I.

Interplay of Individual Rights, Police Power and Due Process/ Equality

A. Review of Police Power
1. Definition and Scope
a. Legal subject
b. Legal Method

Phil Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon

PASEI challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No.1, Series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," for "discrimination
against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is
no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the
law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they
are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class.

US v. Pompeya - G.R. No. 10255. August 6, 1915

The fiscal charges Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo, on the subject of
patrol duty. Pompeya alleged that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional because it is repugnant to
the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens."

The right or power conferred upon the municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of
the state. It has been defined as the power of government, inherent in every sovereign, and cannot be
limited; The power vested in the legislature to make such laws as they shall judge to be for the good of
the state and its subjects. (Commonwealth vs. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.), 53, 85). The power to govern men
and things, extending to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and
the protection of all property within the state. (Thorpe vs. Rutland, etc., Co., 27 Vt:, 140, 149.) The
authority to establish such rules and regulations for the conduct of all persons as may be conducive to
the public interest. (People vs. Budd, 117 N. Y., 1, 14; U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan, supra.)

II. Life, Liberty and Property and Due Process/Equal Protection of the Law

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the law.

1. Liberty; Civil Liberty

Rubi et al v. Provincial Board of Mindoro

In an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro,
petitioners alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.

They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that
due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws. there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

2. Due Process; Requisites

a. Substantive Due Process

Ermita Malate Hotel Association v. City Mayor of Manila - G.R. No. L-24693. July 31, 1967

Petitioners challenged the validity of Ordinance No.4760, for being unconstitutional and void, for being
unreasonable and violative of due process in regulating the operation of motels.

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being
specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely
on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict
and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs."
Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.

Corona v. United Harbor Association of the Phils - G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997

In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92) limiting the term of appointment of
harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) violate respondents' right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law?

In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced,"
while substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law
would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just."

The Supreme Court ruled that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in utter disregard of respondent's right
against deprivation of property without due process of law. The Court held that the provision limiting
the term of appointment of harbor pilots unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their retirement. Renewal of the license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation of
performance which is conducted only after the license has been canceled. Hence, the use of the term
"renewal." It is the "preevaluation" cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable
and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is deprivation of property without due process of law.

Beltran v. Secretary of Health - G.R. No. 133640. November 25, 2005

Prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners commercial bank blood operators, they filed
a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and validity of the Republic Act No. 7719 - National
Blood Services Act, phasing out commercial blood banks.
The court upheld the constitutionality of the questioned law. It held that was based on substantial
distinctions. The former (non profit blood banks) operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a
medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages
voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity. Two, the classification, and the
consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to
provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and
treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. Three, the
Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Lastly, the law applies equally to all
commercial blood banks without exception.

The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a
primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise
of the State's police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.

Lupangco v. CA - G.R. No. 77372. April 29, 1988

Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy filed a complaint
for injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing Resolution No. 105
prohibiting the examinees from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips or the like
three (3) days before the date of examination.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as
to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations.

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and
centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a
full-􀁑edged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be
inef􀁃cient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from
helping out their students. Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee
that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized.

b. Procedural Due Process

Alonte v. Savellano - G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998

Bayani M. Alonte, then incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna and Buenaventura Concepcion were charged
with rape. The victim issued an affidavit of desistance. Petitioners pleaded not guilty when arraigned and
waived pre-trial. The two accused did not present any countervailing evidence, did not take the witness
stand nor admitted the act charged in the information. Thereupon, respondent judge rendered a
decision convicting petitioners of rape.

Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the
court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that
the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.
The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been
the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their
defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; (2) the parties have not been given
the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the
purpose; and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any
modification in the order of trial. There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no
excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and
foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied
even to the most undeserving. This case, in line, must be remanded for further proceedings.

Requisites:

1) Impartial court/ tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear or determine the matter before it

Javier v. Comelec - G.R. Nos. L-68379-81. September 22, 1986

The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only
by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. The case
was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in
cold blood and in broad daylight.

Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier attention by the
respondent Commission on Elections is due process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play
which is the hallmark of the free society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on
the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private respondent, he obstinately insisted on
participating in the case, denying he was biased.

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their
rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will
not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the
justice they expect.

Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan - G.R. Nos. 103501-03. February 17, 1997

Tabuena and Peralta were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having malversed the total amount
of P55 Million of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) funds during their incumbency as
General Manager and Acting Finance Services Manager, respectively, of MIAA.

This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his
mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But
not only should his examination be limited to asking "clarificatory" questions, the right should be
sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible,
neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. Here, these limitations were not observed.
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena
and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate.

Rivera v. Civil Service Commission - G.R. No. 115147. January 4, 1995

Petitioner Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines
("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits of William Lao and Jesus C. Perez, petitioner was charged, on 01
February 1988, by the LBP President with having committed violation of anti graft laws, among others.
Rivera filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the petition, now strongly
asserting that he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier participated in her
capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for
reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion
for reconsideration with the CSC.

Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to
inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full
meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process.

2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property
which is the subject matter of the proceeding

Samartino v. Raon - G.R. No. 131482. July 3, 2002

Respondents, sister and spouse of deceased Bernardo filed an ejectment against petitioner, alleging that
during the lifetime of Bernardo, she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a period of five
years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that
petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor. Summons was served on Roberto
Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service of summons at petitioner's house, he was not at
home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation
Center (NBI-TRC). A liaison officer of the NBITRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that
petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary
period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program. The trial
court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted respondents motion to declare petitioner
in default.

Clearly, the return failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made. It failed to state
that prompt and personal service on the defendant was rendered impossible. It was not shown that
efforts were made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed; hence the resort to
substituted service. As stated above, these requirements are indispensable because substituted service
is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the
defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but
upon another whom law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. For this
reason, failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service
renders said service ineffective.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived
of his property, he should first be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim
is premised.

3) The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan

The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez, a
Tanodbayan, directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against
Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against
Zaldivar.

Due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type
proceeding, that the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence one may have in support' of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.

Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to
heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and
statements justly and according to law.

4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing

c. Administrative Due Process

Ang Tibay v. CIR – G.R. No. 46496. February 27, 1940

Toribio, manager of Ang Tibay dimissed members of respondent union, National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU),
allegedly, to favor National Workers' Brotherhood (NWB), a company or employer union dominated by
himself. Thus, NUL filed a case for unfair labor practices in the Court of Industrial Relations against
Toribio and NWB.

The following are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in administrative proceedings:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must
be "substantial."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
 (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered.

d. Due process in Disciplinary Actions Against Students

Guzman v. National University - G.R. No. L-68288. July 11, 1986

Petitioners students of respondent National University, filed an action to seek relief from what they
describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enroll," for their
participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.

The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears
stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in
student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, contrary to petitioners' view, an
essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands
of procedural due process; and these are, that

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;

(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel,
if desired;

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;

(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and

(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

e. The Res Ipsa Loquitor Doctrine

In re: Atty Laureta - G.R. No. L-68635. May 14, 1987

Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing violated his right to life
and due process of law and by reason thereof the Order is null and void; that the acts of misconduct
imputed to him are without basis.

The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit. What due
process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The word "hearing" does not necessarily
connote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the showcause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29, 1987,
Atty. Laureta was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he should not be
subjected to disciplinary action. His Answer, wherein he prayed that the disciplinary action against him
be dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also given a
like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or the
official actions of the Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the
contempt proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced. Both
were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having authored the letters
written by Ilustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press
copies of the complaint filed before said body, and his having committed acts unworthy of his
profession. But the Court believed otherwise and found that those letters and the charges levelled
against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by themselves, betray not only their malicious and
contemptuous character, but also the lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete
obliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the
cardinal doctrine of independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to have
been said or proven. The necessity to conduct any further evidentiary hearing was obviated.

In Re: Atty. Asoy - A.C. No. 2655. July 9, 1987

Respondent Atty. Patricio A. Asoy as retained counsel of Complainant, Leonard W. Richards, an

Australian, was charged with Malpractice for non-attendance at Court hearings, negligence and lack of
zeal in prosecuting a civil case for damages, resulting in its dismissal for lack of interest and/or failure to
prosecute.

The facts, as disclosed, require no further evidentiary hearing, and speak for themselves. Res ipsa
loquitur. The Orders of the Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. 181-P are of record and Respondent's
excuse that he can no longer recall them is feeble. Respondent's side has been fully heard in the
pleadings he has filed before this Court. A trial-type hearing is not de riqueur. The requirement of due
process has been duly satisfied. What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

f. Due process in rule making by Admin Agencies

Phil Consumers v. Sec of Education - G.R. No. 78385. August 31, 1987

The petitioner opposed the increases in school fees authorized by DECS. Thus, the petitioner, allegedly
on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition,
seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional and
without legal basis.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an

adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the
affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity
of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to
all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character.
Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of
fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so.
The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private
schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of its issuance.

g. Due process in the dismissal of employees

MGG Marine Services v. NLRC - G.R. No. 114313. July 29, 1996

Private respondent was initially employed by the MGG Marine Services, Inc. When the officers left for
abroad, she was instructed to pay the company creditors. However, she paid more than what she was
told to. MGG terminated private respondent's employment for loss of trust and confidence. She then
􀁅led a complaint for illegal dismissal against MGG and its officers.

To constitute a completely valid and faultless dismissal, it is well-settled that the employer must show
not only sufficient ground therefor but it must also prove that it observed procedural due process by
giving the employee two notices: one, of the intention to dismiss, indicating therein his acts or omissions
complained against, and two, notice of the decision to dismiss; and an opportunity to answer and rebut
the charges against him, in between such notices.

The record is devoid of any showing that private respondent was given notice of the charges against her.
Neither was she given a hearing or opportunity to present her defense. The only allegation of petitioners
was that she was asked questions about her withdrawals during the audit. But these are too scant and
too bare to amount to due process. There was no indication of the nature and the type of questions
asked, the process of the supposed inquiry, the time and opportunity given for her defense, and the
degree of explanation allowed her.

Samillano v. NLRC - G.R. No. 117582. December 23, 1996

Petitioner-spouses Conrado and Myrna Samillano were hired by private respondents. Both were
transferred to different posts. As a result of the transfers, the petitioner-spouses filed the complaint for
illegal demotion contending that the transfers resulted in loss of commissions and violated their security
of tenure. Petitioner-spouses filed the complaint for illegal dismissal. Private respondents relied on
allegations that petitioner-spouses misappropriated funds of the radio station and committed acts of
insubordination which resulted in loss of trust and confidence, upon which their dismissals were based.

We uphold the NLRC findings that no formal investigation was conducted prior to dismissal of
petitioners. Private respondents thus failed to adequately comply with the requirement that an
employee should be given the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself before he is dismissed.
"Proper compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing are conditions sine qua non
before a dismissal may be validly effected. . . . Any procedural shortcut, that effectively allows an
employer to assume the roles of both accuser and judge at the same time, should not be
countenanced."
Stolt – Nielsen v. NLRC - G.R. No. 105396. November 19, 1996

SNMSI and private respondent executed a Contract of Shipboard Employment and Crew Agreement
under which the latter, this time, was to serve as an engine fitter on board Stolt Crown Vessel for a
period of ten months. During his employment, he suffered from bronchitis due to exposure to toxic
chemicals, and eventually, he was repatriated to the Philippines. He was terminated which led him to
file with the POEA a complaint for illegal dismissal and contract substitution.

It could not be enough for his dismissal that private respondent was "advised of his infractions and given
the opportunity to explain his side" after he had supposedly "refused to assist in the berthing and
unberthing maneuvers," and that when he refused to clean the cargo tank, the "pertinent portion of the
CBA on mutual assistance was read to him." The procedure was far short of the legal mandate.

"On the issue of due process . . ., the law requires the employer to furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the cause or causes
for termination and shall afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of a representative. Specifically, the employer must furnish the worker with two (2) written
notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) notice which apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (b) the subsequent
notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him."

h. Effect of a Motion for Reconsideration to a claim for violation of

right to due process

Casuela v. Ombudsman - G.R. No. 112354. August 4, 1997

Mary Elaine Bonito filed a complaint against private respondent Jose Valeriano, then an employee of the
POEA. for allegedly receiving P5,000.00 for processing of her papers with the POEA. Bonito withdrew her
complaint against Valeriano because the amount was returned to her. In the decision of POEA, private
respondent was 'declared liable for acts of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.

Private respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner and the other
members of the Administrative Complaint[s] Committee for willful violation of Section 36, Article IX of
the Civil Service Law. Petitioner was consequently found liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties. MR was denied.

Petitioner may not also successfully plead violation of his right to due process because he readily admits
having filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution. This Honorable Court has repeatedly
stressed that the requirements of due process are complied [with] when a party is heard on a motion for
reconsideration.

i. Preliminary Investigation and Due Process

Go V. CA - G.R. No. 101837. February 11, 1992

The police launched a manhunt against the petitioner for being a suspect in a shooting incident.
Petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being
hunted by the police. The prosecutor filed an information for murder against him. At the bottom of the
information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the
accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" of ficers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge."

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 72335-39. March 21, 1988)

After petitioner resigned from his post as Minister of Public Information, Antonio de los Reyes filed a
complaint with the Tanodbayan against the petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices in the
conduct of his office. The Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. Later, an information for the same acts were
filed with Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process"
and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation
and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the alleged
commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the
informations.

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by
the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental
law.

3. The equal protection clause

People v. Cayat - G.R. No. 45987. May 5, 1939

Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet,
Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos
(P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The act makes it unlawful for a member of a
non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or
intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the socalled native wines and liquors which the members of
such tribes have been accustomed themselves.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Marcos v. CA - G.R. No. 126594. September 5, 1997

Nearly six years after the 1986 EDSA Revolution which toppled the Marcos regime, petitioner was
charged with violations of Sections 4 and 10 of CB Circular 960 before the RTC of Manila for allegedly
opening and maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the CB or
otherwise allowed by CB regulations, and for allegedly failing to submit a report of the foreign exchange
earnings from abroad and/or to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the CB within the
period mandated by Section 10 of CB Circular No. 960.

Petitioner's argument that the saving clauses are not germane to the purposes of the Central Bank Act,
and consequently ultra vires, has been roundly confuted by respondent Court of Appeals. If, as she
claims, one of the objectives of that law is to stabilize the monetary system, that is precisely, why
Congress punished as criminal offenses the violations of the issuances of the Monetary Board necessary
for the effective discharge of its responsibilities, and to carry out which the Board deemed it necessary
to provide for the challenged saving clauses. Obviously, these saving clauses were dictated by the need
to continue the prosecution of those who had already committed acts of monetary destabilization. The
opposite view posited by petitioner would result in an absurdity.

Her lamentations that the aforementioned provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at her
and her co-accused do not assume the dignity of a legal argument since they are unwarranted
conjectures belied by even the text of the circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate court
correctly concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioner's claim that her constitutional right to
equal protection of the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such objection, she
may always adduce additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper state therefor,
and not at their present posture.

Lacson v. Sandiganbayan - G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999

Petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) informations for murder
in the alleged a summary execution of the kuratong baleleng gang members. All the accused filed
separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner questions the
constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 (defining the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan), including
Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof."

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements.
Nunez v. Sandiganbayan- G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617. January 30, 1982

Petitioner, accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents, assailed the validity of Pres. Decree No. 1486, as amended by P.D. 1606 creating this special
court on the ground that its creation is violative of the due process, equal protection and ex post facto
clauses of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause has not been violated either despite the limitation in the accused's right to
appeal as the classification satisfies the test of substantial distinctions, germane to the purposes of the
law, the Sandiganbayan having been specially created in response to the problem of dishonesty in the
public service.