Turks shawarma vs Pajaron
The CA correctly found that the NLRC did not
RESPONDENTS Feliciano Z. Pajaron and Larry A.
Carbonilla filed complaints for constructive and
actual illegal dismissal with money claims against
petitioners Turks Shawarma Company/Gem
Zeñarosa.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) found for respondents and
awarded Pajaron backwages and separation pay,
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th
month pay to both of them.
Due to alleged non-availability of counsel,
Zeñarosa himself filed a notice of appeal with
memorandum and motion to reduce appeal bond
with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). He posted a partial cash bond of
P15,000.00, maintaining that he could not afford to
post the full amount of the award of P197,936.27
since he is a mere backyard micro-entrepreneur.
The NLRC denied the motion to reduce bond. It
also denied the motion for reconsideration,
reiterating that the grounds for the reduction of the
appeal bond are not meretorious and that the
partial bond posted is not reasonable.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioners and sustained the
decision of the NLRC.
Did the CA commit a reversible error?
Ruling: No.
The Court, in special and justified circumstances,
has relaxed the requirement of posting a
supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal
on technical considerations to give way to equity
and justice. Thus, under Section 6 of Rule VI of the
2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, the
reduction of the appeal bond is allowed, subject to
the following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce
the bond must be based on meritorious grounds;
and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award is posted by the appellant.
Compliance with these two conditions will stop the
running of the period to perfect an appeal.
In the case at bar, petitioners filed a motion to
reduce bond together with their notice of appeal
and posted a cash bond ofP15,000 within the 10-
day reglementary period to appeal.
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners’ motion to reduce bond, as such motion
was not predicated on meritorious and reasonable
grounds and the amount tendered is not
reasonable in relation to the award. The NLRC
correctly held that the supposed ground cited in the
motion is not well-taken for there was no evidence
to prove Zeñarosa’s claim that the payment of the
full amount of the award would greatly affect his
business due to financial setbacks.
Besides, “the law does not require outright payment
of the total monetary award; [the appellant has the
option to post either a cash or surety bond. In the
latter case, appellant must pay only a] moderate
and reasonable sum for the premium to ensure that
the award will be eventually paid should the appeal
fail.” Moreover, the absence of counsel is not a
valid excuse for non-compliance with the rules. As
aptly observed by the CA, Zeñarosa cannot feign
ignorance of the law, considering that he was able
to post a partial bond and ask for a reduction of the
appeal bond.
At any rate, petitioners did not advance any reason
for the alleged absence of counsel except that they
were simply abandoned. Neither did petitioners
explain why they failed to procure a new counsel to
properly assist them in filing the appeal. Moreover,
the partial bond posted was not reasonable.
In the case of McBurnie v. Ganzon, 719 Phil. 680,
713-714 (2013), the Court has set a provisional
percentage of 10 percent of the monetary award
(exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees) as
reasonable amount of bond that an appellant
should post pending resolution by the NLRC of a
motion for a bond’s reduction. Only after the
posting of this required percentage shall an
appellant’s period to perfect an appeal be
suspended. Applying this parameter, the
P15,000.00 partial bond posted by petitioners is not
considered reasonable in relation to the total
monetary award of P197,936.27. (Del Castillo, J.,
SC 1st Division, Turks Shawarma Company/Gem
Zeñarosa vs. Feliciano Z. Pajaron and Larry A.
Carbonilla, G.R. No. 207156, January 16, 2017).
DUTCH MOVERS, INC. v. LEQUIN
DUTCH MOVERS, INC. ET AL VS EDILBERTO include petitioners as its directors or officers; and
LEQUIN, ET AL those named directors and officers were persons
unknown to them. They likewise claimed that per
G.R No. 210032
inquiry with the SEC and the DOLE, they learned
April 25, 2017 that DMI did not file any notice of business closure;
and the creation and operation of DMI was
attended with fraud making it convenient for
petitioners to evade their legal obligations to them.
Respondents prayed that petitioners, and the
FACTS: officers named in DMI’s AOI, which included Edgar
Smith and Millicent Smith be impleaded and be
held solidarily liable with DMI in paying the
This case is an offshoot of the illegal dismissal judgment awards.
Complaint filed by Edilberto Lequin (Lequin),
Christopher Salvador, Reynaldo Singsing, and
Raffy Mascardo (respondents) against Dutch
Movers, Inc. (DMI), and/or spouses Cesar Lee and
Yolanda Lee (petitioners), its alleged ISSUE:
President/Owner, and Manager respectively. Whether or not petitioners should be held solidarily
Respondents stated that DMI, employed Lequin as liable for the judgement award?
truck and the rest of respondents as helpers. Cesar
Lee, through the Supervisor Nazario Furio, Whether or not there is legal basis to pierce the veil
informed them that DMI would cease its hauling of corporate fiction of Dutch Movers, Inc?
operation for no reason; as such, they requested
DMI to issue a formal notice regarding the matter
but to no avail. Later, upon respondents' request,
the DOLE NCR issued a certification revealing that
RULINGS:
DMI did not file any notice of business closure.
Thus, respondents argued that they were illegally
dismissed as their termination was without cause
and only on the pretext of closure. Applying the cases of Valderrama v. National Labor
Relations Commission, and David v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that the principle of
immutability of judgment, or the rule that once a
Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of cause
judgment has become final and executory, the
of action. NLRC reversed and set aside the LA
same can no longer be altered or modified and the
decision and ruled that respondents were illegally
court's duty is only to order its execution, is not
dismissed because DMI simply placed them on
absolute. One of its exceptions is when there is a
standby, and no longer provide them with work
supervening event occurring after the judgment
which said decision become final and executory.
becomes final and executory, which renders the
decision unenforceable. Supervening events
transpired in this case after the NLRC Decision
Respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Execution.
became final and executory, which rendered its
Pending resolution of the motions, respondents
execution impossible and unjust. Like in
filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implead stating
Valderrama, during the execution stage, ceased its
that upon investigation, they discovered that DMI
operation, and the same did not file any formal
no longer operates. They, nonetheless, insisted
notice regarding it. Added to this, in their
that petitioners who managed and operated DMI,
Opposition to the Motion to Implead, spouses Smith
and consistently represented to respondents that
revealed that they only lent their names to
they were the owners of DMI continue to work at
petitioners, and they were included as incorporators
Toyota Alabang, which they (petitioners) also own
just to assist the latter in forming DMI; after such
and operate. They further averred that the Articles
undertaking, spouses Smith immediately
of Incorporation (AOI) of DMI ironically did not
transferred their rights in DMI to petitioners, which
proved that petitioners were the ones in control of
DMI, and used the same in furthering their business
interests.
The Court is not unmindful of the basic tenet that a
corporation has a separate and distinct personality
from its stockholders, and from other corporations it
may be connected with. However, such personality
may be disregarded, or the veil of corporate fiction
may be pierced attaching personal liability against
responsible person if the corporation's personality
"is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud or defend crime, or is used as a
device to defeat the labor laws x x x. Here, the veil
of corporate fiction must be pierced and
accordingly, petitioners should be held personally
liable for judgment awards because the peculiarity
of the situation shows that they controlled DMI; they
actively participated in its operation such that DMI
existed not as a separate entities but only as
business conduit of petitioners.
7K CORP VS ALBARICO
FACTS:
When Albarico was terminated due to alleged poor  nt signed by the parties, the Court ruled that the vol
performance, he subsequently submitted his money  untary arbitrator rightly assumed jurisdiction to deci
claims against petitioner for arbitration before the N
CMB. The issue for voluntary arbitration before the 
NCMB, according to the parties’ Submission Agree
ment was whether respondent Albarico was entitled  Consequently, we also rule that the voluntary arbitr
to the payment of separation pay and the sales co
mmission reserved for him by the corporation. Then  dismissal, even though the issue of entitlement ther
the NCMB VA rendered a decision finding the corp
oration liable for illegal dismissal
Petitioner corporation appealed to the CA. It assert
ed that under Article 262 of the Labor Code, the juri
sdiction of a voluntary arbitrator is strictly limited to t
he issues that the parties agree to submit. Thus, it c
ontends that the voluntary arbitrator exceeded his j
urisdiction when he resolved the issues of the legali
ty of the dismissal of respondent and the latter’s ent
itlement to backwages on the basis of a finding of ill
egal dismissal.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not Voluntary arbitrator properly assum
ed jurisdiction to decide the issue of the legality of t
he dismissal of respondent as well as the latter’s en
titlement to backwages, even if neither the legality n
or the entitlement was expressedly claimed in the S
ubmission Agreement of the parties.
 
 
RULING:
Yes. There has to be a reason for deciding the issu
e of respondent’s entitlement to separation pay. To 
think otherwise would lead to absurdity, because th
e voluntary arbitrator would then be deciding that is
sue in a vacuum. The arbitrator would have no basi
s whatsoever for saying that Albarico was entitled t
o separation pay or not if the issue of the legality of 
respondent’s dismissal was not resolve first.
Having established that the issue of the legality of d
ismissal of Albarico was in fact necessarily – albeit 
not explicitly – included in the Submission Agreeme
de the said issue.
ator may award backwages upon a finding of illegal 
eto is not explicitly claimed in the Submission Agre
ement. Backwages, in general, are awarded on the 
ground of equity as a form of relief that restores the 
income lost by the terminated employee by reason 
of his illegal dismissal.
There is no indication that the issue of illegal dismis
sal should be treated as a two-tiered issue whereup
on entitlement to backwages must be determined s
eparately. Besides, “since arbitration is a final resor
t for the adjudication of disputes,” the voluntary arbi
trator in the present case can assume that he has t
he necessary power to make a final settlement.

Baronda v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 161006
October 14, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner who was employed by HIDECO as a mud
press truck driver was dismissed allegedly for
negligence after the company conducted
investigation. Petitioner, along with another
employee also dismissed by HIDECO, filed in the
Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board in Tacloban City
a complaint for illegal dismissal against HIDECO.
Voluntary Arbitrator rendered in his decision on
January 13, 1999 by finding the petitioner's
dismissal illegal, and ordering his reinstatement.
HIDECO filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
Voluntary Arbitrator denied the motion on August
11, 2000.  Accepting the outcome, HIDECO
reinstated the petitioner on September 29, 2000.
Petitioner filed motion for execution praying that he
is entitled backwages and other benefits from
January 16, 1999 up to September 28, 2000.
Voluntary Arbitrator granted the petitioner's second
motion for execution.
ISSUE:
WON VA’s order of reinstatement was immediately
executory.
HELD:
We answer the query in the affirmative.
Although the timely filing of a motion for
reconsideration or of an appeal forestalls the
finality of the decision or award of the Voluntary
Arbitrator, 33 the reinstatement aspect of the
Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or award remains
executory regardless of the filing of such motion
for reconsideration or appeal.
The immediate reinstatement of the
employee pending the appeal has been
introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No.
6715, which amended Article 223 of the Labor
Code, to wit:
SEC. 12. Article 223 of
the same code is amended to
read as follows:
Art. 223. Appeal. —
xxx xxx xxx
In any event, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter
reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee, in so far
as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned, shall immediately
be executory, even pending
appeal. The employee shall
either be admitted back to work
under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely
reinstated in the payroll. The
posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement
provided herein. (bold
underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
We also see no reason to obstruct the
reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary Arbitrator,
or to treat it any less than the reinstatement that is
ordered by the Labor Arbiter. Voluntary arbitration
really takes precedence over other dispute
settlement devices. Such primacy of voluntary
arbitration is mandated by no less than the
Philippine Constitution, and is ingrained as a policy
objective of our labor relations law. The
reinstatement order by the Voluntary Arbitrator
should have the same authority, force and effect as
that of the reinstatement order by the Labor Arbiter
not only to encourage parties to settle their disputes
through this mode, but also, and more importantly,
to enforce the constitutional mandate to protect
labor, to provide security of tenure, and to enhance
social justice.
The
2001 Procedural Guidelines in the
Execution of Voluntary Arbitration
Awards/Decisions (Guidelines),
albeit not explicitly discussing the
executory nature of the
reinstatement order, seems to align
with the Court's stance by punishing
the noncompliance by a party of the
decision or order for reinstatement.
Section 2, Rule III of the Guidelines
states:
 Sec. 2. Issuance, Form
and Contents of a Writ of
Execution. —
xxx xxx xxx
b) If the execution be for
the reinstatement of any person
to any position, office or
employment, such writ shall be
served by the sheriff upon the
losing party or in case of death
of the losing party upon his
successor-in-interest, executor
or administrator and such party
or person may be punished for
contempt if he disobeys such
decision or order for
reinstatement. (bold
underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
The 2005 NCMB Revised
Procedural Guidelines in the
Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration
Proceedings also supports this
Court's position, for Section 6 of its
Rule VIII reads:
Sec. 6. Effect of Filing of
Petition for Certiorari on
Execution. — The filing of a
petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court shall not stay the
execution of the assailed
decision unless a temporary
restraining order or injunction is
issued by the Court of Appeals
or the Supreme Court pending
resolution of such petition.
(Emphasis Ours)
We declare, therefore, that the
reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary Arbitrator
was immediately executory upon the receipt of the
award or decision by the parties.
Bernardo B. Pacios, et al., Petitioner, vs.
Tahanang Walang Hagdanan and Sister
Valeriana Baerts, ICM. Respondents. GR No.
229579, November 14, 2018
FACTS:
Tahanang Walang Hagdanan (Tahanan) is
a private organization engaged in the business of
producing and marketing various handicrafts,
utilizing employees who are mostly physically
disabled, without one or both limbs. Respondent
Sister Valeriana Baerts (Baerts) is a nun who
recruited Bernardo B Pacios, Marilou T. Abedes,
Alexis L. Elinon, Armando V. Absedes, Gina P.
Ariate, Vivencia N. Buela, Hermenigilfo E. Cansino
and several others more (collectively called
workers) to work for Tahanan. They were
dismissed last June 11, 2012.
The workers filed an amended complaint for
illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary, non-
payment of 13th month pay, service incentive leave,
separation pay, retirement benefits, with claims for
moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees against Tahanan, Pangarap
Sheltered Home for Disabled People, Inc.
(Pangarap), Venus Amoncio (Amoncio) and Baerts,
Labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
the workers, and ordered that Tahanang Walang
Hagdanan, Pangarap, Amoncio, and Baerts pay
them P16,629,163.63.
Tahanan, Pangarap, Amoncio and Baerts
appealed before the NLRC but was denied due to
non-compliance to the payment of the appeal bond
in the amount of P40,000.00. Their Motion for
Reconsideration plus surety bond in the amount of
P1,622,916.37 as Supersedeas Bond was also
denied by the NLRC. Thus, Tahanan, Pangarap,
Amoncio and Baerts filed a Petition for certiorari.
CA reversed the NLRC’s decision on
dismissing the Appeal based on the non-perfection
of said appeal for the lacking cash bond. The
petitioner’s appeal was reinstated. Meanwhile, the
Labor Arbiter issued a writ of Execution on March
30, 2015 to implement the Labor Arbiter’s October
24, 2013 Decision awarding P16,629,163.63 to the
workers. Thus, the cash bond of P40,000.00 was
released to them. Thereafter they filed a Motion to
Release the Supersedeas Bond but was opposed
by Tahanan, Walang Hagdanan, Pangarap,
Amoncio and Baerts because the CA Decision
dated April 27, 2015 reinstating their appeal before
the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter issued a Resolution
suspending the resolution of the workers’ Motion to
Release the Supersedeas Bond, as well as all
subsequent motions seeking its immediate release.
In view thereof, the workers assailed the
refusal of the labor Arbiter to the NLRC but fell on
deaf ears.
 As a result, the workers filed a motion for
mandamus before the CA which was denied by the
CA citing the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, Tule
XI, Section 17 which states that:
“Sec 17. Effect of Reversal
During Execution Proceedings. – In
case of total or partial reversal of
judgment by the CA, the execution
proceedings shall be suspended
insofar as the reversal is concerned
notwithstanding the pendency of a
motion for reconsideration on such
judgment.
However, where the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed by the Supreme Court,
execution proceedings shall
commence upon presentation of
certified true copy of the decision
and entry of judgment.”
Workers filed their Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by CA.
The workers then filed their Petition for
Certiorari before the SC. They claimed that it was a
purely ministerial act or duty of the NLRC to order
the release of the supersedes bond to them citing
NLRC Rule XI, Section 4 which provides:
“Section 4 – Effect of Petition
for Certiorari on Execution – A
petition for certiorari with the CA or
the SC shall not stay the execution
of the assailed decision unless a
restraining order is issued by said
courts.”
Workers pointed out that the CA did not
include any restraining order in its Decision dated
April 27, 2015. Thus, the execution proceedings of
the labor arbiters October 24, 2013 Decision should
have continued.
Petitioners claim that there is conflict
between sections 4 and 17 of Rule XI of the NLRC
Rules, and that CA gave undue and preferential
application to Section 17. At the very least the CA
should have reconciled the two (2) provisions in
accordance with the tenet that full protection should
be accorded tp the labor sector. Thus, the Court of
Appeals should have applied Section 4 over
Section 17.
ISSUE:
The sole issue for this Court’s resolution is
whether or not the CA erred in affirming the
suspension of the execution proceedings.
HELD:
Petition is granted.
Although the CA affirms the suspension of
the execution was incomplete. The CA pointed out
that RULE XI, Section 17 of the NLRC Rules
“explicitly mandates the suspension of the
execution proceedings in case of total or partial
reversal of judgment by the Court of Appeals. It
held that because its April 27, 2015 Decision
reversed the NLRC Feb 25, 2014 Resolution,
suspension of the execution was mandated under
the rules however, CA failed to note that under the
Rules, the execution proceedings should be
suspended only “insofar as the reversal is
concerned.” This omission leads to an incorrect
reading of the rule and suggests that any reversal
on appeal leads to the automatic suspension of
execution of the appealed decision. When used as
basis for suspending execution, the rule requires an
extra step, namely, the determination of what part
of the execution is affected by the reversal. Based
on Section 3. Effect of Perfection of Appeal on
Execution – The perfection of an appeal shall stay
the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter
except execution for reinstatement pending appeal.
Under this provision, the perfection of an appeal
stays the execution of a Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Thus, for clarity, the CA should have explained that
because its April 27, 2015 Decision deemed
respondents' appeal before the National Labor
Relations Commission as reinstated, the execution
of the Labor Arbiter's October 24, 2013 Decision
was stayed under Rule XI, Section 3 of the National
Labor Relations Commission Rules of Procedure.
However, despite the applicability of Rule XI,
Section 3 of the National Labor Relations
Commission Rules to the factual circumstances
before the Court of Appeals as of its assailed July
22, 2016 Decision and January 23, 2017
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 142199, the Petition
must be granted.
This Motion for Reconsideration is the only
procedural incident preventing the execution of the
Labor Arbiter's October 24, 2013 Decision as it has
stalled the complete resolution of the reinstated
appeal before the National Labor Relations
Commission.
 However, execution may be authorized
even pending appeal. In Aris (Phil.), Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, this Court explained
the reasons for authorizing execution of decisions
reinstating dismissed employees in labor cases
pending appeal:

Before its amendment by Section 12 of R.A.

No. 6716, Article 223 of the Labor Code already
allowed execution of decisions of the NLRC
pending their appeal to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.

In authorizing execution pending appeal of

the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor
Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, the law itself has laid down a
compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies
and enhances the provisions of the 1987
Constitution on labor and the workingman. These
duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed
not so much to express sympathy for the
workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully
underscore labor as a primary social and economic
force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms
with equal intensity. Labor is an indispensable
partner for the nation's progress and stability.

This Court finds that the principles allowing

execution pending appeal invoked in Aris are
equally applicable here as petitioners are poor
employees, deprived of their only source of
livelihood for years and reduced to begging on the
streets. In view of their dire straits and since the
National Labor Relations Commission has already
ruled twice on the case in a way that supports the
release of the supersedeas bond, it is proper to
continue with execution proceedings in this case
despite a pending motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals July 22, 2016 Decision and
January 23, 2017 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
142199 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
National Labor Relations Commission's cashier
is DIRECTED to RELEASE to petitioners the
amount deposited by respondents as supersedeas
bond. The Labor Arbiter is DIRECTED to
immediately CONTINUE the execution proceedings
in the case before him, and to ensure the speedy
implementation of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.