ATTY. PABLO B. FRANCISCO v.

 COMELEC
G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018
VELASCO JR., J.:
Petition for Disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code

Facts:
Francisco, a registered voter in Cainta Rizal, filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification
against respondent Nieto, a candidate for mayor, alleging that on April 1-2, 2016, respondent made financial
contributions out of the government coffers for the asphalt-paving of the road entrance along Imelda Avenue of
Cainta Green Park Village, which according to petitioner, amounted to the expending of public funds within 45
days before the 2016 polls and to illegal contributions for road repairs, respectively punishable under the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Petitioner further claimed that the said asphalt paving was one of the
accomplishments that respondent reported on his Facebook page.

Nieto countered that the questioned asphalting project was subjected to public bidding on March 15, 2016,
with a Notice of Award issued on March 21, 2016. Thus, the asphalting project falls within the excepted public
works mentioned in Sec. 261(v)(l)(b) of the OEC.

COMELEC Second Division and En Banc concurred with their decision of dismissing the petition and
ruled that a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution. To be sure, in order to disqualify a candidate there must be
a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified is guilty of or
found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.

Issue:
W/N a prior judgment finding the respondent guilty of an election offense should be obtained first for a
petition for disqualification under Sec. 68 of the OEC to prosper.

Held:
No. First, it must be stressed that there is a difference between the remedies availed of in Poe, which the
petitioner relied on heavily, and in the instant case. What is involved herein is a Petition for Disqualification
under Sec. 68 of the OEC, whereas Poe was initiated by multiple Petitions to Deny Due Course or Cancel COC
under Sec. 78 of the OEC.

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared
by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.

The essence of a disqualification proceeding that invokes Sec. 68 of the OEC is to bar an individual from
becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office based not on the candidate's lack of
qualification, but on his possession of a disqualification as declared by a final decision of a competent court, or
as found by the Commission. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the OEC. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction. The doctrine in Poe was never meant to apply to Petitions for Disqualification. A prior court
judgment is not required before the remedy under Sec. 68 of the OEC can prosper.

Furthermore, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is, as in all administrative cases,
substantial evidence. This is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. To impose prior conviction of an election offense as a condition sine
qua non before a Petition for Disqualification can be launched would be tantamount to requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, which is significantly beyond what our laws require.

Nevertheless, the petition must necessarily fail for lack of substantial evidence to establish that
private respondent committed an election offense.
JASPER GONZALEZ*Y DOLENDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 225709, February 14, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Election Offense(Violation of OEC)

Facts:
The prosecution alleged that in the early morning, authorities were informed of the rampant selling of
illegal drugs at a wake, which thus led to the conduct of an anti-illegal drug operation. At about 3:30 a.m.,
police officers proceeded to surveil near the area and they saw a person coming out of an alley about four
meters away, with a fan knife in his right hand. Since there was a ban issued by the COMELEC on the carrying
of deadly weapons at that time, they approached the person and introduced themselves as police officers. The
person, who they later identified as Gonzalez, immediately ran away, prompting the police officers to chase and
eventually, arrested him and seized the knife and the found drugs with him.

In his defense, Gonzalez denied the charges against him and instead, at that time, he was just at their house,
which is near the police’s position. He was about to go to sleep when four male persons arrived and arrested
him. The men then tied his hands with his wife's brassiere, and thereafter, showed him a sachet of shabu and
took the knife that was on top of the table. They then dragged him down from their house, bringing with them
his child, while he shouted for someone to call his mother. Many of his neighbors who heard or were awakened
by his shouts and the crying of his child came out of their houses and saw his arrest. At the ground floor, he was
photographed with the knife placed on the top of a small table. Thereafter, the arresting persons boarded him on
a vehicle. They drove around Ugong for thirty (30) minutes, fetched another police officer at his office at the
third floor of the city hall, and then proceeded to the Manilas Barangay Hall to wait for the barangay kagawad.
When the kagawad arrived, he just signed a paper about the seized evidence. Gonzalez was then brought to
Camp Crame for drug testing, and afterwards to the detention cell at the new city hall.

The RTC found Gonzalez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 261 (q) of the
OEC, holding that all the necessary elements thereof have been proven, namely: (1) Gonzalez was found
holding the fan knife with his right hand; (2) such possession occurred during the prohibited period; and (3) he
was carrying the knife while casually walking in a public place. The RTC gave no credence to Gonzalez'
version of his arrest in light of his positive identification as the culprit, as well as the presumption of regularity
accorded to the police officers in the performance of their duties.

Issue:
W/N Gonzalez' conviction for violation of Section 261 (q) of the OEC, as amended by Section 32 of RA
7166, should be upheld.

Held:
No. Section 261 (p) (q) of the OEC, as amended by Section 32 of RA 7166. Section 261 (p) (q) of the OEC,
as originally worded, provides: The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(p) Deadly weapons. - Any person who carries any deadly weapon in the polling place and within a radius
of one hundred meters thereof during the days and hours fixed by law for the registration of voters in the
polling place, voting, counting of votes, or preparation of the election returns. However, in cases of
affray, turmoil, or disorder, any peace officer or public officer authorized by the Commission to supervise
the election is entitled to carry firearms or any other weapon for the purpose of preserving order and
enforcing the law.

(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. -Any person who, although possessing a
permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the election
period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft
shall not be considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof.

This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing officers while in the performance of their
duties or to persons who by nature of their official duties, profession, business or occupation habitually
carry large sums of money or valuables.

while Section 32 of RA 7166, pertinently reads:

Section 32. Who May Bear Firearms. - During the election period, no person shall bear, carry or
transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places , including any building, street, park,
private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in
writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearms licenses shall be suspended during the election
period.
 In order to secure a conviction of an accused based on these provisions, the prosecution must prove that: (a)
the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; (b) such possession occurs
during the election period; and (c) the weapon is carried in a public place. Notably, it is essential
that possession of the deadly weapon in a public place be established beyond reasonable doubt. The Court
agrees, as the prosecution failed to dispel all reasonable doubts surrounding Gonzalez' arrest. In particular, the
prosecution failed to establish its allegation that, immediately before and at the time of his arrest, Gonzalez
was holding a knife in a public place - the critical elements of the crime of violation of Section 261 (p) (q) of
the OEC, as amended by Section 32 of RA 7166. Records show that aside from the testimony of PO1 Congson,
the prosecution did not present any other evidence that would corroborate his version leading to Gonzalez'
arrest. Gonzalez, on the other hand, presented three witnesses - neighbors who lived below and across his house
where he was arrested and who were there at the time of his arrest. All these witnesses corroborated Gonzalez'
version.

Moreover, while the information and the physical evidence presented before the lower court both revealed a
kitchen knife, PO1 Congson categorically testified that he saw a fan knife. 

In fine, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Gonzalez
committed the crime charged.