14 - Generator Protection PDF

GENERATOR
PROTECTION
by:
Barrie Moor
B Eng (Elec)
November 2016 bmoor@powersystemprotection.com.au
GENERATOR PROTECTION Moor, B.
Table of Contents
PCPC 2012 GENERATOR PROTECTION....................................................................1
1.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
1.2 SYNOPSIS....................................................................................................................... 1
1.3 GENERATOR FAULTS ........................................................................................................ 2
1.3.1 DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION ........................................................................................ 2
1.3.2 VOLTAGE DISPLACEMENT PROTECTION ........................................................................ 7
1.3.3 STATOR EARTH FAULT PROTECTION ............................................................................. 9
1.3.4 STATOR INTER‐TURN PROTECTION ............................................................................ 15
1.3.5 ROTOR EARTH FAULT PROTECTION ............................................................................ 16
1.3.6 GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER (GCB) FAIL PROTECTION ............................................... 18
1.4 GENERATOR AND/OR TRANSMISSION SYSTEM EVENTS ......................................................... 19
1.4.1 GENERATOR ISLANDING AND/OR TRIPPING ................................................................. 19
1.4.2 STATOR OVER LOAD (OVER CURRENT) PROTECTION ..................................................... 20
1.4.3 NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE PROTECTION .................................................................. 22
1.4.4 OVER‐VOLTAGE PROTECTION ................................................................................... 24
1.4.5 OVER‐EXCITATION PROTECTION................................................................................ 24
1.4.6 REVERSE POWER PROTECTION .................................................................................. 26
1.4.7 LOSS OF EXCITATION AND UNDER‐EXCITATION PROTECTION........................................... 27
1.4.8 UNDER FREQUENCY PROTECTION .............................................................................. 29
1.4.9 OVER FREQUENCY PROTECTION ................................................................................ 31
1.4.10 OUT OF STEP (POLE SLIP) PROTECTION ...................................................................... 32
1.5 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................... 36
1.6 SELF HELP EXERCISES ..................................................................................................... 39
1.6.1 STATOR EARTH FAULT PROTECTION ........................................................................... 39
1.6.2 REVERSE POWER PROTECTION .................................................................................. 42
1.6.3 UNDER FREQUENCY PROTECTION .............................................................................. 44

November 2016 Generator Protection.doc
PCPC 2012 GENERATOR PROTECTION
1.1 I NTRODUCTION
A generator may be exposed to three types of
occurrence which require protection to operate POWER CONTROL and
POWER CONTROL and
PROTECTION COURSE
and clear the problem. PROTECTION COURSE
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Generator Fault: This requires instantaneous
tripping of the generator to minimise the GENERATOR
GENERATOR
PROTECTION
PROTECTION
damage caused.
Generator Event: This is an event local to the
generator which will not immediately cause
damage but will eventually do so unless
rectified. Protection initiates an alarm rapidly PCPC Melbourne 2012
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Barrie Moor, B Eng (Elec)
Produced in collaboration with
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and, if this is unsuccessful, tripping will be
initiated before actual generator damage
occurs. Generator
GeneratorProtection
Protection
External Event: This is a transmission system z Generator Fault

z Generator Fault
– Rapid tripping necessary
– Rapid tripping necessary
event which will not immediately cause damage z Generator Event
z Generator Event
to the generator and can be rectified by – Slower tripping with alarm to allow operator intervention
– Slower tripping with alarm to allow operator intervention
z External Event
operator intervention. An alarm is generated z External Event
– Remember that every generator in the power station will
– Remember that every generator in the power station will
rapidly to alert the operator of the condition, “see” this event
“see” this event
– Remote power stations may also “see” this event
Remote power stations may also “see” this event
–
followed by tripping as necessary if appropriate – Tripping to be as slow as possible, with alarm to operator
– Tripping to be as slow as possible, with alarm to operator
to allow intervention
action is not taken or is not successful. Note to allow intervention
– Islanding may also be an option
– Islanding may also be an option
that such events may affect generators over a PCPC Melbourne 2012
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wide area and hence tripping must be delayed bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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as long as possible to avoid widespread system
shut‐downs.
1.2 S YNOPSIS
In this discussion we will consider the application of protection to generators, considering the three
occurrences mentioned above. This will facilitate an appreciation of generator protection, the
coordination aspects of such protection and the information required to determine protection
settings.

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1.3 G ENERATOR F AULTS
In the event of a fault within the generator,
rapid tripping of the machine is necessary to POWER CONTROL and
POWER CONTROL and
PROTECTION COURSE
restrict the damage. High impedance neutral PROTECTION COURSE
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earthing of the generator is implemented to
limit earth fault current (and subsequent GENERATOR
GENERATOR
damage) to only a few amps. Generator PROTECTION
PROTECTION
manufacturers take extra precautions at end
windings and terminals to minimise the
Generator
GeneratorFaults
Faults
possibility of phase ‐ phase faults. Phase
segregated busbars virtually eliminate the
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outgoing bus system. The application of bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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protection depends to some extent on the size
(and hence the importance) of the generator. A discussion of protection schemes specifically
installed to detect and trip for generator faults follows.
1.3.1 D IFFERENTIAL P ROTECTION

A phase to phase short circuit inside the
generator results in severe damage to the Differential
DifferentialProtection
Protection
conductors, the stator laminations (probably z Detects multiphase faults
Detects multiphase faults
z
– Earth faults typically limited by high resistance earthing
welding these together) and also is likely to – Earth faults typically limited by high resistance earthing
z Consequences of multiphase faults
z Consequences of multiphase faults
cause mechanical damage due to both the – Damage due to fault current
– Damage due to fault current
– Damage due to unbalanced mechanical forces
– Damage due to unbalanced mechanical forces
mechanical shock of the fault as well as the z Generator design to minimise risk
z Generator design to minimise risk
– Design to minimise risk of multiphase faults
– Design to minimise risk of multiphase faults
unbalanced force on couplings and bearings. – Earth switch systems
– Earth switch systems
z Differential protection schemes
The likelihood of such faults occurring can be z Differential protection schemes
– Bias Differential
– Bias Differential
– High Impedance Differential
reduced significantly by: – High Impedance Differential
– Overall Differential
– Overall Differential
• Generator design : To ensure that phase
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• Bus design : Phase isolated bus trunking is
employed. In this way, any fault will first of all be an earth fault before it can evolve into the far
more serious phase‐phase fault. Earth fault currents are typically limited to only a few amps by
high resistance neutral earthing of the generator and while still being serious, are far less severe
than a solid phase‐phase fault.
• Earth Switch design : Generator earth switches are either 3 x single phase units or three phase
units with staggered operation. In this way, it is not possible to accidentally cause a multiphase
fault by closing an earth switch. The single phase or staggered operation ensures that any fault
will initially be an earth fault with lesser consequences as noted above. Nevertheless, earth
switches will be interlocked to prevent operation onto a live machine, but the consequences of
such an event should the interlocks fail warrant the single phase or staggered operation.
A multiphase fault is best detected by a differential protection scheme based on the Merz ‐ Price
circulating current principle. Two types of differential protection are applicable to generators; biased
differential and high impedance differential.
1.3.1.1 B IASED D IFFERENTIAL P ROTECTION

The principle of operation of the biased
differential schemes is identical to that Bias
BiasDifferential
Protection
applicable to transformer differential
protection. Because the generator is in a
shielded environment, faults are likely to occur
at voltage maxima with minimal DC offset in the
fault current. However faults on the outgoing Bias
Bias
Bias
Bias
transmission system may be transient and CTs
must be designed to cope with fully offset fault
Operate
Operate
currents.
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In some installations, the excitation transformer Biased
BiasedDifferential
Protection
may be tapped off within the generator
z Current Transformers
z Current Transformers
differential zones. Then it is necessary to – Neutral and Line CTs to be matched
– Neutral and Line CTs to be matched
ensure that the differential scheme is not – Good quality : Class PX recommended
– Good quality : Class PX recommended
z Protection
z Protection
unduly sensitive so as to be unbalanced by that – Select a relay operating quantity,
– Select a relay operating quantity,
load. Excitation current amounts to only a few eg. … Vector addition of CT currents
eg. … Vector addition of CT currents
I1I1++I2I2
percent of the machine output and bias –
–
Select a relay restraining quantity,
Select a relay restraining quantity, I1I1++I2I2
eg. … 50% of scalar addition of CT currents
differential settings as low as five or ten percent eg. … 50% of scalar addition of CT currents
22
may still be applicable.
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Bias
BiasDifferential
Protection Bias
BiasDifferential
Protection
Under
UnderThrough
ThroughFault
FaultConditions
Conditions Under
UnderInternal
InternalFault
FaultConditions
Conditions
Bias Bias Bias Bias

Bias Bias Bias Bias
I1 I2 I1 I2
I1 I2 I1 I2
Operate Operate
Operate Operate
I1+I2 ˜ 0 I1+I2 = IF
I1+I2 ˜ 0 I1+I2 = IF
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Biased
BiasedDifferential
Protection Biased
BiasedDifferential
Protection
Typical
TypicalRelay
RelayCharacteristic
Characteristic Typical
TypicalRelay
RelayCharacteristic
Characteristic
5 5
5 5
I1I1++I2I2 4
I1I1++I2I2 4
4 4
Operating Current
Operating Current
Operating Current
Operating Current
3 3
3 TRIP
TRIP 3 TRIP
TRIP
TRIP
TRIP TRIP
TRIP
2
RESTRAIN
RESTRAIN
2
RESTRAIN
RESTRAIN
2
RESTRAIN
RESTRAIN
2
RESTRAIN
RESTRAIN
1 1
1 1
0
0 1 2 3 4 5
I1I1++I2I2 0
0 1 2 3 4 5
I1I1++I2I2
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Restraint (Bias) Current
Restraint (Bias) Current 22 Restraint (Bias) Current
Restraint (Bias) Current 22

Unlike transformer biased differential Biased
BiasedDifferential
Protection
protection, the line and neutral end CTs both z Protection - Can be set reasonably sensitive
z Protection - Can be set reasonably sensitive
measure the same current. Therefore, the – CTs are matched
– CTs are matched
– No phase angle mismatch across the generator
– No phase angle mismatch across the generator
protection can be set reasonably sensitive and – No neutral current (zero sequence) mismatch
– No neutral current (zero sequence) mismatch
– No over excitation (3rdrd& 5ththharmonic) mismatch
does not need to make allowance for – No over excitation (3 & 5 harmonic) mismatch
– No 2ndndharmonic (transformer inrush) mismatch
– No 2 harmonic (transformer inrush) mismatch
differences in excitation and inrush currents. z Nevertheless, a small amount of 2 ndharmonic restrain may
nd
z Nevertheless,
be a small amount
warranted, especially of 2energisation”
if a “hard harmonic restrain
of the may
be warranted,
generator especially
transformer mayifoccur
a “hard energisation” of the
Nevertheless, experience shows that it may be – Relay bias
generator transformer may occur
– Relay bias
wise to provide a small amount of 2nd harmonic z
z
Allows for any CT mismatch
Allows for any CT mismatch
z Bias increased at higher fault currents to accommodate any
z Bias increased at higher fault currents to accommodate any
restraint to prevent mal‐operation upon a hard CT saturation
CT saturation
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1.3.1.2 H IGH I MPEDANCE D IFFERENTIAL P ROTECTION
High
HighImpedance
ImpedanceDifferential
Protection High
HighImpedance
Protection
z CTs are matched
z CTs are matched
– Exactly the same ratio … ie no compensating turns !!
– Exactly the same ratio … ie no compensating turns !!
– Class PX recommended
– Class PX recommended
z Worst mismatch ??
z Worst mismatch ??
– CT saturation on a heavy through fault
– CT saturation on a heavy through fault
– Ensure stability for this as worst case event
– Ensure stability for this as worst case event

In the case of a high impedance differential protection scheme, the same principles apply as for high
impedance busbar differential protection. The neutral and line end CTs must have the same ratio. It
is also recommended that they be matched. Class PX CTs are recommended. Nevertheless, we will
allow for the possibility that one CT will totally saturate while the other CT performs perfectly. Even
though the CTs are matched, this event could happen if one CT has any pre‐fault residual flux.
Under through load and/or through fault
conditions, the balanced CTs ensure that zero High
HighImpedance
Protection
current flows through the shunt connected
differential relay.

Zmag = 0
Rct Zmag = 0
Rct
Rleads
Rleads
I
Rstab V = F IF• (R CT + R LEADS )
Rstab V =CT • (R CT + R LEADS )
CT
Rleads
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However, should CT saturation occur, then spill
High
HighImpedance
Protection
current could flow and could therefore cause Setting
SettingVoltage
Voltageand
andMargins
Margins
relay mal‐operation. However, in applying the z Fault current comprises …
z Fault current comprises …
high impedance differential protection – AC Component
– AC Component
– DC Component
principles, we can select a scheme setting – DC Component
z Hence, employ a DC Stabilised Relay
z Hence, employ a DC Stabilised Relay
voltage that ensures stability, even under the – No additional margin on the setting is required
– No additional margin on the setting is required
z And considering 0% / 100% CT saturation case
extreme mismatch condition when one CT z And considering 0% / 100% CT saturation case
– This in an unrealistically extreme case
– This in an unrealistically extreme case
totally saturates. – 100% safety margin is automatically built in
– 100% safety margin is automatically built in
z So, no additional safety margin on setting is required
z So, no additional safety margin on setting is required

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To ensure operation under generator in‐zone
High
HighImpedance
Protection
fault conditions, the standard requirement is
that every CT knee point must be at least twice
the selected relay setting voltage. Considering
the importance of high speed tripping under
serious fault conditions, it is recommended that
no compromise be made and that a CT knee
point voltage of five times the scheme setting Rstab
Rstab
VVK ≥≥22••VVSET
voltage be specified. K SET
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High
HighImpedance
Protection High
HighImpedance
Protection
CT
CTSelection
Selection Metrosils
Metrosils
Magnetising
Magnetising In the case of a heavy internal fault, secondary system voltages may
z All CTs to be the same ratio Magnetising
Magnetising
current at knee
z
In the case of a heavy
internal fault, secondary system voltages may
z All CTs to be the same ratio current
current at
atknee z become excessive
z All CTs to have Vk ≥ 2.Vsetting current
point
point atknee
voltageknee
voltage become excessive
z All CTs to have Vk ≥ 2.Vsetting point voltage z Implications include damage to equipment and safety of personnel
point voltage z Implications include damage to equipment and safety of personnel
– This is an absolute “MUST” z Empirical Formula
– This is an absolute “MUST” z Empirical Formula
– Preferably Vk ≥ 5.Vsetting CT
CT knee
knee
CT knee
VVPEAK ==22⋅ ⋅ 22⋅ ⋅VVK ⋅ (⋅ VF − VK )
– Preferably Vk ≥ 5.Vsetting pointCT knee
voltage
K (VF − VK )
point
pointvoltage
z Need to know pointvoltage
voltage
z Need to know
– Knee Point voltage PEAK
– Knee Point voltage CT
CT internal
internal
– CT Resistance CT
CTinternal
internal
resistance z VK = CT RMS knee point voltage
– CT Resistance resistance
resistance VK = CT RMS knee point voltage
z
resistance VF = Maximum RMS voltage that would occur if the CT did not
z Class Requirements z
VF = Maximum RMS voltage that would occur if the CT did not
z Class Requirements z
saturate
– Not critical saturate
– Not critical z Install metrosils if this voltage become excessive
– But easiest to specify Install
z (eg. metrosils
>2.8kV peak)if this voltage become excessive
– But easiest to specify (eg. >2.8kV peak)
class “PX” CTs
class “PX” CTs 0.1
0.1PX
PX200
200R5
R5
As for all high impedance differential protection schemes, the secondary system voltages can become
excessive under in‐zone fault conditions. The standard check for Metrosils should also be conducted,
these being necessary if secondary system voltages could possibly exceed 2.8kV peak.
1.3.1.3 C ORE B ALANCE D IFFERENTIAL P ROTECTION

Core balance protection may be applied to
Core
CoreBalance
BalanceDifferential
Protection
smaller generators. The core balance CTs (for smaller generators)
(for smaller generators)
measure the difference between the neutral
and line end currents. The generator may be Diff
Diff
solidly earthed or high resistance earthing may
be implemented to limit the earth fault current
to low values.

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1.3.1.4 G ENERATOR AND T RANSFORMER P ROTECTION

Differential protection of the generator
transformer and unit transformers is based on
BIAS DIFF
BIAS
'X' DIFF
biased differential relays. These are two 'X'
winding delta/star connected transformers and BIAS DIFF

BIAS
'Y' DIFF
'Y'
hence high impedance schemes are not
applicable. Note that for large units, the star GG
winding of the generator transformer may also
have a restricted earth fault scheme HIGH IMP
HIGH'Y'IMP
DIFF
DIFF 'Y'
implemented. BIAS DIFF
BIAS
'X' DIFF
'X'
In some installations, rather than providing PCPC Melbourne 2012

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the generator transformer, each may be
protected by a single differential scheme, and
then a single overall scheme implemented to OVERALL
OVERALL
BIAS DIFF
cover both the generator and its transformer. BIAS DIFF
TRANSFORMER
Illustrated is an installation with duplicate TRANSFORMER
BIAS DIFF
BIAS DIFF
differential protection of the generator and
duplicate differential protection of the GG
generator transformer.
GENERATOR
HIGH IMP GENERATOR
Compare this with the scheme shown in where HIGH
DIFF IMP
DIFF
the generator is protected by high impedance
differential protection; the generator PCPC Melbourne 2012
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protection; and then an overall biased
differential scheme is implemented, covering both items of plant
1.3.2 V OLTAGE D ISPLACEMENT P ROTECTION

Voltage Displacement protection protects the
generator phase isolated busbar system from Voltage
VoltageDisplacement
DisplacementProtection
Protection
earth faults when the Generator Circuit Breaker
z High resistance earthing
z High resistance earthing
(GCB) is OPEN (ie. when the generator z And with the GCB open … un-earthed system
z And with the GCB open … un-earthed system
transformer is energised from the transmission z Voltage displacement protection measures 3.Vo
z Voltage displacement protection measures 3.Vo
z Problems
system only, such as during machine start‐up). z Problems
– Ferro-resonance
– Ferro-resonance
Note that, with the GCB open, the generator – Unbalanced Capacitance
– Unbalanced Capacitance
busbar system is unearthed since the generator
transformer, unit transformer, and excitation
transformer all have delta connected windings.
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The relay used for this protection operates on
the principle of displaced neutral voltage
measurement from an open delta VT. In the GCB
GCB
(OPEN) GENERATOR
(OPEN) GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER
event of a solid earth fault occurring on this TRANSFORMER
unearthed system, the voltage so measured GG
would be 3.Vn = 3 x 63.5 = 190.5 volts for VT with open delta
VT with open
secondary delta
winding
secondary winding
standard 110/√3 volt VT’s.
Voltage
Voltage
Displacement
Displacement
Relay
Relay

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At first glance, an open delta voltage of 63.5
volts might be expected, but remember that the Voltage
VoltageDisplacement
DisplacementProtection
Protection
generator terminal volts are no longer balanced.
z Measures 3.Vn for a solid E/F
With high resistance earthing of the generator, z Measures 3.Vn for a solid E/F
– Healthy phases rise to full phase-phase potential
– Healthy phases rise to full phase-phase potential
the faulted phase will be at earth potential and – Healthy phases are now 60 deg apart
– Healthy phases are now 60 deg apart
– Thus, for standard 63.5V VT, output voltage is 190.5V
the healthy phases at full line to line potential. – Thus, for standard 63.5V VT, output voltage is 190.5V
– Set relay to 10% … say 20V
– Set relay to 10% … say 20V
The neutral point also shifts to line‐ground 190.5
63.5
110
63.5
110
190.5VV
110VV
63.5
190.5
110
63.5
190.5VVV
V
voltage
Neutral
Note too, that these healthy phase voltages are Neutral
Displacement
Displacement
Protection
60° apart, not the usual 120°. The resultant Protection
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As a single earth fault causes no damage, with only capacitive current flowing, a short time delay on
tripping is permissible. This time delay is also necessary to allow transient voltages that occur on
energisation to subside. The relay has to be immune to third harmonic components which can occur
under switching conditions.
It is not unknown, with this type of protection and the open delta connected VT, for ferro‐resonance
problems to occur on energisation. The resultant resonant voltages can be sustained for a long time
(perhaps hours) and thus cause spurious operation of the voltage displacement protection. Spurious
tripping may be avoided by damping out resonant conditions by installing a resistive burden on the
VT secondary and/or selecting voltage displacement settings and/or time delay settings that are
sufficiently insensitive to be immune to any resonant conditions which may arise.
Settings are typically:
• Voltage setting = 10% of the neutral displacement voltage for a solid earth fault
eg. approx. 20 volts for standard 110 volt VTs where the neutral displacement voltage will be:
3.Vn = 3 x 63.5 = 190.5 volts.
Higher settings may be necessary if transient conditions cause problems. The increased sensitivity
that may be achieved with lower settings has marginal value but is likely to result in spurious
protection operations and therefore such unduly sensitive settings are not recommended.
• Time delay setting = 0.3 ‐ 3.0 seconds to allow transient voltages to subside.
1.3.3 S TATOR E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

High resistance earthing of generators limits the
earth fault current to only a few amps. Stator
StatorEarth
EarthFault
FaultProtection
Protection
Typically, earth fault current may be limited to z High resistance earthing limits E/F to low levels
z High resistance earthing limits E/F to low levels
perhaps 3‐5 Amps by a neutral grounding – Not less than capacitance current
– Not less than capacitance current
– Insulation breakdown
– Insulation breakdown
transformer with a secondary connected – Core damage
– Core damage
z Rapid Tripping
resistor. z Rapid Tripping
– To minimise EF damage
– To minimise EF damage
– To minimise probability of subsequent EF causing a
Nevertheless, the effect of such a fault is still – To minimise probability of subsequent EF causing a
phase-phase fault
phase-phase fault
– But not to result in nuisance tripping
serious in that the subsequent burning of stator – But not to result in nuisance tripping
z 95% Protection – Neutral Voltage Displacement
z 95% Protection – Neutral Voltage Displacement
laminations allows eddy currents to flow. This z 100% Protection - Signal Injection
z 100% Protection - Signal Injection
tends to have a snow‐balling effect with the PCPC Melbourne 2012

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damage with welding of laminations, increased
eddy current flow, more heating, and so on. Even a short duration earth fault can cause such damage
to the stator laminations. This is the situation for earth faults at full line potential. An earth fault at
the neutral end of the winding results in very low earth fault current, and in itself is not a problem.
However, should a second earth fault then occur, that would effectively produce either a phase‐
phase fault or a shorted turns fault, both of which will cause considerable damage to the generator.
As noted previously, generator earth switches are phase segregated or are arranged so that one
phase closes before the other two. Thus, if accidentally closed onto a live system, the initial fault will
be a low level earth fault which is detected and the generator is tripped before the other phases of
the earth switch can close and cause a multiphase fault. The phase discrepancy timing of the earth
switch typically exceeds 1 second.
Note also, that with this high resistance earthing of the generator, the neutral point will shift to
phase‐neutral voltage in the event of a solid earth fault on the generator terminals. The unfaulted
phases will shift to phase‐phase voltage relative to earth. The generator and associated busbars must
be insulated accordingly.
High resistance earthing of the stator could be
Stator
StatorEarth
EarthFault
FaultProtection
Protection
achieved by simply and directly connecting a
neutral earthing resistor, as shown, This
resistor would then carry only a small current,
but would require a high insulation level.
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The more usual method of stator earthing is to
connect the resistor to the LV side of an Stator
StatorEarth
EarthFault
FaultProtection
Protection
intermediate transformer, rated to perhaps
several hundred kVA. This resistor is simply
calculated by allowing the [turns ratio]2 of the
transformer. This resistor will also now have a
correspondingly higher current rating, but a
lower voltage rating. The advantage of this
latter design is that it allows for the connection
of protective devices to the earthing system, as
discussed below. PCPC Melbourne 2012
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1.3.3.1 95% S TATOR E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

Simply monitoring the neutral voltage, as
shown, will enable detection of faults in all but
the last 5% of the stator winding. The relay is 95%
95%Stator
StatorEarth
EarthFault
FaultProtection
Protection
set to trip if the neutral voltage shifts by more
than a few percent. Normally it would be at
zero volts, but will shift to full line potential for
a generator terminal fault. However, for a fault
at or near to the neutral end of a winding, the 95% Stator
EF 95% Stator
Protection
voltage shift will be very small and will not be EF Protection
detected. Such practical considerations limit
the sensitivity of this type of protection to
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detection of faults in the top 90 or 95% of the PCPC Melbourne 2012
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stator winding. Hence, this is usually referred to bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
as a 95% scheme.
1.3.3.2 100% S TATOR E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

Relay systems utilising low frequency voltage
injection enables detection of earth faults over 100%
100%Stator
StatorEarth
EarthFault
FaultProtection
Protection
100% of the stator winding. Hence, such
systems are referred to as 100% stator earth
fault protection. Either the injected current
may be directly measured, or the voltage drop
across the grounding transformer secondary
95% Stator
resistor may be measured. EF 95% Stator
Protection
EF Protection
Normally, only a very small capacitance current 100% Stator EF Protection

100% Stator EF
via Injection Protection
Method
will flow, but this will increase significantly for via Injection Method
PCPC Melbourne 2012
an earth fault at any point in the stator winding, PCPC Melbourne 2012
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even at the neutral end. In fact, this protection

is even operational when the generator is off‐line. Thus, a stator earth fault may be detected before
the generator is excited and hence further damage to the generator may be avoided.
The injected signal would not be at system frequency or at a sub‐harmonic or harmonic frequency.
Thus, for a 50Hz system, the injected signal may be at 20Hz. In this way, the injected signal will
always be distinct for any power system currents which may flow under normal and/or fault
conditions. Alternatively, the injected signal may be a special non‐sinusoidal signal which will also
always be distinct from power system currents.
Usually a 100% scheme (low frequency injection) as well as a 95% scheme (simple neutral
displacement) are employed for stator earth fault protection. (It may not be possible to employ two
100% schemes to provide ‘X’ and ‘Y’ protections since they can tend to interfere with one another.)
Thus, the scheme used for stator earth fault protection is typically as below:
• 100% stator earth fault protection based on a measurement of the current flow due to the special
injected signal. This protection is operational even when the generator is off‐line.
• 95% stator earth fault protection based on neutral voltage measurement. This protection is only
operation when the generator is excited. A band pass filter is provided to provide immunity
against DC offset and third harmonic components in the voltage.
The stator earth‐fault protection relay typically has three time stages to facilitate tripping. These
stages are at:
• alarm ‐ no time delay
• trip (100% protection) ‐ short time delay to Transient
TransientOvervoltage
OvervoltageConditions
Conditions
and
and StatorEarthfault
Stator EarthfaultProtection
Protection
prevent spurious tripping under transient
A
A
conditions B
B
C
• trip (95% protection) ‐ short time delay to C
prevent spurious tripping under transient STRAY
CAPACITANCES
STRAY EARTH
L IN G
CAPACITANCES FAULT
EARTH
NE U TRA L
G R O U ND IN G
FAULT
O U ND
conditions
RTRA
I CAPA I CAPB
GU
I CAPA I CAPB
NE
The neutral earthing resistance is chosen so that I CAPTOTAL
I CAPTOTAL
I CAPA I CAPB
I CAPA I CAPB
IN
the earth fault current flowing into the IN
generator neutral for a solid terminal fault is not Require : I N
Require : I N
I CAPTOTAL
I CAPTOTAL
PCPC Melbourne 2012
less than the total current flowing to the PCPC Melbourne 2012
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unfaulted phases due to capacitive current
(Vector addition of capacitive currents to the
Transmission
TransmissionSystem
System
unfaulted phases as shown). This restriction is Faults
Faults &Stator
& StatorEarthfault
EarthfaultProtection
Protection
necessary to limit transient over‐voltages to a
safe level. Also, in determining the generator
neutral current, remember to refer the neutral I1 & I2 only
I1 & I2 only
earthing resistance to the primary side of the
neutral grounding transformer by [turns ratio]2
Because the generator is connected to the No generator neutral
No generator
current neutral
for HV system
transmission system via a delta/star step up current
earth fault.for HV system
earth fault.
transformer, theory suggests that for a HV PCPC Melbourne 2012

PCPC Melbourne 2012
transmission system fault, the generator itself bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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will supply only positive and negative sequence

current. (All zero sequence current will come from the star side of the step up transformer.) That is,
no zero sequence current can flow into or out of the delta winding from the generator itself. That is,
the generator is subjected to a purely balanced current flow and the HV transmission system fault will
have no effect on the generator earth fault protection schemes. This is illustrated.
However, there will be some capacitive coupling
Transmission
TransmissionSystemSystem
between the HV & LV windings of the generator Faults
Faults &Stator
& StatorEarthfault
Earthfault Protection
Protection
transformer, as illustrated. This means that a Transformer
Transformer
HV to LV
Winding HV to LV
Capacitance
Winding Capacitance
close‐in earth fault on the HV transmission
system will result in a small amount of neutral
current in the generator zone. It is imperative
that the generator earth fault protection not be
set excessively sensitive to ensure it is immune
to such events. Small generator neutral
Small for
current generator neutral
HV system
current
earth fault,fordue
HVtosystem
Transformer
earth capacitive
HV-LV fault, due to Transformer
coupling.
A method of confirming the performance of the HV-LV capacitive coupling.
PCPC Melbourne 2012
95% Stator Earth Fault protection is based on PCPC Melbourne 2012
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the formula …
0.05 × U GN Transmission
TransmissionSystem
System
Re max ≤ Faults
U Faults &Stator
& StatorEarthfault
Protection
6 × ϖ × C12 × HV z UGN = Generator rated voltage
UGN = Generator rated voltage
z
6 z C12 = HV-LV coupling capacitance
C12 = HV-LV coupling capacitance
z
z UHV = System HV voltage
z UHV = System HV voltage
– 6 = only 1/6 th of voltage is effective
where: – 6 = only 1/6 th of voltage is effective
z 6 = 3 phases x 2 safety factor
Transformer
HV to LV
Transformer
Winding Capacitance
HV to LV
z 6 = 3 phases x 2 safety factor

Winding Capacitance
z 0.05 = 5% setting voltage

• UGN = Generator rated voltage z 0.05 = 5% setting voltage
• C12 = Transformer coupling capacitance HV
e max ≤≤
RR .05××UUGNGN
00.05
to LV UUHV
66××ϖϖ××CC
e max
12 ×× HV Small generator neutral
12 66 current
Smallfor HV system
generator neutral
• UHV is the step‐up transformer HV voltage. earth fault,for

current
HV-LV
dueHVtosystem
earthcapacitive
Transformer
fault, duecoupling.
to Transformer
HV-LV capacitive coupling.
The division by "6" is because only 1/6th of PCPC Melbourne 2012

PCPC Melbourne 2012
the voltage UHV is effective for a solidly bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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earthed system
• The "6" at the beginning of the denominator of the equation is "3" phases times "2" for half the
pick‐up setting. That is, the "3" is for 3 phases and the "2" is a safety factor.
• The "0.05" in the numerator refers to the 5% setting employed to achieve a 95% Stator EF
protection scheme.
If the in‐service earthing resistance is found to exceed the requirements of the above formula, then it
is necessary to increase the setting of the 95% stator EF protection relay above 5% (say to 10%), thus
reducing its performance (thus to a 90% scheme).


1.3.3.3 R ESTRICTED E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

Small generators may by solidly earthed. In
Restricted
RestrictedEarth
EarthFault
FaultProtection
Protection
such cases, where a generator is solidly earthed,
the biased differential protection schemes
noted previously will provide stator earth fault
protection. Alternatively, a restricted earth
fault scheme, as illustrated, can be used to
provide instantaneous protection against earth
faults.
REF
REF
All CTs must be of good quality, as per the usual
requirements for high impedance protection. PCPC Melbourne 2012
PCPC Melbourne 2012
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1.3.3.4 3 RD H ARMONIC E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

The generator will, by its very design, produce
3rd
3rdHarmonic
HarmonicEarth
EarthFault
FaultProtection
Protection
small amounts of various harmonic voltages.
This will include in particular a small amount of 3rd harmonic voltage
3rd harmonic
exists voltage
under normal
exists under normal
conditions
conditions
3rd harmonic voltage. Apart from capacitive
coupling effects, there is no path for 3rd
harmonic current to flow, so the 3rd harmonic
voltage is essentially driving into an open circuit 3rd harmonic voltage
is 3rd harmonic
essentially voltage
shorted
outis and
essentially
falls to ashorted
low value
and is relatively independent of generator out and
under faultfalls to a low value
conditions
under fault conditions
loading. (The 3rd harmonics are blocked from
flowing into the HV transmission system by the
delta connected step up transformer). PCPC Melbourne 2012
PCPC Melbourne 2012
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However, if an earth fault occurs on the bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
generator system, there is a path for 3rd harmonic current to flow (to ground and up the neutral
earthing resistance). This effectively shorts out the 3rd harmonic voltage source so that, under fault
conditions, the 3rd harmonic voltage falls considerably.
At the time of commissioning, the 3rd harmonic voltage will be measured. The 3rd harmonic voltage
level depends on the generator design and the intricacies of the busbar and transformer connections
and hence a measured value is required. The relay sensitivity will be set to 50% of that measured
value. If, during normal operation, the 3rd harmonic voltage fall below the preset level, then a stator
earth fault is indicated and the generator will be tripped.


1.3.3.5 S TATOR EF P ROTECTION FOR P ARALLEL C ONNECTED G ENERATORS

In smaller installations, a number of generators
Parallel
ParallelConnected
ConnectedGenerators
Generators
may be connected together via a busbar system. &&Stator
StatorEarthfault
Protection
In such cases, upon the occurrence of an earth
fault, it is difficult to determine which generator
is faulty and to effect tripping of only the Core Balance
Current
CoreDirection
Balance
Core Balance
Current Direction
Core Balance
Core Balance
Current
CoreDirection
Balance
Detection
Current Direction Detection
Current Direction Detection
Current Direction
faulted unit. Detection Detection Detection
1 2 3
Illustrates is a system with 3 generators 1 2 3
connected in parallel. In the event of a stator
earth fault on No 3 generator, all three
machines contribute the same amount of fault PCPC Melbourne 2012
PCPC Melbourne 2012
current. bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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Hence, a simple stator earth fault scheme is
unable to determine which machine is actually faulted. However, a core balance CT can be fitted to
each unit. On the healthy generators (1 & 2) the neutral current flow and that core balance current
flow are in the same direction, namely out of the generator. On the faulty unit (No 3), the neutral
current is in the same direction as for the other units, but the core balance scheme detects current
flowing into the protected zone. This system provides the necessary discrimination. Note that it is
important that core balance CTs be used, rather than a residual connection from 3 x phase CTs to
accurately monitor the direction of current flow. Current levels will be very low and mismatches in a
residually connected CT scheme could introduce unacceptable levels of inaccuracy.
1.3.3.6 G ENERATOR E ARTHING VIA E ARTHING T RANSFORMER

Instead of earthing the generator via a high
Generator
GeneratorEarthing
Earthingvia
viaEarthing
EarthingTransformer
Transformer
resistance at the neutral point, it is possible to
use an earthing transformer philosophy.
A
A
The simplest scheme involves a star / delta
A-E-E
connected transformer to provide a zero N
A
N
sequence current source and hence provide B-E
C B-E B
C B
earth fault current for generator faults. The Earthed
Earthed
Earthing Transformer rated to perhaps several hundred kVA
earthing transformer will have a high resistance z
Earthing Transformer rated to perhaps several hundred kVA
z
z
Open Delta secondary voltage is not V SEC
Open Delta secondary voltage is not V
z SEC
A-E & B-E voltages now become full ph-ph potential
to limit the generator earth fault current to the z
A-E & B-E voltages now become full ph-ph potential
z
And are at 60 deg, not 120deg
z
And are at 60 deg, not 120deg
z
Open delta output is 3 x V
z
desired low level. The easiest way of achieving Open delta output is 3 x V
z
PCPC Melbourne 2012
SEC
SEC
PCPC Melbourne 2012
this is by increasing the secondary resistance of bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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the earthing transformer by connection of a
fault current limiting resistor in the delta winding. Essentially, this involves connection of the
secondary winding as an open delta configuration, with the required resistance in the open delta
path, as illustrated.
Note that under normal conditions, the open delta voltage will be zero. Only under a stator earth
fault condition will an open delta voltage be produced and only then will current flow through the
secondary resistance. This resistor is chosen to limit the stator earth fault current to the required
level.

A 95% stator earth fault protection scheme can
also be implemented by monitoring the voltage Generator
GeneratorEarthing
Earthingvia
viaEarthing
EarthingTransformer
Transformer
across the open delta connection. The open
N1 / N2
delta voltage will reach 3•Vo for a generator C
C
A
A
B
B
N1 / N2
Earthing Resistance
95% Stator
Earthing Resistance
RA EF95% Stator
Protection
terminal earth fault. RA EF Protection
100% Stator
A 100% stator earth fault scheme can also be EF100% Stator
Injection
EF Injection
Signal
RB
RB
Signal
implemented by injecting a signal into the open
delta secondary system. Such a scheme is
illustrated where the total earthing resistance is
governed by the summated resistance of
RA+RB. RA+RB also act as a potential divider for PCPC Melbourne 2012
PCPC Melbourne 2012
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the 95% stator earth fault protection scheme, bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
the setting of which also depends on the ratio of the interposing isolation transformer. As for the
100% injection scheme, the normal signal will depend on the resistance RB, but under generator fault
conditions extra signal will also flow via the open delta and RA.
1.3.4 S TATOR I NTER ‐T URN P ROTECTION

If a turn to turn fault occurs within one phase of the generator stator winding, such a shorted turn
fault will not be detected by the biased or high impedance differential protection schemes. Also, if a
stator shorted turn fault does not involve earth, it will not be detected by the stator earth fault or
restricted earth fault protection schemes.
Apart from the obvious damage from the fault current itself, such an event will result in a mechanical
unbalance on the generator and is likely to lead to shaft and / or bearing damage.
The generator may be wound with parallel
Transverse
TransverseDifferential
Protection
sections for each phase of the stator winding.
This design feature can be utilised to allow A
A
detection of shorted stator turns faults (not
involving earth). This is illustrated where, for B
B
simplicity, only C phase protection is shown in
detail. The transverse differential scheme is C
C
based on the subtraction of currents in both
BIAS ELEMENTS
parallel sections by connecting CTs in antiphase. BIAS ELEMENTS
R
Under normal (balanced) conditions both R
section currents are equal. The CT secondary PCPC Melbourne 2012

PCPC Melbourne 2012
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bias elements and the protection relay only measures a small spill current. This mismatch or spill
current will occur due to unbalance between currents in the sections of the phase winding due to
manufacturing tolerances and also due to CT mismatch. However, if stator turns in either section are
shorted, there will be a proportional unbalance in section currents. This unbalance current will flow
into the protection relay which can then trip the generator. Of course, the trip and bias settings must
not only allow for spill currents under normal conditions, but also under heavy through fault
conditions.

Transverse differential protection, as described above, is suitable for the detection of inter‐turn
faults, but requires CTs on each of the separate phase windings. Furthermore, it depending on the
sensitivity of the differential scheme, it may require a considerable number of turns to be shorted
before such a scheme will operate.
A simpler and more sensitive scheme may be
Interturn
InterturnProtection
Protection
achieved by monitoring all three phase voltages.
These will be balanced under healthy
conditions. Via a star / open delta VT system,
the secondary voltage will, under healthy
conditions, summate to zero. This protection
scheme is illustrated.
Note that the star point of the VT HV winding is
Interturn
Interturn
not connected to earth, but is connected to the VT Star point NOT
VT but
earthed, Starconnected
point NOTto
Protection
Protection
Hence, we
Hence,
measure we
phase
earthed, butstar
connected measure phase
unbalance, not
generator point, to
neutral point of the generator, ABOVE the generator star point,
above the earthing resistor
above the earthing resistor
unbalance,
3.Vo
3.Vo
not
PCPC Melbourne 2012
earthing resistor. With this connection, and PCPC Melbourne 2012
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with high resistance earthing of the generator,
the inter‐turn protection will be immune to stator earth faults. However, the scheme will be sensitive
to any mismatch between the output voltages on the three phases. Inter‐turn protection is thus
achieved, as such a fault will cause the line voltages to become unbalanced.
1.3.5 R OTOR E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

The rotor is an unearthed DC system. If a single
rotor earth fault occurs, this will not give rise to Rotor
RotorEarth
EarthFault
FaultProtection
Protection
any fault current and hence is not a serious
z Unearthed system
problem. However, if a second earth fault were z Unearthed system
z Single Fault not a major problem - Delayed tripping
z Single Fault not a major problem - Delayed tripping
to then occur, part of the rotor DC winding will z Double Fault is a major problem - Instantaneous tripping
z Double Fault is a major problem - Instantaneous tripping
– Arcing and burning damage due to current flow
be short circuited, giving rise to an unbalanced – Arcing and burning damage due to current flow
– Mechanical damage due to unbalanced mechanical forces
– Mechanical damage due to unbalanced mechanical forces
DC field. There will be damage to the excitation This may be disastrous !!!!!
This may be disastrous !!!!!
z Monitor DC insulation level - Usually 2 stages
system due to the fault current itself. However, z Monitor DC insulation level - Usually 2 stages
– Alarm when DC insulation falls a little
– Alarm when DC insulation falls a little
of far more concern is the fact that the rotor – Trip when DC insulation becomes unacceptably low
– Trip when DC insulation becomes unacceptably low
magnetic field will now be unbalanced, resulting
in an unbalanced magnetic pull with mechanical PCPC Melbourne 2012
PCPC Melbourne 2012
damage to bearings, couplings, etc. In addition, bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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there is the possibility of damage to the rotor winding as the AVR increases the rotor current as it
tries to maintain rotor flux in spite of the turns of the rotor which have been shorted out.
Also, once a single rotor earth fault occurs, the probability of a second earth fault occurring is
increased. Normally the rotor is floating with respect to earth potential so electrical breakdown of
insulation is unlikely. However, if an earth fault does occur (perhaps due to mechanical abrasion),
this will establish an earth reference. Now, with this earth reference, an electrical potential exists
between earth and the rest of the rotor winding, significantly increasing the probability of electrical
breakdown of insulation.
Rotor earth fault protection simply involves measuring the resistance to earth. This may be done in a
number of ways:

Shown is a tapped resistor connected in parallel
with the rotor winding. A simple potentiometer Rotor
RotorEarth
EarthFault
FaultProtectionProtection
Potentiometer
Potentiometer Method
Method
is used to measure the voltage between the
centre tap of this resistor and earth. Under Detects all Field
Detects
Winding allfaults
earth Field
normal conditions, with the unearthed rotor Winding
except earthfaults
mid-point faults
except mid-point faults
system, there is no earth reference and hence Field
Field
Winding
Winding Exciter
Exciter
the measured voltage will be zero. Should a
RR
rotor earth fault occur, the relay as illustrated
will measure a voltage. However, if the rotor
Push Button to detect
earth fault occurs at its centre point, the Push
Field Buttonmid-point
Winding
Field Winding
to detect
faults mid-point
faults
measured voltage will still be zero. To cover this PCPC Melbourne 2012
PCPC Melbourne 2012
case, the shunt resistor has a second tap. The bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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power station operation will manually toggle to
this second tap. This would be done perhaps once during every 8 hour shift. If there is no rotor earth
fault, the relay still measures zero. If an earth fault has occurred near to the rotor centre point, then
the relay normally measures zero, but will indicate the fault when toggled to the second tap position.
Shown is rotor protection based on a DC
injection scheme. Without any rotor earth fault, Rotor
RotorEarth
EarthFault
FaultProtection
Protection
Injection Method
Injection Method
there is no earth reference, negligible current Detects all Field
Detects allfaults
Field
Winding earth
Winding
even earth faults
when generator is
flows (capacitive current only) and the even when generator is
off-line
off-line
protection remains stable. However, an earth Field
Field
Winding
fault at any point on the rotor will be detected Winding Exciter
Exciter
with injected current being limited only by the
high impedance relay. This protection is active
even when the rotor is not energised. Thus, a Auxiliary
Auxiliary
Supply
RR Supply
rotor earth fault may be detected before the
rotor is energised and further damage will be PCPC Melbourne 2012
PCPC Melbourne 2012
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Typically, more than one level of detection is provided, for example:
• Rotor earth resistance > 80kΩ. Rotor is healthy; no action.
• Rotor earth resistance < 80kΩ. Provide the operator with an alarm so that a controlled shut down
of the generator may be initiated as soon as convenient.
• Rotor earth resistance < 5kΩ. Trip the generator. Tripping is initiated here due to concern over
the disastrous consequences should a second earth fault subsequently occur.


1.3.6 G ENERATOR C IRCUIT B REAKER (GCB) F AIL P ROTECTION

Correct operation of the generator circuit breaker (GCB) in tripping for faults and/or generator and/or
power system events is imperative. Failure to do so is certain to lead to damage to the generator
and/or prime mover.
Tripping of the generator also initiates a GCB Fail Timer. If the GCB has not interrupted the fault
current before this timer operates, there has been a failure and tripping of transmission system CB’s
is required. The performance of the GCB is monitored in two ways:
The GCB current is monitored. If this does not
fall to zero within the preset time, the GCB is Generator
GeneratorCB
CBFail
FailProtection
Protection
deemed to have failed to operate. CB failure Breaker Fail
z To initiate backup tripping Breaker
Current Fail
Check
z To initiate backup tripping
protection based on the current check principle of remote CBs
Current Check
of remote CBs
has a number of advantages, for example: – High fault current events Generator CB
– High fault current events Generator
TRIP Signal CB
TRIP Signal
– Low fault current events
– Low fault current events
• It provides coverage for faults in the blind z Current Check
z Current Check & &
Generator CB status
Generator
based on CB status
based onContact Operation
Auxiliary
z CB Contacts & & Auxiliary Contact Operation
spot between the CTs and CB. z CB Contacts
• It covers the case where the CB may actually 0.15
0.15
sec
0.20
0.20
sec
sec sec
operate but still fails to clear the fault,
perhaps due to failure in the operating Trip
Trip
Trip
Trip
PCPC Melbourne 2012
mechanism. PCPC Melbourne 2012
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There are cases in which low values of current
require CB tripping. For example a transformer Buchholz relay may trip for a very small current flow.
Stator earth faults are also limited to only a couple of amps by the neutral earthing resistor. Reverse
power trips will involve only small currents, just sufficient to overcome windage losses. Despite the
high sensitivity of the current measuring elements, these cannot be set low enough to react to these
low values of current and thus will not be able to determine if the CB has tripped correctly.
To overcome this deficiency, the breaker failure relay can accept information giving the position of
the circuit breaker from a breaker auxiliary contact. Instead of fault current flow, information from
the breaker itself is then evaluated.
The advantages of both methods of detecting CB failure (ie. current check and CB auxiliary contact)
can be realised by implementing both schemes in parallel. The delay time is selected so that it is
longer than the maximum tripping time of the monitored circuit breaker (including arcing time), plus
GCB auxiliary contact time or the resetting time of the current detector elements. The set time delay
is independent of the resetting time of the main protective relay as the current detection reacts to
clearance of fault current only.


1.4 G ENERATOR AND / OR T RANSMISSION S YSTEM E VENTS
Events, as opposed to actual fault conditions,
POWER CONTROL and
either occurring within the power station (such POWER CONTROL and
PROTECTION COURSE
PROTECTION COURSE
as AVR problems) or external to the power MELBOURNE 2012
MELBOURNE 2012
station (such as unbalanced loading) will
eventually cause damage to the generator GENERATOR
GENERATOR
PROTECTION
PROTECTION
and/or prime mover. Rapid tripping is not
warranted. In fact, for external events, tripping
must be delayed for as long as possible to allow Generator
Generatorand
and
operator intervention. Otherwise, with all Transmission
TransmissionEvents
Events
generators at a given power station being Barrie Moor, B Eng (Elec) Produced in collaboration with
equally affect by that event, the likely scenario PCPC Melbourne 2012

PCPC Melbourne 2012
is the simultaneous tripping of all of those bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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generators. Generators at nearby power stations will already be affected, perhaps with their tripping
also being imminent. Now, with one power station tripped off‐line, the system event will be even
more onerous to those adjacent stations. Their tripping and a system shut down is very likely.
Conversely, such an event must not be allowed to actually damage the generators and hence time
delayed tripping is warranted. An alarm is initiated as soon as the event is detected to allow power
system operators time to intervene. Schemes to provide the necessary protection for such events are
discussed below.
1.4.1 G ENERATOR I SLANDING AND / OR T RIPPING

Modern generators may be able to withstand a
total load rejection from operation at full load Generator
GeneratorProtection
Protection
to operation in an island condition where the
z Generator Event
generator is isolated from the power system z Generator Event
z External Event
z External Event
and only supplies its own auxiliaries. This is z And, for both of these, consider the effects of ...
z And, for both of these, consider the effects of ...
– Tripping of Generator
possible for example, if steam by‐pass systems – Tripping of Generator
– Islanding of Generator
– Islanding of Generator
are installed so that excess steam can be
dumped directly into the condensor rather than
having to pass through the turbines.
The capability to react quickly and then to
PCPC Melbourne 2012
continue operation in such a manner is PCPC Melbourne 2012
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advantageous when events occur on the bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
transmission system which would harm the generator should the machine not be disconnected from
the power system. Rather than shutting the machine down completely (eg. by tripping its GCB) it can
simply be ‘islanded’ from the power system by tripping transmission system CB’s only. In this way the
generator continues to operate and is ready to be brought back on‐line as soon as the transmission
system disturbance has been eliminated. Otherwise, if a steam generator is shut down completely, it
will take considerable time, perhaps several hours, to return to full load.
Thus, protection against generator damage due to system events is often staged, with initial
operations tripping transmission system CB’s and safely islanding the generator. Final stages of these

protection schemes then trip the GCB and shut the machine down. These serve as a back‐up to the
first stages and also ensure that the generator is protected should the event actually prove to be a
generator problem rather than a system problem.
1.4.2 S TATOR O VER L OAD (O VER C URRENT ) P ROTECTION

Stator Overcurrent protection is a slow
protection based on an inverse time Stator
StatorOverload
OverloadProtection
Protection
characteristic designed to prevent damage to
z Thermal Overload Capacity
z Thermal Overload Capacity
the stator due to the thermal effects of
continual operation at excessive load. The Const
t t== Const
I I2 2−−11
rating of the prime mover will generally limit the
z Start Stage
z Start Stage
active power output, but under sustained over‐ – Alarm
– Alarm
excitation the reactive power output may lead z Tripping Stage
z Tripping Stage
– Delayed to allow time for operator action
to excessive current. The relay should include a – Delayed to allow time for operator action
– But within the machine capability
– But within the machine capability
thermal memory feature to simulate pre‐fault z Thermal memory
z Thermal memory
loading and also cooling characteristics of the PCPC Melbourne 2012

PCPC Melbourne 2012
generator following an overload. The basic bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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purpose of this protection is to provide back‐up protection to the machine in the event of unusual
circumstances such as AVR failure, sustained over‐excitation or loss of field.
The principle behind this type of protection is to
Stator
StatorOverload
OverloadCapability
Capability
provide a thermal replica of the machines stator 4
1 10 4
1 10
winding and trip if the temperature rise due to
Seconds
Seconds
load current increases at a rate greater than the 1000
1000
generator stator capability as advised by the
manufacturer. A typical equation for a machine 100
100
Manufacturer’s
previously running at 100% of rated load is: Manufacturer’s
Adiabatic
Adiabatic
10 Curve Const
10 Curve
Const t = Const
t = I 2 2− 1
t= 2 I −1
I −1 1
11 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Generator Current (pu)
where I = pu current PCPC Melbourne 2012
PCPC Melbourne 2012
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The time constant specified for large generators bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
may be many 10’s of seconds.
Note that the simple ‘(I2‐1).t=Const’ equation assumes adiabatic conditions (ie. no heat dissipation).
This produces an ‘elbow’ in the manufacturer’s curve.
Analysing the stator overload performance of a generator on the basis of adiabatic conditions is valid
for large overloads where the heating will occur quickly. However, for low level overloads, there will
be some heat dissipation. That is, the ‘elbow’ on the manufacturer’s adiabatic curve is overly
conservative. The true capability of the generator will be a curve allowing for stator cooling similar to
that shown. This curve approaches asymptotically both the ‘(I2‐1).t=Const’ curve and the continuous
capability curve, without the ‘elbow’ that is evident in the manufacturer’s curve.

An equation which attempts to allow for the
Stator
StatorOverload
OverloadCapability
Capability
cooling effects at low stator overloads is: 4
1 10 4
1 10
− Const ⎡ ⎛ I RATED 2 − 1⎞ ⎤
Seconds
t= ⋅ ln ⎢1 − ⎜ Curve Allowing
Seconds
⎟⎥ 1000 Curve Allowing
for
I RATED 2 − 1 ⎣ ⎝ I 2 − 1 ⎠ ⎦
1000
for
Stator Cooling
Stator Cooling
− Const ⎡ ⎛I 2
−2 1 ⎞ ⎤ ⎤
100
t = − Const ⋅ ln ⎢1⎡− ⎜⎜ ⎛ rated
I rated − ⎟⎟1⎥⎞
The exact equation will depend on machine 100
t =I rated 2 −2 1 ⋅ ln ⎢1 − ⎜ 2
−
2 1
I rated − 1 ⎣⎢ ⎣⎢ ⎝ ⎜⎝ I − 1 ⎠ ⎦⎥⎟⎠ ⎦⎥
I ⎟⎥
Manufacturer’s
Manufacturer’s
design, cooling facilities, windage, cooling time Adiabatic
Adiabatic
10 Curve Const
10 Curve t = Const
constants etc. However, lacking this t = I 2 2− 1
I −1
information, the above equation should give 1
11 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
reasonable results. 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
1.8 2
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The Stator Overload relay should also include bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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some form of thermal memory. In this way, if a
machine is cycled in and out of overload, the relay does not reset every time the current falls below
the pick‐up value, but instead decrements its thermal memory to simulate rotor cooling.
Stator Overload relay operation will comprise the following:
• An alarm on pick‐up. This alerts the power station and transmission system operators of the
problem. Action can then be taken to rectify the problem and hence prevent tripping of
generators. The alarm setting will be based on the generator continuous capability. The alarm is
usually time delayed for a few seconds to prevent nuisance alarms occurring every time there is
some system problem (eg. a transmission system fault).
• Tripping according to the Stator Overload relay curve set to coordinate with the generator stator
overload capability.
Stator Overload relays may also include a definite time trip set to say 300 seconds. This long time trip
ensures definite relay operation just above its pick‐up setting and still allows sufficient time for
remedial action to be taken by power system operators.
In the case of small generators, the stator VOLTAGE CONTROLLED OVERCURRENT
VOLTAGE CONTROLLED OVERCURRENT
protection may be simply a voltage controlled TIME
TIME
overcurrent relay as illustrated. Under normal
and/or overload conditions, the voltage is Overload characteristic
Overload
(Voltage characteristic
Normal)
(Voltage Normal)
healthy and the relay performs in accordance
with the upper characteristic. However, in the
event of a fault, either on the generator system
or close‐in on the transmission system, the
Fault Characteristic
voltage will fall and the relay characteristic is Fault Characteristic
(Voltage Depressed)
(Voltage Depressed)
modified accordingly to the lower curve shown.
CURRENT
This provides for rapid clearance of actual PCPC Melbourne 2012
PCPC Melbourne 2012
CURRENT
generator and/or system faults (usually in a bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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back‐up capacity) and reasonable coordination
with the stator overcurrent capability for slower clearance of sustained stator overload events.

1.4.3 N EGATIVE P HASE S EQUENCE P ROTECTION

Unbalanced faults on the transmission network, or within the generator zone, and even unbalanced
loading conditions on the transmission system, result in negative phase sequence currents flowing in
the generator stator windings. Of particular concern would be an open phase on the transmission
system, an event which may persist for some time. The negative phase sequence currents in the
stator effectively produce a flux rotating at synchronous speed in the opposite direction to the rotor.
This results in rotor eddy currents at double the synchronous speed. As the rotor magnetic circuit is
not laminated, these eddy currents can be very large even for only a few percent negative sequence
current in the stator circuit. In extreme cases, heating can be so severe that rotor slot wedges soften,
resulting in their extrusion by centrifugal force and impact on the stator. Note that a sustained
unbalance on the transmission system (eg. due to a failed pole on a CB) may affect generators in a
wide area. For this reason, tripping of generators must be delayed for as long as possible to allow
time for remedial action by power system operators, but nevertheless, the NPS protection must be
correctly coordinated with the generator NPS capability to trip before the generator is damaged.
The generator manufacturer will advise the
negative phase sequence capability of the NPS
NPSProtection
Protection
machine on the basis of the equation: z Reverse rotating stator flux cuts the rotor at double
z Reverse rotating stator flux cuts the rotor at double
frequency
frequency
Const
t= 2
z Rotor is not laminated
z Rotor is not laminated
– Results in significant rotor eddy current heating effects
INPS
– Results in significant rotor eddy current heating effects
z Long time tripping
z Long time tripping
– To allow time for operator intervention
– To allow time for operator intervention
Where INPS is the negative phase sequence
current expressed as a fraction of the rated load I2I2tt==const
const
current (ie. per unit on machine rating).
The generator will also have a continuous PCPC Melbourne 2012
PCPC Melbourne 2012
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manufacturer’s information supplied for a large
steam turbine generator. In this case, the constant is 10 seconds and the continuous capability is
7.5% (ie. 0.075 pu) of the generator rated current. Because of their larger thermal mass, the time
constant for hydro‐generators is likely to be in the vicinity of 30 seconds.
Note that the simple ‘I2t=Const’ equation NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE PROTECTION
NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE PROTECTION
assumes adiabatic conditions (ie. no heat Continuous NPS Rating

Continuous NPS Rating
Generator NPS Constant
I 2R
I 2R
Const
8.%
8.%
10
Generator NPS Constant Const 10
dissipation). This produces an ‘elbow’ in the Manufacturers Formula
Manufacturers Formula
2
I . t2
I .t
Const
Const
t
t
Const
Const
2
I2 2
I2
manufacturer’s curve. Analysing the NPS
performance of a generator on the basis of
4
1 10
adiabatic conditions is valid for large NPS SECONDS
1 10
4
SECONDS
100 0
currents where the heating will occur quickly. 100 0
However, for low level NPS overloads, there will 100
100
be some heat dissipation. That is, the ‘elbow’ 10
10
on the manufacturer’s adiabatic curve is overly 1
1
conservative. 0.1
0.10.0 1 0.1 1 10
0.0 1 0.1 1 NPS CURRENT 10
Standard Manufactuers NPS Formula NPS CURRENT
Standard Manufactuers NPS Formula

The true capability of the generator will be a
curve allowing for stator cooling similar to that NPS
NPSCapability
Capability
shown. This curve approaches asymptotically
z For NPS heating over a longer time, allow for heat
both the ‘I2t=Const’ curve and the continuous z For NPS heating over a longer time, allow for heat
dissipated
dissipated
capability curve, without the ‘elbow’ that is
−K ⎡ ⎡ ⎛ I ⎞ 2 ⎤2 ⎤
evident in the manufacturer’s curve. t t== −2K⋅ ln ⎢1 − ⎜ ⎛2IR2R⎟ ⎞ ⎥
I2IR 2 ⋅ ln⎣⎢ ⎢1 −⎜⎝ ⎜⎜I2I ⎟⎠ ⎟⎟ ⎦⎥ ⎥
An equation which attempts to allow for the 2R ⎣⎢ ⎝ 2 ⎠ ⎦⎥
cooling effects at low NPS overloads is:
− Const ⎡ ⎛ INPS ⎞
2
⎤
t= ⋅ ln ⎢1 − ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ ⎥
( )
RATED
2
⎢⎣ ⎝ INPS ⎥⎦
PCPC Melbourne 2012
INPSRATED ⎠
PCPC Melbourne 2012
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The exact equation will depend on machine NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE PROTECTION

NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE PROTECTION
Continuous NPS Rating I 2R 8.%
design, cooling facilities, windage, cooling time Continuous NPS Rating
I 2R
Const
Const
8.%
10
10
Const
constants etc. However, lacking this Manufacturers Formula
Manufacturers Formula
2.
I t
2
I .t
Const
Const
t
t
Const
I 2
2
2
I 2
information, the above equation should give
2
GEC Formula including Const . I 2R
2
GEC Formula
allowance for heatincluding
dissi pation t Const ln 1 I
allowance for heat dissi pation t I 2R
2 . ln 1 I 2 2R
2 I 2
I 2R
reasonable results. 1 10
4
4
1 10
SECONDS
The Negative Phase Sequence relay should also SECONDS
1000
1000
include some form of thermal memory. In this 100
100
way, if a machine is cycled in and out of NPS 10
10
overload, the relay does not reset every time 1
1
the NPS current falls below the pick‐up value, 0.1
0.10.01 0.1 1 10
but instead decrements its thermal memory to 0.01
Standard
GEC Manufactuers
NPS Formula NPS
including
0.1
Standard Manufactuers NPS Formula
Formula
heat dissipation ef fects
1 NPS CURRENT
NPS CURRENT
10
GEC NPS Formula including heat dissipation ef fects
simulate rotor cooling.
NPS relay operation will comprise the following:
• An alarm on pick‐up. This alerts the power station and transmission system operators of the
problem. Action can then be taken to rectify the problem and hence prevent tripping of
generators. The alarm setting will be based on the generator continuous NPS capability. The
alarm is usually time delayed for a few seconds to prevent nuisance alarms occurring every time
there is some system problem (eg. a transmission system fault).
• Tripping according to the NPS relay curve set to coordinate with the generator NPS capability.
• NPS relays may also include a long time trip set to say 1000 seconds. This definite time trip
ensures relay operation just above its pick‐up setting and still allows sufficient time for remedial
action to be taken by power system operators.
Note that stator earth faults will not be seen by the NPS relay as the NPS setting will exceed the
maximum earth fault current. Maximum earth fault current is generally limited to only a few amps by
the neutral grounding system.


1.4.4 O VER ‐V OLTAGE P ROTECTION

Over‐voltages can be caused by :‐
Over
OverVoltage
VoltageProtection
Protection
• Faulty operation of the Automatic Voltage
Regulator (AVR) z Causes
z Causes
– AVR malfunction
• Incorrect manual operation of the excitation – AVR malfunction
– Transmission system major load rejection
– Transmission system major load rejection
system z Time delay
z Time delay
– To allow time for transmission system causes to be
– To allow time for transmission system causes to be
• Load shedding during manual control of the rectified (eg. By tripping of capacitor banks)
rectified (eg. By tripping of capacitor banks)
z Effects
excitation system z Effects
– Over Voltage damage to insulation
– Over Voltage damage to insulation
• Separation of the generator or power station – Over Excitation heating effects
– Over Excitation heating effects
block from the system
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consequence of over‐voltages. Over‐voltages also result in the magnetic circuits of these items of
plant operating well above the knee point on their B‐H curve. The increased magnetising current
then thermally endangers generators and transformers. The stressing created is proportional to the
flux density, that is, proportional to the ratio, voltage/frequency (Volts/Hz). Thus, for this protection,
it is better to use over‐excitation protection, as it measures the ratio of voltage to frequency. A
simple voltage protection relay may then be used as a final back‐up protection and also to ensure
rapid tripping in the case of large over‐voltages which may actually endanger the plant insulation.
Over‐voltage protection is intended as a back‐up against (AVR) failure or an accidental over‐voltage
when the AVR is under manual control. To prevent the relay from operating due to sudden load
changes, short circuits or traveling waves (surges) on transmission lines, a short time delay is
incorporated.
1.4.5 O VER ‐E XCITATION P ROTECTION

The cause of over‐excitation is either an
increase in voltage or a decrease in frequency, Over
OverExcitation
ExcitationProtection
Protection
either of which can endanger generators and/or
transformers. Over‐excitation leads to an VV==44.44
.44⋅ ⋅ff⋅ ⋅NN⋅ ⋅φφmax
increase in flux above the rated value which max
leads to quick saturation of the iron core. V 11
Modern generators can withstand excitation
φφmax == V⋅ ⋅
.44⋅ ⋅NN
ff 44.44
max
only a few percent above nominal without
V
excessive magnetising current and subsequent φφmax ∝∝ V
max ff
overheating. Application of excitation during
run‐up or run‐down may occur well away from PCPC Melbourne 2012
PCPC Melbourne 2012
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concern.
Power station transformers which are separated from the network and connected only to the
generator are also endangered. This is exacerbated by the fact that generator transformers are
normally operated at a very high flux density, perhaps even above the knee point of the B‐H curve. In

older installations, the generator transformer tends to be the more critical component as far as over
fluxing problems are concerned.
Sustained over‐excitation is reasonably unlikely
Over
OverExcitation
Protection
while connected to the transmission system.
Nevertheless, with modern machines having z Flux depends on
z Flux depends on
– Voltage
little margin above normal operating levels, this – Voltage
– Frequency
– Frequency
protection is now usually configured to be z GCB Interlocking
z GCB Interlocking
operative during run‐up, run‐down, and also – May only be active when GCB is open
– May only be active when GCB is open
– May be set to trip excitation only when the GCB is open
– May be set to trip excitation only when the GCB is open
while connected to the transmission system. z Several Stages
z Several Stages
Note that events on the transmission system z Coordination with O/V Protection
z Coordination with O/V Protection
z Reset Ratio
can cause this protection to momentarily pick z Reset Ratio
– To ensure Over Excitation protection resets OK after
– To ensure Over Excitation protection resets OK after
up, and it is imperative that the relays have a clearance of transmission system events.
clearance of transmission system events.
PCPC Melbourne 2012
high reset ratio (eg. >98%), to ensure that they PCPC Melbourne 2012
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reset once the disturbance has been eliminated.
Otherwise, the V/Hz over‐excitation protection may be configured to be active only during the critical
times of machine run‐up and run‐down, and to be disabled during normal operation when connected
to the power system. This is on the basis that sustained over‐voltage or under‐frequency operation is
extremely unlikely while connected to the transmission network.
The over‐excitation protection scheme may be staged with alarm and time delayed trip levels. This
allows the operator time to take corrective action. For example, the voltage/frequency settings may
be divided into two stages, as illustrated, which also shows coordination of this protection with the
over‐voltage scheme, as discussed above.
Stage 1 (High Set)
• Instantaneous: For protection during run‐up GeneratorOver
Generator
Generator
Generator
Allowable
GeneratorOver
GeneratorOver
VoltsCapability
Excitation
Excitation
Allowable
/ Hertz
VoltsCapability
OverExcitation
/ Hertz
ExcitationCapability
Capability
1000
periods, the instantaneous tripping may be 1000
Generator Over Excitation
Generator Over Excitation
Capability
SECONDS
interlocked with the generator circuit SECONDS
Capability
Trip GCB
breaker (GCB) via an auxiliary contact which 100
100
Trip GCB
Trip Switchyard CB’s
Trip Switchyard CB’s
is CLOSED when the GCB is OPEN. Should Over Excitation
Over Excitation
Stage 2
Stage 2
over‐excitation occur, due to an AVR mal‐ Over Excitation

Over Excitation
Stage 1
10 (GCB Stage 1
Closed)
(GCB Closed)
function or a fault on the exciter, the exciter 10
only is tripped instantaneously. The turbine Over Excitation

Over Excitation
Stage 1
Over Voltage
(GCB Open Stage
during1run-up)
(GCB Open during run-up) Over Voltage
Protection
stop valves are not closed, thus allowing run‐ 1
11 1.025 1.05 1.075 1.1 1.125 1.15 1.175 1.2
Protection
1.225 1.25 1.275 1.3
1 1.025 1.05 1.075 1.1 1.125 1.15 1.175 1.2 1.225 1.25 1.275 1.3
Volts / Hertz (pu)
up to proceed. The protection should be self Allowable Volts / Hertz
Allowable Volts / Hertz
Volts / Hertz (pu)
resetting.
• Delayed: With the GCB closed, delayed tripping is provided. This protection should latch once
initiated, as the fault is associated with the AVR or exciter. The GCB, exciter and turbine stop
valves are tripped.
Thus, for the example shown, the Stage 1 settings are:
• V/Hz pick‐up = 1.09 pu
• Long time delay = 25 seconds : (GCB closed : Trip GCB)
• Short time delay = instantaneous : (GCB open : Trip excitation only)

Stage 2 (Low Set)
This stage is set close to the maximum continuous operating level as specified by the Permissible
Over‐excitation Curve and initiates an alarm before tripping the generator. The operator must then
take action or tripping will occur in a short time.
The figure illustrates a scheme with two time delays provided:
• The first time delay is interlocked with the GCB auxiliary contact which is CLOSED when the GCB is
CLOSED and will only trip transmission switchyard CB's. This protection will cover overfluxing due
to transmission system faults and rapid loss of load conditions. Hence, the machine will be in an
island condition after the first time delay has expired, ready for reconnection to the system once
the disturbance has cleared. This stage must be self resetting.
• The second time delay, also interlocked with the GCB auxiliary contact is set longer than the first.
If the over‐excitation condition persists after opening the of the transmission switchyard CB's, the
fault must therefore be within the generator zone and requires machine shutdown. The
protection should latch to prevent an attempt at run‐up. The second time delay (machine trip)
setting must be just greater than the first time delay (switchyard trip) setting.
Thus, for the example shown, the Stage 2 settings are:
• V/Hz pick‐up = 1.05 pu
• Short time delay = 70 seconds : Trip transmission switchyard CB’s
• Long time delay = 85 seconds : Trip GCB
1.4.6 R EVERSE P OWER P ROTECTION

Reverse power protection protects against loss
Reverse
ReversePower
PowerProtection
Protection
of the prime mover, and usually incorporates a
short time delay to allow for transient z Causes
Causes
z
– Loss of prime mover
conditions caused by load shifts or paralleling of – Loss of prime mover
– Out of step events
– Out of step events
– Inadvertent GCB closure
machines. Prime mover failure will cause the – Inadvertent GCB closure
– GCB closure without excitation
– GCB closure without excitation
z Consequences
generator to run as a motor and drive the z Consequences
– Fire hazard
– Fire hazard
turbine with the driving power being derived – Shaft damage
– Shaft damage
– Turbine blade damage (eg. due to loss of steam cooling)
– Turbine blade damage (eg. due to loss of steam cooling)
from the power system. Thus, the reverse z Tripping
z Tripping
– High speed during genuine reverse power “faults”
– High speed during genuine reverse power “faults”
power protection has to be set low enough to – Low speed during normal machine shut down
– Low speed during normal machine shut down
(eg to ensure steam valves are “really” closed)
(eg to ensure steam valves are “really” closed)
detect windage and friction losses under these
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Reverse power can be caused by:
• Accidental trip of the prime mover.
• Out of step operation.
• Inadvertent Generator Circuit Breaker (GCB) closure while the unit is on rolling gear.
• GCB closure without excitation.
The following damage may be sustained from reverse power conditions:
• Shaft damage when attempting to start the machine as an induction motor.

• Overheating of the turbine blades due to the loss of turbine steam flow. Turbine steam flow
under normal conditions actually provides ventilation for the turbine blades. Conversely, turbine
rotation in trapped steam overheats the blades and shaft.
• Fire hazard in the case of gas turbines or diesel generators where unburnt fuel may be present.
The reverse power relay is also used to open the generator CB during the shut down procedure. If
the GCB were opened before steam valves were fully shut, the machine would accelerate until
tripped by over‐speed protection devices. However, allowing the machine to go into the motoring
mode during shut down ensures that the energy source to the prime mover has truly been
disconnected and the GCB can be safely opened. Settings as low as 0.5% of machine rating may be
necessary to detect the windage and other losses associated with a machine operating in the
motoring mode.
The reverse power relay typically has two time stages to facilitate tripping. These stages are:
• Short time delay, when the turbine steam trip valve is closed, for emergency tripping.
• Long time delay, when the turbine steam trip valve is open, for normal unit shut‐down.
The second time stage therefore also provides back‐up for the first stage.
1.4.7 L OSS OF E XCITATION AND U NDER ‐E XCITATION P ROTECTION

If the excitation of a machine is lost, it will
continue to run as an induction generator at Under
UnderExcitation
Protection
slightly higher than synchronous speed, drawing
z Total loss of excitation
its magnetising current from the system. This z Total loss of excitation
– Operation as an induction generator
– Operation as an induction generator
magnetising current, together with load current, – Rotor slip frequency current thermal damage
– Rotor slip frequency current thermal damage
z Under excitation due to generator (eg AVR) faults
may exceed the rating of the generator. The z Under excitation due to generator (eg AVR) faults
– High speed tripping
– High speed tripping
reactive power drawn from the system will z Under excitation due to system events
z Under excitation due to system events
– Delayed tripping
depress system voltages and therefore affect – Delayed tripping
– Multi stage tripping
– Multi stage tripping
the performance of other generators. Increased
reactive power flow in the transmission system
may also trip some feeders, further affecting PCPC Melbourne 2012
PCPC Melbourne 2012
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importantly, since the rotor is operating at a
speed above system frequency, slip frequency
eddy currents induced in the rotor will cause Generator
GeneratorCapability
CapabilityDiagram
Diagram
local heating. This rotor overheating is typically
Prime Mover (MW)
the primary cause for damage during an under‐ PrimeLimit
Mover (MW)
Limit
MW
MW
Stator Current (MVA)
Stator Limit
Current (MVA)
Limit
excitation condition. Instantaneous tripping is
only required for complete loss of excitation. Stability Field
Stability
Limit Field
Current
Limit Current
Limit
We can consider the generator excitation Limit
requirements in relation to the capability
diagram. The upper limit of the capability
MVAr
diagram, namely the machines MW capability, is MVAr
PCPC Melbourne 2012
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and the stator current limitations. The right

hand side of the diagram is set by the maximum rotor field current, at which time the machine will be
exporting maximum reactive power to the system. Machine terminal voltage is at its maximum in
this case. The left hand side of the diagram relates to stability issues where the machine is likely to
drop out of synchronism with the remainder of the power system.
Typically, generators operate at a slight lagging power factor. That is; in the right hand section of the
capability diagram. However, at low excitation, operation near the stability limit on the left hand side
of the capability diagram ensues. Under‐excitation may be tolerated for some time and the
protection relay will be time delayed, providing the operator with an alarm to facilitate manual
intervention and/or allow time for excitation control systems to respond. Severe under‐excitation,
indicative of AVR problems, requires rapid intervention and tripping may occur in as little as two
seconds. Tripping for the total loss of excitation will be rapid and is typically set to occur after a time
delay in the range of 0.2 to 1 seconds.
Illustrated are a number of characteristics which
may be employed for loss of and/or under‐ Generator
GeneratorCapability
CapabilityDiagram
Diagram
excitation protection. The relay characteristic
MW
may, for example, be based on a number of MW
straight lines. These straight line characteristics
may then be combined to form a composite
characteristic, to more accurately model the
Loss ofof Under
generator capability. Conversely, the relay Loss
Loss
Lossofof
Excitation
Excitation
Excitation
Protection
Under
Under
Excitation
Under
Excitation
Excitation
Protection
Excitation
Protection Excitation
Protection
Protection
Protection Protection
Protection
characteristic may be circular, especially for the
total loss of excitation characteristic. If the MVAr
MVAr
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• If there is DC supply to the exciter, initiate an alarm, with tripping to subsequently occur after a
short time delay of say 10 seconds. Faster tripping is not necessary. This short delay will allow
time for excitation control systems to operate, if at all possible, and to remedy the situation
• If there is no DC supply to the exciter, there would appear to be an AVR problem. Faster tripping
is warranted, with a delay of perhaps only 2 or 3 seconds.
• Total loss of excitation, due perhaps to an AVR failure, will result in machine operation outside its
stability limits. This is detected by operation to the left of all characteristics. Rather than a
straight line for the total loss of excitation protection, a circular characteristic may be employed by
the relay manufacturer. Fast tripping is warranted in such situations, and a short delay of only 0.5
seconds would be typical.

A relay measuring the apparent impedance, as
viewed from the generator terminals, is used to Under
UnderExcitation
Protection
monitor the reactive power requirements of the
Results in a circle of
Results
infinite in a circle
diameter on the of
generator and thus monitor the status of its X
X
infinite
MW diameter
/ MVAr on the
diagram
…MW ie. /aMVAr diagram
straight line
… ie. a straight line
excitation system. Circular characteristics on
R
R
the ‘R‐X’ plane translate to straight line or Also results in a circle
Also results
on the in a circle
MW/MVAr
circular characteristics on the capability on the MW/MVAr
capability diagram
capability diagram
diagram. The relay manufacturer will provide
guidelines to establish the ‘R‐X’ circle Based on generator
Based on
impedance generator
parameters,
butimpedance
recommend parameters,
to check
parameters. It is recommended that these then thebut recommend
capability to check
diagram too.
the capability diagram too.
be redrawn on and compared with the actual PCPC Melbourne 2012

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generator capability diagram. This is easily bmoor9@yahoo.com.au
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achieved via application of the equation:
V2
P=
Z
1.4.8 U NDER F REQUENCY P ROTECTION

Under‐frequency relays are used to protect the
generator and turbine from damage caused by Under
UnderFrequency
FrequencyProtection
Protection
sustained on‐load operation at reduced
z Over Excitation Problems
z Over Excitation Problems
frequency. The cause of under‐frequency is – Best covered by genuine Over Excitation protection
– Best covered by genuine Over Excitation protection
z LP Turbine blade stress problems
either an excessive demand of active power on z LP Turbine blade stress problems
z Cumulative effects
z Cumulative effects
the network, or faulty operation of the governor – Allow for (say) 15 events in the machine’s lifetime
– Allow for (say) 15 events in the machine’s lifetime
or of the frequency regulator. z Multi-staged tripping
z Multi-staged tripping
– First stages to island the machine
– First stages to island the machine
– Final stage to trip the machine
Under‐frequency leads to increased magnetising – Final stage to trip the machine
currents in the electrical machines which can
cause impermissible increases in their operating
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V/Hz under‐excitation protection, as already
discussed.
However, under‐frequency can also cause a
reduction in the life of the steam turbine blades. Generator
Generator
Generator
Generator
Under
Under Frequence Capability
Frequency
Under
Under
Capability
Frequence Capability
Frequency Capability
The large LP (low pressure) turbine blades in 100
100
Continuous : 47.5 - 51 Hz
particular are stressed due to blade resonance Minutes
SECONDS
Minutes
SECONDS
during frequency droops while generating at full 10
10
load. This problem does not occur at no load.
Because the damage is ultimately due to
1
fatigue, the effects of under‐frequency 1
operation are cumulative, and protection relays
are set on the basis of a certain number of 0.1
45 45.5 46 46.5 47 47.5 48 48.5 49 49.5 50 50.5 51 51.5 52 52.5 53 53.5 54
0.1
45 45.5 46 46.5 47 47.5 48 48.5 49 49.5 50 50.5 51 51.5 52 52.5 53 53.5 54
events during the lifetime of the machine (For Turbine Life

Turbine Life
Frequency
Frequency
example; Settings may be based on the
cumulative effect of 15 events during the machine lifetime).

Hence, the generator protection under‐frequency settings should be chosen according to the turbine
frequency characteristic and not according to the system conditions. In fact, transmission system
under‐frequency load shedding schedules should be coordinated with the turbine and generator
protection settings, not the other way around.
Normally, under‐frequency load shedding will have taken account of the frequency droop before the
generator protection is required to operate. However, should the frequency continue to fall; the
accepted procedure is to island the machine and have it only supply power to its auxiliary systems.
This will permit the machine to be re‐connected quickly once the disturbance has passed. Note that,
in an island operation, the reverse power protection cannot operate should the prime mover fail.
However, should that occur, then as the frequency of the generator continues to fall, under‐
frequency protection will act to shut down the machine completely. This is the final protection for
the turbine, as the fault must be within the generator zone.
The under‐frequency settings may, for example,
Generator
Generator Under
be divided into four stages. In addition, there 100
Generator
Generator Under
100
may also be a final high‐set check alarm stage. Continuous : 47.5 - 51 Hz

Minutes
SECONDS
Minutes
The figure, as shown, is typical of the acceptable SECONDS
operating range of a large steam turbine 10
10
generator. At full load, operation in the range
47.5 to 52.5 Hz is permissible. However,
Complete Shutdown
1
Complete Shutdown
1
continued full load operation outside this range
Island
Island
will stress turbine blades. Typical under‐
frequency protection settings may be 47.5, 47.0, 0.1
45 45.5 46 46.5 47 47.5 48 48.5 49 49.5 50 50.5 51 51.5 52 52.5 53 53.5 54
0.1
45 45.5 46 46.5 47 47.5 48 48.5 49 49.5 50 50.5 51 51.5 52 52.5 53 53.5 54
Turbine Life Frequency
Frequency
46.5 and 46.0 Hz, as shown. Turbine Life
The time delay for each under‐frequency setting
will be based on the cumulative withstand time at the NEXT LOWER chosen setting point. The last
stage covers large disturbances and will be set to trip quickly. A short time delay of approximately 2
seconds should ensure stability against system transients, but, nevertheless, be sufficiently fast
enough to prevent turbine and/or generator damage. The last stage trips the generator, while the
earlier stages simply island the generator by tripping transmission system CB’s.
Usually an exception to this timing policy is
implemented with the second last stage. On the Under
UnderFrequency
FrequencyProtection
Protection
basis of the above policy, stage 3 would be set
z Cumulative effect
Cumulative effect
z
on the basis of the stage 4 withstand time. – Assume say 15 events over the machines lifetime
– Assume say 15 events over the machines lifetime
– Protection set to trip when 1/15th of life is used
However, it may be preferable to set stage 3 to – Protection set to trip when 1/15th of life is used
z Set each stage tripping time based on the withstand of the next
z Set each stage tripping time based on the withstand of the next
stage
trip faster than the final stage 4. This is because stage
z If stages 1-3 island and stage 4 trips the generator
z If stages 1-3 island and stage 4 trips the generator
stage 3 simply islands the generator, while stage – May be prudent to set stage 4 to a slower time than stage 3
– May be prudent to set stage 4 to a slower time than stage 3
– Provides for rapid fall in frequency and prevents unnecessary
– Provides for rapid fall in frequency and prevents unnecessary
4 trips it completely. tripping
tripping
– Stage 3 has already de-loaded the generator, so slower stage 4
– Stage 3 has already de-loaded the generator, so slower stage 4
time is OK
time is OK
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In summary:
• Stage 1 covers prolonged system conditions which have caused a slow reduction in frequency and
have not been cleared by load shedding. The time setting is to be related to Stage 2 conditions.
This stage will island the generator by tripping transmission system CB’s.
• Stage 2 covers fault conditions which may cause a rapid reduction in frequency. The time setting
is to be related to Stage 3 conditions. This stage will island the generator by tripping transmission
system CB’s.
• Stage 3 covers internal faults within the generator, turbine area and provides quick clearance.
(The time setting may be marginally less than for Stage 4, consistent with stability.) This stage will
island the generator by tripping transmission system CB’s.
• Stage 4 covers internal faults within the generator, turbine area and provides final clearance. (The
time setting may be the marginally more than for Stage 3, consistent with stability.) This stage will
trip the generator by tripping the GCB.
1.4.9 O VER F REQUENCY P ROTECTION

With reference to the figures associated with
the previous discussion on under‐frequency Over
OverFrequency
FrequencyProtection
Protection
protection, note that the generator and/or
z Many relays provide over frequency protection
z Many relays provide over frequency protection
turbine also have limits on over‐frequency z Not a problem for the turbine blades
z Not a problem for the turbine blades
operation. Thus, in the example given, – Typically the generator is unloaded in over frequency (over
– Typically the generator is unloaded in over frequency (over
speed) scenarios
speed) scenarios
operation at or above 52.5Hz will cause z Mechanical devices also provide over speed protection
z Mechanical devices also provide over speed protection
cumulative degradation of the machine.
However, the stressing of turbine blades occurs
only when the generator is loaded. At low loads
the allowable operating band is much wider. In
fact, at no load, the turbine blade stress PCPC Melbourne 2012
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away from nominal frequency, is necessary to allow the machine to run up and run‐down.
Therefore, the only way an over‐frequency event is likely to occur, is with a massive load rejection.
Then, with load reduced, the permissible band of operation is increased and such operation at higher
frequencies is not so critical. For this reason, electrical protection against over‐frequency operation
may not be employed. Where this function is already provided by a multi‐function relay, then it
would most likely be utilised by the protection design engineer. However, in older installations where
separate, discrete and expensive relays were employed for each individual protection function, over
frequency protection was seldom applied.
Nevertheless, over‐frequency (or over‐speed) events require intervention as the centrifugal forces
involved will also cause machine damage. This is usually achieved by mechanical means such as the
centrifugal forces acting on spring loaded “throw‐out bolts” to trip the machine at say 5% over‐speed.


1.4.10 O UT OF S TEP (P OLE S LIP ) P ROTECTION

Out‐of‐step (pole‐slipping) protection protects
Out
Outof
ofStep
StepProtection
Protection
the turbine‐generator units against loss of (Pole Slipping)
(Pole Slipping)
synchronism due to system conditions, which z Causes
Causes
z
– Transmission system power swings due to slow clearance of
cause the machine to fall out‐of‐step with either – Transmission system power swings due to slow clearance of
faults
faults
– Increased transmission system reactance due to tripping of
the system or other generators (locally or – Increased transmission system reactance due to tripping of
feeders
feeders
z Effects
remotely). This is distinct from loss of excitation z Effects
– Voltage and frequency fluctuations
– Voltage and frequency fluctuations
protection, which can also cause loss of – Indiscriminate operation of generator and transmission system
– Indiscriminate operation of generator and transmission system
protection relays
protection relays
synchronism, but which requires faster tripping. – Other generators also fall out of step
– Other generators also fall out of step
– Mechanical damage
– Mechanical damage
z Detection by monitoring transmission system impedance
z Detection by monitoring transmission system impedance
Out‐of‐step conditions can be caused by
network active power swings resulting from the PCPC Melbourne 2012
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• Short circuits that are not disconnected
quickly enough.
• An increase in the system reactance between generating stations due to tripping of transmission
system feeders.
Prolonged Out‐of‐step conditions can have the following effects:
• Cyclic fluctuations in voltage and frequency.
• Operation of various overcurrent and under‐voltage relays indiscriminately.
• May cause other generators to fall out‐of‐step also.
• Mechanical and thermal stresses on the generator and prime mover.
• Overloading of the generator.
The Out‐of‐step relay detects the power swings by an impedance measurement. The measurement
characteristic may be a lens or a circle as shown. In the case of generators, any swing will pass
through the characteristic from the RHS to the LHS. Swing detection is based on the impedance locus
crossing right through the characteristic. That is; entering via the RHS of the characteristic, then
crossing the central axis (blinder) and finally swinging out through the LHS of the characteristic.
With reference to the figures as shown, stage 1
swings affect the generator and require Out
Outof
ofStep
StepProtection
Protection
(Pole Slipping)
(Pole Slipping)
intervention. The generator may be tripped on X
Unstable swing, but not
X
Unstable swing,
specifically butthis
involving not
the first swing, or tripping may be delayed to specifically
particular
May
involving this
generator.
particular
trip on 2generator.
nd or subsequent
Zsystem May trip on 2nd or subsequent

swings.
second or later swings (this requires some form Stage 2
Stage 2
Zsystem swings.
Unstable swing, specifically

Unstablethis
involving swing, specifically
particular
of swing counting logic to be implemented). Stage 1
Stage 1
0.9 x Xtf
0.9 x Xtf involving Trip
generator.
generator.
May
this on
trip on 2nd
particular
Trip
or on
1st swing.
1st swing.
subsequent
May trip
swings on 2nd or subsequent
if coordination with
Since second and subsequent swings get swings if coordination
transmission
transmission
swing
system power
tripping issystem
with
power
required.
swing tripping is required.
progressively faster, these are more difficult to R
R
detect. The shape of the characteristic
-Xd'
-Xd'
therefore must be coordinated with timer
stages to ensure detection of fast swings. PCPC Melbourne 2012
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implemented where some form of transmission system power swing splitting protection is also
implemented. That will split the transmission system at some convenient predetermined point rather

than allowing indiscriminate tripping of generators. With correct coordination, once the transmission
system has been split, the power swings will settle out and tripping of generators may not be
required.
X
Stage 2 swings do not have a significant effect X
Out
Outof
ofStep
StepProtection
Protection Zsystem
on the generator and tripping may not be (Pole
Stage 2 Zsystem
(PoleSlipping)
Stage 2
Slipping) Stage 1
Stage 1
0.9 x Xtf
0.9 x Xtf
warranted. The horizontal blinder separating z Swing entering and leaving from the RHS

Swing
z
will entering and leaving from the RHS
stabilise
R
stages 1 & 2 is selected so that stage 2 detects
R
will stabilise
z Swing entering the RHS but exiting via the LHS
z Swing entering the RHS but exiting via the LHS -Xd'
will not stabilise -Xd'
swings in the general power system and hence will not stabilise

– Stage 1 swing requires tripping of generator
Stage 1 swing requires tripping of generator
–
may initiate an alarm for this condition. – May trip on first or 2ndndswing
– May trip on first or 2 swing
z Requires a swing counting system
zRequires a swing counting system
Alternatively, a stage 2 swing may initially – Stage 2 swing involves other generators
Stage 2 swing involves other generators
–
– May raise alarm only
– May raise alarm only
initiate an alarm, but if the disturbance – May trip on 2ndndor subsequent swings
– May trip on 2 or subsequent swings
z Requires a swing counting system
continues, tripping may be initiated on second z
zRequires a swing counting system
Should be employed in conjunction and coordination with
z Should be employed in conjunction and coordination with
transmission system Power Swing Tripping schemes
or subsequent stage 2 swings. This, again, transmission system Power Swing Tripping schemes
requires swing counter logic.
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The measurement characteristic also may be a
parallelogram which is adjustable in all four Out
Outof
ofStep
StepProtection
Protection
directions. Tripping is initiated when the (Pole Slipping)
(Pole Slipping)
measured network impedance, enters the X
X
Unstable swing, but not
Unstable swing,
specifically butthis
involving not
specifically
particular involving this
generator.
measurement parallelogram on one side and Characteristic A
Characteristic A
particular
May
May
trip on 2generator.
swings. trip
swings.
on
nd or subsequent
2 nd or subsequent
leaves it on the other side. The reactance range ra
ra
Unstable swing, specifically
Unstablethis
involving swing, specifically
particular
involving Trip
generator. this on
particular
1st swing.
as well as the ohmic resistance range are 0.9 x XTr
0.9 x XTr 120
generator.
May
May
trip on 2nd
trip on
Trip
2
or on 1st swing.
subsequent
nd or subsequent
swings if coordination with
120
swings if coordination
transmission system power with
R
transmission
tripping issystem power
adjustable. The parallelogram characteristic has R swing required.
swing tripping is required.
X'd
X'd
the advantage that always the same ohmic rb
rb
resistance value of the swing period is Characteristic B
Characteristic B
measured, independent of the location of the
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available.
Out
Outof
ofStep
StepProtection
Protection
A swing which enters and leaves via the RHS (Pole Slipping)
(Pole Slipping)
only will settle out and does not require tripping X
X Stable swing, but not specifically
Stable swing,
involving but not specifically
this particular generator.
Characteristic A
of the generator. Characteristic A
involving
Tripping notthis particular generator.
required.
Tripping not required.
ra
ra
0.9 x XTr Stable swing, specifically involving

0.9 x XTr Stable
this swing,generator.
particular specifically involving
120 this particular generator.
120 R
R
X'd
X'd
rb
rb
Characteristic B
Characteristic B
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The above discussion is based on generators. In
the case of pumped storage installations, the Out
Outof
ofStep
StepProtection
Protection
(Pump
(Pump StorageSynchronous
Storage SynchronousMotor)
Motor)
directions of the swing are reversed and the
X
protection has to be set accordingly. Therefore, X
Characteristic A
Characteristic A
a swing condition, while operating in the
ra
ra
pumping mode, will pass through the
0.9 x XTr
0.9 x XTr
characteristic in the reverse direction; ie. from 120
120 R
R
the LHS to the RHS. X'd
X'd
rb
rb

Characteristic B
Characteristic B
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REF 'Y'
VOLTAGE PILOT WIRE 'Y'
DISPLACEMENT 'X'
PILOT WIRE 'X'
VOLTAGE
November 2016
DISPLACEMENT 'Y'
SYNCH
GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER
GENERATOR PROTECTION
DIFF 'Y' DIFF 'X'
CB FAIL 'X' CB FAIL 'Y' INST OC 'Y'
NEGATIVE STATOR REVERSE

SEQUENCE 'Y' OVERLOAD 'Y' POWER 'Y'
OUT OF LOSS/UNDER
STEP 'Y' EXCITATION 'Y' DIFF 'X'
BUCH UNIT
AVR
TRANSFORMER
Generator Protection.doc
HIGH IMP BIASED
DIFF 'Y' DIFF 'X' NEF
AVR
IDMT OC
SYNCH UNDER UNDER

FREQUENCY 'X' FREQUENCY 'Y'
OC 'X'
OVER OVER REF 'Y'
VOLTAGE 'X' VOLTAGE 'Y'
EXCITATION OVER OVER
DIFF 'Y' EXCITATION 'X' EXCITATION 'Y'
TRANSFORMER
OUT OF LOSS/UNDER
STEP 'X' EXCITATION 'X'
NEGATIVE STATOR REVERSE
SEQUENCE 'X' OVERLOAD 'X' POWER 'X'
BUS ZONE
SHUNT
ROTOR ROTOR
EF 'X' EF 'Y' STATOR EF 'X'
Moor, B.
35
STATOR EF
INJECTION 'Y'
1.5 S UMMARY
Protection of a generator relates to three types of occurrences:
• Generator Fault: This requires rapid tripping of the generator to minimise the damage caused.
• Generator Event: This is an event local to the generator which will not immediately cause damage
but will eventually do so unless rectified. An alarm is generated to alert the operator of the
condition, followed by tripping as necessary.
• External Event: This is a transmission system event which will not immediately cause damage to
the generator and can be rectified by operator intervention. An alarm is generated to alert the
operator of the condition, followed by tripping as necessary.
1. Generator differential protection is designed to detect high level phase to phase faults within the
generator. The likelihood of such faults occurring is lessened by generator design, busbar design
and earth switch design. Protection schemes include:
– Biased differential
– High impedance differential
Instantaneous tripping is essential for such serious faults within a generator.
The generator transformer is also protected by differential protection and often this may be
combined with the generator protection to produce an overall differential protection scheme.
2. Generators are usually earthed via a high resistance. This limits earth fault currents to perhaps
only a few amps.
High resistance stator earthing may be achieved by a number of methods, including:
– Simple high resistance stator earthing in the neutral‐earth connection.
– Stator neutral point earthing via a distribution transformer with an appropriate resistor
connected on the secondary winding of that transformer.
– Stator earthing via a line connected star / open delta earthing transformer, with appropriate
resistance connected across the secondary system open delta winding.
To limit transient over‐voltages to safe levels, the earthing resistance should be limited to ensure
stray capacitive currents do not exceed neutral earthfault current.
The Stator Earth Fault current should also not be too low, nor the SEF protection set too
sensitive, to ensure HV transmission system faults do not have an excessive unbalancing effect
on the generator system. Note that transformer winding LV‐HV capacitive coupling does result
in some transfer of zero sequence quantities between the generator and transmission systems.
– 90 or 95% stator earth fault protection schemes simply monitor the neutral voltage and trip if
this is more than 5 or 10% of normal line voltage.
– 100% stator earth fault protection schemes use signal injection methods to detect an earth
fault. These schemes are in operation even when the generator is off‐line.
– Restricted earth fault schemes may be applied to solidly earthed generators and are simply a
residually connected high impedance differential scheme.
– Schemes based on the measurement of the normal 3rd harmonic voltage can also be applied
in some circumstances.

Nevertheless, note that even though stator earth faults are usually limited to only a few amps via
the earthing scheme, high speed tripping is necessary to minimise damage to stator laminations
which can be substantial even under such low fault levels.
Because the generator busbar system is usually unearthed, generator transformer voltage
displacement protection is employed to detect earth faults under conditions where the
generator circuit breaker (GCB) is open.
3. Generator transverse protection can be applied in the case of units having multiple windings in
each phase and is used to detect inter‐turn faults within those windings.
Interturn protection may also be achieved via a line connected star / open delta VT, but note
that the VT’s HV star winding neutral point must not be earthed, but instead directly connected
to the generator neutral point, above the high resistance neutral earthing system.
4. The rotor is an un‐earthed DC system and hence a single earth fault is not an immediate
problem. However, a second earth fault would cause high DC fault currents as well as
unbalanced loading on bearings etc. and hence requires immediate tripping. Typical rotor earth
fault protection will initiate an alarm when rotor to earth resistance falls below normal levels
and then trip in the case of a single low resistance rotor earth fault.
5. Generator circuit breaker fail protection typically utilises the standard current check philosophy.
However, since many generator faults and events may only involve small currents, GCB Fail
protection also usually includes a GCB auxiliary contact scheme.
6. Transmission events that threaten the generator require protection, but this should be set to as
long a time delay as possible. Such events will affect several generators and the unnecessary
tripping of these must be avoided. Typical schemes raise an alarm to allow time for operator
intervention, and then only trip the generator(s) when damage is imminent.
7. Stator overcurrent protection is aimed at preventing long term machine overloading. Protection
is usually based on the manufacturer’s adiabatic machine capability equation of:
Const
t=
I2 − 1
Equations such as this do not allow for machine cooling under low level overloads.
Stator overload protection should also include some form of thermal memory to protect a
machine from being repeatedly cycled in and out of an overload state.
8. The generator rotor is not laminated and hence any unbalance in current flow results in
substantial double frequency eddy currents in the rotor. In extreme cases, the resultant heat
can cause softening of slot wedges which will then be extruded by the centrifugal forces and
subsequently impinge on the stator. Negative phase sequence protection typically operates
according to the machine manufacturer’s adiabatic equation of:
Const
t= 2
INPS
Equations such as this do not allow for machine cooling under low level overloads.

Generator NPS protection should also include some form of thermal memory to protect a
machine from being repeatedly cycled in and out of an overload state.
9. Pure over‐voltage events are rare and protection is better aimed at preventing over‐fluxing.
Nevertheless, simple over‐voltage protection is often applied and is set as a final high speed trip
in the case of extreme over‐voltages which may damage insulation. A short time delay of
perhaps 1 to 2 seconds is incorporated to prevent spurious tripping on system transients.
10. Over‐excitation or over‐fluxing of a generator is more likely and usually more serious than simple
over‐voltage events. Relays that measure the generator flux via the V/Hz quotient are employed
in such cases. Several stages of tripping may be employed and the protection may also be
interlocked with GCB status. Tripping is usually time delayed in accordance with manufacturer’s
specifications.
11. Reverse power protection is usually used to actually shut down a generator. This ensures that
the prime mover is really at zero power before separating the generator from the transmission
system. This prevents any possibility of subsequent over‐speeding should, for example, steam
valves not be completely closed.
Reverse power protection will also trip the generator should the prime mover loose power due
to some power station fault. This is especially important in the case of diesel or gas turbine
machines where unburned fuel will pose a significant fire hazard.
12. Under‐excitation of a generator leaves the machine liable to damage and tripping in the event of
disturbances on the power system. Such conditions may arise due to AVR malfunction or due to
excessive reactive power generation elsewhere in the power system. Extreme under‐excitation
is typically due to a total failure of the AVR system and requires fast tripping. Relays which
monitor the impedance of the power system are used to detect these events and tripping may
be staged in the case of more sophisticate relays, or may be instantaneous in the case of simpler
schemes which basically only provide protection against a total loss of excitation.
13. Operation of a steam turbine at heavy load at frequencies other than nominal causes stressing of
the long LP turbine blades. This effect is cumulative and manufacturers provide details of
permissible total lifetime exposure. Protection philosophy is typically based on allowing a small
number of such events (eg. 15) and then to trip on each occasion that threatens to consumes
more than its pro‐rata allowance. Tripping is typically time delayed and multi‐staged.
14. Over‐frequency operation has the same effects on the turbine as under‐frequency operation.
However, over‐frequency or over‐speed operation is usually as a result of massive load rejection
and in such cases is not critical as the turbine degradation occurs under heavy loading and non‐
nominal frequency operation. Also, over‐frequency protection is usually complemented via
some form of over‐speed mechanical device(s).
15. Following a disturbance on the transmission system, large power swings may occur and these
can stress generators as kinetic energy is converted to mechanical energy and vice‐versa.
Impedance style relays monitor the power swings and can be set to alarm or trip according to
the severity of the power swing. Swing counters can also be installed to initiate tripping on
second or subsequent swings in accordance with power system separation philosophies.


1.6 S ELF H ELP E XERCISES
1.6.1 S TATOR E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

A 350 MVA generator operates at a voltage of 20kV (line to line).
The capacitance of each phase to ground is 0.4 μF (this allows for the generator, the phase isolated
bus trunking and the GCB).
The prevention of excessive transient overvoltages dictates that the neutral earth fault current not be
less than the capacitive current flowing to the unfaulted phases.
1. What is the minimum neutral current permissible?
2. The generator is earthed via a transformer and secondary resistor. The neutral earthing
transformer is rated at 20kV/220 volts. What is the maximum resistance permissible to be
connected to the 220V winding to satisfy the current criteria in ‘1’ above?
3. What short time current rating is required for this resistor?
4. Determine the normal (i.e. under healthy conditions, with balanced voltages on all phases)
capacitance current that flows, and compare this with the value of neutral earth fault current, as
previously determined.

A
B
C
STRAY
CAPACITANCES EARTH A
FAULT
GROUNDING
NEUTRAL
I CAPA I CAPB
A-E
N
I CAPTOTAL I CAPA I CAPB B-E B
IN
C

Earthed

With C phase shorted to earth via the fault, A and B phase voltages now shift to normal line‐line
voltage (ie. 20kV) relative to earth. The neutral point also shifts to line‐ground voltage (ie. 20kV/√3)

The capacitance to earth of each phase is given as 0.4μF. Hence, the impedance is
1
Z CAP =
j ⋅ω ⋅ C
1
=
(
j ⋅ 2 ⋅ π ⋅ 50 ⋅ 0.4 ⋅ 10 −6 )
= − j ⋅ 7958 Ω
Now, note that, with C phase faulted, the voltages VAE and VBE are only 60° out of phase.
That is VAE = 20kV / ‐30°
VBE = 20kV / ‐90°

Hence the total capacitive current flowing under this fault condition is given by:
I CAP = I A + I B
VAE V
= + BE
Z CAP Z CAP
20000∠ − 30° 20000∠ − 90°
= +
7958∠ − 90° 7958∠ − 90°
= 2.513∠60° + 2.513∠0°
= 4.353∠30° Amps

The neutral current must not be less than 4.353 Amps.

Since the generator neutral point actually shifts to 20kV/√3 (ie. The normal line to neutral voltage of
11.547 kV), the required resistance in the neutral path is:

11547
RPRI =
4.353
= 2653 Ω

Allowing for the 20kV/220V neutral earthing transformer, the required secondary resistance is:
2
⎡ 220 ⎤
RSEC = 2653 ⋅ ⎢
⎣ 20000 ⎥⎦
= 0.32 Ω


The secondary resistor would be selected slightly below this value to ensure the capacitance current
did not exceed the neutral current.
Select RSEC = 0.30 Ω

Finally, calculate the capacitance current in each phase under normal balanced conditions.

20000
I CAP = 3
7958
= 1451
. Amps

The capacitance current in all three phases will be equal in magnitude, but 120° apart in phase.
Hence, under normal conditions, these sum to zero and no neutral current flows.

However, note that:
3 ⋅ I CAP = 4.353 Amps

This is the same as the fault capacitance current that was calculated above!!
That is, we note that the capacitance current that will flow under bolted fault conditions is equal
to 3 times the magnitude of the single phase capacitance current flowing under normal balanced
conditions.
When commissioning a generator, this fact can be exploited to confirm that the neutral earthing
resistor is correctly sized.


1.6.2 R EVERSE P OWER P ROTECTION

A 120MW generator includes reverse power protection as follows:
Generator 120MW
11kV
Windage losses = 2.5 %
VT 12kV/110V
CT 7000/1
Relay VNOMINAL = 100V
INOMINAL = 1A
PNOMINAL = 100%
Setting Range = 0.5 ‐ 5% of PNOMINAL in 0.1% steps
Determine a suitable setting for the reverse power protection.

Generator 120MW
11kV

Therefore, generator full load current is 120MW/(√3 . 11kV) = 6298 Amps

Allow for the CT ratio to determine secondary current
CT 7000/1
Therefore IFLC = 6298/7000 = 0.900 Amps secondary

Allow for the VT ratio to determine secondary voltage
VT 12kV/110V
At rated voltage of 11kV VSEC = 11kV / (12kV/110) = 100.83 volts

Thus, while the relay is rated at nominal quantities of 100V and 1A, the actual applied quantities
when the generator operates at full load differ slightly from these. Therefore, when operating at
rated output of 120MW, the protection relay will actually determine this to be:

Full Load = 100.83 Volts • 0.900 Amps = 90.7% PRELAY NOMINAL


Now, to determine the reverse power setting. Determine the reverse power, as measured by the
relay, and then allow a margin. Typically, set to 50% of the specified reverse power and thus ensure
definite operation of the relay.

Windage losses = 2.5 %
The relay will determine this as 2.5% x 90.7% = 2.27% • PRELAY NOMINAL
Actual relay setting must be below this level. For definite operation, set to 50%

PSETTING = 50% x 2.27%
= 1.13%

Settings are available in 0.1% steps ..... round down.
Select RELAYSETTING of 1.1%


1.6.3 U NDER F REQUENCY P ROTECTION

With reference to the generator and turbine capability, as shown, underfrequency protection is to be
set on the basis of 15 events over the machine’s lifetime.
Determine suitable time delay settings for under‐frequency stages:
1. Stage 1, 47.5Hz, trip transmission CB’s and island the generator.
4. Stage 4, 46.0Hz, trip GCB for complete machine shutdown.

The generator can withstand operation at or above 47.5Hz for a cumulative time of 100 minutes, or
6000 seconds. Thus, at first glance, and allowing 15 events during the machine lifetime, the 47.5 Hz
setting would seem to require a time delay of 6000/15= 400 seconds.
THIS WOULD BE INCORRECT !!!


Note that with the next setting selected to 47.0Hz, the 47.5Hz setting must provide protection down
to 47.0Hz. For example, suppose the generator were to operate at 47.01Hz. The 47.5Hz setting must
cover this case (the 47.0Hz setting would not operate for a 47.01Hz event). Thus, the 47.5Hz time
delay must be based on the cumulative time permissible at the next setting point of 47.0Hz. Thus
select a time delay for the 47.5Hz setting of 10/15=0.66 minutes = 40 seconds.
In summary, the time delay for each under‐frequency setting will be based on the cumulative
withstand time at the NEXT LOWER chosen setting point.
The last stage covers large disturbances and will be set to trip quickly. A short time delay of
approximately 2 seconds may be suitable to facilitate fast tripping but to ensure stability against
system transients. The last stage trips the generator, while the earlier stages simply island the
generator by tripping transmission system CB’s.
An exception to the above timing policy may be the second last stage. For example, on the basis of
the above policy, stage 3 would be set on the basis of the stage 4 withstand time to 60/15= 4.0
seconds. However, note that it may be preferable to set stage 3 to trip faster than the final stage 4.
This is because stage 3 simply islands the generator, while stage 4 trips it completely.

In summary:

Stage 1 = 40 seconds
Stage 1 covers prolonged system conditions which have caused a slow reduction in frequency and
have not been cleared by load shedding. The time setting is to be related to Stage 2 conditions. A
setting of 40 seconds would thus be appropriate. This stage will island the generator by tripping
transmission system CB’s.

Stage 2 = 10 seconds
Stage 2 covers fault conditions which may cause a rapid reduction in frequency. The time setting is to
be related to Stage 3 conditions. A setting of 10 seconds would thus be appropriate. This stage will
island the generator by tripping transmission system CB’s.

Stage 3 = 2 seconds
Stage 3 covers internal faults within the generator, turbine area and provides quick clearance. The
time setting is to be marginally less than for Stage 4, consistent with stability. A setting of 2.0 seconds
would be appropriate. This stage will island the generator by tripping transmission system CB’s.

Stage 4 = 2.6 seconds
Stage 4 covers internal faults within the generator, turbine area and provides final clearance. The
time setting is to be the marginally more than for Stage 3, consistent with stability. A setting of 2.6
seconds would be appropriate. This stage will trip the generator by tripping the GCB. The 2.6 second
setting here has been based on allowing sufficient margin over the stage 3 setting of 2 seconds.
Allow 10% accuracy on the stage 3 time delay, 10% on the stage 4, 0.1 seconds for CB operation and
0.1 seconds margin. Thus:

Stage 4 time = Stage 3 time • 120% + 0.2 seconds
= 2.0 • 120% + 0.2
= 2.6 seconds

Remember that if stage 3 has tripped the switchyard CB’s (2.0 seconds) and the U/F problem still
exists (requiring tripping of GCB), the load is now very low (unit auxiliaries only) and the slower
tripping will not be a problem.


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GENERATOR

PCPC Melbourne 2012

External Event: This is a transmission system z Generator Fault

1.3 G ENERATOR F AULTS

PCPC Melbourne 2012

1.3.1 D IFFERENTIAL P ROTECTION

windings do not come into close proximity PCPC Melbourne 2012

1.3.1.1 B IASED D IFFERENTIAL P ROTECTION

PCPC Melbourne 2012

PCPC Melbourne 2012

Bias Bias Bias Bias

1.3.1.2 H IGH I MPEDANCE D IFFERENTIAL P ROTECTION

PCPC Melbourne 2012 PCPC Melbourne 2012

PCPC Melbourne 2012

PCPC Melbourne 2012

PCPC Melbourne 2012

1.3.1.3 C ORE B ALANCE D IFFERENTIAL P ROTECTION

PCPC Melbourne 2012

1.3.1.4 G ENERATOR AND T RANSFORMER P ROTECTION

winding delta/star connected transformers and BIAS DIFF

In some installations, rather than providing PCPC Melbourne 2012

1.3.2 V OLTAGE D ISPLACEMENT P ROTECTION

PCPC Melbourne 2012

PCPC Melbourne 2012

open delta secondary voltage from the PCPC Melbourne 2012

1.3.3 S TATOR E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

tends to have a snow‐balling effect with the PCPC Melbourne 2012

PCPC Melbourne 2012

1.3.3.1 95% S TATOR E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

detection of faults in the top 90 or 95% of the PCPC Melbourne 2012

1.3.3.2 100% S TATOR E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

Normally, only a very small capacitance current 100% Stator EF Protection

PCPC Melbourne 2012

an earth fault at any point in the stator winding, PCPC Melbourne 2012

November 2016 Generator Protection.doc 10

less than the total current flowing to the PCPC Melbourne 2012

transformer, theory suggests that for a HV PCPC Melbourne 2012

November 2016 Generator Protection.doc 11

95% Stator Earth Fault protection is based on PCPC Melbourne 2012

z 6 = 3 phases x 2 safety factor

z 0.05 = 5% setting voltage

• UHV is the step‐up transformer HV voltage. earth fault,for

The division by "6" is because only 1/6th of PCPC Melbourne 2012

November 2016 Generator Protection.doc 12

1.3.3.3 R ESTRICTED E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

1.3.3.4 3 RD H ARMONIC E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

November 2016 Generator Protection.doc 13

1.3.3.5 S TATOR EF P ROTECTION FOR P ARALLEL C ONNECTED G ENERATORS

faulted unit. Detection Detection Detection

1.3.3.6 G ENERATOR E ARTHING VIA E ARTHING T RANSFORMER

November 2016 Generator Protection.doc 14

1.3.4 S TATOR I NTER ‐T URN P ROTECTION

section currents are equal. The CT secondary PCPC Melbourne 2012

November 2016 Generator Protection.doc 15

PCPC Melbourne 2012

earthing resistor. With this connection, and PCPC Melbourne 2012

1.3.5 R OTOR E ARTH F AULT P ROTECTION

November 2016 Generator Protection.doc 16

November 2016 Generator Protection.doc 17

1.3.6 G ENERATOR C IRCUIT B REAKER (GCB) F AIL P ROTECTION

mechanism. PCPC Melbourne 2012

November 2016 Generator Protection.doc 18

1.4 G ENERATOR AND / OR T RANSMISSION S YSTEM E VENTS