Facts: Vicente Dilanco Pons, Santiago Cid's cousin, purportedly acting upon the

instructions of Doris Wolf, borrowed from Myrna Temporas the amount of

P48,500.00 and used the an Isuzu passenger type jeepney (Plate DFB 550) as a
collateral. The amount was given to Pons in P10,000.00 cash and the balance in a
check payable to Doris Wolf. The check was encashed as it was cleared from
Myrna Temporas' account. It bore a signature supposedly of Doris Wolf at its back
portion and a second endorsement by Pons who subsequently deposited it in his
account. On September 11, Temporas asked Pons to secure a special power of
attorney from Doris Wolf. Pons promised to comply in one or two weeks. But
Pons failed to pay the indebtedness. So, Myrna Temporas repeatedly went to his
house in Digmaan, Camarines Sur to collect the amount borrowed but Pons
always promised that he himself would go to her house to pay. Inasmuch as Pons
also failed to produce a deed of sale covering the jeepney, Temporas lodged a
complaint against him for estafa before the NBI. Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca, Sr.
reported the disappearance of his son, Andrew, Jr., the jeepney and its driver to
the police detachment in Bulihan, Silang, Cavite and the police stations in Silang
and Imus, Cavite. Two weeks after 4 September 1987, the body of 23-year-old
Andrew Patriarca, Jr. was found in a sugarcane plantation in Maguyam. His head
was severed from his body. The body of the driver, Geronimo Malibago,
stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner of the jeepney, was recovered after the
harvest of sugarcane in the plantation in Maguyam. Malibago's widow identified
the body from its clothing. Acting on the complaint, the NBI contacted the
relatives of the owner of the jeepney who went to Camarines Sur, identified the
jeepney and informed the NBI that its driver (deceased Geronimo Malibago) and
conductor (deceased Andrew Patriarca, Jr.) had been killed by carnappers.
Patriarca's widow also filed a complaint with the NBI. Upon investigation, an NBI
team led by Supervising Agent Magno Toribio found out that the carnapping of
the jeepney and the killing of Patriarca and Malibago were the "handiwork" of a
group of 4 persons named Rene Januario, Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Toto,
and Eduardo Sarinos alias Digo. The team also discovered that the jeepney was
disposed of through Cid. Januario and Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in
Camarines Sur. The NBI then invited Pons and Temporas to shed light on the
carnapping incident. The jeepney was recovered in an auto shop with its engine
partly dismantled. Upon being informed by the NBI that the jeepney had been
found, an insurance company brought it back to Manila. From the "oral
investigation" they conducted at the Naga City NBI office on 27 March 1988, the
team learned that Sarita and Sarinos took Patriarca and Malibago inside a sugar
plantation where presumably they were killed. Because Januario and Canape
volunteered that their companions were their neighbors in Paliparan, Dasmariñas,
Cavite who could be in Manila already, the NBI team decided to take down their
statements at the NBI head office in Manila. The team traveled with Januario and
Canape to Manila, arriving there at around 1:00 p.m. of 28 March 1988. At the
Taft Avenue head office of the NBI, the team took the statements of Januario and
Canae one at a time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was "just around
somewhere," to assist Januario and Canape during the investigation. Agent Arlis
Vela took the statement of Januario while Supervising Agent Toribio took that of
Canape. On 7 November 1988, an Information signed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Jose M. Velasco, Jr., was filed against Rene Januario and Efren Canape, and their
co-accused Santiago Cid, Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos @ Digo
charging them with violation of Republic Act 6539 (AntiCarnapping Law).
Arraigned on 7 February 1989, Januario and Canape, assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty. On 30 May 1989, Cid, assisted by counsel de parte, likewise
entered a plea of not guilty. Sarita and Sarinos remained at large. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVIII in Tagaytay City, disposing of Criminal
Case TG-1392-89, rendered judgment finding Januario and Canape guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 14, last sentence, of
Republic act 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law, and imposed
upon them the supreme penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment, and
ordered them to pay jointly and severally, but separately, the heirs of their
victims, namely, Geronimo Malibago and Andrew Patriarca, Jr., the sums of: (a)
P50,000.00 for moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; (c)
P25,000.00 for actual damages, and to pay the costs of the proceeding. Januario
and Canape appealed.
Held: Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of Januario
and Canape is, however, not a guarantee that their respective confessions had
been taken in accordance with Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution. This
constitutional provision requires that a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have no less than "competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice." Saunar was not the choice of Januario as
his custodial investigation counsel. Arguendo that Saunar's competence as a
lawyer is beyond question, under the circumstances described by the prosecution
however, he could not have been the independent counsel solemnly spoken of by
the Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in the NBI and therefore it can
never be said that his loyalty was to the confessants. In fact, he was actually
employed by the NBI a few months after. Further, although Saunar might have
really been around to properly apprise Januario of his constitutional right as
reflected in the written sworn statement itself, the same cannot be said about
Canape. Canape was not properly informed of his constitutional rights.
Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he
wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for
counsel if he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are
simply not in compliance with the constitutional mandate. In this case, appellant
Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights and posthaste, asked whether
he was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any means, be
interpreted as a waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice. Furthermore, the
right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights to
remain silent and to counsel implies a correlative obligation on the part of the
police investigator to explain and to contemplate an effective communication that
results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Canape's sworn statement,
which reads and sounds so lifeless on paper, fails to reflect compliance with this
requirement. Neither does the testimony of NBI Agent Toribio. Bearing in mind
that Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents should have exerted
more effort in explaining to him his constitutional rights. The law enforcement
agents' cavalier disregard of Januario's and Canape's constitutional rights is shown
not only by their failure to observe Section 12 (1) of Article III of the Constitution.
They have likewise forgotten the third paragraph of Section 12 of the same article
which mandates that an admission of facts related to a crime must be obtained
with the assistance of counsel; otherwise it would be inadmissible in evidence
against the person so admitting.

Facts: On 28 March 1993, at more or less 10:30 p.m. while inside a

motor vehicle in the national highway at Barangay Agusan up to the
road at Camaman-an, all of Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Henry
Feliciano y Lagura and Orlando Labtan y Daquihon took away, through
intimdation or violence, cash amounting to P720.00, pioneer stereo,
booster and twitters owned by and belonging to Roman S. Mercado,
and a Seiko Diver wristwatch owned by Ismael P. Ebon, all in all
amounting to P10,800.00. Later on, on or about 16 April 1993, at about
2:30 p.m., more or less, at Buntong, Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan robbed
Florentino Bolasito of P30 in cash money. In the course thereof,
Orlando and Jonelto Labtan stabbed Bolasito to death. On 23 April
1993, an information was filed against Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and
Jonelto Labtan charging them with robbery with homicide (as per 16
April 1993 incident). Subsequently, another information dated 20 May
1993 was filed against Feliciano and Orlando Labtan charging them with
highway robbery (as per 28 March 1993 incident). Only Feliciano
pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped the
Maharlika Rehabilitation and Detention Center in Carmen, Cagayan de
Oro City where he was detained while Jonelto Labtan has eluded arrest.
The two cases were tried together. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 found Feliciano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation in the crime of
robbery with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the offended party (the heirs of Florentino Bolasito) the sum
of P50,000.00 and to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00
representing funeral expenses and to pay the cost. The trial court also
found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of highway
robbery, and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of
prision mayor as the minimum term to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period as the maximum term and to
indemnify Roman S. Mercado the sum of P8,000.00, representing the
value of the P700.00 cash, stereo, booster, and twitter and to
indemnify Ismael Ebon the sum of P2,500.00, the value of the Seiko
Wrist watch divested from him and to pay the cost. The trial court
convicted Feliciano on the basis of his sworn statement which he
repudiated during the trial. Feliciano appealed.

Tomoquin
Facts: 

Appellant Elizar Tomaquin was convicted with murder. There were no eyewitnesses to

the incident, and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from appellant’s extrajudicial
confession, was mainly circumstantial. Said extrajudicial confession was given in the
presence of Atty. Parawan, a barangay captain who is also a
lawyer. Tomaquin questions the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession because it
was an uncounselled confession. Tomaquin contends that the barangay captain,
although a lawyer, may not be considered an independent counsel within the purview of
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

The words “competent and independent counsel” in the constitutional provision is not
an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely
stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices
explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay
and ensure peace and order at all times.
In fact, a barangay captain is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, 

On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider the barangay captain as an

independent counsel of appellant.

In this case the role of the barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his
barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal
assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, the
barangay captain could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when
the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the
presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake
his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and
vigilant counsel. An “effective and vigilant counsel” necessarily and logically requires
that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing
of the extrajudicial confession.  

As held in People vs. Velarde:

. . .  The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages
of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the
interview.

Gallardo
Facts: On 28 July 1991, the lifeless body of Edmundo Orizal was found in the rest house of Ronnie Balao
in Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In an autopsy performed by Dr. Edmundo Borja, Tuguegarao Municipal
Health Officer, the victim was found to have sustained 7 gunshot wounds in the chest, abdomen, back,
left and right thighs, and two (2) grazing wounds on the left arm and back. Investigation by the
Tuguegarao police station identified the suspects in the murder of Edmundo Orizal as Armando Gallardo
y Gander, Alfredo Columna y Correa (alias Fermin), and Jessie Micate y Orteza. The police received
information that the suspects were detained at the Camalaniugan Police Station because of other
criminal charges. So elements of the Tuguegarao police went to the Camalaniugan Police Station in
August 1991 to fetch the suspects. Only Gallardo and Columna were in the custody of the Camalaniugan
Police Station. Gallardo and Columna were brought to the Tuguegarao Police Department. On August
18, 1991, they were investigated by Police Investigator SPO4 Isidro Marcos, and they gave statements
admitting that they, together with Jessie Micate, killed Edmundo Orizal. During the investigation, the
dialect used was Ilocano, the native tongue of the accused, and during the taking of the statements,
Atty. Rolando Velasco assisted them. Judge Vilma Pauig was present. She administered the oath on the
jurat of the statements. Galardo and Columna signed their statements admitting the killing of Edmundo
Orizal. On 7 November 1991, on the basis of the sworn confessions of the accused, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cagayan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, Cagayan an information charging
the accused with murder. On 2 December 1991, all three accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
ensued. In due course, the trial court found them guilty of murder for the treacherous killing of
Edmundo Orizal and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to pay in solidum the heirs of
Edmundo Orizal in the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death and P150,000.00 as moral damages.
Gallardo, Columna and Micate appealed.

Issue: Whether the counsel provided by the State to the accused satisfies the Constitutionlal
requirement that a competent and independent counsel be present in a custodial investigation.

Held: The extrajudicial confessions of the accused were given after they were completely and clearly
apprised of their Constitutional rights. A lawyer assisted them and a judge administered their oath. while
the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the
services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice
as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the
former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to
the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. Herein, although Atty. Velasco was provided by
the State and not by the accused themselves, the accused were given an opportunity whether to accept
or not to accept him as their lawyer. They were asked and they immediately agreed to have Atty.
Velasco as their counsel during the investigation. There is no requirement in the Constitution that the
lawyer of an accused during custodial investigation be previously known to them. The Constitution
provides that the counsel be a competent and independent counsel, who will represent the accused and
protect their Constitutionally guaranteed rights. Further, to be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not
challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to
stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our
Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The
counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Herein,
Atty. Velasco acted properly in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution and informed the
accused of their Constitutional rights. Atty. Velasco assisted the accused and made sure that the
statements given by the accused were voluntary on their part, and that no force or intimidation was
used by the investigating officers to extract a confession from them. Under rules laid by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all four
fundamental requirements, namely: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express;
and (4) the confession must be in writing. All these requirements were complied with.
Barasina http://www.thezamboanguena.com/2017/09/people-v-barasina-g-r-no-109993-21-
jan-1994-229-scra-450/

Facts: It was around 6:40 p.m. of 17 July 1988 when Fiscal Lino Mayo of Olongapo City succumbed to a
single bullet on his side of his face fired by a gunman from an unlicensed .45 caliber firearm while the
former was walking at the VIP parking lot of the Victory Liner Compound at Caloocan City. The gun man
continued walking at the same time holding his gun with two hands trying to cock it. After walking a few
meters, the gun man tucked the gun in his right waist and began running away. Barangay Councilman
Prudencio Motos and about four other men (among them, Ruel Ganiola and Michael Estapia, both
porters) chased the gun man. When the gun man was about to reach the LRT Station, they shouted at
the policeman conducting traffic in the area and pointed at the running man. The policeman, Pfc.
Napoleon Francia, shouted at the gun man, who stopped and raised his hands. Pfc. Francia then
confiscated a .45 cal. pistol from the gun man. Afterwards, Pfc. Francia, Councilman Motos and others
brought the gun man to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters aboard a passenger jeep. The gun man
was identified later as Elias Barasina y Laynesa. Barasina was charged for violation of Preisdential Decree
1866 (illegal possession of firearms). Barasina, "John Doe" and "Peter Doe" (true names, real identities
and present whereabouts of the last two mentioned accused, still unknown) were also charge for the
crime of murder. When haled to respond to the inculpations, Barasina was indifferent in entering any
plea, thus the plea of not guilty to the two criminal charges was entered by the trial court in his behalf.
In the course of the trial, Barasina, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of double
jeopardy, i.e. in jeopardy of being convicted of two offenses — Murder and Illegal Possession of
Firearms. In an Order, dated 17 August 1989, the Court denied the Motion to Quash. On trial, one of the
principal defenses set up by Barasina was that he was mauled, maltreated and forced to sign two
documents by the Caloocan policemen while he was inside a small cell inside the Caloocan City Police
Headquarters. He identified those 2 documents, the "Paalala", dated 18 July 1988, and his statement
dated 18 July 1988. He further claimed that he never read any of those documents and that he was not
assisted by any lawyer during their execution, and that he does not know of any Atty. Abelardo Torres.
He signed an Affidavit of retraction dated 22 July 1988. On 28 February 1990, the trial court found
Barasina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) violation of Par. 1 of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearm); and (2) Murder, and sentenced him (1) as a result of his conviction under PD 1866 to suffer
imprisonment of 17 Years, 4 Months and 1 Day of Reclusion Temporal as minimum to 20 Years of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and to pay the costs, and (2) as a result of his conviction of Murder,
to suffer imprisonment of 10 Years and 1 Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum to 18 Years, 8 Months and 1
Day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and to pay the costs. The trial court also directed Barasina to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Fiscal Lino Mayo, the amount of P61,000.00 representing the funeral
and burial expenses of the victim and the amount of P500 ,000.00 representing the moral damages
suffered by his widow and the loss of income as a result of the victim's death at the age of 50 years. On
29 December 1992, the Court of Appeals (de Pano, Elbiñas, Gutierrez [P], JJ.), acting on the appeal
interposed by Barasina, rendered a decision increasing the penalties imposed on Barasina to reclusion
perpetua for each of the two crimes committed. The records do not show that the case was certified by
the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure although the records of the case were forwarded to to the Supreme Court by the
Court of Appeals on 11 May 1993 after the assailed decision was promulgated on 29 December 1992. In
any event, the appeal was later accepted by the Supreme Court and Barasina was thereupon required to
file his brief following which the Solicitor General filed a brief for the People.

Issue: Whether the admissions made in the custodial investigation attended to by Atty. Abelardo Torres,
a lawyer which Barasina did not expressly choose as counsel to assist him therein, are inadmissible.

Held: Section 12 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution dealing with the rights of a person undergoing
investigation reads "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." The phrase
"competent and independent" and "preferably of his own choice" were explicit details which were
added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the 1986 Constitutional Commission who
pointed out cases where, during the martial law period, the lawyers made available to the detainee
would be one appointed by the military and therefore beholden to the military. Yet, the apprehension of
the human rights advocates then along this line hardly inspires belief in the present inasmuch as there
was no indication below that Barasina did in fact choose Atty. Romeo Mendoza to assist him while in the
process of offering the inculpatory statements, to the exclusion of other lawyers (The hiring of Atty.
Romeo Mendoza as counsel by Barasina after the custodial investigation appears to be an afterthought).
Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12 [1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey
the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise,
then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede,
nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one reason or
another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated
by the framers of the charter.

MOrial

Appellant was charged with robbery with homicide. The investigation conducted resulted into
the admission by the appellant of the crime charged against him. With the latter’s consent, his
statements were reduced into writing and was then advised of his constitutional rights under
custodial investigation by SPO4 Fernandez. With appellant’s consent, the latter contacted Atty.
Aguilar as the appellant’s counsel. After appellant agreed to answer voluntarily knowing that the
same can be used against him as evidence in court, the investigation was conducted with the
presence of the counsel. After “all the material points” were asked, Atty. Aguilar asked the
investigator if he van leave due to prior engagement. Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked
Leonardo if he was willing to answer questions in his absence, the latter agreed. During and
despite the counsel’s absence, the investigator continued with the investigation and propounded
several more questions to Leonardo, which the latter answered.
Issue: Whether or not Leonardo Morial’s right to counsel was waived during the
investigation.

Ruling:

Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial

investigation; therefore his quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against
him and his other co-accused. The Court stressed out that an accused under custodial
interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start
thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify that Atty. Aguilar only left after Leonardo had
admitted that he and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar
rationalize that he only left after Leonardo had admitted the “material points”, referring
to the participation of the three accused to the crime. Both are invalid since Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7438 requires that “any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.” Furthermore, the last paragraph
of Section 3 states that “in the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be
conducted.”

Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilar’s departure during the
investigation and to answer questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was an
invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless the same is made in
writing and in the presence of the counsel. In the case at bar, no such written and
counseled waiver of these rights was presented as evidence.

castro

Facts: At about 5:30 p.m. of 19 March 1991, Capt. Allyn Evasco together with Sgt.
Rogelio Raguine, Sgt. Emilio de Guzman and CIC Julian Discargar formed a team
for the purpose of conducting a buy-bust operation. The team went to their target
area in San Roque, San Miguel, Pangasinan and proceeded to deploy themselves
as planned. Sgt. de Guzman who acted as poseur-buyer and civilian informer
Discargar proceeded to Victoriano Castro y Calagno's house. Sgt. Raguine,
meanwhile, hid in a grassy spot near the house. Discargar introduced Castro to
Sgt. de Guzman who said that he wanted to purchase a kilo of dried marijuana
leaves. After going inside the house, Castro emerged with a plastic bag which he
handed to Sgt. de Guzman who, in turn, paid him P600.00. After the exchange,
Sgt. de Guzman made the pre-arranged signal, indicating that the transaction was
complete, by raising his right hand. Upon espying the signal, Sgt. Raguine and the
other team members approached Castro, introduced themselves as NARCOM
(Narcotics Command) agents, and arrested him. He was thereafter brought to the
 San Manuel Police Station. While the arresting team went to San Fernando, La
Union for further investigation, the marijuana leaves were sent to Camp Crame
for examination where it was discovered that the actual weight of the confiscated
marijuana leaves was 930 grams. Castro was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Pangasinan, Branch 38 in an information dated 21 March 1991, for
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972). After Castro entered a plea of not guilty, trial on the merits commenced.
On 29 April 1992, the trial court rendered its decision finding Castro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Castro appealed.
Subsequently, he was brought to the NARCOM Headquarters at San Fernando, La Union where he
was further investigated and allegedly forced to sign a "Receipt for Property Seized"  without the
1

assistance of counsel.

PEOPLE v. ENDINO
GR. No. 133026; Feb 20, 2001

The crime of murder was charged against accused Endino and accused-appellant Galgarin.
Galgarin was arrested and convicted for the crime of murder qualified by treachery, while on the
other hand Endino remained at large.

HELD: Admission of videotaped confessions is proper. The interview was recorded on video
and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the
presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation, as it was
not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness
from the public.

http://flyhighinblueskies.blogspot.com/2015/06/constitutional-law-ii-case-digest.html

Confession given to media

G.R. No. 133026.  February 20, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. 
EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.

GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.

FACTS: Yielding to man’s brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with the aid of Gerry Galgarin alias  Toto, slew Dennis
Aquino in the presence of a lady whose love they once shared.

On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, GALGARIN, uncle of accused ENDINO, suddenly
and without warning stabbed AQUINO repeatedly on the chest.  Aquino’ girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, pleaded to
Galgarin to stop.  Aquino succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker but his escape was foiled when from out of
nowhere Endino appeared and fired at him.  The two (2) assailants then fled in the direction of the airport. Meanwhile, Dennis
sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he collapsed on the floor, grasping for breath and near death.  Clara with the help of
some onlookers took him to the hospital but he expired even before he could receive medical attention.

On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Endino and accused-appellant
Galgarin.  The trial court issued an order putting the case in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement as both accused
remained at large.

On 19 November 1992, Galgarin was arrested at a house in Sitio Sto. Niño, Antipolo, Rizal.   Early in the evening of the following
day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Manlavi and PO3 Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be
taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly.

On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by
reporters.  Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward
Endino as the gunman.  According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his
sister Langging (Edward's mother), was waiting.  Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila.  They took the boat for
Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him heading for
Antipolo.  Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities.   His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN
evening news program TV Patrol.

The case against accused-appellant Galgarin was established through the testimony of Clara Agagas. Her testimony was
corroborated by Anita Leong, neighbor of Aquino, who testified that in the evening of 16 October 1991 Galgarin together with a
companion went to her house looking for Aquino.  She instructed them to proceed to the Soundlab Recording Studio which is
owned by Dennis Aquino as the latter might still be there.  But a few minutes later she heard a (gunshot?) Instinctively, she
instructed her 2 young daughters to duck for cover while she anxiously waited for her seven year old daughter Josephine who
was out of the house for an errand for her.   Soon enough Josephine arrived, crying because she said her Kuya Dennis had been
shot and stabbed. Josephine confirmed her mother’s testimony and even said that she had seen Galgarin stab
her Kuya Dennis and she could remember Gerry very well because of the mole below his nose.
For his part, accused-appellant Galgarin disclaimed having taking part in the slaying of Aquino. Gerry asserted that on 14
October 1991 he was in Antipolo to help his common-law wife Maria Marasigan give birth to their first born.   He stayed with her
until the 16th of October when she was discharged from a maternity clinic.

Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the
arresting police officers.  He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution.

The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of the police officers that no force or
compulsion was exerted on accused-appellant and upon a finding that his confession was made before a group of newsmen that
could have dissipated any semblance of hostility towards him.  The court gave credence to the arresting officers’ assertion that it
was even accused-appellant who pleaded with them that he be allowed to air his appeal on national television for Edward to
surrender.

The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no convincing evidence to support his allegation that he was not at
the locus criminis on the evening of 16 October 1991.   Accordingly, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was convicted of murder
qualified by treachery and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and was ordered to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino P50,000.00
as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages.   The case against his nephew and co-accused Endino
remained in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement as soon as he could be arrested.

ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in admitting accused-appelant‘s videotaped confession as evidence against him.

RULING: Apropos the court a quo’s admission of accused-appellant’s videotaped confession, we find such admission
proper.  The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and
publicly in the presence of newsmen.  Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police
officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.  Besides, if he had indeed been forced
into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been symphatetic with
him.  As the trial court stated in its Decision.-

Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview, freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot
him (Aquino).  There is no showing that the interview of accused was coerced or against his will.  Hence, there is basis to accept
the truth of his statements therein.

We agree.  However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one’s guilt, and the
recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in
further admitting similar confessions.   For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners,
may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused
admit an offense on television.  Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil
our criminal justice system.

We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the
presence of police officers are impermissible.  Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a
difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a
confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.

A word of counsel then to lower courts:  we should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have
been freely given.  This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and
scrutinized.  Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make.   It requires
persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones.  We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and
protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question that next presents itself is whether the trial court
correctly denominated the crime as murder qualified by treachery.   Doubtless,  the crime committed is one of murder
considering that the victim was stabbed while he was simply standing on the pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride,
blissfully oblivious of the accused's criminal design.  The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting victim, without the
slightest provocation from him who had no opportunity to parry the attack, certainly qualifies the killing to murder

Decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION  that accused-appellant is further ordered to
compensate the decedent’s heirs P50,000.00 as moral damages for their emotional and mental anguish. 

Guillermo

Facts: Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing Corp., with
principal place of business at Sitio Halang, Lornaville, San Roque, Antipolo City. Keyser Plastics shared its
building with Greatmore Corporation, a manufacturer of faucets. Separating the respective spaces being
utilized by the two firms in their operations was a wall, the lower portion of which was made of concrete
hollow blocks, while the upper portion was of lawanit boards. The part of the wall made of lawanit had
two large holes, which could allow a person on one side of the wall to see what was on the other side.
On 22 March 1998, Romualdo Campos, a security guard assigned to Greatmore was on duty. At around
8:00 a.m., he saw Eric G. Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Guillermo, as
he knew him to be one of the trusted employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw Victor F.
Keyser arrive. Keyser checked the pump motor of the deep well, which was located in the area of
Greatmore, after which he also went inside the part of the building occupied by Keyser Plastics. Campos
paid scant attention to Keyser. Later, at around 10:00 a.m., Campos was making some entries in his
logbook, when he heard some loud noises (“kalabugan”) coming from the Keyser Plastics area. He
stopped to listen, but thinking that the noise was coming from the machines used to make plastics, he
did not pay much attention to the sound. At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the
performance of his duties when he saw Guillermo look through one of the holes in the dividing wall.
According to Campos, appellant calmly told him that he had killed Victor Keyser and needed Campos’
assistance to help him carry the corpse to the garbage dump where he could burn it. Shocked by this
revelation, Campos immediately dashed off to telephone the police. The police told him to immediately
secure the premises and not let the suspect escape, while a reaction team was being dispatched to the
scene. 10 minutes later, a team composed of SPO4 Felix Bautista, SPO1 Carlito Reyes, and Police Aide
Jovenal Dizon, Jr., all from the Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, arrived at the crime
scene. With them was Felix Marcelo, an official police photographer. They were immediately met by
Campos, who informed them that Guillermo was still inside the building. The law enforcers tried to
enter the premises of Keyser Plastics, but found the gates securely locked. The officers then talked to
Guillermo and after some minutes, persuaded him to give them the keys. This enabled the police to
open the gate. Once inside, SPO4 Bautista and SPO1 Reyes immediately accosted Guillermo, who was
clad only in a pair of shorts, naked from the waist up. SPO1 Reyes then asked him where the body of the
victim was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening the boxes, the police found the
dismembered limbs and chopped torso of Keyser. The victim’s head was found stuffed inside a cement
bag. When the police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he
bashed
the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a
carpenter’s saw. He then mopped up the blood on the floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned
over to the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenter’s saw.
Photographs were taken of the suspect, the dismembered corpse, and the implements used in
committing the crime. When asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had
been maltreating him and his co-employees. He expressed no regret whatsoever about his actions. The
police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further investigation. SPO1 Carlos
conducted the investigation, without apprising Guillermo about his constitutional rights and without
providing him with the services of counsel. SPO1 Carlos requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to conduct a post-mortem examination on Keyser’s remains. The Antipolo police then turned over
the bloodstained piece of wood and saw, recovered from the locus delicti, to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for testing. Keyser’s death shocked the nation. Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was
interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters, namely: Augusto “Gus” Abelgas of ABS-CBN
News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both interviews were subsequently broadcast nationwide.
Guillermo admitted to David that he committed the crime and never gave it second thought. He
disclosed to David the details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the head and cut up his
body into pieces, which he placed in sacks and cartons. When asked why he killed his employer,
Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not feed him properly, and treated him “like
an animal.” Both Abelgas and David said that Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over his
alleged misdeed during the course of their respective interviews with him. On 23 March 1998, Guillermo
was charged by State Prosecutor Jaime Augusto B. Valencia, Jr., of murdering his employer, Victor
Francisco Keyser. When arraigned on 3 April 1998, Guillermo, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
guilty to the charge. On 23 April 1998, however, Guillermo moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and
prayed for a re-arraignment. The trial court granted the motion and on 28 April 1998, he was re-
arraigned. Assisted by counsel de parte, he entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to
trial. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated 7 March 2001 (Criminal
Case 98-14724), found Eric Guillermo y Garcia guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of death. The court also ordered Guillermo to pay the mother of the victim P50,000.00 for death
indemnity, P50,000.00 for funeral expenses, P500,000.00 as compensatory damages, P500,000.00 as
moral damages, P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000 plus P3,000 per court appearance as
attorney's fees. Hence, the automatic review
ssue: Whether Guillermo’s confession to the police officers, to the security guard of Greatmore Corp.,
and to the newsmen are admissible as evidence.

Held: The confession Guillermo made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the
killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down by the
Constitution. The investigating officer made no serious effort to make Guillermo aware of his basic rights
under custodial investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of Guillermo’s right to be
represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it
was a Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation. Moreover,
the record is bare of any showing that Guillermo had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in
the presence of counsel. Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of Guillermo’s confession to
SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For
constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do not apply
to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement authorities
but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the
offense. The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the
slightest use of the State’s coercive power as would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is
not intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such
power. Herein, Guillermo admitted the commission of the crime not just to the police but also to private
individuals. According to the testimony of the security guard, Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the
killing Guillermo called him to say that he had killed his employer and needed assistance to dispose of
the cadaver. Campos’ testimony was not rebutted by the defense, and thus Guillermo's statements to
Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Further, when interviewed on separate
occasions by the media, Guillermo not only agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters, but he
spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the commission of the
crime to the reporters Kara David of GMA Channel 7. The TV news reporters were acting as media
professionals when they interviewed Guillermo. They were not under the direction and control of the
police. There was no coercion for Guillermo to face the TV cameras. The interviews also took place on
several occasions, not just once. Each time, Guillermo did not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead,
he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keyser’s killing. As held in Andan,
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are
voluntary and admissible in evidence.

MALNGAN

Facts: January 2, 2001 when the witness and his tanods saw the accused-appellant, one
hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., hurriedly leaving the house of her
employer. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later
identified as Rolando Gruta. Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay
Chairman Bernardos group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer
of the housemaid. When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall,
he received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that
shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw accused-appellant coming out of the
house. Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to
Balasan Street and found the accused-appellant. Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of
Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the woman as accused-
appellant, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant’s bag. Thereafter,
accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of
multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employers
house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she
wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in
going home.Accused-appellant was then turned over to arson investigators headed by
S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz,
Manila where she was further investigated and then detained. When Mercedita
Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she had the
opportunity to ask accused-appellant at the latters detention cell why she did the
burning of her employers house and accused-appellant replied that she set the house on
fire because when she asked permission to go home to her province, the wife of her
employer shouted at her and when Mercedita Mendoza asked accused-appellant how
she burned the house, accused-appellant EDNA told her that she crumpled newspapers,
lighted them with a disposable lighter and threw them on top of the table inside the
house.

Issue: Whether the all confession without the assistance of competent and independent
counsel of the appellant-accused is inadmissible as evidence.

Held: No, Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was
brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a
suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed
the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution
should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants confession to
Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the interrogation made
by the latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her
rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the
confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well
as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as
such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellants confession to Barangay
Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her
acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or
their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to
having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-
appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto
Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas house. The testimony
of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for
accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered
by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution,
or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the
individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does
not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
another private individual as both accused-appellant and prosecution
witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence
on record to show that said witness was acting under police authority, so
appropriately, accused-appellants uncounselled extrajudicial confession
to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC.

GOMEZ
Facts: On 27 February 1990, Art David, an employer of Felipe Immaculata sent the latter to Bangkok,
Thailand, to canvass ready-to-wear clothes. David and Eduardo Gomez followed Immaculata about a
week later (04 March 1990). Immaculata fetched the two at the Bangkok Airport. Immaculata, David and
Gomez proceeded to and stayed at the Union Towers Hotel. After 2 days, they transferred to the
apartment of one Lito Tuazon where they spent the rest of their stay in Bangkok. On 14 March 1990,
Immaculata, Gomez and Aya Yupangco left Bangkok and boarded Manila-bound flight PR-731.
Immaculata and Yupangco occupied seats 2A and No. 54D. Gomez was on the same flight. He checked-in
two golfbags, and he was issued interline claim tags PR 77-28-71 and 77-28-72. In Manila, Gomez
deposited the two golfbags with the interline baggage room for his connecting flight from Manila to San
Francisco via United Airlines ("UAL") flight 058 scheduled to depart the following morning (15 March
1990). The golfbags were kept in the transit rack baggage along with other pieces of luggage destined
for San Francisco via the UAL flight. Well before flight time on 15 March 1990, Romeo Dumag, a customs
policeman at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport ("NAIA"), was requested by Customs Collector
Edgardo de Leon to help facilitate the checking-in of Eduardo Gomez. Dumag sought from his security
officer, a certain Capt. Reyes, the latter's permission. Having received the go-signal, Dumag accepted
from De Leon the ticket and passport of Gomez. Dumag proceeded to the UAL check-in counter. The
airline's lady staff, Annabelle Lumba, directed Dumag to first claim the passenger's items to be checked-
in at the interline baggage room. At the interline baggage room, Dumag spoke to Michael Angelo
Benipayo, a PAL employee assigned at the NAIA central baggage division and baggage handling section,
and presented the two claim tags of Gomez together with the latter's passport and plane ticket.
Convinced that Dumag had been duly authorized to retrieve the baggage, Benipayo released, upon the
approval of a customs examiner named Nick, the two golfbags wrapped in blue cloth. To acknowledge
the release, Dumag affixed his signature to the "unclaimed baggage/transit list." PAL loader Edgardo
Villafuerte helped carry the golfbags to the UAL check-in counter. Annabelle Lumba attached a San
Francisco laser tag (UA Tag 594513 and Tag 594514) and wrote the name "Gomez" on each side of the
golfbags. She then handed to Dumag the boarding pass and UAL plane ticket for Gomez. Dumag
proceeded to Patio Manila, a restaurant at the NAIA, where he turned over to Collector De Leon the
travel papers of Gomez. Gomez failed to board the UAL flight. The two golfbags were off-loaded from
the aircraft. At around 4:00 p.m., PAL staff Dennis Mendoza brought the golfbags back to the check-in
counter for a security checkup. The x-ray machine showed unidentified dark masses. Alarmed, Mendoza
immediately relayed the information to Capt. Ephraim Sindico of the 801st Aviation Security Squadron
of the Philippine Air Force Security Command ("PAFSECOM") then deployed at the NAIA. Capt. Sindico
rushed to the check-in area. He instructed his men to get the golfbags pass through the x-ray machine
once again. Satisfied that something was indeed wrong, Capt. Sindico reported the matter to Col.
Claudio Cruz who ordered his men to have the golfbags go, for the third time, through the x-ray
machine. The unidentified dark masses having been definitely confirmed, Col. Cruz ordered his men to
open the glued bottom zipper of the golfbags. The golfbags yielded 31 single packs, each with an
approximate size of 1" x 6" x 4," containing a white powder substance suspected to be "heroin" with a
total weight of 20.1159 kilograms. The examination by the PAFSECOM personnel was witnessed by the
NAIA manager, a representative of the UAL and other customs personnel. Eduardo Gomez, a bartender,
and Felipe Immaculata, a former bus driver, were implicated in the crime of transporting 20 kilograms of
heroin, estimated to be worth $40,000,000.00, contained in two golfbags. Also charged, with having
violated Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 (the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, were Aya Yupangco, Art David, Lito Tuazon and Benito Cunanan, who
all were able to evade arrest. Gomez surrendered to the officer-in-charge of the then Clark Air Force
Base in Angeles City. The OIC of Clark Air Force Base turned over custody of Gomez to the Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") of the United States in Manila. The DEA, in turn, surrendered him to the
NBI. On the other hand, on 22 March 1990, David and Immaculata left for Hongkong reportedly to get
some spare parts for David's Mercedes Benz car. In Hongkong, after buying the car spare parts, David
and Immaculata went to the U.S. Department of Justice in Hongkong. While waiting for David,
Immaculata was confronted by a group of people, who turned out to be from the Hongkong Immigration
Office, requesting for his travel papers. Immaculata was brought in for investigation because of an
expired visa, then turned over to the police authorities and finally to the court which decreed his
imprisonment. In the Hongkong prison, Immaculata was visited by NBI agents for his implication in the
"heroin" case. He denied the accusation. Later, he agreed, without the assistance of counsel, to execute
a sworn statement at the Stanley Prison. After his prison term, Immaculata was deported to Manila.
Gomez and Immaculata entered a plea of "not guilty" to the accusation. After trial, Gomez and
Immaculata were each meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113 (Criminal Case 90-4717). While Gomez and
Immaculata filed separate notices of appeal to the Supreme Court from their conviction, only
Immaculata, however, filed his brief. Gomez, assisted by counsel, filed a "manifestation of withdrawal of
appeal" to which the Solicitor General interposed no objection. The Court would only thus consider the
appeal of Immaculata.

Issue: WhetherImmaculata’s uncounselled statement made in Stanley Prison in Hongkong is admissible

as evidence in the Philippines.

Held: While the sworn statement taken from Immaculata by an NBI agent at the Stanley Prison in
Hongkong during his incarceration was not made the basis for Immaculata's conviction by the court, a
word could be said about the manner in which it was procured. It would seem that Immaculata was
merely apprised in general terms of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent. He then was
asked if he would be willing to give a statement. Having answered in the affirmative, the NBI
investigating agent asked him whether he needed a lawyer. After that response, the investigation
forthwith proceeded. This procedure hardly was in compliance with Section 12(1), Article III, of the
Constitution which requires the assistance of counsel to a person under custody even when he waives
the right to counsel. It is immaterial that the sworn statement was executed in a foreign land.
Immaculata, a Filipino citizen, should enjoy these constitutional rights, like anyone else, even when
abroad.

PERKINS

RULE:
Miranda warnings are not required when a suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a
law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement.

FACTS:

An informer told the police that a particular suspect might be responsible for an
unsolved Illinois murder, and the suspect was traced to an Illinois jail in which the
suspect was being held pending trial on an aggravated-battery charge unrelated to the
murder. The police placed an undercover agent in the jail with the suspect. Eventually,
the agent, without giving the suspect Miranda warnings, engaged in conversations with
the suspect, who made incriminating statements about the murder. The suspect was
then charged with the murder, but the circuit court of St. Clair County (Illinois) granted
the suspect's pretrial motion to suppress the statements made to the agent in the jail. On
appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District, affirmed, expressing the view that
Miranda v Arizona (1966) 384 US 436, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 86 S Ct 1602, prohibited all
undercover contacts which were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses from
incarcerated suspects. Petitioner, the State of Illinois, was granted certiorari.

ISSUE:

Should an undercover law enforcement officer, posing as a fellow inmate, be required to

give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before engaging in a conversation that
could elicit incriminating response from the incarcerated suspect?

ANSWER:

No.

CONCLUSION:

On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held
that Miranda warnings were not required when the suspect was unaware that he was
speaking to a law enforcement officer and gave a voluntary statement. The Court found
that conversations between suspects and undercover agents did not implicate the
concerns underlying Miranda. According to the Court, the essential ingredients of a
police-dominated atmosphere and compulsion were not present when an incarcerated
person spoke freely to someone he believed to be a fellow inmate. Coercion was to be
determined from the perspective of the suspect. Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him
into a false sense of security that did not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to
speak were not within the concerns of Miranda warnings. The Court averred that
Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities.

Facts: In November 1984, Richard Stephenson was murdered in a suburb of East St. Louis, Illinois. The
murder remained unsolved until March 1986, when one Donald Charlton told police that he had learned
about a homicide from a fellow inmate at the Graham Correctional Facility, where Charlton had been
serving a sentence for burglary. The fellow inmate was Lloyd Perkins. Charlton told police that, while at
Graham, he had befriended Perkins, who told him in detail about a murder that Perkins had committed
in East St. Louis. On hearing Charlton's account, the police recognized details of the Stephenson murder
that were not well known, and so they treated Charlton's story as a credible one. By the time the police
heard Charlton's account, Perkins had been released from Graham, but police traced him to a jail in
Montgomery County, Illinois, where he was being held pending trial on a charge of aggravated battery,
unrelated to the Stephenson murder. The police wanted to investigate further Perkins' connection to
the Stephenson murder, but feared that the use of an eavesdropping device would prove impracticable
and unsafe. They decided instead to place an undercover agent in the cellblock with Perkins and
Charlton. The plan was for Charlton and undercover agent John Parisi to pose as escapees from a work
release program who had been arrested in the course of a burglary. Parisi and Charlton were instructed
to engage Perkins in casual conversation and report anything he said about the Stephenson murder.
Parisi, using the alias "Vito Bianco," and Charlton, both clothed in jail garb, were placed in the cellblock
with Perkins at the Montgomery County jail. The cellblock consisted of 12 separate cells that opened
onto a common room. Perkins greeted Charlton who, after a brief conversation with Perkins, introduced
Parisi by his alias. Parisi told Perkins that he "wasn't going to do any more time" and suggested that the
three of them escape. Perkins replied that the Montgomery County jail was "rinky-dink" and that they
could "break out." The trio met in Perkins' cell later that evening, after the other inmates were asleep, to
refine their plan. Perkins said that his girlfriend could smuggle in a pistol. Charlton said: "Hey, I'm not a
murderer, I'm a burglar. That's your guys' profession." After telling Charlton that he would be
responsible for any murder that occurred, Parisi asked Perkins if he had ever "done" anybody. Perkins
said that he had and proceeded to describe at length the events of the Stephenson murder. Parisi and
Perkins then engaged in some casual conversation before Perkins went to sleep. Parisi did not give
Perkins Miranda warnings before the conversations. Perkins was charged with the Stephenson murder.
Before trial, he moved to suppress the statements made to Parisi in the jail. The trial court granted the
motion to suppress, and the State appealed. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that
Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]), prohibits all undercover contacts with incarcerated suspects
that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

Issue: Whether strategic deception may be employed by law enforcers to solicit confessions from
suspects, such as the deployment of an undercover agent posing as an inmate, and without the need to
give Miranda warnings.

Held: Conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying
Miranda. The essential ingredients of a "police-dominated atmosphere" and compulsion are not present
when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow inmate.
Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's misplaced
trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner. As recognized in Miranda: "Confessions remain a
proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling
influences is, of course, admissible in evidence." Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense
of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda's
concerns. Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities in
front of persons whom they believe to be their cellmates. Herein, Perkins had no reason to feel that
undercover agent Parisi had any legal authority to force him to answer questions or that Parisi could
affect Perkins' future treatment. Perkins viewed the cellmateagent as an equal and showed no hint of
being intimidated by the atmosphere of the jail. In recounting the details of the Stephenson murder,
Perkins was motivated solely by the desire to impress his fellow inmates. He spoke at his own peril. The
tactic employed here to elicit a voluntary confession from a suspect does not violate the Self-
Incrimination Clause. As held in Hoffa v. United States (385 US 293 [1966]), that placing an undercover
agent near a suspect in order to gather incriminating information was permissible under the Fifth
Amendment. The only difference between the present case and Hoffa is that the suspect here was
incarcerated, but detention, whether or not for the crime in question, does not warrant a presumption
that the use of an undercover agent to speak with an incarcerated suspect makes any confession thus
obtained involuntary. Law enforcement officers will have little difficulty putting into practice the Court's
holding that undercover agents need not give Miranda warnings to incarcerated suspects. The use of
undercover agents is a recognized law enforcement technique, often employed in the prison context to
detect violence against correctional officials or inmates, as well as for the purposes served here. The
interests protected by Miranda are not implicated in these cases, and the warnings are not required to
safeguard the constitutional rights of inmates who make voluntary statements to undercover agents.

ESTRADA

FACTS:

On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly
franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the
Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases
filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of
full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by
Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano
and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the
petition.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the public.

HELD:

NO. In Estes v. Texas, US The Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an
inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal defendant: "Witnesses might be frightened, play to the
cameras, become nervous. They are then subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect
their testimony. Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive
public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of his defense. Finally, the television camera
is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of
the public."
The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed in the courtroom. This
right might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is at
stake, and the due process rights of the accused shall take precedence over the people's right to information.
The accused has the right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make, because it is his life
and liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is not the same as a publicized trial.

IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness intended to ensure a fair trial...could
allow the 'hooting throng' to arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused...will not
subserve the ends of justice, but will only pander to the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers."

Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance forthwith the life and liberty of
any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the
concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

LUVENDINO
http://www.thezamboanguena.com/2017/11/people-v-luvendino-g-r-no-69971-03-jul-1992-211-scra-
36/

DY
People Vs. Dy 
158 SCRA 111
G.R. 74517
February 23, 1988

Facts: Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as suspect to the shooting incident at
"Benny's Bar," at Sitio Angol, Manoc-Manoc Malay, Aklan (Boracay) situated on the Island which caused
the death of Christian Langel Philippe, tourist, 24 years old and a Swiss nationale. He was charged with
the Murder With the Use of Unlicensed firearms. Appellant alleges that he carried the victim to the shore
to be brought to the hospital to save the latter, and who facilitated the surrender to Pat. Padilla a gun
which his helper found the following morning while cleaning the bar. Accused posted bail which was
granted. The accused denied having made any oral confession alleging that he went to Pat. Padilla not to
report the incident but to state that a boy helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while
cleaning and that Pat. Padilla picked up the gun from the bar at his request. The Accused argues that
even if he did make such a confession, the same would be inadmissible in evidence. He was found guilty
in the RTC. Hence the appeal. 

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the constitutional procedure on custodial
interrogation is not applicable in the instant case. 

Held: YES. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found by a boy helper
while cleaning the bar deserves no credence for, if it were so, it would have been absurd for him to have
placed himself under police custody in the early morning after the incident. Sworn Complaint for "Murder
with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by the Chief of Police also attests to Appellant's oral confession.
That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Appellant's voluntary surrender
implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the accused for the reason
that he is already under police custody before the filing of the complaint." What was told by the Accused
to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in ordinary
manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial
investigation.
People v Dy 158 SCRA 111 (1988)
Facts: Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder
before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court
erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police
officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he
used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on
the grounds that such statement was not made in writing and is in violation of the due process
required in custodial investigation.
People v Dy 158 SCRA 111 (1988)
Facts: Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder
before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court
erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police
officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he
used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on
the grounds that such statement was not made in writing and is in violation of the due process
required in custodial investigation.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt
of the accused.

Held: In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the
court. An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar
which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is
because such confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not
under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke
compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule
on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is competent to
satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral confession need
not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral
confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible
in court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the
crime. 
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