding of elite agreements, and developing public trust in
now-consensual elites, improves the links between political leaders and their mass
constituencies. It also prevents populist flare-ups and secessionist movements.
Nigeria seems to be well positioned – from about 1999 – for such elite-
integrative measures. Following the first (relatively) non-violent elections, there are
signs of intensifying intra-elite interaction and even temporary agreements concerning
acceptance of election results and peaceful transition of government. The optimists say
199
that we may be witnessing in Nigeria an embryonic form of elite agreement – still
limited, narrow in scope and weak in details – but a good springboard for a broader and
firmer elite settlement.
This is the first part of the ‘remedial’ strategy suggested by this study. The
second part has to do with the ‘mass’ conditions of ethnic politics, that is the degree and
salience of ethno religious divisions. As we suggested above, such identities are deeply
entrenched and widely available in Nigeria. Moreover, they are easily politically
‘mobilisable’ by ambitious power-seeking politicians (local and national leaders), and
such political mobilisations are characterized by radicalism and intransingence, often
resulting in violent conflicts. They cannot be uprooted or eliminated through mere
education, persuasion or suppression. Rather, as suggested by the theorists of national
identity (e.g., Anderson), such primordial and sectional – and often particularistic,
ascriptive and exclusive – identities can be gradually accompanied and ‘balanced’
(perhaps even gradually superceded) by over-arching national, or at least more
universalistic identities, like the ‘Nigerian identity’. This, we stress, implies not so
much eradication of the particularistic identities – that proves impossible – but
something akin to a ‘multicultural’ strategy that accepts multiple (‘hyphonated’)
identities, for example Nigerian-Ibo identity or Nigerian-Muslim identity. Such strategy
worked in many post-colonial societies, such as Australia, Singapore and South Africa.
While suggesting these general strategies – both derived from the implicit
theoretical frameworks – we may also add some coments on useful more detailed (and
common-sense based) policy measures that may promote these general strategic
‘remedies’:
i Promoting further consensual unification of elites – national and local –
through organizing a national unification and reconciliation meetings: Such meetings
may improve communication, foster better understanding and, in time lead to an all-
elite agreement about the rules of political competition, similar to the SouthAfrican
agreement (forged by the Mandela and De Klerk elites), to the ‘round table’ agreements
in Central Eastern Europe, and to the elite ‘pacts’ in Western Europe and East Asia
(Higley and Burton, 2006).
ii Promoting inter-ethnic harmony by stressing the value of the over-
arching(supra-ethnic) national identity (‘we are all Nigerians’): The federal and
state governments (in the affected states) may promote civic education that explains the
need for national ‘unity in diversity’ and the value of peaceful coexistence among
200
Nigerians. The education system, the mass media and relevant civic and relevant civil
society organization may be encouraged to work toward sensitizing the people on the
ideals of national unity and harmonious inter-ethnic cooperation in achieving national
goals. This may help in fostering mutual understanding among the members of different
ethnic groups in the country.
iii Strengthening the state and rule of law: The Nigerian state lacks
effectiveadministrative-bureaucratic ‘machine’. As suggested by Fukuyama (2014), and
confirmed by most political observers, bureaucratization and effectiveness goes hand-
by-hand, but they can be enhanced only by elimination of ‘neo-patrimonial’ practices:
kinship/tribal particularism, clientelism and graft. There is a need to identify justice and
fairness – the two central values in state-building – with legalism and rule of law.
Iv.Inter-faith and inter-ethnic dialogue: There is an urgent need for the
faithful of Islam and Christianity, as well as the people of different ethnic segments to
enter dialogue aiming at building mutual understanding, respect, peace and tolerance.
As the examples of South Africa suggests, the best way of encouraging such dialogue is
by ‘example from above’, that is dialogue meetings conducted by elite members and
promoted by national leaders and media.
There are also more ‘common sense’ measures that can be recommended – all
derived from our detailed analysis of ethno-religious conflicts. They include the
creation of grazing reserves for herders in order to mitigate the perennial incidents of
herders/farmer conflict in the focal states. That calls for action by the federal
government in liaison with the various State governments. In addition, there is a need to
clearly map and mark grazing routes leading to the reserves in such a manner that would
forestall incessant encroachment of herders on crop farms. One may also suggest
dissolving of ethnic militias that perpetuate violent conflicts. This is to check the
excesses of such groups in escalating ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. Such measures may
also be backed by a conscious programme on arms recall, disarmament and
demobilization of militants so as to ensure a lasting solution. Perhaps most obvious –
but also most difficult to implement – is the recommendation reducing access to
weapons. Control of arms proliferation is difficult but necessary to break the cycle
of violent clashes. This is in view of the correlation between such a phenomenon and
the incidence of ethnic violence in parts of the North Central Nigeria. When there is less
arms in circulation, the tendency is that ethnic conflict would become less violent than it
currently obtains in the country. One may suggest following various arms ‘buy-back’
201
schemes tried – with various degree of success – by some African and Asian countries.
Our analyses also suggest that conflicts could be reduced by a revision of the
citizenship question. There is a need for a constitutional amendment to address the
lingering citizenship question in Nigeria. The 1999 constitution favours citizenship by
‘origin’ and ‘ancestry’. There is an urgent need to replace this provision with the
principle of ‘residency’, whereby any Nigerian can become a full citizen in any place of
birth or residence. This would go a long way in addressing the phenomena of indigene-
settler syndrome in the country. This may be implemented together with a revision of
the Land Use Act. The current Nigeria’s Land Use Act reserves propriety rights over
land for both state and individual citizens. Land issues therefore doubles as both civil
and customary matter. The lacuna in this creates pretexts for crisis of land tenure and
land holding in Nigeria; hence the need for its review.
All these measures should help in achieving a higher level of political stability as
well as faster and more effective (spread among the regions) socio-economic
development. There is a widely known correlation between instability, conflict
(especially violent conflict) and poverty. Ethnic conflict and violence in Nigeria have
often been associated with high level of urban and rural poverty (e.g., Fukuyama
2014:217-30). Other socio-economic concerns such as literacy, employment, and secure
livelihood are also heavily dependent on lasting and secure social and political order.
But there is also a need for a final qualification. Ethnic conflict in Nigeria is old
and endemic. As our research shows, it has many complex historical, structural and
elite-linked causes. This complexity should prevent us from claiming that all the
measures suggested would provide anything like an immediate and effective ‘fix’ or
universal remedy. This research – as any social science research – has important
limitations (mentioned at the beginning), and therefore it can suggest only partial and
limited ‘solutions’. Perhaps the most important – but also obvious – conclusion from
this study is that good effective solutions come from long campaings, and not a ‘quick
fix’. And that the future development of Nigeria depends primarily (though not
exclusively) on the effectiveness cum unity of its political elites (national and local),
especially in the effective measures applied by these elites in nation-building.

202
 Notes

[1] Key informant interviewee, Jos (Plateau State), June, 2015.

[2] Key informant interviewee, Obi (Nasarawa State), June, 2015.
[3] Key informant interviewee, Yelwa (Plateau State), June, 2015.
[4] Key informant interviewee, Lafia (Nasarawa State), June, 2015.
[5] Focussed Group Discussion/Study Chat, Lafia (Nasarawa State), June, 2015.
[6] Different Group Discussions in Jos and Lafia, May-July, 2015; and July 2016
[7] Key informant interviewee, Obi (Nasarawa State), June, 2015
[8] Key informant interviewee, Lafia (Nasarawa State), June, 2015.
[9] Key informant interviewee, Nasarawa-Eggon (Nasarawa State), June, 2015.
[10] Key informant interviewee, Lafia (Nasarawa State), July 2015.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Various field-based insights in the focal study areas, May-July, 2015
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Public security personnel interviewed in Jos, Plateau State, July, 2015
[16] Focussed Group Discussion/Study Chats, Lafia (Nasarawa State), July, 2015; July
2016
[17] Focussed Group Discussion/Study Chats, Jos (Plateau State), June, 2015
[18] Key informant interviewee, Jos (Plateau State), July, 2015.
[19] Various field studies in Nasarawa State, May-July, 2015.
[20] Key informant interviewee, Lafia (Nasarawa State), June, 2015.
[21] The outcome of the fieldwork in the focal States largely confirmed this position.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Key informant interviewee, Lafia (Nasarawa State), June-July, 2015.
[25] Ibid.
[26] A victim of communal conflict in Obi area in Nasarawa State, inrewiewd in Lafia,
July, 2015.
[27] Group Discussions in Jos, Plateua State, July, 2016;
[28] Fieldwork in the focal areas, June-July, 2015
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.

203
[31] ibid.
[32] Key informant interviewee, Obi (Nasarawa State), June, 2015.
[33]. Key informant interviewee, Jos (Plateau State), June, 2015.

204
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 Appendix

Appendix I: Report of Commission of Inquiry into the Plateau Crisis of 2008

CHAPTER ONE
1.0 Introduction
The relative peace and tranquil setting had been the bastion of the city of Jos in
Plateau State ‘Home of Peace and Tourism’ and had been enjoyed by all Nigerians
and foreigners from past memory. However, in recent years that attraction is being
gradually eroded by numerous events of violence with discernible economic, ethnic,
political and sectarian undertones.
The Unrest of 28th November 2008 was another instance of those violent acts.
Newspaper and press reports ran riot with their various accounts of what had occurred
supported with alleged figures of casualties and the huge extent of losses of properties.
Grievances that had apparently been built up over time and appeal to religious
sentiments were used by both sides to manipulate popular emotions and eventually to
inflame the situation to a level where it could no longer be controlled. Christians and
Muslims, indigenes and non-indigenes became both perpetrators and victims. The
immediate responses to the violence included the deployment of detachments of the
Mobile Police force (Mopol) and subsequently, the soldiers of the Nigerian Army to
maintain Law and order and the imposition of a curfew.
Following the restoration of relative order on the 30 th of November 2009, the
State began to pick up its pieces in Jos North. There were several high powered visits
to the city under numerous political and governmental guises. These became the
subject of much disaffection as it was alleged that partisan lines were drawn. This was
particularly so in the case of the Federal Government, the State Government and the
National Assembly, all seemingly pitched against each other in their individual and
numerous attempts at ensuring the return of normalcy in the immediate aftermath of the
violence, in providing relief materials and ascertaining the cause of the Unrest.
Besides this Commission, several Panels of inquiry and/or investigation were set
up:
i) The two arms of the National Assembly set up Ad-hoc Committees to look into
the Jos crisis of November, 2008,
ii) The Federal Government set up the General Abisoye Panel of Investigation on
the Jos crisis,
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 iii) The State House of Assembly set up a Committee to look into the details of the
November, 28th crisis.
There was a resulting overlap in terms of reference and functions coupled with
arguments being traded on which institution was vested with jurisdiction on
investigative functions and the scope of such jurisdiction. Of particular note was a
cause of action instituted by the Plateau State Government against the Federal
Government in the case of Plateau State Vs Federal Government of Nigeria, The
Attorney General of the Federation.
1.1 Plateau State v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and
Attorney General of the Federation in Suit No: SC 331/2008.
The Plateau State Governor Jonah David Jang instituted an action against the
Federal Government in the Supreme Court for setting up a panel of Inquiry to probe the
November 28th riot that rocked Plateau State over the Local Government Election in Jos
North.
President Umaru Yar’adua had set up an administrative panel of Inquiry to probe
the crisis. He appointed Major General Emmanuel Abisoye (Rtd.) as Chairman of the
Panel and other members comprising of Mr. Festus Okoye, Ambassador G.D. Preware
and Ambassador Fati Sa’ad, while Alhaji Shafi’l was appointed as the Secretary. The
terms of reference of the President established Panel was inter alia to look into the
causes of the crisis, identify those responsible for the crisis and make recommendations
on how to avert a re-occurrence.
The action was instituted on behalf of the State, wherein Governor Jang invoked
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over questions of law between the Federal
and the State Government.
The Originating summons prayed for the following;
That the Supreme Court should declare that President Umaru Yar’adua has no
power under the Constitution or Tribunal of Inquiry Act 1966, now to be found in Cap
T21 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) to constitute a Tribunal of Inquiry or appoint
any person or group of persons by whatever name to inquire into the civil unrest that
occurred in Jos.
1. A declaration of the Supreme Court that the power to constitute a Tribunal of
Inquiry into the civil unrest which occurred in Plateau State in November is a
residual matter in respect of which only the State’s House of Assembly is
competent to make laws vide Section 4(7) of the 1999 Constitution.
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 2. The grant of an injunction restraining the Federal Government from setting
up a tribunal to inquire into the Jos Crisis.
3. An injunction restraining the Federal Government and its agents from
directing any one or body of persons from sitting or continuing to sit as a
tribunal purporting to be acting under the Tribunal of Inquiry Act to inquire
into the civil unrest that occurred in Jos.
Pending the hearing of the Originating Summons by the Supreme Court a
Motion on Notice was filed seeking the following;
a) An order preserving the res in the case by an order of interlocutory
injunction restraining the Federal Government and its agents from further
taking any steps capable of giving effect to the announcement by the
secretary to the Federal Government, Alhaji Yayale Ahmed, that the
Commission of Inquiry into the Jos Crisis had been set up.
b) The order of court stopping the Federal Government from accepting the
report of the recommendation of the Commission and that if the
recommendation had been accepted, the Supreme Court should stop the
Federal Government from acting on them.
The argument centred on a Supreme Court’s judgment delivered on January the
31st 2003 to the effect that the 1999 Constitution made no provision for Tribunals of
Inquiry as did the 1963 Constitution in item 39 on the Exclusive legislative list and item
25 on the Concurrent legislative list. Therefore, the power to make a general law for the
establishment and regulations of Tribunals of Inquiry in the form of the Tribunals of
Inquiry Act 1966 is now a residual power under the 1999 Constitution belonging to the
states. The Judgment was delivered in an appeal involving Chief Gani Fawehinmi,
Justice Chukwudifu Oputa and Human Right Violation Investigation Commission
(HRVIC) (as appellants) against General Ibrahim Babangida, Brigadier General Togun
and Brigadier General Akilu (as respondents). The suit dealt with the summoning of the
Respondents before the HRVIC to testify in relation to the murder of Mr. Dele Giwa
and the challenge of the legality of the HRVIC by the respondents.
The case was in the first instance before the Federal High Court before going on
appeal to the Court of Appeal and final appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court ruled that Human Right Violation Investigation Commission (HRVIC), a.k.a.
Oputa Panel has no power to summon witnesses outside the Federal Capital Territory.
In the Judgment delivered by Justice Samson Uwaifo with the Assent of the Chief
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Justice of Nigeria, Justice Uwais and Justices Belgore, Kutigi, Ogundare, Onu and Iguh,
the court held that the 1999 Constitution made no provisions for Tribunals of Inquiry to
issue summons against witnesses. Justice Uwaifo stated further that unlike the 1963
Constitution which made that Provision in Item 39 of the Exclusive List and Item 25 of
the Concurrent List, the 1999 Constitution is devoid of such provision stressing that ‘It
follows that, the power to make a general law for the establishment and regulation of
Tribunals of Inquiry in the form of the Tribunals of Inquiry Act is now a residual power
under the 1999 Constitution given to the States’
Therefore on the 15th day of January 2008, the Commission of Inquiry into the
Unrest of 28th November 2008 in Jos North Local Government area of Plateau State was
inaugurated by the Plateau State Government.
1.2 Inauguration
The Commission was inaugurated on Thursday the 15 th of January 2009 by the
Governor of Plateau State, Da Jonah David Jang at the Government House, Rayfield,
Jos. In his address, the Governor decried the monumental loss of lives and property
during the Unrest. He declared that the Plateau State Government was not against the
Panels of investigation set up by the President and the National Assembly, but there was
a need to respect the rule of law and operate within the confines of the Constitution. He
assured the people of Plateau State and Nigerians that this Report will be implemented
and those found guilty dealt with according to the laws of the land. He expressed the
wish of the Plateau people that this shall be the last of these violent eruptions.
His Excellency Judge Bola Ajibola, SAN, CFR, in response to the speech of
Governor Jonah David Jang, with regret, the history of civil unrests in Jos which are of
similar nature, starting with the one of the 12th of April 1994, a crisis that ‘subsequently
erupted on an unprecedented scale’. Although certain measures were said to have been
taken then, including the appointment of a caretaker Chairman of Jos North in the
person of Alhaji Aminu Mato, it was stated that there were still quiet disaffections and
tensions which spread unabated until it erupted into another communal clash in Jos on
the 7th of September, 2001 and another crisis in 2002 which was not limited to Jos but
spread across the entire Plateau State.
The Chairman recognized that the Governor, Jonah Jang, had charged the
Commission to carry out their assignment with quick dispatch but ensuring that no stone
is left unturned and on the premise that members of the Commission have solemnly
promised to serve the people of Plateau state and Nigeria conscientiously, diligently,
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honestly and judiciously to the best of their ability ensuring peace and stability. The
Chairman further cautioned that there shall be no room for partiality and improper
sentiments in the conduct of the inquiry, and that the inquiry shall be conducted with
honesty, justice and truth as the watch dog of the Commission.
The Chairman on behalf of other members of the Commission extended
entreaties to all agencies and functionaries of the Government, particularly those of the
Federal Government which has shown its own resolve on this matter, therefore the
Commission welcomes wholeheartedly their contribution and support.
1.3 Constitution of the Commission
The Commission was constituted as follows;
i) His Excellency Justice Bola Ajibola(SAN),KBE,CFR - Chairman
ii) Professor M.T. Yahya - Member
iii) Barrister (Mrs.) Virginia Abang - Member
iv) Barrister Daniel Gopep - Member
v) Mr. Sale Fale - Member
vi) Chief D.G. Fompun - Secretary
The Instrument constituting the Commission of Inquiry provided for a Secretary
of the Commission who was Mr. D G Fompun. The instrument constituting the
Commission of Inquiry provided that, lead and other counsel to the Commission were to
be appointed by the Honourable Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice,
Plateau State.
1.4 Terms of reference
In the exercise of the powers conferred by section 2 of the Commission of
Inquiry Law (Cap 25) Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963 applicable in Plateau State and
all other powers enabling him in that behalf, His Excellency, Jonah David Jang,
Executive Governor of Plateau State, constituted a Judicial Commission of Inquiry to
look into the Jos civil disturbances (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Commission’) with
the following terms of reference:
i. Establish the Remote and Immediate Causes of the November 2008 Jos
unrest.
ii. Identify individuals, groups of persons and institutions directly or
indirectly responsible for the unrest and their roles in precipitating the
unrest and recommend appropriate sanctions;
iii. Ascertain the extent of loss of lives and damage to property;
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 iv. Recommend ways of avoiding the re occurrence of such unrest in future,
and
v. Make any other recommendations incidental to the Commission’s terms
of reference.

1.5 Functions of the Commission

The Instrument constituting the Commission of Inquiry provided to the effect
that the Chairman and members of the Commission were to function within powers
conferred upon them by Section 7 of the Commission of Inquiry Law (Cap 25), Laws of
Northern Nigeria 1963, which states:
The Commissioner shall have the following powers:
a) to procure all such evidence, written or oral, and to examine all such persons
as witnesses as the commissioners may think it necessary or desirable to
procure or examine;
b) to require the evidence (whether written or oral) of any witness to be made
on oath or declaration, such oath or declaration to be that which could be
required of the witness if he were giving evidence in a magistrate’s court;

c) to summon any person in Nigeria to attend any meeting of the

commissioners to give evidence or produce any document or other thing in
his possession and to examine him as a witness or require him to produce
any document or other thing in his possession, subject to all just exceptions;
d) to issue a warrant to compel the attendance of any person who, after having
been summoned to attend, fails to do so, and does not excuse such failure to
the satisfaction of the commissioners, and to order him to pay all costs which
may have been occasioned in compelling his attendance or by reason of his
refusal to obey the summons, and also to fine such person a sum not
exceeding five pounds, such fine to be recoverable in the same manner as a
fine imposed by a magistrate’s court except that failure to pay such fine shall
not warrant an order directing imprisonment;
e) to admit any evidence, whether written or oral, which might be inadmissible
in civil or criminal proceedings;
f) to admit or exclude the public or any member of the public from any meeting
of the commissioners;

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 g) to admit or exclude the press from any meeting of the commissioners,
h) to award any person who has attended any meeting of the commissioners,
including any interpreter appointed under section 9 of this Law, such sum or
sums as in the opinion of the commissioners may have been reasonably
expended by him by reason of such attendance;
i) to enter upon any land, whether state land, native lands, lands at the disposal
of any native authority, land occupied by any native or native community or
unoccupied lands for the purpose of obtaining evidence or information
required by, or which may be required by, or which may be of assistance to
the commissioners.
Provided that the Commissioners shall withhold the exercise of any power under
this section if the President or a Governor of a Region shall certify to them that the
exercise of such a power would in his opinion encroach unduly upon the territorial or
other jurisdiction of the Government of the Federation or of such Region.
1.6 Mode and procedure of Inquiry
In carrying out its functions, the Commission was to adopt the following
procedures:
i) Make a full, faithful and impartial enquiry into the unrest that occurred in Jos
on 28th of November 2008;
ii) Report in writing the result of the enquiry
iii) The inquiry shall be conducted in public and the Commission shall have
the power to exclude the public or any member of the public if it deemed
necessary;
iv) The Commission shall have power to regulate its own proceeding;
v) The Quorum of the Commission shall be constituted with the Chairman
and two (2) other members.

1.7 Appearance of Counsel

In line with Constitutional provisions of the right to fair hearing and as was
provided in the Commission of Inquiry Law, Cap 25, Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963,
the established practice of the Commission was that any person whose conduct is the
subject of enquiry by the Commission or who is in any way implicated or concerned in
the matter under investigation by the Commission is entitled to be represented by a
Counsel.

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 Any other person or group of persons who consider it desirable that they should
be represented by counsel may be allowed by the Commission to be so represented.
1.8 Counsels to the Commission
Government appointed the following persons to act as counsel to the
Commission:
i. Charles Obishai Esq., - Lead Counsel
ii. Paul Agbo Esq., - Counsel
iii. Pascal Mammoh Esq., - Counsel
iv. Jim Gottom Esq., - Counsel
v. Binchan Janitor Esq., - Counsel
1.9 The seat of the Commission
The Commission of Inquiry Law, Cap 25, Laws of Northern Nigeria, as
applicable in Plateau State, provides that the seat of the Commission shall be in Jos,
Plateau State, but that its meetings could be convened at any venue in Nigeria as may be
deemed appropriate by the Chairman.
The sitting of the Commission was held at the Azi Nyako Youth Centre, Dadin
Kowa, Jos, Plateau State.
1.10 Submission of the Report
In line with the provisions of the Commission of Inquiry Law, Cap 25, Laws of
Northern Nigeria, 1963, as applicable to Plateau State, the Commission was obligated to
submit its Report to the Governor in writing within six (6) Months from the date of its
first sitting after being sworn in by the Governor and in the case of a need for any
extension of time the Governor had the power to grant such extension. On 3 rd July 2009,
the Commission requested for an extension of time within which to conclude its
mandate. The extension was granted and the Commission was given an additional three
months, granting it up till the 31st day of October 2009 to submit its final Report. The
Commission submitted its Report on Tuesday 27th October, 2009.
1.11 Call for memoranda
The Chairman invited members of the public and concerned parties to submit
memoranda or Petition (ten copies each) on or before, but not later than the 16 th of
February 2009 to the Secretary to the Commission, Chief D.G. Fompun at the Azi
Nyako Youth Centre Yakubu Gowon Way, Dadin Kowa, Jos. Telephone Number;
08056401066 and 08037019041
1.12 Methodology
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 The Methodology adopted by the Commission was to conduct the hearings in
public in line with the Instrument constituting it. To this end, there were invitations to
the members of the public calling for memoranda and asking them to provide
information and evidence along the lines of the Terms of Reference given to the
Commission and each Memorandum was to be submitted in 10 copies. Adverts were
placed in the newspapers and radio announcements and television adverts were run
continuously and simultaneously.
The sittings of the Commission were heard in public.
1.13 Chairman’s opening remarks
After the official inauguration by the Plateau State Governor on the 15th of
January, 2009 and the subsequent meetings on procedure held on the 25 th – 26th of
January in Abeokuta, the Commission held its inaugural public sitting on Friday 20 th
February 2009 at the Azi Nyako Youth Centre, Dadin Kowa, Jos. The occasion was
opened with the Chairman’s opening remarks wherein he explained the need for the
Commission to invite stake holders and concerned persons within and outside Jos North
Local Government to file in their petitions and memoranda and confirmed having
received a large bundle of documents as of that date and at that date 161 memoranda
had been received.
The Chairman read out the Commission’s Rules of Procedure and expressed the
intention to have a preliminary surveillance of the affected places in order to engender
the Commissions purpose and mission amongst its members and to afford the
opportunity to physically observe and evaluate the destruction that occurred.
The Commission’s primary mission was stated as the quest to seek the truth.
The Chairman promised that the Commission would be just and impartial, regardless of
religious, ethnic or political affiliations. He expressed that the wish of the Commission
and that of the entire leadership of Plateau State was to ensure that these catastrophe
would no longer be repeated.
Finally the Chairman expressed the view that a lot of effort would need to be put
into this exercise to ensure peace both in Jos North, the city of Jos, Plateau State and the
whole of Nigeria. Peace in Nigeria will be merely illusory without peace in this region
and that the ambition of the Commission was to bring about a report and
recommendations that will make it safe for every one to live in peace in Jos, Plateau
State and the whole of Nigeria.
1.14 Visit to locus in quo
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 The Chairman and members of the Commission in their resolve to undertake a
fact finding inspection tour of all the affected areas of the crisis took a one day visit on
the, 21st of February 2009, to the following areas, Rikkos, Tina Junction, Dogon Dutse,
Congo Russia, Zololo Junction, Nassarawa, Bauchi Ring Road, Bauchi Road,
Kwararafa Area, Zaria Road, Katako, Ali Kazaure, Rock Haven, Gada Biyu and Tudun
Wada.
1.15 Press Conference
The Commission held a press conference on 7 th March, 2009, during which the
Chairman of the Commission addressed the Press on its activities. The Commission
commended the Press on their very good coverage and thereby educating the public on
the Commission’s mandate. The Commission confirmed that it commenced public
sitting on Friday the 20th February, 2009 and that it had to that time received a total of
161 memoranda and had, to the date of press conference listened to 11 witnesses:
The Chairman also stated:
i) That the Commission’s Lead Counsel applied for extension of time for a
period of two (2) weeks so as to enable those who were unable to submit
their petition before the initial deadline of February 16 th 2009 (earlier
closing date) to do so. The said application was granted and the
Commission adjourned till 27th February 2009.

ii) That after the two weeks extension, 43 additional memoranda were
received making a total of 204 petitions and memoranda (at that time).

iii) That at the inception of its assignment, the Commission visited some of
the places where the crisis occurred on the 21 st of February, 2009 with a
view to assessing the scope of the destruction during the Unrest.

iv) The Commission further informed the Press of the areas it visited,

v) That the witnesses who had submitted their petitions had dealt with the
historical and introductory part of the crisis especially the remote and
immediate causes,

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 vi) That from submissions brought before the Commission, the Commission
considered it necessary to invite certain persons such as; the then
Commissioner of Police, the then State Director of SSS, Alhaji Dasuki
Nakande, Alhaji Samaila Mohammed, Aminu Baba, ANPP
Chairmanship candidate, Surveyor General Plateau State, NYSC
Director, the Chairman Okene Local Government Council and some
other persons to appear before the Commission and to clarify some of the
issues raised from the submissions of the witnesses to assist the
Commission by giving much needed information in its fact finding
aspect of its assignment. The Commission further pointed out that it is a
Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the November 28th Crisis and not a
litigation process dealing with plaintiffs and defendants nor a prosecution
dealing with prosecutors and accused persons.
The Commission further informed the press that the Commission intended to
carry out its work expeditiously in order to cover a lot of grounds within one month of
the press release.
1.16 Litigation against the Commission
Several litigations were instituted against the Plateau State Government and the
Commission contesting the creation of the Commission and seeking to truncate its
activities. The cases instituted were:
i) Alhaji Sani Jibrin v. Plateau State Government in Suit No:
FHC/J/CS/10/2009.
ii) Mallam Saidu Musa v. The Plateau State Government in Suit No:
PLD/J20/2009.
iii) Sheikh Balarabe Dawud & 9 Ors. V. The Plateau State Government & 7
Ors. in Suit No: PLD/J326/2009.
iv) Alh. Ali Inuwa and 10 Ors. V. The Plateau State Government & 4 Ors. in
Suit No: PLD/J243/2009.
v) Alh. Hassan Sa’eed (Sheikh) & 7 Ors. V. Prince Bola Ajibola & 8 Ors in
Suit No: PLD/J242/09
These cases were vigorously defended by the Counsel to the Commission and
were of no obstacle to the continuation of the Commissions work to its successful
conclusion.
1.17 Chairman’s closing remarks
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 The public sittings of the Commission after having received 221 memoranda,
out of which 211 were orally presented, whilst the Commission heard 213 witnesses,
ended on Friday 7 August 2009, on which day the Chairman delivered his closing
remarks. To commence, a five-minute silence was observed in memory of all the
victims that were brutally killed. He thanked all the members and staff of the
Commission and also members of the public for their support and regular attendance.
The Chairman declared finally that the Commission was set up to serve the interest and
protect the future of the people of Jos North and that of the entire Plateau State. He
prayed that peace should reign in the State and the Country at large.
1.18 Terminology
The Commission made use of certain terminology
during the course of its work and within this Report. Particular note is made of
the term ‘Hausa/Fulani’. The Commission recognise that the Hausa and Fulani are two
distinctive ethnic groups in Nigeria, but notes that the two have historical antecedents
that often pitch them together as one especially within the context of Jos North. In
subsequent chapters of this Report therefore the expression ‘Hausa/Fulani’ is used to
refer to the two tribes as one body that has a coincidence of common or joint social,
political and religious agenda.
It must be further clarified here that matters relating to the Hausa/Fulani in this
Report are with reference to Jos North Local Government area only which is the area of
immediate concern to this Commission, but occasionally also to Plateau State alone, and
therefore not necessarily of general application to the entire Hausa or Fulani people
within Nigeria.
Chapter Two
2.0 The immediate cause of the crisis
On Thursday 27th November, 2008, the Plateau State Independent Electoral
Commission (PLASIEC) conducted the Local Government Polls in Plateau State. In its
memorandum JCI/J/86/2009 presented before the Commission by its Chairman Mr.
Gabriel D. Azi on the 25th February, 2009, PLASIEC described the conduct of the
elections as peaceful, free and fair. Reports from three newspapers which the
Commission annexed to its memorandum also indicated that the election were peaceful,
free and fair. Daily Trust Newspaper of Friday 28th November, 2008 on page 58
reported that;

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 ‘elections into the 17th Local Government Councils in Plateau State held
peacefully across the state yesterday ---- some of the voters that spoke to Daily Trust
expressed satisfaction with the conduct of the election and appealed to the aspirants to
imbibe the spirit of sportsmanship’.
The Leadership Newspaper of Friday November, 28 on page 4 reported thus;
‘Local Government elections were conducted peacefully amidst tight security in
the 17th Local Government in the State to forestall any break down of law and order so
as to have a free and fair election that will be acceptable to all political parties in the
State’.
This Day Newspapers of 28th November, 2008 on page 9 stated as follows:
‘Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission (PLASIEC) has received
commendations from Government and well-meaning citizens of the State for peaceful,
free and fair Council elections’.
This reflects a summary of the view of the Police. According to C.P Samson V.
Wudah, the Plateau State Commissioner of Police at the time of the election, on 27 th
November, 2008, the exercise was generally peaceful, free and fair. This statement can
be found at page 5 of his response submitted to the Commission of Inquiry. The
response of C.P Samson V. Wudah tendered before the Commission is Exhibit
JCI/J/2009/S.H.2.
From all the evidence placed before the Commission, there is nothing contrary
to the fact that the conduct of the election was peaceful, free and fair. However, crisis
broke out in Jos North in the early hours of 28 th November, 2008. C.P Samson V.
Wudah in his response at page 5 said that the crisis that erupted in Jos North Local
Government at the end of a peaceful, free and fair election throughout the State came as
a surprise to the electorate as well as the Police.
How then did the crisis begin and who started it? According to C.P Samson
Wudah,
‘as early as between 0230 – 0330 hours of 28th November, 2008, information
filtered to the Police that some Muslim youths were holding noctural meetings at
Muslim dominated areas and soon thereafter there were reports of people shouting
‘Allahu-Akbar’ along Ali Kazaure Street and other Muslim dominated areas in Jos
North’.
The Muslim youths, C.P Samson Wudah continued, mounted road blocks in
some places and at about 0500 to 0530 hours attempted an incursion into the collation
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centre which was repelled by the Police and thereafter the burning of churches, houses,
maiming and killing of non-Muslims in some Hausa/Fulani Muslim dominated areas of
Laranto, Nassarawa Gwong and Angwan Rogo began.
The evidence of the Police that the Unrest was sparked off by the Hausa/Fulani
Muslim youths from Ali Kazaure and some Muslim dominated areas in Jos North was
corroborated by the evidence of PLASIEC and indeed several other witnesses who
presented memoranda before the Commission.
In its memorandum PLASIEC stated on page 4 as follows:
‘While the results of the election were being collated in all the 17 Local
Governments of the State, information reached the Commission’s Office through
security reports that trouble had started around Ali Kazaure Street when the result of
the election were not even announced. The information was that properties were being
destroyed or burnt and fighting has ensured in various parts of Jos North’.

In memorandum JCI/J/140/2009 presented by residents of Angwan Dalyop, a

neighbourhood of Ali Kazaure Street, they stated on page 3 – 6 of the memorandum as
follows:
‘Prior to the crises, the actual mobilization and manoeuvres of the Hausa
Youths that culminated in the mayhem started around 2:00 am with a call to sallah
using a public address system (at an unusual time). After the call the Imam made a
clear declaration of war when he said ---- ‘Jama’a, wannan Jihadi ne, ku kashe maza,
ku kashe mata, ku kashe tsofofi da yara, ku kone gidajen arne’ meaning people, this is a
Jihad, kill men, kill women, kill the elderly and children. Go ahead and burn the
houses of the infidels …
Shortly after the declaration there was a sudden violent rush of Hausa youths
marching to and from the streets chanting ‘Allahu Akbar. This mass movement
continued till day break when the actual destruction of houses, lives and other
properties started. The crisis in Angwan Dalyop started about 6:00 am on that Friday
28th November, 20 `08. There was sudden pandemonion as residents were woken by
the sudden mass movement of Hausa youths brandishing dangerous weapons such as
cutlasses, swords, machetes, clubs, bows and arrows and later guns. Some of these
youths were identified to be residents of Ali Kazaure area. We were also able to learn
from one Ahmadu Ali Kazaure that most of the armed militants were from Gangare in
Jos’.
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 C.S.P Sale Adudu (Rtd.) was Commission witness 202. According to the
witness who gave evidence in memorandum JCI/J/133/2009 presented by Bache
Development Association on the 30th July, 2009, he was an eye witness to what
transpired at the collation centre in Kabong. C.S.P Sale Adudu (Rtd.) stated in his
evidence as follows:
‘So when the results were coming in, the Hausa/Fulani were leading with almost
thirty something thousand, very close to be in favour of the result(sic). But later, the
other results were coming from the indigenes. At about 11:00 p.m the results of the
indigenes were almost fifty something thousand. Then some of them start shouting ‘the
Arnas have won the election…… Hon. Nazifi raised an alarm using a telephone call
and said ‘ku fito!, ku fito! Arna sun ci zabe! Meaning ‘come out! The infidels have won
the election!. He said so more than ten times, ku fito, ku fito, ku fito! Ku fito an gama
damu’ meaning ‘come out, come out, come out, come out, we are finished, they have
won’. It was after these phone calls that we witnessed people coming out, the next I
could see was smoke every where…. They set COCIN Church, Sarkin Mangu on fire’
That was how the crisis was initiated. The Christians on their part reacted to the
violent upsurge by the Hausa/Fulani Muslim youths. According to the Christians, they
reacted in self defence.
In the words of C.P Samson V. Wudah,
‘there was predictably reactions from the Christians in places they are also in
majority’.
The evidence of Ngas Development Association in its memorandum
JCI/J/32/2009 stated at page 2 of the memorandum thus:
‘The mischief-makers planned it so that the crisis could assume a wider scale
and dimension. Thus, after concluding their plan on the fateful day, they directed their
hoodlums to churches as targets’. Furthermore, from their scene of carnage at Ali
Kazaure, Christians became their victims as terror reigned supreme. It was in reaction
to this that the crisis assumed a wider dimension as non-Muslims in the absence of
security agents mobilized for self defence to wade off their attackers’.
In his own evidence, Commission witness 41, Brother Emmanuel Nanle, who
presented memorandum JCI/J/67/2009 on behalf of Tekan Youth Fellowship stated as
follows:
‘Even in Christian dominated areas (where they had to react to the conflicts)
Mosque and prayer spots were pulled down manually because it was not fully burnt but
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in Moslem dominated areas where these Churches were made to rout under intense
heat’.
From this evidence and indeed the totality of the evidence placed before this
Commission, it becomes very clear that the immediate cause of the November 28 crisis
in Jos North was the violent attack by the Hausa/Fulani Muslim youths on the people
and against the properties of the people they perceived as their opponents. This
violence started at Ali Kazaure spreading to other Hausa/Fulani Muslim dominated
areas in Jos North. Their opponents too reacted in self defence and Jos North Local
Government was engulfed in a Unrest. There is no doubt at all that the Hausa/Fulani
Muslim youths started the Unrest but the Christians too reacted in self defence and also
attacked the Hausa/Fulani Muslims.
The Hausa/Fulani Muslims in Jos North did not present their own side of the
story to the Commission. When the time to submit memoranda elapsed on the 16 th
February, 2009, the Commission extended the time to do so up till 16 th March, 2009.
However, the Commission continued to grant extensions as new memoranda came in
for submission the course of its work and up till its last month of its public sittings, but
despite the extension, the Hausa/Fulani Muslims in Jos North did not submit their
memoranda and failed to appear but wrote a letter dated 2 nd February, 2009 to the
Secretary of the Commission indicating that Muslims in Jos North will not appear
before the Commission. Some of them filed cases in various courts challenging the
competence of the Commission and seeking an order restraining it from sitting but these
cases did not yield that desired result. When the names of some of the Hausa/Fulani
Muslims were mentioned and allegations were made against them by witnesses who
testified before the Commission and they were invited to come to the Commission to
respond to those allegations, they declined. However, some Muslims responded to the
call to submit memoranda and submitted theirs. Some of those who submitted and
presented memoranda before the Commission are Alhaji Garba Mohammed Jos,
Barrister A.A. Ibrahim, Alhaji Umaru Miango and Adamu Yusuf. Similarly, some of
those whose names were mentioned and allegations made against them by witnesses
who testified before the Commission also responded to the Commission’s invitation to
come before the Commission and respond to allegations made against them. This
include General Ibrahim Babangida (Rtd.), Alhaji Yahaya Karaku, Chairman Okene
Local Government and Daily Trust Newspapers.

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 Though a substantial number of Muslims in Jos North did not appear and present
memoranda before the Commission, they apparently attributed the November, 28 crisis
to the November 27th Local Government polls.
Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande, a former Minister and spokesman for the
Hausa/Fulani Community in Jos in an interview he granted to the Sunday Tribune of
11th January, 2009 tendered as Exhibit JCI/J/149/2009/4 by Commission witness 13,
John Rwang in memorandum JCI/J/149/2009 stated that:
‘the Hausa youths were simply demonstrating their displeasure over perceived
ways and means being devised by the State Government that wanted to rig an election’.
We however think that the wanton destruction of lives and properties that took
place during the crisis cannot be justified by a perceived attempt to rig an election.
After all, the result of the election had not been announced at the time the crisis broke
out. Even if the elections were rigged, there are constitutional ways of seeking redress
at the Electoral Tribunals.
PLASIEC in its presentation before the Commission stated that the outcome of
the Chairmanship election in the November 27 Local Government election for Jos
North was not challenged before the Local Government Election Petition Tribunal.
Unfortunately, this means that the aggrieved parties rather than following the rule of
law chose the path of lawlessness, mayhem, destruction and jungle justice. More
worrisome is the pattern of the attack. Places of worship rather than party offices were
the targets of attack. Individuals were attacked based on their religious leanings rather
than political leanings. The whole crisis took a religious dimension.
This notwithstanding, one cannot give a totally religious colouration to the crisis
because there were cases of Muslims who were attacked by fellow Muslims. The
Middle Belt Forum Plateau State Chapter in its memorandum JCI/J/38/2009 presented
before the Commission stated on page 8 thus:
‘Amazingly, many individuals, who were practicing Muslims, but not of
Hausa/Fulani origin were also targeted for attack. For example, there are credible
oral accounts which speak of some Yoruba – speaking residents of Nasarawa Gwong
area of Jos (who are Muslims) being brutally attacked and molested. A few of them
were even reported to have been killed’.
One cannot also give the Unrest an exclusive ethnic interpretation because just
as some Muslims were attacked by their fellow Muslims, as in the case of Yoruba
Muslims who were not spared by the Hausa/Fulani Muslims, some of the indigenes
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were attacked by their fellow indigenes such as the case of Alhaji Umaru Chowhe
Miango an indigene of Plateau State who was attacked by his fellow indigenes also
from Plateau State.
The Yoruba Community who presented memorandum JCI/J/202/2009 stated on
page 1 of the memorandum as follows:
‘Yorubas did not present any candidate for any key position in the election.
Therefore it came as a surprise when on 28 th November, 2008, thousands of Hausa
Youths under the disguise of their dissatisfaction with the yet to be released results of
the Local Government Elections joined by their kith and kin in Nasarawa Gwong,
Rikkos and Dutse Uku unleashed terror on Yoruba residents in these areas’.
On his part Alhaji Umaru Miango who presented memorandum JCI/J/148/2009
and gave evidence as Commission witness 2 on 24th February, 2009 stated as follows:
‘Hausa Muslims do not trust the indigene Muslims saying we are betrayers of
faith. That whenever something is being discussed, may be to kill the Christians, we are
the ones that leaked it out to them because we live with the Christians. And the
Christians on the other hand suspect us indigene Muslims to be hiding information from
them. So they kill us for no just cause on most occasions, we the indigene Muslims
don’t know what happens, they just kill us’.
It is for these reasons that we cannot but agree with the views of Human Rights
Watch as stated on page 3 of its memorandum JCI/J/147/2009 presented before this
Commission that’
‘religious, political and ethnic disputes often serve as mere proxies for the
severe economic pressures that lie beneath the surface’.
Indeed, we shall see subsequently that the causes of the Unrest are rather
economic with religious, political and ethnic undertones being merely used as avenues
to fuel and to achieve the economic goals of the perpetrators.
The Commission concludes that the immediate cause of the Unrest of 28 th
November, 2008 in Jos was the attack initiated by the Hausa/Fulani Muslim youth in
Ali Kazaure area of Jos spreading very quickly to other areas within the city and the
response by the Christian youths in self defence which threw the city into a mindless
crisis that led to colossal loss of lives and properties.

CHAPTER THREE

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 3.0 Remote causes of the Unrest
During the cause of the Commission’s hearings, a plethora of factors were laid
down before it as being remote causes of the Unrest. Indeed, it is possible to identify
not only the immediate and remote causes, but perhaps direct and indirect causes or
even pre-causes and post causes.
The contributions which aided the Commission in this regard may not be
exhaustive of the remote causes, as some causes may be even more remote than others.
The Commission’s mandate to establish remote causes is treated here through a
topical analysis of the factors which we found as being the remote causes of the 28 th
November, 2008 Unrest. The actions analysed herein and the actors, differ in their
qualitative and quantitative impact on how each of these causes affected the crisis.
Similarly, the different factors suggested also vary in time.
However, the Commission, going by its mandate, finds the following to be the
remote causes of the Unrest.

3.1 Ownership of Jos North

Evidence presented before the Commission by many witnesses expressed the
fact that two civil Unrests similar to the one of 28 th November, 2008, earlier occurred in
Jos North Local Government area on the 12th April, 1994 and 7th September, 2001 for
which Plateau State Government set up the Justice Aribiton Fiberesima and Justice Niki
Tobi Commissions of inquiry to investigate the respective previous civil Unrests.
One witness who gave evidence in this regard and even tendered the reports of
the two previous Commissions, is Commission witness 32 Da G.G. Bot who presented
memorandum JCI/J/23/2009. Justice Aribiton Fiberesima Report is Exhibit
JCI/J/23/2009/2 while Justice Niki Tobi report is Exhibit JCI/J/23/2009/27. Both
exhibits were tendered in the memorandum of Da G.G. Bot. It is clear from the reports
of the two previous Commissions that ownership of Jos was identified as a major
remote cause of the two previous civil Unrests.
In its report on page 4, the Justice Aribiton Fiberesima Commission stated as
follows:
‘A recurrent friction for many years between the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere
tribes on one hand, and the Hausa/Fulani tribes on the other hand is a remote cause of
the riot. Each part lays claim to Jos. The Berom, Anaguta and Afizere claim that they
are the undisputable indigenous people of Jos, that the Hausa/Fulani are settler

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strangers who migrated into Jos for various reasons which include commerce,
employment and repair of fortune but the Hausa/Fulani contend that they are owners of
Jos, had had the privilege of producing rulers of the town since way back in 1902.
They also claim political ascendancy over the other communities at all times. This
feeling of one having supremacy over the other simmered for years, only to break out
into open confrontation and riot on the 12th April, 1994.
The Justice Niki Tobi Commission of Inquiry on its part on page 42 of its report
stated that;
‘One of the remote causes of the September, 2001 crises is the claim of
ownership of Jos. While the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom claim ownership of Jos Town,
the Hausas and to some extent the Fulanis also claim ownership of it. These competing
claims came to the fore in the Commission both in the Memoranda submitted and in
oral evidence’.
In the crisis at hand, not a few witnesses who tendered memoranda and testified
before the Commission also identified the claim of ownership of Jos town between the
Afizere, Anaguta and Berom tribes on one hand and the Hausa and Fulani tribes on the
other hand as a major remote cause of the civil Unrest of 28th November, 2009.
The Berom Elders Council in its memorandum JCI/J/40/2009 stated at page 7
paragraph 4 of the Memorandum that the primary remote cause of the November, 28
2008 crisis rest on the issue of the ownership of Jos and concluded that the Afizere,
Anaguta and Berom rather than the Hausa/Fulani tribes, are the founders and aborigines
of Jos town.
The Afizere Youth Movement in its memorandum JCI/J/95/2009 while
identifying ownership of Jos as a major remote cause of the crisis stated that the
Hausa/Fulani:
‘have for long been struggling to forcefully assert themselves into political
arena and traditional rulership of Jos and this is viewed by the indigenes (Anaguta,
Afizere and Berom) as being selfish and greedy’.
This view is supported by Afizere Cultural Development Association in its
memorandum JCI/J/106/2009 and memorandum JCI/J/109/2009 presented by Izere
(Jarawa) Concerned Daughters.
Anaguta Community presented Memorandum JCI/J/139/2009 before the
Commission and on page 7 of the Memorandum stated that:

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 ‘a major cause of the repeated crises in Jos is the crave for the ownership of Jos
as contained in the many claims and counter claims by the Anagutas, Afizeres, Beroms
and the Hausas as each is claiming ownership of Jos’.
Just like the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom, the Hausa/Fulani tribes also lay claim
to Jos. In a booklet titled ‘Who owns Jos North’ tendered as Exhibits JCI/J/31/2009/2
in memorandum JCI/J/31/2009 presented by Dr. Charles Gonyok which was widely
circulated in Jos North by the Hausa/Fulani shortly before the November 28 th Unrest
and an advertorial by Coalition of Jasawa Elders published in the Daily Trust of
Monday 12th January, 2009 tendered as Exhibit JCI/J/135/2009/4 in memorandum
JCI/J/135/2009 presented by Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Movement, the
Hausa/Fulani contended that they are founders and owners of Jos town. They claimed
in the two documents that they founded Jos even before the advent of the white man and
are the dominant tribe in the city and control its economy. They equally claimed that
they have produced 13 past Chiefs of Jos and pointed to the fact that the names of many
streets and places within the city are in Hausa language.
No doubt from all these set of facts, the ownership of Jos between the Afizere,
Anaguta and Berom on one hand and the Hausa/Fulani on the other is in issue and has
been a source of acrimony for a long time. As earlier stated, the Justice Aribiton
Fiberesima and Niki Tobi Commissions of Inquiry set up to investigate the civil Unrests
of 12th April, 1994 and 7th September, 2001 respectively in Jos town identified
ownership of Jos town as a major remote cause of these two previous crises. These two
Commissions considered and resolved the ownership of Jos in favour of Afizere,
Anaguta and Berom.
In its report tendered as Exhibit JCI/J/23/2009/3 in the memorandum of Da G.G.
Bot, the Justice Fiberesima Commission resolved ownership of Jos on page 25 as
follows:
‘In the light of the above consideration or careful thought, we concede to the
claim of Berom, Anaguta and Afizere tribes and to declare that they are ‘indigenes’ of
Jos but as to the Hausa/Fulani people’s assumption, we make bold on the evidence at
our disposal to advice them that they can qualify only as ‘Citizens’ of Jos’.
Justice Niki Tobi Commission which investigated the 7 th September, 2001 civil
Unrest in Jos in its report tendered as Exhibit JCI/J/23/27 resolved the ownership of Jos
thus:

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 ‘In this matter history and authentic history has given us a consistent story of
how the three tribes of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom own Jos. We accept the evidence of
the three tribes and other tribes that supported their evidence. We reject the evidence
that the Hausas and the Fulanis or any other tribe for that matter founded Jos and
therefore own Jos’.
That was not the end of the matter. When Justice Niki Tobi Commission
submitted its report, the then Government of Rtd. Major General Chris Ali set up a
Peace Conference comprising of all tribes in Plateau State, Hausa/Fulani inclusive, to
consider the report and the Peace Conference in its report of September, 2004 which is
Plateau State Legal Notice No. 2 of 2004 tendered as Exhibit JCI/J/148/2009/2 in the
memorandum of Alhaji Umaru Chowhe Miango (memorandum JCI/J/148/2009)
affirmed the decisions of Justices Fiberesima and Niki Tobi Commissions on ownership
of Jos and held that the Afizere, Anaguta and Beroms tribes are co-founders, and
owners of Jos but not the Hausa Fulani who at best are citizens. See page 23 of Exhibit
JCI/J/148/2009/2.
With the decisions and findings of the two Commissions on the ownership of Jos
coupled with the ‘Plateau Resolves’ of 2004, one would have thought that the
ownership of Jos was settled in 2004. In Exhibits JCI/J/31/2009/2 and JCI/J/135/2009/4
which are the booklet widely circulated by the Hausa/Fulani shortly before the
November, 2008 crisis and the advertorial published by Coalition of Jasawa Elders in
the Daily Trust Newspaper of 12th January, 2009, the Hausa/Fulani claimed ownership
of Jos and repeated those same reasons they placed before the Justices Fiberesima and
Niki Tobi Commissions but that were rejected. No new fact has so far been advanced
by the Hausa/Fulani in their claim for ownership of Jos. It is the same old stories.
Since no new fact has been adduced by the Hausa/Fulani to the evidence presented
before the Fiberesima and Niki Tobi Commissions to dislodge the findings and
conclusions of the Commissions, we do not depart from the findings and conclusions of
those Commissions on the ownership of Jos. Indeed we align ourselves with those
findings and conclusions.
The evidence placed before this Commission by way of memoranda submitted,
oral evidence adduced and Exhibits tendered strengthens rather than controvert the
findings and conclusions of the two Commissions that the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom
are founders and owners of Jos and not the Hausa/Fulani settlers.

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 In memorandum JCI/J/40/2009 presented by the Berom Elders Council,
reference was made to the ancient battle of 1873 in which the Hausa/Fulani from
Bauchi attempted to conquer the natives of Jos but were heavily defeated and chased out
of Jos by the combined army of Afizere, Anaguta, Berom and other tribes. The
Hausa/Fulani army retreated and never came back to attack natives of Jos. They only
came back to Jos after the advent of the Whiteman. This evidence by the Berom Elders
Council is from a letter dated 4th January, 1915 from Mr. Lonsdale, District Officer,
Bauchi Division to the Resident Naraguta Division. The letter was a response to a
request by the Resident for an account from the District Officer of this battle of 1873.
In the letter, Mr. Lonsdale narrated to the Resident of Naraguta an account of the battle
as told him by Abdu Wazirin Wunti of Bauchi who was himself present during the
battle as follows:
‘We proceeded to Jos---- close to the present site of Niger Company Canteen,
we were attacked by a large number of Naragutawa, Bukurawa, Jarawa, Bujiawa and
men of Amo. They beat us and we all separated in flight reaching Tilde at night. The
pagans turned from Rafin Jaki. The (sic) Bauchi was killed near Naraguta on the Buji
road as he was fleeing; forty one (41) of us were killed and twelve of our horses. We
captured eighteen of their cattle. After that we did not fight them again’.
A certified true copy of this letter is Appendix v attached to memoranda
JCI/J/106/2009 presented before this Commission by the Afizere Cultural and
Community Development Association.
The fact that the Hausa/Fulani Jihadists did not conquer the natives of Jos area
was corroborated by Late Sardauna of Sokoto Sir Ahmadu Bellow, himself a Fulani
man and who Plateau Indigenous Development Association (PIDAN) in their
memorandum (memorandum JCI/J/107/2009) described at page 4 of the said
memorandum as former Premier of Northern Nigeria and who worked with the colonial
masters and toured all the provinces of Northern Nigerian including Jos. Sir Ahmadu
Bello in his book ‘My Life’ tendered as Exhibit JCI/J/148/2009/3 in memorandum
JCI/J/148/2009 presented by Alhaji Umaru Chohwe Miango stated on page 11 of that
book that:
‘the countries which did not come under the Fulani rule were the areas known
as Borno Province, the Plateau Province (less Wase), the Jukun, the Tiv and Idoma
peoples of South of the Benue Province and small part of Kabba and Ilorin Province’.

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 This piece of evidence has not been controverted at all. We accept it as the truth
of what happened between the natives of Jos and the Hausa/Fulani invaders in 1873.
This is more particularly so as Sir Ahmadu Bello confirmed in it his book that the
Hausa/Fulani never conquered the indigenes of Jos who remained independent. Hence
the claim by Hausa/Fulani that their ancestors met Jos a virgin land and founded same
cannot be true because at least the natives of Jos were in occupation of the area before
the battle of 1873 and that is why they were able to mobilize themselves and drove the
Hausa/Fulani invaders out of Jos. If they met the territory a virgin land as claimed then
who drove them out of it?
The Hausa/Fulani invaders themselves admitted that that after the failed attempt
to conquer Jos in 1873, they never came back until after the advent of the white man.
This admission by the Hausa/Fulani lend support to the contention of the Afizere,
Anaguta and Berom tribes that the Hausa/Fulani are not indigenes of Jos but settlers
who came to Jos as labourers in the Tin mines after tin was discovered by the
Whiteman.
The Hausa/Fulani have in their booklet ‘Who owns Jos North Local
Government Council’ relied heavily on a statement by Mr. C.G Ames a colonial
administrator that the Hausas have been in Jos since the beginning of the century.
Plateau Indigenous Development Association (PIDAN) has in its memorandum argued
that the beginning of the 20th century is 1900s and since the white man came to Jos and
discovered tin at the beginning of the century, the Hausa came to Jos as a result of the
discovery of tin and came to work as labourers in the mines. This is further confirmed
by the admission of the Hausa/Fulani that after the defeat of 1873 they never came to
Jos until after the advent of the white man. This accorded with the views of Dr. Charles
C. Jacobs in his book ‘Studies in Berom History and Culture’, Exhibit JCI/J/40/2009/6
presented by Berom Elders Council wherein he stated on page 227 of the book as
follows:
----’the bulk of the labour force on the minefields came from outside the Plateau
Chiefly from other parts of Northern Nigeria. The Hausas and the Kanuris came to
constitute the cadre of experienced miners who worked all the year round and supplied
the bulk of the headmen’.
Bill Freund in his book ‘Capital Market and Labour in the Nigerian Mines
(Exhibit JCI/J/107/2009/9) tendered in memorandum JCI/J/107/2009 presented by
Plateau Indigenous Development Associations gave an excellent account of the political
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economy of tin mining and labour on the Plateau tin mines. He stated that in the 1940s
due to the Second World War and the increase demand for tin to prosecute the war
effort, forced labour (Diban Gwamna) was imposed as a state policy and many Hausas
from the North were drawn into the minefields.
This then means that if attempts by the Hausa/Fulani to conquer Jos failed and
they were driven out of Jos in 1873 and only came to Jos at the beginning of the 20 th
Century as labourers in the mine fields, then their claim that their ancestors met Jos a
virgin land and founded same cannot be true.
There is evidence before the Commission that the Hausa/Fulani in Jos got the
lands they are presently occupying from the natives. Commission witness 28, Toma
Jang Davou who presented memorandum JCI/J/130/2009 on behalf of Berom
Parliamentary Forum said the Hausa Community in Jos bought the land, they now use
as Hawan Idi praying ground from his father in 1955. The sale agreement between the
father of Commission witness 28 and representatives of the Hausa Community in Jos
North is Exhibit ‘B’ attached to memorandum JCI/J/136/2009. It was also the evidence
of the same witness that it was the Late Gbong Gwom Jos, Da Rwang Pam, that gave
out the land upon which Jos Central Mosque was built, to the Hausa Community for
that purpose. On the day the piece of land was handed over to the Hausa/Fulani
Community by late Da Rwang Pam, the then Gbong Gwom Jos, the Sardauna of Sokoto
and Premier of Northern Nigeria, late Sir Ahmadu Bello who was himself present and
was accompanied by Alhaji Ali Kazaure, Alhaji Ali Iliya, Alhaji Sale Hassan, Alhaji
Inuwa Ali and other dignitaries made the following remarks:
‘Today is my day of great joy and happiness. The Gbong Gwom Jos through
extraordinary generosity has given Muslims land to build a Mosque for their
Community who are his loyal subjects. Today I want us to say that the Beroms and
Hausas must work in harmony. The Hausa must respect the authority of the Berom.
The day you cheat on the Berom, you will suffer untold hardship because if you cheat
on the Berom, you will always end up being cursed. Remember you will never see
happiness until you respect the host community’.
This remarks can be found at page 6 of memorandum JCI/J/65/2009 presented
by Berom Patriotic Forum in Tertiary Institutions of Plateau State. Can the
Hausa/Fulani now turn round and claim ownership of Jos?
If the Hausa/Fulani are founders and owners of Jos as claimed, they would not
have obtained lands from the natives for the purpose of their community projects and
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residential buildings. This more than anything else, confirms the fact that the
Hausa/Fulani are not the owners of Jos.
Another important piece of evidence is the evidence provided by Plateau
Indigenous Development Association in its memorandum JCI/J/107/2009 at page 18 –
19 that the colonial masters themselves realized the need to pay the pagan natives for
the take over of their land to build the Jos Government station. This is a confirmation
that the pagan natives are owners of Jos and hence the need to pay them compensation
for the take over of their lands. They did not talk of the need to pay compensation to
the Hausa/Fulani because they were themselves settlers and did not own any land.
Reference must also be made to the memorandum of Alhaji Garba Mohammed
Jos himself a Hausa man who was born in Jos 72 years ago. In his memorandum
JCI/J/221/2009, Alhaji Garba Mohammed Jos who identified the claim of ownership of
Jos by the Hausa/Fulanis as the most thorny issue stated that the Hausa/Fulanis are not
indigenes of Jos and are not owners of Jos. He suggested the fact that the solution to the
Jos crises is for the Hausa/Fulani to accept their status as non-indigenes and concede the
position of Chairman to the indigenes.
He said he was born in Jos 72 years ago but will contest for the Chairmanship
only with the acknowledgement of the fact that he is not an indigene and would seek the
consent and support of the indigenes.
In view of all these evidence and the findings and conclusions of the previous
Commissions of Inquiry set up by Plateau State Government supported by the outcome
of Plateau Peace Conference tagged ‘Plateau Resolves’ (Exhibit JCI/J/148/2009/2)
which has been Gazetted as Legal Notice No. 2 of 2004, we cannot but come to the
inescapable conclusion that the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom tribes are founders and
owners of Jos town but not the Hausa/Fulani. The claim of the Hausa/Fulani that they
founded Jos North and are owners of same is totally unfounded in view of the evidence
placed before the Commission.
3.2 Indigeneship of Jos
The issue of indigeneship of Jos is connected with its ownership and just like
ownership of Jos, its indigeneship has generated a lot of conflicts and friction.
The report of Plateau State Peace Conference tagged Plateau Resolves tendered
as Exhibit JCI/J/148/2009/2 before this Commission, defines indigenes of a place to
be:

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 ‘those people whose ancestors were the first to have settled permanently in a
particular area and who are often considered as natives and have rights to their lands,
traditions and culture’.
This definition accords with the definition in Justice Fiberesima’s report which
defined indigenes of Jos North to be those whose ancestors were natives of Jos beyond
living Memory and then went on to hold that Afizere, Anaguta and Berom are indigenes
of Jos North but not the Hausa/Fulani who are settlers. Indeed, having held that the
Afizere, Anaguta and Berom are co-founders and owners of Jos North, we have no
difficulty in coming to the conclusion that these three tribes are indigenes of Jos North.
However, the Hausa/Fulani also claim indigeneship of Jos. In Exhibit
JCI/J/135/2009/4, an advertorial published in Daily Trust of 12 th January, 2009 and
tendered in the memorandum submitted by the Justice, Peace and Reconciliation
Movement, the Hausa/Fulani elders contended very strongly that the Hausa/Fulani are
indigenes of Jos North and are not settlers. The same claim is contained in the booklet
‘Who owns Jos North Local Government’ which is Exhibit JCI/J/31/2009/2.
The contradictory point about their claim of indigeneship to Jos North however,
is that in one breath, they said they are indigenes of Jos North because their ancestors
founded Jos and by virtue of that fact are owners and indigenes of Jos North but in
another breath are claiming, indigeneship because according to them, they have lived in
Jos for over 100 years and should by virtue of their long stay in Jos be recognized and
treated as indigenes.
As for the first arm of the claim that the Hausa/Fulani are founders and owners
of Jos and should therefore be indigenes of Jos, we hold that this claim lacks any merit
in view of our earlier holding that the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom tribes are the
founders and owners of Jos town not the Hausa/Fulani. The claim of the Hausa/Fulani
that they are indigenes of Jos North because they are founders and owners of same
therefore lacks foundation. It cannot stand because they are striving to put something
on nothing.
The second arm of the claim is that they (Hausa/Fulani) have lived in Jos for a
long time and being Nigerians should be recognized as indigenes of Jos on that basis.
However, there is evidence before this Commission that there are other Nigerian non-
indigenes who came to Jos even before the Hausa/Fulani but are not claiming
indigeneship of Jos but rather still trace their roots to their respective states of origin.

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 For example, the Yoruba Community in memorandum JCI/J/202/2009 stated
that the Yorubas were the first set of non-natives that came to Jos in 1850 and have
contributed positively to the development of Plateau State but are not and will not claim
indigeneship of Jos North. The Yoruba stated in that memorandum at page 3 as
follows:
‘Since no Yoruba man contested for any of the key positions in the election, why
did they become subjects of attack and annihilation? The above questions become
more germane in view of the peaceful disposition of the Yorubas since their settlement
in Jos in 1850. More so that since their settlement, it is not gainsaying that they have
contributed positively in no small measure to the socio-economic development of Jos
and its environs….. They are peaceful, law abiding people and have been found to
regard everywhere as home. Notwithstanding their being the pioneer settlers in Jos,
the Yoruba have never compromised their status as non-indigenes’.
The Yoruba who also presented memoranda JCI/J/43/2009 state therein at page
4 as follows:
‘The crisis in Jos has become a recurrent painful sore, it happened in 2001,
2002 and now 2008. Unlike in previous crises, Yorubas were used as canon fodders
suffering heavy losses in human and material losses in the hands of both indigenes and
Hausa. We have been able to establish that one hundred and eighty Yorubas were
confirmed dead during this crisis. The total number of affected victims is nine hundred
and twelve including the dead’.
That was also the assertion of the Igbo Community in Jos who stated in their
memorandum JCI/J/127/2009 presented before the Commission at page 3 that:
‘Ndigbo going by records have settled in Jos for well over a century and have a
tradition of mutual respect and co-operation with the Government of the State and its
people. Some of the earliest settlers worked in mining business. By the time the
railway line reached Jos in about 1913, Ndigbo formed majority of the work force. The
same is applicable to the work force in hospitals, Police, Schools and even Ministries.
They were the first to go into large scale trading, all kinds of artistry such as carpentry,
masonry, plumbing, bicycle and motor repairs, electrical services etc. In spite of the
foregoing, the Ndigbo in Jos has never laid claim and are not laying claim to ownership
of Jos or any part of the State’.
People of the South-South in their memorandum JCI/J/142/2009 presented by
Barrister Smart Irabor stated on page 2 of their memorandum that;
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 ‘the South-South citizens, particularly the Urhobos from Delta State were the
first to settle in Jos. Since our great-grand fathers, settled in Jos, they have live
peacefully with their host state. We have never agitated to be recognized or granted the
status of indigenes. We have been contended and still contented with our status as
‘settlers’.
Even the tribes who are indigenes of Plateau State but are not indigenes of Jos
North are not claiming indigeneship of Jos. The Mwaghavul people for instance in their
memorandum JCI/J/28/2009 stated therein that though from Mangu Local Government
of Plateau State, they cannot claim indigeneship of Jos. In fact apart from the
Hausa/Fulani, no other tribe other than the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom who are
indigenes of Jos North are claiming indigeneship of the Local Government. The
Hausa/Fulani are not claiming indigeneship of Jos North for themselves and other non-
native Nigerians in Jos but are claiming indigeneship for themselves alone to the
exclusion of all other non-native Nigerians in Jos. For example membership of their
Jasawa Development Association does not extend to the Yorubas, Igbos, people of the
South-South and other non-native Nigerians in Jos.
In this situation, it will amount to double standard and selective justice to
recognize the Hausa/Fulani only as indigenes of Jos North while all other Nigerians
residing in Jos North who are non-natives are not recognized as indigenes. The
Hausa/Fulani have argued that every Nigerian should be recognized as an indigene
wherever he or she resides but the application of that policy will still pose difficulties
because although one can be a citizen of Nigeria at large, the issue of indigeneship will
still have to be resolved by the Constitution. One is a Nigerian in the first place because
he or she belongs to a community indigenous to Nigeria. See Section 147 of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
It is the application of indigeneship that makes us know who is a Nigerian and
who is not. After all the constitution itself recognizes indigeneship. The Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in section 147 (1) and (3) provides that:
‘there shall be such offices of Ministers of Government of the Federation as may
be established by the President provided that in giving effect to sub-section 1 – 2, the
President shall appoint at least one Minister from each State who is an indigenes of
such state’.
No doubt there is the need to address the indigenes/settler dichotomy but the
problem is a national issue, the resolution of which requires a national approach as
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isolated treatment of the problem will itself results in double standards and injustice.
Tekan Youth Fellowship probably have this situation in mind when it stated at page 14
– 15 of its memorandum JCI/J/67/2009 that:
‘it is pertinent to note that the constitutional amendment that allows for the right
of every citizen to reside and contest for election in any part of Nigeria will not achieve
much if its implementation is practicable only in some states’.
The fellowship concluded that every conflict is a function of comparative benefit
and draws its strength and weakness as it compared what is obtained in one part against
the order. If every citizen of Nigeria is at liberty to claim indigeneship of any part of
Nigeria of his choice as a national policy, Plateau State and indeed Jos North cannot be
an exception.
3.3 Non Implementation of Previous Reports
As earlier indicated, prior to the civil Unrest of 28 th November, 2008, there has
been crises in Jos notable among which were the civil Unrests of 12 th April, 1994, and
that of 7th September, 2001 for which the Plateau State Government set up the Justices
Fiberesima and Niki Tobi Commissions to investigate the respective civil Unrests. The
two Commissions at the end of their investigations submitted their reports. The two
Commissions in their respective reports identified the persons, groups of persons,
organizations or institutions directly or indirectly responsible for the crises and
recommended sanctions.
Justice Fiberesima Commission for instance on page 8 – 10 of its report stated as
follows:
‘On April 11th just a day before the faithful day, Alhaji Yaya Aga Abubakar, the
president of Jasawa Development Association in company of Alhaji Aminu Mato’s
junior brother, Sanusi Mato, held a meeting at Masallachin Juma’a Jos with the
Jasawa Community during which they resolved to carry out a demonstration the
following day. So Yaya Abubakar and Sanusi Mato were directly connected with the
riot that brought disaster and shame to Jos metropolis, to Plateau State and to Nigeria,
and that brought death and destruction to lives and properties.
The following officers of Jasawa Development Association were among those
who encouraged the perpetration of the heinous and wicked riot of April 12 th, we
believe that from them the Police may approach more accomplices:
1. Usman Ibrahim - Publicity Secretary
2. Yahaya Garba - State Deputy Chairman
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 3. Usman Likita - Leading member
4. Usman Iliya - Chairman Jos North
5. Mansur Nakande - leading member
The Jasawa Development Association seemed to be a militant body of
Hausa/Fulani youths. It was the group that Yaya Abubakar instigated at Massalachin
Juma’a to carry out a demonstration on 12 th April, which they did. The Commission
therefore finds, the Jasawa Development Association as a group to be directly
connected with the riots.
Danlami Babajoda, the State’s Chairman of the Butchers’ Association was privy
to the act of the members of his association who on April 11 th slaughtered cows and
goats on the public highway by the Abattoir in protests against the suspension of Alhaji
Aminu Mato from office as Chairman of Jos North Local Government Council. He was
said to have stated to the State Security Services that their action was just the beginning
of what they intended to do until Alhaji Mato was allowed to assume office as
Chairman. Thus Danlami Babajoda was also a prime mover of the incidents that led to
the riots and is answerable to the Government for his conduct.
---- On the evidence of these and other eye-witnesses, the Commission included
the following as principal actors who were involved in certain offences connected with
the riots:
Mr. Baba Teacher
Madam Hanatu
Madam Rhoda
Mr. Sunday
Maman Ayuba
Mr. Paul
Danjuma painter.

On its part Justice Niki Tobi Commission identified Alhaji M. D. Abubakar the
then Commissioner of Police, Plateau State, Alhaji Inuwa Ali, Frank B. Taddy the then
Chairman of Jos North Local Government, Alhaji Sale Bayeri, Alhaji Dahiru Sale,
Jasawa Development Association, Jama’atu Nasril Islam, BECO Solidarity Forum, Jos
North, and Plateau Youth Council as having participated in the crisis. See page 142 –
276 of the report. The Commission on page 327 of its report recommended as follows:

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 ‘All persons who were alleged before the Commission to have participated in
the crisis by engaging in the Commission of offences as detailed in Chapter 4 of this
report should be handed over to the Police for thorough investigation and possible
prosecution on the advise of the Ministry of Justice’.
Similarly, Justice Fiberesima’s Commission had recommended on page 36 – 37
of its reports as follows:
‘We recommend that the Honourable Attorney-General and Commission for
Justice should initiate proceedings if necessary against the following for offences
connected with the riot of 12th April, 1994, if they were legally punishable at the time
they were Convicted:
Alhaji Yaya Aga Abubakar
Alhaji Sanusi Mato
Danlami Babajoda
Usman Ibrahim
Yahaya Garba
Usman Aliyu
Usman Likita
Mansur Nakande
Mr. Baba Teacher
Madam Hanatu
Madam Rhoda
Mr. Sunday
Mama Ayuba
Mr. Paul
Mr. Danjuma Painter.

The Commission further recommended that the activities of over-zealous

demagogues, like Alhaji Sale Hassan and Alhaji Shehu Masalla, be closely monitored
by Government in order to neutralize them before they wreck havoc to law abiding
society. We further recommend to Government to put under the microscope the
activities of Jasawa Development Association and all other potentially dangerous
tribal, religious or social organizations.
Lastly in this regards we recommend that the State’s deputy Commissioner of
Police, Alhaji Hamisu Isa, who handled the riotous situation in a shoddy manner in
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spite of all warnings and information from the State Security services at his disposal
should be subjected to disciplinary measures by the appropriate authority’.
There is no indication that these recommendations concerning persons, group of
persons, organizations or institutions directly or indirectly allegedly responsible for the
previous crises as found by the two Commissions were implemented by the
Government.
Niki Tobi Commission in its report lamented so much the non-implementation
of the reports of the Justice Fiberesima Commission of Inquiry when it stated on page
326 of its report as follows:
‘The Commission believes that non-implementation by Government of the
reports of the previous Commission of Inquiry into the riots of 12 th April, 1994 in Jos
metropolis (the main features of which are very similar to the September 7 th 2001 civil
disturbances) is a sure recipe for a repeat performance of such disturbances’.
Quite a large number of memoranda presented before this Commission as well
as witnesses who testified also fingered non-implementation of the recommendations of
the previous Commissions of Inquiry as one of the remote causes of the November 28 th,
2008 Unrest.
People Democratic Party, Northern Zone in its memorandum JCI/J/137/2009
presented before this Commission stated this fact when it said at page 7 – 8 of it’s
memorandum as follows:
‘Between 1994 and November, 2008, Jos and other parts of Plateau State
suffered violent eruptions of various degrees. In all these cases, Government reacted
by swiftly setting up Judicial Commissions of Inquiry to investigate the remote and
immediate causes. All the said Commissions were thorough in their investigations and
not only identified culprits but made far reaching recommendations towards bringing
lasting peace in the State. Unfortunately, for inexplicable reasons, these
recommendations never saw the light of the day let alone being implemented. This sad
development has firstly, tended to make perpetrators to get away with impunity.
Secondly, the same people feel emboldened to unleash further terror with the believe
that they will get away with it as was the case in the most recent outbreak of violence’.
This position cannot be far from the truth at all. There we many far-reaching
recommendations made by these reports. These recommendations were the foundations
for resolving conflicts and giving redress. They were also the building blocks for
progress, and mechanisms for their implementation mechanising should have been put
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in place. This Commission found that there are many common recommendations
between the Fiberisima Report and the Niki Tobi Report as well as between these and
the Plateau Peace Conference. We find that some will also find their way into this
present Report. This recurrence is borne out of the plain fact that these
recommendations have not been given effect. Indeed if the reports of the previous
Commissions were implemented and the perpetrators of the previous crises dealt with in
accordance with the laws of the land, the Unrest of November, 28th 2008 might not have
occurred and even if it did, the magnitude would not have been the same as what was
witnessed. We find as a fact that the non-implementation of the previous reports is one
of the major remote causes of the November 28th, 2008 crisis.
3.4 Delineation of Electoral Wards.
There are fourteen (14) electoral wards in Jos North Local Government Area.
The Confederation of Plateau State Youth Movements in its memorandum
JCI/J/154/2009 gave a tabulation of all the electoral wards with number of polling units
and registered voters in each of the wards as follows:

S/N WARD POLLING UNIT VOTERS REGISTERED

1. Abba Na Shehu 29 15,620

2. Ali Kazaure 38 15,726
3. Garba Daho 26 11,258
4. Gangare 20 10,674
5. Ibrahim Katsina 25 11,463
6. Jenta Adamu 24 12,418
7. Jenta Apata 34 17,245
8. Jos Jarawa 37 19,644
9. Naraguta A 31 17.375
10. Naraguta B 106 72,202
11. Sarkin Arab 17 10,303
12. Tafawa Balewa 11 4,245
13. TudunWada/ 63 41,015
Kabong
14. Vandapuye 11 7,986
TOTAL 266,761

In memorandum JCI/J/77/2009 presented by Hon. Francis Tadi Gazu, the

presenter stated at page 3 – 4 of his memorandum as follows:-

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 ‘As the date of the election drew nearer, it was clear that Jos North had been
divided into two major groups. The first group was dominated by the native Christians
whose candidate was the flag bearer of People Democratic Party (P.D.P), while the
second group was Hausa Muslim dominated with their candidate in All Nigeria Peoples
Party (A.N.P.P)----- It is however worthy of note to mention here that a majority of the
Yoruba Muslims who have always identified with the natives at elections voted
overwhelmingly for the P.D.P. The Plateau Indigenous Muslims also identified with
their kith and kin despite their religious differences and voted for P.D.P’.
Hon. Francis Tadi Gazu then went on to identify the Hausa/Fulani dominated
areas/wards as Naraguta A, Ali Kazaure, Sarkin Arab, Ibrahim Katsina, Garba Daho,
Gangare and Abba Na Shehu, while he said the native (Christians) dominated
areas/wards are Naraguta B, Jenta Adamu, Jos Jarawa, Vandapuye, Tafawa Balewa,
Jenta Apata, and Tudun Wada/Kabong wards.
From the above table, one can see that the Hausa dominated wards have fewer
number of registered voters while the natives (Christians) dominated wards have a
heavier registered voters population. For example the total number of registered voters
in five Hausa dominated wards of Ali Kazaure, Sarkin Arab, Ibrahim Katsina, Garba
Daho and Gangare put together is fifty nine thousand, four hundred and four (59,404)
which is not up to the total number of registered voters in one native Christians
dominated ward of Naraguta B with seventy two thousand, two hundred and two
(72,202) registered voters. That means one Christian dominated ward is far bigger than
five Muslim dominated wards put together. Another ward with a large number of
registered voters is Tudun Wada/Kabong Ward with forty one thousand fifteen (41,015)
registered voters. Again the number of registered voters in Tudun Wada/Kabong Ward
compete favourably with the total number of registered voters in the five Muslims
dominated wards.
This is an indication that few Hausa/Fulani registered voters have more words
than the many native registered voters. In other wards, the Hausa/Fulani with few
number of registered voters have more wards than the native indigenes who have more
registered voters. This kind of imbalance will certainly create ill-feelings and bad blood
because the indigenes view this lopsided creation of electoral wards as a deliberate act
to give Hausa/Fulani an undue political advantage over the indigenes.
The Peoples Democratic Party Elders, Northern Forum, Plateau State said this
much when it stated on page 6 of its memorandum (memorandum JCI/J/137/2009) thus:
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 ‘Now, the consequences of such lopsidedness are many. Firstly it leads to
uneven representation in the Council and by extension a disenfranchisement of the
people, as the political space in the large wards becomes choked up. Secondly the
injustice gave expression to claims of political domination by the Hausas’.
It was lopsided divisions as this that made Berom Elders Council to write
several letters of complaints, one of which is Exhibit S.A 8, a letter dated 3 rd June, 1992
to the then President General Ibrahim Babangida to rectify the situation. The then
Secretary to the Government of the Federation in response to this complaint and several
others raised a memorandum dated 2nd June, 1993 (Exhibit S.A 9) to the then President
for a consideration of this and other issues but according to General Ibrahim Babangida
(Rtd.) who testified through his Counsel, the issue could not be addressed because he
stepped aside soon thereafter and thought subsequent Governments after his
administration should have addressed the problem.
The problem has not been addressed ever since and as can be seen from the
evidence before us, such as that of P.D.P Elders, Northern Forum , Plateau State, the
indigenes of Jos North are highly aggrieved by this lopsided delineation of electoral
wards in Jos North and these grievances have been a source of friction and acrimony.
On the other hand, this lopsided delineation of wards made the Hausas have a false
notion that they are in the majority in Jos North and should win any election conducted
in that Local Government.
According to Hon. Francis Tadi Gazu, presenter of memorandum JCI/J/77/2009,
Mallam Sani Yahaya Jengre, a Muslim cleric relied on this kind of fallacy when he told
his listeners in a Mosque that the Muslims in Jos North constitute 80% of the population
and should win the Chairmanship election. The Muslims might have felt disappointed
when the election result turned otherwise and this feeling of disappointment contributed
in no small way in fuelling the crisis. Certainly, a delineation of electoral wards based
on actual population of registered voters rather than favouritism will go a long way in
calming nerves and thereby reduce conflicts.
3.5 Inciting and Provocative Publications
Commission witness 8 and presenter of memorandum JCI/J/25/2009 was
Evangelist Da Andrew N. Dalyop. He lives at Dogon Dutse, Jos. In his evidence
before the Commission he stated as follows:
‘Around 2:00 p.m all we could hear from the loudspeakers was ‘matasa da
jama’a ku fito Jihad, kuma Allah zai yi maku albarka’ meaning ‘youths come out and
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fight Jihad, God will bless you’. What we saw was better imagined than said, because
it was a mob of both youth and the aged well armed carrying machetes, axes, cutlasses,
containers of petrol and guns while chanting ‘Allahu-akbar, za mu ji ma arna, Jos ta
Arewa namu ne; ‘sabuwa da kaza bata hana yanka meaning ‘we are going to kill the
infidels (pagans), Jos North is our own, being familiar with the chicken does not
prevent it from being slaughtered’.
The evidence of other witnesses from different parts of Jos on their experiences
on the day of the crisis is substantially similar to that of Evangelist Da Andrew N.
Dalyop. Berom Forum Chwelnyap while presenting its memorandum JCI/J/152/2009
through its Secretary, Mr. John P. Choji stated on page 14 of the memorandum that:
‘Muslims clerics and their Agents had used loud speakers installed in their
Mosques to call out their faith adherents or attackers. Shouts of war-like slogans or
wake up calls were made such as ‘Muslims arise, it’s a call to Jihad (holy war)’ ‘arise
and reclaim Jos City’ etc. These calls had also dictated the routes/locations to be
followed or attacked as most of the attackers were hired mercenaries. No doubt, the
calls had incensed the sensibilities of the attackers whose modus operandi was ‘sabuwa
da kaza baya hana yanka’ (no respecter of familiarity)’.
When cross examined by Counsel to the Commission to mention the Mosques
where such calls to war were coming from, John P. Choji stated thus:
‘we have one at Tudun Pera, one at Yan-Shanu junction, just at the entrance to
Chwelnyap through Bauchi Bridge. We have one close to the Church of Jesus Later
Day Saints and one is in Bauchi Motor Park and so many others’.
There were cases of provocative and inciting preaching in places of worship too.
One of those preaching is the preaching of Sheikh Yahaya Jengre contained in Exhibit
JCI/J/36/2009/4 tendered in memorandum JCI/J/36/2009 presented by C.A.C Hill of
Victory. The transcript of Exhibit JCI/J/36/2009/4, a cassette in Hausa, is attached to
memorandum JCI/J/77/2009 wherein Sheikh Yahaya Jengre uttered these words:
‘By the grace of Allah, Jos North cannot be rigged. Come to think of it, was
there election somewhere that was won and not announced? When it became apparent
that we had won and they had to announce, did they not cancel the elections? For your
information this upcoming election cannot be cancelled and by force, we shall win
Allah willing. Look, we are Muslims, over eighty percent of the people of Jos North are
Muslims. We are not Christians. Do you think we shall vote a Christian to lead us in
Jos North?’
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 Apart from verbal utterances, there were also written publications which were
widely circulated in Jos City. One of such written publications is Exhibit ‘C B’
attached to memorandum JCI/J/136/2009 presented by Berom Parliamentary Forum.
Exhibit ‘C B’ of memorandum JCI/J/136/2009 is a publication by the Islamic
Revolutionary Network. The Islamic Revolutionary Network stated therein as follows:
‘Faithful actions are being taken to check the hidden agenda of Governor Jonah
Jang who has a hidden hatred for Muslim. All concern Muslims must rise up to stop
this evil plans against Islam in the State-----in-sha Allah we shall win over them this
time around, we shall go forth (Jihad)’.
The interview Alhaji Inuwa Ali granted Weekly Trust of 13 th December, 2008
which is Appendix II attached to memorandum JCI/J/152/2009 resonates the contents of
this publication by Islamic Revolutionary Network. In the Newspaper interview, Alhaji
Inuwa Ali a Hausa/Fulani Community Leader in Jos stated among other things that the
genesis of the November, 28th Unrest is because of the hatred Plateau State Government
has for the Hausa/Fulani and that though Plateau State Government has invited the
Hausa/Fulani for a dialogue, they will not respond because they have nothing to tell
Government.
While presenting memorandum JCI/J/154/2009 on behalf of Confederation of
Plateau State Youth Movements, its Chairman Mr. Iliya Lar who gave evidence as
Commission witness 5 stated as follows:
‘As we present this paper, thousands of Nigerians must have watched the
chilling film on the November 28th, 2008 violent crisis in Jos North Local Government,
which is being distributed in towns of Northern States and circulated via GSM
phones---- the intention of the producers was to arose sentiment against Plateau….’
The film in question which is on a video cassette was tendered and admitted in
evidence as Exhibit JCI/J/154/2009/2. We have carefully watched the video cassette
which showed corpses being brought into the Central Mosques Jos and dressed for
burial after which they were buried in mass graves. However, the identity of the
corpses and the locations from which they were taken was not discernible.
The Confederation of Plateau State Youth in its memorandum at page 26 stated
that the film is incapable of showing how the carnage took place. What was very clear
from watching the video is that the Mosques itself was not attacked as there was no
bullet marks on the wall or even any damage to the Mosque.

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 References were also made to publications by Daily Trust Newspapers which
according to many of the witnesses who testified before the Commission are inciting
and provocative.
Sunday Kasuwa Bwoi presenter of memorandum JCI/J/207/2009 made
reference to Daily Trust Newspaper of Wednesday 26th November, 2008 which he
attached as appendix A to the memorandum wherein Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande in
an interview with the Newspaper stated that:
‘Governor Jang is not sincere about the Local Government Polls. So far,
utterances coming from Government officials is to the effect that they will manipulate
the election, and they will declare results even while elections are going on; because
they say it has happened elsewhere in Nasarawa and Lagos States’.
Alhaji Nakande however did not substantiate this allegation. The P.D.P Elders
Northern Forum too had castigated the Daily Trust Newspaper. The Forum stated on
page 20 of its memorandum JCI/J/137/2009 that:
‘Daily Trust Newspaper for many weeks devoted it pages churning out half
truths to outright falsehood on history of Jos and the cause of the crisis to legitimize the
claims of the Hausas’.
Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network (PIDAN) while
presenting its memorandum JCI/J/107/2009 also took exception to publications of Daily
Trust Newspapers and particularly referred to an article in the Weekly Trust of Saturday
6th December, 2008 titled ‘Son of the Soil’ by one Bala Mohammed who stated therein
as follows:
‘The Hausas are magnanimous settlers. The British settled in Australia and the
Aboriginal have never been the same. Today Australia is a Whiteman country through
and through ----- The same white settlers went west and settled in today’s America. The
indigenous sons of the soil’ have never been the same. They in fact even lost their
identities for derisive pejorative term, ‘Red Indians’, they were shot and killed and
those who refused to die were inflicted with syphilis and gonorrhoea’.
This Weekly Trust of which PIDAN referred to is attached to its memorandum
as appendix 27. Daily Trust responded to the allegations made against it before the
Commission. In its response which is Exhibit S.B1 presented by Andrew Agbese,
Bureau Chief Jos, Media Trust Nigeria Limited, Daily Trust Newspaper stated that the
publications being referred to are either advertorials or articles written by individuals

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who are entitled to their views, and that the articles are not inciting or provocative and
are not a reflection of the editorial policy of the Newspaper.
There are two sides to the conflict in Jos. On one side are the Hausa/Fulani
Muslims while on the other side are the indigenous tribes of Plateau State who are
predominantly Christians. As earlier noted, the Hausa/Fulani Muslims not only refused
to submit memoranda to this Commission despite an extension of time for parties to do
so but even wrote a letter to the Commission that Muslims in Jos North would not
appear before the Commission. Despite this letter, some Muslims including one
Hausa/Fulani submitted memoranda to this Commission but there is no evidence before
this Commission that the indigenous tribes of Plateau State also made publications that
were considered provocative and inciting. Even from the totality of the evidence placed
before this Commission, we could not lay our hands on any publication from the
indigenes that was provocative and inciting.
As for the publications enumerated above, there is no doubt that they are
provocative and inciting. For example, calls upon the faithful to come out for a Jihad
and kill the infidels, both young and old, apart from being misguided is inciting and
provocative. Similarly, a call on members of a religious grouping not to vote for people
of another faith in an election, and that if people of that particular grouping did not win
the election, there should be trouble is very inciting and provocative.
Also provocative and inciting is publication by Bala Mohammed that the Hausa
Settlers are magnanimous because in America, the Americans did not only dominate the
Red Indians but also killed and inflicted them with venereal diseases. This is highly
provocative, even though this was published after the Unrest of November 28th, 2008.
These kind of publications instead of disabusing minds was aimed at causing
distrust, ill-feeling and disunity leading to escalation of the Unrest. Without these type
of publications, the Unrest would not have assumed the dimension it did. Surely,
similar inciting and provocative publications were remote causes of November, 28th
2008 crisis.
3.6 Creation of Jos North Local Government Area
Jos North Local Government Area in Plateau State was created by State (Creation and Transitional
Provisions) Decree No. 2 of 1991 which came into force on the 30 th September, 1991. Prior to its creation, Berom
elders Council had in a letter dated 23 rd January, 1989 (Exhibit S.A3) addressed to the then Military Governor of
Plateau State and another letter dated 11 th September, 1991 (Exhibit S.A2) also addressed to the then President
General Ibrahim Babangida requested for the creation of Jos Metropolitan Local Government Area out of the former

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Jos Local Government. The areas they wanted included in the Jos Metropolitan Local Government Area are Jos
town, Vwang, Kuru, Du, Gyel, and Gwong Districts all in the former Jos Local Government.

The Hausa/Fulani Community also wrote a letter dated 28 th January, 1989

(Exhibit S.A4) to the then President Ibrahim Babangida requesting for the creation of
additional Local Government Areas out of the former Jos Division but wanted the
creation in a different form from the form suggested by the Berom Elders Council. The
Hausa/Fulani Community demanded that the area Berom elders Council proposed as
one Jos Metropolitan Local Government be split into two, Jos North and Jos South.
At the end, Jos North and Jos South Local Governments were created out of the
proposed Jos Metropolitan Local Government as demanded by the Hausa/Fulani
contrary to the demand of the Berom Elders Council who had submitted in Exhibit S.A2
that the creation of any Local Government in Jos based on the present North and South
Federal Constituencies will automatically deprive Beroms of their right to Jos, the seat
of their cherished traditional institution. Indeed, Du Elders Council in its memorandum
JCI/J/81/2009 stated at page 15 of the memorandum that the creation of Jos North Local
Government Council in which Du District was split into two with one part in Jos North
and the other part in Jos South was unacceptable to the indigenes and a majority of the
people. Du Elders Council added on the same page that in other places where similar
things happened, they complained and theirs were rectified but that of Jos was ignored.
It was at the same time that Jos North and Jos South Local Governments were
created out of the former Jos Local Government that Jos East was also carved out of the
same former Jos Local Government (see Decree No. 2 of 1991). The indigenes viewed
this as a careful attempt to split up the indigenes in the then Jos Local Government into
different Local Governments and carve out a Local Government for the Hausa/Fulani
which the indigenes considered as having been carved out of their indigenous Districts
such as Du, Gyel and Gwong. According to Du Youth Movement in its memorandum
JCI/J/73/2009 page 13, the indigenous communities made their proposals for the
creation of new Local Government Areas in Jos but the Hausas were busy scheming to
carve them out of Jos city centre and with the help of General Babangida at the helm of
affairs, the indigenes surprisingly woke up to the taunting of the new Local
Governments. Du Youth Movement accused General Ibrahim Babangida of having
deliberately created Jos North Local Government in the manner it was created to favour
the Hausas to the detriment of the indigenes.

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 In its memorandum, JCI/J/152/2009 the Berom Forum, Chwelnyap
JCI/J/152/2009 stated on page 4 as follows:
‘When Jos North Local Government Council was created out of the former Jos
Local Government Council, there was a protest by the native tribes because it was
perceived as a conspiracy to marginalize them by giving the Hausa/Fulani the sole
ownership of the Jos North L.G.C. This perception by the indigenous tribes was
supported by the fact that Jos North L.G.C was established by Military dictatorship fiat
which was made without due consultations with the indigenous communities as well as
the various interest groups in Jos’.
From this evidence, it is clear that the indigenous tribes of Jos North were not
comfortable with the creation of Jos North Local Government out of the former Jos
Local Government which they contended was against their wishes. They saw it as a
clever design by the Hausa/Fulani to carve out the indigenous group and claim Jos
North as their own enclave. It was no surprise therefore when the Berom Elders
Council wrote a letter dated 3rd June, 1992 (Exhibit S.A8) to the then President Ibrahim
Babangida urging him to reconsider the creation of Jos North Local Government Area
on the ground that the creation would generate crisis and called on the President to
reverse the creation.
In memorandum JCI/J/40/2009 at page 13 the Berom Elders Council described
the creation of Jos North Local Government Area in the following words:
‘Jos North Local Government Area was created by the General Ibrahim
Babangida (IBB) administration in 1991 in clear negation of the wishes and demands
of the indigenes. The design of the Hausa/Fulani was to carve out the indigenous
groups and so claim the L.G.A as their own. Despite our protest to Dodan Barracks,
Babangida did not botch (sic). This is the most unnatural Local Government ever
created as it cuts Du District Chiefdom into two without regard to traditional
institutions; it has amorphomous (sic) boundaries, with the State Secretariat and
Governor’s Office in Jos South L.G.A and not in the supposed State Headquarters, Jos
North’.
Berom Elders Council recommended the dissolution of Jos North Local
Government Area in the following words:
‘We reject in totality Jos North Local Government Area as presently constituted.
The Local Government Area should be dissolved and due process followed in the

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creation of a new Local Government Area based on the wishes and desires of the
indigenous people’.
Responding to the allegation against him that his administration created Jos
North Local Government Area in the manner it did deliberately to favour the
Hausa/Fulani to the detriment of the indigenes, General Ibrahim Babangida through his
Counsel stated that Jos North Local Government Area was created based on a guideline
for the creation of new Local Governments laid down by the defunct National Electoral
Commission which is Exhibit S.A1.
According to the General Ibrahim Babangida, there were demands for the
creation of Local Governments and the Armed Forces Ruling Council deliberated and
approved the creation of additional Local Government Areas. The minutes of the
meeting of the Armed Forces Ruling Council in this regard is Exhibit S.A5. The
creation of additional Local Government Areas was given the force of law by the
enactment of States (Creation and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 2 of 1991. The
Decree is Exhibit S.A7. General Ibrahim Babangida, said there were several complaints
following the creation of additional Local Government Areas one of which was a
complaint from Berom Elders Council asking that the creation of Jos North Local
Government be looked into because its creation was not properly done. That petition by
Berom Elders Council to the then President Ibrahim Babangida is Exhibit No. S.A8.
Following the several complaints, a memorandum (Exhibit S.A9) was raised by
the then Secretary to the Government of the Federation for a consideration of the
complaints, one of which is Exhibit S.A8 by Berom Elders Council calling, for a
reconsideration of the creation of Jos North Local Government.
General Ibrahim Babangida said his administration could however not address
the complaint of Berom Elders Council because shortly after Exhibit S.A9 was raised,
he stepped aside and he thought the Governments that came after his should have
looked into the issue since Government should be a continuous process.
The attempt by General Ibrahim Babangida’s Government to revisit the creation
of Jos North Local Government, even though the issue was not in fact redressed, is an
indication that there is indeed a problem with the creation of Jos North Local
Government as shown by the evidence before the Commission. Since the creation of
Jos North Local Government in the manner it was created, Jos has not known peace.
The fears of the indigenes have been confirmed.

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 It is not as if the Hausa/Fulani are entirely satisfied with the creation of Jos
North Local Government in the manner it was created. They had themselves called for
the creation of Jos North Local Government, out of the present Jos North Local
Government with capital at Angwan Rogo.
Their call for the creation of a new Local Government Area out of the present
Jos North Local Government with the capital at Angwan Rogo is contained in Appendix
IV attached to memorandum JCI/J/149/2009 presented by Laranto Berom Community,
Jos North. Appendix IV of that memorandum is a leaflet written by one Idris Ibn
Mohammed for Joint Islamic Committee on behalf of Al-Qaeda Network of Nigeria in
conjunction with Jasawa Development Association. The Elders of Jasawa Development
Association (J.D.A), Jos had made a similar submission to the Niki Tobi Commission of
Inquiry in 2001. The memorandum of the Jasawa Elders submitted to Niki Tobi
Commission in 2001 is attached to memorandum JCI/J/28/2009 presented by
Mwaghavul Development Association as Appendix II. In the said Appendix II they
stated as follows:
‘We call for the splitting of Jos North Local Government Area into three
autonomous Local Governments, namely:
1. Jos North-East comprising Naraguta A, Naraguta B and Jos-Jarawa Wards,
2. Jos North West comprising of Jenta Apata, Jenta Adamu, Tudun Wada,
Kabong, Vandapuye and Tafawa Balewa Wards,
3. The remaining wards of Ibrahim Katsina, Ali Kazaure, Garba Daho, Abba
Na shehu, Sarkin Arab and Gangare ward should remain and sustain the
present Jos North Local Government Council’.

This is a strong indication that the creation of Jos North Local Government the
way it was created is definitely not a reflection of the wishes of the people. If proper
consultations were done and the wishes of the people reflected in its creation, the
creation of Jos North Local Government would not have generated so much conflict.
Surely, the creation of Jos North Local Government in the manner it was created is a
remote cause of the November, 28 2008 Jos civil Unrest.
3.7 Allegation of expansionist tendencies
According to Honourable Francis Tadi Gazu who presented memorandum
JCI/J/77/2009, the Hausa/Fulani dominated areas of Jos North are Ali Kazaure, Sarkin
Arab, Ibrahim Katsina, Garba Daho, Gangare, Angwan Rogo, Angwan Rimi, and Abba

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Na Shehu. However, the allegation against the Hausa Fulani is that their desire is to
expand the frontiers of their territories as far as possible, take over the whole of Jos,
control and dominate same through the instigation and use of persistent crisis. The Tiv
Community in Plateau State who presented memorandum JCI/J/183/2009 described this
strategy of the Hausa/Fulani as:
‘always be the first to strike, plunder, burn, intimidate and when your enemies
run, proceed to occupy’.
Many of those who testified and presented memoranda before the Commission
think the crisis of 28th November, 2008 was carefully planned and executed by the
Hausa/Fulani in Jos with the aim of exterminating their neighbours and taking over their
territories and ultimately take over the whole of Jos which they believe legitimately
belongs to them to the exclusion of all others. Some of the utterances being made by
the Hausa/Fulani while attacking their neighbours in the day of the crisis support these
assertions. Commission witness 8 and presenter of memorandum JCI/J/25/2009,
Evangelist Da Andrew N. Dalyop from Dogon Dutse, Jos, stated that the Hausa/Fulani
who came to attack them during the crisis made the following remarks:
‘Allahu Akbar, za mu ji ma arna, Jos ta Arewa namu ne; sabuwa da kaza bata
hana yanka’
meaning
‘we are going to kill the infidels (pagans), Jos North is our own, being familiar
with the chicken does not prevent it from being slaughtered’.
Even leaflets being circulated by the Hausa/Fulani in Jos during the crisis was a
manifestation of their desire to fight and take control of Jos North exclusively for
themselves.
One of these leaflets is a document attached to memorandum JCI/J/33/2009
presented by Jos Divisional Cultural Organisation (JODICO) as appendix V. The
leaflet is authored by one Sheik Mohammed Usman Kano and addressed to members of
Jasawa Development Association. It was stated therein as follows:
‘Members of Jasawa Development Association, if Allah agrees the infidels will
leave the position of Chairman for us we should not be weak, we shall not leave them.
We shall start a Jihad to defeat the infidels….. the arms sent from Lebanon are in Chad.
The arms sent by Gadafi have been brought in and are in Bauchi. The one sent by
Saudi Arabia are in Cameroon….’

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 Another of such leaflets is Exhibit CB attached to memorandum JCI/J/136/2009
presented by Berom Parliamentary Forum. Exhibit CB is a document written by
Islamic Revolutionary Network. The Network stated therein as follows:
‘The taking over of Jos North is now….. No Compromise, no going back. Allah
will punish us if we compromise on issue of Jos North Local Government Area….. in-
sha Allah, we shall win over them this time around. We shall go forth (Jihad) Quran
3:39, 9:73’.
The desire of the Hausa/Fulani to take over and control Jos North Local
Government was strongly emphasized when in 1987, Alhaji Sale Hassan, a
Hausa/Fulani Community Leader in Jos called upon the Jasawa Youth to rise and
recover the rulership of Jos which according to him slipped off the hands of their
parents in 1945. This call was carried by the Reporter Newspaper of 13 th October, 1987
attached to memorandum JCI/J/33/2009 presented by Jos Divisional Cultural
Organisation as Appendix iv. In the said Appendix iv, Alhaji Sale Hassan was quoted
as saying:
‘This is because the traditional title of Jos belongs to the Hausas and not any
other tribe….. In 1945 when late Rwang Pam was made District Head of Jos, we
protested and we were assured that the Jos Traditional Rulership would be restored to
us but up to today, that promise has not been fulfilled. The Youth must struggle to
recover the Jos traditional title because when our great grand parents were brought
here, Jos was under Bauchi…..’
Ever since that call, Jos has not known peace. It has been one crisis after the
other. The struggle to ‘recover’ Jos traditional title has not been peaceful. It is
probably due to this struggle to recover the traditional title of Jos by the Hausa/Fulani
with the aim of taking over and dominating Jos North that Alhaji Inuwa Ali, a member
of the Hausa/Fulani Community in Jos has been parading himself about as the Emir of
Jos even though the paramount ruler of Jos is the Gbong Gwom Jos. Jos Divisional
cultural Organisation (JODICO) in its memorandum JCI/J/33/2009 stated on page 12, of
the memorandum as follows:
‘The antecedents of Inuwa Ali from Kano State, a settler in Jos points to other
causes of the crisis of recent, he has been parading himself as Emir of Jos, a
magnanimous beneficiary of the traditional title of Turakin Jos has gone beyond bounds
to issue out titles to other Hausa settlers in Jos an action all right thinking people see

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as a dire confrontation to the authority of His Majesty, Da Victor Pam (DIG) (rtd)
Gbong Gwom Jos’.
The invitation letter to the turbaning of these titles holders appointed by Alhaji
Inuwa Ali is Appendix III attached to the memorandum of JODICO. It contains the list
of the title holders in question and all Ward Heads under Alhaji Inuwa Ali.
Appointment of Ward Heads as well is an indication that Alhaji Inuwa Ali had
established his own traditional council independent of the Gbong Gwom Jos, the
paramount ruler of Jos, which confirms the assertion that he is indeed parading himself
about as Emir of Jos, a confrontation to the Gbong Gwom Jos. The indigenous tribes,
understandably have not taken kindly to this posture and this has resulted in a bitter
struggle for the control of Jos, a source of the incessant friction in Jos. As can be seen
this desire to expand frontiers, take over and control Jos North is a motivating factor in
the adoption of any means, including even the use of religious sentiments and violence
to achieve this goal.
It has been forcefully stressed before the Commission that the desire of the
Hausa/Fulani is to Islamize not only Jos but the entire Plateau State and Nigeria as a
whole. One of the many persons who canvassed this position before the Commission is
Mr. Jidauna Joel Gukas who presented memorandum JCI/J/13/2009. Jidauna Joel
Gukas stated on page 4 of his memorandum as follows:
‘What happened in Jos city on 28th November, 2008 was climax of a long pre-
planned thing, a plan by the Hausa settlers in Jos to dominate and completely
annihilate Plateau State indigenes (a mad day time dream) to complete the Jihad
Usman Dan Fodio tried on the Plateau in 1873 but failed woefully….’
Jidauna Joel Gukas then went on to refer to the Guardian Newspaper of 25 th
September, 2001 which he attached to his memorandum wherein Dr. Hassan Dati
Ahmad (Chairman Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria(SCSN) was quoted as saying
that Sharia law should be implemented in Plateau State. Mr. Gukas wondered why
Sharia law should be implemented in Plateau State which is a predominantly Christian
State if not for the desire of the Hausa/Fulani Muslims to Islamize Plateau State.
Laranto Berom Community which presented memorandum JCI/J/149/2009 also share
the view of Jidauna Joel Gukas. The Community referred to a leaflet written by one
Idris Ibn Mohammed for Joint Islamic Committee on behalf of Al-Qaeda Network and
Islamic Revolutionary Community of Nigeria in conjunction with Jasawa Development

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Association, Plateau State which it attached to its memorandum. The leaflet is headed
‘why we must carry out a Jihad in Plateau State’ and it is stated therein as follows:
‘We write again to remind prominent Islamic Leaders like you the reason why
we must continue the Jihad in Plateau State’.
However, Alhaji Garba Mohammed Jos who presented memorandum
JCI/J/221/2009 before the Commission and Barrister A.A. Ibrahim who also presented
memorandum JCI/J/215/2009 think otherwise. According to the duo, religion is not in
issue but rather it was a case of manipulation of religion to achieve an entirely selfish
agenda. Alhaji Garba Mohammed Jos who presented memorandum JCI/J/221/2009
stated therein as follows:
‘One way in which they cleverly gain recognition is by attaching themselves to a
recognised Islamic Organisation such as JNI (Jama’atu Nasril Islam) etc so as to
enhance their illegal activities…. Whenever they are challenged, it is claimed that the
Muslims on the Plateau are discriminated against. The indigenes had to attach
themselves to CAN alerting it since they have no alternative, This is the only way
religion came in. But there is no religion involved at all but politics and Chieftaincy
and this is what should be tackled’.
Barrister A.A Ibrahim in his memorandum JCI/J/215/2009 stated as follows:
‘From my personal interaction and observation, the frequent crises in Plateau
have nothing to do with religion. Religion is only co-incidental factor used deceitfully
as a weapon to achieve selfish and ungodly ambitions interests by both parties…. The
main factor for these crises as at today is economic empowerment which has created
business and material gap between followers of the two religions’.
From the foregoing, the Commission finds that religion was not the main issue
but was an issue that was exploited by both sides to achieve other goals. Religion was
merely injected into the crisis to inflame passions and mobilize members for a crises
which sole aim was to serve economic and political interests of the perpetrators. After
all no religion preaches violence and none sanctions destruction of lives and properties.
If the perpetrators of the crisis are actually religious, there would have been no crisis in
the first place. The reason for the crisis can be anything but certainly not religion
because there is no common philosophy between religion and the violence which was
witnessed during the November 28th Unrest.
3.8 The Quest for Economic Dominance of Jos North by the Hausa/Fulani

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 The struggle to take over, control and dominate Jos North is not an end in itself.
Certainly, it is just but a means to an end. Why are both parties struggling so much,
even violently, to control and dominate Jos North? The reasons are not far fetched.
Human Rights Watch think the reason behind the crisis is purely economic. In its
memorandum JCI/J/147/2009 presented by Eric Guttschuss, Human Rights stated
therein as follows:
‘religious, political and ethnic disputes often serve as mere proxies for the
severe economic pressures that lie beneath the surface’.
Indeed the quest to pursue a tribal agenda or political domination of any given
environment are all aimed at getting economic advantage. Everything boils down to
economic benefit at the expense of opponents. If there is the need to struggle, even
violently, to gain control and dominate Jos North, it is for the purpose of gaining the
economic upper- hand. What confirms this fact is the testimonies of many witnesses
who testified before the Commission that shortly after their houses were burnt, offers
were made to them by the Hausa/Fulani to buy these burnt landed properties cheaply.
That was the testimony of Pastor O.J. Iregbu, Commission witness 172 who
presented memorandum JCI/J/08/2009. According to the Witness, offers were made for
the purchase of the land, property of Effective International College, situated in the
midst of Hausa/Fulani Muslims at Ubiyal Katako Junction, Jos but the offers were
turned down. However, during the November, 28 th Civil Unrest, structures on the land
were destroyed by the Hausa/Fulani Youth. That was also the testimony of
Commission witness 170 Mr. James Olukayode Obaleye who presented memorandum
JCI/J/217/2009. The evidence of James Olukayode Obaleye is as follows:
‘By the time I returned to see the situation of the house, it was only our house
that was standing. Virtually every dwelling house on this street was raised down. The
houses left are the very few belonging to certain Hausa/Fulani occupants. I then had
entrusted my house to a Hausa man. We have lived with him for 15 years. The Hausa
man who I have known as one Mohammed told me certain people wanted to buy the
house. I refused. He later approached me to say they wanted to rent, I still declined.
Not long after my house was burgled. Some of the items were recovered in
Mohammed’s house. Thereafter when it became obvious that they could not take over
my house, they decided to set it on fire, being the only house standing after the incident
of 28th November, 2008.

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 There were even cases of outright breaking, entry, stealing and looting of
properties as in the case of Mr. A.I Ogbagbe who presented memorandum
JCI/J/169/2009. Mr. A.I. Ogbagbe stated in his memorandum as follows:
‘The riot erupted in Ali Kazaure area of Jos in Jos North Local Government
Area of Plateau State around 5:00 am on Friday 28th November, 2008. I went to my
shop later in the day and to my utmost dismay, I discovered that my shop had been
broken open and bags of Akpu I stored in my shop had been stolen and removed from
the shop’.
That was also the story of Mrs. Dorathy Ogbonna who presented memorandum
JCI/J/171/2009 and narrated her story as follows:
‘My name is Dorathy Ogbonna, I am a dealer in Gari. My shop is located at
Kasuwan Nama, shop No. 3. It happened on Friday 28th November, 2008, I discovered
that my shop had been broken open and all items in the shop removed and stolen’.
The zeal to expand territories even by means of burning and buying over of
peoples properties, or even outright stealing and looting, brings to the fore the economic
motive of many of the active participants of the Unrest.
One fact which Human Rights Watch also pointed out is the fact that poverty
and unemployment have both become widespread and severe in Nigeria such that
competition for scarce opportunities to secure Government jobs, education and political
patronages has intensified dramatically. This situation had led to economic destitution
and desperation and if not curbed will continue to play a very negative role in crisis
situations. If the citizenry are economically comfortable, the temptation to engage in
purely criminal activities in the name of ‘a struggle against marginalisation’ will be
less pronounced. There is the need for Government, not only at the state level alone,
but particularly at the national level to seriously address the issue of economic depravity
and social insecurity.
3.9 Influx of People into Jos
One disturbing fact about the November 28 th civil Unrest in Jos is the evidence
that ‘mercenaries’ were brought into Jos from neighbouring states and even
neighbouring countries to prosecute the civil Unrest. National Association of Afizere
Youth Movement in its memorandum JCI/J/95/2009 presented by its National President
and Commission witness 97, Engr. Yakubu Ashoms stated on page 15 of the
memorandum as follows:

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 ‘Weeks before the November 27th Local Government Polls, there were influx of
large number of Hausa/Fulani from neighbouring states, notably Bauchi State. This
was with the intent of adding to the voting and fighting strength of the Hausa/Fulani
during the Polls (as the case at old Lamingo road, Jos in May, 2002). These people
masqueraded as water vendors, commercial motor cycle riders and scavengers. Apart
from over-stretching existing facilities like roads, water supply etc, they constituted a
menace whenever found in clusters especially Bauchi Road and adjoining streets’.
Another piece of evidence was the arrest of 26 heavily armed persons on the 1 st
January, 2009 at a Military check-point in Jos. This news was reported by several
Newspapers and magazines among which are Guardian Newspaper of 3 rd January, 2009
tendered as Exhibit JCI/J/155/2009/3 in memorandum JCI/J/155/2009 presented by Mr.
John Likita Mwanle Best and News Gate Magazine of 15th January, 2009 which is
Exhibit G attached to memorandum JCI/J/65/2009 presented by Berom Patriotic Forum.
News gate Magazine reported on page 5 as follows:
‘The mercenaries were caught with sophisticated weapons ranging from AK 47,
assorted guns, several pistols, daggers, amulets and charms including Army and Police
uniforms, Military boots, teargas and other weapons. On their heads were caps with
inscription like ‘war, ‘fire’, Islamic warriors’, ‘JNI’ and other inscriptions. They had
badges of the Nigeria Army on their uniforms’.
This Day Newspaper of 27th December, 2008 which is Exhibit JCI/J/40/2009/7
tendered in memorandum JCI/J/40/2009 presented by Berom Elders Council quoted
Governor David Jonah Jang of Plateau State as saying that 50 of the 530 persons
arrested by the Police in connection with November 28 th civil Unrest in Jos were
foreigners and were caught in Military uniforms armed with guns.
Mr. E.A. Gbuuga, the Comptroller of Immigration Services, Plateau State
Command responded to the Commission’s invitation to appear before it and gave
evidence. He submitted a written response which is Exhibit SG1. In his submission
the Comptroller of Immigration Service, Plateau State stated that the Nigeria
Immigration Service, Plateau State was not invited to be part of the security
arrangements for the Local Government election and was not also invited to be part of
the Security Council meeting before, during and after the crisis but when he heard
allegations of foreign nationals involvement in the crisis, he wrote a letter to the
Comptroller of Prisons in Jos to allow him screen and determine the immigration status
of the alleged foreigners. The Controller of Prisons on the strength of the request
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forwarded a list of 76 suspected foreigners to him and he constituted a six member
Committee to screen the suspects to determine their immigration status and 7 persons
out of the 76 suspected foreigners were found out to be foreigners. Of the 7 foreigners,
6 are from Niger Republic while 1 is from Chad Republic. Again on the 8 th January,
2009, C.P. Abiola Odion of General Investigation Department, Force C.I.D Abuja
investigating the civil Unrest in Jos requested the Controller of Immigration in Jos to
assist the Police to screen 16 suspected foreign nationals and it was discovered that all
the 16 persons are Nigeriens from Niger Republic but none of them had any form of
travel documents and were discovered to be illegally residing in Nigeria.
According to E.A Gbuuga, all those foreigners entered Nigeria illegally because
of the porous nature of Nigerian borders which has compelled Nigeria Immigration
Service High Command to propose to the Federal Executive Council the construction of
147 passport control plazas at the recognized border posts in the country.
This report by the Comptroller of Immigration Service in Jos confirms the
presence of foreigners residing illegally in Jos and even though the number may not be
as many as was reported in the press, the number may not also be as few as the figure
given by the Immigration Service because there is no evidence that the Immigration
Service screened all those arrested in connection with the crisis. The Police in its
response through C.P Samson V. Wudah, the Commissioner of Police, Plateau State at
the time of the crisis and who was transferred to Force Headquarters, Abuja shortly after
the crisis stated that some foreigners were arrested during the crisis but their level of
involvement in the crisis has not yet been determined because those arrested during the
crisis have been charged to court but the cases are still pending. He said the
investigation into the case of the 26 armed persons arrested in Jos on the 1 st of January,
2009 at UTC Junction has been transferred to Force Headquarters, Abuja and they have
been charged to court in Abuja.
The presence of large number of illegal immigrants in any place at all is not an
encouraging news. The evidence placed before this Commission is that there were
illegal immigrants in Jos at the time of the civil Unrest in Jos and in crisis situations,
anything can happen. We think that a large presence and even influx of people from
other states into Jos shortly before and during the Unrest is a pointer to the fact that the
Unrest has a connection with the influx of people. Even though the Commission could
not ascertain the evidence as to whether these were in the main, illegal aliens or
‘mercenaries’. The porous nature of our borders which permits the influx of illegal
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foreigners into Nigeria is a major cause for concern which needs to be addressed for the
security of every part of Nigeria.
3.10 Lack of prompt response by the security forces
One fact which ran through some memoranda presented before the Commission
was the fact that the Police and the Military who eventually intervened and brought the
situation under control did so belatedly after the perpetrators of the crisis had had a field
day causing havoc to lives and properties. The argument put forward is that the security
forces did not respond at all or where they responded, it was too late. Izu Umuna
Cultural Association, Jos in its memorandum JCI/J/160/2009 stated on page 2,
paragraph 7 that ‘while the attack lasted, distress calls to the Police were not responded
to’.
On his own part, Pastor Godwin Okeke presiding Pastor of Jesus Total
Liberation Mission, Jos who presented memorandum JCI/J/132/2009 on behalf of the
Church stated on page 4 of the memorandum that:
‘the Jos riot of 28th November, 2008 was also aided by the security lapses from
the security operatives in the State for example, I met the Police Patrol Teams, I told
them what was happening in the Church, that some people were in with guns and some
ammunitions but they didn’t give me attention. Consequently the attackers had enough
time to execute their evil plans not only burning the Church, but pulling down the
walls’.
Mr. Sunday Gomper who submitted and presented memorandum JCI/J/91/2009
stated on page 19 of his memorandum as follows:
‘The defenceless citizens made frantic effort to access security men to give them
protection but to no avail, it was a total collapse of the security network’.
There were many of such complaints from various Witnesses.
Apart from complaints of lack of prompt response or total inaction on the part
of the security forces, there was also a complaint of alleged excessive use of force and
arbitrary killings level against the security forces. This complaint was by the Human
Rights Watch which presented memorandum JCI/J/ 147/2009 and stated on page 1 of
same as follows:
‘On November 28th – 29th, 2008, deadly clashes between Muslim and Christian
mobs and the excessive use of force by security forces left hundreds dead in Jos,
Plateau State… In responding to the inter-communal violence, the Nigeria Police and
Military were implicated in more than 130 arbitrary killings, mostly of young Muslim
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men from Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups. Human Rights Watch documented 133 killings
but believes that the actual number of arbitrary killings by security forces may be
substantially higher than these figures….. The vast majority of the killings by the Police
and Military came on November, 29th, the same day that Plateau State Governor Jonah
Jang issued a ‘shoot-on-sight order to security forces’.
However, this allegation of excessive use of force and arbitrary killings by the
security forces following an alleged ‘shoot-on-sight’ order to the security forces from
Plateau State Governor Jonah Jang was based on evidence which the presenter say, was
gotten from unnamed sources. Mr. Eric Guttschuss who presented the Memorandum of
Human Rights Watch admitted under cross examination that he came to Nigeria on 3 rd
December, 2009, many days after the crisis and he relied heavily on the evidence of
unnamed persons who therefore could not be called to corroborate or confirm the
evidence before the Commission. As for the ‘shoot-on-sight order’ allegedly issued by
Governor Jonah Jang, Eric Guttschuss also admitted under cross examination that he did
not see the statement containing the ‘shoot-on-sight-order’. However, the address by
Governor Jonah Jang to the people of Plateau State following the civil disturbances in
Jos on Friday, 28th November, 2008 was tendered before the Commission. The address
is annexure C.1 attached to the response of Mr. Samson Jidauna Dimka, Secretary to the
Plateau State Government to the Commission. The response itself was tendered before
the Commission and admitted in evidence as exhibit JCI/J/2009/ S.J.1. What the
Governor actually stated in the statement is as follows:
‘The security details are under instruction to return fire-for-fire from any
person or group disturbing the peace’.
The Commission found elsewhere in this report that the parties to the Unrest
used sophisticated weapons during the crisis. Certainly, where a mob is heavily armed
and has attacked the security forces and where deadly force is being used and their lives
are threatened with death, it is believed that the security forces will always be guided by
their rules of engagement under such circumstances. In any case, the security forces
denied the allegation of excessive use of force and arbitrary killings or even receiving
any `shoot-on-sight’ order from the Governor. C.P Samson V. Wudah, Plateau State
Commissioner of Police at the time of the Unrest in his response before the Commission
stated as follows:

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 ‘There was never a time when such order was given to me either verbally or in
writing. Neither did I give shoot-at-sight-order to any Police officer during the crisis.
The whole operation was guided by operation order’.
Even the Human Rights Watch emphasised the fact that the Army and Police
authorities denied the fact of excessive use of force and arbitrary killings. Human
Rights Watch stated in its memorandum as follows:
‘Senior Police and Military officials interviewed by Human Rights Watch in
December denied having received any reports of their forces being involved in
arbitrary killings during the violence. Assistant Commissioner of Police, Oga Ero said
‘we have received no report at Police High Command that Police were killing people’,
Brigadier Emeka Onwuamaegbu likewise informed Human Rights Watch that ‘ I have
no evidence or information that Nigerian Soldiers were involved in any arbitrary
killings’.
Against the background of these denials, mention must be made of the cases of
armed persons who though not security personnel, were arrested wearing fake Military
and Police uniforms. C.P. Samson V. Wudah on this point stated as follows:
‘When their houses were searched on 30th November, 2008, an Army
Camouflage uniform, a single barrel gun cartridge and three boots were recovered.
Also an elderly man was once brought to my office by D.P.O Laranto who alleged that
seventeen boys were murdered by some men in uniform. Their uniforms according to
him were slightly in between Army and Immigration…. They were reported to have a
video machine with which they film the corpses’.
With these kind of evidence, the alleged excessive use of force and arbitrary
killings by the Nigeria security forces becomes uncertain, as these could have been by
the alleged persons in fake Military uniforms. It is a possibility that the alleged
arbitrary killings were done by persons impersonating security forces. Nevertheless, the
allegations are grave and worthy of proper investigation.
These allegations not withstanding, the security forces were credited with having
brought the civil Unrest under control. The Police responding through CP Samson
Wudah, the then Commissioner of Police, Plateau State stated that there was enough
deployment of Policemen to maintain security all over the state during the election and
when the Unrest broke out, sufficient re-enforcement was brought in from neighbouring
states to assist Plateau State Command and the Police did their best but inadequate
logistics affected the overall performance of the Command during the Unrest. This
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excuse apart, the Commission is not unaware of the fact that the State Governor, though
the Chief Security Officer of the State, is not the Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces and cannot on his own without the permission of the Commander-in-Chief order
the deployment of troops. This reason in addition to logistics problems of the Police
must have also affected the swift intervention of the security forces during the crisis.
If these lapses are identified and rectified by the authorities, we will have a
functional and responsive Military and Police force whose services are very relevant in
crisis situations. Without a functional and responsive network of Police and Military
personnel, crisis such as that of 28th November, 2008 cannot be effectively and promptly
curtailed. Lack of prompt response by the security forces is a sure remote cause of the
Unrest.
3.11 Blockage of roads during hours of worship
In memorandum JCI/J/145/2009 by Professor D.N. Wambutda, the presenter
stated therein that:
‘I wish to strongly suggest that the closing of roads for worship on both Friday
and Sunday be stopped forth with, otherwise we shall see more religious riots. The
reason is simple. The roads are built by tax payer’s money including non-believers. It
is very inconvenient running into unexpected stoppages. More land should be made
available to build more Mosques and Churches’.
In Memorandum JCI/J/37/2009 by the NGAS Development Association, Jos
North Branch, it was expressed in their recommendations that:
‘The Law as passed by State House of Assembly against blocking of road during
Worship should be enforced…..’
Blockage of roads during religious worships by both Muslims and Christians
featured very prominently during the Niki Tobi Commission of Inquiry set up to
investigate the September 7th, 2001 civil Unrest. Indeed blockage of roads during
religious worships was an immediate cause of the 2001 civil Unrest. It was for this
reason that Justice Niki Tobi Commission in its report recommended very strongly that
the Government should ban and enforce the banning of the blockage of public roads by
both Christians and Muslims for prayers and other religious purposes, because
according to the Commission, the practice is illegal and oppressive to members of the
public and creates unnecessary tension and acrimony among different religious
groupings. We have earlier pointed out that the recommendations of all previous
Commissions of Inquiry were not implemented. That it has been identified by several
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memoranda as a remote cause of the November, 28th Unrest is an indication that the
practice still persist. This practice will continue to create tension and acrimony among
the different religious groupings in Jos and it is this built-up and accumulated tension
that is one of the remote cause of the November 28 th civil Unrest and if not curtailed,
will continue to cause more conflicts.
3.12 Unemployment and poverty
What is not at all in doubt is the fact that the crisis of 28 th November, 2008 and
indeed others before it were prosecuted by the youths on both sides of the divide.
Residents of Angwan Dalyop, a neighbourhood of Ali Kazaure where the crisis started,
presented memorandum JCI/J/140/2009 and stated on page 4 of the memorandum as
follows:
‘The crisis in Angwan Dalyop Pam-Osumenyi axis started at about 6:00 am on
Friday 28th November, 2008. There was sudden pandemonium as residents were woken
by the sudden mass movement of Hausa Youth brandishing dangerous weapons such as
cutlasses, swords, machetes, clubs, bows and arrows and later guns. Some of these
youth were identified to be residents of Ali Kazaure, Angwan Dalyop Pam, Angwan
Rogo and environs----We were also able to learn from one Ahmadu Ali Kazaure that
most of the armed militants were from Gangare in Jos. Along the main road, Ali
Kazaure Street the armed youth dashed to Chorbe Junction, Fatima Church area with
others numbering over a hundred stationing themselves in front of No. 5 Ali Kazaure
Street (Mathias Zira’s house) and others at the gate of Fatima Cathedral Church.
Residents, terror-stricken, watched as those from Chorbe returned looking more fierce
and aggressive, more determine to unleash havoc on residents and home. As the
Hausa/Youth advance towards Angwan Dalyop Pam via Federal Hotels resident youth
grouped and stood by the way realizing that their homes were the target’.
That was the story all over Jos. The youths were the ones prosecuting the civil
Unrest which caused a colossal loss of lives and properties.
The problem is that a large proportion of our youths all over the country are
predominantly unemployed. A larger proportion still, are not only unemployed, but
uneducated and not in school. This is more particularly so in Northern Nigeria where
the almagiri system is a common practice. Mr. Sunday Gomper who presented
memorandum JCI/J/91/2009 described the almajiri system as a ‘Northern phenomenon
where parents give up their children of school age to a cleric to travel to distant places
on discipleship training’.
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 The system according to Mr. Gomper deprives the youngsters of formal
education and the trainees have to embark on begging for alms and gifts of left over
food for their survival. The Children of the less privilege people in society, Mr.
Gomper further said, are the ones that undergo this training and indoctrination. He
concluded that:
‘the events in the crises in Jos and others all over the Northern part of the
country showed the involvement of the almajiris who were used by their sponsors to
kill, maim, loot and vandalize properties of victims while the almajiris ended up being
cannon-fodders of their sponsors in the event of reprisal attacks while the children of
the faceless sponsors are far away in London or America pursuing their studies’.
The sum total of the whole situation is that we have a large body of unemployed
and idle youths who are ready tools in the hands of misguided Nigerians who will
always use them to foment trouble for their own selfish ends. One sure example of this
is the use of our idle unemployed and uneducated youths for political hugger by
politicians.
Added to this problem is the issue of poverty which Plateau Patriots who
presented memorandum JCI/J/72/2009 stated on page 20 thereof as having reduced the
proverbial future leaders to a state of desolation and abject poverty and this has
challenged the state of security, law and order in Northern Nigeria. The Plateau Patriots
further stressed that the country cannot progress if at the slightest discomfort, youth are
mobilised and armed with gallons of costly inflammables to burn down holy sites,
homes, business premises and industries in one breath. The Plateau Patriots made
copious reference to a survey carried out by Daily Trust Newspapers on the state of
political hugger in Northern Nigeria. The survey titled ‘The rise and rise of political
hugger in Northern Nigeria’ was published in Weekly Trust of 10th May, 2008. The
report, according to the Plateau Patriots reveals how politicians trained and armed
youths as thugs, use them and later dump them meanwhile these dangerous youths have
since taken a life of their own and are now unleashing violence on innocent citizens and
of course will be easily available at a small fee in any part of Nigeria at the behest of
corrupt and desperate political and religious ‘entrepreneurs’. The Plateau Patriots
quoted Weekly Trust as stating that the youths have become really dangerous and are
spread all over Northern Nigeria. They are known as sara-suka (hack and stab) in
Bauchi, Yan Kalare in Gombe, Yan daba in Kano, Ecomog in Borno, Kauraye in
Kaduna and Katsina States and Area Boys in Sokoto. These armed youth are often
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dehumanised, callous and often under the influence of drugs. They can do anything.
That is why according to the Weekly Trust, when the sara-suka in Bauchi came to a
house looking for kwarasa, a member of a rival group, and could not find him, they
turned on Jummai an innocent pregnant tenant in the house and threw her into the well.
That is the level to which our youth have degenerated. The sara-suka was
alleged to have entered a Mosque and dragged out one worshiper who they accused of
belonging to a rival group. They are indeed uncontrollable. Not even their mentors can
call them to order.
This is the sad state of our youth all due to poverty, unemployment, lack of
social security, drug addiction and youth restiveness. It is no surprise therefore that it
was the youth that prosecuted the civil Unrest of 28 th November, 2008. The blame
certainly is as a result of all these social vices which need to be addressed and tackled.
The youth who are the leaders of tomorrow are today destroying their tomorrow and the
future is bleak.
3.13 Illegal proliferation of arms, weapons and use of military uniforms.
A review of all the testimonies of Witnesses and memoranda presented before
the Commission reveals that a large quantity of arms and weapons were used in the
prosecution of the civil Unrest of 28th November, 2008 and this perhaps explains the
magnitude of the crisis. According to Nasarawa Baptist Church, Jos which presented
memorandum JCI/J/53/2009, those who attacked the Church and its members came
‘with all sorts of dangerous weapons like guns, machetes, clubs, daggers, sticks and
petrol in gallons’. Apostolic Living Faith Church, Jos which presented memorandum
JCI/J/55/2009 stated on page 2 of its memorandum as follows:
‘within few minutes, we saw some boys they were in groups, in their hands they
were holding guns, bows, arrows, cutlasses, axes, gallons and series of things’.
As for members of Methodist Church of Nigeria, Jos Diocese who presented
memorandum JCI/J/62/2009, they were woken up by shouts of Allahu-Akbar and
sporadic gun shots while the presenters of memorandum JCI/J/81/2009, Du Elders
Council, said the Muslim youth who were in groups attacking residents of Katako,
Chwelnyap, Nasarawa Gwong, Dogon Dutse and Ubiyal areas of Jos were carrying
dangerous weapons including guns. The story was same all over, the use of dangerous
weapons to prosecute the civil Unrest.

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 In some cases, the attackers apart from being armed with dangerous weapons
also wore fake Military uniforms. P.D.P Elders, Plateau State Chapter which presented
memorandum JCI/J/76/2009 stated on page 6 of its memorandum as follows:
‘Military/Mobile Police uniforms were procured along with guns/ammunition
all prior to November 27th. Fortunately a number of fake Soldiers/Policemen were
arrested. Unless those who procured the uniforms/equipment are fished out and
prosecuted, any inquest in Jos North crisis would be exercise in futility’
The possibility of this problem was brought to the fore by the evidence of
Nigeria Custom Service that it seized a large consignment of Military camouflage
uniform materials concealed in a luxurious Bus travelling from the Eastern part of
Nigeria to Plateau State and handed same over to the Police, albeit that this was after the
Unrest of 28th November, 2008. This evidence is contained in the response of Nigeria
Customs Service to this Commission which was tendered and admitted as Exhibit
JCI/J/2009/S.H 1.
If the fact that the perpetrators of the civil Unrest of 28 th November, 2009 wore
Military uniforms and were armed with very sophisticated weapons is worrisome, what
is far more worrisome is the fact that some of these sophisticated weapons of
destruction were manufactured in Yan -Tinka Market of Jos. That was the evidence of
organisation of African Institute Churches which presented memorandum
JCI/J/30/2009. According to the Church, ‘most of the locally made weapons used in
the 2001 and the 2008 crises were manufactured at Yan – Tinka Market, in Dilimi area
of Jos’.
The fact that the perpetrators of the crisis used fake Military uniforms and were
armed with very dangerous weapons is an indication that the crisis was carefully
planned and financed. Dr. Charles Gonyok who presented memorandum JCI/J/31/2009
stated this fact in his Memorandum on page 14 as follows:
‘the calibre of weapons used, the uniform worn by the arsonists, the manner the
rampage was organised all point to the fact that the perpetrators of the violence had
taken their time to plan it’.
It is very obvious then that arms, weapons and Military uniforms have been
either manufactured and/or imported and stockpiled for the purpose of igniting the
crisis. The Commission cannot but agree with Methodists Church of Nigeria, Jos
Diocese which presented memorandum JCI/J/62/2009 and stated on page 9 of its

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memorandum that ‘we have reason to believe that government and security agencies
should be alerted on the importation of fire arms into Jos North’.
If Military uniforms, arms and ammunitions have not been stock pilled for the
purpose of igniting a crisis, such materials would not have been readily used during the
Unrest. The availability of Military uniforms and dangerous weapons is itself a major
remote cause of the crisis. Indeed without these items, the crisis would not have started
abruptly and spontaneously in different places and it would have been much easier for
the security forces to contend the situation. The heavy reliance on Military uniform and
dangerous weapons in a purely civil Unrest of this nature is a great cause for concern.
This is more particularly so as the level of sophistication in the use of arms and
ammunition has kept escalating since crises commenced in 1994.
3.14 Political marginalisation
One fact which attracted a lot of prominence in the presentation before the
Commission is the issue of marginalization which in fact is a multi dimensional
complaint. On one hand are the Hausa/Fulani who are complaining of being
discriminated against and marginalized by indigenes of Plateau State. In an advertorial
published in Daily Trust of January 12, 2009 by Hausa-Fulani Elders Forum which was
tendered as Exhibit JCI/J/135/2009/4 in the memorandum of Justice, Peace and
Reconciliation Movement, the Hausa/Fulani Elders stated as follows:
‘we have been branded and condemned as ‘settlers’ which according to their
policy disqualifies our children from getting indigene certificate which also paves the
way for extensive exploitation of our people socially, economically and politically by
the ‘indigenes’ ------- we have been denied the right to participate fully in politics by
creating a situation whereby we may only vote for ‘indigenes’ but impossible to be
freely voted for despite our numerical strength. We have no doubt that we are the most
discriminated against and worst maltreated Nigerians’
However, the indigenes think differently. The indigenes on the other hand think
the Hausa/Fulani are having both sides of the world by taking appointments in their
home states and come back to Plateau and take appointments that are meant for the
indigenes leaving the indigenes empty handed.
The indigenes contended that in Hausa-Fulani States, it is not possible for people
of Plateau State residing there to get any appointment as is the case of the Hausa/Fulani
who have enjoyed appointments in Plateau State. In the words of National Association
of Afizere Youth Movement in their memorandum JCI/J/95/2009,
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 ‘Previous Commissions of Inquiry reports showed that Jos belong to Anaguta,
Afizere and Berom. However, with key state and Federal political positions reserved
for Jos North occupied by the Hausa-Fulani Muslims (Baba Hassan, Jos North-North
State House of Assembly, Samiala Mohammed, Jos North/Bassa Federal House of
Representatives and Ibrahim D. Nakande, former Minister of Information), all they
eagerly desire was Chairmanship of Jos North to tell the whole world they own Jos.
The Hausa/Fulani fail to understand that the aforementioned political office holders
were allowed to be due to the spirit of brotherliness, peaceful co-existence and give and
take inherent in the three indigenous tribes’.
According to Jos Divisional Cultural Organisation (JODICO) in its
memorandum JCI/J/33/2009, the Hausa immigrants in Jos have enjoyed unfettered
political representation in Jos. The Association cited the likes of Alhaji Inuwa Ali,
Baba Akawu, Alhaji Danladi, Inuwa Adda, Shehu Sale Hassan, Samaila Mohammed,
former Chairman, Jos North Local Government who is currently representing Jos
North/Bassa Federal Constituency in the House of Representatives, Ibrahim Baba
Hassan currently Deputy Speaker, Plateau State House of Assembly, Alhaji Yaro
Mairake, P.D.P Chairman Jos North, Alhaji Dankurma, former Chairman, Muslim
Pilgrims Welfare Board etc who have at one time or the other received massive support
from indigenes.
With all these appointments, sometimes at the expense of the indigenes, Du
Elders Council wondered why the Hausa/Fulani should be complaining of
marginalization. Du Elders Council which presented memorandum JCI/J/8/2009 on
page 21 stated as follows:
‘Although the Hausa people as settlers have benefited more than any other
settler tribe in Jos, they have been complaining of marginalization which is completely
false. They have won Chairmanship of Jos, they have had Minister on Plateau quota,
House of Representative from Plateau etc, which no other settler has benefited while no
Plateau indigenous tribe has ever enjoyed such privilege in any Hausa State no matter
how long such a person has lived there’.
Mr. Jidauna J. Gukas who presented memorandum JCI/J/13/2009 stated on page
12 of his memorandum that in 2003 general election, one Mr. Osita Obiri won election
into Kano State House of Assembly under the platform of P.D.P representing Fagge
Constituency but was denied the seat because Kano Hausa indigenes protested that he is
an ‘arna’ and Timothy a Tiv man from Benue State contested and won Councillorship
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position in Tarauni Ward of Nasarawa L.G.C also on the platform of P.D.P but was not
allowed because Hausas said he was a non-indigene though 85% of people of Nasarawa
Local Government Area in Kano State are non-indigene settlers.
Another category of marginalization which was also highlighted is the
marginalization not against the Hausa/Fulani alone but even marginalization of
indigenes by the indigenes which take the form of political appointments being
concentrated to members of a particular political group at the expense of all others in
the State.
From all these set of facts, it is therefore clear that complaints of marginalisation
is indeed multi dimensional and parties on both sides to the crisis are accusing one
another. Whether there is indeed marginalization is another question. Considering the
calibre of appointments the Hausa/Fulani have had in the past and are still having, we
cannot at all agree with them that they have been heavily marginalized and maltreated.
If it were so, they would not have been able to attain the positions they occupied in the
past and are still occupying. After all, they are not the only non-indigenous tribes
residing in Jos. There are several other ethnic groups such as the Igbo, Yoruba and
people of South-South who have not complained of marginalization though there is no
evidence that they have enjoyed any of such positions as the Hausa/Fulani have
enjoyed. If they, the Hausa/Fulani can occupy these positions they have occupied, these
other tribes too are entitled to such privileges. They are also Nigerians. The
Hausas/Fulani cannot have their way all the time. The justice of the situation is live and
let live. With dialogue and tolerance we can attain a lot of heights. We need not
employ violence to enforce our perceived rights. If every settler tribe on the Plateau
must have a fair share of appointments, the Hausa/Fulani could not have gotten half of
what they got. To conclude that the Hausa/Fulani are marginalized in terms of
appointments while the other settler tribes have nothing at all will amount to double
standard and selective justice. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. One
would have thought that the Hausa/Fulani in the spirit of fairness should demand that
every Nigerian in Jos should be treated fairly but that is not their demand. With
dialogue, mutual understanding and peaceful co-existence, we can attain a united and
just Jos where not only the Hausa alone, but indeed all other settler Nigerians in Jos will
be accommodated in the scheme of things. It has been pointed out that even in the
Hausa/Fulani States, non indigenes are being heavily discriminated against. The
Hausa/Fulani while fighting for their rights in Jos should also champion a cause where
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all Nigerians irrespective of their place of origin can reside in any part of Nigeria and be
treated fairly. To insist that everything should be for the Hausa/Fulani and nothing for
everybody cannot be a true struggle against marginalization. It is at best a selfish
demand.
It was suggested by the then Director of State Security Services in Plateau State
before the Commission that the Hausa/Fulani should have been offered the position of
Deputy Chairman in the Jos North Local Government Chairmanship election of 27 th
November, 2008 as a way of balancing the political equation in Jos. As fair as that
assertion was, it is not possible for the Hausa/Fulani to be either Chairman or Deputy
Chairman at all times. They have been either Chairmen or Deputy Chairmen in the past
and at those times they were either Chairmen or Deputy Chairmen, some other groups
had nothing and now that some other groups have those positions, they too may have
nothing like in the case of these other groups in the past. After all when these other
groups had nothing, heaven did not fall. People must cultivate the spirit of give and
take.
Sometimes, support for a particular political party by a group determines what
that group gets from the political party. If the Hausa/Fulani did not support P.D.P but
another party, the Hausa/Fulani cannot easily expect patronage from P.D.P if it
eventually wins. That probably is what Tula Berom (BECO) University of Jos had in
mind when they said about the practice of the Hausa/Fulani in Jos in their memorandum
JCI/J/34/2009 on page 9 that:
‘a Hausa man could claim to be a member of P.D.P but finds it very convenient
to vote against his party for a fellow Hausa man in another party or better still fight
and kill a P.D.P member in solidarity with his kith and kin in a different party. They
will never vote any other person except their own irrespective of party affiliation and
loyalty’.
However, a party can only nominate its candidate from an area where it is likely
to have support, otherwise it cannot win the election.
We think that if the parties to the crisis are just and fair to one another and
embrace dialogue and negotiation, they will be able to resolve the issue of
marginalization without rancour. After all, justice to one party at the expense of justice
to all other parties is a threat to justice everywhere.
3.15 Social issues:

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 The persistent violent crises in Jos metropolis since 1994 have not been without
its negative effects. The crises have for instance affected negatively the relationship
between the Hausa/Fulani who are predominantly Muslims on one hand and the
indigenous tribes of the Plateau and other Nigerians resident in Jos and are
predominantly Christians on the other hand The position of Hausa/Fulani Elders Forum
on the November, 28th Unrest is contained in Exhibit JCI/J/135/2009/4, an advertorial in
the Daily Trust Newspaper of 12th January, 2009. The advertorial written in an angry,
combative and abusive language accused the indigenes and Government of Plateau
State of common hatred for the Hausa/Fulani of Plateau State. The Hausa/Fulani Elders
alleged that there is a careful design not only to marginalize and discriminate against
the Hausa/Fulani of Plateau State but even terminate and eliminate all the Hausa/Fulani
people. They contended very vehemently in the advertorial that Jos town belongs to the
Hausa/Fulani people and if the people of Plateau State do not want them, Jos North
Local Government Area should be merged with Bauchi State so that they will be under
Bauchi State instead of Plateau State. In their words:
‘The Government and the so called ‘indigenes’ are still busy talking about
‘settlers’ and planning how to displace and totally eliminate them from Jos Township.
How can we continue to live under this inhuman treatment? The only option open to us
is to request for boundary adjustment to relocate to Bauchi State or any arrangement
that will separate us from our persecutors at least to save our lives’.
The reaction of the indigenes and other Nigerians residents in Jos North is no
less combative, abusive and angry. They labelled the Hausa/Fulani as an ungrateful
group of settlers who are arrogant and disrespectful to the host community. They
contended that the Hausa/Fulani are fighting everybody to take over, control, dominate
and Islamize Plateau State as a whole. Tula Berom (BECO) University of Jos in their
memorandum JCI/J/34/2009 described the situation in the following words:
‘A typical orientation among the Hausas is that they are superior to all
indigenes and non-Hausa people and by extension, they must always lead them. The
indigenes are predominantly non-Muslims and therefore labelled ‘arna’ (infidels) who
are only good for Hausa exploitation. No wonder, the Hausa continue to feed fat on the
sweat and toil of the indigenes in commodity and farm produce markets as Commission
agents and in motor parks as collectors of transport fares dressed in National Union of
Road Transport Works uniform - - - we stand to be corrected on this point that the
Hausa community in Jos is the most intolerant of all non- indigenes and other
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Nigerians politically, culturally and religiously. The Hausas have never accommodated
any other ethnic group in their so-called dominated electoral wards neither have they
ever supported indigenous cultural events and activities’.
As for the Igbo Community which presented memorandum JCI/J/127/2009, the
November 28th Unrest was:
‘premeditated, carefully planned and executed by the Hausa community in Jos
to destroy the financial base of the Igbos in Jos, drive the Igbos away from Jos North
Local Government Area, loot their moveable properties, annex or buy their immovable
properties at ridiculously low price as was successfully done in 2001’. They viewed the
November 28th crisis as ‘the execution of Hausa expansionist agenda which was aimed
at gaining wider/firmer hold on Jos North Local Government Area’.
The Yoruba Community presented memorandum JCI/J/202/2009 wherein it
placed the cause of the November 28th 2008 Unrest at the doorstep of the Hausas who
have expansionist tendencies and have attacked and killed other residents, destroyed
their properties then offered to purchase the remnants of the properties especially
residential buildings at a paltry sum of money.
The scenario then is that there is mutual suspicion and mistrust, deep rooted
misgivings, hatred, unforgiveness, anger and the quest to revenge between the
Hausa/Fulani on one hand and the indigenous tribes of Plateau State as well as all other
residents of Jos on the other hand. This frosty relationship has led to segregative
settlements. Thus we have the predominantly Hausa/Fulani Muslim dominated areas
like Angwan Rogo, Ali Kazaure, Gangare, Angwan Rimi, Bauchi Road etc, while
Apata, Jenta Adamu, Alheri, Tafawa Balewa, Rukuba Road etc are dominated by
indigenous tribes and other residents of Jos who are predominantly Christians. What
has further worsened this segregation is that the divisions are based on religious
affiliations with Christians on one side and Muslims on the other side. In
memorandum JCI/J/72/2009 presented by the Plateau Patriots, the Association
expressed its worries about the cleavages and exclusiveness existing among the two
parties in the Jos crisis which is only capable of escalating the situation rather than
promoting peaceful co-existence between the two factions. The association observed
with a lot of concern on page 37 – 38 of its memorandum as follows:
‘The successive conflicts in Jos have brought sharp divisions between the
Christians and Muslims. In fact it has resulted in self-imposed gerrymandering of Jos
city into exclusive ‘safe’ homes for each religion. Today Muslims in their numbers are
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crowded in Gangare, Angwan Rogo, Bauchi Road, Ali Kazaure, Yan Shanu, Tudun
Wada and Dilimi. Most Yoruba Muslims are resident in fairly mixed area of Nasarawa
Gwong. This has resulted in ghetto-ization of these settlements with serious security
implications for the entire city. It is very difficult to conduct elections in such areas.
Security agencies should also watch out for serious crime in those areas. They are
suitable environment for sleeper cells of militant terrorists. There is therefore an
urgent need for the authorities including government, security agencies, scholars,
traditional rulers, conflict resolution practitioners and most importantly religious
leaders to understand these phenomena and provide remedial lasting measure’.
Tekan Youths fellowship which presented memorandum JCI/J/67/2009
suggested a reintegration of the two parties in the following words on page 14 of its
Memorandum:
‘Government should acquire open areas in exclusively dominated mono-
ethnic/religious areas of the city centre for erection of housing estate that could house
barracks and security agencies and even civilians so as to punctuate the tone of this
none assimilation’.
Indeed, residents of Jos have divided themselves into two warring irreconcilable
factions and this itself is a remote cause of the crisis. As long as the two communities
continue to live apart, there can be no genuine integration and reconciliation. This
posture will aggravate rather than calm down the tension and pave the way for
reconciliation. As long as this situation continues to exist, there will be mutual
suspicion, mistrust, deep rooted misgiving, hatred, unforgiveness, anger and the desire
to seek revenge.
As a result of these segregative settlements which has discouraged rather than
encouraged integration and peaceful co-existence among the different segments of Jos,
suggestions have been made on how best the situation can be addressed. One of these
suggestions is the provision of security post in strategic areas within Jos city. In their
recommendations, Berom elders Council which presented memorandum JCI/J/40/2009
suggested on page 20 paragraph 11 of the memorandum as follows:
‘For hot beds of crisis in Jos, for example, Kwararafa, Abba Na-Shehu, Dilimi,
Ali Kazaure, Yan Keke, Rikkos and Gangare we strongly recommend that permanent
security outfits be stationed within them to forestall any future break down of law and
order’.

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 That was also the suggestion of Yoruba Community in Jos who in their
memorandum JCI/J/202/2009 suggested therein:
‘that one way of attaining peace in Jos is ‘the construction of permanent
security posts in any identified flash point in Jos Metropolis and its environs’.
According to the Community, Kaduna unrest was nipped in the bud via such
strategy. Indeed if there were security posts in the identified flash points of Jos prior to
the crisis of 28th November, 2008, the crisis would have been effectively monitored and
contained with ease. The absence of such security posts led to an escalation of the crisis
as security forces could not monitor and check the crisis effectively and promptly. As a
matter of fact, segregative settlements leading to growth of flash points and hot beds of
crisis is not a healthy development. The Yoruba Community has urged the Government
to discourage the concentration of ethnic or religious group settlement. The
Commission thinks that a complete integration of residents of Jos irrespective of their
religions or ethnic differences will go a long way in fostering harmony and peaceful co-
existence among them.

CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 Persons or groups of persons or organizations/ institutions directly
responsible for the Unrest, their roles and sanctions and Persons/ Individuals,
Organizations/Institutions indirectly responsible for the Unrest, their roles and
sanctions.
This Chapter deals with the third term of reference of the Commission which is
to ‘identify individuals, groups of persons and institutions directly or indirectly
responsible for the Unrest and their roles in precipitating the Unrest and recommend
appropriate sanctions’. In dealing with these issues, the Commission shall for ease of
reference, divide this term of reference into two broad headings viz:

i) Individuals, Groups of persons and Institutions directly responsible for

the Unrest and their roles in precipitating the Unrest and appropriate
sanctions.
ii) Individuals, Groups of persons and Institutions indirectly responsible for
the Unrest and their roles in precipitating the Unrest and appropriate
sanctions

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 4.1 Individuals, groups of persons and institutions directly responsible for
the Unrest and their roles in precipitating the Unrest and appropriate sanctions.
From the various memoranda submitted to the Commission and evidence led
thereon the following persons, groups of persons and institutions were alleged by
witnesses and presenters of memoranda before the Commission to be directly
responsible for the Unrest that engulfed Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau
State on the 28th November, 2008. The Commission noted that some of the names of the
alleged culprits given are not full names, thus making identification difficult. The names
as presented by the witnesses are:
1) Hausa- Fulani Youth
2) Dansabe Musa
3) Madu
4) Mallam Murtala
5) Alhaji Wada
6) Ibrahim Gambo.
7) Usman.
8) Abubakar.
9) Awalu
10) Dahiru
11) Saidu
12) Hausa Leaders and Elders
13) Aminu Mato, the ANPP Chairmanship candidate for the local
Government Election held on 27th November 2008.
14) Alhaji Auwalu Mai Sugar
15) The Police
16) Honourable Nazifii Mohammed
18) Members of Ulama
19) The Mosque located opposite the Seminary gate
and behind the Seminary institution.
20) The Mosque before Katoko Bridge and the one at Angwan Rogo.
21) Mosques located in sarki Mangu and Masallacin Idi
22) Muslim youth
23) Usman Sanusi
24) Ibrahim Haruna
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25) Alhaji Abdullahi
26) Salisu Kareng
27) Ali
28) Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jengre, a Muslim Cleric in Jos.
29) Alhaji Danladi Pasali, former Chairmanship aspirant for Jos North
( PDP)
30) All Mercenaries, Alimajiris and foreign nationals arrested in the battle
field during the riot.
31) The Tudun-Pera Mosque
32) Bulbula Mosque
33) The Imams of the 2 mosques
34) Musa Sati
35) Alhaji Musan Sati
36) Alhaji Garba Abdulkadi.
37) Alhaji Hassan Mohammed
38) Alhaji Ali Abubakar
39) Alhaji Ado M. Ibrahim
40) Alhaji Ado Datti
41) Alhaji Sabo I.Kebur
42) Alhaji Usman Ladan
43) Hussaini Paraguay
44) Mohammed Sani Mudi
45) Alhaji Usman Ibrahim Abubakar
46) Moses Rwang Dung
48) Hon. Abdul Ningi MHR
49) Ahmadu Laushi
50) Alhaji Auwalu Yelwa
51) Jama’atul Nasril Islam (JNI), Jos North
52) Alhaji Abba
53.) Ibrahim Mohammed, National Museum , Jos
54) Mallam Idris Abdul
55) Mohammed Usman
56) Alhaji Salihu Mohammed
57) Mohammed Adam
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58) Mallam Hassan Bazza
59) Mijin Patu Mai Itace
60) Baba Audu Miango
61) Baba Maigemu Rikkos
62) Buhari (the son of Alhaji Bala).
63) Shehu Bala
64) Aminu Umar
65) Senator Kazaure (a.k.a)
66) Abubakar Dashe (Witness)
66) Entire Muslim youth residing within the Old Mining Camp .
67) Entire Muslim Elders residing within the Old Mining Camp.
68) Mallam Musa Gwani, the Imam of the small mosque within the old
mining camp.
69) Babawo Nakasa.
70) Dogon Tonga.
71) Bala Scroll Mai Ido Daya.
72) Uzu (Youger brother to Shaibu).
73) Yusuf Garba.
74) Alhaji Garba Bude Ido.
75) Tyson Danwasa.
76) Dog Dealer of Alhaji.
77) Ibrahim Allarama.
78) Umaru Aljan.
79) Mubarak Isiaku.
80) Garba Abubakar.
81) Isiaku (Father of Mubarak).
82) Murtala Adamu (Mai Gishiri).
83) Mustaph Mustie.
84) Siyaye (Alhaji Ali’s son).
85) Ibrahim Danbanga.
86) Sheik Bala Dauud.
87) Sheik Alhassan Sa’id
89) Alhaji Ali (Father to Modibbo Siyaye).
90) The Police and the army.
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 91) Tudun Wada Christian Youth Vanguard
92) The Berom Youths

4.1.1 Roles of the alleged culprits in precipitating the Jos Unrest of 28th
November, 2008 and recommendations for possible sanctions.
Having outlined above the persons, groups of persons, individuals and
Institutions alleged to be directly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th to 29th
November, 2008, the Commission, shall hereunder take a critical look at the roles of the
various persons, groups and institutions listed above to determine the extent of their
involvement and thereafter, make appropriate recommendations on the nature and
procedure of the sanctions to be applied in respect of each of them.
4.1.2 Hausa/Fulani youth
Though no names were given, memorandum JCI/J/22/09 presented by Rev D.
A. Ogunlowo and one Mrs Rebecca Adeyemo representing the First Baptist Church, 43
Adebayo street, Jos dealt with this group. The witnesses told the Commission that
Hausa/Fulani youth between the ages of 8 and 18 years numbering about 120
surrounded the Church and threw into it handmade explosives into it which exploded
and burnt down the structure. Another half of this number went to the Church’s
cybercafé and tried to force the windows open. When they could not force open the
windows, they set the cybercafé ablaze. The youth also threw handmade explosives into
the Church’s pastorioum and broke its glasses. They were also said to be chanting
among other utterances:
‘kill the infidel, the pastor is an infidel he must not be allowed to live
‘..........Allahu-Akubar........’

( See pages 1 and 2 of Exhibit JCI/J/22/09/1

Memorandum JCI/J/25/2009 presented by Evangelist Da Andrew Nyango
Dalyop also identified persons.
On pages 9 and 10 of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/25/09/1) the witness who
testified as Commission Witness No.8 (CW8) named those persons, he perceives as the
perpetrators in Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008 in his neighbourhood as:
4.1.3 Mallam Musa Gwani
The Imam of the small Mosque within the old mining camp, allegedly used
loud speakers to mobilise the youth after 2:00pm prayers declaring Jihad and inciting

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the youth to embark on destruction. Mallam Musa Gwani was on the basis of this
allegation against him by C.W8 invited by the Commission to appear before it on the
22nd July, 2009 to defend himself on this allegation. The Commission as well published
the invitation in several National Dailies; of particular note are the Daily Trust
Newspaper, This Day, and the Nigerian Standard amongst others. However, Mallam
Musa Gwani failed to honour the invitation. Gleaning from the evidence before the
Commission, the act of the Mallam Musa Gwani was quite inciting, more so when it
was alleged that this propelled a lot of youth and elders of the Hausa/Fulani Muslims to
come out en-mass with dangerous weapon thus unleashing terror on their Christian
neighbours. See pages 9 and 10 of Exhibit JCI/J/25/2009/1 and Verbatim Report of the
Commission’s proceedings of 26th February, 2009.
The Commission therefore recommends that the Mallam Musa Gwani be
investigated by the Police and prosecuted, and if found guilty, the appropriate sanctions
under the law should be applied.
4.1.4 Abdullahi Hassan Bazza
Was allegedly the first to start burning neighbours’ houses within the
Community. He was alleged to have burnt his immediate neighbour’s house on the 28 th
day of November, 2008 and was allegedly seen distributing petrol in his house to his
friends (see page 9 of Exhibit JCI/J/25/2009/1) and page 2 of the clarification thereon
sub titled ‘Pages 9 and 10, Item 9 - persons/institutions directly involved or
responsible’’. Based on this incriminating piece of evidence by CW8 against the said
Abdullahi Hassan Bazza, the Commission invited him to appear before it on the 22 nd
day of July, 2009 the said Abdullahi Hassan Bazza was duly served with the invitation
and also the same invitation was published by the Commission in several National
Dailies. It should also be noted that apart from the personal service of the letter of
invitation and publication of same in several Newspapers and announcements made on
Radio and Television, the said Abdullahi Hassan Bazza to honour the Commission’s
invitation to appear before it to shed light on the allegation against him. In the
circumstance, the Commission is constrained to act on the evidence before it and
resolve that Abdullahi Hassan Bazza could be the persons directly responsible for the
Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008. The Commission, therefore, recommends that
Abdullahi Hassan Bazza be investigated in accordance with the due process by the
Police and prosecuted if found culpable and appropriate punishment be meted to him for
his role.
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 4.1.5 Dan Asabe Musa:
In memorandum JCI/J/25/2009, presented by Evangelist Da Andrew N. Dalyop
(CW 8). Danasabe Musa was alleged to have spearheaded the mob that burnt the
witness’ houses. The said Dan Asabe Musa was invited by the Commission to appear
before it on the 22nd day of July, 2009; however, he failed to honour the invitation and
so denied the Commission the opportunity to hear his own side of the story. The
Commission in this circumstance has only one irresistible option, that of making use of
the best available evidence to it, which in this case, is that of the sole witness under
oath. The Commission in the absence of any other evidence to the contrary believes
that Dansabe Musa could be one of those persons directly responsible for the Jos Unrest
of 28th and 29th November, 2008. The Commission, therefore, hereby recommend that
the said Danasabe Musa be investigated by the Police and possibly prosecuted for his
role in precipitating the Jos Unrest of 28 th November, 2008 and if found guilty,
appropriate punishment should be meted out to him to serve as deterrent to others.
4.1.6 Mallam Murtala
C.W.8 told the Commission amongst other things that ‘Malam Murtala was seen
carrying a gun and was among those arrested by the Police’. In the circumstance, it is
the Commission’s view that since Malam Murtala was arrested by the Police, the Police
should conclude their investigation and if the investigation is positive, prosecute the
said Malam Murtala in Court for his role in the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2009 and
if found guilty appropriate punishment be applied to him.
4.1.7 Alhaji Wada, Ibrahim Gambo, Mallam Usman Saidu and Alhaji
Abubakar:
C.W.8 mentioned the names of the above named persons and alleged that they
were principal instigators of the Unrest of 28 th November, 2008 but did not say what
they did that amounted to instigating the Unrest except that in the case of Alhaji
Abubakar, the witness said he was seen carrying a riffle.
The Commission wishes to emphasise here that all the persons mentioned above
were all, after careful review of the allegations against them, invited to appear before
the Commission to clarify and or present their own side of the story in rebuttal of the
allegations against them. They failed to honour the invitation to appear before the
Commission. Nevertheless, after a careful consideration of the serious allegations
against Alhaji Wada, Mallam Usman and Ibrahim Gambo who were described by the

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witness as principal instigators. The Commission feels they should be interrogated by
the Police.
However, in respect of Alhaji Abubakar referred to above, who was also
alleged to be a principal instigator of the Unrest and was allegedly seen carrying a
riffle, the Commission notes with great displeasure, his refusal to appear before it to
defend himself against such an allegation. Under the Nigerian Criminal Law, illegal
possession of firearm, a rifle in this case, is an offence unless such a person in whose
possession a gun is found to be licensed to carry it. The questions are, was Alhaji
Abubakar licensed to carry the riffle he was allegedly seen with by the witness. If the
answer is in affirmative, for what purpose was the license issued? Why was he carrying
the gun as of the time of the Unrest? However, if he was not licensed to carry such gun
by the relevant authorities, how did he come to be in possession, where did he get the
riffle from and what was he doing with it at the time in issue? These are some of the
questions begging for answers. The Commission therefore, is of the view that the said
Alhaji Abubakar be investigated by the Police and prosecuted and if found guilty should
be duly punished.
4.1.8 Nasiru Sani PHCN Agent.
He was alleged to have been carrying a locally made pistol during the Unrest
and was invited to appear before the Commission to rebut the allegation himself. His
name was accordingly listed on the cause list among witnesses to appear before the
Commission on the 22nd July, 2009 but he failed to appear before the Commission. The
evidence of CW8 against Nasiru Sani PHCN Agent is direct. Nasiru Sani was seen
carrying a locally made pistol during the Unrest. The Commission therefore
recommends that he should be invited by the Police, investigated and prosecuted for his
role in precipitating the Unrest.
4.1.9 The Entire Muslim Youth
Residing within the Old Mining camp were alleged by the witness in Exhibit
JCI/J/25/2009/1 (C.W.8) to have started the mayhem within the witness’ Community
and of burning of Christian houses within the area. The Police should interrogate
those of them that were specifically identified and mention and in the process identify
more of those who played a negative role in the Unrest.

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 4.1.10 The Entire Muslim elders residing within the old mining camp.
This group is said to have instigated and incited the youth to embark on
destruction. The witness’ reasoning was that the Muslim Elders residing within the Old
Mining Camp instigated and incited their youths to carry out the destruction of the
Christians’ property within their neighbourhood with the hope that same would be sold
to them in the end. He based this on an earlier experience within the neighbourhood,
when following the construction of the large Mosque in Albayan private school which
became an inconvenience to the Christians of the area because the Muslims would block
the road leading from Duala Hotel through former Army Barracks football pitch on
Fridays during prayers. This coupled with fears of insecurity of their lives and loved
ones, some Christians were compelled to sell their property to Hausa/Fulani Muslims
and evacuate the area to safer places. The witness gave instances of such Christians who
were compelled to sell their houses and relocated to other places to include one
Mr.Miskom A.D Sule, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Patrick Okonkwo and Baba Ma’aji amongst
others. See page 8 of Exhibit JCI/J/25/2009/1. This piece of evidence was corroborated
by several other witnesses who testified before the Commission, and told the
Commission that immediately after the Unrest of 28th November, 2008, their Hausa
neighbours bombarded them with telephone calls requesting them to sell the remains of
their burnt/ destroyed houses to them. Of particular note is the evidence of Mr. James
Olukayode Obaleye who testified as CW170 in memorandum JCI/J/217/2009 on the
15th day of July, 2009. This Witness told the Commission in his memorandum he
presented before the Commission and tendered in evidence as Exhibit JCI/J/217/2009/1
and his oral evidence that he had received several calls from his Hausa/Fulani
neighbours to sell his house at B4 ‘A’ Laranto behind St. Augustine Monastery, Katako,
Jos to them but he refused. According to him, his refusal to do so led to the burning of
his house by his Hausa/Fulani Muslims neighbours after the Unrest. See pages 2 and 3
of Exhibit JCI/J/217/2009/1. Also see pages 4 of Exhibit JCI/J/160/1-being presentation
by the Izu Umunna Cultural Association, Jos and 5 - 6 of Exhibit JCI/J/127/2009/1
being a presentation by the Igbo Community Association (I.C.A) Jos to this effect.
The Hausa Leaders, elders and youth of the neighbourhood were also mentioned
as being responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008.
The witness told the Commission that all the persons mentioned, both young and
old came out en-mass with various dangerous weapons against their Christian
neighbours. The witness had this to say:
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 ‘…around 2:00pm all we could hear from the loudspeakers was ‘Matasa da
jama’a ku fito Jihad, kuma Allah zai yi maku albarka’ meaning ‘youth come out and
fight Jihad,God will bless you.’. What we saw was better imagined than said, because
it was a mob of both youth and the aged, well armed carrying machetes, axes, cutlasses,
containers of petrol and guns, while chanting ‘Allah –hu -akbar, za mu ji ma arna, Jos
ta Arewa namu ne’, ‘sabuwa da kaza bata hana yanka’ .... ......meaning ‘we are going
to kill the infidels (pagans), Jos North is our own, being familiar with the chicken does
not prevent it from slaughtering’.
See Verbatim Report of the Commission proceedings of 26 th February, 2009 and
also page 5 of Exhibit JCI/J/25/2009/1). From this direct evidence before the
Commission, it is clear that these groups of persons were some of those persons who
precipitated the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008 and thus should be held responsible
for the Unrest. The Commission is however, handicapped as no specific names of the
youth and Hausa/Fulani elders were given by the witness to enable it act appropriately.
The Commission however recommends that the Hausa/Fulani Muslims elders and youth
of the neighbourhood should be closely watched and monitored by security agents,
particularly the Police and the army to forestall future break down of law and order in
that neighbourhood.
4.1.11 Tudun Wada Christian youth vanguard and Muslim youth
The Tudun Wada Christian Youth Vanguard and Tudun Wada Muslim Youth
were mentioned in memorandum JCI/J/158/2009 presented by Adamu M .Yusuf. The
memorandum was presented by its maker, Adamu M. Yusuf and he testified as
Commission witness No 33(CW33). In pages 1 and 2 of this Exhibit, the witness
mentioned the Tudun Wada Christian Youth Vanguard and Muslim Youth of the Tudun
Wada as some of the groups of persons directly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th -
29th November, 2008.
The witness, in the same page 1 of Exhibit JCI/J/158/2009/1 alleged that his
house on plot No.TW.608 TA was set ablaze by Christian Youth Vanguard on Saturday,
29th November, 2008. Similarly, on page 4 of the Exhibit, the witness alleged that the
same Christian Youth Vanguard set fire on one Alh. Moh’d Wadata’s Bakery, a
neighbour of his. He also alleged that they were fully armed with dangerous weapons.
In his words, the witness said:
‘ the Christian Youths Vanguard took advantage of it, crossed over the
secretariat’s fence which is not high for criminals jumping over. They advanced
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forward through the Church premises and rocky spaces by overpowering the Muslim
Youths and set fire on Alh.Moh’d Wadata’s Bread Bakery, also a close neighbour. They
were fully armed with dangerous weapons: such as Dane –gun, Bow and Arrow,
cutlasses, stones etc.’
For the Muslim Youths, the witness alleged on page 2 of Exhibit
JCI/J/158/2009/1 that the Muslim Youths were out destroying and burning houses of
their Christian neighbours. The witness stated thus:
‘Information reached me that Muslim Youths were out destroying and burning
houses of our Christian neighbours. I rushed out and pleaded with them that whatever
happened, our non -Muslim neighbours were innocent. One of them pushed me aside
and made uncomplimentary remarks in Hausa that ‘kai tsohon banza, don Allah bamu
wuri .Kai ba ka gani an kone naka Massalaci da Gidajen Muslimai ba? Kai an naka ai’
(Meaning- You useless old man, please give us chance. Don’t you see our Mosque and
Muslim houses have been set on set ablaze? Your own house too will be set on fire’)’’.
The Commission observes that in Exhibit JCI/J/158/2009/1 and the oral
testimony of the witness, not a name out of members of Christian or Muslim Youth was
mentioned. What is more worrisome is the fact that during his oral testimony, the
witness told the Commission that there is no group in Tudun Wada known as Christian
youth vanguard but that he used the phrase because on the day of the incident, the youth
were in groups. In the circumstance, even if the Commission finds that these youths
played a role in the Jos Unrest of 28 th November, 2008, there is nothing much the
Commission can do as full and detailed particulars in respect of members of these youth
have to be placed before the Commission to enable it have them investigated. However,
the Commission is of the view that in order to forestall future break down of law and
order in that neighbourhood, the Youth of the neighbourhood as a whole should be
closely monitored by security operatives and the Police.
4.1.12 Albayan Islamic private school and mosque.
CW 8 while presenting Exhibit JCI/J/25/2009/1 alleged Albayan Islamic Private
School was directly responsible for the unrest. According to the witness, gunshots were
fired from the premises of this School, and this attracted the attention of some Christian
youth who were on their way to Angwan Rukuba from Chwel-Nyapto to seek refuge.
They confronted those who fired the shots and this led to a fight. The fight was probably
what leads to the death of five pupils of the school as indicated in the evidence of

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W.C195 who presented of Exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/1, memorandum of the Human
Rights Watch.
From this evidence, the alleged firing of gunshots from the AIbanyan Islamic
private school and mosque triggered off the Unrest within the vicinity of the school as
the witness told the Commission that upon hearing the gunshots, the Christian youth
who were passing by the school ‘turned and faced those who fired the gunshots’.
However, the level of destruction done to that school and number of lives lost as
indicated in Exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/1 seem to indicate that the volume of attack on the
school was considerable.
It is the Commission’s view that this allegation of gunshots and the activities of
the ‘Christian youth who were passing by the school’ should be seriously investigated
by the Police and if found to be true, the persons who were involved in this fierce battle
should be arrested and prosecuted for their roles in precipitating the Jos Unrest of 28 th
November, 2008.
4.1.13 Bala and Auwalu of Rusau Village, Jos
The memorandum JCI/J/79/2009 of Haske Women Association, Rusua Village,
Jos North Local Government Area, and Plateau State was presented on behalf of the
Association by Mrs. Kate Okoye a member of the Association, who testified as
Commission witness No.42 (CW.42). Although the witness did not state the name of
anybody in their memorandum as directly or indirectly responsible for the Jos Unrest of
28th November, 2008, persons affected by the crisis who were called to testify in the
memorandum mentioned the names of the following as being responsible for the
Unrest:

i) Mrs. Evelyn Osai one of the women affected and an eye-witness called
by CW 42 told the Commission that one Bala came to look for her
children to kill and later set her house ablaze.
ii) Awalu was identified by Mrs. Binta John as the killer of her husband,
Mr. Timothy John,
The Commission upon the application of Mrs Kate Okoye ordered that these
persons be invited to appear before the Commission. They were so invited but they
failed to appear before the Commission to defend themselves against these very grave
allegations. Since they failed to appear before the Commission, the Commission has no
choice but to rely on the direct and first hand evidence of the eye witnesses and hold

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that the said Bala of Rusau village and Awalu formerly of Rusau village, Jos, but now
in Jagindi, Kaduna State, were most probably some of the persons directly responsible
for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008 as they actively participated in the burning of
innocent people’s properties and callously killing innocent people. The Commission,
therefore, recommends that they be identified and arrested by the Police and the matter
investigated and charged to court for the offence of culpable homicide and arson and if
found guilty, maximum punishment for such of offences should be applied.
4.1.14 Suspects based in Gangere:
Memorandum JCI/J/106/2009 – The Afizere Cultural and Community
Development Association (ACCDA) National body. This memorandum was presented
by Atang Izam Atang, the National President of the Association. In tackling the issues
of identifying the persons, groups of persons and institutions responsible for the Jos
Unrest of 28th November, 2008, the writers of the memorandum identified on pages
14–15 of Exhibit JCI/J/106/2009/1 the following groups and organisations as being
responsible for the Unrest of 28th November, 2008. The presenters mentioned on page
15:
i) Group of hoodlums armed with guns, cutlasses, machetes, iron bars,
heavy sticks etc chanting ‘Allahu Akbar.........’ but did not identify any
person by name as a member of this group
ii) A group from Gangare, but nobody was identified as belonging to this
group.
Some Mosques which used loud speakers to mobilize the rioters and encouraged
and directed them to surge forward and attack the ‘arnas (infidels) and calling ‘jihad’
( holy war) etc.
However, the presenters did not give the names of these Mosques or those of their Mallams. In this regard,
the Commission is not in a position to act in anyway. There are so many Mosques and Imams in Jos, and they cannot
all be taken as suspects. If the presenters had wanted the Commission to act on this matter they could have supplied
details to assist the Commission. The Commission wishes to recommend that all the Mosques and their Imams and
youth in that neighbourhood and all their activities be closely monitored by security operatives to avert any future
break down of law and order in that neighbourhood and its environs.

4.1.15 Sikiru Panel Beater, Nuru Carpenter and Baba Audu Miango
Memorandum JCI/J/115/2009 by Kauna Baptist Church Rikkos, Jos. This
memorandum was presented on behalf of the church by Rev. Elisha Fom Jugu, who
testified as Commission Witness No.65 on the 2 nd day of April, 2009. On page 6 of

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Exhibit JCI/J/115/2009/1, the following persons among others were identified as being
responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008:
i) One Sikiru a Panel Beater
ii) Nuru, a carpenter in Rikkos
iii) Baba Audu Miango.
From the memorandum and oral evidence thereof, the witness stated that on the
morning of 29th November, 2008, Sikiru came with the others and burnt the Church.
Nuru Carpenter in Rikkos was also identified by the eye witness as one of the persons
that burnt down the Church. See pages 6 and 7 of the memorandum and pages 3 and 4
of the verbatim report of 2nd April, 2009. These persons were duly invited to appear
before the Commission to defend themselves but failed to appear. The Commission is
of the view that these individuals should be identified by the Police, the allegations
investigated and charges proffered where applicable.
4.1.16 Buhari and Kabiru:
Memorandum JCI/J/141/2009 by Messrs Noah and Nathaniel Ayoola and
Madam Alice Ayoola of Rijiya Tara, Rikkos behind NIXEA, Jos North. The Memo was
presented by Mr. Noah Oloyewole Ayoola, who testified as Commission Witness No.66
(CW66) on behalf of all the presenters, on the 2 nd day of April, 2009. The witness on
page 3 of Exhibit JCI/J/141/2009/1 identified the following persons as responsible for
the Unrest of 28th – 29th November, 2008:
i) One Buhari, the son of Alhaji Baba
ii) One Kabiru, an Okada rider

These two persons are known personally to the witness of the memorandum and
were said to be their immediate neighbours. Having heard directly from the presenter
who saw these persons and identified them, the Commission then invited the said
Buhari and Kabiru to appear before it to rebut the allegations against them, but they
failed to appear and since the evidence against them is strong and yet undisputed, the
Commission hereby recommends that they be identified, arrested, investigated and
prosecuted for their role in precipitating the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008.
4.1.17 Groups of Hausa / Fulani Muslims.
Memorandum JCI/J/130/2009 by The Evangelical Church of West Africa
(ECWA), Nasarawa Local Church Council, Jos District. This memorandum was
presented on behalf of the Church by one Mr Joshua Chuwang, a pastor of the Church.

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In page 12 of the Exhibit JCI/J/130/2009/1, the witness identified those who were
responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008 as the Hausa/Fulani Muslims
(See page 12 of Exhibit JCI/J/130/2009/1). According to the witness these people came
shouting ‘Allahu Akubar, Allahu Akubar’ and saying ‘come out for Jihad, ‘let us kill
the arna (infidel)’. Since no person is specifically mentioned as one of the Hausa Fulani
youths, there is little the Commission could do here to identify the alleged persons.
4.1.18 Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande and Alhaji Ismaila Mohammed.
Many memoranda presented before the Commission and the witnesses who
testified in respect of these memoranda mentioned Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande and
Alhaji Ismaila Mohammed as persons directly and/or indirectly responsible for the Jos
Unrest of 28th November, 2008. These memoranda include but are not limited to the
following:
(i) Memorandum No JCI/J/139/2009 presented by the Anaguta Community:
This memorandum on page 21 mentioned the fact that ‘the Hausa have always
been the perpetrators of the crisis in Jos North’. Though no mention was made of
specific persons, groups of persons or individuals in the memorandum, presenter of the
memorandum and Commission witness No. 6 Mr. Pius Gimba while being examined in
Chief by Lead Counsel to the Commission and cross examined by other Counsel
mentioned the following persons as being sponsors of and responsible for the Jos Unrest
of 28th November, 2008.
i) Ismaila Mohammed and,
ii) Dasuki Nakande, amongst other persons.(See Verbatim Report of the
proceedings of the Commission on 25th February, 2009).
According to the witness, these men were mentioned because of their comments
and utterances in media and public fora which are very inciting and derogatory.
Furthermore, the witness also told the Commission that these men are leaders within the
Hausa/Fulani Community and should be held responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th
November, 2008. The witness went further to tell the Commission that Ismaila
Mohammed and Dasuki Nakande are the ring leaders of the Unrest in Jos.
(ii) Memorandum JCI/J/154/2009 by Confederation of Plateau State Youth
Movement was presented by Iliya Gokum Lar on behalf of the Confederation. On page
21 of memorandum JCI/J/154/2009 (Exhibit JCI/J/154/2009/1), the witness stated they
are sure that Ismaila Mohammed who is one of the spoke men of the Hausa Muslims in
Jos can help the Commission to unravel the mystery of Jos Unrest of 28 th November,
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2008. On page 30 of their memorandum, the witness urged that the said Ismaila
Mohammed should be arrested and prosecuted.
The presenter and the witnesses who gave oral evidence on their behalf pointed
out Ismaila Mohammed amongst others as the person responsible for the Jos Unrest of
28th November, 2008 because of his inflammatory utterances and comments before,
during and after the Unrest. The witness cited in particular, the interview granted by
Nakande to the Daily Trust Newspaper and published on the 26 th day of November,
2008. This oral testimony of C.W.5 is contained in the Verbatim Report of Commission
proceedings of 25th February, 2009, where the witness stated the reason for saying that
Nakande and Ismaila Mohammed were responsible for the Unrest. See Verbatim Report
of the said 25th February, 2009. The Daily Trust Newspaper of Wednesday, 26 th
November, 2008, where the witness alleged that the inflammatory and inciting
interviews were granted by Alhaji Dasuki Ibrahim Nakande was tendered as Exhibit
JCI/J/154/2009/3, while The Vanguard Newspaper of Monday,16th March, 2009,
where Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande granted an Interview titled ‘Our grouse against
Governor Jang’ was also tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibit
JCI/J/154/2009/5 respectively.
(iii) Memorandum JCI/J/76/2009 presented by P.D.P, Plateau State chapter. The
memorandum tendered and admitted as Exhibit JCI/J/76/2009/1 was signed and
presented on behalf of the party P.D.P, Plateau State Chapter by its State Secretary,
Daniel Dakim. The witness on page 5 of the Exhibit mentioned amongst others, Alhaji
Samaila Mohammed as one of the persons to be invited by the Commission to clarify
the statement he allegedly made in some National Dailies that ‘the violence in Jos is an
indication of the fact that some people do not have the right to protest’.
(iv) Another memorandum and oral evidence, led thereon naming these two men
is in memorandum JCI/J/73/2009 presented by Du Youth Movement. This
memorandum was presented by Rwas Chuwang Gyang on the 31 st day of March, 2009
on behalf of the Movement. Mr. Rwas Chuwang Gyang testified as Commission
Witness No.53 (CW53). On page 18 of the said Exhibit JCI/J/73/2009/1, the witness
mentioned the role of Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande and made particular reference to
the comments attributed to him (Nakande) in some National Dailies. To buttress this
allegation, the Witness attached The Sunday Vanguard of 11th, January, 2009, page 45
titled ‘THE SUNDAY PERISCOPE’ where the Interview titled ‘Our grouse against
Governor Jang’ granted by Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande was published as Appendix
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VI. This Appendix was subsequently tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibit
JCI/J/73/2009/6
(v) Memorandum JCI/J/28/2009 submitted by Mwaghavwul Development
Association, Jos Branch also alleged that Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande and Hon. Ismaila
Mohammed were among the persons directly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th
November, 2008. This memorandum was presented by one Hon Mape, the Chairman of
the Association on the 26th day of February, 2009. Hon. Mape testified as Commission
Witness (CW9) and stated on page 8 thereof that:
‘During the tenure of Samaila Mohammed as Chairman, Jos Local Government
Area, he came with certain policies that provoked the entire Anaguta and other
indigenes ..........He also bastardized the issuance of indigene Certificates to such an
extent that non indigenes were able to obtain the Certificates..............’
In answer to cross examination by a counsel, one Ali Aku Esq., the witnesses
admitted that since Samaila Mohammed bastardized the issuance of indigeneship
Certificate, he was part and cause of the problem. See Verbatim Report of the
Commission’s proceedings of 26th February, 2009 to this effect.
(vi) Memo JCI/J/137/2009 PDP Elders Northern Zone Forum Plateau State. The
memorandum was presented on behalf of the Forum by Doctor Jonah Madugu. At page
16 of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/137/2009/1), the witness identified Honourable
Ismaila Mohammed (Member Federal House of Representatives) and Honourable D.S.
Nakande (former Federal Minister of State for Information and Communication) as
persons directly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008:
There was further testimony to the effect that these named individuals were
responsible for the Jos crisis of the 7 th September, 2001 and referred the Commission to
the Report
The Commission, after reviewing the gravity of the allegations against these two
men from several memoranda presented before it, felt it was very necessary and
important and in the spirit of fair hearing, that these men be invited to appear before the
Commission to present their defence. The Commission thought that there was need for
these men to appear before it to rebuff the allegations therein. This was further
strengthened by the fact that numerous memoranda and oral evidence presented before
the Commission alleged that they were to be held responsible for inciting and
provocating, precipitating and sponsoring the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008.

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 In view of the serious and grievous allegations made against these two men, the
Commission also decided to thoroughly read the Reports referred to above to establish
the credibility or otherwise of the allegations against them. Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki
Nakande and Ismaila Mohammed were specifically invited to appear before the
Commission on the 20th day of July,2009.
The Commission, from the totality of the evidence before it, as highlighted
above, found as a fact that there is a lot of misinformation and distortion of facts
peddled in the interviews by Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande, which is unbecoming of
a man of his status in the society. One wonders what was the motive of Alhaji Ibrahim
Dasuki Nakande for peddling so much misinformation and distortion of facts on the Jos
Unrest of 28th November, 2008
The Commission has carefully perused the excerpts of the interview granted by
Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande tilted ‘Our grouse against Governor Jang’ as published in
Exhibit JCI/154/2009/5 and compared it with other evidence presented before the
Commission and found that all the facts represented therein by Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki
Nakande, particularly the fact that Governor gave an order of shoot on sight and as a
result:
‘the people who were not rioting but simply demonstrating their displeasure
over perceived ways and means being devised by the State Government who wanted to
rig an election were killed and that the action taken was not to scare but to kill and it
was an act that was carried out to the letter’
is nothing but complete falsehood and great misinformation and
misrepresentation of facts. The stand of the Commission is borne out of the fact that
there is no evidences that the Governor gave any shoot-at-sight order and also ‘the
people’, who Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande said ‘were simply demonstrating were actually
rioting and carrying dangerous weapons such as guns, cutlasses, bows and arrows,
knives, petrol and dealing death and destruction with lives and property of non
Hausa/Fulani people.
The Commission therefore recommends that Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande
and Alhaji Ismaila Muhammed should be thoroughly investigated by the Police.
The Commission is of the view that the utterances of these two men are capable
of igniting more crises in the future.
4.1.19 Alhaji Auwalu Mai Sugar

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 Memorandum JCI/J/109/2009 presented by the Izere (Jarawa) concerned
Daughters of the Afizere Chiefdom of Jos North and Jos East Local Government Area,
Plateau State which memorandum was tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibit
JCI/J/109/2009/1 mentioned one Alhaji Auwalu Mai Sugar as one of the persons
directly responsible for the Unrest. The said Alhaji Auwalu Mai Sugar was alleged in
paragraph 5, page 18 of Exhibit JCI/J/109/2009/1 to have armed himself, stood on his
balcony and was shooting indiscriminately at passers-by and even into the vicinity of
the Church. However, moves to serve the said Alhaji Auwalu Mai Sugar to appear
before the Commission to defend himself revealed that he is now deceased.
4.1.20 Ring of ‘Mercenaries’
Other groups mentioned in Exhibit JCI/J/109/2009/1 is a convex ring of
mercenaries and internal collaborators in Gangare, Yanshanu and Filin Ball. Although
these groups were mentioned by the witness, the witness did not state specifically what
roles were played by them, and neither were any names of such ‘mercenaries’ or their
internal collaborators mentioned to enable the Commission recommend any further
proper investigation of the allegations.
4.1.21 Mijin Patu Alale and two others
Memorandum JCI/J/111/2009 by Izang Ayana Arin was presented by Iki Atsen
Arin on behalf of the maker. The witness of the memorandum on page 1 made reference
to a neighbour of his, one Hausa man who came to his house shortly before the Hausa
youth descended on him and his house. On page 3 of Exhibit JCI/J/111/2009/1, the
witness further mentioned the following persons as persons directly responsible for the
Jos Unrest of 28th – 29th November, 2008:
i) Mijin Patu Alale,
ii) One truck driver who lives in the same house with Abu,
iii) One Alhaji Abdullahi who was shouting ‘Ku kashe arna ku kone
gidajeusu’. (Meaning ‘kill the infidels, and burnt their houses’).
These persons attacked the witness of this memorandum, burnt his house, cut off
his left wrist and took it away leaving him for dead. Application was made by A.A.
Madaki Esq., Counsel representing the witness to invite the persons mentioned in the
Exhibit JCI/J/111/2009/1 to appear before the Commission to explain their role in the
Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008 and the application was granted. The suspects were
accordingly invited to appear before the Commission to defend themselves but they
failed to appear. The Commission recommends that they should be arrested and the
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matter investigated by the Police on the complaint of the witness and charged to court
for causing grievous bodily injury and arson if the allegation is substantiated.
4.1.22 Okasha and Tanko
Memorandum JCI/J/112/2009 was written and submitted to the Commission by
Mrs Rahila Goyol of Kauna Baptist Church, Rikkos; Jos. Mrs Rahila Goyol came to the
Commission to present her memorandum but was read by one Mrs Juliana Pyantu on
behalf of Mrs Rahila Goyol who was too emotional to read same. Her husband and
three sons were killed during the Unrest by the suspects and their collaborators. Mrs.
Goyol said her husband and her three children took refuge in the house of Baba
Maigemu their neighbour, but the Hausa/Fulani Muslim Youth who looted the property
in their house and burnt same and later went to the house of Baba Maigemu and killed
her husband and the three children. Mrs. Goyol said the Hausa/Fulani Muslim youth
had beaten Baba Maigemu and threatened to kill him before they eventually
overpowered him and kill her husband and her three children.
Mrs. Goyol said the suspect one Okasha was the person who disclosed to the
Hausa/Fulani Youth the whereabouts of her husband and her three children because he
saw her husband and the three children when they entered the house of Baba Maigemu.
As for Tanko, Mrs Goyol saw him together with the Hausa/Fulani Youth armed with
long knives on the day of the Unrest but when the saw the Policemen who came to
patrol the area, they quickly hid their knives.
The Commission is of the view that since there is direct evidence of an eye
witness against Okasha and Tanko, they should be identified and interrogated by the
Police and charged to court if there is sufficient evidence against them.
4.1.23 Usman Sanusi and 4 others
Memorandum JCI/J/114/2009 by Iki Atsen Arin, Rahila I. Arin and Lami A.
Arin all of Rikkos New Layout, Jos. This memorandum was presented on behalf of all
the makers by Iki Atsen Arin on the 18 th day of March, 2009. He testified as
Commission witness 22 (CW22). The witness on pages 4 and 10 of the memorandum
identified the following persons as responsible for the 28th November, 2008 Unrest:
i) Muslim youth
ii) Usman Sanusi
iii) Ibrahim Haruna
iv) Alhaji Abdullahi
v) Salisu Abdullahi
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 vi) Ali
All these suspects were invited to appear before the Commission on the 22nd day
of July, 2009 to respond to the allegations labelled against them. Notices to this effect
were personally served on them. Unfortunately, they refused to appear and defend
themselves of these allegations. The witness who testified was at the scene of the
incident, and he saw when one of the suspects, Usman Sanusi was among those who
macheted, stoned and eventually killed his brother, late Peter Ibrahim Arin. He also saw
the same Usman Sanusi when he entered their compound through their fence with a
machete strapped to his waist and gave false assurance that he, Usman Sanusi, would
not allow anyone to harm them . The witness also overheard the same Usman Sanusi,
when he was telling people inside Alhaji Abdullahi’s house that there were still people
in the witness’ house and further heard the response of Alhaji Abdullahi when he told
Usman Sanusi that he should leave them there so that they could kill them (i.e. the
Witness and other people in the house with him) in the evening. See pages 2, 3 and 4 of
the memorandum
From the totality of this evidence against these persons - Usman Sanusi, Ibrahim
Haruna, Alhaji Abdullahi and Salisu Abdullahi, should be identified by the Police,
investigated and prosecuted for arson, murder and conspiracy to commit murder and if
found guilty, appropriate punishment for the offences be applied. As for ‘Muslim youth
of Rikkos, the Commission finds it difficult to accuse the entire youth of area.
However, if identified culprit should further mention any other person not included
here, such a person should also be investigated and prosecuted.
4.1.24 The Nigerian Police
The Nigerian Police was accused by many presenters of memoranda before the
Commission and numerous accusations were levied against the them for failure to
respond promptly to curtail and contain the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008. There
were also allegations of arbitrary killings. Some of these Memoranda are:
(i) Memorandum NO.JCI/J/160/2009: This memorandum was submitted by
Izu Umunna Cultural Association, Jos and it was presented on the 18th of March, 2009
by Ikechukwu Tony Egwuonwu, 2nd Deputy President (I.U.C.A), Jos on behalf of the
Association. He testified as Commission witness No.25 (CW25). On page 5 of
memorandum JCI/J/160/2009, the witness made a plea to the Commission
‘to find out if there was diligence in the performance of duties and functions by
the Federal Government, State Government, the Police, the Army and other security
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services amongst others and to recommend adequate punishment for dereliction of
duties’.
In his oral evidence, the witness told the Commission inter alia that the Police
failed to perform their duties which are to safe guard lives and properties as they failed
to respond to distress calls from people during the time of the Unrest. To be specific, in
the Verbatim Report of the 18th day of March, 2009, the witness said this:
‘in this State, people will make distress calls to the Police even at 2:00a.m -
3:00 am and the Police will not come. The crisis only stopped when the Soldiers
entered.
Thereafter, the witness said the Police should be held responsible since they
cannot do their work.
(ii) Another memorandum that came down heavily on the Police is
memorandum JCI/J/25/2009 presented by Evang. Andrew N. Dalyop. The memorandum
was presented on the 26th day of February, 2009 by Evangelist Da Andrew Dalyop who
testified as Commission Witness No .8 (CW8). At page 2 of the memorandum, the
witness stated among other things that:
‘after the election on Thursday, 27th November, 2008, meeting was held in the
evening amongst representatives of the Christian and Muslims factions within Dogon
Dutse Community.’
Thereafter, the witness and one A.S.P Monday Davou (Rtd.) alongside Alhaji Isa
Mohammed and Alhaji Bashiru Jibrin among other persons were delegated to meet the
D.P.O of Nassarawa Police station to brief him of their willingness to come together
and protect their Community in event of any crisis. The witness then went on to tell the
Commission that the D.P.O assured them of his cooperation and willingness to protect
their neighbourhood to ensure that there was no break down of law and order in the
neighbourhood. This implied that the Police in that neighbourhood knew before hand
that there was the possibility that there might be problem in that neighbourhood.
However, the D.P.O. and the entire Police within the neighbourhood did nothing to
avert the Unrest that engulfed the area on the 28 th days of November, 2008. The witness
also state in page 4 of Exhibit JCI/J/25/2009/1, that when the crisis erupted, the same
D.P.O could not be reached and the people were left at the mercy of their rampaging
Hausa/Fulani Muslim attackers. Their plight was further worsened by the fact that the
Policemen they met at station when they went for help told them that there was nothing
they could do as the matter was out of their control. In his oral evidence, the witness
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reiterated his statement in Exhibit JCI/J/25 /2009 /1. The witness told the Commission
that before the crisis, they reported to the DPO in Nassarawa Gwong and the Police
therefore, knew that there was likelihood of a break down of peace. See the oral
testimony of the witness in the Verbatim Report of the proceeding of the Commission
for 26th February, 2009.
(iii) Memorandum JCI/J/38/2009, presented by the Middle Belt Forum,
Plateau State Chapter, Jos, Nigeria is another memorandum that questioned the role of
the Police, particularly, the Nassarawa Gwong Police Station. The memorandum was
presented by Mr. Samuel Bulus Dawang, who testified as Commission witness No.95
(CW95) on behalf of the Forum. The Witness in his oral evidence told the Commission
that prior to the day of Local Government Area Councils elections of 27 th November,
2008, the members of his Community and himself noticed an unusual and
unprecedented influx of strange persons posing either as water vendors, shoe shiners etc
into Jos and some rural areas like his area, Kinga Village Naraguta. He added that
when they noticed such influx of strange persons and vehicles into the town particularly
in their area, they reported the matter first of all to the Police out-post in their area,
Naraguta. The witness also told the Commission that when the crisis erupted, all their
efforts to get the Police to come to their rescue proved abortive and requested that the
Police be invited to give explanations for their attitude during the Unrest. See the
Verbatim Report of the Proceedings of the Commission of 8th April, 2009 for the details
of his testimony.
(iv) Memorandum No. JCI/J/132/2009 - This memorandum was presented by
Jesus Total Liberation Mission, Jos. It was heard by the Commission on the 18 th day of
June, 2009 with Rev. Godwin Okeke, Senior and the Presiding Pastor, testifying on
behalf of the Church as Commission witness No.113 (CW113). The witness at page 4
stated that the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008:
‘was also aided by the security lapses from the security operatives in the State’.
He gave an example of the failure of the Police to help him when he reported to
them, particularly, the Police patrol team he met on his way along Zaria Road and told
them about what was happening to his Church, and requested for their intervention.
According to the witness, the Police did not give him any attention and at the end, his
church was completely destroyed by the Hausa/ Fulani Muslim youth attackers. Further
more, in his oral evidence the witness confirmed what he had written in Exhibit
JCI/J/132/2009/1 when he told the Commission that:
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 ‘around 11:00 O’clock, I stopped them and told them what happened and if they
could go there but none of them paid any attention.’.
(v) Memorandum NO.JCI/J/131/2009 by The Redeemed Peoples Mission,
Jos, Plateau State. This memorandum came up for hearing before the Commission on
the 16th day of July, 2009 and was presented on behalf of the Mission by one Rev.
Vincent Nwachil, who testified as Commission witness 182 (CW182). The Church
stated on page 1 of the memorandum:
‘some of the miscreants were putting on Police and Military uniforms as they
unleashed terror by killing and injuring innocent citizens’.
(vi) Memorandum JCI/J/147/2009 - Human Rights Watch. This
memorandum was presented by one Eric Guttschuss on behalf of the Human Rights
Watch on the 20th day of July, 2009 and it was tendered and admitted in evidence as
exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/1. He testified as Commission witness 195 (CW195). In Exhibit
JCI/J/147/2009/1, Human Rights Watch accused the Police and particularly, the Mobile
Police (MOPOL) of arbitrary killings and strongly urged that these allegations be
investigated. At page 1 of Exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/1 Titled ‘SUMMARY’, the witness
stated inter alia that:
‘in responding to the inter-communal violence, the Nigerian Police
...............were implicated in more than 130 arbitrary killings, mostly of young Muslim
men from the Hausa/Fulani ethnic group.........’.
and thereafter, proceeded to urge the Commission to investigate the allegations.
The details of the alleged arbitrary killings by the Police are chronicled in pages 8 to 14
of Exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/9, where the witness gave what he called eye witnesses’
accounts of the alleged arbitrary killings by the Police, particularly, the MOPOL. The
witness, in the first 2 paragraphs of page 8 of Exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/1 gave a total
figure of 74 persons allegedly arbitrary killed by the Police. In the said pages 8 to 14 of
Exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/1, Witness chronicled a total of 7 incidents of alleged arbitrary
killings by the Police, according to him; these incidents were narrated to him by eye
witnesses to the alleged arbitrary killings.
Before we proceed further with the evidence of this witness, we must first of all
place on record here that the witness was not an eye witness to all the alleged arbitrary
killings by the Police as in the course of the presentation of the Exhibit
JCI/J/147/2009/1, the witness told the Commission that he was neither in Nigeria nor
Jos on the 28th day of November, 2008, i.e. the day the Unrest erupted as he was in the
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US then and came into Nigeria about the 3rd day of December, 2008. In spite of this fact,
throughout his narration of the alleged eye witness accounts of the alleged arbitrary
killings by the Police, the witness did not mention the name of any of the eye witness to
the alleged arbitrary killings.
In the course of his oral evidence, when requested by the Lead Counsel to the
Commission to give the names of the said eye witnesses and also produce them to
testify before the Commission of what they saw, the witness refused to disclose their
names and also told the Commission that he was not in the position to produce them
before the Commission to testify.
The Commission then proceeded and invited the relevant officers of the
Nigerian Police to appear before it to defend their roles in the allegation of aiding and
abetting or precipitating of the Jos unrest of 28th November, 2008 and also their
dereliction of duty during the Unrest as alleged by the many witnesses that appeared
and testified before the Commission. The Commissioner of Police, Plateau State
Command, Jos, the DPO, Nigerian Police, Nassarawa Gwong, Jos, D.P.O Laranto
Police station and the Officer in Charge Police Out-Post, Naraguta were all invited to
appear before the Commission on the 31st day of July, 2009.
On the 5th day of August, 2009, the former Commissioner of Police, Plateau
Command, CP Samson V. Wudah appeared before the Commission to present the
response of the Police to the allegation levelled against it by the witnesses as earlier
highlighted above.
In his written response dated 5th August, 2009, on the allegation of the failure
of the Police to check alleged of influx of strange persons into Jos and its environs as
made by witness in memorandum JCI/J/38/2009 (Exhibit JCI/J/38/2009/1), the
Commissioner, who testified in camera for security reasons, denied that there was any
wrong doing or security lapses on the part of the Police and referred the Commission to
annexure ‘A’ to his response, which according to him is the ‘Operational Order NO.
2/2008’ on which the whole of the election activities were anchored, including Police
activities before, during and after the election’ The Commissioner also referred the
Commission to paragraph 10 of his response titled ‘Manpower Development/Police
Action’ which he claimed had addressed the issue of perceived security lapses on the
part of the Police. See pages 6, 7 to paragraph 1 of page 8 and page 9 paragraph 12 (a)
of the response dated 5th August, 2009

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 The Commission having carefully listened to the oral evidence and clarifications
made by the witness (CW211) and having also response, carefully read through the
written response, found that the witness did not at all address the issues raised by
CW.95 in Exhibit JCI/J/38/2009/1 on the alleged influx of strange persons into Jos and
its environs prior to the Local Government Elections of 27 th November, 2008. He did
not tell the Commission whether he received the report and whether he directed his men
to investigate same and what the outcome of the investigation was. From all indications,
the Police did not take the report seriously and did not even investigate it. If the Police
had taken time to investigate it, it was most probable that some people could have been
arrested and this could shed light on any plot to cause mayhem. Their failure to do so
indicates a security lapses on the part of the Police and a dereliction of duty. If the
Police had acted promptly on such useful report, the Jos Unrest of November, 2008
could have been nipped in the bud. The Commission is of the view that the Officer in
Charge of the Police out-post, Naraguta, where the report was made should be
investigated for negligence and dereliction of duty. He did not appear before the
Commission to answer to the invitation sent to him and the Commissioner of Police
who appeared for all Police Officers invited did not address the issue raised against him.
In responses to allegations contained in memoranda JCI/J/131 /2009, and
JCI/J/160/2009/1 Commissioner of Police, Plateau Command, Jos, CP Samson V.
Wudah, CW.21 to a large extent, admitted lapses on the part of the Police but stated that
such lapses were not deliberate but due to circumstances beyond the control of the
Police. He attributed any lapses on the part of the Police during the period of the Unrest
of 28th November, 2008 to logistics reasons, mainly inadequacy of rapid response
facilities available to the Police to effectively respond promptly in crisis situations. This
idea was so explained when he stated thus in pages 9 to 10 of his response:
‘There is no doubt that the situation that characterised every segment of other
Government agencies in terms of adequacies also applies to the Nigerian Police Force.
It is not an overstatement to state that Police inadequacies are glaring, particularly in
terms of logistics, If there were enough vehicles and effective communication gadgets in
the Command, the Command would have done better in managing the crisis’.
In terms of manpower, the witness told the Commission that the Command had
adequate manpower on ground as the Command was able to get enough men from other
Commands to assist in managing the crisis. Here reference is made to pages 6 to 8 of
the Response schedule 20 herein. He explained further that :
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 ‘the Divisional Police Officers and Sector Commanders were given definite
instructions to protect all places of worship during peace time and crisis periods as
these have always been targets during ethnic, religious or political crisis in this
Country.’.
However, the witness failed to tell the Commission either in his written response
or oral evidence adduced in respect thereof, how many Mosques or Churches the Police
sent Policemen to protect during the Crisis. From evidence of wanton destructions of
Churches and from evidence to the effect that the only place of worship guarded by a
combined team of Nigerian Army and the Police with armoured car permanently
stationed there, was the Central Mosque, Massalachin Juma’a Jos, no other place of
worship was protected by the Police or Soldiers.
On the issue of the failure of the Police to respond to distress calls while the
crisis lasted, the witness blamed this on lack of mobility and other logistics. He stated
categorically on page 10, paragraph (c) among other things as follows:
‘that while the attacks lasted, distress calls to the Police were not responded to
is not true. As acknowledged above in paragraph 12 b , this incident happened
spontaneously and because of lack of vehicles and other logistics, the Police could not
reach every member of the society that made a distress call to it’.
As in the case of allegations against the Police of their failure to protect places of
worship, particularly, Christian place of worship, the witness in his defence did not tell
the Commission the names or the numbers of the members of the society whose distress
calls during the Unrest were attended to by the Police nor the areas where such calls
emanated from and what the Police did in such situations.
The witness narrated their handicaps in terms of mobility for swift movement of
security operatives to crisis spots, lack of Communication gadgets such as mobile
phones, walkie talkies etc. He told the Commission that in the whole of Plateau
Command, there are only 30 walkie talkies which are grossly inadequate for the
Command to effectively communicate with the various Police stations, D.P.Os; Police
out-posts both those within Jos metropolis and others in the other Local Government
Areas of the State. He told the Commission that the Police Command Plateau State
does not have up to 50 serviceable vehicles at it disposal to effectively respond swiftly
in crisis situations
On the issue of allegation of the use of Police uniforms by persons posing as
Police during the Unrest, the witness, C.W 211 admitted that:
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 ‘it is common knowledge that Police uniforms and that of other services have
been found in possession of criminals in this country in the past and will continue.’
On the allegation of arbitrary killings by the Police based on an alleged shoot-
on-sight order issued by Governor Jonah Jang of Plateau State, the witness categorically
denied same and further told the Commission that the Governor has no such power to
give the Police any order to shoot-at-sight. He added that the Police cannot be said to
kill the same citizens they are under obligation to protect. He also insisted that the
Police operated strictly within the Operational Order NO.2/2008 with reference NO.
CJ.3919/PS/OPS/VOL.40/79 dated 25th, November, 2008 issued by the Police Force
Headquarters in respect of the Unrest. See page 11 of the Witness’ response, schedule
20.
On the 7th day of August, 2009, the present Commissioner of Police Plateau
State Command, Jos also gave evidence before the Commission and buttressed the
assertion of CP Samson V. Wudah.
The Commission will now address the following questions:
i) Whether the Nigerian Police Plateau Command, Jos was aware that
there was going to be break down of law and order in Jos North after the
Local Government Elections held on the 27th day of November, 2008
despite the fact that the said Election was conducted peacefully without
any problems and failed to take any steps to ensure that the Unrest did
not occur?
ii) Whether or not there were any lapses and complicity on the part of the
Nigerian Police, Plateau Command during the Jos Unrest of 28 th
November, 2008.
iii) Whether the Police was involved in arbitrary killings as alleged in
Exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/1 above.
From all the available evidence chronicled in the numerous
Memoranda presented before the Commission and reviewed above and
considering the oral testimonies of witnesses in support thereof, there is no doubt that
the Local Government Elections held throughout the State on the 27 th day of November,
2008 were peaceful and successful. The Commission is of view, however that after the
Elections and during the collations of the Election Results, the Police was some how
aware that there was possibility of a break down of law and order in Jos North Local

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Government Area. Commission witness (CW.211 that is, C. P. Samson Wudah on page
5 paragraph 9(i) stated inter alia that:
‘As early as between 0230-0330 hours of 28 th November, 2008, information
filtered to the Police that some Moslem youths were holding nocturnal meetings at
Moslem dominated areas’.
And in paragraph 9(ii) CW211 stated thus:
‘Soon after, they were reported to be shouting Allahu Akbar along Ali Kazaure
Street and other Hausa Muslims dominated areas in Jos North. It was further revealed
that they mounted road blocks in some places. At about 0500 to 0530 hrs they attempted
an incursion on the collation centre which was repealed by the Police..........’
This piece of evidence from CW211 shows very glaringly that it was certain that
there would be break down of law and order in Jos North Local Government Area of
Plateau after the Election was concluded while the results of the Elections were still
being collated. All CW.211 could tell the Commission was that after the miscreants
were repelled by the Police, they regrouped and attempted to penetrate the collation
centre at Kabong, Gada Biu to attack the Police, electoral officials and destroy electoral
materials but the Police drove them away and quickly evacuated the electoral materials
and officials out of the collation centre to PLASIEC Headquarters, for safety. The
witness did not tell the Commission of the steps taken to forestall a total break down of
law and order due to the action of these miscreants. The Police had ample time to
mobilize to effectively curtail the crisis from spreading but they failed to take adequate
steps to ensure this did not happen. CW211 admitted that the Police received the
information of the gathering storm at 230 - 033 hrs and furthermore C.W 202 had
earlier told the Commission that the Hausa youth started gathering at about 11.45pm on
the 27th day of November, 2008 from Evangel Hospital Road, towards the collation
centre at Kabong. This claim also buttressed the earlier evidence of Mr. Nuhu Asama
who testified as CW.96 on the 8th day of April 2009, in memorandum JCI/J/133/2009
presented by Bache Development Association, CW.96 who told this Commission that
the Hausa youths/thugs came out about 11:30 pm in response to the alarm raised by one
Hon. Nazifi by phone calls to some unknown persons to come out. The Commission is
of the view that from that 11:00pm of 27 th November 2008, when the first alarm was
raised, if the Police had taken the matter seriously and quickly mobilized forces to the
various flash-points like Ali Kazaure, Angwan Rogo, Gangare etc, the Unrest could
have been nipped in the bud. CP Samson V. Wudah simply told the Commission in his
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oral submission during cross-examination by a Counsel to the Commission that they
closely monitored the situation until the eruption of the crisis. The Commission is of
the view that the Police, in this regard, is guilty of dereliction of duty as they had
knowledge of early warning signs of the Jos Unrest of 28 th November, 2008 but did not
take adequate steps to prevent it from happening.
From the evidence of CW.211, i.e. the former Commissioner of Police, CP
Samson V. Wudah, there is no evidence of any Police posting to take charge of strategic
locations, i.e. flash-points in Jos North Local Government Area which could have
promptly quelled any uprising by undesirable elements while the results of the election
were being collated and eventual announcement of such results. The Commission
disagrees with the Police that they did everything possible to protect lives and properties
during and after the Election.
(ii) On whether or not there were any deliberate lapses and complicity on the
part of the Nigerian Police, Plateau Command during the Unrest, the Commission has
considered and reviewed all the evidence placed before it. On alleged Police lapses
during the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008, for instance, the allegations by CW25 in
Memorandum No. JCI/J/160/2009, Exhibit JCI/J/160/2009/1 that ‘distress calls to the
Police during unrest were not responded to,’ the Police admitted their lapses in this
regard when in the response, the Police stated in page 10, paragraph (c):
‘ .......this incident happened spontaneously and because of lack of vehicles and
other logistics the Police could not reach every member of the society that made
distress call to it’.
Further reference to lapses on the part of the Police is contained in page 4 of
Exhibit JCI/J/132/2009/1 wherein the witness stated as follows:
‘The Jos riot of November 28th was also aided by the security lapses from the
security operatives in the State. For example, when I met the Police patrol team, I told
them what was happening in the Church, that some people were in with guns and some
ammunitions but they didn’t give me attention. Consequently, the attackers had enough
time to execute their evil plans by not only burning the church but pulling down the
walls’.
In this instant case where the witness met the Police face to face and even a
patrol team and mobile too, the Police refused to attend to him. Could the Police say in
this case too that this ‘member of the society’ who saw the Police face to face and made
a plea for assistance to save his Church ‘could not be reached? This piece of evidence
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bring the Commission’s memory back to the sad evidence of Mrs. Comfort A.
Akinjogbin, who testified as Commission witness No.20 (CW20) on the 18 th of March,
2009 in memorandum JCI/J/171/2009, wherein she narrated to the Commission how
three corps members were slaughtered in their house and how, while the boys were in
the pool of their own blood, she saw Police patrol team passed by in front of her house
and pleaded with them to help her and the poor hapless corpers but the Police refused to
give her any assistance. See paragraph 7 to 10 of page 4 of Exhibit JCI/J/171/2009/1
where the witness narrates her ordeal as follows:
‘...........then I saw a Police vehicle with many Police men and I cried and
pleaded with the Police who were standing by , even rolling on the ground asking for
help to take my boys to hospitals to save their lives but no response. Then two other
Police vehicles filled with Police men came. I kept pleading but they claimed they were
called at Congo and if I was not ready to leave with them immediately I could die with
my three sons (i.e. the three NYSC members)’.
The evidence of C.W.8, Evangelist Da Andrew Dalyop in this regard is also
relevant. This witness stated in his evidence contained in Exhibit JCI/J/25/2009/1 and
oral evidence before the Commission that prior to the Election and the Unrest of 28 th
November, 2008, Christians and Muslims elders/leaders in their Community met to
deliberate on the security situation in their area and after the meeting, he and other
elders were delegated to confer with the Police D.P.O, Nassarawa Gwong Police Station
to brief him of their suspicion of likelihood of the break down of law and order after the
election and how they have decided to protect their neighbourhood against any
breakdown of law and order. The witness went further to state that the DPO was quite
happy with their information and plan and assured them of his support and cooperation
in case of any eventuality.
However, the witness told the Commission that when the Unrest eventually
broke out, the same DPO could no longer be reached and the other Policemen they met
at the station told them that the matter was beyond them and so refused and failed to do
anything.
The Commission holds that there were obvious lapses and dereliction of duty on
the part of the Police. The Police failed to perform its duty of protecting lives and
property effectively thus the magnitude of destruction of lives and property was worse
than what it ought to have been if the Police had performed their duty promptly and
effectively.
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 It is also the evidence that the Police alone could not curtail the Unrest until the
Military had to be called in. CW211 stated in paragraph 11 titled Consultations in
pages 8 to 9 of his written response that:
‘... it became imperative for more support from the Military........... From then,
the Military and the Police jointly curtailed the situation from escalating to other Local
Government Areas in the State’’.

From this evidence of CW211, it is clear that the Police could not curtail the
Unrest as already admitted and earlier referred to at page 9 – 10 of his response.
As for the D.P.Os of Laranto, Nassarawa Gwong, Police Stations and the O/C in
charge of Naraguta Police Outpost who all prior to the Unrest were duly informed by
various witnesses before the Commission of the likelihood of the possible breakdown of
Law and Order prior or after the elections of 27 th November, 2008 but failed to take any
reasonable steps to deal with the matter appropriately and cause thorough investigations
which might have averted any uprising in the Jos North Local Government Area, they
should be thoroughly investigated and prosecuted for dereliction of duty and if found
guilty should be out rightly dismissed from service.
The activities of the former Commissioner of Police, Plateau Command, CP
Samson V. Wudah before and during the crisis should be thoroughly investigated as
there is evidence before the Commission that the Commissioner of Police then was
being directed by Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande on what to do and what not to do.
(See memorandum JCI/J/206/2009 by Da Ezekiel D.J. Choji). And if found wanting,
should be prosecuted for dereliction of duty and punished appropriately.
4.1.25 The Nigerian Army:
A few Memoranda presented before the Commission also alleged that the
Nigerian Army was either directly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th November,
2008 or caused it to escalate. Of note is memorandum JCI/J/147/2009 of Human Rights
Watch, presented by Eric Guttschuss on behalf of the organisation on the 20 th day of
July, 2009. He testified as Commission witness No. 195 (CW195) as stated above. The
memorandum accused the Military amongst other security agencies of arbitrary killings
and strongly called for their investigation. On page 1 of Exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/1, titled
‘SUMMARY’, the Witness stated inter alia that:
‘in responding to the inter-communal violence, the Nigerian Police and military
were implicated in more than 130 arbitrary killings, mostly of young Muslim men from
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the Hausa/Fulani ethnic group. While most of the intercommunal violence took place
on 28th day of November, the vast majority of the killings by the police and military
came on November 29, the same day that the Plateau State Governor issued a ‘shoot on
sight order’ to security forces.
According to his research, Human Rights Watch ‘also documented eight
incidents involving the arbitrary killings of 59 men by the Military.’ The witness,
thereafter, proceeded to urge the Commission to investigate the allegations of
widespread killing by security forces.
C.W 195 then proceeded to chronicle from pages 15 to 18 of Exhibit
JCI/J/147/2009/1, the alleged eye Witnesses accounts of arbitrary killings by the
Military. The first eye witness of the of alleged arbitrary killings by the Military was an
alleged incident in Rikkos (Angwan Damisa). The witness alleged that he interviewed
five witnesses in the Rikkos neighbourhood, and each gave an account independently of
the others, who saw the killing of eight men by a Soldier in the Nigerian army uniform
on the morning of 29th November, 2008 and proceeded to give a detailed account of
what the alleged eye witness saw and narrated to him. There were other such alleged
incidents in Ali Kazaure, where the witness said he interviewed eight witnesses who
allegedly witnessed the alleged arbitrary killings of 25 young men in a house in the
area, Rikkos (Gadan Katako). The witness alleged that an eye witness told him that he
witnessed Military Soldiers on 29th November arrested 16 Muslims and killed 10 of the
arrestees and finally at Laranto Divisional Police Headquarters, where the witness told
the Commission that he allegedly interviewed two Police officers separately who
allegedly witnessed a Soldier ‘summarily executed an unarmed man at the Laranto
Divisional Police Headquarter’ in the morning 29th November, 2008.
It is very important to reiterate that the presenter was not an eye witness to all
the alleged arbitrary killings by the Military.
The Commission in order to get to the root of the serious allegations against the
Military invited the General Officer Commanding, GOC, 3 rd Armoured Division, Jos to
appear before the Commission on the 31st day of July, 2009 to defend this allegation of
arbitrary killings levelled against the Military by the memorandum. However, the
G.O.C did not turn up; neither did he send any representative.
A scrutiny of Exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/1 shows that some of the direct findings of
the witness gives a further perspective on the allegations. In page 6, paragraph 3 of
Exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/1, the witness stated that:
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 ‘many of the witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch believed that those
responsible for these arbitrary killings may have been persons impersonating Police
officers and Soldiers’
This was his direct finding in the course of his interviews. Though witness stated
that ‘many Witnesses’ he interviewed believed that the killings were done by persons
impersonating ‘Soldiers’, the witness disbelieved them without any form of
investigation of their claim. In an answer to a question put to him by the Commission’s
Lead Counsel, the witness admitted that he did not investigate this possibility.
Also in paragraph 5 of page 6 -7 of Exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/1, the witness stated
that the senior Police and Military officers he interviewed denied any knowledge of
arbitrary killings by the security forces,
‘..... and Military officials interviewed by Human Rights Watch in December
denied having received any reports of their forces being involved in arbitrary killings
during the violence’.
When asked to comment on the allegation of arbitrary killings documented by
Human Rights Watch,
Brigadier General Emeka Onwuamaegbu, the Army spokes persons likewise
informed Human Rights Watch that:
‘I have no evidence or information that Nigeria Soldiers were involved in any
arbitrary killings’.
From the contents of Exhibit JCI/J/147/2009/1 and the oral evidence led thereon,
which contradicted the witness’ position in the said Exhibit, the allegations of arbitrary
killings against the security forces, particularly, the Military have not been established
by the witness. In an instance, the witness stated that he carried out extensive research
on the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008, but the witness also admitted to the
Commission that he did not carry out any investigation to establish the authenticity or
otherwise of the claim of persons impersonating the Police and Soldiers. He also told
the Commission that the only evidence he saw were spent bullets but could not carry
out any further investigations to establish the fact as to who used the spent bullets, their
types or what guns the spent bullets were shot from etc.
4.2 Individuals, groups of persons and institutions indirectly responsible for
the Unrest of 28th November, 2008.
From the various memoranda submitted and presented before the Commission
coupled with oral evidence adduced in support by the witnesses who appeared before
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the Commission, it was alleged that the persons mentioned hereunder were indirectly
responsible for precipitating the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008:
1. Alhaji Inuwa Ali
2. The Daily Trust Newspaper
3. JASAWA Development Association.
4. Security Operatives
5. Honourable Aminu Baba
6. Idris Ibn Mohammed
7. General Ibrahim Babangida
8. Mohammed Haruna
9. The State Security Services (SSS)
10. The Nigeria Customs Services (NCS)
11. Alhaji Sale Hassan, an elder in Jos North
12. The Nigeria Immigration Services (NIS)
13. Alhaji Usman Ibrahim Abubakar ( Jerry) the Chairman of Plateau
Muslim Forum (PPMF)
14. Jama’atu Nostril Islam (JNI).
15. Hon. Shehu Bala Usman (Acting Secretary of ANPP)
16. Alhaji Jamil of Jamil Motors
17. Barrister Ahmed S. Garba
18. Sheikh Mohammed Usman Kano
19. Alhaji Ibrahim Mantu
20. Alhaji Yahaya Karaku (Okene Local Government Area Council, Kogi
State)
21. The Governor and Government of Plateau State.
4.2.1 Alhaji Inuwa Ali:
Alhaji Inuwa Ali was mentioned as one of the persons indirectly responsible for
the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008 in about Seven memoranda. These memoranda
and their allegations on his role in precipitating the Unrest are as stated and explained
hereunder:
(i) Memorandum JCI/J/40/2009 by Berom Elders Council presented by
Prof. John I. Dung Gwom (CW 10). In his oral evidence, the witness categorically
mentioned Alhaji Inuwa Ali as one of the persons responsible for the crisis. His reason

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being that in September, 2008 a full fledged grand Durbar in Jos, tagged ‘Hawan
Turaki’ was staged for Alhaji Inuwa Ali as the Sarkin Al - umman Muslumin, Jos.
Berom Elders Council view this staging of Durbar by Alhaji Inuwa Ali as a
show of gross insubordination and ingratitude because late Gbong Gwom Jos, Dr. Fom
Bot, had earlier conferred the title of Turakin Jos on Alhaji Inuwa Ali with the belief
that Alhaji Inuwa Ali will work in partnership with him to promote peaceful co-
existence in Jos. This show of insubordination and ingratitude rather than promote
peace has been shown to provoke and incite the indigenes of Jos.
(ii). Memorandum JCI/J/65/2009 – This memorandum was presented by the
Berom Patriotic Forum in the Tertiary Institutions of Plateau State. The memorandum
came up for hearing on the 25th day of March, 2009 and was presented by one Dalyop
Danladi Mancha (CW.35) on behalf of the Forum. This memorandum on page 12
mentioned the name of Alhaji Inuwa Ali who was installed as ‘Sarkin Al-Uman
Musulmi Jos’ with a complete traditional cabinet as a cause of the Unrest. C.W.35
told the Commission that the act of installing the said Alhaji Inuwa Ali as stated above
was done without regard to the traditional institutions of the land and his act of
conferring chieftaincy titles on some people after his installation and the appointment of
his Ward Heads was quite provocative. This witness also referred to the fact that the
said Alhaji Inuwa Ali in his attempt to become the Emir of Jos has been implicated in
all previous crisis that took place in Jos. Particular reference was made of the crisis of
1994 and 2001.
iii) Memorandum JCI/J/91/2009 also accused Alhaji Inuwa Ali, the Turakin
Jos, as one of the persons to be invited to appear before the Commission to explain his
role in the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008. This memorandum was presented by Mr.
Sunday Gomper who gave evidence as CW26 on the 19th day of March, 2009.
(iv) Other memoranda wherein the name of Alhaji Inuwa Ali was mentioned
are: memorandum JCI/J/136/2009, memorandum JCI/J/137/2009, memorandum
JCI/J/149/2009, JCI/J/150/2009 and memorandum JCI/J/206/2009.
The Commission, in order to hear Alhaji Inuwa Ali’s side of the story invited
him to appear before it on the 21st day of July, 2009. He however failed to honour the
invitation
The Commission has reviewed in detail the evidences both written and oral
adduced before it by various witnesses and came to the conclusion that Alhaji Inuwa Ali
was mentioned as one of the persons indirectly responsible for the Jos crisis of 7 th
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September, 2001. In the Justice Niki Tobi Main Report of September, 2002 on the said
civil disturbances in Jos and Environs in 2001, particularly, at page 185, the
Commission had this say about Alhaji Inuwa Ali:
‘...the Commission is of the opinion that Alhaji Inuwa Ali is not a fit and proper
person to hold the office of Turakin Jos. He should, accordingly be removed
forthwith...’

Now in 2008, there is evidence before the Commission that he installed himself
as ‘Sarkin Al’umman Musulmi Jos with complete traditional cabinet’. There is in
evidence also that he did this without regard to the Gbong Gwom Jos who conferred on
him the title of ‘Turakin Jos’ in the first place. See page 12 of Exhibit JCI/J/40/2009/1
in the following words:
‘only very recently in September2008, a full fledged and grand durbar was
staged in Jos, tagged ‘ Hawan Turaki’ for one Alhaji Inuwa Ali as the Sarkin Al-umma
Muslumin Jos. During the durbar, a full Emirate Council was constituted with regalia
of offices to over 20 title holders. He has also appointed chiefs in other settlements like
Bukuru and Barkin Ladi’.

The witnesses who presented memoranda JCI/J/40/2009 and JCI/J/65/2009 in

order to buttress their claims, attached to the said memoranda copies of the invitation
cards to the Durbar with the list of the traditional cabinet members and the names of
persons on whom Alhaji Inuwa Ali conferred traditional titles. (See Exhibit
JCI/J/40/2009/1 with the relevant annexure for details).
The question, the Commission wishes to ask at this juncture is whether Alhaji
Inuwa Ali has any traditional or Constitution rights to establish another traditional
institution parallel to that of Gbong Gwom Jos and as well appoint his own chiefs and
title holders as he did on the 30 th day of September, 2008? On whose land did Alhaji
Inuwa Ali established his emirate? Although, Alhaji Inuwa Ali refused to appear before
the Commission to respond to allegations made against him when required to do so,
evidence from witnesses who testified before the Commission show clearly that Alhaji
Inuwa Ali is from Kano in Kano State but claims to be a member of Jasawa
Development Association. Membership of this Association is however restricted to
only Hausa/Fulani Muslims of Jos to the exclusion of any other tribe in Jos. If a person
from Kano or any other part of Nigeria, for that matter should, come to Jos and set up a
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traditional institution with the usual full paraphernalia of office as Alhaji Inuwa Ali did
on the 30th day of September, the indigenes of the area will not be happy. It is highly
provocative. This act of establishing an emirate Council in Jos is a clear message to the
Hausa/Fulani youth that Jos belongs to them and they have a right to fight and take over
the town from the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom tribes who have been declared the
indigenes of the same by the all the previous Reports, particularly, the Hon Justice J.
Aribiton Fiberesima’s Report of 1994, and Hon. Justice Niki Tobi CON Report of
September, 2002 as well as Plateau Resolves of 2004. Little wonder the Hausa/Fulani
youth fought so furiously and ferociously on the 28th November, 2008 against the
indigenes and other Nigerian citizens resident in Jos.
From the evidence before the Commission, Jos is not an emirate; hence his acts
amounted to an affront to the established traditional authority in Jos. This action should
be discouraged.
The Daily Trust Newspaper - Daily Trust Newspaper was accused on the ground
that it’s Reportage of the Unrest of November 28th and 29th 2008
‘were Jaundiced, lopsided and negatively skewed and that the Newspaper sought
to poison the minds of the Muslims worldwide to the belief that Muslims are hated and
are being killed in the Plateau State.’
and that its reportage of the Unrest was highly provocative and negative. To
substantiate these allegations, the witnesses tendered copies of the Newspaper wherein
the publications in question were made. The memoranda that made these allegations
against the Daily Trust Newspaper are memorandum JCI/J/31/2009 by Dr. Charles
Kopkama. Gonyok (mni). memorandum JCI/J/107/2009 by the Plateau Indigenous
Development Association (PIDAN), and memorandum JCI/J/137/2009 by PDP Elders
Northern Zone Forum Plateau State.
The Commission invited the Management of Media Trust Nigeria Limited,
Publishers of the Daily Trust Newspapers to defend themselves against these allegations
on the 28th day of July, 2009. A Representative of Media Trust Limited, Andrew
Agbese, presented a written response to the Commission in defence of these allegations
against Media Trust Nigeria Limited. In the said written response dated July 28 2009,
the witness denied any bias on the part of Media Trust Nigeria Limited regarding the
reportage of the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008. According to the witness, all
sections of the warring parties were given equal coverage and never at any time was the
Newspaper house unbalanced in its reportage of the Unrest. The witness stated on page
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4 of his response that all the publications complained of by the various witnesses before
the Commission, were personal views and opinions of the persons that wrote them and
that it is:
‘nothing to do with the style of Media Trust or any of its publications nor were
they the reports of any of its correspondence or reporters for which it could be held
liable’.
He made reference to Weekly Trust of 4th January, 2009, particularly the write
up titled ‘dear son of the soil’ and another writer, Abdullahi and stated that in those
write ups, the columnists expressed their personal views and opinions while the
advertorial signed by a group that calls itself ‘The Coalition of Jasawa Elders’ published
in the January 30th edition of the Daily Trust was also their personal views and had
nothing whatsoever to do with Media Trust editorial policy.
After a careful perusal and review of the evidence, the Commission found that
the publications complained about as being a cause of the Unrest were made after the
occurrence of the Unrest. With this in view, it cannot be said that these publications,
though very inciting and provocative, particularly, the write up titled the ‘son of the soil
‘where unprintable pictures of naked women and men allegedly depicting Plateau
people as uncivilised were displayed and another picture portraying Plateau people as
poverty stricken and sitting in front of thatched roof huts with tattered clothes, caused
the Unrest of 28th November, 2008. Rather, these publications could be said to have a
tendency towards preparing grounds for resurrecting further hostilities in Plateau State.
The Commission also view these publications as often very biased, lopsided, derogatory
and tilted in favour of a particular group.
The Commission further advises the Publishers and Editors of Daily Trust
Newspapers to learn to adhere to the professional ethics of Journalism which is to be
fair and balance in reporting any news event and stop appealing to ethnic and religious
sentiments.
4.2.2 Jasawa Development Association:
Jasawa Development Association was mentioned severally by numerous
witnesses before the Commission as an Association being responsible for Jos Unrest of
28th November, 2008. Some of these memoranda and witnesses are as follows:
i) Memorandum JCI/J/69/2009 by Berom Community Jos North presented
by Dr. Baba Thomas Bingel. This memorandum which was tendered and admitted in
evidence as Exhibit JCI/J/69/2009/1, on page 5 identified the formation of Jasawa
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Development Association as one of the remote causes of the Jos Unrest of 28 th
November, 2008. It was stated in paragraph 1 lines 13 and 14 of Exhibit
JCI/J/69/2009/1 that the Association was found to be a perpetrator of the 2001 crisis and
was indicted in 2001. According to the presenter
‘the existence of this association therefore has always posed a threat to
peaceful coexistence in Jos.’
ii) Memorandum JCI/J/107/2009 presented by Plateau Indigenous
Development Association Network (PIDAN) was presented by Prof. Nenfort Gomwalk
on behalf of the Association on the 17th day of March, 2009. He testified as C.W.15. In
the memorandum the presenter accused the Jasawa Development Association because
of the actions and utterances of its members and leaders who claimed Jos as their own
and thus always make false claims about the ownership of Jos. C.W.15 in an answer to
a question put to him by Ali Aku Esq., Counsel to Indigenous Muslims Association,
Plateau State said that although, he did not really know whether they were
‘perpetrators but certainly they contributed to it by their action’.
The Witness went further to state as follows:
‘I suppose if you write articles that incite people or give wrong/false
information, you must be held responsible’.
iii) Memorandum JCI/J/149/2009 by Laranto Berom Community: This
memorandum was presented on behalf of the Community by John Rapp on the 27 th day
of February, 2009 and he testified as Commission witness 13 (CW13). C.W13, on page
11 of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/149/2009/1) mentioned Jasawa Association as
one of the Associations indirectly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28th November,
2008.
iv) Memorandum JCI/J/152/2009 by Berom Forum Chwelnyap. This
memorandum was presented on the 25th day of March by John Pam Choji who testified
as Commission witness 37 (CW 37) on behalf of the Forum. The witness on page 12,
paragraph (b) of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/152/2009/1) mentioned Jasawa
Development Association as one of the groups responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th
November, 2008. According to the witness, the Association serves as a rallying point
for the Hausa Community in Jos and articulates all causes of action of the Community
in all ramifications. The witness further stated that by the pronouncements of its
officials like Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakade, and Ismaila Mohammed before, during and
after the Local Government polls and the crisis,
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 ‘the organization exists to serve ulterior intends and purposes. actions and
inactions of the organization before and during the crisis points to the direction of
having masterminded the episode.’
v) Finally memorandum JCI/J/115/2009 which was presented by Kauna
Baptist Church, Rikkos also accused Jasawa Development Association as being
responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008.
Based on all these allegations against the Association, the Commission invited
the leadership of the Association to appear before the Commission on the Monday the
20th day of July,2009. However, the Leaders of this Association failed to honour the
Commission’s invitation. The Commission found as a fact that the Association was
heavily indicted in both the Hon. Justice J. Aribiton Fiberesima Report into the Jos
Riots of 12th April, 1994 and that of the Hon Justice Niki Tobi of September, 2002 on
the Jos crisis of 7th September, 2001. The reports held the Association responsible for
those crises and recommended in their reports that activities of the Association be
suspended for two years.
The said Commission further recommended that:
‘in event of the Association involving itself in violence or threatened violence
and precipitates crisis of any form during the period of suspension, the Association
should be proscribed forthwith’.
We refer to pages 198 to 205 of Hon. Justice Niki Tobi Report and pages 26
to29, particularly, page 29 of Hon. Justice J Aribiton Fiberesima Report. This
Commission also finds that Jasawa Development Association by its activities is one of
the Association indirectly responsible for the Jos unrest of 28TH November, 2008. The
Association and its Leadership should be investigated. The Commission further
recommends the outright proscription of the Association if after investigation the
allegations aforementioned, are proved against them.
4.2.3 Places of worship
Some places of worship were also mentioned by witnesses who testified before
the Commission for being indirectly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th November,
2008. These memoranda and places of worship are as follows:
(i) Memorandum JCI/J/149/2009 by Laranto Berom Community, Jos was
presented on behalf of the Community on 27th day of February, 2009 by Mr. John Rapp
who testified as Commission witness 13 (CW13). The memorandum identified four
Mosques namely, the Mosque located opposite the gate of St. Augustine’s Major
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Seminary, Laranto, the Mosque behind St. Augustine Major Seminary, Laranto and the
Mosque before Katako bridge and the Mosque at Angwan Rogo.
According to the witness, these places of worship played very negative role
before, during and after the crisis. For instance, the presenter stated on pages 13 and 14
of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/149/2009/1) that:
‘Daily worshippers were spurred not to accept the outcome of the Local
Government Election which comes up on the 27th November, 2008 where it fails to
favour them. They were told to resist Government at all cost’.
The witness further emphasised the negative role played by these Mosques on
the 28th day of November, 2008 (i.e. the first day of the Unrest) when he stated on page
14 that:
‘the Mosques were used as ‘control towers’ to direct the Hausa militants to
specific residential areas ...’.
The Mosque was also used as easy mobilisation avenue for the youths and the
militants. Also on Saturday 29th November, 2008, shortly when the results were finally
announced, these mosques used public address systems to shout ‘Alahu akbar’ and
teleguided Hausa youths and militants to unleash mayhem on Laranto residents which
ultimately led to massive destruction of about 35 houses and death of those people 3
lives.......’
The witness in his oral evidence testified that the role of the Mosques and their
Imams led to the escalation of the crisis. The Commission was bombarded with other
similar evidence against the Mosques and their Imams by several other witnesses who
appeared before it. For instance, memorandum JCI/J/25/2009/, which was admitted in
evidence as Exhibit JCI/J/25/2009/1, stated that the Imam of the small Mosque within
the Old Mining Camp mobilized the youths through the use of loudspeakers. Oral
evidence was also given by the witness who testified before the Commission on 26 th
February, 2009 as CW8.
Memorandum JCI/J/140/2009 by Angwan Dalyop Development Association
(ADDA) was presented on behalf of the association by Paul Davou, the Protem
Secretary of the Association. The memorandum on page 7 accused the Mosques located
in Sarki Mangu Street, Masallacin Idi and Katako Area for the negative roles they
played during and after the crisis. According to the memorandum, these Mosques
several weeks before the election, were used to incite worshippers early in the morning
between 4:30am and 5: 00am. Daily worshippers were instigated not to accept the
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verdict of the forthcoming 27th November, 2008 Local Government Election, if it does
not favour them. They were urged to stand up and resist Government among others.
This allegation was not only made in this memorandum. It was also made in
memorandum JCI/J/149/2009 by Laranto Berom Community presented by John Rapp
CW13. See page 7 of this memorandum.
(ii) Memorandum JCI/J/93/2009 by Church of Christ in Nigeria (Jos). This
memorandum was presented on behalf of the Church by one Elder Martins David
Dalyop, the Church Secretary. The witness who presented the memorandum identified
on page 7 of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/93/2009/1) the Mosques at Tudun -Pera,
Bulbula Mosque and the Imams of the two Mosques as being responsible for the
Unrest.
Their roles according to the witness were giving:
‘directives and commands to the Hausa/Fulani Muslim attackers to keep on the
fight until the victory is achieved’.
For this reason, the witness holds the imams responsible for the planning and
execution of the Unrest.
These allegations of the roles of the Mosques and their Imams in
contributing to the escalation of the Unrest are of great concern to the Commission.
Worship places as far as the Commission is concerned are meant to preach love. peace
and unity and not hatred, war and disunity. Lives are supposed to be preserved and
protected and not to be destroyed.
4.2.4 General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, Former Military President
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
The retired General Ibrahim Babangida was mentioned in several memoranda
presented before the Commission and by witnesses that testified before the
Commission. All the allegations against General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida were
centred on the creation of Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State without
consultation with the people of Plateau State which has led to widespread disaffection
and suspicion.
i) Memorandum JCI/J/107/2009 by The Plateau Indigenous Development
Association Network (PIDAN). This memorandum was presented on behalf of PIDAN
by Prof. Nenfort Gomwalk. PIDAN at page 21 of the memorandum (Exhibit
JCI/J/107/2009/1) stated that creation of Jos North Local Government in 1991 by the

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Babangida Administration was totally against the wishes of the Anaguta, Afizere and
Berom Communities of Jos. He further stated that:
‘the said Communities found themselves in Jos South while the Hausa
Community was left in Jos North Local Government LGA where Jos metropolis is
located’ The Anaguta, Afizere and Berom saw this arrangement as a grand plan by the
Hausa to seize Jos town from them’.

The witness also stated that these other Communities resented the pattern of the
newly created Local Government Area as it left the Berom Paramount ruler, the Gbong
Gwom Jos, isolated in an Hausa/Fulani dominated enclave while the Hausa/Fulani
jubilated over the creation of the Local Government which they saw as having been
created for them.
(ii) Memorandum JCI/J/65/2009 by The Berom Patriotic Forum in Tertiary
Institutions of Plateau State. This memorandum was presented on the 25 th day of March,
2009 by one Dalyop Danladi Mancha, the Chairman of the Forum, who testified as
Commission witness 35 (CW35). The witness at page 18 of the memorandum (Exhibit
JCI/J/65/2009/1) described General Ibrahim Babangida as showing ‘an unhealthy
interest in Jos Hausa/Fulani terrorism’ and so one of the persons responsible for the Jos
Unrest of 28th November, 2008. The witness also stated that his assertion that
Babangida was involved in the recent Jos Unrest was informed by the revelation made
by the 26 mercenaries arrested in Jos on 26 th December, 2008. The witness informed the
Commission that the ‘mercenaries’ boast that nothing would happen as they have the
support of a General in Minna named ‘Evil Genius’. The witness tendered in evidence
News Gate monthly Magazine of 15th January, 2009 wherein this publication was
made. The Magazine was admitted in evidence as Exhibit JCI/J/65/2009/2. It was on
page 5 of Exhibit JCI/J/65/2009/1 as follows:
‘when the journalists attempted to speak to them, they said they were not
worried. They boasted that there wouldn’t be any problem because highly placed
Nigerians including a former Military President from Minna popularly known as the
evil genius and the Federal Government were staunchly behind them’.
iii) Memorandum JCI/J/133/2009 by Bache Development Association of
Bassa Local Government Area. This memorandum was presented on behalf of the
Association by Nuhu Ashama on the 8th day of April, 2009. He testified as Commission
witness 96 (CW96.) At page 7 of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/133/2009/1), the
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witness stated that after the boundary of Jos North Local Government was carved out, it
became apparent that the Local Government was created to favour the Hausa/Fulani
Community and strengthen their claim to Jos.
(iv) Memorandum JCI/J/69/2009 by Berom Community Jos North was presented
on behalf of the Community by Dr. Baba Thomas Bingel on the 24 th day of February,
2009. He testified as Commission witness 1 and stated that the action of General
Ibrahim Babangida in creating Jos North was against the wishes of the people of the
state, particularly, the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere communities who had wanted a
‘Federe’ LGA. He further told the Commission that with the way the Local
Government was created, the native Communities saw it as a grand plan by the
Hausa/Fulani to seize Jos Town from them using the Federal might. Other memoranda
in which General Ibrahim Babangida was mentioned also in the course of oral evidence
being led thereon are memoranda JCI/J/206/2009, JCI/J/149/2009 and JCI/J/73/2009.
(v) The Commission invited General Ibrahim Babangida to appear before it on
the 28th day of July, 2009 to defend himself of these allegations. He was represented by
a two member team of lawyers comprising Mohammed Ndayako Esq. and Benjamin
Attah Esq.
(vi) Counsel on behalf of General Ibrahim Babangida generally denied all the
allegations against the General and stated that the creation of Jos North Local
Government was done in accordance with the due process of creating Local
Government Areas. Counsel further stated that the decision to create the Local
Government was not an individual decision but a collective decision of the Armed
Forces Ruling Council. They tendered several documents from the Presidential Library
of former President, General Ibrahim Babangida, to show that due process was followed
in the creation of Jos North Local Government Area. The following documents were
tendered and relied upon by Counsel:
a) AIDE-MEMOIRE ON GUIDELINES FOR THE CREATION OF NEW
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS - admitted in evidence as Exhibit SA1,
b) A letter from Berom Elders’ Council (BECO) dated 11th September,
1991 titled ‘Request for the creation of more Local Governments from present Jos
Barakin Local Government – admitted in Evidence as Exhibit SA2,
c) A letter from Berom Community dated 23 rd January, 1989 tilted
‘REQUEST FOR THE CREATION OF JOS METROPOLITAN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT COUNCIL COMPRISING OF DU, GWONG, GYEL, KURU AND
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VWANG DISRICTS OUT OF THE PRESENT JOS LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COUNCIL’ – admitted in Evidence as Exhibit SA3,
d) A Letter titled ‘an open letter to the President......’ dated 28 th January,
1989- admitted in Evidence as Exhibit SA4,
e) A document titled Meeting of Governors held on 18th September, 1991-
admitted in Evidence as Exhibit SA5,
f) An undated write up titled ‘Request for the creation of a Jos East
(Defunct Federe (sic).......’ – admitted in Evidence as Exhibit SA6,
g) The States (CREATION AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS)
DECREE (NO. 2) 1991 was admitted as Exhibit SA7.
h) A letter from Berom Elders’ Council (BEC) dated 3 rd June, 1992 titled
‘Reconsider Jos Local Government Area- admitted in Evidence as Exhibit SA8,
i) Submission/Memo.No.SGF./22/S.1/C.1/1/583 to the then President for
consideration and review of the Local Government Areas wrongly created without the
consensus of the people- admitted in evidence as Exhibit SA9.
The learned Counsel for General Ibrahim Babangida told the Commission that
after Jos North Local Government was created, the Government received complaints
from the natives of Jos for a review of the creation of the Local Government. Counsel
also informed the Commission that he had it on good account that Exhibit S.A9 was
raised by the then Secretary to the Federal Government for consideration but before any
action could be taken on the memorandum, the former President stepped aside. He
thought that since Government was a continuous process, the Government that came
after his should have addressed the issue.
The Commission found that the creation of the Jos North Government Area by
General Ibrahim Babangida in 1991 was clearly to favour the Hausa/Fulani of Jos
North. The indigenous tribes of Jos North did not demand for the creation of Jos North
Local Government in the form it was created. It was the Hausa/Fulani that through
Exhibit S.A4 demanded for the creation of Jos North Local Government Area in the
form it was created. The indigenous tribes also demanded for the creation of Jos Local
Government but not in the form it was eventually created. The form in which Jos North
was created is in accordance with the demand of the Hausa/Fulani of Jos North as
contained in Exhibit S.A4.
The Commission finds as a fact that there was no wide consultations with all
stakeholders before Jos North Local Government was created in 1991 and as a result
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majority of the people of Jos North are dissatisfied with the form Jos North Local
Government Area was created. As earlier pointed out, not even the Hausa/Fulani of Jos
North are satisfied. In as much as we find it unacceptable that the Government of
retired General Ibrahim Babangida for created the Local Government without
considering the wishes of the generality of the people of the former Jos Local
Government, we do not think that it was a deliberate act to create a crisis situation in
Jos.
However, since majority of the people of Jos North are dissatisfied with the
form Jos North Local Government Area was created, the Government can set up
machinery and put up a demand before the National Assembly to consider a
restructuring of Jos North Local Government Area to reflect the wishes and aspirations
of everybody in Jos North.
4.2.5 The Nigeria Customs Service, Plateau State Command:
The Nigerian Customs came into the search light of the Commission by virtue of
memorandum JCI/J/160/2009, which urged the Commission to:
‘find if there was diligence in performance of duties by the Federal Government,
Customs amongst others’.
The main grudge of the witness against the memorandum (Exhibit
JCI/J/160/2009/1) was that sophisticated weapons were used during the Jos Unrest of
28th November, 2008 and that if the Nigerian Customs whose duty it was to check the
importation of illegal arms into the Country did their job, they could have discovered
that there was massive importation of illegal arms into Jos North. The witness,
Ikechukwu Tony Egwuonwu, who testified as Commission witness 25 (CW 25) on the
19th day of March, 2009 told the Commission that the Nigerian Customs is one of the
Federal Government Agencies that was indirectly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th
November, 2008 for failing to do their job.
The Commission, therefore, invited the Comptroller of Customs, Plateau state
Command to appear before it on the 31st day of July to present his response to this
allegation against the Nigeria Customs service. On the 31st day of July, 2009 when the
response was listed for hearing before the Commission, the Nigeria Customs Service
presented a 2 page written response signed by one Nnachi Emeghe A/C. Mr. Nnachi
Emeghe also gave oral evidence when he appeared before the Commission on the 31st
July, 2009 to present his written response in order to explain some of the points in the
written response. The witness both in his written response and oral testimony before the
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Commission denied the allegation that the Nigeria Customs Service, Plateau Command
did not do its job of checking all vehicles and persons coming into Jos to ensure that
they do not carry arms and ammunition into the city leading to the proliferation of arms
and ammunition in Jos North.
The witness at page 1 paragraph 1 of his written response (Exhibit SH1) and his
oral evidence summarized the functions of the Nigeria Customs Service to include but
not limited to suppression of smuggling. The witness then told the Commission that as
far as he was concerned, the Nigeria Customs Service performed its duties to the best of
it abilities and in conformity with the Law establishing it. In the words of the witness:
‘These functions have been diligently pursued to the best of our abilities here in
Plateau, Benue, and Nassarawa States Area Command.’
The witness told the Commission that the Customs Service is very effective and
because of its effectiveness, the Customs Service, Plateau Command recently
discovered and seized military camouflage uniform materials concealed in a luxurious
bus travelling from the Eastern part of the Country to Plateau State and handed them
over to the Police for further investigation.
On the issue of the allegation of their failure to check the proliferation of arms
and ammunition into Jos prior to the Unrest of 28th November, 2008. The witness stated
that they were not aware that there was proliferation of arms and ammunition into Jos
prior to the Unrest. According to the witness, this was due to the nature of the location
of Plateau State in the hinterland, which by Law, mounting of check points by Customs
is prohibited. The witness further told the Commission that since the Custom Service,
Plateau Command does not have power under the law to set up check points for
checking what comes into the State, the Customs was handicapped in detecting when,
how and by whom arms and ammunition were imported/brought into the State, a
situation which also make the arrest of those involved and seizure of such weapons
impossible. To buttress this assertion, the witness referred the Commission to Customs
and Excise Circular Nos. NCS/ENF/ABJ/058/S.2/VOL.V of 19th July, 2004 and
NCS/ENF/ABJ/058/S.2/VOL.IV of 25th January, 2005 which according to him prohibits
the establishment of Customs check points forty five kilometres radius from the border.
The witness thereafter went ahead and recommended to the Commission that in
view of the peculiar security situation in the State, the Nigeria Customs, Plateau State
Command should be provided with adequate logistics to perform its duties and also be
allowed to establish check points for effective checks.
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 The Commission has carefully reviewed the evidence of the witness regarding
the allegation against the Nigeria Customs Service, Plateau Command and found that
the allegation of dereliction of duty on the part of the Nigeria Custom Services, Plateau
Command has not be established and thus the Service was not in any way responsible
for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008. However, due to the legal limitation placed
on the Nigeria Customs Service, Plateau Command by the Customs and Excise Circular
Nos. NCS/ENF/ABJ/058/S.2/VOL.V of 19th July, 2004 and
NCS/ENF/ABJ/058/S.2/VOL.IV of 25th January, 2005, the Commission hereby
recommends that the Plateau State Government should take up the matter with the
Federal Government of Nigeria and the relevant Customs authorities for the abrogation
of these circulars. This will enable the Nigeria Custom Service, Plateau State Command
establish check points in all points of entry into the State for effective checks and
control of arms and ammunition and other offensive materials into Jos North Local
Government Area and Plateau State in general.
4.2.6 The Nigeria Immigration Service, Plateau State Command:
The Commission was also called upon by a memorandum presented by Barrister
Itegwuonwu (Exhibit JCI/J/160/2009/1) to investigate the activities of the Nigeria
Immigration Service, Plateau State Command, particularly the alleged involvement of
large number of foreign nationals in the Jos Unrest to find out if there was any
negligence of duty on its part. The Commission invited the Comptroller of Immigration
Service, Plateau State Command, Jos to appear before it on the 31 st day of July, 2009 to
defend the Command and also explain its roles during the Unrest.
The Comptroller of Immigration Service, Plateau Command, in the person of
Mr. E.A. Gbuuga appeared before the Commission on the 31 st day of July, 2009. He
presented a written response which was admitted as Exhibit S.G.1. The witness in both
his written response and oral submission denied that the Nigeria Immigration, Plateau
Command was guilty of any complicity in the Jos Unrest of 28 th November, 2008 either
prior to or during its occurrence.
He made it clear that the officials of the Nigeria Immigration Service, Plateau
Command were never at anytime prior to the Local Government Elections of 27 th
November, 2008 invited to take part in any security arrangements for the Elections but
this notwithstanding, he used his discretion to issue a press release on the 25 th day of
November, 2008 advising non-Nigerians to stay away from voting or disrupting the
election. The witness further told the Commission in his response that he also deployed
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his officers and men to observe the elections with the aim of stopping foreign nationals
from participating in the election.
On allegation of the involvement of foreign nationals in the Unrest, the witness
stated in paragraph (8) page 2 of his response that he wrote to the Comptroller of
Nigeria Prison Service and Director of State Security Service to avail him of the
opportunity to screen and determine the immigration status of all the suspects alleged to
be foreigners and he was obliged.
The Controller of Prison Service sent him a list of seventy six (76) suspected
foreigners which he screened and found out that seven (7) out of the seventy six (76)
persons are foreigners. Six (6) of the seven (7) foreigners are Nigerien while the
remaining one (1) is a Tchadian. Two (2) of the six (6) Nigerien came into the country
illegally through Maigateri border in Katsina State while one (1) came in through
Kongonon border. The remaining three (3) came to Nigeria through Baban Mutum also
in Katsina State. He said all these foreigners came into Nigeria before 28 th November,
2008.
The witness blamed the influx of foreigners into Nigeria on the porous nature of
the Nigerian borders and stated that it was for this reason that the Nigeria Immigration
High Command proposed to the Federal Executive Council the construction of 147
passport control plazas across the recognised borders posts in the country. He urged
this Commission to recommend to the Government to start the construction of these
passport control plazas immediately to curtail illegal immigration across the porous
Nigerian borders.
The Commission thinks that though the Nigeria Immigration Service, Plateau
State Command is not in a position to monitor the influx of foreigners at the border, the
Commands at these borders can do so while Plateau State Command can at least
monitor and repatriate those illegally residing within Jos city.
As for the construction of passport control plazas across the recognised border
posts in the country, the Commission agrees entirely with the suggestion of Nigeria
Immigration Service that this be done forthwith. This will go a long way to curtail
illegal immigration across the Nigerian borders.
4.2.7 Alhaji Yahaya Karaku, Executive Chairman, Okene Local
Government Area.
Alhaji Yahaya Karaku, the former Executive Chairman of Okene Local
Government Area of Kogi State was mentioned in three memoranda as one of the
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persons indirectly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th November, 2008. The
memoranda that mentioned the former Chairman are as follows:
Memorandum JCI/J/137/2009 by P.D.P Elders Northern Zone Forum Plateau
State. This memorandum was presented on behalf of the P.D.P Elders Northern Zone
Forum by Dr. Jonah Madugu on the 25th day of February, 2009. He testified as
Commission witness No.7(CW7).The witness stated in page 14 -15 of the memorandum
(Exhibit JCI/J/137/2009/1) that:
‘after the violence was brought under control, a band of 26 mercenaries called
‘Miyetti Allah Danga Vigilante Security’, a body said to be registered with Bauchi State
Government .....came into the Town of Jos few hours into the curfew, in a convoy of a
bus with the inscription Okene Legislative Council….. In their luggages were firearms
(including Military ‘prohibited’ ones), Army, Police and Anti riot Mobile Police
uniforms, army and Police identity cards...........’
He then told the Commission that upon their arrest by the Soldiers, the
mercenaries when paraded on the Local TV Stations and they confessed that they had
been on vigilante operation in Okene L.G.A at the invitation of the Council Chairman.
The witness went further to conclude that the only reason for their being in Jos at the
time was to cause violence on the innocent citizens of Jos and further fuel the already
restive situation in the city.
Memorandum JCI/J/206/2009 by Da Ezekiel J. Choji. This memorandum was
presented on the 16th day of June, 2009 by Da Ezekiel Choji Dawang Joh who testified
as Commission witness 99 (CW99). This memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/206/2009/1) at
page 17 made reference to the case of the celebrated 26 ‘mercenaries’ whom the Okene
Local Government Chairman was linked with and the Commissioner of Police claimed
knowledge. He lamented the alleged treatment the ‘26 mercenaries’ got. According to
the witness, the 26 mercenaries who were arrested in Jos on the 26 th day of December,
2008, were given presidential treatment as they were transferred from Jos to Abuja to
be tried outside the place where the crime was committed.
Memorandum JCI/J/207/2009 by Sunday Kasuwa Bwoi. This memorandum
was heard on the 16th June, 2009 with Mr. Sunday Kasuwa Bwoi himself testifying as
Commission witness 103 (CW103). The Witness at page 6 of the memorandum
(Exhibit JCI/J/207/2009/1), stated among other things that:
‘Alhaji Karaku stunned the world when he openly laid claim to the fact that the
26mercenaries intercepted and arrested in Jos were indeed his vigilantes hired from
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neighbouring Bauchi State to help him fight the menace of armed robbers in his Local
Government Area speaks volumes of the extent of those externally involved in the
planning, executing and fuelling the crisis..........’
The witness in his oral evidence told the Commission that he mentioned Alhaji
Karaku because he was the chairman of Okene Local Government Area and tendered a
News paper publication to this effect. See Verbatim Report of the proceedings of the
Commission for 16th June, 2009. The Commission invited Alhaji Karaku to appear
before it on the 30th July, 2009 and defend himself and his Local Government of these
allegations.
Alhaji Karaku was represented by a Counsel, one Yakubu Shaibu Esq., who
filed a written response on behalf of his client. The written response was tendered and
admitted in evidence as Exhibit SF 1. The Chairman in his response denied the
allegations and contends that he did not arm or facilitate the arming of any person or
group of persons to cause crisis in Jos. He said when he became the Chairman of
Okene Local Government in April, 2008 he was informed of the existence of a joint
Police/Vigilante Group that patrols all the Federal Highways within Okene Local
Government for the purpose of combating the activities of armed robbers and cattle
rustlers.
Alhaji Karaku added that on the request of the Commissioner of Police, Kogi
State, the Council renders what ever assistance it could to the group for the effective
performance of their duties. According to the former Chairman, the Vigilante group was
given Okene Legislative Council’s bus being used by the group at the time of their
arrest in Jos after their bus got burnt and the Commissioner of Police Kogi State wrote
requesting for a vehicle to assist the group. He denied all the allegations levelled against
him and stated that none of the persons that made the allegations had any personal
contact with the alleged arrested ‘mercenaries’ as these allegations were based on
Newspaper reports. He urged the Commission to disregard all of them. In proof of his
defence, the former Chairman attached to his response the following documents:
a) Copies of The Daily Trust and The Nation Newspapers of January, 2009
where the alleged call for the arrest and prosecution of the Chairman was
made by the Plateau State Government.
b) Copy of a letter dated 27th Feb.2009 from The Assistant Commissioner of
Police, ‘B’ Department Operations, The Nigeria Police Headquarters,
Lokoja, Kogi State to the Chairmen, Okene/Adavi L.G.As Titled ‘ Request
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 for Assistance and signed by one Ibezimako Aghanya, Commissioner of
Police, Kogi State Command, Lokoja.
c) A letter dated 5th January, 2009 from CP Ibezimako Aghanya, the
Commissioner of Police, Kogi State, to the Commissioner of Police, State
Command Headquarters, Nigeria Police, Jos, Plateau State, titled ‘RE:
ARREST OF ALHAJI HASSAN AND TEAM.
d) A letter dated 4th November, 2008 from The Commissioner of Police State
Command Headquarters the Nigeria Police , Lokoja , Kogi State to Hon.
Yahaya Abubakar Karaku. Executive Chairman, Okene Local Government
Area, Kogi State Titled ‘Re: Allowance For Police Special Squad, Mobile
Policemen and Non-Indigene Vigilante Groups’ and finally
e) A letter from the Kogi State Government of Nigeria, Government House,
Office of the Special Adviser to the Executive Governor dated 22/09/2009
and addressed to all Chairmen, Local Government Areas, Kogi State titled
Maintenance of Vigilante Group/Neighbourhood Security in The State.’
In view of all these explanations, the Commission is satisfied with the defence of
Alhaji Yahaya Abubakar Karaku, and finds no evidence of his culpability or complicity
in the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008. The letters have shown that his action of
giving the Bus belonging to Okene Legislative Council to the Vigilante Group in which
they were arrested in Jos on the 26th day of December, 2008 was strictly based on
existing security arrangements in the State before his assumption of Office in April,
2008 as the Executive Chairman of Okene Local Government Area.
The Kogi Police Command admitted equipping the Vigilante group with arms
and ammunition. This is perhaps where the illegality should be looked at. Such a trend
in the country may lead to the official sponsorship of criminals in the name of working
with vigilante groups to fight crime in the Country. The activities of the Vigilante
Group should be investigated.
4.2.8 The Governor of Plateau State, Da Jonah David Jang and
Government of Plateau State.
The Governor of Plateau State, Da David Jonah Jang and the Plateau State
Government were mentioned in a few of the memoranda presented before the
Commission as persons and institutions indirectly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28th
November, 2008. The allegations against them bother on security lapses and ‘shoot-on-
sight’ order allegedly issue to the security forces. These allegations are contained in
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memorandum JCI/J/147/2009 presented to the Commission by Human Rights Watch.
The organisation alleged that there were arbitrary killings by the security forces
following a ‘short-on-sight’ order by Governor Jonah David Jang of Plateau State
leading to at least 118 cases of alleged arbitrary killings. Human Rights Watch stated
on page 5 paragraph 3 of its memorandum as follows:
‘Plateau State Governor Jonah Jang issued a public statement on November 28
announcing a dusk-to-dawn curfew and warning citizens that security forces were
under orders to return ‘fire for fire’. The following day, November 29, the Governor
imposed a 24 hour curfew in the worst affected neighbourhoods and issued a ‘shoot-at
sight order’ to security personnel. .......’
According to Human Rights Watch, while most of the inter-communal violence
documented by Human Rights took place on November 28, the vast majority of the
alleged killings by the Police and Military were carried out on November 29, the same
day the Governor issued the ‘shoot–on –sight order’. He expressed that this was also the
accusation of the Hausa/Fulani against the Governor. It was as a result of this allegation
of arbitrary killings by the security forces that the Hausa/Fulani accused the Governor
of genocide and claimed they have reported him to the World Court. The
allegation of the Hausa/ Fulani against the Governor is in every material particular same
as these allegations made by Human Rights Watch.
Based on these allegations, the Commission invited the Government of Plateau
State to appear before it on the 7 th day of August, 2009 and respond to this allegation
against the Governor and the State. The Government of Plateau State filed a written
response to these allegations and was presented by Mr. Samson Jidauna Dimka,
Secretary to the State Government. He testified as Commission witness 213 (CW213)
and denied all the allegations against the Governor and Government of Plateau State.
He told the Commission that the Governor of Plateau State, Da David Jonah Jang, and
the Plateau State Government are not responsible for the Unrest of 28 th November,
2009. According to Mr. Dimka, the Governor does not have power under the
constitution to issue a shoot- at- sight order to any security personnel in the country and
therefore did not issue any such order. He further stated that what the Governor stated
in his address to the people of Plateau State following the civil disturbances in Jos on
Friday 28th November, 2008 was that:

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 ‘security details are under instruction to return fire-for-fire from any person or
group of persons disturbing the peace. It is this Statement of the Governor, he said,
that some persons have mischievously misconstrued to mean ‘shoot-at-sight order’
To substantiate this assertion, the witness attached to the written response, a
copy of the address of the Governor in question as annexure ‘C1.’
The witness went on to furthermore the Commission that:
‘the Governor, as a retired Senior Military Officer who is well aware of the
workings and operational detailing of security forces on internal Security Operations,
and conversant with the provisions of Section 215 sub-section 4 and Section 218 of the
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which spells out the power of the
Governor in relation to the Commissioner of Police and that of the President in
deploying the Armed Forces, could not have assumed power not bestowed on him by
the Constitution by issuing a shoot- at- sight order to the Police and Military Personnel
as alleged by the Human Rights Watch’.
The witness pointed out the fact that though Governor Jang is the Chief Security
Officer in Plateau State, the Police and Military are Federal Security Forces under their
respective hierarchy at the Federal level of the Government. The question now is
whether indeed Governor Jonah David Jang issued a shoot-on-sight order to the security
forces during the Unrest of 28th November, 2008? In the first place, the allegation by
Human Rights Watch that Governor Jonah David Jang issued a shoot-on-sight order has
not been substantiated. The statement containing this alleged order has not been
produced before the Commission. While being cross examined by the Lead Counsel to
the Commission, Mr. Eric Guttschuss (C.W 195) who presented the memorandum of
Human Rights Watch stated that he had not seen the statement containing the allege
shoot-on-sight order. There is therefore no evidence to substantiate this allegation that
the Governor in a statement gave security forces a shoot-on-sight order. It is not in
doubt at all that the Police and Military are Federal establishments under the command
of the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and not a state
Governor. Since there is no evidence to substantiate this allegation, the Commission
has no difficulty at all in coming to a conclusion that the Government did not issue a
shoot-on-sight order. In any case, the security forces have categorically denied ever
receiving any shoot-on-sight order by the Government. C.W.195 who presented
memorandum JCI/J/147/2009 stated therein as follows:

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 ‘Senior Police and Military authorities interviewed by Human Rights, however,
denied having received or carried out an order to shoot- on- sight. The Nigerian army
spokesperson, Brigadier General Emeka Onwuamaegbu, told Human Rights Watch ‘it
is one thing for a political leader to issue an order , another for those of us
implementing it.... our soldiers went out with very strict instruction to use minimum
force and follow the rule of engagement’.
The Assistant Commissioner of Police in charge of Operations in Plateau State ,
Oga Ero, told Human Right Watch:
there was no order by my officers to shoot on sight as far as I was aware of’.
This piece of evidence was further corroborated by the former Commissioner of
Police, Plateau State ,CP. Samson V. Wudah, who appeared before the Commission on
5th August ,2009. The former Commissioner, who testified as Commission witness 212
(CW212) stated emphatically that Governor Jonah David Jang has no powers to issue a
shoot-on-sight order to the Police and the Police did not take any such an order from the
State Governor.
According to C.W 212, the Police receive its instructions from the Inspector
General of Police and not the State Governor.
As far as the Commission is concerned, the allegation that the Governor issued a
shoot-on-sight order to the security forces remains unproved and is not worthy of
further consideration.
On the allegation that there were security lapses on the part of the Government
of Plateau State, CW213, denied that there were security lapses on the parts of
Government.
The witness at page 3 paragraphs 3.5 and 3.6 of the written response chronicled
the security steps taken by the Government of Plateau state prior to the Local
Government Elections held on 27th November, 2008 to ensure that the said Elections
were held peacefully. The witness stated as follows:
‘…… in preparing for the November, 27 2008 election, the security situation
was carefully assessed and appropriate measures put in place to guarantee a successful
and hitch free election. The State Security Council reviewed events and the security
situation at the period preceding the elections and at its meeting of 24th November,
2008, took a decision to conduct the election. The government had acquired over 40
patrol vehicles equipped with communication gadgets for joint Operation
Teams.............’
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 The witness further stated that:
‘when Government was satisfied with the arrangement made by PLASIEC, the
Security Council took all the necessary measures by way of Security deployment and
logistics to facilitate a hitch- free State-wide election’.
The minutes of the Security Council meeting of 24 th November, 2008 was
attached to the written response of the Government and marked as annexure `A’.
CW.213 further informed the Commission that the Government at about midnight of
the day of the election received information that some youths had converged to set up
illegal road blocks, burn fires and barricades around strategic locations along Bauchi
road area in Jos North despite the peaceful and successful conduct of the election and
when residents began to call the attention of security agents, Government immediately
despatched the joint operation security team of the Police, Air force and Army who
instantly and successfully dispersed the unruly youth.
The witness also informed the Commission that when the Government at about
2.00 am received other reports suggesting that a series of unprovoked violent attacks
were being orchestrated by a band of youths coming from the Ali Kazaure ward of Jos
North allegedly protesting the ‘outcome’ of the election results in Jos North, the
Government once again immediately alerted the Joint Operation Security Team of this
latest development.
Finally, the witness told the Commission in paragraph 3.18 thereof that upon the
receipt of the intelligence reports referred to above, the Government directed the
relevant security agencies to arrest the culprits and have them prosecuted. In proof of
this averment, the witness referred the Commission to Annexure ‘C’ which is the
minutes of the Security Council meeting PSSC 021, 2008 of Monday, 08, 2008 which
was attached to the written response.
The Commission has carefully and meticulously gone through all the annexures
attached to the written response of CW213 and found that the various security reports
received from SSS, confirmed to the Government that adequate security arrangements
were on the ground for the conduct of a peaceful Local Government elections of 27 th
November, 2008 and also to contain any likely up rising during or after the election and
also that the Governor and Government of Plateau State took numerous adequate and
timely security measures to protect lives and properties of its citizens before and after
the eruption of the Unrest of 28th November, 2008. The Commission therefore, finds

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that the Government of Plateau State and the Governor are not liable for any wrong
doing regarding security lapses on their part in relation to these allegations.
4.2.9 Alhaji Ibrahim Mantu, Former Deputy Senate President.
Alhaji Ibrahim Mantu, the former Deputy Senate President of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria was mentioned in memorandum JCI/J/207/2009 as one of the
persons indirectly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008. The
memorandum was presented to the Commission by Sunday Kasuwa Bwoi and was
heard by the Commission on 16th day of June, 2009 with Mr. Sunday Kasuwa Bwoi
testifying as Commission witness 103 (CW.103). Although the witness did not state the
role Alhaji Ibrahim Mantu played in precipitating the Unrest he told the Commission in
his oral evidence that he mention Mantu because of revelations from Mantu’s ADC who
served under him for 7 years. The former ADC granted an interview which was
published titled ‘Mantu is behind most of Jos crisis’. He also told the Commission that
he had expected Mantu to have refuted the allegations in that interview but he did not
which meant that what his ADC said was true. CW103 said Mantu himself confirmed
what his ADC said to be true when he, Mantu referred to what the ADC said as a
‘betrayal.’
To prove this allegation, witness CW103 requested that the former ADC, Alhaji
Abubakar Dashe and Alhaji Ibrahim Mantu himself be called to appear before the
Commission and give evidence. The Commission invited Alhaji Ibrahim Mantu and
Alhaji Abubakar Dashe to appear before the Commission. Alhaji Ibrahim Mantu failed
to appear before the Commission as requested but Alhaji Abubakar Dashe appeared
before the Commission on the 28th day of July, 2009. Alhaji Abubakar Dashe testified
as Commission witness No.204 and confirmed that he actually granted the interview in
the Leadership Newspaper of March 8, 2009. A copy of the Leadership Newspaper of
March 8, 2009 containing the interview published was tendered and admitted in
evidence as Exhibit.SC.1. While answering a question put to him by the lead Counsel
to the Commission, C.W 204 stated that Ibrahim Mantu was behind most of the crisis in
Jos. He proceeded to tell the Commission among other things that as ADC to Mantu, he
heard him on several occasions inciting people thus ‘go and fight for your right, go and
resist’. According to CW 204, a personality like Mantu should not use such inciting
words. The witness told the Commission that from his experience as ADC to Senator
Ibrahim Mantu, he knew that most of these crises, especially in Jos North were fuelled
by Politicians like Mantu. He said whenever Ibrahim Mantu lost an election; he would
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create problems using religion. That was the evidence against Senator Ibrahim Mantu,
former Deputy Senate President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
A careful review and consideration of the totality of the evidence adduced
against the former Deputy Senate President revealed that nothing concrete was
established against him, suggesting that he precipitated the Jos Unrest of 28 th
November, 2008. The witness did not tell the Commission where, when and to whom
the inciting words were used by the Senator Ibrahim Mantu, or that Mantu had a hand in
the mayhem which occurred in Jos on the 28 th November, 2008. However, for the sake
of the overall security and well being of the State, the Commission advices Government
to watch and monitor the activities of Senator Ibrahim Mantu in view of the evidence
that whenever he lost an election, he would cause trouble using religious sentiments.
The Police should investigate his activities
4.2.10 Alhaji Sale Hassan:
Alhaji Sale Hassan, Hausa/Fulani Community leader in Jos North was also
mentioned by some memoranda and witnesses who testified before the Commission as
being indirectly responsible for the Unrest. The Memoranda are:
(i) Memorandum JCI/J/91/2009 by Sunday Gomper of School of Technical
Education Plateau State Polytechnic, Barkin Ladi. This memorandum was presented by
Mr. Sunday Gomper himself on the 19th day of March, 2009. He testified as
Commission Witness 26 (CW 26). On page 20 of the said memorandum (Exhibit
JCI/J/91/2009/1), the witness identified Alhaji Sale Hassan, as arrow head of the
mayhem of 28th November, 2008 and stated therein that it would be necessary for the
Commission to invite him to appear before it.
(ii) Memorandum JCI/J/78/2009 by Kuru Community, Jos South Local
Government, Plateau State. The memorandum was presented on behalf of the
Community Mr. by Samuel Dung Davou on the 27th day of March, 2009. He testified as
Commission witness 44 (CW44). The witness on page 12 paragraph (j) of the
memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/78/2009/1) mentioned Alhaji Sale Hassan as one of the
persons to be invited to appear before the Commission to defend the role he played in
respect of the Unrest of 28th November, 2008 because in 1987, Alhaji Sale Hassan vide
the Reporter Newspaper of Tuesday, October 13, 1987 called on the Jasawa youths to
rise up and recover Jos ruler ship and that ever since then, Jos has never known peace.
The witness referred the Commission to Newspaper in question which was attached to
memorandum JCI/J/78/2009 as Appendix 9.
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 The Commission invited Alhaji Sale Hassan to appear before it and respond to
this allegation but he failed to appear. The Commission considers this as an unfortunate
development. The Commission has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence against Alhaji
Sale Hassan and found that he vide the Reporter Newspaper of Tuesday, October 13,
1987 urged the Jasawa youths to rise up and recover the rulership of Jos Town (See
Appendix 9) and ever since then Jos has not known peace. The witnesses also referred
this Commission to the previous Reports on Jos crisis, particularly, those of Hon.
Justice J. Aribiton Fiberesima’s Commission of Inquiry into the Jos Riots of 12 th April,
1994 and Hon. Justice Niki Tobi’s Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Disturbances in
Jos and Environs on 7th September, 2001. The Commission went through these Reports
and found that indeed the name of Alhaji Sale Hassan appeared severally in Hon Justice
J. Aribiton Fiberesima’s Report of 1994 as a founder of the troublesome Jasawa
Development Association responsible for the entire crisis in Jos. (See pages 27, 28 and
29 of the said Report). The Commission further observed that in the Report of Hon.
Justice Niki Tobi Commission, Alhaji Sale Hassan was not spared either. His name
came up once again in connection with the activities of Jasawa Development
Association which was held responsible for the 2001 Disturbances in Jos and its
Environs. Alhaji Sale Hassan was described in the Report as the ‘mentor or sponsor of
the Association.’ Although he was not directly linked to the present Unrest.
The Commission is of the view that the activities of Alhaji Sale Hassan
particularly in connection with the Jasawa Development Association should be closely
monitored by the Government. He should be invited by the Police for a full
investigation and report about his activities particularly in connection with Jasawa
Development Association and the findings should be made available to the SSS.
4.2.11 Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jengre:
A Muslim Cleric, Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jengre was mentioned in many
memoranda presented before the Commission as one of the persons indirectly
responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008, for his very inciting preaching.
Some of these memoranda are as follows:
(i) Memorandum JCI/J/77/2009 by Honourable Francis Tadi Gazu. The
memorandum was presented by Hon. Francis Tadi Gazu on 2nd day of April, 2009. He
testified as Commission witness 69 (CW69). The witness at pages 9 and 10 of Exhibit
JCI/J/77/2009/1 accused Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jengre as one of the persons responsible
for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2009. The witness is of the firm view that if
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anyone was to be held responsible for the Unrest, it was Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jengre.
The reason for his assertion is that Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jengre’s sermon to the Muslim
Ummah was very inciting, intolerable and outright misrepresentation of facts. The
witness further stated at page 5 of Exhibit JCI/J/77/2009/1 that Sheikh Sani Yahaya
Jengre’s sermon were full of intolerance for the natives’ host of Berom, Anaguta and
Afizere people. The witness gave an instance of the intolerance displayed by the Sheikh
in his preaching by referring the Commission to the said sermon, where the Mallam
warned the Governor of Plateau State not to install a Berom man as Chairman of Jos
North and went on to dare the Governor that if he does that, he would face dire
consequences. The witness also told the Commission that Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jengre
grossly mispresented facts when he told his congregation in his sermon that they
constituted eighty percent of the population of Jos North. The witness went further to
state that since the supporters of the said Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jengre are predominantly
illiterates, they agreed totally with him and had every reason to riot when they were told
that a mere twenty percent population had been declared winners’. See pages 4, 5, 6 and
7 of Exhibit JCI/J/77/2009/1.
These utterances and the circumstances in which they were uttered are sufficient
to trigger Unrest:
iii) Memorandum JCI/J/91/2009 by Sunday Gomper (CW26) of School of
Technical Education Plateau State Polytechnic Barkin Ladi. This witness listed Shiekh
Yahaya Jengre as one of the persons that should be held responsible for the Unrest and
recommended very strongly that his activities be investigated but did not state any
reason to support his assertion.
(iv) Memorandum JCI/J/207/2009 by Mr. Sunday Kasuwa Bwoi, this
memorandum also mentioned Sheikh Yahaya Jengre as one of the persons indirectly
responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008. At page 5 of the memorandum
(Exhibit JCI/J/207/2009/1), the witness who testified as C.W 103 listed Shiekh Sani
Yahaya Jengre as one of the persons he regarded as prime suspects responsible for the
Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008,
(v) Memorandum JCI/J/152/2009 by Berom Forum, Chwelnyap. This
memorandum was presented by John Pam Choji on behalf of the Forum on the 25 th day
of March, 2009. He testified as Commission witness 37(CW37). On pages 1 and 2 of
the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/152/2009/1), the witness referred to provocative

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sermons by Muslim Ulamas and cited an example of a recent sermon preached by
Shiekh Sani Yahaya Jengre, which according to the witness, was:
‘quite inciting against adherent of other faith and contributed to the
mayhem......’ .
(vi) Memorandum JCI/J/65/2009 by Berom Patriotic Forum in Tertiary
Institutions of Plateau State: This is one of the memoranda that also pointed out Shiekh
Sani Yahaya Jengre as one persons indirectly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th
November, 2008. This memorandum was presented on behalf of Patriotic Forum by
Dalyop Danladi Mancha, the Chairman of the Forum on the 25 th day of March, 2009.
He testified as Commission witness 35 and accused Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jengre because
of his inciting preaching contained in some cassettes being circulated in Jos city prior to
the Unrest.
(vii) Memorandum JCI/J/136/2009 by Berom Parliamentary Forum, No. 10
Madu Road, Du. This memorandum was presented on the 19th day of March, 2009 by
Mr. Toma Jang Davou on behalf of the Forum. He testified as Commission witness 28
(CW28). On page 10, paragraph 6 of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/136/2009/1), the
witness recommended the trial of Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jengre for causing the Jos riots
which resulted in deaths and destructions of wealth by his war propaganda. The witness
in order to prove this allegation tendered in evidence a cassette he called ‘Sheikh Sani
Yahaya Jengre ‘cassette of war propaganda’. The Commission has carefully listened to
the preaching and found the message contained in the preaching to be quite inciting and
inflammatory.
The Commission in view of this evidence invited the said Sheikh Sani Yahaya
Jengre to appear before it on the 24th day of July, 2009 and respond to these weighty
allegations against him but he failed to appear as requested. The evidence against
Shiekh Sani Yahaya Jengre is overwhelming and the Commission is of the view that it
constitutes some of what triggered off the Jos Unrest of 28 th November, 2008. The
Commission finds that he was indirectly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th
November, 2008. He should therefore be investigated by the Police and prosecuted for
his role in aiding and precipitating the Unrest.
4.2.12 Idris Ibn Mohammed and 4 others
Idris Ibn Mohammed, Sheikh Mohammed Usman Kano, Alhaji Salisu
Mohammed, Mallam Idris Abdul, Barrister Ahmed S. Garba and Mohammed Adam:
These persons were all mentioned in some memoranda presented before the
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Commission. Memorandum JCI/J/78/2009 by Kuru Community Jos South Local
Government Council, Plateau State. This memorandum was presented on behalf of the
Community by Mr. by Samuel Dung Davou on the 27 th day of March, 2009. He
testified as Commission witness 44 (CW44). The witness on page 12 paragraph (j) of
the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/78/2009/1) recommended that these men, Idris Ibn
Mohammed, Sheikh Mohammed Usman Kano, Alhaji Salisu Mohammed, Mallam Idris
Abdul and Barrister Ahmed S. Garba be invited to appear before the Commission to
explain their roles in the Unrest in Jos considering their write-ups in three documents he
attached to memorandum JCI/J/98/2009. The three documents were tendered in
evidence before the Commission and were admitted in evidence as follows:
(a) A document titled ‘Association for Establishment of Islam In Jos Town’
endorsed by Alhaji Salisu Mohammed and Mallam Idris Abdul, Exhibit
JCI/J/78/2009/1.
(b) A Document titled ‘Which are the Tribes Contesting For Ownership of
Jos’ (from YANCI) Exhibit JCI/J/78/2009/3.
(c) Another document titled ‘JASAWA MUSLIMS’ endorsed by Sheikh
Mohammed Usman Kano, Exhibit JCI/J/78/2009.
According to C.W 44, these documents are inciting and misleading. The witness
insisted that the above named persons be brought to the Commission to explain their
roles in the Unrest of 28th November, 2008 being authors of the alleged inciting and
misleading documents
(i) Memorandum JCI/J/149/2009 – Laranto Berom Community. This
memorandum was presented by John Rapp on the 27 th of February, 2009 on behalf of
the Community. He testified as Commission witness 13 (CW 13). At page 9 of the
memorandum random (Exhibit JCI/J/149/2009/1), the witness mentioned One Idris Ibn
Mohammed as one of the persons responsible for fuelling the crisis by making inciting
publications (See the verbatim report of the Commission’s proceedings for 27 th March,
2009. In his evidence before the Commission, C.W 13 specifically mentioned the roles
of the above listed persons played in the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008.
The witness stated that Idris Mohammed role in the Jos Unrest was his
authorship of a document titled ‘why we must carry out Jihad’. As for Sheikh
Mohammed, the witness said he called on members of Jasawa Development
Association to ensure that Muslims should by all means become Chairman of Jos North.
To buttress this assertion, the witness tendered in evidence a document addressed to
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members of Jasawa Development Association which was admitted in evidence and
marked as Exhibit JCI/J/78/2009/4, Exhibit JCI/J/78/2009 is a wake up call to all
members of Jasawa Development Association to rise up and fight for a take over of Jos
North.
A careful perusal of Exhibit JCI/J/78/2009/4 shows that it bears the name of
Sheikh Mohammed Usman Kano but was not signed and is undated. However, in view
of the facts that the contents of the publications are highly provocative, the Commission
urges the Police to thoroughly investigate this allegation and get to the bottom of how
the publication came about. If Sheikh Mohammed Usman Kano is identified and he is
indeed the author, he should be prosecuted.
The witnesses also mentioned Alhaji Salisu Mohammed and Mallam Idris Abdul
because they were signatories to Exhibit JCI/J/78/2009/2, a document emanating from
‘Supreme Council for the Actualisation of Sharia in Nigeria’. The document is a
clarion call upon all Muslims in Nigeria to make financial contributions towards a take
over and islamization of Jos.
The Commission has carefully read and examined Exhibit JCI/J/78/2009/2 and
has seen that the document is dated 11th May, 2002 and indeed signed by Alhaji Salisu
Mohammed and Mallam Idris Abdul. Though the document precedes the Unrest of 28th
November, 2008, the contents and message in the document fits appropriately into the
circumstances of the Unrest of 28th November, 2008. The Commission recommends
that Alhaji Salisu Mohammed and Mallam Idris be identified and prosecuted for writing
inciting and provocative materials.
As for Barrister Ahmed S. Garba, C.W 13 alleged that he wrote and published a
fabricated and inciting document tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibit
JCI/J/78/2009/1. Barr. Ahmed S. Garba was invited to appear before the Commission
and respond to the allegation against him but he failed to appear before the
Commission. The witness as well accused one Mohammed of publishing exhibit
JCI/J/78/2009/5 which according to him is biased and inciting.
The Commission after a careful consideration of the totality of materials and
evidence placed before it found that all the write ups attributed to these men are quite
inciting and capable of breaching the peace in Jos North Local Government. These
inciting materials constitute a permanent source of conflict in the minds of the youth
who are leaders of tomorrow. Indeed, publications of offensive materials like these
cannot enhance peaceful co-existence. It will rather continue to inflame passions. In
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order to encourage peaceful co-existence among residents of Jos, the Police should
thoroughly investigate the sources of these inciting and provocative publications in
order to bring the culprits to book. This will go a long way in calming nerves and
further foster peaceful co-existence among residents of Jos.
4.2.13 Alhaji Kega
The name of Alhaji Kega of Kega Motors was mentioned in memorandum
JCI/J/149/2009 presented by Laranto Berom Community as one of the persons
indirectly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th November, 2008. This memorandum
was presented by John Rapp. On page 9 of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/149/2009/1)
he stated that Alhaji Kega was one of the persons that might be responsible for the Jos
Unrest of 28th November 2008. The witness stated that prior to the Unrest,
‘it noticed unusual influx of aliens especially, youths into Jos. They were of
Northern Descendants and their presence was noticed around Alhaji Kega’s (Kega’s
motors) residence around Corner Shagari ‘.
For this reason, the witness described Alhaji Kega as ‘a chief suspect who
supported the crisis’ The Commission recommends that the activities of Alhaji Kega be
investigated by Security Operatives. He should be able to tell the Police who were those
aliens in his house and where they were from and what they were doing in his house at
the relevant period.
4.2.14 Alhaji Danladi Pasali, former P.D.P Chairmanship aspirant for Jos
North.
Memorandum JCI/J/126/2009 by Girin District Community. This memorandum
was presented by Mr Pius Benjamin Dung, the secretary of the Community on behalf
of the Community on the 23rd day of March, 2009. He testified as Commission
witness 31 (CW31). At page 4 of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/126/2009/1), the
witness mentioned the name of Danladi Pasali as one of the persons responsible for the
Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008. The witness accused Alhaji Danladi Pasali because
of his displeasure over what the witness described as ‘Hausa loss of the candidacy of
Governorship’. This he said was reflected in an interview Alhaji Danladi Pasali granted
the Daily Trust Newspaper of Monday, 26th January, 2009, titled ‘No Hausa man will
leave Jos North’ The witness further stated that the language used by Danladi Pasali
shows that he was aggrieved and could do anything to disrupt the process of the election
or better still join forces with any group to ensure that hell broke loose.

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 The Commission carefully read the interview in question and found that the
language used by Danladi Pasali shows that he was aggrieved and could do anything to
disrupt peace in Jos.
Another memorandum mentioned Alhaji Danladi Pasali is memorandum
JCI/J/95/2009 by The National Association of Afizere Youth Movement. This
memorandum was presented by Yakubu Ashoms on behalf of the Association on the 8 th
day of April, 2009. Mr. Yakubu Ashoms testified as Commission witness 97 (CW 97).
On page 19 of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/95/2009/1), the witness named Danladi
Pasali as one of the persons indirectly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th November,
2008. The allegation against the said Danladi Pasali was based on an open letter written
to the presidency by the Plateau PDP Muslim forum published in the Daily Trust of 3 rd
February, 2009. In view of all these allegations, the Commission invited Alhaji Danladi
Pasali to appear before it and defend himself, but he failed to appear.
Since Alhaji Danladi Pasali refused to appear before the Commission and
respond to the allegations made against him, the Commission in view of the gravity of
the allegation against him, is of the view that Alhaji Danladi Pasali should be invited by
the Police and investigated for any complicity in the Jos Unrest of 28 November, 2008
and if sufficient evidence is established against him, he should be prosecuted and
punished accordingly.
4.2.15 ANPP Chieftain: Hon. Nazifi Yusuf and Mohammed Sani Mudi.
These men were also mentioned in numerous memoranda presented and by
witnesses who gave evidence before the Commission.
(i) Memorandum JCI/J/58/2009 by The Berom Community Development
Association Janda ( Fudawa). The memorandum was presented by one Anthony Gyang
Bot on behalf of the Association on the 19th day of March. He testified as Commission
witness 29 (CW29). On pages 9 and 10 of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/58/2009/1),
the witness mentioned ANPP Chieftain, Nazifi Yusuf and Mohammed Sani Mudi as
those indirectly responsible for the crisis. According to the witness, his view is
predicated upon the evidence the two men, gave before the House of Representatives
Ad-hoc Committee on the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008 to the effect that ‘the
crisis of 28/11/08 followed their protest against attempts to change the results at the
collation centre. The witness then called on the Commission to invite them to come and
explain their roles in the Unrest.

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 (ii) Memorandum JCI/J/95/2009 by The National Association of Afizere Youth
Movement. This memorandum was presented by Yakubu Ashoms on behalf of the
Association on the 8th day of April, 2009. Mr. Yakubu Ashoms testified as Commission
witness 97 (CW 97). At page 19 of memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/95/2009/1), the
witness named Hon. Nazifi Mohammed as one of the persons directly responsible for
the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008. The allegation against the said Hon. Nazifi
Mohammed is based on his alleged statement that if the Candidate of ANPP was not
declared winner of the Chairmanship election in Jos North hell would be let loose. Hon.
Nazifi Mohammed was invited to appear before the Commission on the 21 st day of July,
but he failed to do so.
(iii) Memorandum JCI/J/126/2009 by Girin District Community. This
memorandum was presented by Mr Pius Dung, the Secretary of the Community on
behalf of the Community on the 24th day of March, 2009. He testified as CW 31. On
page 4 of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/126/2009/1), the witness accused Hon. Nazifi
Mohammad as one of the persons responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28 th November,
2008. The witness alleged that Hon. Nazifi made a statement during the security
meeting at the Police officers mess on the 24th of November, 2008 and stated as follows:
‘ if ANPP does not win the forthcoming Election in Jos North, the town will be
on fire’.
According to C.W. 31, the security meeting was preparatory to the election of
27th November, 2008.
(iv) Memorandum JCI/J/133/2009 by Bache Development Association of Bassa
Local Government of Plateau State. This memorandum was presented by Mr. Nuhu
Ashama on behalf of the Association on the 8 th day of April, 2009. Mr. Nuhu Ashama
testified as Commission witness 96 (C.W96). The witness on page 8 identified Nazifi
Mohammed as the person that started the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2009. According
to the witness, there was an eye witness account of how Nazifi started the Unrest by
making phone calls calling on some people to come out because the infidels have won
the election. This eye witness is retired CSP Sale Adudu. Retired CSP Sale Adudu was
invited to the Commission and he gave evidence as C.W.202. In his evidence he stated
as follows:
‘when I got to Kabong, I met John Kenle…. So when the results were coming in,
the Hausa/Fulani were leading with almost about thirty something thousand – very
close to be favour of the result. But later the other results were coming from the
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indigenes. At about 11:00 p.m the result of the indigenes were almost fifty something
thousand. Then, some of them started shouting, the arna has won the election, they
have won this election’.
C.W. 202 said it was at this stage that Hon. Nazifi Mohammed made about 10
phone calls to some unknown persons saying:
‘Ku fito, ku fito, arna sun ci zabe’
Meaning
‘come out, come out, the infidels have won the election’
According to C.W 202, it was the series of alarms raised by Hon Nazifi
Mohammed to some unknown persons through phone calls that triggered off the Unrest.
(v) Memorandum JCI/J/137/2009 PDP Elders Northern Zone Forum Plateau
State. The memorandum was presented on behalf of the Forum by Doctor Jonah
Madugu. He testified on the 25th day of February, 2009 as Commission witness 7 (CW
7). At page 16 of the memorandum (Exhibit JCI/J/137/2009/1), the witness identified
Honourable Nazifi Mohammed (former member Plateau state House of Assembly) and
Honourable Aminu Baba (the defeated PDP Chairmanship candidate for Jos North
Local Government Council) as some of the persons indirectly responsible for the Jos
Unrest of 28th November, 2008. According to C.W7, the duo contributed in no small
measure to the flaring up of nerves penultimate the election. Furthermore, the witness
alleged that the content of the interviews granted by these individuals to the media, print
and electronic, local and international revealed that they had the motive to instigate
mayhem in the city of Jos unless Aminu Baba of ANPP was declared winner of the
Chairmanship election.
It was on the strength of these serious allegations that the Commission invited
Hon. Mohammed Nazifi to appear before it on the 21 st day of July, 2009 and respond to
the allegations against him. He was personally served with an invitation to appear
before the Commission. This same invitation was published in several National Dailies.
The Commissions finds that the allegations against Hon. Nazifi are weighty and
overwhelming. The Commission recommends that he be invited by the Police and
interrogated. He should be prosecuted.
4.2.16 Alhaji Abba, Alhaji Jamil of Jamil Motors and Ibrahim Mohammed
of National Museum.
Memorandum JCI/J/67/2009 by Tekan Youth Fellowship. This memorandum
was presented on behalf of the youth fellowship by its president, Bro. Emmanuel Nanle
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on the 26th day of March, 2008. Brother Emmanuel Nanle gave evidence as C.W.41 and
in his oral testimony identified the following persons, as being directly/indirectly
responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008.
C.W 41 told the Commission he suspected that Alhaji Abba and Alhaji Jamil of
Jamil Motors knew something about the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008 because he
used to buy cars from Alhaji Abba at Bauchi Road but few days to the Unrest, he went
to the Alhaji Abba’s car stand at Bauchi Road for the purpose of buying a car but
found that he had removed all the cars in the car Stand .He further told the Commission
that when he inquired from the Alhaji Abba the where about of his cars, Alhaji Abba
told him that he had moved the cars to Abuja. The witness also told the Commission
that Alhaji Jamil also did the same which was an indication that they had prior
knowledge that there would be Unrest in Jos North that period.
For Ibrahim Mohammed, a staff of National Museum, Jos, the witness told the
Commission that he was seen wearing army uniform and was armed with a gun on the
day of the Unrest. The witness then urged the Commission to invite these men to appear
before the Commission to say what they know about the Unrest.
From the evidence available to the Commission, Alhaji Abba and Alhaji Jamil
were alleged to have got a prior knowledge of the Unrest and that was why they were
able to remove their vehicles from their car stands shortly before the Unrest. The duos
thus have a strong allegations standing against them. The Commission recommends
that they be investigated.
Ibrahim Mohammed was seen wearing army uniform and was armed on the day
of the Unrest. He should be thoroughly interrogated and prosecuted.
As for all other persons mentioned by this memorandum, no concrete allegation
has been made against them in memorandum JCI/J/67/2009.
4.2.17 The Council of Ulamas and Jama atu Nasril Islam Jos North (JNI)
Council of Ulamas and Jama’atu Nasril Islam were accused of being responsible
for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008 by various memoranda presented before the
Commission and witnesses who testified in respect of these memoranda.
Memorandum JCI/J/206/2009 by Da Ezekiel D.J. Choji - This memorandum
was presented on the 16th day of June, 2009 by Da Ezekiel Choji Dawang Joh who
testified as Commission witness 99 (CW99). CW99 came down heavily on the Council
of Ulamas. He told the Commission that the Council of Ulamas:

353
 ‘are preachers of hatred who use their vantage position and facilities in the
Mosques to preach civil disobedience and encourage Jihadist violence using public
address systems in the presence of security agents without reaction from them. Crisis
of this nature has become the fastest money spinning industry, as soon as they strike,
they take the bodies to the Mosques, film them and have the video posted on the internet
to show the ignorant Islamic world the falsehood that Muslims are being persecuted
and that needed financial and material support to fight the so called infidels.’ Millions
of hard currencies are sent o them to cause more havoc on the Plateau.............’

The witness then went on to say that the Council of Ulamas in Plateau must be
investigated to explain their roles in the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008.
P.D.P Elders Northern Zone Forum Plateau State presented memorandum
JCI/J/137/2009 which was tendered in evidence and admitted as Exhibit
JCI/J/137/2009/1. The forum identified Jama’atu Nasril Islam, Jos North as one of the
groups responsible for precipitating the Jos Unrest of 28 th November, 2008 because
during the Unrest, they were busy carrying every corpse from the street into the Central
Mosque, filming same and posting the video clips on the internet to create the
impression that people were killed inside the Central Mosque. The forum argued that
the Hausa/Fulani actually killed all these people themselves and hurriedly carried the
bodies into the Mosque for purpose of whipping up sentiments to gain sympathy from
gullible media and compounding the problem beyond the frontiers of Plateau State. The
video clip was tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibit JCI/J/154/2009/5 which the
Commission viewed on the 13th day of May, 2009.
The Commission invited the leaders of the Council of Ulamas and JNI to appear
before it to respond to the allegations against them, but they failed to appear, alleging
fears of bias. The Commission after a careful study of the whole unfortunate incident
urge the Government of Plateau State to advise religions institutions strong against
fanning the embers of propaganda encourage and foster inter-religious dialogue among
the various religious groupings in Jos North.
4.2.18 The State Security Service (SSS) Plateau State Command:
The State Security Services, Plateau State Command was also accused of being
indirectly responsible for the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008 because of its failure to
give the Governor of Plateau State an accurate report of the security situation on ground
concerning the looming breakdown of law and order in the State prior to the Unrest in
354
Jos North. The memorandum that alleged these lapses against the State Security Service
Plateau Command in this regard is memorandum JCI/J/160/2009 by the Izu Umunna
Cultural Association Jos. The presenter testified as Commission witness 25 (CW 25).
On page 5, paragraph (b) the association appeal to the Commission to investigate and
find if there was diligence in the performance of duties and functions of Federal
Government and other agencies including the SSS prior to Unrest that erupted in Jos
North on the 28th day of November, 2008. In his oral evidence CW25 insisted that the
SSS did not do their job hence the Unrest. He said the SSS should be held responsible
for the Unrest and should be brought before the Commission to explain its role in the
Unrest of 28th November, 2008. The Director of the State Security Command was given
notice to appear before the Commission on the 31 st day of July, 2009 to respond to the
allegations levelled against the service by CW25. The former Director of the State
Security Service, Plateau State Command, A.B. Charanchi who was the man on ground
prior to and during the Jos Unrest of 28 th November, 2008 appeared before the
Commission. In his oral submissions, he denied that the State Security Service, Plateau
Command was guilty of any negligence of its duties. According to him, the SSS did
their job very well as it reported every security situation in Jos North and the State at
large to the Governor of Plateau State prior to the outbreak of the Jos Unrest.
The witness further told the Commission that at various stages prior to the
Unrest, he informed the Governor of Plateau State about the threats to peace, law and
order in Plateau State, and particularly, in Jos North Local Government Area in the
following areas:
a) Disagreement over the choice of Timothy Buba as the PDP flag bearer for
the Chairmanship seat in Jos North alleging over bearing influence by the
State Governor, Jonah David Jang,
b) The fielding of a Christian Vice Chairman for the PDP which introduced
ethno religious political dimension into the Political situation and which also
caused the disquiet as most Muslim party members threatened to leave PDP
or vote en-mass for the opposition parties, particularly ANPP,
c) The agitation of other political parties for lack of confidence in PLASIEC to
conduct free and fair elections,
d) Threat of resistance by Muslim Community in Jos over alleged
marginalization,

355
 e) Inciting sermon of one Idris Mailafiya prior to the election calling on the
Muslims to vote only for the Muslim candidates who will protect their
interest.
During his oral presentation he did not tell the Commission that he assured the
Governor and Government of Plateau State that these anticipated threats could be
curtailed by the SSS and other security operatives in Jos. However, the Commission on
perusing the previous security reports allegedly sent to the Governor by the witness
discovered that the former Director of the SSS concluded most of his reports to the
Governor with the assurance that the service had put adequate measure on the ground to
contain any such possibility. For instance in the security report addressed to the
Governor dated 22nd October, 2008, Mr. A.B. Charanchi concluded the report as
follows:
‘The State is expected to be relatively peaceful in the month of November, 2008
regardless of the envisaged threats. The service will sustain efforts at frustrating
neutralizing and containing threats in liaison with the relevant agencies and
Government to ensure peace in the State please.’
Similarly, in the security report of 16 th November, 2008, about 11days to the
election, the Director of the SSS concluded in the general assessment thus:
‘The elections are envisaged to be largely peaceful in most LGAS. However Jos
North, Langtang North.... Regarding Jos North LGA, there is a strong likelihood of
post-election violence. However this command has emplaced containment measures
including perception management and cautioning of relevant stakeholders and groups,
including leaders of political parties, candidates in the elections... Furthermore, the
command is liaising closely with relevant security agencies to ensure a peaceful
conduct of the election, please’.
From the above evidence, the Commission is of the view that the allegation that
Governor was not adequately informed of the security situation on ground prior to the
Unrest is not completely unfounded. The Commission is of the view that there should
be better and more cordial understanding between the SSS and Plateau State
Government.
The above represents the assessment of the Commission on the numerous names
mentioned by various memoranda as being either directly or indirectly responsible for
the Unrest of 28th November, 2008.

356
 The Commission found that some names were only mentioned vaguely without
any particularity and hence could not be identified. Others were mentioned with very
little evidence adduced against them.
The Commission was greatly limited in its ability to proffer any assessment
against these groups and therefore urges the alleging parties to provide further and
better particulars to enable further investigation by the Police.

CHAPTER FIVE
5.0 Extent of loss of lives and injuries to persons
This Chapter relates to the term of reference 3(c) of the Commission which is to
‘ascertain the extent of loss of lives and damage to property’.
The Commission’s mandate did not expressly direct it to make recommendations
for the payment of compensation. The Commission has nevertheless been empowered
by term of reference No. 3(e) of the instrument establishing it to ‘make any other
recommendations incidental to the Commission’s terms of reference’.
The Commission has set out in detail here-under the names of persons who lost
their lives and those injured during the Unrest as supplied by the various memoranda
presented before it.
The Commission wishes at this juncture to rely on its omnibus term of
reference and impress it upon not only the State Government but also the Federal
Government to look into the claims of those injured and the families of those who lost
their lives during the Unrest. This is imperative as some of the families who presented
memoranda on loss of lives and injuries to persons have made claims for such losses
and injuries.
The Commission gathered from the totality of evidence placed before it that
people suffered from various types of injuries, ranging from gun shots, arrows, burning
and/or machete attacks and some of which resulted in the fatalities suffered. Distilling
from the various Memoranda and evidence based thereon, the following lives were lost
in the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008.
5.1 Loss of Lives
MEMO.JCI/J/133/2009 – Bache Development Association Of Bassa L.G.A
1. Aaron Asaharu

357
2. Samuel Amanya Assak
3. Adudu Achisun
MEMO.JCI/J/151/2009 – Stefanos Foundation
1. Amos Goyo
2. Ige Dogo
3. Samson Ajala
4. Laraba Ishaya
5. Tunde Oyilola
6. Dauda Dagama
7. Chinedu Emeka
8. Paul Agwam
9. Danjuma Goyol
10. David Goyol
11. Israel Goyol
12. Abednego Sule
13. Adani Mathew
14. Henry Ezike
15. Steven Olanrewaju
16. Ngokwa Ismail
17. Mr. Okeke Eket
18. Mr. Kosara Okeke
19. Miss. Ngozi Okeke
20. Mr. N. T. Yusuf
21. Agabu Istifanus
22. Dauda Dagama
23. John
24. Michael Arandon
25. Adang
26. Rev. Ephraim Masok
27. Peter
28. Martha Azi
29. Samuel Arin
30. Peter I. Arin
31. Dung Tok
358
32. Shugatan Zfinaza
33. Yinka Ojebisi
34. Abraham Oladimeji
35. Danladi Machocho
36. Dennis Nyam
37. Philip Atem
38. Cletus Eliya
39. Nenfort Danbaba
40 Ishaya Dekin Irimiya
41. Samson Ajala
42. Bala Tapnu
43. Nicodemus Daniel
44. John Garba
45. Monday Ido
46. Agabus Istifanus
47. Samuel Joseph
48. Tunde Oyedokun
49. Victor Eliya
50. Bitrus Bawa
51. Jacob Yinka A.
52. Samuel Kum
53. Nike Obe Adegbemiro
54. Dale
55. Victoria L. Daniel
56. Laraba Iliya
57. Yusuf Jacob
58. Pastor James Lawet
59. Bulus Daniel
60. Rev. Timothy Abituna
61. Sunday Alawode
62. Noah Olaniyi
63. Samuel Olaniyi
64. Abigail Olaniyi
65 John Aboyi
359
66. Iliya Peter
67. Emmanuel Luka
68. Barr. Atang Toma Afan
69.. Mary Chukanya
70. Barnabas Anno
71. Bawa Inuwa
72. Rotgak Gana
73. Hassan Baba
74. Joseph Nyango
75. Daniel Ibrahim
76. Geoffrey kwonpat
77. Danlami Zusha
78. Rev. Bulus Tsety
79. Bulus Daniel
80. Moses kyata
81. Francis Stephen
82. John Pam Chibi
83. Ibrahim Sako
84. Maikole Maiagwa
85. Daniel Sunday
86. Kmsi Sani
87. Timothy John
88. Bisat Danjuma
89. Francis Aruma
90. Emmanuel Gaiya
91. John Garba
92. Musa Manja
93. Yohanna Musa Manja
94. Davou Barge
95. Gyang Davou Barge
96. Bot Chewnd
97. Timothy Tanko
98. Sunday Alamu
99. Ishaku Gimba
360
 100. Azi Ada Rin
101. Bulus Nyam

MEMO. JCI/J/112/2009/1 –Mrs Rahila Goyol, Kauna Baptist Church, Rikkos ,

Jos.
1. Mr. Amos Goyol*
2. Tokitda Amos Goyol* (all listed in Memo JCI/J/112/2009)
3. David Amos Goyol*
4. Israel Amos Goyol*
MEMO.JCI/J/68/2009 – Irigwe Community Domiciled In Jos North.
1. Bulus Ali
2. Denkwe Gado
3. Mrs. Izah
4. Ige Tegwi
5.. Mrs. Salalve
6. Joseph Tari
7. Diba Kpasha
8. Isiaku Ransa
9. Kureh Duzongo
10. Danladi Yakubu Juwa
MEMO. JCI/J/22/2009 – Rev. D. A. Ogunlowo And 1 Or
1. Mr. Mathew Aja.
2. Mr. Alawu
3. Mr. S. A. Dele
MEMO.JCI/J/28/2009 - Mwaghavul Development Association Jos Branch
1. Mr. Agabus Dechan
2. Mr. Bulus Chafen
3. Mr. Bisat Samuel
More than 100 Igbo people killed, however, no names were given by (Memo No
JCI/J/160/2009 – Izu Umunna Cultural Association, Jos).
MEMO.JCI/J/17/2009 – Senior Staff Association., Jos
1. Hse Grace Kaze (S. 4425)
2. Madam Christiana Pai (S. 5003)
3. Oshowo Comfort (S. 4459)
361
 4. Mrs. A. A. Badewa
5. Mrs. F. A. Dosunmu
6. Mr. W. A. Fanko
7. Mrs. E. Adekunle
8. Lydia Sha
MEMO.JCI/J/03/2009 –, Evang Musa Paul Gindiri
1. Mr. Noah T. Yusuf (also listed memo JCI/J/151/2009 and Memo No.
JCI/J/137/2009).
MEMO. JCI/J/159/2009 – Prof. Sonni G. Tyoden
1. Uchenna Ezike *
2. Samuel Akipisoya
3. Olubaomi Taiwo
4. Dang Weng
5. Ibrahim Dauda
6. Balogun Emmanuel
7. Ogunji Sayo
8. Mr. Maxwell Dewa
9. Victor Amaziah
MEMO.JCI/J/137/2009 – P.D.P. Elders Northern Zone Forum Plateau State
1. Mr. Kwasu Zaruma
2. Mr. Timothy John *
3. Mayowa Bolaji
4. Joseph Poujugu
5. Barr. Azi Musa Afan
6. Samuel Arin Izang *
7. Danladi Yakubu*
8. N. T. Yusuf*
MEMO. JCI/J/134/2009 – Church of Christ in Nigeria
1. Pastor James Lewat* and three other members
2. 5 members COCIN Nassarawa
3. Timothy Joseph
4. Joseph Fom Jugu
5. Dung Tsok*
MEMO.JCI/J/171/2009 – Mrs Comfort A. Akinjogbin
362
 1. Oluwaleke Akande
2. Adetola Odusole
3. Ibukun Akinjogbin (all NYSC)
MEMO.JCI/J/79/2009 – Haske Women Association Russau Village Jos North
L.G.A. Plateau State.
1. Mr. Kwasu Zaruma
2. Timothy John*
3. Mayowa Bolaji
MEMO.JCI/J/37/2009 – Ngas Development Association Jos North Branch.
1. Nde Bala Munuk (Alias don’t cook)
2. Nde Gabriel Bile
3. Nenfort Danbaba (repeat of Memo No. JCI/J/94/2009
4. Jirit Danbaba
5. Fwengak Rotshak
6. Amos Goyol and three children*
7. Ishaya Bellneng
8. Nengak Deshi
9. Michael Goyol*
MEMO. JCI/J/127/2009 - Igbo Community Association (I.C.A.) Jos
1. Onyekachi Nnadi
2. Nwakego Madumere
3. Cletus Chukwu
4. Ikedi Duru
5. Henry Nwachukwu
6. Ogechukwu Inyama
7. Uzondu Njoku
8. Amechi Nmadufor
9. John Ukachi
10. Gabriel Nwaigwe
11. Nnamdi Uzogara
12. Chijioke Anim
13. Rascal Uchendu
14. Livinus Opara
15. Kenneth Osuji
363
16. Cyril Ezeh
17. Chidiebere Etonihu
18. Chukwudi Okwara
19. Albert Adimekwe
20. Ukachukwu Eze
21. Emeka Ikejiaka
22. Uzoma Onuebunwe
23. Samuel Uju
24. Charles Felix Obi
25. Silas Oguzo
26. Anyaocha Romanus
27. Henry Ezike *
28. Victor Ndonlokwem
29. Romanus Echesirim
30. Michael Akachukwu
31. Joseph Ezeugwu
32. Paulinus Eze
33. Gloria Ogbu
34. Martina Ogbu
35. Peter Ani
36. Philip Ugwu
37. Sunday Okorie
38. Martin Okonkwo
39. Andrew John O.
40. Titus Nnamani
41. Stephen Ugwu
42. Christian Ugwu
43. Sabastine Ugwoke
44. David Ezema
45 Christopher Ukwueze
46. Charles Omeje
47. Martin Ugwu
48. Chukwuma Ozoagu
49. Bartholomew Onovo
364
50. John Ani
51. Stanley C. Aguagba
52. Alphonsus Chukwujioke
53. George Ogbujiagba
54. Andrew Okeke*
55. Miss Ngozi Okeke*
56. Kosarachi Okeke *
57. Simon Anyadubaula
58. Alfred Chianumba
59. Nnamdi Okeke
60. Louis Ikegbune
61. Adolphus Nsoedo
62. Chinedu Aghaji
63. Arinze Okonkwo
64. Clement Onwurah
65. Uchenna Ifejika
66. Emmanuel Ezinne
67 Mgbojikwe Samuel
68. Innocent Okonkwo
69. Cyprian Nwafor
70. Onyeka Okoli
71. Innocent Ginika
72. Sunday Chidebelu
73. Nwankwo Nnaemeka
74. Angus Nwakalor
75. Chigbogu Modebelu
76. Cyril Enweluani
77. Uche Udeagbala
78. Michael Kalu
79. Joseph Kalu
80. Stephen Chukwu
81. James Chukwu
82. Joseph Oturu
83 Pius Oturu
365
84. Christian Nwanchukwu
85. Maduabuchi Steve
86. Anthony Kalu
87. Stella Kalu
88. Okon Oji.
89. Nwaokorie Michael
90. Ogbonna David
91. Emmanuel Nwoji
92. Jonathan Ejiogu
93. Anthony Maduako
94. Philip Maduabuchi
95. Okey Sunday
96. Peter Nwokike
97. Ogbonnaya Agwu
98. Joseph Agwu
99. Peter Okoro
100. Gregory Onu
101. Steve Okafor
102. Solomon Obasi
103. Alum Christopher
104. Okorie Jacob
105. Anthony Egwu
106. Jude Mba
107. Pius Obasi
108. Andrew Uneke
109. Gilbert Uneke
110. Sabastine Enewe
111. Pius Anyam
112. Cletus Aziekwu
113. Mary Ossai
114. Nnamdi Okikiri
115. Linus Nwokobia
116. Mike Uyakonwu
117. Roseline Isichie
366
 118. Usondu Chiedu,
MEMO. JCI/J/93/2009 – Church Of Christ In Nigeria (COCIN) (Chwel – Nyap,
Jos)
1. Pastor James J. Lewat*
2. Baba Bulus Daniel*
3. John Garba*
4. Ibrahim Garba
5. Sunday Samson
6. Dauda Dauji Dagama*
7. Pam Usman
8. Chinedu Emeka
9. Agabus *
MEMO.JCI/J/41/2009 - Farin Gada Community Development Association, Jos
North
1. Jonathan Tere.
2. Bulus Agom
3. Samuel Yakubu
4. Kwasu Zaruma
5. Aaron
Three (3) NYSC Members*
MEMO. JCI/J/184/2009 – Mrs. Caroline Okeke
1. Mr. Andrew Okeke *
2. Mr. Kosarachi Okeke*
3. Miss Ngozi Okeke*
MEMO. JCI/J/89/2009 – Ngas Youth Movement (NYM)
1. Nde Bala Monuk
2. Nde Gabriel Mbile
3. Mr. Pangak Iliyas
4. Mr Nengak Deshi
5. Mr. Jirit Danbaba
6. Mr. Fwengak Rotshak
7. Mr. Rotshak P. Gana
8. Amos Goyol *
9. Mr. Jacob A. Goyol*
367
 10. Mr. Inuwa Goyol*
11. Tokidda A. Goyol*
12. Nenfort Danbaba* .
MEMO.JCI/J/193/ 2009- Mountain Of Fire And Miracles Ministries –Middle
Belt Region ,Jos , Plateau State.
1. Shola Olaseni Akindipe
2. Agnloye Sunday
3. Abiola Moshude Rabiu
MEMO. JCI/J/176/2009 – Anaboze (Buji) Community – Resident In Jos and
Bukuru
1. Sani Tafinta
2. Inusa Musa
MEMO.JCI/J/94/2009 - Barrister Kopduna Danbaba
1. Nenfort D. Danbaba*
MEMO. JCI/J/183/2009 – The Tiv Community Of Plateau State.
1. Mr. John Sanga
2. Mr. Addi Agor. (Repetition memo No. JCI/J/163/2009)
MEMMO.JCI/J/144/2009 – Chief Emmanuel Ezike
1. Henry Uchenna Ezike*
MEMO.JCI/J/163/2009 - Samuel Ihulugh Ndyar And 5 Others
1. Zungwe Adi :
MEMO.JCI/J/201/2009 – Berom and Other Tribes of St. Augustine Monastery
1. Simon Anyandubalu
MEMO.JCI/J/196/2009 - Urhobo Community Jos Plateau State
1 Mr. Benjamin Aboze
2. Mr. Joel Aboze.
3. Mr Ejiro Aboze
4. Mr. Wilfred Udu:
MEMO. JCI/J/202/2009 - Yoruba Community Oyo State
1. Mallam Shuarau Abdul Jabbar
2. Alh Tajudeen Gbadamasi
3. Abdul Fatai Gbadamasi
4. Abdul Waheed Abdul Rahman
5. Rilwan Abdul Fatai
368
 6. Abdul Aziz Raji
7. Obe Adegbemiro Stephen
8. Mr Mathew Ajani
9. Evang Timothy
10. Mr Dimeji Ojebisi
11. Mr Yinka Ojebisi*
12. Mr Samson Ajala
13. Mr Noah O.
14. Mr S.A. Dele
15. Mr O. Alamis
16. Madam Mariam Tella
17. Emili Olaniyi
18. Olu Olaniyi
19. Noah Olaniyi*
Ekiti State
1. Bayo Alofe
Osun State
1. Dehinde Moris
2. Alh Moshood Lawal Raji
3. Tunde Oyedokun*
4 Sunday Oyeniyi
5. Tunde Usman
6. Ibukun Akin* (Corper)
Ondo State
1 George Akindapo
Ogun State
1. Okusi
Kwara State
1. Mallam Surajudeen
2. Mallam Kazeem
Kogi State
1. Pastor Peter Falade
MEMO.JCI/J/130/2009 – Evangelical Church of West Africa (Nassarawa Local
Church Counsel, Jos District
369
 1. Mr. N.T. Yusuf*
MEMO.JCI/J/114/2009 – Iki Atsen Arin and 2 Ors.
1. Peter Ibrahim Arin*
2. Adang Atsen Arin*
3. Atsen Ayama Arin*
MEMO.JCI/J/95/2009 – The National Association of Afizere Youth Movement
(AYM)
1. Ishaku Gimba*
2. Samuel Arin Izang *
3 Barrister Azi Musa*
4. Ishaya Irmiya Ajik*
5. Peter Ibrahim Arin*
6. Adang Atsen Arin*
7 Dennis Inyam*
MEMO.JCI/J/102/2009 ECWA Bishara No. 1 Adebayo Street, Jos.
1. Mr. N.T. Yusuf*
MEMO.JCI/J/95/2009 – The National Association of Afizere Youth Movement
(AYM)
Ishaku Gimba*
MEMO JCI/J/97/2009 – Pan Development Association, Jos
Mr. Stephen Goeshalong
MEMO JCI/J/115/2009 – Kauna Baptist Church, Rikkos, Jos
1. Mr. Amos Goyol*
2. Tokida Amos Goyol*
3. David Amos Goyol*
4. Israel Amos Goyol*
MEMO. JCI/J/121/2009 – Deeper Life Bible Church, Jos Plateau State
Headquarters, Jos.
1. Israel Oyelami
MEMO.JCI/J/124/2009 – Hoteliers Drinks Distributors and Sellers Association,
Plateau State Branch.
1. Mrs. Moyosola Kayode Akinyemi
2. Mr. Emeka Ephraim
3. Mrs Late Usikre & 2 Others
370
 MEMO.JCI/J/146/2009 – Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA)
1. Elder N.T. Yusuf*
2. Rev. Empraim Masok
3. Mama Lami Izeh
4. Mr. Monday Kure
MEMO.JCI/J/26/2009 – CAN Directorate of Research.
1. *Put the total number of persons who lost their lives at 129 but did not give
their names.
MEMO. JCI/J/30/2009 – Organisation of African Instituted Churches, Plateau
State Chapter.
1. Aladura Michael
2. Mrs. Abigail Olaniyi*
3. Four (4) Children of Mrs Abigail Olaniyi*
MEMO. JCI/J/12/2009 – Rev. E.I. Algbejo (Pastor of Bethel Raptist Church,
Jos.
1. Mr. Yinka Ojebisi*
2. Mr. Demiji Ojebisi
MEMO. JCI/J/53/2009 – Nassarawa Baptist Church, Jos (Gbenga Olaleye)
1. Evangelist Timothy Adetona
2. Mr. Adegbenron Obe
MEMO.JCI/J/71/2009 – The Anaboze (Buji) Development Association,
Nasarawa Gwong, Jos.
1. Sani Tafinta
MEMO. JCI/J/42/2009 – Agboola Baptist Church, Fudawa Bauchi Ring Road
1. Mrs. Mary Oladele and two* (2) of her younger brother
MEMO.JCI/J/113/2009 – The Central Baptist Conference
1. Loss of 19 lives, but no names was given.
MEMO.JCI/J/65/2009 – The Berom Patriotic Forum in Tertiary Institutions of
Plateau State.
1. Listed 129 death but no name was given.
The above represents the lists of persons given as persons who lost their lives
during the Unrest as presented by each individual memorandum. The Commission
found that several memoranda repeated names already given in other memoranda.
Those repeated names are asterisked above.
371
 Gleaning from all the memoranda and the lists of persons presented, the
Commission found that the actual number of persons who lost their lives in the Unrest is
312.
5.2 Claims for loss of lives.
The Commission also found that amongst the memoranda, three presenters made
monetary claims for lives lost. These are:
i) Memorandum JCI/J/144/2009 by Chief Emmanuel Ezike : the witness
told the Commission that his son, Mr. Henry Uchenna Ezike who was a final year
student of Physiology/Pharmacology of the University of Jos was killed during the
Unrest of 28th November, 2008. He made a claim of N10,000,000 for the loss of his life.
ii) Memorandum JCI/J/163/2009 by Samuel Ihulugh and 5 others; the witness
told the Commission that Zungwe Adi who was macheted to death They made a claim
of N30, 000,000:00 for the loss of life.
5.3. Names of persons Injured during the Unrest.
From the various Memoranda and evidence presented before the Commission,
the following persons sustained various degrees of injuries during the Jos Unrest 28 th
November, 2008:
MEMO. JCI/J/111/2009 – Izang Ayama Arin
1. Izang Ayama Arin
MEMO.JCI/J/151/2009 – Stefanos Foundation
1. Adam Eveh
2. Binchan Fankur
3. Friday Yakubu
4. Sunday Haruna
5. Christopher Dogo
6. Seyi Odewumi.
7. Michael Eze
8. Tanimu Rivi
9. Ajang Yakubu
10. Peter Umaru
11. Musa Bala
12 Danladi Chozhi
13. Andrew Bitrus
14. Filibus John
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15. Samuel Giwa
16. Sunday Unah
17. Arung Nyam
18. Danjuma Yakubu
19. Gideon Monday
20. Shut Rwang (Silas Luka)
21. Christopher Danjuma
22. Sunday Usman
23. Kwasio Zaroma Sani
24. Femi John Akirele
25. Caroline Okeke
26. Nengak JIbo
27. Atul Ajiki
28. Philip Adankala
MEMO.JCI/J/133/2009 - Bache Development Association:
1. Samson James
2. Samuel Giwa*
3. Adamu Ive
4. Ayuba Gado
5. Friday Yakubu
6. Danjuma Lassa
7. Ibrahim Lassa
8. Tanimu Rivi *
9. David S. Tongwe
10. Yakubu Audu
11. Gara Adogi
12. Steven Gado
13. Mr. Daniel Chozhi
14. Musa James
15. Sunday Anku*
16 Filibus John*
17 Mali Choyi
18. Danjuma Pah
19. Thomas Alebi
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 20. Yusuf Musa
21. Ariver Adamu
22. Aba Ali
23. Momoh Bala
24. Ado Mandara
25. Dogo Maichibi
26. Danjuma Agwa
27. Chohu Adamu
28. Daniel Sunday
29. Yakubu Inuwa
30. Agaya Ado
31. Demi Ngu
32. Monday Goro
33. Joshua Wamba
34. Sunday Anku *
MEMO.JCI/J/28/2009 – Mwaghavul Development Association Jos Branch.
1. Mr. Naanpan Gabriel Nungkyes
2. Mr. Joshua Naanpan
3. Mr. Pankyes I. Shalook
4. Mr. Emmanuel Musa
5 Mr. Augustine Artubur
6. Ephraim Kombun
7. Usaini Manji Istifanus Joseph
8. Mr. Maxwell Dabor
9. Mr. Peter Benshak
10. Mr. Mundi Josiah
MEMO.JCI/J/117/2009 – Academic Staff Union of University of Jos, Jos
Branch
1. Pokyes Yakwal
2. Mr. Mugu Yusuf
MEMO.JCI/J/134/2009 – Church of Christian In Nigeria (COCIN)
1. Ekwu Danjuma
2. Gabriel Antipas Ponsah
3. Tongnen Oliver
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 4. Davou Dung
5. Sohbe Hosea
6. Friday Lumi
7. Mwoldom Dalong
MEMO.JCI/J/37/2009 – Ngas Development Association Jos Branch.
1. Nentawe Sindima
2. Jatau Ali
3. Mungak Deshi
4. Yiljura Dagan David
5. Joseph Gonsun
6. Shemshak Gomer
MEMO.JCI/J/93/2009 – Church Of Christ In Nigeria (COCIN) (Chwel – Nyap,
Jos)
1. Dorcas Vou Choji
2. Jinedu Kokong
3. Ibrahim Izang
4. Nyam M. Sha
5. Damon
6. Habila David Ariku
7. Simon Kyanta
8. Grace Dung
9. Julius Dung
10. Mark Dung
11. Davou Joro
12. Dauda Wayo limoro
13. Christopher Thomas
14. Kish Kish Dauda
15. Habila Kurma
16. Elisha Yohanna Yakubu
17. Da Yohanna Yakubu
18. Caleb Dung Jari
19. Samson Magaji
20. Christopher Yasha
21. Musa Bala *
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 22. Gideon Monday
23. Oladipo
24. Kangyang Tengwong
25. Mr. Henry Agom
26. Mr Joseph Jatau
27. Mr Paul Sani
MEMO.JCI/J/95/2009 – The National Association Of Afizere Youth Movement
1. Itse Atu
2. Izang Ayamma*
3. Igyem Makeri Atsi
4. Adang Nyam
MEMO. JCI/J/89/2009 – Ngas Youth Movement (NYM)
1. Mr. Nunggak D. Felix
2. Mr. Yiljura P. Gokwat
3. Mr. Semshak Gomer
4. Mr. Hosea T. Dangana
5. Nentawe Sindima
6. Barthelomew Marvel
7. Mr. Jatau Ali
8. Olayinka
9. Sabastine Sabairu
MEMO. JCI/J/176/2009 – Anaboze (Buji) Community Resident In Jos And
Bukuru
1. Yakubu Audu*
2. Sam Audu
3. Gabriel Audu
4. Joseph Jenadu
5. Italiya Maitala
6. Amos Auta
7. Bitrus Sankira
8. Simon Nadawo
9. Dani Nadawo
10. Hashimu Lanba
11. Joshua Ujande
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MEMO.JCI/J/183/2009 – The Tiv Community Of Plateau State.
1. Mr. Achohol Lazarus
2. Mr. Ihyulen Indyar*
MEMO.JCI/J/79/2009 – Haske Women Association Rusau Village Jos North.
1. Amana Musa
2. Michael Sunday
3. Ayeba
MEMO. JCI/J/54/2009 - The Apostolic Church, Jos Area Lawna Territory.
1. Sunday Ekanem: Burnt Body and
hospitalised = N240,000.00
MEMO.JCI/J/163/2009 - Samuel Ihulugh Ndyar And Others
1. Lubem Ruben Adi :
2. Bunde Lorhemba:
3. Isaac Ayila:
MEMO.JCI/J/137/2009 – P.D.P. Elders Northern Zone Forum, Plateau State
1. Samson James*
2. Samuel Giwa*
3. Adamu Ive*
4. Ayuba Gado*
5. Friday Yakubu*
6. Danjuma Lassa*
7. Ibrahim Lassa*
8. Tanimu Rivi*
9. David S. Rongwe*
10. Yakubu Audu*
11. Denkwe Gado*
12. Mrs. Izah*
13. Ige Tegwi*
14. Bulus Ali*
15. Gara Adogi*
16. Steven Gado*
17. Danladi Chozhi*
18. Musa James*
19. Sunday Anku*
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20. Filibus John *
21. Mali Choyi*
22. Mrs. Sala Ive*
23. Joseph Tari*
24. Diba Kpasha*
25. Danjuma Pah*
26. Isiaku Ransa*
27. Thomas Alebi*
28. Yusufu Musa*
29. Ariver Adamu*
30. Aba Ali*
31. Momoh Baba*
32. Ado Mandara*
33. Dogo Maichi*
34. Danjuma Agwa*
35. Chohu Adamu*
36. Daniel Sunday*
37. Yakubu Inuwa*
38. Agaya Ado*
39. Demi Ngu*
40. Kureh Duzongo*
41. Danladi Yakubu Juwa*
42. Monday Goro*
43. Joshua Wanba*
44. Sunday Anku*
45. Mr. Henry Agom*
46. Mr. Joseph Jatau*
47. Mr. Paul Sani*
48. Amana Musa*
49. Mr. Michael Sunday*
50. Ayeba*
51. Itse Atu*
52. Sunday Anku*
53. Musa James*
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54. Mr. Sunday *
55. Ayuba Daniel*
56. Samuel Giwa*
57. Mr. Nuhu*
58. Mr. Aba *
MEMO.JCI/J/68/2009 – Irigwe Community Domiciled In Jos North LGA.
1. Samson James*
2. Samuel Giwa*
3. Adamu Ive*
4. Ayuba Gado*
5. Friday Yakubu*
6. Danjuma Lassa*
7. Ibrahim Lassa*
8. Tanimu Rivi*
9. David S. Tongwe*
10. Yakubu Audu*
11. Bulus Ali*
12. Gara Adogi*
13. Steven Gado*
14. Rev. Danladi Chozhi*
15. Musa James*
16. Sunday Anku*
17. Filibus John *
18. Mali Choyi*
19. Joseph Tari*
20. Danjuma Pah*
21. Isiaku Ransa*
22. Thomas Alebi*
23. Yusufu Musa*
24. Ariver Adamu*
25. Aba Ali*
26. Momoh Baba*
27. Ado Mandara*
28. Dogo Maichibi*
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 29. Danjuma Agwa*
30. Chohu Adamu*
31. Daniel Sunday*
32. Yakubu Inuwa*
33. Agaya Ado*
34. Demi Ngu.*
35. Monday Goro*
36. Joshua Wamba*
37. Sunday Anku *
MEMO.JCI/J/130/2009 – Evangelical Church of West Africa (Nassarawa Local
Church Council), Jos District.
1. Sunday Anku*
2. Musa James*
3. Sunday*
4. Samuel Giwa*
5 Mr. Nuhu*
6 Ayuba Daniel*
MEMO.JCI/J/95/2009 – The National Association of Afizere Youth Movement
(AYM)
1. Musa Azi Itse
2. Adang Nyam,
3. Adamu Zela
4. Baba Tela Isha
5. Hon. Adar Roseline Baraje (Mrs)
MEMO. JCI/J/146/2009 – Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA)
1. Samuel Nyako
2. Three members
3. Philip Adankala
4 Simon Danbako
5. Sunday Anku*
6. Samson Sunday*
7. Musa James*
8. Agwom Sani
9. David Joshua
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 10. Wilson Danjuma
11. Luka Gyang
12. Dachollom Gyang
13. Gyang Hwere
14. Eld. Danladi Gona Chozhi*
15. Eld Tanimel I. Rivi
16. Eld. Bulus M. Innah
17. David S. Gongwe
18. Danjuma Yakubu*
19. Baba’a Amala
20. Ibeh John
21 Danjuma Audu*
22. Stephen Gado*
23. Amaja Adogi
24. Gara Adogi*
25. Tina Richard
25. Richard Chohu
26. Monday Richard
27. Mali Choyi*
28. Mrs. Marry Rangu
29. Baba Mai-agula Adogi Gara
MEMO.JCI/J/30/2009 – Organisation of African Institute Churches, Plateau
State Chapter.
1. Mrs. Gbenga Akingbesote
2. Ayo Adebisi
3. Evang. Akinbami
4. Mrs. Odewumi’s Children
MEMO.JCI/J/71/2009 – The Anaboze (Buji) Development Association,
Nassarawa Gwom, Jos.
1. Yakubu Audu*
2. Sam Audu*
3. Gabriel Audu
4. Joseph Jenadu
5. Amos Auta
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 6. Bitrus Sankira
7. Simon Nadawo
8. Dani Nadawo
9. Hashimu Lanba
10. Joshua Ujande
The above represents the lists of persons given as persons injured during the
Unrest as presented by each individual memorandum. The Commission found that
several memoranda repeated names already given in other memoranda. Those repeated
names are asterisked above.
Gleaning from all the memoranda and the lists of persons presented, the
Commission found that the actual number of persons who sustained varying degrees of
injuries during the Unrest is 323.
5.4 Claims for injuries.
It is necessary to state here that some injured persons made claim for injuries
sustained and the medical bills they paid for the treatment of such injuries. The
memoranda wherein such claims were made include:
MEMO JCI/J/196/2009 the Urhobo Community, Jos, Plateau State: The
presenter of this memorandum claimed a total sum of N840, 000.00 in respect of
medical bills incurred by two of their members (Hajia Jokpa Abdullahi and Mr. A.
Tialobi for treatment of the injuries they sustained during the unrest in the sum of N420,
000.00 respectively
MEMO JCI/J/54/2009 – Apostolic Church, Jos Area Lawna Territory: The
presenter of this memorandum claimed a sum of N240, 000.00 on behalf of a member
of their Church, Mr. Sunday Ekanem and the medical bill incurred for the treatment of
fire-burn injuries he sustained during the unrest.
5.5 Missing Persons
From the various Memoranda and evidence before the Commission, the
following people were declared as missing in the Jos Unrest of 28th November, 2008.
MEMO. JCI/J/196/2009 – Urhobo Community Jos Plateau State
Mr. Benjamin Aboze
Miss Precious Aboze

MEMO JCI/J/146/2009 – Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA) .

1. Mr. Barnabas Anno Kumbo
382
 MEMO. JCI/J/137/2009 – PDP. Elders Northern Zone Forum Plateau
State.
1. Mr. Yohanna Aika
2. Mrs. Nanle Auta
3. Ayo Nka
4. Bulus Monday
Total number of persons missing = Seven (7)

CHAPTER SIX
6.0 Extent of damage to property and claims
This chapter shall deal with the third arm of the Term of Reference No. 3(C) of
the Commission, which is to ascertain the extent of damage to property amongst others.
From this Term of Reference, the Commission is merely to among other
things, ascertain the extent of damage to property and is not empowered to make
award or pay compensation to those who lost their properties or those whose properties
were damaged, burnt, vandalised and or destroyed during the Jos unrest of 28 th
November, 2008.
The Commission is, however, by the Term of Reference No.3 (e) empowered to
make any other recommendations incidental to the Term of Reference of the
Commission. In view of this Commission’s power, the Commission hereby lists below
in tabular summary form all the relevant memoranda and extent of damage to property
and claims based thereon presented before it by various persons, groups of persons,
institutions and other bodies affected by the Jos Unrest of 28thNovember, 2008
The Commission wishes to invoke its power in the Clause 3 (e) of its Term of
Reference to put it across to the Government of Plateau State and the Federal
Government of Nigeria to look into these claims for the purpose of making appropriate
compensations to affected persons. This is imperative considering the pains and losses
that have been suffered by these people. Most of these Claims have been supported by
Police Extracts, Affidavits of Loss/Damage, photographs and Valuation Reports of the
destroyed, damaged, vandalized or burnt property. These have been admitted in
evidence and marked accordingly. These Exhibits all formed part of the bundle of
Exhibits in this matter.

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 The Commission, has for ease of reference, indicated in the relevant column
what supporting documents are available on each claim and finally the last column
where page numbers of the particulars of each claim can be found in volume 1A
(Appendix) to the main Report.
The details of the extent of damage to property and Claims thereon have been
given as Appendix in Volume 1A to the main Report.

CHAPTER SEVEN
7.0 Recommendations
The Commission had the benefit of 221 registered Memoranda and heard all of
the 211 of them that were orally presented at its public sittings, whilst 213 witnesses
gave oral evidence under oath and were examined by counsel. The Commission also
had the added benefit of the visit to the locus-in-quo and consultations with several
stakeholders, respected elders, leaders and shapers of thought within the country. The
Commission, with the main objectives of truth, equity and peaceful co-existence is
strongly of the view that dealing with the Unrest of the 28 th of November, 2008, and the
efforts at forestalling future reoccurrences requires the employment of both preventative
and curative measures. The Commission recognises the urgency of all of its
recommendations but understands that the effects or fruition of the efforts at
implementing each of them shall require time. Therefore, as a start the Commission
urges all parties to sincerely embrace peace in the face of adversity and permit the
efforts at rebuilding to take its course. Thus the following recommendations were
decided as being imperative.
7.1Criminal Investigation and Prosecution of Persons.
A number of individuals were named as being either directly or indirectly
involved in criminal acts including alleged murder, assault, criminal damage, arson,
conspiracy, inciting public disturbances and other acts that are recognised criminal acts
under the Criminal Code of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. In some cases, direct
evidence was given by witnesses under oath against the named perpetrators. In some
instances, people or groups were alluded to without being identified or any particulars
given. The Commission was not created nor was it empowered as a prosecutorial body,
hence in accordance with its mandate, the approach of the Commission was to receive

384
all the evidence tendered and invite named and identifiable persons. These have been
thoroughly examined in Chapter 4. The Commission hereby recommends:
i. That the persons named in some of the memoranda as being involved in
alleged criminal acts should be identified and investigated by the police
and prosecuted accordingly. The participants found to be culpable should
be punished under the law.
ii. That the individual events and occurrences alleged to have happened
should also be investigated and the participants should be prosecuted
where necessary and punished under the law.
iii. That persons and groups alluded to should be identified in each instance
with the assistance of the parties that made such allegations. These
should be investigated and prosecuted, and where appropriate punished
under the law. Persons arrested and detained must also be investigated in
order to ensure prompt prosecution of those who have culpable evidence
against them, and those found without cases to answer or who were
wrongfully arrested should be promptly released.
iv. The volume of prosecutions pursuant to the Unrest of November 28th
2008 may be pursued by a dedicated team from the office of Public
prosecutions under the Attorney-General of the State with the assistance
of an investigative arm of the Police. Nevertheless, even after these
matters are investigated the options the State may pursue include one
borne out of the fact that the reoccurrence of violence is viewed as being
highly probable unless a genuine quest for peace and reconciliation is
embarked upon. The State Government should set up a Reconciliation
Commission for the purposes of allowing adversaries to meet and
reconcile their differences. Those who come out and embrace this
process may be granted amnesty from criminal prosecution. The State
Government should then seek to investigate and prosecute those who do
not.
7.2 Implementation of previous Reports of Commissions of Inquiry.
The Commission noted the existence of a number of previous commissions of
inquiry that had rendered Reports to the State Government. Usually these Reports
should be published followed by the release of Government white papers based on their
findings which should also be published. The Governments should then put
385
implementation mechanisms in place for the recommendations made therein. This has
not happened. The Commission drew a lot from these reports as they were often
referred to in several memoranda and also particularly because some had the benefit of
representations from the Hausa/Fulani as well as the Muslim communities within
Plateau State, these being some of the groups that did not present themselves before this
Commission. The Commission recommends:
i. A publication of previous reports of commissions of inquiry, the issuance
of Government white papers based on the reports and the gazetting of the
same.
ii. Putting into motion an implementation committee that will look at the
means and modalities of co-ordinating the implementation of these
previous reports and this present Report inclusive.
7.3 Compensation for confirmed victims of the mayhem
The Commission found that numerous individuals and organisations including
Government agencies were victims of the Unrest. People lost their lives and left
dependants behind, people suffered varying degrees of injuries, homes and other
property were lost or damaged, and organisations lost money and material. Some of the
memoranda before the Commission put in Statements of Claim inter alia. The
Commission encouraged the Claims to be supported by evidence where possible, sworn
affidavits verifying the Claims as well as the use of evaluation reports where such was
applicable to the nature of the Claims. The Commission recommends:
i) That the State Government should set up a committee for the purpose of
scrutinising and verifying the Claims presented.
ii) That the Government should set up a compensation scheme aimed at
coming to the aid of these people and groups and alleviating their
suffering by paying compensation if not in whole, at least in part. The
State Government should also request that the Federal Government
provide it with support in this effort.
iii) That hospitals, clinics and aid organisations should also be allowed, to
submit claims for the relief and emergency aid rendered to many victims,
during the period of the Unrest, a lot of which were left unpaid.
iv) A number of schools were destroyed and many school children have
been denied of school premises. The Government must treat the

386
 rehabilitation of these institutions as a matter of priority in order to
alleviate the impact on children.
7.4 Redress illegal land acquisition and mapping out of slums
The Commission heard witness testimony on the growth of illegal land
acquisition within and around the Jos metropolis. There was evidence before the
Commission of haphazard and indiscriminate land grabbing, land development without
planning approvals leading to the creation of slums which formed enclaves for
miscreants within the communities. The Commission recommends:
i. That the State Government should take urgent steps to acquire slums and
clustered settlements such as Gangare, Yan Tinka, Rikkos Cattle
market(Yan Shanu), Angwan Rogo, Angwan Rimi, Angwan Dalyop,
Katako, part of Ali Kazaure, Dilimi, and create a modern city out of them
including the construction of urban access roads through these
settlements. The Government should open up the slums by roads and
infrastructure such as housing estates, clinics and modern schools.
ii. That the Government is advised to reacquire the University of Jos land
and hand over same to the University’s authorities. Over time, some
persons had acquired some parcels or portions of the University of Jos
land by tribal settlements, wrong issuance of Rights of Occupancy and
other title including numerous illegal sales and purchases. With the
active co-operation of the Federal Government, the land which forms
part of the layout of the University community should be repossessed and
immediately occupied by the University who should seek to fence it and
develop it for its use. This will enhance security within the University’s
campuses.
7.5 Security with recognized flash-points and Relocation and security of
Bauchi Road Motor Park
The Commission found and identified that certain parts of Jos have become
flash-points of high volatility and are usually the epi-centres when crises erupt.
The security of the University of Jos was also put in question particularly
because of the proximity of the Bauchi Road motor park to it and as a result of the
closeness, the tendency for a spill over effect into the University during crises with its
attendant consequences of attracting victims from the University’s community. The

387
centrality of the park with its imminent chaos is another consideration as motor parks
are known hideouts of touts and criminal elements. The Commission recommends:
i) The State Government must immediately ensure that there is the
establishment by the police of well manned security posts and police
stations within and around these recognized flash points.
ii) That the State Government should relocate the motor park and its
appurtenances to an appropriate location.
iii) That security, police and private must be maintained in and around motor
parks being public arenas with high volatility of violence.
7.6 Provision of emergency response outfits and enforcement of regulations
A lot of the damage that occurred from the burning of Katako market, the State
High Court premises and other buildings were exacerbated by the lack of fire fighting
and rescue response units as well as equipment to handle the emergency situations that
arose therefrom. A lot of lives could have been saved and the extent of irreparable
damage could have been greatly mitigated. The Commission recommends:
i) That buildings and particularly public buildings should be made to have
primary fire-fighting and safety equipment and this should be strictly
enforced.
ii) That the major hospitals within the State should have emergency
response units with adequate ambulances and equipment as well as
trained personnel.
7.7 Relocation of slum markets and reconstruction of Jos Main Market
Evidence before the Commission indicated that some slum markets are flash-
points, hide-outs of criminals, sale-points of dangerous weapons such as machetes,
slaughter knives, home made guns, etc. Congestion in these markets also contributed to
flashes of skirmishes and fuel crises that lead to destruction of properties, valuables and
lives. The Commission recommends:
i) That the open sale of implements commonly used as weaponry must be
banned and the sale restricted and regulated.
ii) That the State Government should relocate those slum markets such as
Katako, Yan Tinka, Kasuwa Nama, etc. to safer and more secure
locations which should not be delineated along the lines of apparently
belonging to any given ethnic grouping.

388
 iii) That the State Government should also take the issue of reconstruction of
the burnt down Jos main market seriously and urgently. The provision of
such a market will douse the tension enveloping the various slum
markets.
iv) Market stall allocations should reflect the religious and ethnic spread in
Jos and should not be predominated by any particular group. In this way
a whole market area will not be ready targets because they belong to a
particular ethnic group.
7.8 Re-delineation of Electoral Wards
The creation of electoral wards is based on principles which aim at promoting a
fair level of equity in the distribution of voters within each ward. The evidence before
the Commission was to the inevitable conclusion that the ward delineation within the
Jos North Local Government Area allowed fewer registered Hausa/Fulani voters to have
more wards than the numerically superior native voters. The total number of registered
voters in the five Hausa/Fulani dominated wards of Ali Kazaure, Sarkin Arab, Ibrahim
Katsina, Garba Daho and Gangare is about 59,904 going by the last recorded data
tendered in evidence, compared with one single ward of Naraguta B which has 72,202
registered voters at the last record. This lopsidedness leads to uneven representation
and disenfranchisement. The Commission recommends
i) That the State should pursue the redelineation of electoral wards according to
the guiding criteria and based on the population figures carried out within these areas.
7.9 Address the issues raised by the creation of Jos North Local
Government Area.
The creation of the Jos North Local Government Area had been visited with
complaints from the time it was created by the States (Creation and Transitional
Provisions) Decree No. 2 of 1991. The Berom Elders Council has written a petition to
the then General Ibrahim Babangida Military administration which resulted in the
raising of a memorandum to that effect, by the then Secretary to the Government of the
Federation, which General Babangida admitted was not dealt with before the expiration
of his administration. The Hausa/Fulani community itself have expressed their
dissatisfaction with a submission that was made by the Jasawa Development
Association to the Niki Tobi Commission in 2001 as treated under the remote cause of
the Creation of Jos North Local Government Area chapter 3.5 of this Report. The
Commission recommends:
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 i. That the present Jos North Local Government should be redelineated into
about 3 sustainable local Governments with an equitable representative
number of wards within each local Government.
ii. The creation of new local Government areas and wards should be by
consultation and follow the prescribed Constitutional provisions and the
Federal Government and the National Assembly is urged to accede to
these requests urgently.
7.10 Strengthening of security agencies and their Apparatus
There was a glaring preponderance of evidence that focused on the lack of
prompt response by security forces, a lack of coordination amongst the security
agencies at intelligence gathering, the weakness of the agencies and their ill-equipped
officers and units all leading to their inability to curtail the violence. Further, the
security apparatus of the State was ill-prepared and the warning signs were not
intelligently related. This is perhaps the most important direct and immediate cause of
the spread of the violence. The Commission recommends:
i) That the Federal Government needs to pay immediate attention to the
training and equipment needs of its security agencies and their apparatus,
particularly in the area of operation and logistic supports.
ii) That the State and Federal Governments take security very seriously and
should increase the level of active coordination and sharing of
intelligence amongst the Police, Customs Service, Immigration Service,
State Security Service and the Military formations within Plateau State to
enhance their capacity.
iii) Security involves both the preventative and the curative; hence
proactivity is highly required to nip the potentials for crises in the bud.
The State Government must also readily take on their advices as in the
recent instance when the scheduling of the elections for Thursday was
advised against because it would mean that the results would be released
on a Friday, a Muslim worship day, with possible religion-flamed
consequences.
iv) The monitoring of specific groups like the Jasawa Development
Association and their leaders to detect early signs of unlawful incitement
and ensure the enforcement of the law.

390
 v) That security committee should be set-up at community levels and
should be coordinated centrally.
vi) That Community Policing recently initiated under the Police ’10-point
agenda’ and already available in other States of the federation should be
actively established in Plateau State.
vii) That the State should initiate witness protection and assistance
programmes and should legislate to that effect to allow people to come
forward with vital information.
7.11 Investigate the allegations against the armed forces of excessive use of
deadly force and extra-judicial killings and alleged dereliction of duty.
Specific allegations were made with regard to excessive use of deadly and brutal
force by the Police and armed forces that were mobilised to quell the Unrest. Evidence
to prove these acts were too thin before the Commission. The Commission nevertheless
recommends:
i) That any specific allegations of these acts should be made available and
all evidence should be brought forward. The various armed forces
should commission internal investigations into these allegations. The
State and Federal Governments should also ensure that full investigations
are carried out with the full participation of surviving victims, victims’
families and credible witnesses. It is on record that there was a Police
inquiry ordered by the then Inspector General of Police. Since the inquiry
is not public, its findings should be made public. The Federal
Government has constitutional authority over these apparatus and has set
up a panel of investigation. The report and findings must unravel the
truth behind these allegations and made public.
ii) The Commission calls upon the security forces and specifically the
Armed Forces to abide by the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials in carrying out their duties.
There must be restraint when engaging with civilian population and the
use of deadly force must only be employed when all other alternatives
have been exhausted and their lives or that of another is in clear and
imminent danger.
7.12 Check illegal migration of aliens and ‘mercenaries’.

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 The Immigration service was accused of dereliction of its duties to check the
illegal immigration of aliens and ‘mercenaries’ into the country which led to the ease
with which they could be found in Jos North. There was evidence of the presence and
arrest of some illegal aliens but not compelling evidence for the Commission to
conclude that aliens were the mass perpetrators of the Unrest as posited by some
Witnesses. The Commission however accepts the recommendation of the Comptroller
of Immigration Services, Plateau State Command and recommends:
i) That the Federal Government should accept the proposal already made to
the Federal Executive Council and construct the required 147 passport
control plazas at all the recognised border posts in the Country to allow
for proper border controls.
7.13 The State Government must give due consideration to all ethnic
groupings in appointments, nominations, promotions.
The Commission found that a common feature belying the ill-feeling between
indigenous ethnic groups and non-indigenous ethnic groups and thereby causing inter
and intra ethnic rifts are issues of lack of opportunities and access in Government.
When one party or ethnic group assumes power, the ‘winner takes all’ syndrome
becomes prevalent and positions in sensitive Government positions such as
Commissioners, membership of boards of Government parastatals are skewed in favour
of the group in power. This is sometimes only perceived but in some cases exists as a
matter of fact. The Commission recommends:
i) That the State should formulate a deliberate representative policy similar
to the creation of the policy of Federal Character by the Federal
Government, that promotes inclusion and participation.- This should be
enshrined as a ‘State Character’ principle taking into consideration the
different ethnic groups, particularly, in local Government areas where
there is more than one ethnic grouping with substantial quantitative
presence, then there should be a chairman and vice-chairman from
alternate ethnic groups.
ii) There should be no enforcement of candidature in elections to avoid
uprising.
7.14 Protection of the rights of every citizen.
The Commission found that a fundamental cause of the polarity that leads to
ethnic and with it religious conflict was the ‘Indigene v Settler’ question. The question
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as to, who the tribes that are indigenous to Jos are, was exhaustively treated and settled
by preceding Commissions of Inquiry who heard from both sides of the divide, and the
Commission takes judicial notice of this. It was observed that no known law in Nigeria
deals directly with the issue of indigene-ship either at Federal or at the Plateau State
level. Therefore, pending the Constitutional resolution of this issue and the enactment
of an ‘Indigene’s Charter’ or ‘Citizen’s Charter’ if indeed a distinction between the two
is to be accepted as desirable within the Nigerian Federation, the Commission
recommends that:
i. The State Government should promote the Citizen’s rights in any part of
Nigeria that they may find themselves. This means that all persons who
are bonafide citizens should have equal rights, opportunities and access,
and not to deny those designated as non-indigenes of an area, the access
to some of the most important avenues of socio-economic mobility be it
Government jobs, academic scholarships, university admissions or fees.
7.15 Monitoring of the activities of certain groups of persons, organisations
and their activities.
The Commission received and examined evidence pertaining to the activities of
certain persons and groups within the community whose acts, or opinions, through their
publications, utterances, perverse the polity, mislead their follower-ship or readership,
disseminate rumours and false propaganda and heat up the polity as well as causing
mistrust, ill-feelings and hostilities. These, the Commission found to be a major root
cause of the Unrest of 28 November 2008. The Commission recommends:
i. The watching and monitoring by security forces of the activities and
utterances of named associations and named individuals which this
Report has analysed in Chapter 4, and found to have various degrees of
culpability.
ii. The watching and monitoring by security forces of the activities and
utterances within places of worship that have been alleged with evidence
that they permitted their sacred institutions to be politicised and hi-jacked
as instruments of incitement and rallying points for mobilising and
recruiting foot-soldiers to perpetrate acts of violence and mayhem,
including and specifically those in the areas identified as where the
Unrest started in order to forestall the continued use of these places of
worship for ungodly purposes.
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 iii. The scrutiny of the role of the media in reporting and dissemination of
some information and in some cases false propaganda and unbalanced
reporting of views should also be visited and the media watchdog should
be alive to its responsibilities.
7.16 Outlaw anti-social ‘religious’ acts of using loudspeakers, road -
blockages and indiscriminate development of Churches and Mosques within
residential areas.
The Commission finds that there are certain anti-social acts which have become
prevalent and which cannot be condoned if peaceful co-existence is to reign amongst
people from different religious beliefs living together. The Commission recommends:
i) That the use of loudspeakers mounted on the external walls and
amplified to reach beyond the vicinity of Churches and Mosques within
Jos North Local Government Area must be banned and the ban must be
enforced. The Local Government Authorities should be able to promote
the enforcement of nuisance laws and environmental laws which
proscribe these acts.
ii) That the blocking of streets during hours of worship must be banned and
enforced.
iii) That the Jos Metropolitan Development Board should arrest and re-dress
the indiscriminate construction of public places of worship especially
within residential areas.
7.17 Reinforce positive dialogue amongst the diverse ethnic and religious
groups.
The Commission was informed of the existence of several inter-religious
initiatives and committees such as the Inter Religious Council, but whose activities and
impact have become weak. These initiatives provide the fora to muster and develop
understanding and the strengthening of inter-ethnic and inter-religious ties. Whilst there
is a need for them to be strengthened positively, there is also an urgency to look into the
weaknesses in their leadership. This is needed to foster integration as a matter of
urgency. This will eliminate evils such as the concept of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ the
erroneous construction of the concept of ‘jihad’ and the use of derogatory language
against one another. The Commission recommends:
i) That religion is a matter of personal conviction and should not be
imposed on anyone.
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 ii) The re-awakening of these initiatives with emphasis on the dissemination
of information and educating people through publications, seminars and
regular enlightenment programmes in the various ethnic languages
desirable.
iii) That Traditional Rulers and traditional institutions must be key actors in
these initiatives as leaders of thought within their various enclaves and
the State Government should re-visit the issue of the creation of Village
Areas, Districts and Chiefdoms as such will foster a sense of belonging.
Particularly, the Jos North Council of Chiefs where major ethnic groups
in Jos were represented should be reactivated.
7.18 Poverty alleviation and the provision of Employment
The quest for access to avenues for upward economic mobility is one of
the paramount causes of crises. Unemployed youths are easily mobilised and are often
used to unleash mayhem on innocent citizens. The Commission recommends:
i) That the State Government must provide a conducive environment for
the teeming unemployed youths of all ethnic groups within the State.
ii) That the States development of infrastructure must be widespread and
not selective.
iii) That the Universal Basic Education programme (UBE) be intensified in
Plateau State to ensure that youth have basic education.

CHAPTER EIGHT
8.0 General observations
The Commission employed numerous approaches in its attempt to fulfil its
mandate. In this instance it explored its fifth terms of reference which was
‘to make any other recommendations incidental to the Commissions terms of
reference’
by introducing a truth and reconciliation - seeking dimension. It explored this
through its reception of external contributions over and beyond the compendium of
memoranda formally submitted. Aside from conducting public hearings and sittings, it
also reached out to other persons who could render some insight into the Unrest, its
nature and its root causes as well as solutions which could be proffered. An important
product of this aspect of the work was the input it received from numerous dignitaries.

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The Commission received some evidence in camera, but also went out to conduct
interactive sessions with various persons.
One of the contributions it received was a letter received from Jama’atu Nasril
Islam notifying the Commission of its boycott.
8.1 The Jama’atu Nasril Islam notification of boycott
The letter dated February 2, 2009 and signed by both the Deputy Chairman of
the Branch and its Legal Adviser was purportedly written ‘on behalf of all Muslims in
Jos North affected one way or the other by the November 28 – 30, 2008 Jos Crisis’. It
notified the Commission of the decision of the organization and that of ‘all Muslims’ in
Jos North Local Government not to participate in any of the Commission’s proceedings.
This letter represents the writers’ view of the remote causes of the Unrest. They
believe that the Governor and the Government of Plateau State conspired, planned and
executed the crisis with the aim of ‘forcing the Muslims out of Jos’. The writers are a
section of the society, and mainly Hausa/Fulani. Apparently, there is inherent mutual
distrust between them on one hand and ethnic groups indigenous to the Local
Government on the other. Consequently, there was an apparent boycott of the
Commission by Muslims, especially the Hausa/Fulani in terms of presentation of
memoranda or response to allegations made against them in the memoranda presented
by other stake holders.
The letter puts the dates of the incident as 28 th – 30th of November, thus
including the events of Sunday 30th November on which date mass burial of Muslim
victims continued.
The Commission deems the letter as most unfortunate and its contents mostly
misguided. The Commission invited all parties involved in the Unrest including anyone
who had any contribution or claim whatsoever to submit memoranda to it. Particularly,
it gave ample time in the first instance and gave extension of time in order to
accommodate more memoranda. It also made special entreaties to the Muslims and
Hausa/Fulani Community through the mediums available to it assuring everybody of a
fair and unbiased hearing. Nevertheless, none of these yielded in their participation.
There was overwhelming evidence before the Commission pointing to the fact
that the Hausa/Fulani at a point in the election process got wind that the result might not
be in their favour and apparently made moves that started the Unrest.
Certain historical antecedents led to this state of affairs of mutual suspicion and
perhaps mutual hatred between this group and the Government.
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 The long existing animosity, mutual suspicion and mutual distrust between the
Hausa/Fulani in Jos North Local Government on one hand and the indigenous ethnic
groups on the other was what exploded to the Unrest of November 28, 2008.
Understandably, most of the memoranda presented before the Commission accuse the
Hausa/Fulani of having started the Unrest. Most witnesses, especially direct victims
identify their attackers as Hausa/Fulani and testify that their attackers were chanting
‘Allahu Akbar’ as they attacked. This gave the impression that the motives of the
attacks were religious. Other bits of evidence however, show that religion was only
being manipulated.
8.2 Input of dignitaries
The input of the dignitaries who were invited or visited in their respective
domains were most helpful and have very important roles to play in arriving at a fair
report and the same time toe the path of peace, mutual respect and national integration.
Some witnesses who also had chats with the Commission in camera also offered useful
and most illuminating information.
8.3 General Yakubu Gowon
General Yakubu Gowon gave a rather detailed account of what he personally
witnessed on the 28 November, 2008. His account left one in no doubt that his
investigations and follow-ups indicated that the Hausa /Fulani did not only start the
mayhem but perpetrated a lot of havoc. He retorted however, that there was no need for
that in view of the Nation’s past experience in inter-communal relations and the sprit of
‘one nation, one destiny’ that had marked the National struggle and had kept the Nation
together as one. The General is of the opinion that it would be rather far fetched to look
for links between this unrest and activities of international Islamic radical groups like
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
Considering the cultural affiliation and religious persuasion of the Hausa/Fulani,
he expressed the belief that the position of the Sultan of Sokoto could be used to bring
about the desired integration and harmonious relationship between the Hausa/Fulani on
one hand and the indigenous ethnic groups and other Nigerians based in Plateau State
on the other. He recalled how cordially he had interacted as Head of State with the
father of the present Sultan of Sokoto. He also recalled his personal experience during
his recent ‘Nigeria prays’ visit to Sokoto and noted that the present Sultan is in position
to positively influence the thinking and orientation of the Hausa/Fulani in Plateau
towards better relations with the immediate communities.
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 He felt that the Jos crisis could be attributed to the attitude of politicians who
want to assume power by hook or by crook and that religion was only being used to
achieve selfish and narrow interest instead of being used to unite people. He suggested
that traditional and community leaders should in future be held responsible for any
breakdown of law and order in their domains. He emphasized the need for tolerance
and good understanding and for Nigerians to love one another so that government at
various levels could take care of their welfare. He hoped that the Commission’s Report
would be implemented to avert future occurrences.
8.4 Chief Solomon Daushep Lar
Chief Solomon Lar recalled how effectively he had been able, as a Governor to
carry along the Hausa/Fulani and how much respect they had for him. He emphasized
that the issue of indigeneship has to be constitutionally resolved so that people can feel
free wherever they are and contribute effectively to national development. The act of
governance should be an inclusive one without discrimination because where people are
not carried along there is potential for friction; and leaders must recognize that there is a
need to educate their followers properly. As an elder statesman, he noted that the best
approach that would help create a conducive atmosphere for peaceful co-existence and
the building of a virile Nation, is to foster mutual respect, mutual love and the spirit of
give and take. The political terrain in the country is such that no people can be an island
on their own without interacting with others. For this reason there is need to encourage
the spirit of cooperation and good neighbourliness.

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 8.5 Chief Joshua Chibi Dariye
The emphasis in Chief Dariye’s contribution was on continuity in governance.
He believes that if some of the socio-political structures he had left behind had been
built upon and lessons were learnt from past experiences, the Unrest might not have
occurred or might have been less devastating. He too mentioned the need for the spirit
of give and take. He practically dramatized the undesirability of the concept of ‘winner-
takes-all’ and noted that followers would give maximum support and cooperation if, in
words and deeds, the leader shows them that they too are forces to be reckoned with.
He recalled that greater caution would normally be required to conduct an
election in Jos North Local Government Area and specifically lamented the scheduling
of the election for a Thursday with the consequence of the result having to be released
on a Friday. He recommended specifically:
i) That the issue of security should not be toyed with as this could explode
and lead to monumental loss of lives and property.
ii) That Government should be inclusive in handling security matters as no
single individual had monopoly of wisdom and expertise over
governance.
iii) That religion is a matter of personal conviction, and therefore should not
be imposed on any one.
iv) That there is the need for proper education and enlightenment of
adherents of various religions.
v) That the Inter-Religious Council committee be strengthened to discharge
its responsibility effectively.
vi) That proactive security should be taken in the event of any likely crisis,
so as to nip it in the bud at the initial stage.
vii) That Government should provide a conducive environment for the
teeming unemployed youths who are often used to unleash mayhem on
innocent citizens.
viii) That the various crises in Plateau State and in Jos in particular had been
largely due to agitations for non-inclusion of other ethnic groups.
ix) That non-integration among the people had been a major problem and
therefore there is the need for proper integration among the diverse
ethnic groups in the State.

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 x) That there must be recognition of other ethnic groups especially the
Hausa/Fulani as some of them may not be able to trace their roots any
longer.
xi) That the interest of all ethnic groups must be considered in the act of
governance to achieve peace.
xii) That the State Government should revisit the creation of Village Areas,
Districts and Chiefdoms as such will give a sense of identity and
belonging to the people.
xiii) That the Jos North Council of Chiefs where major ethnic groups in Jos
were represented be reactivated to foster peace.
xiv) That there should be constant dialogue among diverse interest groups for
peaceful co-existence.
xv) That the youths who are unemployed be gainfully engaged to avoid
youth restiveness.
xvi) That there should be tolerance by all to achieve peace.
xvii) That there should be team work for the development of Plateau State and
Nigeria.
xviii) That people should imbibe the spirit of forgiveness and eschew violence.
xix) That Government should ensure that the use of loud speakers in Mosques
and Churches be stopped to avoid unnecessary provocations and
sensational preaching by some over-zealous religious leaders.
xx) That Government should re-open the Plateau State University as it was
also a major source of raising tension.
xxi) That development of Government infrastructures should be widespread
and not selective.
xxii) That in politics, there should be no enforcement of candidature to avoid
uprising’.
The view of the Commission is that these advices are very rich and valuable.
8.6 The Gbong Gwom Jos
The Gbong Gwom recalled with nostalgia the tremendous contributions non-
indigenes of Jos had made to the development of the city and its environs. Mentioning
by name many of such personalities he had grown up with as youths he pointed out the
most accommodating spirit with which the indigenes had interacted with them.
However, considering the high esteem in which people hold their culture and tradition,
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guests owe it as a duty to ensure that they respect the sanctity of the ‘host’s bedroom’.
He observed that the teachings of the major religions, especially Christianity and Islam,
are complementary and comprehensively encompass what we all need in order to derive
maximum benefits from one another. Christianity emphasizes love, Islam carries the
banner of peace, and certainly we would not have crises if we genuinely imbibe the
spirit of love and peace. He further called on politicians to stop overheating the system
for personal gains and to shun greed. He expressed hope that the State Government
would implement the Report of this Commission.

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 8.7 The Sultan of Sokoto
The Sultan observed that the visit of the Commission to his palace would go a
long way in projecting the image of the Commission. While he expressed confidence in
the Commission, considering the integrity and reputation of its members, especially the
Chairman, he urged the Commission to go all out to unravel the whole truth of what
happened on November, 28 and 29 2008. He mentioned that he had received saddening
reports of colossal loss of lives and property and expressed the hope that a time would
come when all Nigerians would feel absolutely at home in any part of the country where
they choose to reside in, irrespective of ethnic affiliation or religious persuasions. This
sentiment he had expressed in his acceptance speech at the award ceremony at Anambra
State University when he was given a honorary Doctorate Degree of the University on
20th November, 2008, barely one week to the unfortunate Unrest in Jos. He emphasized
i) That the injustice in respect of indigene/settler matter must be corrected
through state laws or by the Constitution.
ii) That the leadership at various levels must always be honest and upright
in its act of governance to enable people feel at home anywhere they find
themselves.
iii) That the political leaders must be told the home truth and be proactive in
governance.
iv) That traditional rulers had been placed at the background in the scheme
of things in the country and were only required when things had gone
wrong.
The interactions with these dignitaries revealed that all Nigerians irrespective of
ethnic, religious and social differences have a strong faith in the existence of Nigeria as
a united and indivisible nation and that we stand to gain more as a people if we bury our
differences and work together. That we have come a long way as a nation and if we
continue to promote tribal, religious and political cleavages, it will serve us no good.
That religion should be an instrument of integration and peaceful co-existence rather
than of mayhem and destruction. That with mutual tolerances and the spirit of give and
take we can overcome our difficulties. A true test of religiosity which we all greatly
profess is when we co-exist and live together in peace. That we have greatly
misunderstood each other and if we open up our hearts we will see that there is in fact
no basis for all these frictions. There is the need for Christians and Muslims to
accommodate one another in the interest of peace all over the world since peace is the
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corner stone of both religions. But then these types of crises are a wake up call for the
Country to address the issues that give rise to them, else it will consume not just a
section of the Country but the whole Country.

CHAPTER NINE
9.1 Conclusion
The Commission concluded the assignment given to it by the Plateau State
Government with regard to the Unrest of 28th November, 2008. The Commission
started its mission on the 15th January, 2009 and concluded it public sittings on the 8th
August, 2009 with the final submission of its report on the 27 th October, 2009, after
having received an extension of its mandate to end on 31st October, 2009.
The Commission was able to accomplish its assignment as reflected in its terms
of reference. The first chapter covered the preliminary and introductory matters, while
chapter two and three dealt into the issue of the immediate and remote causes of the
Unrest.
Chapter four examined in detail those individuals and/or organisations who are
said to be directly or indirectly responsible for the Unrest. Chapter five detailed the loss
of lives and injuries to persons, whilst the losses of property suffered by those who
presented memoranda is detailed within chapter six and further particulars of the claims
are provided in Volume 1A as an Appendix to the Main Report. The pertinent
recommendations which the Commission distilled from various memoranda and
representations are contained in Chapter seven. The Commission further proceeded to
make some general observations in chapter eight of this Report. The Report thereby
concludes with this present chapter.
The Commission took what it felt was a unique step and in an efforts towards a
truthful and reconciliatory Report invited and interacted with numerous dignitaries. This
it felt was important if the desire for peaceful co-existence between the Hausa/Fulani of
Jos North Local Government Area on the one hand and the indigenes of Jos North on
the other, as well as with other Nigerian citizens resident therein is to be achieved.
Indeed, the need for peaceful cohabitation cannot be over emphasised in order to ensure
that there is no re-occurrence of violence and that the quest for peace does not become
illusory.
The Commission feels that certain actions must be taken not only in Jos North
Local Government Area but in the whole of Plateau State. People need to be re-

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orientated on ways of living together. The Commission observed that this togetherness
was not new, with evidence of the numerous non-indigenous tribes cohabitating in Jos
for over a century. The Yorubas arrived in 1850, the Hausa/Fulani arrived by all
records in 1904, the Igbo around 1913, and the Urhobos and South-South communities
from about the 1820, amongst others. If these people have lived together all this time,
surely there must be a way of ensuring continued peaceful co-existence. Therefore, the
need for initiatives on peace building and conflict resolution is a necessity. The State
must find a means of closing ranks with those who are disgruntled both within and
outside Jos North. Hand of fellowship must be extended to ensure that it is not a
‘winner takes all’ but a ‘winner shares all’.
There can be community of purpose in Jos North regardless of religious,
political and ethnic or tribal differences; a model for the rest of the country. There is
need for dialogue and the State Government should be at the vanguard of this effort.
The Commission found that at the root of these recurring clashes is the issue of
economic strife although other elements, such as religion, politics and ethnicity are
easily used as a smoke screen. A good example of this was where witnesses informed
the Commission of how quickly offers were made to buy damaged homes cheaply or
even forcefully taken over, once its inhabitants had been displaced. In memorandum
JCI/J/160/2009 presented by the Izu Umunna Cultural Association Jos, the Igbo
Community stated that
‘we further submit that what happened was premeditated, carefully planned and
executed action by the Hausa/Fulani community to destroy the financial bases of the
Igbos, drive the Igbos away from the areas attacked, loot their movable properties,
annex or buy their immovable properties at fear driven, panic driven, ridiculously low
prices as was successfully done in 2001’
The memorandum presented by the Human Rights Watch supported this notion
when it said
‘Religious, political and ethnic disputes often serve as mere proxies for severe
economic that lie beneath the surface’
The Commission has gleaned from all that has been presented before it, that
tolerance, the spirit of give and take and the rejection of aggression and antagonism will
play vital roles; however what will go a long way is the education of the teeming youths
who are easily manipulated to perpetrate violence. In the immediate and the short term,

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recognised flash – points must be adequately and regularly policed with the set up of
permanent security posts within these areas.
The work of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry was to some extent limited by
the deliberate non participation of the Hausa/Fulani people, members of key
organisations such the Council of Ulamas, and the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI). This
was premised on allegations of bias levelled against the Plateau State Government and
the Chairman of the Commission. These allegations have been vehemently denied by
both quarters on numerous occasions.
Even though there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the Unrest of
28th November, 2008 erupted from acts of violence initiated by some Hausa/Fulani
Muslims, a point corroborated by the Police, nevertheless the Commission felt that it
ought to hear from both sides. The only contribution of this groups was a letter from
Jama’atu Nasril Islam. The Commission was however supplied with figures of those
killed through the memorandum presented by Human Rights Watch:
‘The final death toll from November 28th – 29th violence is still unclear. Muslim
authorities in Jos have registered 632 dead including several hundred victims buried in
three mass burials on November, 30 and December 1 (from an interview with Sheikh
Khalid Aliyu, a spokes person for the Jos North Muslim Ummah official in Jos)…’
The Commission could not verify the above claim but is left in no doubt that
massive casualties were suffered by the Hausa/Fulani Muslims.
Therefore, the Commission proposes that these groups must be engaged in
dialogue and a sub-Commission may be set up to look into their own claims.
The Commission restates here that despite the coincidence of time, the Local
Government election of 27th November, 2008 were not an immediate cause of the
unrest, but they had subsequent effects in that the feeling that the Hausa/Fulani has lost
the election and had by that token lost access to one of the major opportunities for
economic domination and advancement amongst their people pushed them to violence.
Politicians therefore have a great role to play in suing for peace and they should
be admonished where politics seeks to explore religion and ethnicity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The Commission having completed the mandate given to it beholds a feeling of
eternal gratitude for the opportunity accorded to it to serve. It therefore becomes
necessary to thank all those who worked tirelessly to ensure the successful completion

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of an arduous assignment and who made invaluable contributions to the work of the
Commission.
Our initial gratitude must be extended to every one of the individuals, groups
and organisations who came before the Commission either to present memoranda or act
as witnesses before the Commission. Your contributions constituted the nucleus around
which our assignment revolved. It was clear to the Commission that many of these
contributions were made at great cost to you. Indeed, it was a painful experience for the
many of who had to recount the details of their all-too-recent experiences, the physical
and mental scars of which were still very fresh. Your commitment was to us, a
confirmation of the fact that you reposed your trust on the Commission. We admire and
salute your courage. We also thank the lively audience that came to the Commission
and spent time listening to almost all the Commission’s daily proceedings.
The Commission recognises the efforts of its members for the wonderful sense
of comradeship displayed between them. Each one of you proved that you were most
able and enduring. The Commission could not have gotten better persons for the
assignment anywhere in the State.
Our next appreciation go to Chief D. G. Fompun, the able and tireless Secretary
of the Commission for managing the affairs and coordinating the work of a sound
Secretariat for the Commission, and also overseeing the welfare of the members. (We
call him Chief here because, he started with the Commission as Mr. D.G. Fompun but
was subsequently made the Makaman Mangu halfway through our session). We say,
well done. Chief D. G. Fompun, you have done very well and showed that your
appointment was well deserved. The Commission also thanks the Assistant Secretary 1,
Mr. P.K.Gurumna’an who started with the Commission but along the way took ill and
could not continue. He was such an able Assistant Secretary to the Commission. We
wish you a quick recovery from your illness. Our thanks go to all the other Assistant
Secretaries, Mr. Richard Tome, Mr. Ambrose Zwalnang, Mr. Emmanuel Bimtet and
Mr. Solomon Mwankon.
The Commission had the fortune of being supported by a team of brilliant
lawyers who acted as Counsel to the Commission ably led by Barr. Charles Obishai,
Barr. Paul Agbo, Barr. Paschal Mammo, Barr. Jim Gotom and Barr. Binchen Janitor.
The Commission’s work might have been truncated but for the efforts of the Lead
Counsel and vigorous defence he maintained against various litigations instituted

406
against the commission. He did such a wonderful job and candidly, we dare say he
deserved his appointment as Lead Counsel.
We must not by any stretch of imagination forget to thank all the learned counsel
who appeared before the Commission and did a marvellous job of their assignment
either as party-counsel or as amicus curiae. Your contributions were invaluable to the
work of the Commission.
Our thanks also go to the Registry staff led by Mr. Mark Mallan, and including
Mr. Patrick Ajijelek, Mrs. Victoria Go’ar, Mr. Orji D. Deshi, Mr. Bulus Ajiji, Mrs. Na’
omi Jugu and Miss Henrrieta Botmang. We must also not fail to say a big thank you to
the Secretaries and Senior Computer Analysts, Mr. James Gado Chinge Dodo, who
practically slept in the office to ensure that this Report was typed and ready for
submission on time, along with Mrs. Ladi Izang who worked with him.
We extend our appreciation for the work done by the verbatim reporters of the
Commission, Mr. Michael M. Mancha, Mr. Joseph Mwangyel and Mr. Noel Lipgan.
We cannot forget the photographer of the Commission, Mr. Banahel Mangut,
who took all the photographs in the Commission and ensured that the memories of the
activities of the Commission shall be kept alive.
We note with appreciation the efforts of Mr. Yakubu Rwang, David Bishe and
Mrs. Martina Gojang who all worked very hard to keep the venue of the sitting of the
Commission and its environs very clean.
We commend the Commission’s Technician, Mr. Fabian Fottiem, who ensured
that all the Commission’s electrical appliances were in good working condition at all
times. He was also always on standby to put the Commission’s generator on and ensure
that the Commission’s sittings was never disrupted any time that there was power
failure caused by PHCN Plc.
Our thanks go to the team of Mr. Christopher Gyang, Mr. Chollom Pam, Mr.
Moses Zitta, The tireless Mr. Yohanna Adams, Mr. Sunday Yilbish, Mr. Lawrence
Agyos, Mr. Austin Usman, Mallam Wetka and Mr. Alex Adi who served as drivers to
the Commission.
The Commission’s work received ample coverage because of the due co-
operation given by the Press crew ably led by their Media Coordinator, Mr. Harris
Dawurang. The Commissions sittings received wide coverage not only in Plateau State
but all over the Country.

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 The security operatives which included the Police and SSS detachments
did a good work of maintaining order and peace, around and within the venue of the
Commission’s sitting and the ensuring the personal security of its members during the
risky undertaking.
Finally, our eternal gratitude goes to God almighty, who protected us all. May
his peace continue to reign in Plateau State.
DEDICATION
This Report is dedicated to all those who lost their lives during the unrest, the
entire people of Jos North Local Government Area and Plateau State in general and God
Almighty.
This being our deed upon which we set our hands this 27th day of October, 2009:
………………………………………………….
His Excellency,
Judge Bola Ajibola, SAN, KBE, CFR
Chairman
……………………………………………………….
Prof. Muslih T. Yahya
Member

…………………………………………………………
Barr. Daniel Gopep
Member

…………………………………………………………
Barr. Ogbene Virginia Abang (Mrs)
Member

…………………………………………………………..
Mr. Sale Fale
Member

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