November 2010

FOOD
SECURITY:
A GLOBAL
CHALLENGE

Bernard Bachelier
www.fondapol.org
 FOOD SECURITY:
A GLOBAL CHALLENGE

Bernard Bachelier
 The Fondation pour l’innovation politique
is a liberal, progressive and European Think tank

President: Nicolas Bazire

Vice-president: Charles Beigbeder

Chief Executive Officer: Dominique Reynié

dominique.reynie@fondapol.org
 FOOD SECURITY:
A GLOBAL CHALLENGE

Bernard Bachelier
Director of the Foundation for World Agriculture and Rural Life (FARM)

The food crisis which struck the world in 2008 brought back the agri-
cultural issue as one of the international community’s top priorities. It
is obvious that new food shortages may occur. Hunger is not declining
as had been hoped. Since spring 2008, all global conferences have been
devoting one item on their agenda to food security and pledged new
funding. However, those statements did not translate into action. Public
opinion is finding it hard to understand what is going on and to distin-
guish between what is intended for media impact and what will initiate
real action.

In November, France began chairing the G8 and the G20 for a

year. Food security will be on the Summit’s agenda, but will consist
of a technical follow-up to experts’ findings on the issue. The French
Presidency intends to exert its political influence on market regulation.
As announced by Nicolas Sarkozy, it is preparing a G20 initiative on
agricultural prices. The President of the French Republic has designated
regulation of the agricultural commodities markets as one of the French
presidency’s four top priorities. This objective will give rise to a meeting
of the G20 ministers in charge of agriculture – a first in a world domi-
nated by finance.

5
 This emphasis on prices is certainly understandable. In fact, it was
their sudden rise which triggered the food crisis. Yet this was just a
symptom of a far deeper problem, like a fever signalling an illness. The
main cause of the planet’s food imbalance is the decline in investments
in agriculture, particularly subsistence farming in poor countries. If the
problem is to be thoroughly dealt with, new agricultural policies need
to be formulated which are endowed with adequate funding to ensure
their implementation. Controlling price volatility will not suffice to give
farmers in developing countries the means to expand and stabilise the
production levels needed to ensure their fellow citizens’ food security.

At a time when the international community is gathering to readdress

these issues, a review of the facts will make it possible to better grasp
what is at stake.
| political innovation

The food crisis has revealed the impact

of disinvestment in agriculture

The 2008 food crisis revealed to the media, and through the latter to the
public, the lack of interest which had been plaguing agriculture for many
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years. This situation had long worried experts. As early as in 2006, the
World Bank had decided to devote its 2008 World Development Report
to the agricultural issue. This decision had been made before the crisis.
The Report was completed in spring 2007 and released in November
2007, yet it was the food riots which, in late 2007, and to a greater
extent in spring 2008, put an end to media indifference. These riots,
which struck dozens of cities in poor countries, were caused by soaring
prices there, particularly those of wheat, rice, and grain. The price of
rice tripled in the first three months of 2008. This price hike was due as
much to cyclical, as to structural, factors.

Cyclical causes: Drought and overheating markets

Among the cyclical causes, the most important was climate phenomena
which translated into a succession of poor crops in Australia and in
Eastern Europe. Drought, however, did not account for it all. The finan-
cial markets amplified the phenomenon’s effects. In fact, early 2008
marked the first phase of a credit crisis resulting from a distrust of the

6
financial markets and increased prices for all commodities. Freed from
the financial markets, some liquidities were used to speculate on agricul-
tural markets. There was also what may be called a “State speculation”
resulting from the ban on exports agreed upon unilaterally by some
countries. This was the case for the rice market, whose movements were
amplified by the closing of the borders of India, Thailand and Vietnam
– the leading suppliers of Sub-Saharan Africa.

The third cause often cited as having caused the 2008 food crisis is the
biofuel production. Some EU citizens have objected to their increased use
and accused them of diverting production from its food-related purpose
and of inflating prices: “Eat or drive, you have to choose” proclaimed
certain media outlets. In reality, the 2009 price drop showed that the
production of biofuels had no real impact on prices. Only three eco-
nomic entities pursue a deliberate biofuel policy: Brazil, which produces
them from sugar cane; the United States, which primarily uses corn; and

Food security: a global challenge

the European Union, which is banking on sugar beets and oilseed crops.
The European Union has set a target of a 10% biofuel integration into
all fuels used for transports by 2020. The United States, on the other
hand, wants to quadruple its production by 2022. Brazil’s petrol already
contains 20 to 25% ethanol. These are still moderate objectives. Biofuel
production currently occupies 2% of the world’s farmland. This figure
will rise to 4% by 2050, according to the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Analyses have shown that most of the transmission of prices from

biofuel crops to foodstuffs came from American corn, which is also a
staple diet in Latin America. The quantity of American corn used for
biofuels doubled between 2005 and 2007, increasing from 40 to 80 mil-
lion tonnes. Yet the role of corn-based biofuel itself needs to be consi-
dered in context, because the quantities destined for animal feed and
human consumption have remained steady. At any rate, blaming bio-
fuels equates to using the wrong target. Their consumption is steady and
rising in a progressive and scheduled manner; not only does it not foster
volatility, it actually counteracts it. Moreover, Europe and the United
States have retained the necessary agricultural potential to meet market
needs, even if, ultimately, the world will certainly not be able to subsist
on their surplus stocks.

7
 Structural causes: Declining investments and levelling-off of yields
There are also structural causes. In 2007, world grain stocks were excep-
tionally low, a situation which was not due to crop failures alone. It was
the outcome of agricultural policies pursued for the previous twenty
some years – the product of disinvestment in agriculture. Rich countries
no doubt continued to sustain their agriculture through massive public
transfers. The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy’s budget
was thus preserved until 2013 by the agreement entered into by Jacques
Chirac and then-Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schröder, while the
United States opted for a new 2008 Farm Bill which maintained budge-
tary aid for U.S. agriculture. Agricultural policies have nonetheless been
undergoing major changes which have had significant consequences.
They have helped to eliminate stocks by regulating production through
the fallowing of farmland. Under normal circumstances, that has the
| political innovation

advantage of preventing market imbalances by selling surpluses at a dis-

count. In the absence of reference stocks, however, trade no longer has
an alert mechanism and cannot react quickly in the event of a crisis.

The policy having the most devastating impact remains the slowdown
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in yield growth. On a global scale, grain yields from 1960 to 2000

increased by 2.5% per year, thereby multiplying production by 2.6. Since
the early 2000s, productivity gains have been sluggish, levelling off, on
average, at 1% per year. There are several reasons for this phenomenon.
First, developed countries – particularly Europe – have focused their
attention on environmental protection, thereby rejecting farm intensifi-
cation and condemning productivism, which came to be viewed as the
source of all evils and pollutions. They have forgotten that it was thanks
to increased yields realised through improved techniques that their food
production had become so cheap and safer for consumers.

This levelling of yields does not just concern Europe. It can be

imputed to the drastic decline in public funds devoted to agriculture
and agricultural research, as stated in the World Bank’s 2008 report. In
2006, the share of public aid allocated to agriculture dropped to 4%,
even though it had reached almost 20% in the late 1970s. Sub-Saharan
African countries devote no more than 4% of their national budgets to
agriculture.

8
Flawed economic policies
This shrinking of agriculture’s share in the public budgets is a conse-
quence of the structural adjustment policies imposed by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to grant debt reductions. Under its
influence, the public funding of agriculture, as well as that of agricul-
tural public services, were dismantled and have become victims of eco-
nomic reforms. Like any other economic activity, agriculture still cannot
be funded by the private sector alone. While such a scenario could be
envisaged in countries with capital such as Brazil, the disengagement of
the public sector would paralyse poor countries’ food production. Low
profitability, climate risk, economic uncertainties, production fragmen-
tation and the lack of land legislation can only dissuade investors.

Furthermore, the prevailing doctrines favour the lowest possible

consumer prices and to reach that goal, the easiest option is to resort
to cheap imports. However, international market prices have been both

Food security: a global challenge

stable and low for more than two decades. Cheap imported wheat, rice
and milk satisfy urban consumers; governments, for whom they ensure
social peace; importers, which often have close ties to political leaders;
and international financiers, since they limit national budget charges.
Essentially, nearly everyone but farmers has reasons to be content.
Indeed, these strategies are ruining local farming, dissuading investors
and preventing the creation of national trading channels. This harmful
balance functions as long as world prices are low. If prices rise suddenly,
the system explodes and urban trade cannot call upon local producers
who, cut off from the markets and access to credit, cannot take advan-
tage of these opportunities.

It is this approach which the food crisis has called into question. It
temporarily disrupted it because the exporting countries’ abundant pro-
duction in 2009 made it possible to promptly return to lower prices, but
it also sounded an alarm. Yet not everyone seems to be conscious of the
risks which may adversely affect the planet’s food security if nothing
changes.

9
 Increasing malnutrition poses a challenge to farm policies

In 2008, malnutrition soared higher. What is meant by “malnutrition”?

According to the definition adopted by the FAO at the 1996 World
Food Summit, “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have
[…] access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food […] for an active and
healthy life.” This definition is based upon four pillars:

- physical availability of food which relies on agricultural production

and trade: supply;

- physical – and above all economic – access, which relies upon the indi-
viduals’ ability to obtain food and therefore upon the relations between
farm prices and income: consumer creditworthiness;

- the use of food and its ability to meet individual needs, their condition,
| political innovation

their environment, local deficiencies and consumer habits;

- stability; i.e., continuity of access and lack of shortages: sustainable

management which relies upon public policies which provide against
relevant contingencies.
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Every year, the FAO publishes a report, “The State of Food Insecurity
in the World,” which assesses the number of undernourished people on
the basis of indicators which take into account the various characteris-
tics of groups of individuals such as age, gender and occupation.

A billion undernourished people

The first World Food Conference was held in November 1974. At that
time, there were 900 million undernourished people. Twenty-two years
later, according to the 1996 World Food Summit, this figure was still 850
million. The Summit’s participants pledged “[their] political will and
[their] common and national commitment to achieving food security
for all […] with an immediate view to reducing the number of under-
nourished people to half their present level no later than 2015.” This
commitment was taken up again in the Millennium Development Goals
adopted by the UN Millennium Summit which met in New York from
6 to 8 September 2000. However, as of 2002, the “World Food Summit:
Five Years Later” found that the number of undernourished people still
exceeded 800 million. It is common knowledge that the Millennium goal
will not be reached.

10
 The food crisis – and later the economic crisis – occurred in this
context. The number of undernourished people once again rose, to 915
million in 2008 and over a billion in 2009, under the combined effect
of higher farm prices and a decline in North-South transfers. The FAO
is hoping for a slight decrease in 2010; nonetheless, this figure is still
unacceptable for the world in which we live.

The two continents which suffer the most from hunger are Asia, with
640 million undernourished people (60% of the total number of under-
nourished people) and Sub-Saharan Africa with 260 million (a quarter
of the total). It is Africa which has the highest ratio of undernourished
people to the total population: 36%. Three-quarters of its chronically
hungry people live in rural areas and a majority of them live off the
land. It is common knowledge that malnutrition is a consequence of
poverty but the fact that it is closely linked with rural poverty is often
overlooked.

Food security: a global challenge

Subsistence farming: Forgotten by public policies and neglected by private
investments
The current situation stems from a simplistic conception of subsistence
farming which keeps the latter on the economy’s sidelines. To emerge
from poverty, farmers need access to the market. They must be able
to act as economic actors: access credit, acquire means of production,
farm inputs and small machinery, and sell their production. In order to
overcome shortages or gain access to a more diversified diet, they need
to be able to buy what they do not produce by selling their surpluses.

Two factors account for this situation: the way agricultural poli-
cies supporting subsistence farming are designed and the decline of
public funding for the improvement of this type of farming. However,
the conception of subsistence farming which has prevailed for several
decades among international bodies and some NGO circles translates
into a de facto freeze. Meeting familial needs through external aid keeps
households dependent. Distrust of the economy, the markets and inno-
vation prevents any sustainable progress. In concrete terms, external aid
is implemented through projects which temporarily alleviate the most
economically disadvantaged by distributing fertilizer and seed, along
with some technical advice. Such projects only concern a very small per-
centage of farmers, and for a limited time. They do not help farmers or

11
 their organisations to build up some capital, which would enable them
to achieve autonomy. They serve more as a billboard for rich countries
than as a coherent development strategy. The funds committed by inter-
national solidarity to subsistence farming in poor countries are insignifi-
cant compared to the real needs. The way they are spent further reduces
their impact. The poor results of the fight against food insecurity are the
direct consequence of the way this issue is being handled.

Meeting 2050’s food needs will require increasing yields and reinvesting in
agriculture
Future needs will lead to a further deterioration of the world food
balance if we continue to sustain the status quo. The FAO estimates that
world food production will need to increase 70% by 2050 to feed the
9 billion people who will then inhabit our planet; 90% of this increase
will have to take place in developing countries and 80% will need to
| political innovation

result from higher agricultural yields. This is a crucial point. Increased

production cannot be expected to result from extending crop areas. The
latter will remain limited. The fact is that what the planet needs is a new
form of production intensification, but intensification nonetheless.
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South America, Asia and Africa are experiencing contrasting situa-

tions. Thanks to its land and water, and capital to exploit both, South
America – with Brazil in the lead – will become an even greater expor-
ting region than it is today. Asian countries such as China and India
will be confronting the dual challenge of implementing a new leap in
production while also reducing the environmental risks already cur-
bing the effects of the green revolution, inasmuch as their land reserves
are limited. Economic growth will have a positive impact on markets,
allowing a portion of farm migrants to be absorbed, bearing in mind
that demographic and social imbalances may occur at any time, drawing
governmental concern. Yet economic growth will also lead to a diversifi-
cation in nutrition behaviours towards products of animal origin requi-
ring more crop areas. In any event, Asian governments need to both fund
and protect their agriculture and ensure that they have a sufficient supply,
which explains the Indian, Chinese and Korean investments in Africa or
in former Soviet Union countries. They will also need to improve the
internal operation of their markets, as shown by the difficulties expe-

12
rienced by India, which finds itself in the paradoxical situation of having
to endure serious famine and register extensive crop losses, due to a lack
of effective marketing channels.

Europe and North Africa have shared agricultural interests

North Africa and the Near East will remain structurally deficitary
because of the limits which drought and competition over water
resources have imposed upon agricultural land. The quantities of grain
which they import every year varies, depending upon rainfall. They also
depend upon the national budgets’ capacity to subsidise commodities
in order to contain consumer prices. Morocco, thanks to its dynamic
economy, and Algeria, thanks to its oil, avoided the impact of the food
crisis. This is not true of Egypt, which is still one of the most vulnerable
countries because of its fragile economy and political tensions. These
factors obviously have made it one of the most susceptible to the closing

Food security: a global challenge

of exports unilaterally decided by Russia during the summer of 2010.

The European Union must consider that the fate of the populations
inhabiting the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea are partly
its responsibility. Food requirements certainly constitute a market for
European producers, but the top priority is to modernise agrarian struc-
tures through the development of domestic markets. Such modernisa-
tion calls for diversification of productions. Morocco’s successful milk
production is an example of the local cooperative movement. French
sectors may participate in the creation of economic channels, in the oil-
seed crop sector, for example.

How can Europe plan on managing migratory flows and promoting

better management of fragile ecologies without helping to improve the
status of millions of poor farmers? The Union for the Mediterranean
(UfM) initiative spearheaded by Nicolas Sarkozy and Henri Guaino is
facing extreme political reluctance. Even if no miracle is to be expected
from regional trade hindered by political pressures, the UfM could pro-
vide a platform for seeking a consensus on shared agricultural issues,
including not only North-South and South-North trade but also eco-
nomic partnerships between agricultural and agro-industrial sectors.

13
 The priority now is to help Sub-Saharan Africa achieve a successful green
revolution
Sub-Saharan Africa deserves special attention. Close to Europe, it
remains a poor region whose economy is essentially agricultural. Yet this
agriculture has not yet undergone intensification efforts. Its grain yields
are still the world’s lowest, about 13 quintals per hectare, as compared
to the world average of 32 quintals, and to the industrialised countries’
50 quintals. There are many farmers, however. Only 230 million hec-
tares are being farmed out of a potential – estimated by the FAO – of
over 1 billion hectares of agricultural land. Its water sources are abun-
dant, though unevenly distributed. What is lacking are the means to
optimally exploit them.

Indeed, Sub-Saharan Africa is the region in the world most adversely

affected by structural adjustment policies and the States’ disengagement.
| political innovation

The growth rate of about 6% in the last few years can be mainly imputed
to the export of raw materials. Due to a lack of productive investments,
Sub-Saharan Africa does not possess the engines which have driven the
emerging countries’ agricultural economy.
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Numerous reasons have been advanced to explain this situation: the

weakness of governments, conflicts and wars, exchange rates which – in
the euro zone – penalise exports, the continent’s political fragmentation,
climatic constraints, not to mention the health problems weighing hea-
vily upon the working classes. Nonetheless, we should not overlook the
ramifications of the economic policies imposed by donors. Nothing has
been substituted for the interventionist and costly public policies which
have been justifiably questioned. National and international public
authorities have abandoned agriculture. Export crops, such as cocoa
beans, or cotton, or even those subject to industrial processing such as
palm oil, managed to do well, but food crops were actually caught in a
blind spot, which reopens the question of how public policies are formu-
lated and agricultural financed.

West Africa could meet its food requirements

As the Foundation for World Agriculture and Rural Life studies have
shown, West Africa is perfectly capable of meeting its food requirements.
Even though its population has doubled in the last twenty-five years, its

14
regional crop productions have more than tripled. Food production has
increased from 59 million tonnes in 1980 to 212 million in 2005. Yet
70% of this increase was achieved by expanding crop areas and 30 %
by increasing yields. This ratio is the opposite of what applies to the rest
of the world. Agriculture has not been intensified. According to the FAO,
the region has 236 million hectares of cultivable land, but only 24% of
this potential is being farmed, or 55 million hectares, excluding the 119
million hectares of grazing land.

It is estimated that cultivated land can be increased by 50%. By doing

so, yields would double. This doubling of yields depends upon water
control. Water resources not only exist, but potentially irrigable land
exceeds 10 million hectares. In addition, primarily depressed areas,
which can benefit from local water reservoirs, offer a major potential
of from 11 to 16 million hectares. The problem raised by these develop-
ments is that of investment capabilities. The necessary funds cannot be

Food security: a global challenge

made available from local government budgets. That should be made a
priority and there has to be a genuine effort to promote African agricul-
ture.

Irrigation development is indispensable to satisfy rice needs, even

though the region relies upon importing 55% of its supply. It is estimated
that by 2025 the demand for rice to feed 455 million inhabitants will
total 22 million tonnes, or slightly less than 7 million hectares yielding 5
tonnes per hectare. The land area currently dedicated to rice-growing is
5 million hectares, with a yield of 1.67 tonnes of paddy per hectare[?],
yet the average yield within the Office du Niger area – which is already
4 tonnes per hectare – shows that such objectives are not beyond reach.

West Africa could feed all of its inhabitants by 2025. African far-
mers can produce that much and the region’s resources would allow it.
Investments must be made in agriculture. The African states cannot do it
alone. They need the assistance of the international community.

15
 Statements by the international community
which have not led to action

What is the status of the spring 2008 mobilisation of world leaders? At

the institutional level, diplomatic circles had lively discussions about it,
but a very small amount of funds were actually freed up, conformism
sidetracked discussions on agricultural policies, etc., so we shall try to
shed more light on this.

During his speech of 6 June 2008 at the World Food Summit convened
by the FAO in Rome, French President Nicolas Sarkozy launched the idea
of a Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition,
whose objective was to improve coordination of the international
system and to endow it with a group of experts as was done with the
climate issue, and with means to promote a new impetus for agricultural
| political innovation

policies. Apparently all that has been seen is an ever-growing number of

would-be coordinators.

The United Nations’ Secretariat and its Framework Programme

The first candidate body is a United Nations team created by Secretary-
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General Ban Ki-Moon in April 2008. Its official name is self-descrip-

tive: Coordination Team of the UN System High Level Task Force on
the Global Food Security Crisis. This body defined a Comprehensive
Framework for Action (CFA) intended to guide the multilateral and
national actors’ initiatives. Its supporting document, written in UN style,
is directed at specialists in this type of diplomacy. It is hard to imagine
how it can reach the actors. Its organisation is now comprised of some
twenty experts in New York, Geneva, and Rome. Funding for its 3.4 mil-
lion-dollar budget comes from the United Kingdom (1 million), Iceland,
France, Switzerland and the World Bank.

The reformed Committee on Food Security

The other major international coordination candidate is the FAO. Its
Director-General, Jacques Diouf, fought to prevent Ban Ki-moon from
relieving him of his duties and strengthened the Committee on World
Food Security (CFS) created after the 1974 World Food Conference to
ensure the monitoring of the world’s food situation. The reform, sup-
ported by France, opened the CFS to the various actors of the world food

16
system. France also spearheaded the creation, on 3 September 2010, of
the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE).
The CFS Chair is Noel De Luna. Dr S. Swaminathan, the Father of the
Green Revolution in India, was elected Chair of the panel of experts.
Currently, the CFS has the institutional authority to handle coordina-
tion, even though there may be some doubt as to the ability of large
gatherings to make decisions and affect government strategies.

Since 2008, the G8 and the G20 have included food security on their
agenda. In 2009, the G8 industrialised countries adopted a Statement
on Global Food Security, the Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI). The
signatories agreed “to act with the scale and urgency needed,” and to
mobilise 20 billion dollars over three years. This figure had already been
mentioned after the Rome conference of 6 June 2008. In any case, each
of the actors remains responsible for implementing it. It is not known
whether this involves new funding and what the latter’s destination is. It

Food security: a global challenge

is merely an announcement.

In addition, the Aquila Declaration recommends strengthening global

governance and cites all the coordinating bodies without clarifying their
respective duties. While it is true that the G8 is not a coordinating body, a
few weeks later, on 24 and 25 September 2009, the G20 put the issue on
its Pittsburgh meeting’s agenda and recommended, at the United States’
insistence, to call upon “the World Bank to work […] on setting up a
multilateral trust fund” in order to support innovative actions and pro-
grammes such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
Programme (CAADP). Commitments in funding amount to 22 billion
dollars. Nothing is known of the 22 billion mentioned in Pittsburgh, any
more than of the Aquila’s 20 billion. Yet the United States has secured a
recommendation for the creation of a special fund to be managed by the
World Bank – an idea which Europeans opposed.

The United States is spearheading the initiative and relying upon the World
Bank
On 22 April 2010, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury announced the
creation of the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program. As antici-
pated, the fund will be managed by the World Bank. It was immediately
endowed with 900 million dollars, 475 million of which came from the

17
 U.S. Funding sources are the United States, Canada, Spain, South Korea
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (30 million dollars). Neither
the European Union nor France are funding countries. Thus, the United
States has taken over the leadership the fight against food insecurity. Its
acting staff is located in the heart of Washington DC, within the triangle
formed by the White House, the World Bank, the IMF and the U.S.
Congressional Building. The special fund is not a coordinating body, but
something much better since it is endowed with both limited governance
and financial authority.

At the same time, the United States launched its own strategy for
fighting against food insecurity, “Feed the Future,” a highly structured
programme with clear choices. This strategy implemented by the Obama
administration focuses on supporting the agricultural production of
poor countries, thereby straying from the country’s traditional approach
| political innovation

to food aid.

The European Union’s refusal to take part in this initiative is a historic

error. Once again, it results from lack of strategic vision and poor res-
ponsiveness (at that time, the European Commission’s new authoritative
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bodies, commissioners, etc., were being nominated). This lack of parti-

cipation is all the more regrettable in that in late 2008, the European
Union had released a special credit of 1 billion euros. Unfortunately, the
although the exiting Commission’s technocrats had managed to spend
this billion without making any political, strategic or operational impact.
Conversely, the transparency of U.S. initiatives leaves some room for
hope and inspires regret, by contrast, for the vagueness of the European
positions.

Agricultural market regulation

may deal with only part of the problem

President Sarkozy has announced that France would include the issue of
regulation of commodities markets – notably that of agricultural pro-
ducts – on the agenda of the G20 Summit which France has chaired since
12 November 2010. There are numerous reasons for controlling the
volatility of agricultural markets. Instability penalises consumers when
prices climb and farmers when they fall. The lack of price predictabi-

18
lity makes agriculture lose a large share of potential investments. Their
supplies’ volatility causes serious problems for agri-food industries.
Instability generates more instability. Producers react to market signals,
so the agricultural sector is dragged into a vicious circle. Agricultural
markets are beset by specific problems: dispersion of production, vulne-
rability to vagaries of weather and, above all, conflictual information
which forces farmers to make decisions in the absence of reliable eco-
nomic data. In addition, the financialisation of agricultural markets has
been boosting speculation for some ten years.

Under these conditions, one can but hope that the international com-
munity will adopt provisions to limit price fluctuations to what is strictly
necessary for the smooth operation of the markets.

Price instability in developing countries depends upon endogenous factors

Food security: a global challenge

This is a complex issue and its resolution would not guarantee the pla-
net’s food security. In fact, regulation concerns international market
prices, yet the latter have little impact on poor countries’ domestic mar-
kets. Studies conducted by the Foundation for World Agriculture and
Rural Life (FARM) have shown that the transmission of international
prices to African farmers was very limited. Internal, national and regional
market volatility depends upon two main categories of endogenous fac-
tors. The first stems from the fact that production is dependent upon
climate uncertainty, as well as the organisation of production, access to
credit and to inputs. The second category concerns market operation
deficiencies resulting from insufficient capital and credits, institutional
roadblocks, disorganisation of agricultural systems and the lack of phy-
sical and financial storage capacities.

Price levels for imported foodstuffs also matter. Cheap rice imports
are destabilising local production in certain countries such as Senegal.
However, for some twenty years prior to 2007, the price of imported rice
was not unstable: it was constantly low.

Is it possible to satisfy both producers and consumers?

Conflicts of interest between producers and consumers are also an issue.
Is it possible to determine pricing benchmarks which would satisfy both
categories? Governments of poor countries tend to arbitrate in favour of

19
 consumers, to the detriment of farmers. Is it not likely that this conflict
between developed and developing countries –or at least the poorest
among them – could arise within the G20?

If regulation were to cause domestic agricultural prices to increase in

Sub-Saharan African countries, it should imperatively be accompanied
by local production support measures. Under such conditions, it would
be hard to distinguish a G20 agreement from the Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPA) negotiations underway in the European Union and
the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP). Negotiations with West
Africa have not always been successful. This region’s farmer organisa-
tions impose import taxes on farm commodities of from 50 to 80%.
African governments are scarcely in favour of that. More importantly,
European negotiators are doing nothing to help African States to protect
their regional markets and to facilitate the implementation of pro-active
| political innovation

agricultural policies.

Similarly, the Doha Round negotiations conducted within the fra-

mework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) stalled in July 2008
over the “special safeguard mechanism” (SSM) demanded by India. The
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latter wanted to apply temporary restrictions to limit imports by raising

customs tariffs or by imposing quotas. For India, the goal was to protect
vulnerable farmers from imports in the event of excessive price declines.

The major defect of trade negotiations, whether European or multi-

lateral, is their inability to distinguish between the setting of trade rules
and funding for agriculture. Indeed, the World Trade Organization has
no control over development aid, even though the Doha Round is called
the “Development Round.” This flaw will resurface at the G20 Summit,
if the latter deals with market regulation without also discussing agri-
culture development policies and their funding. It would be even more
regrettable in that the G20 is offering France a historic occasion to take
over leadership of the food security issue.

20
 Designing new agricultural policies
is as crucial as the funding to implement them

Funding agriculture and public agricultural policies constitutes an indivi-

sible pair. Failure to provide the means to implement such policies erases
any potential to give new impetus to agricultural policies. Conversely,
the inability to design adequate frameworks causes financial decision-
makers to be hesitant. Multilateral donors allege that good governance
is more important than budget increases, but this is an inaccessible ideal
requiring a mixture of “intelligent” public policies, the Rule of Law, an
effective administration and the absence of corruption. Aid agencies
consequently focused their attention on development projects. They
have abandoned overall strategies and sectoral programmes.

Agricultural policies and development policies are emerging from a

thirty-year cycle which began in the early 1980s and was originally moti-

Food security: a global challenge

vated by the necessity of reducing the States’ debts. This cycle is sym-
bolised by structural adjustment policies. The International Monetary
Fund’s “good students,” notably the states of Sub-Saharan Africa, car-
ried out this approach to the fullest possible extent. They dismantled the
agricultural services, stabilisation funds, reduced agricultural budgets,
privatised development companies and agricultural banks, and opened
their markets to imports.

Challenging this policy entails facing numerous obstacles due to the

loss of competencies in the ministries and the depletion of budgets. More
importantly, it means dealing with a conceptual issue. It is impossible to
reconsider liberalisation and the market economy and it is difficult to
design and implement the new functions required by public policies in
liberal economies – all the more so in that today no State can succeed
solely through its own efforts.

Agricultural policies which promote investment and entrepreneurism

Formulating new agricultural and development policies is a necessity.
This policy design cannot result from a reorientation of former policies,
but rather requires breaking away from them. To reach that goal, policy-
makers must bring all of their influence and energies to the table.

21
 Food production should be transformed into the production of
market commodities for community trading. The aim of this paper is to
contribute to the formulation of new agricultural policies, an objective
which requires bearing in mind certain essentials:

- Inasmuch as food security is the issue at stake, the agricultural pro-

ductions concerned are therefore food crops: grains, tuber crops and
products of animal origin, notably milk and poultry.

- Export crops, such as cotton, cocoa beans, natural rubber, or industrial

crops such as oilseed crops or biofuels, are not excluded. They should
not be pitted against food crops, but agricultural policies cannot be
limited to the success of these sectors.

- The goal is to ensure that food crops such as rice or maize in Sub-
| political innovation

Saharan Africa, like milk in India, are transformed into market com-
modity products for regional markets.

- Priority must be given to the local markets’ production potential and

operation. What matters is to produce more and reduce unitary pro-
fondapol

duction costs. Indeed, inasmuch as the markets are already open, any
market protection will cause food prices to rise.

- Increased yields and productivity are an essential condition for suc-

cess. Agricultural intensification in poor agricultural countries should
be deemed a priority. This is a right to which agricultural companies
are entitled which must have access to available technologies. These
countries have the productivity flexibility which gives them the poten-
tial to enjoy growth without causing environmental degradation.

- Developing the economic functions of farmer organisations and struc-

turing the agricultural systems should constitute the focus of action.
This does not mean downplaying the increasing importance of private
businesses and investors, who may play a role as the economic powe-
rhouse, but this private sector can only occupy a limited place in the
food channels. It will not meet food security or agricultural employ-
ment challenges through it own efforts.

22
Proposal for an economic pro-business or pro-corporate approach
The “probusiness” approach defines a global conception of economic
development-oriented agricultural policies and the diffusion of entrepre-
neurship. Its aim is to guide public policies and to mobilise professional
and private actors in fostering a “probusiness” attitude.
The expression “probusiness” is borrowed from Dani Rodrik,
Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard University’s
John F. Kennedy School of Government and from Arvind Subramanian,
Division Chief in the International Monetary Fund’s Research
Department. In a May 2004 working paper entitled “From ‘Hindu
Growth’ to Productivity Surge: The Mystery of the Indian Growth
Transition,” the authors offer the theory that India’s economic growth
resulted from a governmental attitude shift in the 1980s in favour of
private business. The authors distinguish between a “promarket” and
a “probusiness” orientation. “The former focuses on removing impedi-

Food security: a global challenge

ments to markets and aims to achieve this through economic liberaliza-
tion. [The second] focuses on raising the profitability of the established
industrial and commercial establishments. It tends to favor incum-
bents and producers.” Interestingly, Dani Rodrik’s translator in French
retained the expression “probusiness” (rather than pro-corporate). We
adopted the same term, as we felt it effectively characterises and diffe-
rentiates this approach.

This strategy leads to the implementation of a new economic model

for agriculture. Based upon the promotion of professional organisa-
tions which exercise economic functions, it is predicated upon access
to external funding through a mixture of bank loans and development
subsidies. Its aim is to free up margins to ensure the autonomy of agri-
cultural groups.

The public sphere represented by the States, the regional organisations

and the international institutions is part of the “probusiness” approach.
Public authorities promote and securitise investments via several key
channels: investments in infrastructures (transports, communication),
investments in market structures, incentive measures (legislation, subsi-
dies) to promote farm credit, initiatives in favour of risk-hedging mecha-
nisms, regional integration policies, long-term policies focusing on local

23
 productions (with suitable customs tariff), policies promoting the struc-
turing of agricultural systems (legislation, subsidies, management dele-
gation, promotion of the mutualist approach and of cooperatives.

Private actors, agricultural professional organisations and their eco-

nomic and financial partners – particularly credit institutions – need
to be involved in formulating and implementing public policies. This
involves allowing them to participate in the decision-making process and
not restricting them to serving in civil society or private sector forums,
which actually exclude them from decisive negotiations.

For an “agricultural G20” devoted to food security

Priority should be given to investments, particularly to reviving public

funding through international solidarity. It is possible for this planet
| political innovation

to enjoy food security, but it calls for a strong conceptual and finan-
cial mobilisation of both the North and the South, in order to make
optimal use of what is available by way of technologies, know-how,
economics and management. The dual challenge consists of relaunching
investments in agriculture and designing new agricultural policies. The
fondapol

international community needs a drastic push to pick up its pace so

that these agricultural challenges will receive the energetic attention they
require. The G20 provides such an opportunity. Market regulation is a
unifying goal. It needs to be surpassed by dealing with the food security
issue with renewed vigour.

24
The Fondation pour l’innovation politique publishes this note in
partnership with the Foundation for World Agriculture and Rural Life
(FARM). Granted charitable status, FARM was founded by five French
firms: Crédit Agricole SA, GDF Suez, Casino group, Limagrain Vilmorin,
Air France and the French Development Agency, with the support of the
French State.

FARM aims to promote efficient agricultural systems and agri-food

chains respectful towards farmers. FARM fosters the development of an

Food security: a global challenge

economic approach towards agricultural value chains and the adoption
of business management practices in agricultural activities. FARM
coordinates studies, organizes conferences, develops pilot projects and
trains farm leaders.

The financial contributors of the Foundation are the five founders

companies, together with individual donors, several sponsor companies
and French public authorities.

More information and FARM’s publications are available on the website

www.fondation-farm.org

FARM
59 rue Pernety Paris 14
Adresse postale : 91-93 Bd Pasteur 75710 Paris Cedex 15
tel : 33 (0)1 57 72 07 19

25
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26
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