1

People v. Peña
G.R. No. 133964
February 13, 2002

Facts

1. Ramil Peña was charged with murder.

2. In the early morning of December 8, 1995, Peña hired Jimbo Pelagio, a tricycle driver to take him to Paco,
Obando, Bulacan. At the destination, he ordered Pelagio to get off the tricycle.
3. Then, Peña robbed Pelagio of his money and repeatedly struck him on the head with a gun. Pelagio fell on
the ground unconscious. Peña shot him on the head and fled on board his tricycle.
4. That same morning, SPO1 Froilan Bautista got a call from the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital stating
that a man had been shot on the head and was in their hospital. SPO1 Bautista and SPO1 Jose Sta. Ana
rushed to the hospital and found the still conscious Pelagio lying on a stretcher.
5. SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio where the latter related how Peña inflicted his injuries on
him, which he took down on two sheets of yellow paper. (N.B. Read the statement or declaration made by
Pelagio taken by SPO1 Bautista at the last page)
6. On February 6, 1996, Jimbo Pelagio expired.
7. For his part, Peña claimed that he was in San Isidro, San Luis, Pampanga together with his wife on the
date of the incident. Peña’s testimony was corroborated by his uncle Maximiano Guevarra, the owner of
the house where he stayed.
8. The trial court found Peña guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Hence, the Appeal.
9. Peña next claims that the evidence relied upon by the trial court is hearsay and inadmissible. He argues
that said evidence does not constitute res gestae.

Issue
Whether the statement of the victim Jimbo Pelagio as well as the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the
victim’s declaration can be considered as part of the res gestae, hence, an exception to the hearsay rule.

Ruling

(A) Dying Declaration

1. The requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations are: (1) at the time the declaration was made,
death was imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause
and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to facts which the victim was
competent to testify to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the declaration is offered in a criminal
case wherein the declarant’s death is the subject of the inquiry.
2. The first element is lacking. It was not established with certainty whether Pelagio uttered his statement
with consciousness of his impending death. While he was in pain when he made his statement, he
expressly stated that Peña only pistol-whipped him and almost shot him.
 3. The crucial factor to consider is the contemporaneity of the moment when the statement was made and
the moment of the realization of death. The time the statement was being made must also be the time the
victim was aware that he was dying.

(B) Res Gestae

4. While it may not qualify as a dying declaration, Pelagio’s statement may nonetheless be admitted in
evidence as part of the res gestae.
5. A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when
(1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and
its immediately attending circumstances.
6. Pelagio’s declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made shortly after a startling
occurrence and under the influence thereof. Under the circumstances, the victim evidently had no
opportunity to contrive his statement beforehand.
7. In People v. Hernandez, the infliction on a person of a gunshot wound on a vital part of the body should
qualify by any standard as a startling occurrence.
8. In this case, it is clear that the pistol-whipping and the gunshot on the head of Pelagio qualified as a
startling occurrence. Notably, Pelagio constantly complained of pain in his head while his statement was
being taken by SPO1 Bautista, so much so that there was no opportunity for him to be able to devise or
contrive anything other than what really happened.

(C) Testimonies or Written Statements of the Prosecution Witnesses

9. As to the testimonies or the written statements of the three prosecution witnesses which were taken into
consideration by the trial court as part of the res gestae, even if there were intervening periods between
the time the victim gave his account of the incident to the prosecution witnesses and the time the latter
first disclosed what the victim told them, the same will not affect the admissibility of the victim’s
declaration or statement as part of res gestae since it is sufficient that such declaration or statement was
made by the victim before he had time to contrive or devise a falsehood.
10. As stated by the trial court found, the straightforward and consistent testimonies of the three vital
prosecution witnesses bear the earmarks of credibility. Further, there exists no ill motive on their part to
prevaricate, hence their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

(D) Murder or Homicide

11. However, this Court cannot agree with the trial court that the crime should be murder. While evident
premeditation and treachery were alleged in the information, the trial court did not state why the killing
was qualified to murder. The prosecution failed to establish the attendance of the qualifying
circumstances with concrete proof. The crime proved was only homicide.
12. Aside from the sentence, Peña was also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity in view of prevailing jurisprudence and P26,000.00 as actual damages as supported by
receipts.
 *******************************************************************
The statement or declaration made by Pelagio, taken by SPO1 Bautista, reads:

T: Alam mo ba ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa Valenzuela Emergency T: Dati mo bang kilala si Ramil Peña?
Hospital at kinukunan ka ng salaysay? S: Opo.
S: Opo, dahil pinagpapalo po ako ng baril ni RAMIL PEÑA sa ulo at kinuha T: Ano ba ang tatak ng tricycle mo?
and tricycle kong minamaneho. S: Yamaha RS-100, kulay itim.
T: Taga saan itong si Ramil Peña? T: Sino and may-ari ng tricycle?
S: Sa Dulong Tangke, Valenzuela, (Malinta), M.M. S: Si Rey Dagul.
T: Saan, kailan at anong oras nangyari ito? T: Binaril ka ba ni Ramil?
S: Sa Paco, Obando, Bulacan, kaninang ika-8 ng Disyembre 1995 sa ganap S: Muntik na ho.
na ika-4:15 ng umaga. T: Bakit sa iyo ginawa ni Ramil and bagay na ito?
T: Sakay mo ba itong si Ramil Peña? S: Ewan ko ho.
S: Oho, sumakay sa may gasolinahan ng Petron sa Malinta, Valenzuela, M.M.

People v. Bernabe Palanas

GR No. 214453
June 17, 2015

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

A criminal complaint was filed against Palanas before the RTC of Pasig

FACTS:
6:40 in the morning on Block 14, Kenneth St. corner Eusebio Ave. Pasig City. SP02 Ramon Borre (SP02
Borre) brought his 5 month old grandson outside his residence. P03 Leopoldo Zapanta (P03 Zapanta) while was
watching TV in Borre’s house, as he had slept over, he heard 4 successive gunshots and saw 2 men armed with .38
caliber revolvers standing a meter away from Borre. He saw Bernabe Palanas (Palanas) but could not identify the
other shooter. Zapanta and Borre’s stepson Ramil Ranola (Ranola) brought Borre to the Pasig City General Hospital.
On the way, Borre told Ranola and Zapanta that it was “Abe/ Aspog/ Abe Palanas” who shot him. This was repeated to
his wife Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion). 11:00 that day, Borred died in the hospital due to the gunshot wounds.

During the trial, Planas used the defese of alibi and alleged that on the day of the incident he was in Paranaque
city attending his sick father, and attended a baptism in Tondo, whereafter he then went back to his father to
Paranaque. Upon returning to his home in the evening it was only then he knew of such incident due to him being
accused by Resureccion of being the murderer of Borre.

RTC declared that Planas was guity beyond reasonable doubt stating that Borre’s statement was res gestae and
due to positive identification by Zapanta. RTC gave no credence to Palana’s alibi as Paranaque and Pasig could be
travelled to in 1hr. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and considered the statement of Borre as a dying
declaration.

ISSUE:
Whether the statement of Borre was a dying declaration

HELD:
YES. The CA is also correct in admitting SPO2 Borre’s statements on his way to the hospital as evidence, both
as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.

For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4) conditions must
concur:
 (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;
(b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his impending death;
(c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
(d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the
victim.

On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus, constitute another
exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre’s statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the
cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it may be
reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death was already imminent. This
declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of
his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Verily, because the declaration was made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and
awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.

In the same vein, SPO2 Borre’s statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. “Res gestae
refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character
and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.”

In this case, SPO2 Borre’s statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot by Palanas and his
companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants.
Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such
statement is relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2
Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
People v. Bernabe Palanas
GR No. 214453
June 17, 2015

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

A criminal complaint was filed against Palanas before the RTC of Pasig

FACTS:
6:40 in the morning on Block 14, Kenneth St. corner Eusebio Ave. Pasig City. SP02 Ramon Borre (SP02
Borre) brought his 5 month old grandson outside his residence. P03 Leopoldo Zapanta (P03 Zapanta) while was
watching TV in Borre’s house, as he had slept over, he heard 4 successive gunshots and saw 2 men armed with .38
caliber revolvers standing a meter away from Borre. He saw Bernabe Palanas (Palanas) but could not identify the
other shooter. Zapanta and Borre’s stepson Ramil Ranola (Ranola) brought Borre to the Pasig City General Hospital.
On the way, Borre told Ranola and Zapanta that it was “Abe/ Aspog/ Abe Palanas” who shot him. This was repeated to
his wife Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion). 11:00 that day, Borred died in the hospital due to the gunshot wounds.

During the trial, Planas used the defese of alibi and alleged that on the day of the incident he was in Paranaque
city attending his sick father, and attended a baptism in Tondo, whereafter he then went back to his father to
Paranaque. Upon returning to his home in the evening it was only then he knew of such incident due to him being
accused by Resureccion of being the murderer of Borre.

RTC declared that Planas was guity beyond reasonable doubt stating that Borre’s statement was res gestae and
due to positive identification by Zapanta. RTC gave no credence to Palana’s alibi as Paranaque and Pasig could be
travelled to in 1hr. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and considered the statement of Borre as a dying
declaration.

ISSUE:
Whether the statement of Borre was a dying declaration

HELD:
YES. The CA is also correct in admitting SPO2 Borre’s statements on his way to the hospital as evidence, both
as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.

For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4) conditions must
concur:

(a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;
(b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his impending death;
(c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
(d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the
victim.

On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus, constitute another
exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
 (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre’s statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the
cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it may be
reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death was already imminent. This
declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of
his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Verily, because the declaration was made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and
awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.

In the same vein, SPO2 Borre’s statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. “Res gestae
refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character
and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.”

In this case, SPO2 Borre’s statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot by Palanas and his
companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants.
Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such
statement is relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2
Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
 SPOUSES PAMPLONA vs. SPOUSES CUETO
G.R. No. 204735, February 19, 2018
THIRD DIVISION | BERSAMIN, J.:
NATURE OF THE ACTION: Under review is the decision whereby the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision issued by the Regional Trial Court, dismissing the respondents' complaint and ordering the
petitioners instead to execute a deed of sale on the property in favor of the respondents upon the release of
the consigned amount.
FACTS: On 10 January 1989, plaintiff Lilia and defendants mutually agreed that the former would buy and
the latter would sell on installment, the aforementioned immovable including the house standing thereon for
the total sum of US$25,000.00 payable on a monthly installment of US$300.00. The agreement was verbal
considering that Lilia and defendants are sisters and brother-in-law, respectively, and completely trusted each
other. However, a notebook with the personal inscription of defendant Bibiana was sent to Lilia at the latter's
address in Italy, affirming their oral agreement and wherein the list of all the remittances would be entered.
On even date, defendants voluntarily transferred the peaceful possession of the subject property to Lilia and
from the date of the agreement, the latter had remitted to the former her monthly instalments through
registered mail, with a total payment of US$14,000.00 to date, leaving a balance of US$11,000.00. Since
January 1989, Lilia allowed her son Rolando to reside at the subject property as Lilia had to leave for abroad
due to her employment in Italy. Since January 1989, Lilia through her son, has religiously paid the annual
realty taxes on the premises, including electric and water bills.
On 13 August 1997, defendants filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Batangas City, with
malicious intent and to the prejudice of plaintiffs' rights, a case for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3429  against plaintiffs son Rolando and his wife Liza. Being indigent, spouses Rolando and Liza failed
to defend themselves resulting in a judgment by default and they were finally evicted in January 1998. Lilia
learned of the eviction case in June 1998 when she returned home from Italy. She executed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim dated 15 June 1998, and registered the same with the land records of Batangas City.
ISSUE: Whether or not a contract to sell was partially executed
RULING: In our view, the existence of the partially executed contract to sell between Bibiana and Lilia was
sufficiently established.
It is uncontested that Lilia sent money to Bibiana. The latter did not deny her receipt of the money.
Moreover, the records showed that the parties further agreed for Vedasto and Roilan to occupy the property
during the period when Lilia was remitting money to Bibiana; and that Lilia immediately took steps to
protect her interests in the property once the petitioners started to deny the existence of the oral contract to
sell by annotating her adverse claim on the petitioners' title and instituting this action against the latter. We
concur with the CA's holding that the respondents adduced enough evidence to establish the existence of the
partially executed contract to sell between Lilia and Bibiana.
In Serrano v. Caguiat,12  the Court has explained:
A contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's
obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the
suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never
existed. The suspensive condition is commonly full payment of the purchase price.
The differences between a contract to sell and a contract of sale are well-settled in jurisprudence. As early as
1951, in Sing Yee v. Santos, we held that:
x x x [a] distinction must be made between a contract of sale in which title passes to the buyer upon delivery
of the thing sold and a contract to sell x x x where by agreement the ownership is reserved in the seller and is
not to pass until the full payment, of the purchase price is made. In the first case, non-payment of the price is
a negative resolutory condition; in the second case, full payment is a positive suspensive condition. Being
contraries, their effect in law cannot be identical. In the first case, the vendor has lost and cannot recover the
ownership of the land sold until and unless the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside. In the second
case, however, the title remains in the vendor if the vendee does not comply with the condition precedent of
making payment at the time specified in the contract.
In other words, in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass to the buyer until
full payment of the price. xxxx
The distinctions delineate why the admissions by Roilan and Vedasto were consistent with the existence of
the oral contract to sell between Lilia and Bibiana. Under the oral contract to sell, the ownership had yet to
pass to Lilia, and Bibiana retained ownership pending the full payment of the purchase price agreed upon.
The contentions of the petitioners are factually and legally unwarranted.

To start with, it was incumbent upon Bibiana to prove her allegation in the answer that the money sent to her
by Lilia was in payment of past debts. This conforms to the principle that each party must prove her
affirmative allegations.[11] Yet, the petitioners presented nothing to establish the allegation. They ought to be
reminded that allegations could not substitute for evidence. Without proof of the allegation, therefore, the
inference to be properly drawn from Bibiana's receipt of the sums of money was that the sums of money
were for the purchase of the property, as claimed by the respondents.

Secondly, the admissions by Roilan and Vedasto of the petitioners' ownership of the property could not be
appreciated in favor of the petitioners. That Bibiana and Lilia had entered into a contract to sell instead of a
contract of sale must be well-noted. The distinctions between these kinds of contracts are settled. In Serrano
v. Caguiat,[12]  the Court has explained:

A contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's
obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the
suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never
existed. The suspensive condition is commonly full payment of the purchase price.
the failure of Roilan to raise as a defense in the unlawful detainer suit against him the existence of the
contract to sell between Bibiana and Lilia could not be properly construed as an admission by silence on the
part of Lilia. It is basic that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another.[13] Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. As an exception to the rule, the act or declaration
made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing may be
admitted as evidence against a party who fails to refute or reject it. This is known as admission by silence,
and is covered by Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 32. Admission by silence. — An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or
observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence
against him.

For an act or declaration to be admissible against a party as an admission by silence, the following
requirements must be present, namely: (a) the party must have heard or observed the act or declaration of the
other person; (b) he must have had the opportunity to deny it; (c) he must have understood the act or
declaration; (d) he must have an interest to object as he would naturally have done if the act or declaration
was not true; (e) the facts are within his knowledge; and (f) the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn
from his silence is material to the issue.[14]

The first two requirements are lacking in the case of Lilia. She was not shown to have heard or seen the
admissions by Vedasto and Roilan that were in writing because she was then abroad. Also, she was not
shown to have had the opportunity to deny their written admissions simply because she was not a party to the
written admissions. The rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing only when the
party to be thereby bound was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. Without such mutual
correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that although the party would have immediately reacted had
the statements been orally made in his presence, such prompt response can generally not be expected if the  if
the party still has to resort to a written reply.
Dantis vs. Maghinay

FACTS:
* Petitioner Rogelio Dantis filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession against Respondent Julio Maghinang
Jr. Petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. According to
him, he acquired ownership of the property through a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of his deceased father, Emilio
Dantis. He had been paying the realty taxes on the said property but Julio, Jr. occupied and built a house on a portion of his
property without any right at al. Rogelio alleged that demands were made upon Julio, Jr. to vacate the premises but the same fell
on deaf ears and that the acts of Julio, Jr. had created a cloud of doubt over his title and right of possession of his property.

* In his Answer Julio, Jr. denied the material allegations of the complaint. By way of an affirmative defense, he claimed that he
was the actual owner said parcel of land. According to him, he had been in open and continuous possession of the property for
almost thirty (30) years; The land was sold by Rogelio’s father, Emilio, to his father, Julio Sr.

* Defendant presented the following evidence to prove the sale of land to his father:
1. Exhibit 3 – affidavit executed by Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of the Petitioner of the agreement to sell such land
 2. Exhibit 4 – an undated handwritten receipt evidencing down payment for said lot

* But defendant admitted that the affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor, Emilio Dantis, the father of petitioner. Also, he
admitted that the receipt he presented was admittedly a mere photocopy.

* RTC ruled that even if these documents were adjudged as competent evidence, still, they would only serve as proofs that the
purchase price for the subject lot had not yet been completely paid and, hence, Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver the
property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a mere possessor by tolerance. It therefore declared that petitioner is the true
and lawful owner of the aforementioned real property; and ordered defendant and all persons claiming under him to peacefully
vacate the said real property and surrender the possession thereof to Rogelio or latter’s successors-in-interest.

* CA ruled in favor of respondent. It stated that the partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with the delivery of the res,
gave efficacy to the oral sale and brought it outside the operation of the statute of frauds. Finally, the court declared that the
respondent had an equitable claim over the subject lot which imposed on the petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the affidavit and photocopy of the receipt submitted by the defendant are adequate proofs that there is a perfected
contract of sale between Emilio and Julio, Sr.

RULING: NO.

To begin with, Exhibit "3," the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary weight.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness
by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of cross-
examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of oath.

Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. The
sworn statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio.
Accordingly, Exhibit "3" must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot be
deemed a declaration against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule because the
declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio).

Exhibit "4," on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be
admitted to prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence rule requires that the highest
available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the
production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3.

A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

In the case, Defendant failed to prove the due execution of the original of Exhibit "4" as well as its subsequent loss. Also, his
testimony was riddled with improbabilities and contradictions which raise doubt on the veracity of his evidence.  When asked
where the original was, Defendant’s testimony gave the impression that the original of the document was lost while it was in the
possession of his parents. During cross-examination, however, he testified that it was lost while it was in his possession. Further,
Exhibit 4 would not be an adequate proof of the existence of the alleged oral contract of sale because it failed to provide a
description of the subject lot, including its metes and bounds, as well as its full price or consideration.